EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 140557-58. December 5, 2001.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . EDGARDO

HERRERA , accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant Edgardo Herrera was convicted by the trial court of one count of
murder and one count of homicide. The trial court imposed the death penalty on the crime
of murder. On automatic review before the Court, appellant professed his innocence and
alleged that the trial court erred in nding him guilty of the crime of murder and homicide
and in disregarding his testimony that he acted only in self-defense. He further alleged that
assuming that he is guilty, the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance
of treachery and the aggravating circumstance that he took advantage of his position as a
police officer.
The Supreme Court a rmed appellant's conviction for the crime of murder and
homicide. His claim of self-defense was negated by the nature and number of the gunshot
wounds in icted on the victim. The victim suffered six (6) gunshot wounds on the head,
shoulder, right arm, right hand, and right thigh. The Court found no reason why appellant
had to pump several bullets on the head, shoulder, arm and thigh of the victim if he shot
the latter just to defend himself. The Court also ruled that treachery is evident when the
appellant suddenly positioned himself at the back of the unsuspecting victim, pointed his
gun at him and, without any warning, promptly delivered the fatal shots. The victim was
unaware of the attempt on his life and the danger that lurked behind him. There was no
way the victim could have defended himself, taken ight or avoided the assault. The Court,
however, ruled that the trial court improperly applied the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of public position pursuant to Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code in imposing the death penalty on appellant for the killing of the victim.
Appellant did not take advantage of his being a policeman to shoot the victim or that he
used his "in uence, prestige or ascendancy" in killing the victim because he could have
shot the victim even without being a policeman. The mere fact that appellant is a
policeman and used his government issued .38 caliber revolver to kill the victim is not
su cient to establish that he misused his public position in the commission of the crime.
Furthermore, since the information failed to allege the said aggravating circumstance, the
same cannot be appreciated against appellant. The Court modi ed the decision of the trial
court by imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of the death penalty, with
regard to the murder conviction.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE; TESTIMONY

OF ACCUSED SUPPORTING PLEA UNCORROBORATED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND
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 EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL; REJECTED IN CASE AT BAR. — Accused-appellant's allegation of
self-defense was established solely by his testimony. He failed to corroborate his claim of
self-preservation with evidence other than his own testimony. In this connection, it has
been held that the plea of self-defense cannot be justi ably entertained where it is not only
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is also extremely doubtful in
itself. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant's tale is too riddled with loopholes to be
believed. The Court has consistently held that to be credible, testimonial evidence should
not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but it should also be credible,
reasonable and in accord with human experience. Verily — . . . It is a well-settled rule that
testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must foremost be credible in itself. The test to determine the value or
credibility of testimony of a witness is whether or not such is in conformity with common
knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT PROSPER ABSENT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR UNLAWFUL AND
UNPROVOKED ATTACK BY VICTIM. — Even were the Court to accept accused-appellant's
claim of self-defense at its face value, his pretensions at self-preservation do not inspire
belief. As the Court pointed out in People v. Gadia : "Where an accused invokes self-
defense, the burden is shifted to him to prove that he killed the victim to save his life. For
this reason he must rely on his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence for
the prosecution, for such can no longer be disbelieved after the accused admits the killing.
He must prove the presence of all the requisites of self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; (3) lack of su cient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. Of these requisites, the most decisive is that the victim was guilty of unlawful
aggression. This is because the theory of self-defense is based on the necessity on the
part of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the aggression. Hence, absent
evidence of prior unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim, the claim of self-defense
cannot prosper."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; VICTIM'S INITIAL REACTION HARDLY AMOUNTS TO UNLAWFUL
AGGRESSION AS CONTEMPLATED BY LAW. — Although it is a cardinal principle in criminal
law that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused, the rule is
reversed where the accused admits committing the crime, but only in defense of one's
self. In interposing self-defense, accused-appellant admits authorship of the killing and the
burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that the killing was justi ed. Going by
accused-appellant's account in this case, Ganan's initial reaction hardly amounts to
unlawful aggression as contemplated by law. According to him, the victim tried to grab his
gun which was still tucked in his waist but accused-appellant beat Ganan to it by pulling
the revolver out. With the rearm already in accused-appellant's hand, there was no chance
for the victim to use it against him. Furthermore, taking into consideration accused-
appellant's background and training as a policeman as well as his bigger build than the
victim, not to mention the fact that the latter was seated when the altercation started, it
was the victim and not accused-appellant who was, in fact, in a disadvantageous position.
In other words, there was no imminent and real threat to the life or limb of accused-
appellant under said circumstances. There was thus no justi cation for accused-appellant
to re at the victim. Assuming arguendo that the scenario described by accused-appellant
above actually took place, it will not extricate him from his predicament.cTDECH

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PHYSICAL EVIDENCE NEGATES SELF-DEFENSE. — The physical

evidence, namely the multiple gunshot wounds sustained by Enrique Ganan, belie accused-
appellant's testimony that he hit the victim only once. Indeed, the sheer number of wounds
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 alone totally negates accused-appellant's pretensions at self-defense and, in fact,
indicates a determined effort on his part to kill and not just defend himself. Intent to kill
may be deduced from the nature of the wound in icted and the kind of weapon used. In
this case, accused-appellant was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. While the victim
sustained only one head wound, its location and the distance from which it was red
con rms the prosecution's account that Ganan was shot from behind above the back of
his right ear at point blank range.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FLIGHT; AN INDICATION OF GUILT. —
Immediately after the incident, accused-appellant ed to Batangas and hid there for one
and a half (1 1/2) months. Flight strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the existence
of a guilty conscience. Indeed, ight is an implied admission of guilt and accused-
appellant's act of eeing to Batangas after shooting the victims cannot but betray his guilt
and his desire to evade responsibility therefor. Certainly, a righteous individual will not
cower in fear and unabashedly admit the killing at the earliest possible opportunity if he
were morally justi ed in doing so. If the accused-appellant honestly believed that his acts
constituted self-defense against the unlawful aggression of the victim, he should have
reported the incident to the police instead of escaping and avoiding the authorities.
6. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; EVIDENT WHEN ACCUSED
SUDDENLY POSITIONED HIMSELF AT THE BACK OF THE UNSUSPECTING VICTIM,
POINTED HIS GUN AT HIM, AND DELIVERED THE FATAL SHOTS; CASE AT BAR. — Given
the prevailing facts of the case, the Court agrees with the trial court that the killing of
Enrique Ganan was attended by alevosia. "There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The qualifying
circumstance of treachery attended the killing as the two conditions for the same are
present, i.e. (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or
form of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected
attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim."
In the case at bar, Enrique Ganan was in the comforts of his home, eating shballs while
cuddling his youngest daughter and was engaged in conversation with some visitors when
he was shot in the head from behind by the gunman. As in the recent case of People v.
Padilla, treachery is evident when the accused-appellant suddenly positioned himself at the
back of the unsuspecting victim, pointed his gun at him and, without any warning, promptly
delivered the fatal shots. The victim was unaware of the attempt on his life and the danger
that lurked behind him. There was no way the victim could have defended himself, taken
flight or avoided the assault. The attendance of treachery qualifies the killing to Murder.
7. ID.; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; INCURRED NOTWITHSTANDING THE MISTAKE IN
THE IDENTITY OF THE VICTIM, CASE AT BAR. — Be that as it may, the sad fact remains
that for bring at the wrong place at the wrong time, Corazon's life came to an abrupt end.
On that fateful evening while she was chatting with a friend, her young life was cut short by
a stray bullet red from accused-appellant's gun. While it may not have been the intention
of accused-appellant to shoot her, this fact will not exculpate him because, as we pointed
out in People v. Hilario , "The fact that accused killed a person other than their intended
victim is of no moment. According to Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from
that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or
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 intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, el que es causa de la
causa es causa del mal causado, or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused. The accused performed voluntary acts. The purpose was to kill. Hence,
notwithstanding the mistake in the identity of the victim, the accused is still criminally
liable."
8. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; THAT ADVANTAGE BE TAKEN BY THE
OFFENDER OF HIS PUBLIC POSITION; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The Court,
however, agrees with the Solicitor General that the trial court improperly applied the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position pursuant to Article 14,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code in imposing the death penalty on accused-
appellant for the killing of Enrique Ganan. To appreciate this aggravating circumstance, the
public o cer must use the in uence, prestige or ascendancy which his o ce gives him as
a means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the
inquiry "Did the accused abuse his o ce to commit the crime?" In the case at bar, there
was no showing that accused-appellant took advantage of his being a policeman to shoot
Ganan or that he used his "in uence, prestige or ascendancy" in killing the victim. Accused-
appellant could have shot Ganan even without being a policeman. In other words, if the
accused could have perpetrated the crime even without occupying his position, there is no
abuse of public position. The mere fact that accused-appellant is a policeman and used his
government issued .38 caliber revolver to kill Ganan is not su cient to establish that he
misused his public position in the commission of the crime. Furthermore, since the
information failed to allege this aggravating circumstance, the same cannot be
appreciated against accused-appellant. A generic aggravating circumstance must be
alleged in the information if its appreciation would result in raising the penalty from
reclusion perpetua to death.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p

On May 29, 1996 at around 6:30 p.m., Enrique Ganan was sitting on a steel chair at
his home eating shballs while cuddling his youngest child. He was engaged in a
conversation with Ma. Rizza Aguilar and his brother Edwin. His wife, Mariel was situated a
few meters away. At the same time, Corazon Cajipo was chatting with a friend about ten
(10) meters away. The calm evening air was shattered when someone armed with a .38
caliber revolver suddenly approached Enrique from behind and red at close range.
Although wounded, Enrique managed to pass his child to his brother in the ensuing uproar
and attempted to crawl to safety. His attacker, however, followed and pumped more
bullets into him. After ring the sixth shot, the assailant casually walked away. When the
smoke cleared, Enrique Ganan and Corazon Cajipo, who caught a slug in her temple, lay
bloodied and fatally wounded.
For the killing of Enrique, accused Edgardo Herrera was charged with Murder in an
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-9225, whose accusatory portion alleges:
That on or about the 29th day of May 1996, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, EDGARDO C. HERRERA a lia s "JUN", did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and quali ed with treachery shoot
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 one ENRIQUE GANAN Y DURA with a .38 caliber revolver on the vital parts of the
body which caused his instantaneous death.
Contrary to law. 1

For Corazon's death, Herrera was indicted for Homicide in an Information, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 96-9226, alleging —
That on or about the 29th day of May 1996, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused EDGARDO C. HERRERA alias "JUN", with deliberate intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one ENRIQUE GANA y DURA
with a .38 caliber revolver and as a consequence of which hit one CORAZON
CAJIPO y FULGENCIO causing upon the latter a mortal wound which caused her
instantaneous death.
Contrary to law. 2

Upon arraignment on November 7, 1996, accused entered a plea of "Not Guilty" to

the crimes charged. 3 The cases were consolidated 4 and tried jointly.
Subsequently, the court a quo rendered judgment against accused, nding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the aforementioned cases as
follows;
(1) In Criminal Case No. 96-9225, the Court nds the herein accused
EDGARDO HERRERA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER, de ned and
penalized in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, and in view of the presence of qualifying circumstances of Treachery
(Article 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code) and also the aggravating circumstance
of taking advantage by the accused of his public position, (Article 14, par. 1,
Revised Penal Code), the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH; and

(2) In Criminal Case No. 96-9226, the Court nds herein accused
EDGARDO HERRERA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE de ned and
penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of the presence of
the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his public o ce (Article 14,
par. 1, Revised Penal Code) and there being no mitigating circumstance to offset
it, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer an Indeterminate Penalty ranging
from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as Minimum to Seventeen
(17) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as
Maximum.

Accused is further ordered to pay the legal heirs of Enrique Ganan the
amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death and P50,000.00 for moral and
exemplary damages. aSEDHC

Likewise, accused is ordered to pay the heirs of Corazon Cajipo the amount
of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death, P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages and the additional sum of P25,000.00 as actual damages for funeral
and burial expenses.

Costs against herein accused in both cases.

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 SO ORDERED. 5

On automatic review before this Court, accused professes his innocence, alleging
that —
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
EDGARDO HERRERA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER AND HOMICIDE AND IN DISREGARDING HIS TESTIMONY THAT HE
ACTED ONLY IN SELF-DEFENSE.

II

ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS

GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
III
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE THAT ACCUSED TOOK ADVANTAGE OF HIS POSITION AS
POLICE OFFICER.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General recommends that the penalty of Death be
reduced to Reclusion Perpetua in Criminal Case No. 96-9225; and that the maximum
penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 96-9226, be within the medium period of Reclusion
Temporal.
The prosecution's version of the incident is summed thus in the People's brief:
On May 29, 1996, around 6:30 p.m., Enrique Ganan was sitting on a steel
chair at the compound premises of his home at 2218 Cinco de Junio Street,
Pasay City, 6 near the corner of Propetario Street eating shballs and cuddling his
youngest daughter while engaged in a conversation with Ma. Rizza Aguilar. 7 His
wife, Mariel Ganan, was about 1 1/2 to 2 meters away from him. A neighbor,
Corazon Cajipo, was chatting with Elena Sobrevilla and other neighbors while
resting her chin on the fence at a distance of more or less 10 meters away from
where Enrique Ganan was seated. 8
Appellant emerged from Propetario Street behind Enrique Ganan and
positioning himself at his right side, placed his left hand on Ganan's right
shoulder and uttered: "Saan si Pareng Yayi" (referring to deceased Enrique Ganan)
while his right hand pointed a gun at Enrique Ganan. He immediately red it at
close range hitting Ganan at the right side of his neck near his head. 9 Commotion
ensued. Immediately after the rst shot was red, Enrique Ganan, although
wounded, stood up and passed the child he was cuddling to his brother. Appellant
shot him again. 1 0 At that instance, witness Ma. Rizza Aguilar took her daughter
and Ganan's eldest daughter and ran for safety. Witness Ma. Elena Sobrevilla
took Ganan's other child who was then running to her father. After the second
shot Ganan was already sprawled on the ground but still tried to escape by
crawling on the cement oor towards the direction of his house. Appellant still
pursued him and red several more shots hitting Ganan in different parts of the
body. After the sixth shot, accused casually walked away from the crime scene.
Elena Sobrevilla heard that a stray bullet hit somebody. When she turned her gaze
to Cajipo, she found her lying on the ground with the left side of her head
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 drenched in blood. Two bodies were found lying in the premises — that of
Corazon Cajipo with a bloodied head and that of Enrique Ganan with several
gunshot wounds. It was only then that Ganan's wife, Mariel, who was
dumbfounded by the whole shooting incident, found the nerve to run to her
husband and embrace him. She still found him breathing. Neighbors arrived and
brought Enrique Ganan to the Manila Sanitarium Hospital but he was pronounced
dead on arrival. 1 1
The body of Enrique Ganan and Corazon Cajipo were brought to the
Veronica Memorial Chapel, Pasay City for autopsy as shown by the Requests for
Autopsy. 1 2 The autopsy on the cadavers of Enrique Ganan and Corazon Cajipo
were conducted by Dr. Ludovico J. Lagat, Medico Legal O cer of the NBI on May
29, 1996. . . .

In the rst assigned error, accused-appellant admits having killed the victim but
asserts that he did so in self-defense. To bolster his cause, accused-appellant contends
that all the elements of self-defense are present in this case. First, he claims that there was
unlawful aggression because the victim allegedly tried to grab his gun when he asked the
latter what really happened during the birthday of Rene Carrasco. Second, he points out
that in anticipation of the imminent danger posed when the victim allegedly tried to go for
accused-appellant's gun, he had to use "reasonable means most immediate to the person
being unlawfully attacked and resist such force without much contemplation of the means
of the method to be used." 1 3 Thus, according to him, his act of shooting the hand of the
victim to stop the latter from reaching for his gun "is nothing but proof of spontaneous
re exes of self-preservation and should not be taken against him." 1 4 Third, he insists that
he did not provoke the victim because he was merely asking him what really transpired
during the birthday celebration of Rene Carrasco where he lost consciousness. He wanted
to know whether it was true that the victim and his cohorts kicked him and urinated on him
while he was unconscious.
I n People v. Cabansay , 1 5 we reiterated the rule that self-defense, "[a]s a justifying
circumstance shifts the prosecutorial burden of proving the guilt of the accused to the
accused himself who must prove the elements of such defense, to wit: 1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; 2.) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and 3.) lack of su cient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. 1 6 It is incumbent upon the accused to rely on the strength of his own
evidence which must be clear, su cient and convincing, and not on the weakness of the
evidence for the prosecution." 1 7
A circumspect scrutiny of accused-appellant's version of what happened, however,
leaves the Court unconvinced that he killed Enrique Ganan in self-defense.
According to accused-appellant, two (2) days prior to the incident or on May 27,
1996 at about 5:30 p.m. while he was cooling himself outside his house, the victim and one
Tito approached him and invited him to attend in the birthday celebration of Rene Carrasco
alias Tokwa . 1 8 The celebration was held at the house of the victim. 1 9 Upon his arrival,
accused-appellant greeted the celebrant and shook his hand. 2 0 He likewise shook the
hand of Enrique Ganan, who was his kumpadre, he being the godfather of one of the
latter's children. 2 1 Accused-appellant was then handed a bottle of beer which he took to
one side and drank sparingly inasmuch as he planned not to stay long because he was
then recuperating from injuries he sustained when his car collided with a jeep. 2 2
When the bottle of beer was almost consumed, he asked permission to leave from
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 the celebrant and Enrique, but he was handed another beer by the victim and was prevailed
upon to remain and to join the others seated at the table. 2 3 He, however, informed Rene
Carrasco and Enrique that the second beer would be his last and he would be leaving after
that because he was still recovering from the vehicular mishap. 2 4 After consuming the
second bottle, he stood up and bade leave of the people present, however, after doing so
he passed out. 2 5 He was brought home by one Edmund Del Mundo and a certain Bong 2 6
where he regained consciousness. 2 7
Suspecting that his drink was drugged, accused-appellant induced himself to vomit
by inserting a finger in his throat. 2 8 After vomiting, he again lost consciousness and awoke
at around 10:00 a.m. the next morning. 2 9 He was told by his wife that the two (2) men who
brought him home left his service rearm which, upon examination, he discovered to have
only one bullet left as the rest were already red. 3 0 After examining his revolver, his
attention was called by his wife who told him that her cousin Gigi Cajipo, mother of
Corazon Cajipo, wanted to talk to him. 3 1 Gigi then informed him that when he passed out,
Enrique Ganan and the other people present during the birthday celebration red his
handgun and made fun of him by kicking him and urinating on him. 3 2
Skeptical at rst that his kumpadre would humiliate him thus, accused-appellant
then decided to confront the victim about what really transpired during the drinking
session. 3 3 He then instructed a boy named Gardo to check if the victim was at home, 3 4
and upon being informed by the latter that Ganan was already in his house, accused-
appellant reloaded his revolver and walked over to the victim's place. 3 5 He came upon
Ganan sitting on a white chair talking to several people. 3 6 What happened thereafter is
narrated by accused-appellant, to wit:
ATTY. POLLO
Q In what manner did you greet the deceased Ganan?

A I greeted him good afternoon Pare, something bad might have happened
during the birthday celebration of Rene Carrasco and its quite shameful.
Q And what did he do after you greeted him?

A I rst asked Yaye what really transpired because I lost consciousness

during that time.

Q What in the first place was your purpose in talking with Ganan?
A To know the whole truth of what really transpired when I lost
consciousness and if they really kick[ed] and urinated [on] me and did
something "pambababoy sa akin" and if its true we might as well forget
each other as kumpare and return its (sic) other's candle and that if it's true
also I'd rather leave that place and live in another place.
Q When you asked Ganan with that question, what did he do?
A He did not answer but instead, he grabbed my gun.
Q Where is your gun located that time?

A It was tucked at the right side of my waist and I was wearing a fatigue
jacket.

Q Was he able to grab the gun?

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 A Yes, he was able to hold the muzzle of the gun.
COURT
Q According to you it was tucked, meaning the muzzle of the gun is inside
your waist? What was showing is the handle of the gun?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q How was he able to grab the gun?

A He was able to grab my gun but I pulled it out.
COURT
Q So he was not able to grab your gun you pulled it out?
A Yes Your Honor.
Continue.
ATTY. POLLO
Q So after pulling out your gun what happened Mr. Witness?
A I was able to fire twice and my target was his hand.
COURT

Q He is unarmed why did you shoot him?

A Because he was trying to grab the gun from me.
Continue.
ATTY. POLLO

Q So after firing your gun twice do you know if he was hit?

A I do not know if he was hit.
Q And after those two shots what did the victim Ganan do?
A He was already standing by then and trying to reach up for my gun which
at that time I was already raising my gun with my right hand pointed up.
COURT
Q According to you you were already standing is it the understanding of the
Court that when he allegedly tried to grab your gun he was just seated on
that chair?
A Yes Your Honor, he was still sitting but trying to stand up.
Continue.
ATTY. POLLO

Q By the way, who is taller between you, you or Ganan?

A I'm taller than him sir.

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 Q What is your height?
A Five six and a half sir.
ATTY. POLLO
Q How about Ganan?

A I think he is about five two sir.

Q So what did you do when the victim was trying to reach your gun or grab
the same?
A I just raised my hand with my gun and he is still trying to take possession
of it.

Q And what happened?

A Suddenly somebody pushed Yaye from behind and Yaye was able to pull
my right hand downward.
Q And after the victim was able to pull down your hand what happened?
A With the push from behind Yaye, he fell on his knees, his hands was ( sic)
still holding on to my right hand a gunshot came from the place where I
was facing.
COURT
Q Are you trying to tell this Court that somebody shoot (sic) you when you
were thrusting allegedly with Ganan?
A Yes Your Honor.
ATTY. POLLO
Q So what did you do when you heard that shot.

A I look[ed] at the place where the gunshot came and I saw nobody.
Q How about Yaye what happened to Yaye?
A He was still on his knees pulling my right hand and I still red another shot
aimed at his arm sir, to let go of my hand.
COURT
Q So you shot him again?
A Yes Your Honor.
ATTY. POLLO
Q And what happened after that?
A I heard another shot coming from the same place where I rst heard a
gunshot.
COURT
Q What did you do when you heard another gunshot in that direction where
the alleged first gunshot was fired?
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 A I was able to free my hand from the hands of Yaye and raised my hand
with my gun and look[ed] where the gunshot came from, I did not make
any step.
ATTY. POLLO
Q So what else transpired after this?

A I saw Ganan pull up his shirt and looking at my face tried to pull a gun
tucked in his waist.

Q You saw the gun?

A I just saw the handle because at first I did [not] notice that it was tucked in.
Q At that time you saw Enrique Ganan pulling out his gun how many shots
were then fired at him?
A Three Your Honor.
ATTY. POLLO
Q So when you saw him trying to pull his gun what did you do?

A I aimed my gun towards his hand which was then pulling his gun at his
stomach.

COURT
Q According to you the gun was tucked, how many times did you re at him
again this time?

A Another shot Your Honor.

Q So that is the fourth shot?

A Yes Your Honor.

Q All the four shots fired did it hit the deceased Ganan?
A Only the fourth one Your Honor.

Q How about the one you said you fired at his shoulder?
A I am not sure if it hit him Your Honor.

ATTY. POLLO

Q And the fourth shot where did it hit Ganan?

A He was hit in the head.

COURT
Q You were aiming at his hand but you hit him in the head?

A Well, it happened so fast while my gun was aimed at his hand, he suddenly
stoop[ed] and [I] hit his head instead while I was looking at the direction
where the gunshots are coming from.
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 ATTY. POLLO

Q So after firing the fourth shot what happened?

A I look[ed] around to see if there were people hit.

Q And what did you see?

A I saw nobody hit.

Q So what did you do next after seeing that there were no other persons hit?

A I saw Ganan sprawled on the ground and I did not have a chance to bring
him to the hospital because there was somebody shooting at me.
Q So what did you do?

A I left the scene. 3 7

The foregoing narration of accused-appellant detailing the manner by which he

supposedly defended himself from the assault of the victim is incredible.
First, accused-appellant claims that Ganan grabbed the muzzle of his gun only to
turn around when he admitted that the gun was tucked in his waist and he pulled it out so
the victim was not able to grab it. These contradictory accounts alone on how accused-
appellant drew his gun seriously undermines his claim of self-defense.
Second, it is inconceivable how he could have aimed the weapon at Ganan's hand
and then re it when they were supposedly grappling for possession of the gun most of
the time. The sequence described by accused-appellant where he held his revolver up in
the air with his extended right hand and then red a third shot at the victim before he
resumed the same position particularly strains the credulity of the Court.
Third, going by accused-appellant's account, it simply goes against the grain of
human experience for both accused-appellant and the victim who were supposedly
grappling for possession of the revolver not to be momentarily startled by not only one but
two gunshots coming from another rearm. It is also highly unusual that Ganan would
want to grab possession of the accused-appellant's handgun while the said gun was
pointed at both of them.
Fourth, it is likewise unusual for accused-appellant, allegedly distracted by gun re
from an unidenti ed assailant and whose eyes are supposed to be focused towards the
gunman, to have red at point-blank range and to hit the victim at the back of the head had
not the latter, for some arcane reason, stooped down as if to deliberately meet the
oncoming bullet's trajectory.
Fifth, it is equally odd that while accused-appellant claims that he was red upon,
neither he nor the eyewitnesses to the incident was able to identify the supposed gunman,
considering that it is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to look at
the faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. 3 8
Most often, the face of the attacker, and his body movements create lasting impressions
which cannot be easily erased from their memory. 3 9 Curiously too, neither were any slugs
or spent shells from the alleged assailant's firearm recovered from the crime scene.
Sixth, accused-appellant mentions seeing a gun tucked in the waist of Ganan which
the latter allegedly tried to pull out when he raised his shirt. However, other than accused-
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 appellant's bare allegation that he saw the rearm tucked in the victim's waist, there is no
other evidence on record to show that the alleged gun of the victim ever existed.
Seventh, the nature and number of the gunshot wounds negates accused-appellant's
claim of self-defense. The victim suffered six (6) gunshot wounds on the head, shoulder,
right arm, right hand, and right thigh. If accused-appellant shot the victim just to defend
himself, it certainly de es reason why he had to pump several bullets on the head,
shoulder, arm and thigh of the latter. What is more damning, Dr. Ludovino Lagat, the
Medico Legal Officer who performed the autopsy on the victim testified that the most fatal
wound located on the head, was in icted not more than half an inch from behind, 4 0 or at
point-blank range. It has been held in this regard that the location and presence of several
wounds on the body of the victim is physical evidence that eloquently refutes accused-
appellant's allegation of self-defense. 4 1
Eighth, the calm and composed demeanor of accused-appellant in the face of an
outrage committed on his person is not the normal behavior of someone who has just
suffered the embarrassment of being urinated upon and kicked around in public when he
confronted the alleged perpetrator of such an offensive affront on his dignity.
Ninth, accused-appellant's allegation of self-defense was established solely by his
testimony. He failed to corroborate his claim of self-preservation with evidence other than
his own testimony. In this connection, it has been held that the plea of self-defense cannot
be justi ably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent
evidence but is also extremely doubtful in itself. 4 2
Succinctly stated, accused-appellant's tale is too riddled with loopholes to be
believed. The Court has consistently held that to be credible, testimonial evidence should
not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but it should also be credible,
reasonable and in accord with human experience. 4 3 Verily —
. . . It is a well-settled rule that testimonial evidence to be believed must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible
in itself. 4 4 The test to determine the value or credibility of testimony of a witness
is whether or not such is in conformity with common knowledge and consistent
with the experience of mankind.

Even were the Court to accept accused-appellant's claim of self-defense at its face
value, his pretensions at self-preservation do not inspire belief.
As the Court pointed out in People v. Gadia : 4 5 "Where an accused invokes self-
defense, the burden is shifted to him to prove that he killed the victim to save his life. For
this reason he must rely on his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence for
the prosecution, 4 6 for such can no longer be disbelieved after the accused admits the
killing. 4 7 He must prove the presence of all the requisites of self-defense, namely: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; (3) lack of su cient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. 4 8 Of these requisites, the most decisive is that the victim was guilty of
unlawful aggression. This is because the theory of self-defense is based on the necessity
on the part of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the aggression. 4 9 Hence,
absent evidence of prior unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim, the claim of self-
defense cannot prosper." 5 0
Although it is a cardinal principle in criminal law that the prosecution has the burden
of proving the guilt of the accused, the rule is reversed where the accused admits
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 committing the crime, but only in defense of one's self. 5 1 In interposing self-defense,
accused-appellant admits authorship of the killing and the burden of proof is shifted to
him to establish that the killing was justi ed. 5 2 Going by accused-appellant's account in
this case, Ganan's initial reaction hardly amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated
by law. According to him, the victim tried to grab his gun which was still tucked in his waist
but accused-appellant beat Ganan to it by pulling the revolver out. With the rearm already
in accused-appellant's hand, there was no chance for the victim to use it against him.
Furthermore, taking into consideration accused-appellant's background and training
as a policeman as well as his bigger build than the victim, not to mention the fact that the
latter was seated when the altercation started, it was the victim and not accused-appellant
who was, in fact, in a disadvantageous position. In other words, there was no imminent and
real threat to the life or limb of accused-appellant under said circumstances. There was
thus no justi cation for accused-appellant to re at the victim. Assuming arguendo that
the scenario described by accused-appellant above actually took place, it will not extricate
him from his predicament. In People v. Riduca , 5 3 the Court rejected accused's claim of
self-defense, thus:
Such evidence even if conceded to be true, does not make out a case of
self-defense. Neither the words nor the acts attributed to the deceased in the
foregoing testimonies indicate that there was any imminent or real threat or
danger to the life or limb of appellant. . . . and if, indeed, Rillamas did take hold of
the barrel of appellant's ri e or even tried to grab it, We do not believe it was
justified for appellant "to remove the safety lock and fire" his weapon.
In their relative positions, appellant had more freedom of action than the
deceased who was sandwiched among the three other passengers . . . whose
position would have made it di cult for the deceased to try to snatch appellant's
ri e. In other words, between the two of them, appellant had the better chance to
win in the struggle for the rifle.

Indeed, an even closer scrutiny of accused-appellant's very own testimony only

yields additional support for the prosecution's case. Accused-appellant, for instance,
admitted that before he went to confront the victim, he made sure that his revolver was
fully loaded. 5 4 He asked a boy named Gardo to observe Ganan's house to see if he was
present and to report the matter immediately to him. 5 5 To these unmistakably preparatory
acts must be added the fact that by accused-appellant's admission, he was subjected to
the ignominy of being kicked and urinated upon by the victim. Even accused-appellant's
description of the scene before the shooting incident closely resembles the account given
by the prosecution witnesses. 5 6
In sum, accused-appellant failed to corroborate his claim of self defense with
evidence other than his own testimony, despite the fact that there were other persons in
the locus criminis when the incident happened and who, therefore, may have witnessed it.
In stark contrast, the evidence of the prosecution is well nigh overwhelming.
First, there were three (3) eyewitnesses to the incident, namely: Ma. Rizza Aguilar,
Ma. Elena Sobrevilla and the victim's widow, Mariel M. Ganan. All three (3) eyewitnesses
positively identi ed accused-appellant as the gunman who red the shots which killed
Enrique Ganan and Corazon Cajipo. 5 7 All three (3) eyewitnesses declared that Ganan was
shot on his right by the accused-appellant from behind. 5 8 All three (3) eyewitnesses
remained steadfast and unyielding on cross-examination that accused-appellant was the
assailant who shot the deceased, 5 9 despite repeated attempts by defense counsel to
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 throw them off track. While the said eyewitnesses may be either close or related by a nity
to the victim, no less than accused-appellant himself admitted that he could not impute
any ill-motive against any of them for testifying against him. 6 0
Second, the physical evidence, namely the multiple gunshot wounds sustained by
Enrique Ganan, belie to accused-appellant's testimony that he hit the victim only once.
Indeed, the sheer number of wounds alone totally negates accused-appellant's
pretensions at self-defense and, in fact, indicates a determined effort on his part to kill and
not just defend himself. 6 1 Intent to kill may be deduced from the nature of the wound
in icted and the kind of weapon used. 6 2 In this case, accused-appellant was armed with a
.38 caliber revolver. While the victim sustained only one head wound, its location and the
distance from which it was red con rms the prosecution's account that Ganan was shot
from behind above the back of his right ear at point blank range. 6 3
Third, immediately after the incident, accused-appellant ed to Batangas and hid
there for one and a half (1 1/2) months. 6 4 Flight strongly indicates a guilty mind and
betrays the existence of a guilty conscience. 6 5 Indeed, ight is an implied admission of
guilt and accused-appellant's act of eeing to Batangas after shooting the victims cannot
but betray his guilt and his desire to evade responsibility therefor. 6 6 Certainly, a righteous
individual will not cower in fear and unabashedly admit the killing at the earliest possible
opportunity if he were morally justi ed in doing so. If the accused-appellant honestly
believed that his acts constituted self-defense against the unlawful aggression of the
victim, he should have reported the incident to the police instead of escaping and avoiding
the authorities. 6 7
All told, the Court nds no reason to reverse the ruling of the court a quo insofar as
the crimes were committed. What remains to be determined is the propriety of the
penalties imposed on accused-appellant. SCaTAc

With regard Criminal Case No. 96-9225, Murder is the unlawful killing of any person
when quali ed by any of the circumstances listed under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. 6 8 Treachery or alevosia, aptly alleged in the information, is one such qualifying
circumstance.
Given the prevailing facts of the case, the Court agrees with the trial court that the
killing of Enrique Ganan was attended by alevosia. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 6 9 The qualifying
circumstance of treachery attended the killing as the two conditions for the same are
present, i.e. (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or
form of attack employed by him. 7 0 The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected
attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim."
71

In the case at bar, Enrique Ganan was in the comforts of his home, eating shballs
while cuddling his youngest daughter and was engaged in conversation with some visitors
when he was shot in the head from behind by the gunman. As in the recent case of People
v. Padilla , 7 2 treachery is evident when the accused-appellant suddenly positioned himself
at the back of the unsuspecting victim, pointed his gun at him and, without any warning,
promptly delivered the fatal shots. The victim was unaware of the attempt on his life and
the danger that lurked behind him. There was no way the victim could have defended
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 himself, taken ight or avoided the assault. The attendance of treachery quali es the killing
to Murder.
As regards Criminal Case No. 96-9226, the Solicitor General points out that there is
jurisprudential support to upgrade the killing of Corazon Cajipo to Murder on account of
alevosia although she was not the intended victim of the assailant.
Citing People v Basao, 7 3 the Solicitor contends that assuming the real object of the
assault was Enrique Ganan and that the death of Corazon Cajipo was purely accidental, it
does not modify the nature of the crime nor lessen the accused's criminal liability because
when accused-appellant red his gun, the attack was made in continuous aggression that
cannot be broken up to constitute separate, distinct and independent assaults.
We agree but only insofar as it a rms accused-appellant's culpability for the death
of Corazon. It cannot be said that a crime against a victim was quali ed by treachery
where he was hurt solely because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time. 7 4 The aw
in the Solicitor's argument lies in his failure to appreciate the kind of rearm used and the
number of shots red by the malefactor in relation to an apparent confusion of what
constitutes a complex crime under the Revised Penal Code. The concept of a complex
crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which states that —
ART 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period. (As amended by Act No. 4000)

The cases at bar clearly do not fall under any of the two instances of complex
crimes that would merit the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. In
Basao, supra, the victims were on board their speeding motorcycle when they were fatally
strafed with a volley of automatic gun re from the accused's M-16 Armalite ri e. In this
case, accused-appellant, using a single action .38 cal. Smith & Wesson revolver, red
several times. In People v. Bermas, 7 5 reiterating the earlier ruling of People v. Vargas, Jr. ,
7 6 the Court observed that —

Evidently, this is a case where several persons were killed and others
injured by successive shots. In the case of People vs. Mones, the Supreme Court
found the accused guilty of three distinct and separate murders, each quali ed by
treachery, when the said accused red a series of shots killing three persons
attending a school commencement exercise. Similarly, in the case of People vs.
Desierto, 7 7 it was ruled that several shots from a Thompson sub-machinegun
causing several deaths, although caused by a single act of pressing the trigger of
the sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person ring it only
has to keep pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, with his nger and it
would re continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should
be considered as producing several felonies, but the number of bullets which
actually produced them. 7 8 . . . Consequently, the accused should be responsible
for each of the resultant crimes instead of the complex crime of double murder
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

Be that as it may, the sad fact remains that for being at the wrong place at the
wrong time, Corazon's life came to an abrupt end. On that fateful evening while she was
chatting with a friend, her young life was cut short by a stray bullet red from accused-
appellant's gun. While it may not have been the intention of accused-appellant to shoot her,
this fact will not exculpate him because, as we pointed out in People v. Hilario , 7 9 "The fact
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 that accused killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment. According
to Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act be different from that which is intended. One who
commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally
or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. 8 0 The rationale of the
rule is found in the doctrine, el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado, or he
who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. 8 1 The accused performed
voluntary acts. The purpose was to kill. Hence, notwithstanding the mistake in the identity
of the victim, the accused is still criminally liable." 8 2
The Court, however, agrees with the Solicitor General that the trial court improperly
applied the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position pursuant to
Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code in imposing the death penalty on
accused-appellant for the killing of Enrique Ganan. To appreciate this aggravating
circumstance, the public o cer must use the in uence, prestige or ascendancy which his
office gives him as a means by which he realizes his purpose. 8 3 The essence of the matter
is presented in the inquiry "Did the accused abuse his office to commit the crime?" 8 4
In the case at bar, there was no showing that accused-appellant took advantage of
his being a policeman to shoot Ganan or that he used his "in uence, prestige or
ascendancy" in killing the victim. Accused-appellant could have shot Ganan even without
being a policeman. In other words, if the accused could have perpetrated the crime even
without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position. 8 5 The mere fact that
accused-appellant is a policeman and used his government issued .38 caliber revolver to
kill Ganan is not su cient to establish that he misused his public position in the
commission of the crime. 8 6 Furthermore, since the information failed to allege this
aggravating circumstance, the same cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant. A
generic aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information if its appreciation
would result in raising the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. 8 7
There being no modifying circumstances to be appreciated, the proper imposable
penalty for the killing of Enrique Ganan is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 2, in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659. 8 8
So too must the penalty imposed by the trial court for the death of Corazon Cajipo
be modi ed. The penalty for Homicide is Reclusion Temporal. 8 9 Considering that there is
neither any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the imposable penalty as provided in
Article 249, in conjunction with Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, is Reclusion
Temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper
penalty should be Ten (10) years of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years
and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal as maximum. cCaIET

Following prevailing jurisprudence 9 0 and in line with controlling policy, the Court
nds the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victims proper
without any need of proof 9 1 other than the death of the victim. 9 2 The award of moral
damages by the trial court to the victims' heirs is likewise proper and is pegged at
P50,000.00 by controlling case law 9 3 taking into consideration the pain and anguish of the
victim's family 9 4 brought about by his death. 9 5
The award of P25,000.00 as actual damages for the funeral and burial expenses
incurred by heirs of Corazon Cajipo, being amply supported by documentary evidence 9 6 is
likewise sustained. However, with the absence of any aggravating circumstance, the award
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 of exemplary damages should be deleted. 9 7
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 110, nding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder in Criminal Case No. 96-9225, and nding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 96-9226, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No. 96-9225, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and in Criminal Case No. 96-9226, he is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) Years of Prision Mayor, as minimum,
to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. Further,
accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Enrique Ganan the amounts of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the heirs of Corazon
Cajipo the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as funeral and burial expenses. The award for exemplary damages is
DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Buena, J., is on official leave.

Footnotes

1. Record, p. 1.
2. Ibid., p. 41.
3. Id., pp. 88, 91.
4. Id., p. 91.
5. Id., p. 320.
6. TSN, 18 March 1997, p. 8.
7. Ibid., pp. 8-10; TSN, 27 February 1998, p. 6.
8. TSN, 27 February 1998, pp. 5-7; 2 October 1998, pp. 8-9; 5 August 1997, p. 5.

9. TSN, 18 March 1997, pp. 10, 15; 27 February 1998, p. 8.

10. TSN, 27 February 1998, p. 8-10.

11. TSN, 5 August 1997, pp. 4-34; 27 February 198, pp. 11-17; 18 March 1997, pp. 8-16.
12. Exhibits A and F.

13. Appellant's Brief, p. 9.

14. Ibid.
15. G.R. No. 138646, 6 March 2001, p. 7.

16. Revised Penal Code, Article 11; People v. Arizala, 317 SCRA 244, 251 [1999], citing
People v. Navarro, 295 SCRA 139 [1998] and People v. Villamor, 292 SCRA 384 [1998].
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 17. People v. Vallador, 257 SCRA 515, 524 [1996], citing People v. Quino, 232 SCRA 400
[1994] and People v. Aliviado, 247 SCRA 300 [1995].
18. TSN, 17 March 1999, pp. 6-7.

19. Ibid., p. 8.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id., p. 9.
23. Id., pp. 10-11.
24. Id., p. 12.
25. Id.
26. Id., p. 13.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id., p. 14.
31. Id.
32. Id., p. 15.
33. Id., pp. 15-16.
34. Id., p. 16.
35. Id., p. 17.
36. Id., p. 18.
37. TSN, 17 March 1999, pp. 19-23.

38. People v. Dee, et al., G.R. Nos. 115251-52, 5 October 2000, 342 SCRA 115, 124, citing
People v. Pulusan, 290 SCRA 353, 372 [1998].
39. People v. Arellano, G.R. No. 131518, 17 October 2000, 343 SCRA 276, 286, citing People
v. Dolar, 231 SCRA 414 [1994].
40. TSN, 22 January 1997, pp. 46-47.
41. People v. Samudio, G.R. No. 126168, 7 March 2001, p. 9, citing People v. Saragina, 332
SCRA 219 [2000].

42. Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 141749, 17 April 2001, p. 6, citing Jacobo v. CA, 270
SCRA 270 [1997].

43. People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106873, 3 October 2000, 341 SCRA 688, 705, citing People
v. Atad, 266 SCRA 262 [1997]; People v. Cayabyab, 274 SCRA 387 [1997]; People v.
Manambit, 271 SCRA 344 [1997]; People v. Salazar, 272 SCRA 481 [1997].
44. People v. Cayabyab, 274 SCRA 387, 398 [1997]; People v. Obzunar, 265 SCRA 547, 567
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 [1996].

45. G.R. No. 132384, 21 September 2001, pp. 17-18.

46. Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 141749, 17 April 2001.

47. People v. Rabanal, G.R. No. 119542, 19 January 2001.
48. People v. Pantorilla, 322 SCRA 337 [2000].
49. People v. Florague, G.R. No. 134779, 6 July 2001.
50. People v. Francisco, 333 SCRA 725 [2000].
51. People v. Magallanes, 275 SCRA 222 [1997].
52. People v. Camacho, G.R. No. 138629, 20 June 2001, p. 7, citing People v. Unarce, 270
SCRA 756 [1997].

53. 55 SCRA 190, 199 [1974].

54. TSN, 6 April 1999, p. 16.

55. TSN, 17 March 1999, p. 16.

56. Ibid., p. 18.

57. TSN, 18 March 1997, pp. 6-7; 5 August 1997, pp. 6-9, 13-14; 27 February 1998, pp. 6-8.

58. TSN 18 March 1997, p. 19; 5 August 1997, p. 19; 27 February 1998, pp. 8-9.
59. TSN, 18 March 1997, pp. 26-36; 5 August 1997, pp. 26-31; 2 October 1998, pp. 10-28.

60. TSN, 6 April 1999, pp. 24-25.

61. People v. Baniel, 275 SCRA 472 [1997].

62. People v. Bayod, G.R. No. 122644, 5 February 2001, p. 16.
63. TSN, 22 January 1997, pp. 22-23, 42-47.
64. TSN, 6 April 1999, pp. 24-27.

65. People v. Mira, G.R. No. 123130, 2 October 2000, 341 SCRA 631, 642, citing People v.
Bahenting, 303 SCRA 558, 566 [1999].
66. People v. Surilla, G.R. No. 129164, 24 July 2000, 336 SCRA 376, 386, citing People v.
Villanueva, 284 SCRA 501, 510 [1998].
67. People v. Manlulu, 231 SCRA 701, 709 [1994].
68. II Reyes, Revised Penal Code, p. 472, 14th Revised Ed. (1998).
69. Revised Penal Code, Article 14, par. 16.

70. People v. Galam, 325 SCRA 489 [2000].

71. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 129216, 20 April 2001, p. 17, citing People v. Sumalpong, 284
SCRA 464 [1998].

72. G.R. Nos. 138472-73, 9 August 2001, p. 12; see also People v. Perreras, G.R. No 139622,
31 July 2001, p. 9 and People v. Barellano, 319 SCRA 567, 588-589 [1999].
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 73. 310 SCRA 743, 777 [1999].
74. People v. Guillermo, 302 SCRA 507 [1999].
75. 309 SCRA 741, 782 [1999].

76. 184 SCRA 254 [1990]; see also People v. Parojinog, 203 SCRA 673 [1991].
77. C.A. 45 O.G. 4542.

78. I Reyes, Revised Penal Code, pp. 559-560, 9th Revised Ed. (1971).
79. G.R. No. 128083, 16 March 2001, p. 10.

80. I Reyes, Revised Penal Code, p. 64, 12th Revised Ed. (1981).

81. People v. Ural, 56 SCRA 138 [1933].

82. Supra; see People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 [1943].
83. Supra.
84. People v. Magayac, 330 SCRA 767, 777 [2000], citing U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150,
156-157 [1911].

85. People v. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670-671 [1999].

86. People v. Villa, Jr., 331 SCRA 142, 154 [2000], citing People v. Pantoja, 25 SCRA 468,
471-472 [1968]; People v. Magayoc, supra.

87. People v. Legaspi. G.R. Nos. 1336164-65, 30 April 2001, pp. 13-14.
88. People v. Lao-as, G.R. No. 126396, 29 June 2001, p. 8; People v. Perreras, supra.
89. People v. Consejero, G.R. No. 118334, 20 February 2001, p. 14.
90. People v. Amion, G.R. No. 140511, 1 March 2001, p. 13; People v. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. Nos. 103613 & 105830, 23 February 2001, p. 52, citing People v. Pedroso, G.R.
No. 125128, 19 July 2000, 336 SCRA 163; People v. Go-od, G.R. No. 134505, 9 May 2000,
331 SCRA 612; People v. Flores, G.R. No. 129284, 17 March 2000, 328 SCRA 461.

91. People v. Concepcion, et al., G.R. No. 131477, 20 April 2001, p. 18, citing People v. De
Vera, 312 SCRA 640 [1999].
92. People v. Mindanao, G.R. No. 123095, 6 July 2000, 335 SCRA 200; People v. Quijon, 325
SCRA 453 [2000]; People v. Buluran, supra.

93. People v. Pardua, et al., G.R. No. 110813, 28 June 2001, citing People v. Jabonero, G.R.
No. 132247, 21 May 2001; People v. Ereño, 326 SCRA 157 [2000].
94. People v. Alba, et al., G.R. Nos. 130627 & 139477-78, 31 May 2001, p. 15, citing People
v. Ereño, supra.
95. People v. Langit, 337 SCRA 323 [2000]; People v. Mindanao, supra.
96. Exhibits T, U and V.

97. People v. Maneng, G.R. No. 123147, 13 October 2000, 343 SCRA 88, 96, citing People v.
Abdul, 310 SCRA 246 [1999]; People v. Guzman, 326 SCRA 131 [2000]; People v.
Quilatan, G.R. No. 132725, 28 September 2000, 341 SCRA 247, 257, citing People v.
Estares, 282 SCRA 524 [1997].
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