Tobias

 Willcocks  

Part  (a):  Briefly  describe  either  an  important  issue  in  your  field  of  interest  
or  a  current  legal  problem  facing  a  particular  country,  region,  or  the  world,  
and  then  propose  a  theoretical  framework  or  a  legal  analysis  or  strategy  to  
address  this  issue.    
 
The   doctrine   of   legitimate   expectations   establishes   that,   generally,   clear   and  
unambiguous  promises  by  public  authorities  must  be  kept.  However,  the  courts  
must  strike  a  balance  between  protecting  individuals’  interests,  on  the  one  hand,  
and   promoting   the   freedom   of   public   authorities   to   adapt   to   changing  
circumstances,   on   the   other.   Where   promises   concern   the   procedure   of   decision-­‐
making,  the  solution  is  often  straightforward;  enforcing  the  expectation  does  not  
entail   determining   the   substance   of   the   decision.   In   contrast,   this   essay   will  
analyse  the  evolution  of  the  courts’  approach  to  the  more  complex  cases  in  which  
something  substantive  has  been  promised.  Such  cases  risk  the  court  infringing  on  
the  statutory  power  conferred  by  Parliament  on  the  public  body.  I  suggest  that  
moving   towards   a   test   of   proportionality   would   bring   greater   clarity   to   the  
courts’  attempt  to  balance  private  and  public  interests.  
 
Until  recently,  the  courts  have  applied  the  Wednesbury  test  to  establish  whether  
frustration   of   a   substantive   legitimate   expectation   is   legal1.   Put   simply,   the   test  
asks   whether   a   decision   to   resile   is   one   that   a   reasonable   authority   could   reach.2  
Hence,  Wednesbury  established  a  high  threshold  for  overturning  administrative  
conduct.   The   test   leans   heavily   towards   promoting   the   freedom   of   public  
authorities   above   the   interests   of   individuals   since   any   reasonable   departure  
from  a  promise  will  stand.  
 
The   case   of   Coughlan   marked   a   profound   shift   in   the   depth   and   style   of   the  
courts’   approach   to   legitimate   expectations.   The   case   concerned   a   local   health  
authority’s   promise   that   an   injured   woman   would   have   a   home   for   life   at   a  
particular   facility.   Even   though   breaking   the   promise   could   have   been   deemed  
Wednesbury   reasonable3,   the   House   of   Lords   held   that   it   would   be   manifestly  
unfair,   amounting   to   an   abuse   of   power,   for   the   authority   to   move   Mrs   Coughlan  
to  a  different  facility.  To  establish  this  abuse  of  power,  the  court  considered  all  
aspects   of   the   case   -­‐   from   the   claimant’s   particularly   vulnerable   condition,   to   the  
quasi-­‐contractual   nature   of   the   promise.4  Coughlan   swings   the   balance   back  
towards   individuals’   interests   by   increasing   the   number   of   potential   obstacles  

                                                                                                               
1  See  R.  v.  Home  Secretary,  ex  p.  Hargreaves  [1997]  1  W.L.R.  906,  at  [921]  per  Hirst  LJ  
2  R.  v.  Chief  Constable  of  Sussex,  ex  parte  International  Trader’s  Ferry  Ltd   [1999]   2   AC   418,  

at  [452]  per  Lord  Cooke  

3  R.   v.   Devon   Health   Authority   ex   parte   Coughlan   [2000]   2   WLR   622   at   [65]   per   Lord  
Woolf
4  ibid  at  [62]  per  Lord  Woolf  

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 Tobias  Willcocks  

that   public   authorities   must   overcome   to   legally   renege   on   their   promises.   In  

particular,   the   courts   must   undertake   a   more   delicate   balancing   act   that  
Wednesbury   required,   and   take   into   account   a   wider   range   of   factors.   Hence,  
applying   the   ‘abuse   of   power’   concept   is   notoriously   controversial   in   marginal  
cases.  In  Rashid5,  for  example,  the  state’s  failure  to  follow  standard  policy  for  an  
asylum   application   was   held   to   be   an   abuse   of   power   despite   the   applicant   not  
knowing  about  the  policy  or  expecting  it  to  be  applied.  The  lower  threshold  also  
means  there  are  far  more  marginal  cases  than  under  the  Wednesbury  test.    
 
Reframing   the   enquiry   in   terms   of   a   proportionality   analysis   might   be   the  
solution.   Frustrating   a   legitimate   expectation   would   not   amount   to   ‘abuse   of  
power’   where,   first,   a   legitimate   aim   is   pursued;   second,   the   harm   to   individuals’  
interests   is   necessary   and   minimal;   and   third,   a   sensu   stricto   balance   is   stuck  
between  the  individual’s  interest  and  the  public  authority’s  purposes.  
 
Proportionality   analysis   is   promising   in   two   respects.   First,   it   has   already  
received  some  judicial  support.  In  Nadarajah6,  Laws  LJ  suggested  that  the  court  
should  assess  whether  breaking  a  promise  was  proportionate  to  the  pursuit  of  a  
legitimate   aim.7  Second,   it   accounts   for   the   varying   weight   attributed   by   the  
courts  to  certain  factors  in  legitimate  expectation  cases.  An  example  is  the  courts’  
treatment   of   detrimental   reliance.   Reliance   gives   greater   weight   to   individuals’  
interests,   since   frustration   of   the   expectation   will   entail   actual  loss   rather   than  
offending   interests   merely   in   principle.   Nonetheless,   in   Oxfam8,   the   court   held  
that  blatant  abuses  or  arbitrary  exercises  of  power  could  trigger  protection  of  a  
promise,   even   without   reliance. 9  The   proportionality   approach   justifies   and  
brings   clarity   to   the   sensible   position   that   a   lack   of   reliance   is   not   necessarily  
fatal  to  an  expectation  so  long  as  other  factors  buttress  it  sufficiently.10  
 
Of   course,   the   proportionality   approach   is   open   to   criticism.   For   one   thing,   the  
Court  of  Appeal  confirmed  in  ABCIFER11,  albeit  reluctantly,  that  proportionality  is  
not   yet   a   freestanding   basis   for   judicial   review   in   English   law.12  Moreover,   the  
scrutiny  of  proportionality  risks  inadvertently  elevating  expectations  to  a  level  of  

                                                                                                               
5  R(Rashid)  v.  Home  Secretary  [2005]  EWCA  Civ  744  
6  Nadarajah  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department  [2005]  EWCA  Civ  1363  
7  ibid  at  [69]  per  Laws  LJ  
8  Oxfam  v  Her  Majesty’s  Revenue  and  Customs  [2009]  EWHC  3078  
9  ibid  [50]  per  Sales  J  
10  R  (Bancoult)  v  Foreign  Secretary  (No  2)  [2008]  UKHL  61  at  [179]  per  Lord  Mance  
11  R   (Association   of   British   Civilian   Internees:   Far   East   Region)   v   Secretary   of   State   for  

Defence  [2003]  QB  1397  

12  ibid,  at  [35]  per  Dyson  LJ  

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 Tobias  Willcocks  

protection   so   far   reserved   for   fundamental   rights.13  What   is   clear,   however,   is  

that   the   courts’   endorsement   of   the   ‘abuse   of   power’   enquiry   does   more   to  
uphold  individuals’  interests  than  the  Wednesbury  approach.  Given  that  the  test  
also  tends  to  promote  uncertainty,  a  proportionality  framework  could  supply  the  
infrastructure  to  underpin  this  fundamental  development  in  the  law  of  legitimate  
expectations.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

                                                                                                               
13  For  the  view  that  this  may  be  justified,  see  R  (Niazi)  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  

Department  [2008]  EWCA  Civ  755  at  [51]  per  Laws  LJ;  for  a  suggestion  to  the  contrary,  
see  [2008]  UKHL  61  at  [182]  per  Lord  Mance    

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 Tobias  Willcocks  

Part  (b):  Please  tell  us  something  about  yourself  —  in  particular,  why  you  
wish   to   pursue   an   LL.M.   degree   at   Harvard   and   how   doing   so   connects   with  
what  you  have  done  in  the  past  and  what  you  plan  to  do  in  the  future.  
 
Now  in  my  final  year  studying  Law  at  Oxford,  it  is  exciting  to  discover  how  the  
areas   of   law   I   have   studied   individually   are   not   as   discrete   as   they   seemed   at  
first.   I   find   it   fascinating   to   tease   out   subtext   in   the   courts’   decisions.   For  
example,  analysing  the  calculation  of  damages  in  contractual  misrepresentation  
cases  reveals  the  influence  of  Tort  Law  on  the  issue  of  quantum.  Additionally,  I  
am  increasingly  mindful  of  the  space  that  law  occupies  alongside  other  aspects  of  
life,   such   as   politics   and   business.   In   Competition   Law,   for   example,   politically-­‐
charged  relationships  between  the  European  Commission  and  private  companies  
drive  developments  in  enforcement.  These  observations  have  made  the  study  of  
law   immensely   rewarding.   Grappling   with   legal   issues   requires   as   much  
attention   to   the   context   in   which   the   law   operates   as   to   the   provisions   of   the   law  
itself.  With  a  diverse  range  of  experiences  to  draw  on,  I  relish  this  challenge.    
 
I  have  gained  significant  insight  from  my  extra-­‐curricular  activities.  For  example,  
founding   and   running   a   profitable   online   business   –   selling   wholesale  
information   to   local   business   owners   –   highlighted   the   challenges   facing   small  
businesses   and   provided   grounding   for   my   legal   thinking.   Similarly,   after  
reaching   the   UK   final   of   the   KPMG   International   Case   Competition   earlier   this  
year,  I  was  selected  to  represent  the  UK  at  the  International  Final  in  São  Paulo.  
The   competition   required   innovative   solutions   to   business   problems   and  
allowed  me  to  develop  a  commercially-­‐astute  approach  to  the  law.  I  have  drawn  
on  these  insights  to  construct  persuasive  arguments  in  my  mooting.  In  particular,  
delivering   robust,   practical   legal   opinion   to   Lord   Hughes   of   the   UK   Supreme  
Court  in  the  final  of  the  Oxford  Holdsworth  Moot  was  central  to  my  success  in  the  
competition.  
 
Moreover,   my   experience   of   São   Paulo   has   shown   me   the   importance   of  
international   cultural   experiences   for   my   own   development   as   a   leader.   In  
addition   to   sampling   Brazilian   culture,   I   used   the   experience   as   a   platform   for  
working  with  social  enterprises  upon  my  return.  I  led  a  team  of  five  to  create  a  
scaling   strategy   for   an   early-­‐stage   organisation   in   Rio   de   Janeiro   –   helping   to  
secure   $1   million   in   investment.   Subsequently,   I   have   become   a   director   of   the  
Oxford   Strategy   Group,   a   student-­‐run   consultancy.   Managing   forty   consultants  
from  six  continents,  I  have  seen  first-­‐hand  the  immense  value  of  diversity,  both  
for   tackling   the   most   complex   problems   and   for   conceiving   the   best   solutions.  
Additionally,   my   continued   work   with   social   enterprises   reflects   the   pleasure  
that  I  take  in  leveraging  my  personal  experiences  overseas  to  achieve  sustained  
social   impact   at   home.   I   am   left   in   no   doubt   that   continuing   my   legal   studies  

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 Tobias  Willcocks  

abroad   is   a   natural   progression   and   will   lay   the   foundations   for   my   career   in  
legal  practice  in  the  UK.  
 
The   diversity   of   HLS,   which   arises   as   much   from   the   vast   range   of   courses   as  
from  the  students  in  each  cohort,  drew  me  to  Harvard  in  particular.  As  I  take  a  
special   interest   in   Constitutional   Law,   I   am   excited   to   explore   how   a   US  
perspective  might  inform  my  understanding  of  legal  discussions  in  the  UK.  The  
US   federal   system,   for   example,   provides   an   interesting   reference   point   for  
analysing   tension   between   the   EU   and   certain   Member   States.   Similarly,   the  
opportunity  to  study  units  at  the  Harvard  Kennedy  School  and  Harvard  Business  
School   is   especially   appealing.   My   own   experiences   have   already   highlighted   to  
me   the   value   of   engaging   with   a   range   of   areas   outside   of   conventional   legal  
study.  I  am  attracted  to  a  course  that  is  built  on  this  very  premise  and  relies  so  
confidently   on   the   intellectual   benefits   of   encountering   a   plurality   of   fields   of  
study.  Moreover,  the  opportunity  to  participate  in  the  Graduate  Forum  confirms  
that  the  Harvard  course  is  one  in  which  my  natural  inclination  to  explore  ideas  
beyond  the  confines  of  a  curriculum  will  be  nourished  and  encouraged.  It  is  for  
these  reasons  that  I  am  convinced  I  would  find  the  LL.M  an  incredibly  rewarding  
endeavour.  
 
Pursuing  the  LL.M  will  provide  a  firm  foundation  for  me  to  embark  on  a  career  as  
a  barrister.  For  as  long  as  I  can  remember,  the  Bar  has  been  my  primary  career  
goal.   Having   shadowed   barristers   practising   criminal   and   environmental   law,   I  
am   particularly   looking   towards   the   public   law   Bar.   Part   of   the   appeal   of   the  
Harvard  LL.M  is  the  opportunity  to  experience  an  unparalleled  range  of  subjects  
in   order   to   pinpoint   where   my   precise   interests   lie.   Thus,   while   my   studies   at  
Harvard  would  undoubtedly  broaden  my  horizons,  I  am  excited  to  discover  the  
specific  areas  of  law  that  could  form  the  basis  of  my  career.    
 
 
 
Total  word  count:  1499  
Signature:  Tobias  Willcocks  
 
 

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