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VOL. 385, JULY 31, 2002 601

Pablico vs. Villapando

*
G.R. No. 147870. July 31, 2002.

RAMIR R. PABLICO, petitioner, vs. ALEJANDRO A.

VILLAPANDO, respondent.

Constitutional Law; Local Governments; Power to remove

erring elective local officials from service lodged exclusively with
the courts.—It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove
erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively
with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as
it vests power on the “disciplining authority” to remove from office
erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the
last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of
1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials
must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in
whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must
exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just
an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through
the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will
must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the
disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given
only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should
not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to
remove.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

_______________

* EN BANC.

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Pablico vs. Villapando

     Castillo & Poblador for petitioner.

     FJG Villaran & Associates for private respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the

President, on appeal, validly impose the penalty of
dismissal from service on erring elective local officials?
This purely legal issue was posed in connection with a
dispute over the mayoralty seat of San Vicente, Palawan.
Considering that1 the term of the contested office expired on
June 30, 2001, the present case may be dismissed for
2
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2
having become moot and academic. Nonetheless, we
resolved to pass upon the above-stated issue concerning the
application of certain provisions of the Local Government
Code of 1991.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On August 5, 1999, Solomon B. Maagad, and Renato M.
Fernandez, both members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
San Vicente, Palawan, filed with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan an administrative complaint
against respondent Alejandro A. Villapando, then Mayor of
San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse3
of authority and culpable
violation of the Constitution. Complainants alleged that
respondent, on behalf of the municipality, entered into a
consultancy agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated
mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections. They argue
that the consultancy agreement amounted to an
appointment to a government position within the
prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Section 6, of
the 1987 Constitution.
In his answer, respondent countered that he did not
appoint Tiape, rather, he merely hired him. He invoked
Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice
dated August 21, 1992, stating

_______________

1 See Rollo, p. 422.

2 Malaluan v. Commission on Elections, et al., 254 SCRA 397, 403-404
(1996), citing Atienza v. Commission on Elections, 239 SCRA 298 (1994);
Abeja v. Tanada, 236 SCRA 60 (1994); Yorac v. Magalona, 3 SCRA 76
(1961).
3 Rollo, p. 74.

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Pablico vs. Villapando

that the appointment of a defeated candidate within one

year from the election as a consultant does not constitute
an appointment to a government office or position as
prohibited by the Constitution.
On February 1, 2000, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan found respondent guilty of the administrative
charge 4and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from
service. Respondent appealed to the Office of the President
which, on May 29, 2000, affirmed the 5
decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan.
Pending respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Office of the President, or on June 16, 2000,
petitioner Ramir R. Pablico, then Vice-mayor of San
Vicente, Palawan, took his oath of office as Municipal
Mayor. Consequently, respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction and prayer for a
temporary
6
restraining order, docketed as SPL Proc. No.
3462. The petition, seeks to annul, inter alia, the oath
administered to petitioner. The Executive Judge granted a
Temporary Restraining Order effective for 72 hours, as a
result of which petitioner ceased from discharging the
functions of mayor. Meanwhile, the case was raffled to
Branch 95 which, on June 23, 2000, denied respondent’s
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motion7 for extension of the 72-hour temporary restraining

order. Hence, petitioner resumed his assumption of the
functions of Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
On July 4, 2000, respondent instituted a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals
seeking to annul: (1) the May 29, 2000 decision of the Office
of the President; (2) the February 1, 2000, decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; and (3) the June
23, 2000 order of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan,
Branch 95.

_______________

4 Rollo, p. 135.
5 Rollo, p. 208.
6 Rollo, p. 212.
7 CA Rollo, p. 94.

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Pablico vs. Villapando

8
On March 16, 2001, the Court of Appeals declared void the
assailed decisions of the Office of the President and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, and ordered
petitioner9 to vacate the Office of Mayor of San Vicente,
Palawan.10 A motion for reconsideration was denied on April
23, 2001. Hence, the instant petition for review.
The pertinent portion of Section 60 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 provides:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.—An elective local

official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on
any of the following grounds:
x x x     x x x     x x x
An elective local official may be removed from office on the
grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. (Emphasis
supplied)

It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited

provision that the penalty of dismissal from service upon
an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a 11
court of law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al.,
we held that “[t]he Office of the President is without any
power to remove elected officials, since such power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly
provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted
Section 60.”
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, however, adds
that—“(b) An elective local official may be removed from
office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this
Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local
Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or
the disciplining authority whichever first acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.” The disciplining
authority

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8 Third Division, composed of Associate Justices Hilarion L. Aquino

(ponente); Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (member); and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez

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(chairman).
9 Rollo, p. 32.
10 Rollo, p. 55.
11 257 SCRA 55, 100 (1996).

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Pablico vs. Villapando

referred to pertains to the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan
12
and the Office of the
President. 13
As held in Salalima this grant to the “disciplining
authority” of the power to remove elective local officials is
clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee
that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or
regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of
law, such as the Local Government Code. Implementing
rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they
implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule
out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. Even Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., the principal author of the Local
Government Code of 1991, expressed doubt as to the
validity
14
of Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the implementing
rules.
Verily, the clear legislative intent to make the subject
power of removal a judicial prerogative is patent from the
deliberations in the Senate quoted as follows:

x x x     x x x     x x x
Senator Pimentel. This has been reserved, Mr. President,
including the issue of whether or not the Department Secretary or
the Office of the President can suspend or remove an elective
official.

_______________

12 Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.—A

verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be
prepared as follows:

(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly

urbanized city, an independent component city or component city
shall be filed before the Office of the President;
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be
filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be
appealed to the Office of the President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed
before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan
concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.

13 Supra, citing Regidor v. Chiongbian, 173 SCRA 507 (1989); Teoxon v.

Members of the Board of Administrators, PVA, 33 SCRA 585 (1970);
Manuel v. General Auditing Office, 42 SCRA 660 (1971).
14 Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government Code of 1991, The
Key to National Development, 171 (1993 ed.).

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Senator Saguisag. For as long as that is open for some later

disposition, may I just add the following thought: It seems to me
that instead of identifying only the proper regional trial court or
the Sandiganbayan, and since we know that in the case of a
regional trial court, particularly, a case may be appealed or may
be the subject of an injunction, in the framing of this later on, I
would like to suggest that we consider replacing the phrase
“PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR THE
SANDIGANBAYAN” simply by “COURTS.” Kasi po, maaaring
sabihin nila na mali iyong regional trial court o ang
Sandiganbayan.
Senator Pimentel. “OR THE PROPER COURT.”
Senator Saguisag. “OR THE PROPER COURT.”
Senator Pimentel. Thank you. We are willing to accept that
now, Mr. President.
Senator Saguisag. It is to be incorporated in the phraseology
that will craft to capture15 the other ideas that have been elevated.
x x x     x x x     x x x.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove

erring elective local officials from service is lodged
exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule
XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the
“disciplining authority” to remove from office erring
elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the
last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code
of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public
officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the
authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is
vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is
involved is not just an ordinary public official but one
chosen by the people through the exercise of their
constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put
to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining
authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only
the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it
should not be permitted16
to manipulate the law by usurping
the power17 to remove. As explained by the Court in Lacson
v. Roque:

_______________

15 Deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code of 1991,

August 1, 1990, pp. 39-40.
16 Salalima v. Guingona, supra.
17 92 Phil. 456, 464 (1953).

607

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Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections

“. . . the abridgment of the power to remove or suspend an elective

mayor is not without its own justification, and was, we think,
deliberately intended by the lawmakers. The evils resulting from
a restricted authority to suspend or remove must have been
weighed against the injustices and harms to the public interests
which would be likely to emerge from an unrestrained
discretionary power to suspend and remove.”

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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant

petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ., concur.

Petition denied.

——o0o——

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