EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-17169. November 30, 1963.]

ISIDRO C. ANG-ANGCO , petitioner, vs . HON. NATALIO P. CASTILLO,

ET AL. , respondents.

Juan T. David for petitioner.

Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE POWERS; PRESIDENT HAS NO

POWER TO TAKE DIRECT ACTION OF REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED CIVIL SERVICE
OFFICIAL. — The action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the
authority of the President, in taking direct action by considering petitioner resigned with
prejudice to reinstatement in the same bureau in the administrative case of petitioner,
without submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law
and should be set aside.
2. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE; COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE HAS ORIGINAL
AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER ADMINISTRATIVE CASES OF PERSONNEL IN
THE CLASSIFIED SERVICE; LIMITATION. — Under Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act
of 1959 it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive
jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all o cers and employees in the
classi ed service. The only limitation to this power is that the decision of the
Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, whose decision
in such cases shall be final.
3. ID.; EXECUTIVE POWERS; NO APPEAL TO PRESIDENT IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES. — The Civil
Service Law of 1959 does not provide for any appeal to the President, nor is he given
the power to review the decision in administrative cases motu proprio, unlike the
provision of the previous law, Com. Act. No. 598, which was expressly repealed by the
new law.
4. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONTROL BY PRESIDENT OVER OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES IN EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; EXTENT. — The extent of the power of
control given to the President by the Constitution over all o cers and employees in the
executive department was interpreted by this Court in the case of Hebron vs. Reyes 104
Phil., 175 to mean "the power of an o cer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate o cer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter", to distinguish it from the power of general
supervision over municipal government, but the decision does not go to the extent of
including the power to remove an o cer or employee in the executive department. The
power merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and
not over the actor or agent himself of the act.
5. ID.; ID.; CIVIL SERVICE; SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE
EMPLOYEES AND POWER OF CONTROL OF PRESIDENT RECONCILED. — The power of
control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove
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 o cers and employees who belonged to the executive department if they are
presidential appointees or do not belonged to the classi ed service, for such can be
justi ed under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint, but not with regard to those o cers or employees who belong to the
classi ed service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line
with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest
the appointment of the interior o cers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of department." With regard to those officers whose appointments are vested on
heads of department, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removal
precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of
1959.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO , J : p

On October 8, 1956, the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote a
letter to the Secretary of Commerce and Industry requesting for special permit to
withdraw certain commodities from the customshouse which were imported without
any dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange. Said commodities consisted of
1,188 units of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not covered by any Central Bank
release certi cate. On the same date, the company addressed an identical request to
the Secretary of Finance who was also the Chairman of the Monetary Board of the
Central Bank. Senator Pedro Sabido, in behalf of the company, likewise wrote said
o cial urging that authority be given to withdraw the abovementioned concentrates.
Not content with this step, he also wrote to Dr. Andres Castillo, Acting Governor of the
Central Bank, urging the same matter. Then Secretary Hernandez wrote another letter to
Dr. Castillo stating, "Senator Sabido is taking this to you personally. Unless we have
legal objection, I would like to authorize the withdrawal of the concentrates upon
payment of all charges. Please expedite action."

Almost at the same time, the Import-Export Committee of the Central Bank, thru
Mr. Gregorio Licaros, submitted to the Monetary Board a memorandum on the joint
petition of the company and Sabido Law O ce for authority to withdraw the
concentrates from the customhouse stating therein that it sees no objection to the
proposal. The Monetary Board, however, failed to take up the matter in its meeting of
October 12, 1956 for the reason that the transaction did not involve any dollar
allocation of foreign exchange, and of this decision Mr. Licaros was informed.
Having failed to secure the necessary authority from the Central Bank, on
October 13, 1956, the counsel of the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc.
approached Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco in an attempt to secure from him
the immediate release of the concentrates, but this o cial seeing perhaps that the
importation did not carry any release certi cate from the Central Bank advised the
counsel to try to secure the necessary release certi cate from the No-Dollar Import
O ce that had jurisdiction over the case. In the morning of the same day, Mr. Aquiles J.
Lopez, of said O ce, wrote a letter addressed to the Collector of Customs stating,
among other things, that his o ce had no objection to the release of the 1,188 units of
concentrates but that it could not take action on the request as "the same is not within
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 the jurisdiction of the No-Dollar Import O ce within the contemplation of R. A. No.
1410." The counsel already referred to above showed the letter to Collector of Customs
Ang-Angco who upon perusing it still hesitated to grant the release. Instead he
suggested that the letter be amended in order to remove the ambiguity appearing
therein, but Mr. Lopez refused to amend the letter stating that the same was neither a
permit nor a release. Secretary of Finance Hernandez having been contacted by
telephone, Collector of Customs Ang-Angco read to him the letter after which the
Secretary verbally expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certi cate.
Collector Ang-Angco, while still in doubt as to the propriety of the action suggested,
nally authorized the release of the concentrates upon payment of the corresponding
duties, customs charges, fees and taxes.
When Commissioner of Customs Manuel P. Manahan learned of the release of
the concentrates in question he immediately ordered their seizure but only a negligible
portion thereof remained in the warehouse. Whereupon, he led an administrative
complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco charging him with having
committed a grave neglect of duty and observed a conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the customs service. On the strength of this complaint President Ramon
Magsaysay constituted an investigating committee to investigate Ang-Angco
composed of former Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, as Chairman, and Atty. Arturo
A. Alafriz and Lt. Col. Angel A. Salcedo, as members. Together with Collector Ang-
Angco, Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez was also investigated by the same Committee, who was
also charged in a separate complaint with serious misconduct in o ce or conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the State. As a result, Collector Ang-Angco was
suspended from office in the latter part of December, 1956.
After the investigation, the committee submitted to President Magsaysay its
report recommending that a suspension of 15 days, without pay, be imposed upon
Ang-Angco chargeable against the period of his suspension. On April 1, 1957, Collector
Ang-Angco was reinstated to his o ce by Secretary Hernandez, but the decision on the
administrative case against him remained pending until the death of President
Magsaysay. After around three years from the termination of the investigation during
which period Ang-Angco had been discharging the duties of his o ce, Executive
Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of the President, rendered a decision on the
case on February 12, 1960 nding Ang-Angco "guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service", and considering him resigned effective from the date of notice,
with prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs.
Upon learning said decision from the newspapers, Collector Ang-Angco wrote a
letter to President Carlos P. Garcia calling attention to the fact that the action taken by
Secretary Castillo in removing him from o ce had the effect of depriving him of his
statutory right to have his case originally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service,
as well as of his right of appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, whose decision
under Republic Act No. 2260 is nal, besides the fact that such decision is in violation
of the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to o cers or employees in the civil
service against removal or suspension except for cause in the manner provided by law.
In a letter dated February 16, 1960, Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the
President, denied the request for reconsideration. Not satis ed with this resolution,
Collector Ang-Angco sent a memorandum to President Garcia reiterating once more
the same grounds on which he predicated his request reconsideration. Again Secretary
Castillo, also by authority of the President, in a letter dated July 1, 1960, denied the
appeal. In this instance, Secretary Castillo asserted that the President by virtue of his
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 power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and o ces, can take direct
action and dispose of the administrative case in question inasmuch as the provisions
of law that would seem to vest nal authority in subordinate o cers of the executive
branch of the government over administrative matters falling under their jurisdiction
cannot divest the President of his power of control nor diminish the same.
Hence, after exhausting all the administrative remedies available to him to secure
his reinstatement to the o ce from which he was removed without any valid cause or
in violation of his right to due process of law, Collector Ang-Angco led before this
Court the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a petition for
the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The Court gave due course to the
petition, but denied the request for injunction.
The main theme of petitioner is that respondent Executive Secretary Natalio P.
Castillo in acting on his case by authority of the President in the sense of considering
him as resigned from notice thereof, violated the guaranty vouchsafed by the
Constitution to o cers and employees in the classi ed service in that he acted in
violation of Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which vests in the
Commissioner of Civil Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide
administrative cases against o cers and employees in the classi ed service, deprived
him of his right of appeal under Section 18 (b) of the same Act to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals whose decision on the matter is nal, and removed him from the
service without due process in violation of Section 32 of the same Act which expressly
provides that the removal or suspension of any o cer or employee from the civil
service shall be accomplished only after due process, and of Section, 4, Article XII of
our Constitution which provides that "no o cer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed except for cause as provided for by law." Since petitioner is an o cer who
belongs to the classi ed civil service and is not a presidential appointee, but one
appointed by the Secretary of Finance under the Revised Administrative Code, he
cannot be removed from the service by the President in utter disregard of the provision
of the Civil Service Act of 1959.
Respondents, on their part, do not agree with this theory entertained by
petitioner. They admit that if the theory is to be considered in the light of the provisions
of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the same may be correct, for indeed the Civil Service
Law as it now stands provides that all o cers and employees who belong to the
classi ed service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil
Service and as such all administrative cases against them shall be indorsed to said
o cial whose decision may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals from
whose decision no further appeal can be taken. They also admit that petitioner belongs
to the classi ed civil service. But it is their theory that pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law applicable to employees in the classi ed service do not apply to the
particular case of petitioner since to hold otherwise would be to deprive the President
of his power of control over the o cers and employees of the executive branch of the
government. In other words, respondents contend that, whether the o cer or
employees concerned are presidential appointees or belong to the classi ed service, if
they are all o cers and employees in the executive department, they all come under the
control of the President and, therefore, his power of removal may be exercised over
them directly without distinction. Indeed, respondents contend that, if, as held in the
case of Negado vs. Castro, 55 Off. Gaz. 10534, the President may modify or set aside a
decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals at the instance of the office concerned, or
the respondent employee, or may even do so motu proprio, there would be in the nal
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 analysis no logical difference between removing petitioner by direct action of the
President and separating him from the service by ultimate action by the President
should an appeal be taken from the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals to
him, or if in his discretion he may motu proprio consider it necessary to review the
Board's decision. It is contended that this ruling still holds true in spite of the new
provision wrought into the law by Republic Act 2260 which eliminated the power of
review given to the President because the power of control given by the Constitution to
the President over o cers and employees in the executive department can only be
limited by the Constitution and not by Congress, for to permit Congress to do so would
be to diminish the authority conferred on the President by the Constitution which is
tantamount to amending the Constitution itself (Hebron vs. Reyes, L-9124, July 28,
1958). Indeed this is the argument invoked by respondent Castillo in taking direct
action against petitioner instead of following the procedure outlined in the Civil Service
Act of 1959 as may be seen from the following portion of his decision:
"In connection with the second ground advanced in support of your
petition, it is contended that in deciding the case directly, instead of
transmitting it to the Commissioner of Civil Service for original decision, this
O ce deprived the respondent of his right to appeal to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals. This contention overlooks the principle that the President
may modify or set aside a decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals at
the instance of either the o ce concerned or the respondent employee, or
may even do so motu proprio (Negado vs. Castro, 55 Off. Gaz., No. 51, p.
10534, Dec. 21, 1959). There would therefore be no difference in effect
between direct action by the President and ultimate action by him should an
appeal be taken from the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service or
the Civil Service Board of Appeals. The result is that the President's direct
action would be the nal decision that would be reached in case an appeal
takes its due course."

Thus, we see that the main issue involved herein is whether the President has the
power to take direct action on the case of petitioner even if he belongs to the classi ed
service in spite of the provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959. Petitioner
sustains the negative contending that the contrary view would deprive him of his o ce
without due process of law while respondents sustain the a rmative invoking the
power of control given to the President by the Constitution over all o cers and
employees belonging to the executive department.
To begin with, we may state that under Section 16 ( i) of the Civil Service Act of
1959 it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction
to decide administrative cases of all o cers and employees in the classi ed service
for in said section the following is provided: "Except as otherwise provided by law, (the
Commissioner shall) have nal authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all permanent o cers and employees in the competitive or classi ed
service and upon all matters relating to the employees." The only limitation to this
power is that the decision of the Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals, in which case said Board shall decide the appeal within a period of
90 days after the same has been submitted for decision, whose decision in such case
shall be nal (Section 18, Republic Act 2260). It should be noted that the law as it now
stands does not provide for any appeal to the President, nor is he given the power to
review the decision motu proprio, unlike the provision of the previous law,
Commonwealth Act No. 598, which was expressly repealed by the Civil Service of 1959
(Rep. Act 2260), which provides that the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals
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 may be reversed or modi ed motu proprio by the President. It is, therefore, clear that
under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of petitioner
comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having
been deprived of the procedure laid down therein in connection with the investigation
and disposition of his case, it may be said that he has been deprived of due process as
guaranteed by said law.
It must, however, be noted that the removal, separation and suspension of the
o cers and employees of the classi ed service are subject to the saving clause
"except as otherwise provided by law" (Section 16 (i), Republic Act No. 2260). The
question then may be asked: Is the President empowered by any other law to remove
officers and employees in the classified civil service?
The only law that we can recall on the point is Section 64(b ) of the Revised
Administrative Code, the pertinent portion of which we quote:
"(b) To remove o cials from o ce conformably to law and to
declare vacant the o ces held by such removed o cials. For disloyalty to
the (United States) Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines may at any time remove a person from any
position of trust or authority under the Government of the (Philippine
Islands) Philippines."

The phrase "conformably to law" is signi cant. It shows that the President does
not have blanket authority to remove any o cer or employee of the government but
that his power must still be subject to the law that may be passed by the legislative
body particularly with regard to the procedure, cause and nality of the removal of the
persons who may be the subject of disciplinary action. Here, as abovestated, we have
such law which governs the action to be taken against o cers and employees in the
classified civil service. This law is binding upon the President.
Another provision that may be mentioned is Section 79 (D) of the Revised
Administrative Code, which provides:
"Power to appoint and remove. — The Department Head, upon the
recommendation of the chief of the Bureau or o ce concerned, shall
appoint all subordinate o cers and employees whose appointment is not
expressly vested by law in the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines, and may remove or punish them, except as especially provided
otherwise, in accordance with the Civil Service Law."

The phrase "in accordance with the Civil Service Law" is also signi cant. So we
may say that even granting that, for administrative purposes, the President of the
Philippines is considered as the Department Head of the Civil Service Commission, his
power to remove is still subject to the Civil Service Act of 1959, and we already know
that with regard to o cers and employees who belong to the classi ed service the
nality of the action is given either to the Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil
Service Board of Appeals.
Let us now take up the power of control given to the President by the
Constitution over all o cers and employees in the executive department which is now
invoked by respondents as justi cation to override the speci c provisions of the Civil
Service Act. This power of control is couched in general terms for it does not set in
speci c manner its extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron vs. Reyes,
supra, had already occasion to interpret the extent of such power to mean "the power
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 of an o cer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate o cer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter" 1 , to distinguish it from the power of general supervision over
municipal government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including the
power to remove an o cer or employee in the executive department. Apparently, the
power merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and
not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It only means that the President may set
aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the performance of his duties.
That meaning is also the meaning given to the word "control" as used in
administrative law. Thus, the Department Head pursuant to Section 79 (C) is given
direct control of all bureaus and o ces under his department by virtue of which he may
"repeal or modify decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or o ces", and under Section
74 of the same Code, the President's control over the executive department only refers
to matters of general policy. The term "policy" means a settled or de nite course or
method adopted and followed by a government, body, or individual 2 , and it cannot be
said that the removal of an inferior o cer comes within the meaning of control over a
specific policy of government.
But the strongest argument against the theory of respondents is that it would
entirely nullify and set at naught the bene cent purpose of the whole civil service
system implanted in this Jurisdiction which is to give stability to the tenure of o ce of
those who belong to the classi ed service in derogation of the provision of our
Constitution which provides that "No o cer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Section 4, Article XII,
Constitution). Here, we have two provisions of our Constitution which are apparently in
con ict, the power of control by the President embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII,
and the protection extended to those who are in the civil service of our government
embodied in Section 4, Article XII. It is our duty to reconcile and harmonize these
con icting provisions in a manner that may be given to both full force and effect and
the only logical, practical and rational way is to interpret them in the manner we do it in
this decision. As this Court has aptly said in the case of Lacson vs. Romero:
". . . To hold that civil service o cials hold their o ce at the will of the
appointing power subject to removal or forced transfer at any time, would
demoralize and undermine and eventually destroy the whole Civil Service System
and structure. The country would then go back to the days of the old Jacksonian
Spoils System under which a victorious Chief Executive, after the elections could
if so minded, sweep out of o ce, civil service employees differing in political
color or a liation from him, and sweep in his political followers and adherents,
especially those who have given him help, political or otherwise." (Lacson vs.
Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 754)

There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President
may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove o cers and employees
who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not
belong to the classi ed service for such can be justi ed under the principle that the
power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson vs. Romero, supra), but
not with regard to those o cers and employees who belong to the classi ed service
for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision
of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
the inferior o cers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department"
(Article VII, Section 10 (3), Constitution). With regard to these o cers whose
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 appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a
procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such
law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.
"We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of
inferior o cers in the heads of departments it may limit and restrict power of
removal as it seems best for the public interest. The constitutional authority in
Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and
regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the
o cers so appointed. The head of a department has no constitutional
prerogative of appointment to o cers independently of legislation of Congress,
and by such legislation he must be governed, not only in making appointments
but in all that is incident thereto." (U. S. vs. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483)

I n resume we may conclude that the step taken by respondent Executive

Secretary, even with the authority of the President, in taking direct action on the
administrative case of petitioner, without submitting the same to the Commissioner of
Civil Service, is contrary to law and should be set aside.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that petitioner be immediately reinstated to his
o ce as Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, without prejudice of submitting
his case to the Commissioner of Civil Service to be dealt with in accordance with law.
No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Mondano vs. Silvosa, L-7708, May 30, 1955; 41 O.G., 2884.
2. Lockhead Aircraft Corp. vs. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 171 P. 2d 21, 24, 28
Cal. 2d 481, 166 A. L. R. 701.

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