Notes On "Space and Nomos" by Felipe Martínez Marzoa
Notes On "Space and Nomos" by Felipe Martínez Marzoa
Notes On "Space and Nomos" by Felipe Martínez Marzoa
Space is to be divided. Perhaps we can assume space is nothing but the pure possibility of division, that in
which no particular boundaries are better than others. This indifference is the reason why every attempt to
match space with nomos must be a seriously doubtful thing. Space rather seems to be the absence of any
nomos. Space, as far as it really involves indifference as to the option among particular divisions, cannot be
accepted as a primary phenomenon, for such a primary condition would make every boundary as valid as
every other, with the consequence that no division would be valid at all. p. 307 [D: intercambia espacio por
tiempo y se obtiene cierta línea argumentativa de Heidegger y su tiempo. Es interesante que aquí Marzoa
asume que h ay, por supuesto, validez.]
The necessity of giving this complex a very initial place brings Schmitt to speak of “primitive meaning” of a
word, a very unrigorous notion, whose opportune (and erroneous) application to nomos sets the concept of
a division of space at the basis of all. The spell of such a prestigious Greek word should preserve the secrecy
of the compatibility between space being the indifference as to the location of boundaries and, on the other
hand, the fact that there should be qualified limits, space boundaries that are nomos while others are not. p.
308
In any case, the presupposition of space in this modern sense [i.e. space as indifference to the limits] involves
something like a contradiction, because being is inseparable from limit. p. 308
Thus we are induced to ask where this dynamics [the indifference as to the limits and therefore of
unlimitedness] is taking us; it seems [...] the suggested unlimitedness will involve two aspects: gradual
elimination, on the one hand, of the status “beyond the line” and, on the other hand, also disappearance of
the internal delimitations (collective identities) on this side of the line; so, in both senses, no collective
identities at all. p. 308
[...] the prospect is that there will not be sovereign communities anymore, only individuals and rights of the
individual ─ that is to say, the classical principle (or, perhaps better, nominal definition of “right”) that I
have the right to do what I decide, as far as this is not incompatible with the fact that everyone else can do
the same, which is tautologically the rule in a situation in which the individual does not essentially belong to
any community. p. 309
[...] the acknowledgment of something that must be the same for all generates a uniform space, whose
uniformity makes arbitrary [p. 310] any location of the limits of this space itself and thus bursts the
community whose statue should have been established. pp. 309-310
Another way to say the same thing: regular interchange within the community (“you are you, I am I,” “this
is this, that is that,” the distance which makes this be this and that be that) presupposes a community, so the
fact that there are binding contents, binding things, so also the fact that the interchangeability is not general
(i.e., that things are not exchangeable for other things without limitations as to the type of things), and so
on: this history has already been related. p. 310
When I said above space as indifference to the limits began to be valid with the Hellenistic epoch, this
“began to be valid” was a way to refer to the situation that results from this bursting of the polis which I
have just said is the consequence of the fact p olis i tself. p. 310
[...] in order to understand certain things Schmitt seems to take for granted, we must assume a situation in
which not only has that community “burst,” but also basic suppositions operate that positively involve the
absence of any community, namely, that there is, at least as ruling tendency, what we call the ware,1 the
thing as exchangeable for other things without limitation as to the type of things, which, tautologically, can
occur about a thing only in the case it occurs about every thing; this, as we have already said, implies the
absence of binding contents. The concept of ware in this sense involves the whole structure we call civil
society, and this it is this structure that I have meant when I spoke of basic position of space as indifference
to the limits. p. 310
1
See my articles ‘‘Estado y legitimidad’’ and ‘‘Estado y pólis,’’ in Los filósofos y la política, ed. M. Cruz (Madrid: Fondo
de Cultura Económica, 1999), 85–115. Nota al pie luego de aparecer la palabra w are (mercancía).