Heirs of Pedro Lopez V de Castro

10/10/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 324
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 591

Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro
*
G.R. No. 112905. February 3, 2000.
THE HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ, EUGENIO LOPEZ DE

LEON, PASCUAL LOPEZ DE LEON, ANTONIO GUICO
LOPEZ, FORTUNATO GUICO LOPEZ, MIGUEL GUICO
LOPEZ, ERLINDA LOCERO LOPEZ, TING LOPEZ DE
LEON, RUFINA LAYAO LOPEZ, LUISITA LOPEZ DE
LEON, MACARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, FELISA LOPEZ DE
LEON, PRINTIS L. DE LEON, FLOVIANA LOPEZ
VELASCO, LOURDES LOPEZ DE LEON, LAGRIMAS
LOPEZ DE LEON, ROSARIO LOPEZ DE LEON,
RESURRECCION LOPEZ DE LEON and RICARDA
LOPEZ DE LEON, petitioners, vs. HONESTO C. DE
CASTRO, MARIA SOCORRO DE CASTRO married to
ANTONIO PERIGRINA, FRANCISCO DE CASTRO,
FAUSTINO DE CASTRO, EPIFANIA C. VDA. DE
CASTRO, and their successors-in-interest, respondents.
Actions; Land Registration; Courts; Jurisdiction.—In all cases

where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the
manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must be
strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Because the rule has always been
that the court having territorial jurisdiction over the property
should take cognizance of its registration, upon the creation of a
branch of the court in another locality pending applications for
registration should be transferred to that court.—When petitioners
applied for the registration of Lot No. 1 before the CFI in Cavite
City in 1956, the governing law then as regards the matter of
jurisdiction was the Judiciary Act of 1948 or Republic Act No. 296.
Section 52 of that law providing for the permanent stations of
district judges or judges of Courts of First Instance stated that for
the Seventh Judicial District that included the province of Cavite,
there would be ‘two judges in Cavite City. The law did not create
other branches of the CFI in the province of Cavite outside of the
City of Cavite. It was on June 22, 1963 when Republic Act No.
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001750e6e382853b74da5003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/29
3749 took effect that a CFI branch in Tagaytay City was set up.
That amendment to Republic Act No. 296
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
592
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
provided that four judges would preside “over the Courts of First
Instance of the Province of Cavite and the Cities of Cavite,
Tagaytay and Trece Martires” who would be “judges of the first,
second, third and fourth branches” of that court. Because the rule
has always been that the court having territorial jurisdiction over
the property should take cognizance of its registration, upon the
creation of the Tagaytay City branch, petitioners’ application for
registration should have been transferred to that court inasmuch
as the property involved is located in that city.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Venue; Venue is procedural, not
jurisdictional, and hence may be waived.—Venue is procedural,
not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to
provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their
access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. Thus, the last
paragraph of Section 51 of Rep. Act No. 296 provided that in land
registration cases, the Secretary of Justice, who was then tasked
with the administration and supervision of all courts, may
transfer land registration courts “to any other place more
convenient to the parties.” This implied that Land Registration
Case No. 299 could be retained in the Cavite City branch of the
CFI if it would be convenient to the applicants who had been used
to transacting business with that branch; the case did not have to
be transferred to Tagaytay City. Parenthetically, Circular No. 46
dated July 3, 1963 that then Secretary of Justice Juan R. Liwag
addressed to all CFI judges and clerks of court in line with the
enforcement of Rep. Act No. 3947, merely quotes Section 6
thereof. Said circular does not elucidate on whether cases should
be transferred to the branches that had territorial jurisdiction
over them.
Same; Same; Same; Judgments; Where in an earlier case, the
principal issue raised in the petition for review on certiorari was
the personality of a party to file an opposition to the application for
land registration, the Supreme Court’s affirmance of the lower

court’s ruling on that issue in no way implied that the issue of
jurisdiction was likewise resolved.—Petitioners’ claim that this
Court had “sustained” the jurisdiction of the Cavite City branch of
the CFI over Land Registration Case No. 299 in G.R. No. 51054 is
incorrect. To be sure, the principal issue raised in the petition for
review on certiorari in G.R. No. 51054 was the personality of the
Municipality of Silang to file an opposition io the application for
land registration. While this Court upheld the lower court’s ruling
on that issue, such
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VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 593
affirmance in no way implied that the issue of jurisdiction was

likewise resolved. It is only now that the same issue is brought to
light for resolution.
Same; Same; Same; When a land registration court issues an
order of default, it is presumed to regularly perform its task in
accordance with law especially with regard to notice requirements.
—As regards the jurisdiction of the Tagaytay City branch over the
land registration proceedings instituted by private respondents,
the order of general default issued in Land Registration Case No.
299 is of relevance. When the Cavite City branch of the CFI
issued an order of default, it is presumed to have regularly
performed its task in accordance with law especially with regard
to notice requirements.
Same; Same; Same; Compliance with the requirement of
notice and publication has the effect of notifying all persons
interested in the proceedings.—Compliance with the requirement
of notice and publication had the effect of notifying all persons
interested in the proceedings including the herein private
respondents. As this Court said in Aguilar v. Caoagdan: x x x it is
true that appellants were not personally notified of the pendency
of the present registration case even if they were actually
occupying, as they claim, portions of the land, but such procedural
defect cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court because
registration proceedings have the nature of actions in rem. x x x.
Same; Same; Same; Double Registration; A proceeding in rem,
such as land registration proceedings, requires constructive seizure
of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have
rights to or interests in the property; Where a party files an
application for registration of a parcel of land which is already the
subject of registration proceedings, the second court could no

longer entertain the same.—A proceeding in rem, such as land
registration proceedings, requires constructive seizure of the land
as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or
interests in the property. Constructive seizure of the land for
registration is effected through publication of the application for
registration and service of notice to affected parties.
Consequently, when private respondents filed their own
application for registration of the same parcel of land, strictly
speaking, the Tagaytay City branch could no longer entertain the
application for registration as the res involved had been
constructively seized by the Cavite City branch of the same court.
In hind-
594
sight, this complication of two applications for registration having

been filed for one and the same tract of land could have been
avoided had Land Registration Case No. 299 been transferred to
the Tagaytay City branch of the same court where it rightfully
belonged, upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 3947.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule that where more than one
certificate of title is issued over the same piece of land, the person
holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a
person who relies on a subsequent certificate refers to the date of
the certificate of title and not to the date of filing of the application
for registration of title.—In land registration proceedings, all
interested parties are obliged to take care of their interests and to
zealously pursue their objective of registration on account of the
rule that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall
prevail. To illustrate, where more than one certificate of title is
issued over the land, the person holding a prior certificate is
entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a
subsequent certificate. It should be stressed that said rule refers
to the date of the certificate of title and not to the date of filing of
the application for registration of title. Hence, even though an
applicant precedes another, he may not be deemed to have
priority of right to register title. As such, while his application is
being processed, an applicant is duty-bound to observe vigilance
and to take care that his right or interest is duly protected.
Same; Same; Laches; A party is guilty of laches where he
neglects or omits to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that he either had abandoned or

declined to assert it—Even granting that petitioners did not really
have actual knowledge of private respondents’ application for
registration, yet after discovering that the land was already
registered in the name of private respondents, petitioners should
have immediately sought recourse in law to protect their rights.
As it turned out, they let almost seven (7) years to pass from such
discovery before they acted to revive what already was a dormant
judgment. Hence, they filed the separate action “for execution of
judgment and cancellation of titles” of private respondents
because more than five (5) years had elapsed since the
promulgation of the decision directing the issuance of a decree of
registration. Under these circumstances, the inevitable conclusion
is that petitioners neglected for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, they
could or should have done earlier. They neglected or
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VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 595
omitted to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the

presumption that they either had abandoned or declined to assert
it. In short, they were guilty of laches.
Same; Same; Same; Land registration proceedings entails a
race against time and non-observance of time constraints imposed
by law exposes an applicant to the loss of registration rights if not
to the deleterious effects of the application of the doctrine of laches.
—The doctrine of stale demands or laches is based on grounds of
public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted. Land registration proceedings entails a race
against time and nonobservance of time constraints imposed by
law exposes an applicant to the loss of registration rights if not to
the deleterious effects of the application of the doctrine of laches.
An applicant for registration has but a one-year period from the
issuance of the decree of registration in favor of another applicant,
within which to question the validity of the certificate of title
issued pursuant to such decree. Once the one-year period has
lapsed, the title to the land becomes indefeasible. While the law
grants the aggrieved applicant certain remedial measures, these
are designed to make up for his failure to register his title to the
property and not necessarily to restore ownership and/or title that
he had allowed by inaction to be vested in another person.
Same; Same; Remedies of an aggrieved party after the lapse of

one year from issuance of decree of registration.—In Javier v.
Court of Appeals, the Court set out these remedies as follows: x x
x. The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree of
registration is no longer open to review or attack although its
issuance is attended with actual fraud. This does not mean
however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If
the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for
value, an action for reconveyance is still available. The decree
becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one
(1) year from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name is to bring an ordinary action in
court for reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is
always available as long as the property has not passed to an
innocent third party for value. If the property has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action
for
596
damages, x x x. In Spouses Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, the Court
also said: x x x it has been held that the proper recourse of the
true owner of the property who was prejudiced and fraudulently
dispossessed of the same is to bring an action for damages against
those who caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are
insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may
be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund.
Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; In the
determination of the nature of a complaint, its averments rather
than its title, are the proper gauges.—The wrong appellation of
petitioners’ complaint shall not mislead this Court as, in the
determination of the nature of a complaint, its averments rather
than its title, are the proper gauges. A reading of the allegations
of the complaint in Civil Case No. TG-1028 betrays petitioners’
true intention in filing the case. In paragraph 15 of the complaint,
petitioners alleged that they were “unduly deprived of their
ownership and lawful possession of the land x x x due to the
wrongful registration of the subject land in the name of the
defendants by means of fraud and misrepresentations.” Except for
this general statement, the issue of fraud or misrepresentation is
not alleged with particularity in the complaint. This is
unfortunate because, if filed within the time set by law, a

complaint with the proper allegation of fraud coupled with proof
thereof could cause the loss of the indefeasibility of private
respondents’ title to the property. It is established that if fraud
attended the acquisition of title under the Torrens System, such
title cannot be used as a means to perpetuate fraud against the
rightful owner of real property.
Same; Same; Same; An aggrieved applicant for land
registration cannot seek protection under the provisions of the
Rules of Court which are merely suppletory to special laws
governing land registration proceedings.—The inevitable
conclusion therefore is that petitioners were cognizant all the
while of the futility of their attempt to cancel the title of private
respondents under the law. Hence, they indirectly and collaterally
attacked the land title duly issued to private respondents on the
theory that the revival of the dormant judgment in their favor
could result in the realization of their objective of nullifying such
title. However, aggrieved applicants for land registration cannot
seek protection under the provisions of the Rules of Court which
are merely suppletory to special laws governing land registration
proceedings.
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VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 597
Land Registration; The resolution of the instant petition

cannot be complete without a word on the manner by which
officials of the then Land Registration Commission ignored the
lower court’s order to explain the conflicting claims of ownership
over the same property.—The resolution of the instant petition
cannot be complete without a word on the manner by which
officials of the then Land Registration Commission ignored the
lower court’s order to explain the conflicting claims of ownership
over the same property. Particularly, there is a need for an
explanation why they caused the publication of the notice of
hearing in private respondents’ application for registration
notwithstanding that the same office had already published the
notice of hearing as regards petitioners’ application for
registration of the same parcel of land. It is within the power of
these officials to determine whether or not the same parcel of land
is the subject of two applications for registration. The
indefeasibility of private respondents’ title over the property
should not get in the way of an administrative investigation of
possible omission or neglect of official duty. This Court cannot let
such Malfeasance or misfeasance in office pass unnoticed lest the
integrity of the Torrens System of land registration be

undermined.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Valdez, Domondon & Associates for petitioners.
Augusto F. Del Rosario for private respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this case, the two applications for registration of the

same parcel of land were filed twelve years apart in
different branches of the same Court of First Instance, but
a certificate of title was issued in one case while the other
is still pending appeal.
The applicants in the earlier case are now before this
Court on a petition for review on certiorari. They assert
that the decision ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration in their favor, while promulgated subsequent
to the issuance of
598

the certificate of title in the names of the second applicants,

should be “executed” and that the certificate of title issued
to the latter should be nullified.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On July 25, 1956, Pedro Lopez, et al. filed an application
for the registration of a 69-hectare parcel of land in
Tagaytay City with the Court of First Instance of Cavite,
Branch III under Land Registration Case No. 299 and LRC
Record No. 11617. On January 29, 1957, the court issued
an order of general default, excepting only the Director of
Lands.
On June 24, 1957, Assistant Fiscal Jose M. Legaspi,
representing the Municipality of Silang, Cavite, filed a
motion to lift the order of general default and submitted an
opposition on behalf of the municipality. The opposition
was later amended on September 16, 1966 alleging that a
portion of the land applied for which the municipality had
leased to private persons had been its patrimonial property
since 1930 or earlier. The municipality further alleged that
in a registration case entitled “Mariano Lopez de Leon v.
Municipality of Silang” (CA-G.R. No. 8161-R), the Court of
Appeals found that the applicants had never been in

possession of the land sought to be registered.
In its answer to the amended opposition, the applicants
claimed that a part of the whole tract of land they sought to
register was their inheritance, which includes Lot No. 2 of
plan PSU-51901 with an area of 119 hectares. However, it
had to be excluded in the application for registration of the
69-hectare land in Cavite upon the recommendation of the
Chief Surveyor of the General Land Registration Office
because it is located in the province of Laguna. Similarly,
Lot No. 1 of PSU-51901 that lies within Tagaytay City had
been excluded from the registration proceedings under
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 53498 or Land Registration 1
Case No.
2201 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 67.
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VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 599

Nevertheless, the municipality filed a motion to dismiss the

application for original registration of Lot No. 1 on the
ground of res judicata. The applicants, on the other hand,
contended that the principle of res judicata is not
applicable because the subject matter of CA-G.R. No. 8161-
R (Mariano Lopez de Leon v. Municipality of Silang) was
Lot No. 2 or the portion of the land in Laguna.
On February 7, 1969, the lower court issued an order
denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit on the
ground that the oppositor municipality had no personality
to intervene considering that Lot No. 1 was outside of its
territorial limits. The lower court held:
“x x x. Even if said land was communal property of the

Municipality of Silang, by virtue of its incorporation into (the) city
of Tagaytay it became the property of the latter. Hence, the
Municipality of Silang has no personality to appear in this (sic)
proceedings. If any right of action exists, it accrues in favor of the
City 2of Tagaytay and the same should be pursued by the said
city.”
The oppositor municipality filed a motion for

reconsideration of the said order. On July 23, 1970, the
court issued an order stating that “in order not to impede
whatever action the movant” might take against the order

of February 7, 1969, said motion should be denied. On
January 12, 1971, the applicants filed a motion praying
that the clerk of court be commissioned to receive evidence
for them it appearing that the order of July 23, 1970 had
become final and executory “by virtue of which the
Municipality of Silang no longer3
ha(d) any personality to
appear in these proceedings.” The court granted said
motion and directed the clerk of court to submit a report on
the matter.
In his report dated April 15, 1971, Clerk of Court
Rolando D. Diaz stated that since time immemorial,
Micaela, Fer-
_______________
2 Ibid., p. 68.
3 Decision in CA-G.R. No. 49053-R, p. 4; Rollo of G.R. No. 51054
(Municipality of Silang v. Court of Appeals), p. 52.
600

nando, Ciriaco and Catalino, all surnamed De los Reyes,

owned and possessed the parcel of land in question. On
November 3, 1870, they sold the land to Ambrocio Carrillo
Trinidad and Francisco Dimaranan. On September 15,
1892, the property passed in ownership to Pedro Lopez de
Leon, Sr. and Maxima Carrillo Trinidad, the daughter and
sole heir of Ambrocio Carrillo Trinidad. Pedro and Maxima
remained in possession of the property until their death
when their children, applicants Pedro Lopez, Mariano
Lopez de Leon, Pastor Lopez de Leon, Eulogio Lopez, Clara
Lopez, Ricarda Lopez and Rosario Lopez took over
ownership and possession thereof. Upon their death, their
respective heirs succeeded over the property and, on
February 25, 1971, they partitioned it. The agricultural
property was under the supervision of Domingo Opena who
planted portions thereof to rice and other agricultural
products.
The clerk of court thus recommended that the court
confirm its order of general default, approve his report, and
register the property in the names of the applicants in4
accordance with the extrajudicial partition
5
of the property.
On April 19, 1971, the court accordingly rendered a
decision approving the report of the clerk of court and
ordering that once the decision becomes final, the

corresponding decree of 6
registration of title be issued in
favor of the applicants.
The oppositor Municipality of Silang interposed an
appeal from the said decision of the land registration court
to the Court of Appeals. On7 May 2, 1979, the Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the appeal Tor
lack of personality of the oppositor-appellant Municipality
of Silang
8
to interfere in the registration proceedings
below.” Undaunted, the
________________
4 Record, pp. 20-21.

5 Presided by Judge Alfredo Catolico.
6 Rollo, pp. 74-80.
7 Penned by Associate Justice Milagros A. German and concurred in by
Associate Justices B.S. de la Fuente and Pedro D. Cenzon.
8 Rollo, pp. 66-71.
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VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 601

oppositor municipality filed with this Court a. petition for

review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 51054
(Municipality of Silang v. Court of Appeals) which was
denied on September 19, 1979. The municipality’s motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied
9
with finality for
lack of merit on October 24, 1979. On10 November 9, 1979,
judgment was entered in the said case.
Meanwhile, in the course of examining the records for
the purpose of issuing the decree of registration in favor of
Pedro Lopez, et al., the Land Registration Commission
discovered that Lot No. 1, plan Psu-51901 had been
decreed
11
in favor of private respondents Honesto de Castro,
et al. 12
Further investigation revealed that sometime in 1967,
Honesto de Castro, et al. filed before the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, Branch IV in Tagaytay City, an
application for the registration of the same parcel of land
under Land Registration Case No. TG-95 and LRC Rec. No.
N-33292. The case was called for hearing on March 18, 13
1968. Eight (8) days later or on March 26, 1968, the court
promulgated a decision adjudicating the land located at
Barrio Iruhin, Tagaytay City, more particularly described
as Plan Psu-51901-Amd., in favor of said applicants and
directing that upon the finality of the decision,

14
the
corresponding decree of registration be issued. The ruling
of the court was based on its finding that one Hermogenes
Orte, who originally owned the land sought to be
registered, sold it in 1932 to Marciano de Castro. The deed
evidencing said sale was destroyed during the Japanese
occupation. De Castro continued possession of the land
until his death on April 26, 1940. His wife Epifania and
their children named Maria Socorro, Francisco, Honesto,
Romualdo, Felicitacion, Faustino and Felixberto continued
possession of the
_______________
9 Ibid., p. 73.
10 Rollo of G.R. No. 51054, p. 102.
11 Rollo, p. 19.
12 Record, p. 83.
13 Presided by Judge Jose C. Colayco.
14 Rollo, pp. 82-84.
602

property who declared the land for assessment and

taxation purposes in Cabuyao, Laguna. However, upon
learning that the property lies in Tagaytay City, the
applicants declared it in their names in said city.
The cause of the conflicting claims over the same land
was never explained because the head of the geodetic
engineers of the Land Registration Commission did not
appear in court in Land Registration Case No. 299.15 Hence,
on August 19, 1981, the CFI of Cavite, Branch III issued
an order declaring that the court had lost jurisdiction to
hear the case, without, however, dismissing the case.
Seven (7) years later, or on June 28, 1988, the heirs of
Pedro Lopez, et al. filed a complaint “for execution of
judgment and cancellation of land titles of the defendants
and their successors-in-interest” before the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, Branch 18, at Tagaytay City. Docketed as
Civil Case No. TG-1028, the complaint named as
defendants Honesto C. de Castro, Maria Socorro de Castro
married to Antonio Perigrina, Francisco de Castro “widow,”
Faustino de Castro, Felixberto de Castro, Epifania C. Vda.
de Castro and their successors-in-interest.
The complaint alleged the facts pertinent to enforce the

judgment of April 19, 1971. The plaintiffs, petitioners
herein, alleged further that, upon the filing of their
application for registration with the CFI of Cavite, Branch
III at Cavite City, said court acquired jurisdiction over the
res because land registration proceedings are in rem and
therefore, the CFI of Cavite, Branch IV at Tagaytay City
could not have acquired jurisdiction over the same res by
virtue of De Castros’ application for registration. They
claimed that no less than this Court had recognized the
jurisdiction of Branch III in Cavite City when it passed
upon the correctness of the lower court’s ruling in favor of
Pedro Lopez, et al. Contending that the decision of Branch
III on April 19, 1971 declaring that title to the land
belonged to Pedro Lopez, et al. had become final and
executory on June 18, 1980, they asserted that they were
the
________________
15 Presided by Judge Hector C. Fule.
603
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 603

lawful owners of the land. However, they had been unduly

deprived ownership and possession thereof on account of its
“wrongful registration” in the name of the defendants “by
means of fraud and misrepresentation.” As a result of their
undue deprivation of ownership, possession and enjoyment
of the property notwithstanding that the question of
ownership had been settled in their favor, plaintiffs
claimed that they suffered actual and moral damages.
Claiming that the judgment sought to be executed had not
been barred by the statute of limitations, they prayed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for the judgment to effect:
1. Execution of judgment of the decision of the then Court of

First Instance (CFI) Branch III, Cavite, dated April 19,
1971 by the Hon. Judge Alfredo Catolico which becam e
final on June 18, 1980;
2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration and the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay
City to cancel the titles of the land in question under the
names of the defendants and their successors in interest

and that new title to the same parcel of land be issued to
plaintiffs;
3. Ordering all the occupants of the questioned land to
vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to the
plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the defendants and/or their successors in
interest to pay plaintiffs or its (sic) heirs and/or successors
in interest actual damages (in) the amount of P200,000.00
or the amount that may be proven during the hearing and
trial of this case;
5. Ordering the defendants and/or their successors in
interest to pay plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 for and as
attorney’s fees;
6. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 or the sum that may be proven during the
trial;
7. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit. Plaintiffs
further pray 16for such other reliefs just and proper under
the premises.
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim, the

defendants interposed the defenses of prescription, laches
and/or
_______________
16 Rollo, pp. 64-65.
604

estoppel and failure to state a cause of action. They averred

that they were no longer the owners of the property as it
had been sold “absolutely and unconditionally to innocent
third parties for valuable consideration and in good faith.”
They contended that in view of the indefeasibility of their
title to the property, even the title of their successors-in-
interest can not be subject to collateral attack. They
claimed that Branch III of the CFI in Cavite should have
“remanded” the records of LRC Case No. 299 or LRC
Record No. 11617 to the same CFI branch in Tagaytay City
to which the “legal and proper jurisdiction to hear and
decide that particular case belonged.” They asserted that
the complaint should have been directed by the plaintiffs
against the Assurance Fund under the provisions of P.D.

No. 1529. Alleging that the “very precipitate and wrongful
suit” caused them mental anguish, serious anxiety, social
humiliation and similar injury, they claimed moral
damages of P500,000.00, nominal damages of P100,000.00
and attorney’s fees of P300,000.00.
On May 21, 17
1990, the RTC of Cavite, Branch 18 in
Tagaytay City rendered the decision in Civil Case No. TG-
1028 dismissing the complaint for being “improper and
premature.” The court likewise dismissed the defendants’
counterclaims for “their 18dearth of sufficient legal, factual
and evidentiary support.”
The lower court held that the decision of Branch III that
became final on June 18, 1980, could not be enforced
against defendants considering that they were not parties
in LRC Record No. 11617. Neither could it order the
cancellation of the titles issued to defendants because the
LRC and/or the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City had not
been impleaded as parties to the case and therefore the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over them.
The lower court held further that because the case was
covered by Act No. 496 and/or P.D. No. 1529 which are
special laws, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on
execution of
_________________
17 Presided by Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo.

18 Rollo, pp. 89-94.
605
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 605

judgment by independent action cannot be invoked. The

court also ruled that:
Treating the second issue raised by plaintiffs, the then Court of

First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV, or this Court, validly
acquired jurisdiction over the case filed by defendants Honesto de
Castro, et al., in LRC Case No. TG-95. The records show that
herein defendants as petitioners) in that case, complied with all
the jurisdictional requirements of law, conferring jurisdiction
upon this Court to try that case and lent validly (sic) upon its
proceedings. As admitted by the plaintiffs themselves, this Court
was not aware of the existence of LRC Record No. 11617, pending
before the other Branch of this Court, in the same manner that
they, or the plaintiffs themselves, did not also know the existence
of LRC Case No. TG-95 before this Court. This Court is assured
that good faith pervaded among the parties concerned, in the
conduct of its proceedings, all procedural requirements having
been punctiliously complied with and no irregularity or breach of
law having been committed. So that the decision rendered by this
Court in that case is valid and subsisting, for all intents and
purposes and can be nullified only under circumstances and
through procedures mandated by law. Hence, the corresponding
decree of registration issued in TG-95 and the original certificates
of titles issued to defendants in consequence thereof, are all valid
and binding until declared otherwise, in a case directly assailing
their validity, and of course, by a competent court. And by express
provision
19
of law, the same are insulated from any collateral
attack.
The court concluded that the complaint was in the nature

of a collateral attack on the validity of the certificate of title
issued in favor of the defendants and their successors-in-
interest because, “(b)y its caption and averments, the
validity of the title in question, is not directly assailed.”
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said
decision, which was denied on May 29, 1991. It reiterated
that the plaintiffs’ failure to implead the Administrator of
the NLRDRA, the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City and
the possessors of the property in question was a fatal
procedural
________________
19 Ibid., p. 93.
606

error because they were indispensable parties over which

the court should acquire jurisdiction. Their inclusion as
defendants in the case was necessary in order that their
title to the property could be directly attacked. Petitioners
should have availed of the remedy provided by Section 32
of P.D. No. 1529 and their failure to observe that law was a
“colossal error” because once issued, a certificate of title
becomes indefeasible, “completely insulated 20
from any form
of collateral attack assailing its validity.”
Petitioners sought recourse before the Court of Appeals,21
which dismissed the appeal on November 29, 1993.
Stressing the indefeasibility of title under the Torrens

System of land registration, the Court of Appeals echoed
the lower court’s ruling that the decree of registration in
favor of respondents cannot be reopened or set aside in a
“collateral proceeding such as the one in the case at bar
which has for its objective the execution of a judgment
which apparently has become dormant, thus appellants’
insistence that it be revived.” Citing Article 1544 of the
Civil Code on sale of property to different vendees which it
opined had a “persuasive influence” in the resolution of the
appeal, it held that “in case land has been registered in the
name of two different persons, the earlier in date (of
registration) shall prevail.” Nonetheless, emphasizing that
the land in question has been transferred to a third person
the Court of Appeals ruled that the title issued in favor of
respondents should be “maintained in their status quo,
until the proper court shall have determined 22
their
priorities, and the equities resulting therefrom.”
Consequently, petitioners filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
raising the following assignment of errors:
________________
20 Ibid., pp. 95-97.

21 The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Quirino D. Abad
Santos, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Emeterio C. Cui and
Alfredo J. Lagamon.
22 Rollo, pp. 105-106.
607
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 607

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE VITAL
AND PIVOTAL ISSUE THAT THE TRIAL COURT
(CFI TAGAYTAY CITY, BRANCH IV), HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBSEQUENT
LAND REGISTRATION CASE FILED BY THE
APPLICANTS BELOW, PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HEREIN, AND IN DECREEING
THE REGISTRATION OF TITLE OVER THE
SAID LOTS WHICH WERE ALREADY
PREVIOUSLY THE SUBJECT OF
REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS BY ANOTHER
COURT (CFI CAVITE, BRANCH III) IN A

PREVIOUS LAND REGISTRATION CASE IN
FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS HEREIN WHICH
WAS SUSTAINED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
AND EVEN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT LIKEWISE FAILED TO RESOLVE THE
ISSUE OF THE PROPRIETY OF THE INSTANT
ACTION FILED BY THE PETITIONERS FOR
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT OF CFI BRANCH
III, WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO A REVIVAL OF
THE JUDGMENT.
COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
MERELY RELYING ON THE DOCTRINE OF
INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE, COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON THE RESPOkDENTS’ TITLES, AND
PRIORITY IN THE REGISTRATION AND
ISSUANCE OF THE TITLES IN FAVOR OF THE
RESPONDENTS, WHICH RELIANCE ARE
MISPLACED AND UNAVAILING IN VIEW OF
THE LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER
COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE LAND
REGISTRATION CASE FILED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AND TO ISSUE THE DECREE
OF REGISTRATION.
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS CANNOT DIVEST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS OF THE DISPUTED LOTS BY
FILING THE INSTANT ACTION FOR
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT AND ASSAILING
THE VALIDITY OF RESPONDENTS’ TITLES.
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE PETITIONERS ARE RIGHTFULLY AND
LEGALLY ENTITLED TO THE LOTS IN
QUESTION.
608

In all cases where the authority to proceed is conferred by a

statute and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is
mandatory, the same must be strictly

23
complied with, or the
proceedings will be utterly void.
When petitioners applied for the registration of Lot No.
1 before the CFI in Cavite City in 1956, the governing law
then as regards the matter of jurisdiction was the Judiciary
Act of 1948 or Republic Act No. 296. Section 52 of that law
providing for the permanent stations of district judges or
judges of Courts of First Instance stated that for the
Seventh Judicial District that included the province24
of
Cavite, there would be two judges in Cavite City. The law
did not create other branches of the CFI in the province of
Cavite outside of the City of Cavite.
It was on June 22, 1963 when Republic Act No. 3749 25
took effect that a CFI branch in Tagaytay City was set up.
That amendment to Republic Act No. 296 provided that
four judges would preside “over the Courts of First Instance
of the Province of Cavite and the Cities of Cavite, Tagaytay
and Trece Martires” who would be “judges of the first,
second, third and fourth branches” of that court. Because
the rule has always been that the court having territorial
jurisdiction over
26
the property should take cognizance of its
registration, upon the creation of the Tagaytay City
branch, petitioners’ application for registration should have
been transferred to that court inasmuch as the property
involved is located in that city.
It appears, however, that the Cavite City branch
remained the venue of petitioners’ application for
registration, apparently on account of the following
provision of Rep. Act No. 3749:
_________________
23 Dordas v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 59, 67; 270 SCRA 328 (1997).
24 44 O.G. 4757, 4775.
25 59 O.G. 8553.
26 Aguilar v. Caoagdan, 105 Phil. 661, 665 (1959).
609
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 609

SEC. 6. Wherever an additional branch or branches of the Court

of First Instance is or are established in this Act in the same place
where there is an existing court or courts of first instance, all
cases already filed in the latter court or courts shall be heard,
tried and decided by such latter court or courts.
Notably, the law is not clear on whether or not the phrase

“in the same place” refers to the judicial district/province or
the place where a branch of the court is stationed. Hence,
considering the general rule that once a court acquires
jurisdiction over 27a case it remains with that court until its
full termination, the phrase “in the same place” should be
interpreted as referring to the province of Cavite. The
Cavite City branch of the CFI of Cavite thus correctly
retained jurisdiction over the application for registration
because there was no jurisdictional question involved in the
proceedings in Land Registration Case No. 299. What was
in question was whether the Cavite City branch of the
Cavite CFI was the proper venue for said case upon the
creation of the Tagaytay City branch. As this Court once
said:
Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction

may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which
otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an
action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be
changed by the consent of the parties and an objection that the
plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be waived by
the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection. In either
case, the court may render a valid judgment. Rules as to
jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the
parties, whether
28
or not a prohibition exists against their
alteration.
Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be

waived. It is meant to provide convenience to-the parties,
rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates
to
_________________
27 Secretary of Health v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 803, 812; 241 SCRA
688 (1995).
28 Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, G.R. No. 101538, June 23,
1992, 210 SCRA 256, 265-266.
610

29
the place of trial. Thus, the last paragraph of Section 51 of
Rep. Act No. 296 provided that in land registration cases,
the Secretary of Justice, who was then tasked with the
administration and supervision of all courts, may transfer

land registration courts “to any other place more
convenient to the parties.” This implied that Land
Registration Case No. 299 could be retained in the Cavite
City branch of the CFI if it would be convenient to the
applicants who had been used to transacting business with
that branch; the case did not have to be transferred to
Tagaytay City. Parenthetically, Circular No. 46 dated July
3, 1963 that then Secretary of Justice Juan R. Liwag
addressed to all CFI judges and clerks of court in line with
the enforcement of Rep. Act No. 3947, merely quotes
Section 6 thereof. Said circular does not elucidate on
whether cases should be transferred to the branches that”
had territorial jurisdiction over them.
Petitioners’ claim that this Court had “sustained” the
jurisdiction of the Cavite City branch of the CFI over Land
Registration Case No. 299 in G.R. No. 51054 is incorrect.
To be sure, the principal issue raised in the petition for
review on certiorari in G.R. No. 51054 was the personality
of the Municipality of Silang to file an opposition to the
application for land registration. While this Court upheld
the lower court’s ruling on that issue, such affirmance in no
way implied that the issue of jurisdiction was likewise
resolved. It is only now that the same issue is brought to
light for resolution.
As regards the jurisdiction of the Tagaytay City branch
over the land registration proceedings instituted by private
respondents, the order of general default issued in Land
Registration Case No. 299 is of relevance. When the Cavite
City branch of the CFI issued an order of default, it is
presumed to have regularly performed its task in
accordance with law especially with regard to notice
requirements. Act No. 496 provided that after the court
shall have set the application for initial hearing the
following procedure should be observed:
_________________
29 Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, G.R. No. 104649,

February 28, 1994, 230 SCRA 413, 416-417.
611
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 611

SEC. 31. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for
initial hearing of the application from the clerk of the Court of
First Instance, the Chief of the General Land Registration Office

shall cause a notice thereof to be published twice, in successive
issues of the Official Gazette, in the English language. The notice
shall be issued by order of the court, attested by the Chief of the
General Land Registration 30 Office, and shall be in form
substantially as follows: x x x.
The general order of default of January 29, 1957 stated as

follows:
It appearing from the certificate of the Chief of the General Land

Registration Office and the return of the Sheriff, attached to the
record of this case, that the notice relative to the application in
said case was duly published, posted, and served in accordance
with law; and that the time allowed for entering appearance and
filing answers expired at 9:30 A.M. on the 29th day of January,
1957, for which date said case was duly set for hearing by the
Court;
And it further appearing from said record that no person has
appeared as respondent in the case filed an answer within the
time for that purpose allowed, with the exception of the Director
of Lands represented by Asst. Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Legaspi;
All persons, except those herein above named, are hereby
declared to be in default in the above-entitled case, and it is
ordered that a general default be recorded in said case, and that
the application therein be taken as confessed by all the world,
except the persons31hereinabove named.
It is so ordered.
On January 24, 1957, the Municipality of Silang filed a

motion to lift said general order32of default and to admit its
opposition to the registration. This fact supports the
presumption that the officials concerned performed their
duties regularly
__________________
30 As amended by Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 96 and Rep. Act No. 1151.
31 Record on Appeal in CA-G.R. No. 49053-R, pp. 1011; Rollo of G.R. No.
51054, p. 76.
32 Ibid., p. 11; supra.
612

because it implies notice, whether actual or constructive,

on the part of said municipality that a land registration
proceedings had been filed with respect to Lot No. 1.

Compliance with the requirement of notice and
publication had the effect of notifying all persons interested
irt the proceedings including the herein private
respondents. As this Court said in Aguilar v. Caoagdan:
x x x it is true that appellants were not personally notified of the

pendency of the present registration case even if they were
actually occupying, as they claim, portions of the land, but such
procedural defect cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court
because registration
33
proceedings have the nature of actions in
rem. x x x.
A proceeding in rem, such as land registration proceedings,

requires constructive seizure of the land as against all
persons, including34 the state, who have rights to or interests
in the property. Constructive seizure of the land for
registration is effected through publication of the
application
35
for registration and service of notice to affected
parties. Consequently, when private respondents filed
their own application for registration of the same parcel of
land, strictly speaking, the Tagaytay City branch could no
longer entertain the application for registration as the res
involved had been constructively seized by the Cavite City
branch of the same court. In hindsight, this complication of
two applications for registration having been filed for one
and the same tract of land could have been avoided had
Land Registration Case No. 299 been transferred to the
Tagaytay City branch of the same court where it rightfully
belonged, upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 3947.
Be that as it may, the Court is not persuaded that the
registration proceedings instituted by private respondents
should
________________
33 Supra, at p. 666.
34 Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 239, 248; 276 SCRA
276 (1997).
35 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 852, 868 (1996).
613
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 613

be nullified by reason of the fact that the Cavite City

branch of the same court was already proceeding with
another registration case for the same piece of land.

In land registration proceedings, all interested parties
are obliged to take care of their interests and to zealously
pursue their objective of registration on account of the rule
that whoever first acquires title to a piece of land shall
prevail. To illustrate, where more than one certificate of
title is issued over the land, the person holding a prior
certificate is entitled to the land as36
against a person who
relies on a subsequent certificate. It should be stressed
that said rule refers to the date of the certificate of title and
not to the date of filing of the application for registration of
title. Hence, even though an applicant precedes another, he
may not be deemed to have priority of right to register title.
As such, while his application is being processed, an
applicant is duty-bound to observe vigilance and to take
care that his right or interest is duly protected.
Petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence required
of them as applicants for land registration. In the same
way that publication of their application for registration
was supposed to have rendered private respondents on
constructive notice of such application, the publication of
notice in the land registration proceedings initiated by
private respondents had the same effect of notice upon
petitioners. Petitioners were thlis presumed to have been
notified of the land registration proceedings filed by private
respondents in the Tagaytay City branch of the Cavite CFI
thereby providing them with the opportunity to file an
opposition thereto.
The fact that an interlocutory matter in Land
Registration Case No. 299 had to be resolved by both the
Court of Appeals and this Court did not in any way mean
that petitioners should no longer exercise due diligence to
protect their right or interest in the said proceedings. On
the contrary, they were bound to exercise such diligence
with vigor especially because
________________
36 Margolles v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109490, February 14, 1994,

230 SCRA 97, 114.
614

as early as April 19, 1971, they already had a judgment in

their favor. The record does not show why petitioners did
not have actual knowledge of the registration proceedings

instituted by private respondents. However, the lack of
such knowledge in fact raises a doubt as to the veracity of
their claim that they were in possession of the land. If
indeed they possessed the property, even if through an
administrator, as diligent owners, the threat to their
ownership could not have escaped them considering that
the property is in a rural community where news travels
fast.
Even granting that petitioners did not really have actual
knowledge of private respondents’ application for
registration, yet after discovering that the land was
already registered in the name of private respondents,
petitioners should have immediately sought recourse in law
to protect their rights. As it turned out, they let almost
seven (7) years to pass from such discovery before they
acted to revive what already was a dormant judgment.
Hence, they filed the separate action “for execution of
judgment and cancellation of titles” of private respondents
because more than five (5) years had elapsed since the
promulgation of the decision
37
directing the issuance of a
decree of registration. Under these circumstances, the
inevitable conclusion is that petitioners neglected for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, they could or should
have done earlier. They neglected or omitted to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption
38
that they either had abandoned or declined to
assert it. In short, they were guilty of laches.
The doctrine of stale demands or laches is based on
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims and is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or
_________________
37 Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provided for the filing of an

action to enforce a judgment after the lapse of the 5-year period.
38 Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 206, 218;
264 SCRA 181 (1996).
615
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 615

39
39
claim to be enforced or asserted. Land registration
proceedings entails a race against time and non-observance
of time constraints imposed by law exposes an applicant to
the loss of registration rights if not to the deleterious
effects of the application of the doctrine of laches. An
applicant for registration has but a one-year period from
the issuance of the decree of registration in favor of another
applicant, within which to question the validity of the
certificate of title issued pursuant to such decree. Once the
one-year period has lapsed, the title to the land becomes
indefeasible. While the law grants the aggrieved applicant
certain remedial measures, these are designed to make up
for his failure to register his title to the property and not
necessarily to restore ownership and/or title that he had
allowed by inaction to be vested40
in another person. In
Javier v. Court of Appeals the Court set out these
remedies as follows:
x x x. The basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year, a decree
of registration is no longer open to review or attack although its
issuance is attended with actual fraud. This does not mean
however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If
the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for
value, an action for reconveyance is still available. The decree
becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one
(1) year from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name is to bring an ordinary action in
court for reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is
always available as long as the property has not passed to an
innocent third party for value. If the property has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action
for damages, x x x.
41
In Spouses Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, the Court also
said:
________________
39 Ibid., at pp. 219-220.

40 G.R. No. 101177, March 28, 1994, 231 SCRA 498, 504.
41 323 Phil. 462, 477; 253 SCRA 391 (1996).
616

x x x it has been held that the proper recourse of the true owner of
the property who was prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of
the same is to bring an action for damages against those who
caused or employed the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an
action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for
recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund.
In filing the action for execution of judgment and

cancellation of titles, petitioners must have realized that
only the remedy of filing an action for damages was
available to them. Otherwise, they could have filed an
action for reconveyance of the property. Of course,
petitioners cleverly clothed their complaint as one for
execution of judgment under the provisions of the Rules of
Court. Clearly, such procedural strategy was a bid to revive
the decision of the lower court ordering the issuance of a
decree of registration in their names. In other words,
petitioners availed of procedural remedies provided for by
the Rules of Court as it appeared that because of the lapse
of time, they would not benefit from remedies prescribed by
land registration laws.
The wrong appellation of petitioners’ complaint shall not
mislead this Court as, in the determination of the nature of
a complaint, its42 averments rather than its title, are the
proper gauges. A reading of the allegations of the
complaint in Civil Case No. TG-1028 betrays petitioners’
true intention in filing the case. In paragraph 15 of the
complaint, petitioners alleged that they were “unduly
deprived of their ownership and lawful possession of the
land x x x due to the wrongful registration of the subject
land in the name of the defendants by means of fraud and
misrepresentations.” Except for this general statement, the
issue of fraud or misrepresentation
43
is not alleged with
particularity in the complaint. This is unfortu-
__________________
42 Heirs of Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 752, 763 (1997).

43 In Heirs of Manuel A Roxas v. Court of Appeals (337 Phil. 41, 52; 270
SCRA 309 [1997]), the Court held that there is “fraudulent concealment
and misrepresentation in the application” for registration where it is
alleged that “no other persons had any claim or interest in the said land.”
617
VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 617

nate because, if filed within the time set by law, a

complaint with the proper allegation of fraud coupled with
proof thereof could cause the loss of the indefeasibility of
private respondents’ title to the property. It is established
that if fraud attended the acquisition of title under the
Torrens System, such title cannot be used as a means to
perpetuate44
fraud against the rightful owner of real
property.
We take note of petitioners’ allegation in their “reply
memorandum that in the registration proceedings filed by
private respondents, “what was published in the Official
Gazette was the description of a bigger tract of land that
includes the45 smaller lot actually applied for by
respondents.” That factual allegation could have had its
impact before the trial court in an action for reconveyance
on the ground of fraud in the acquisition of title but not
before this Court where factual issues may no longer be
raised.
The inevitable conclusion therefore is that petitioners
were cognizant all the while of the futility of their attempt
to cancel the title of private respondents under the law.
Hence, they indirectly and collaterally attacked the land
title duly issued to private respondents on the theory that
the revival of the dormant judgment in their favor could
result in the realization of their objective of nullifying such
title. However, aggrieved applicants for land registration
Cannot seek protection under the provisions of the Rules of
Court which are merely suppletory to special laws
governing land registration proceedings.
The resolution of the instant petition cannot be complete
without a word on the manner by which officials of the then
Land Registration Commission ignored the lower court’s
order to explain the conflicting claims of ownership over
the same property. Particularly, there is a need for an
explanation why they caused the publication of the notice
of hearing in private respondents’ application for
registration notwithstanding that
________________
44 Bornales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75336, October

18, 1988, 166 SCRA 516, 524-525.
45 Rollo, p. 186.
618

the same office had already published the notice of hearing

as regards petitioners’ application for registration of the
same parcel of land. It is within the power of these officials
to determine whether or not the same parcel of land is the
subject of two applications for registration. The
indefeasibility of private respondents’ title over the
property should not get in the way of an administrative
investigation of possible omission or neglect of official duty.
This Court cannot let such malfeasance or misfeasance in
office pass unnoticed lest the integrity of the Torrens
System of land registration be undermined.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is
DENIED, and the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-1028 is
AFFIRMED. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Department of Justice so that an investigation against
officials who were responsible for the publication of two
notices of hearing of an application for registration of the
same parcel of land may be conducted and the guilty
officials duly sanctioned.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ.,

concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.—A decision of the land registration court,

ordering the confirmation and registration of title, being
the result of a proceeding in rem, binds the whole world.
(Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162 [1995])
——o0o——
619
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10/10/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 324

VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 591

THE HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ, EUGENIO LOPEZ DE

Actions; Land Registration; Courts; Jurisdiction.—In all cases

592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro

land registration, the Supreme Court’s affirmance of the lower

VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 593

Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro

affirmance in no way implied that the issue of jurisdiction was

subject of registration proceedings, the second court could no

594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro

sight, this complication of two applications for registration having

warranting the presumption that he either had abandoned or

VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 595

Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro

omitted to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the

Same; Same; Remedies of an aggrieved party after the lapse of

596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro

damages, x x x. In Spouses Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, the Court

unfortunate because, if filed within the time set by law, a

VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 597

Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro

Land Registration; The resolution of the instant petition

integrity of the Torrens System of land registration be

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

In this case, the two applications for registration of the

598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the certificate of title in the names of the second applicants,

Appeals found that the applicants had never been in

VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 599

Nevertheless, the municipality filed a motion to dismiss the

“x x x. Even if said land was communal property of the

The oppositor municipality filed a motion for

whatever action the movant” might take against the order

600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

nando, Ciriaco and Catalino, all surnamed De los Reyes,

ordering that once the decision becomes final, the

4 Record, pp. 20-21.

VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 601

oppositor municipality filed with this Court a. petition for

directing that upon the finality of the decision,

602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

property who declared the land for assessment and

The complaint alleged the facts pertinent to enforce the

15 Presided by Judge Hector C. Fule.

VOL. 324, FEBRUARY 3, 2000 603

lawful owners of the land. However, they had been unduly

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for the judgment to effect:

1. Execution of judgment of the decision of the then Court of

names of the defendants and their successors in interest

In their answer with compulsory counterclaim, the

16 Rollo, pp. 64-65.

604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

estoppel and failure to state a cause of action. They averred

against the Assurance Fund under the provisions of P.D.