Ethics, Morals and Business. A Brief Intro To Business Ethics
Ethics, Morals and Business. A Brief Intro To Business Ethics
Ethics, Morals and Business. A Brief Intro To Business Ethics
a little more clarity in our language. That's why we start off with a quick and easy definition
of the terms we will need most often during this course: ethics and morals.
Ethics
For a start, it can't hurt to go back to the roots. Etymology (= the study of the origin of
words) reveals that “ethics"
1) has roots in ancient Greek, whereas “morals” is of Roman/Latin origin.
2) refers to “ēthikē” (ἠθική), actually an adjective originally connected to epistēmē
(ἐπιστήμη) to denote “ethical understanding”.
3) was derived from “ēthos” (ἦθος), meaning “character” or “disposition”, to be While, originally, both
distinguished from “ethos” (ἔθος) which refers to customs, rites or habits – what Romans terms were roughly
synonymous, addressing
later used to call the “mores". patterns of human
action, ethics has since
So, while etymology doesn't reveal us the “true meanings” of the words, it may give a come to be defined as
first orientation. There's actually no binding or clear-cut definition of the terms that covers the philosophical
discipline that deals with
all they contain and defines how they relate to each other. However, there's some sort of morals.
convention that “ethics” refers to the discipline that describes, judges and directs human
behaviour in terms of “good” and “evil” – and “morals” rather refers to given patterns,
norms and rules of action which are the subject of ethical reflection. At the risk of
oversimplification, we could put it in a formula: Ethics is about morals, and morals is about
actions.
Morals
Morals or morality is about the actual patterns, norms and rules of behaviour that do
exist – side by side – in any given society. Other than “ethics”, the term has its roots not in
Morals has come to be ancient Greek, but in Latin. While, etymologically, ethics and morals carry quite similar
defined as the sum of
patterns, norms and (similarly ambiguous) meanings, the convention to identify ethics with the study of morals
rules of behaviour that may simply have to do with the fact that the one is considered to be older than the other.
exist in any given
society. “O tempora, o mores!” For generations, this has probably been the standard quote to
bemoan the “moral decline” of society. It's credited to Cicero, who used it in his well known
speech against Catilina, in 63 B. C. Actually, Cicero is also credited with having introduced
ēthikē into Latin in the sense of “philosophia moralis” – the meaning we nowadays infer to
it. “Mores” – the term which interests us here – is derived from Latin “mos”, which actually
carries the same, ambiguous range of meaning as ēthikē, denoting character, will, custom or
rule.
“Mores” and the “moral sciences” In its original, descriptive meaning, “mores” has been one of the oldest
L
sociological concepts to capture what was considered right and wrong, or moral, in human behaviour in a
given society or community. Actually, the “moral statistics” developed in early 19th century by Belgian
astronomer, mathematician and sociologist Adolphe Quételet has been called a progenitor of sociology: Here
Actually, “morale” still carries these meanings: In most general terms, it is about
motivation or will: In that sense of the word, we talk about “employee morale”, “working
morale” or even the “morale” of troops or sports teams, e. g.. More specifically, “morale” Moral standards are
implies some sort of value judgement. What's special about moral standards, generally, is supposed to be serious,
preferable, universal,
that they are supposed to be serious, preferable, universal, impartial and emotional. They impartial and emotional:
are about things that matter, that we value. And in fact, in most cases we feel some sort of They refer to things that
we value.
moral intuition that tells us what's the right thing to do. Sometimes, however, these
subjective intuitions may seem grossly immoral to others, or in the light of ethical reflection.
To act “morally”, generally speaking, means to act in compliance with some norm or
rule that's being approved/held up by a social group. This usually implies some sort of
positive and negative support or sanctions. Immoral acts do violate
some moral standard,
• "Unmoral” or “immoral” we call a behaviour that does not comply with some set of while amoral acts are
supposed to be “beyond
moral rules or norms. good and evil”.
• "Amoral” – and this may be new to you – we call behaviour that is not governed or
hampered by any such moral considerations.
How does moral behaviour relate to legal/"lawful” behaviour? Generally speaking, laws can be seen as
legitimate. Indeed, in many cases, laws are not sufficient to secure moral behaviour. In addition to that, if
sanctions are rare or not too deterrent, abiding to the law (e. g. to pay one's taxes) itself constitutes a basic
moral claim.
Economic behaviour can be said to be “amoral” in that it is free from explicit moral
considerations, even though they are still valid outside of the economic sphere, limiting
economic behaviour in the sense of “guardrails". Economic behaviour,
theoretically, is
supposed to be amoral –
This disrespect of economic behaviour and economics for moral norms is the result of a governed by “laws” of
historical process of emancipation of economic thinking from moral philosophy (see above). economics that
This process of “disembedding” of the economy from the social fabric, which goes hand in supposedly do without
moral man.
hand with a belief in economics as a hard natural science that makes no normative
judgements, is actually one of the main sources of conflict and the reason for business
ethics. On the other hand, of course, the “economic system”, even if it has developed its
own institutions, norms and rules, is still part of society and linked to it in many ways.
Moral outrage and the moral economy of society Actually, moral outrage has both been an indicator that
L
something's wrong (with the economy or with politcs) and an initiator for change. Think of some recent
examples for such moral outrage: With his best-selling book Indignez-vous! (Time for Outrage!), written at the
age of 92, Stéphane Hessel, a former resistance fighter and survivor of the Holocaust, confirmed and
inspired the views of millions of people around the globe (Hessel 2011). The Occupy movement has brought
hundreds of thousands of people worldwide on the streets, criticizing the “greed” of bankers, bank bailouts
and a generally unjust distribution of wealth in an economy that – according to the movement – benefits the
richest 1% of the population. The “anti-globalization movement” has been around since the early 1990s,
criticizing neo-liberal globalization and the collateral damage on societies and nature in its wake. More
recently, so-called “shit storms”, “flash mobs” and other spontaneous outbreaks of collective outrage have
been made effective through new social media. Actually, we encounter such outrage about particular
“immoral” business practices almost on a daily basis. Topics of particular concern in this respect include:*
- lay-offs ("redundancies"), discrimination and intrusions of privacy at the workplace (LABOUR)
- exploitation of people and nature for profit, bribery and unfair trade (SOURCING)
- deceiving consumers, price gouging, intruding the public space (MARKETING)
- a “greed is great mentality” and resource-sapping consumerism (CONSUMPTION)
- “greedy” traders and bankers, bank bailouts, creative accounting, externalization (CONTROLLING)
- narrow shareholder value management (STAKEHOLDERS)
- depletion of natural resources (SUSTAINABILITY)
* The terms in capital letters refer to relevant fields of management or economic behaviour that we are going to deal with in-
depth in the following units.
In all these cases, moral outrage signals that there's a conflict between our moral
Moral outrage reveals a
conflict between our intuitions and economic reality, between what's deemed to be economically sound and
moral intuitions and morally justifiable. This sheds light on the fact that the economy is still very much
economic reality.
embedded in a moral universe.
Descriptive ethics
Descriptive ethics deals with the question what role “morality” actually plays in the
Descriptive ethics looks
economy – immoral behaviour which we just discussed, but also moral behaviour. It may at the role moral norms
well be that “economics” does not deal with morality – that's not its business. Moral actually play in an
economy – notably as a
considerations, seen that way, are “exogenous”, outside of its realm of competence. Still, form of “social capital”
contrary to the belief that business is just amoral or even immoral or that moral norms that allows for efficient
economies &
would only interfere with business, limit it, morals actually play an important role for the businesses.
efficient functioning of an economy. There are indeed many moral aspects and factors that
play a role in economic behaviour – in economies and businesses alike.
Normative ethics
That's what's usually being referred to as ethics (“ethics proper”), even though it's only
one part of it. There's “descriptive ethics” which we have been dealing with in part 1.
There's something like “explicative ethics” which takes a “meta perspective”, reflecting
upon different normative ethical theories or paradigms. That's the perspective we will take
Normative ethics (“ethics in the remainder of the unit.
proper”) is about judging
and directing behaviour Normative ethics is basically concerned with the evaluation, justification and direction
– from different aspects of behaviour based on some notion of what's good and bad (or evil). Ethics is the discipline
& through different
lenses. that reflects upon these issues. And it does this from different angles and through different
lenses.
I will try to present you some of these to give you a first impression of what an ethical
argument involves. This will necessarily be somewhat superficial – this is indeed a vast field.
However, we will get back to the different arguments repeatedly in our later course units
Roughly, arguments of and discuss them in more detail, and with concrete examples.
normative ethics can be
said to focus either on In an effort to structure this field of ethical theories, I will distinguish between theories
intentions, implications
or interactions.
that focus on intentions, interactions or implications. This seems sufficiently rough for a
start. It could certainly be done differently, as you may find out yourself whenever you
browse through any two or more textbooks on business ethics. However, it is a starting
point that draws on conventional categories and presents them in a different and
(hopefully) compelling way.
Intentions
“Intentions” focuses on individual motives of agents. These reasons for action have to be
good in themselves, unconditionally. Morally good actions are those that are done for
morally good reasons: to do good or at least to comply with some moral standard.
An intentions-based
ethics focuses on This perspective contains what's usually covered by the term “deontological” ethics,
agents' motives which
have to be good in
derived from the Greek δέον (deon), meaning something that has to be done, no matter
themselves – in extreme what. It obviously implies a sense of duty and virtue, and unconditional respect for moral
cases at all cost.
rules, rights and needs. Examples include:
• follow the ten commandments
• obey the law
Implications
“Implications” focuses on the collective consequences of actions. These results of actions
have to be good – not the agents' reasons, the “morality” of which is not relevant or
conditional upon these ends. Morally good actions are those that yield good outcomes: It's An implications-based
about doing something because it's supposedly instrumental to the best outcome for ethics focuses on
outcomes which have to
everybody involved. be good, irrespective of
motives – in extreme
This perspective contains what's usually referred to as “teleological” (or cases justifying all
“consequentialist") ethics, derived from the ancient Greek τέλος (télos), meaning some sort means.
of goal or purpose. It implies a sense for the hidden, sometimes wondrous, “emergent”
effects of human actions, an understanding that some good may come even from bad
intentions. Actually, this change of perspective has been referred to as a “paradigm change”
in the development of modern ethics. Examples include:
• lie if it helps
• self-interest, even greed is ethically neutral in that it promotes general welfare
• charity may be immoral when it keeps people dependent
• make and take bribes if it saves jobs
In short, this conception of ethics is about doing something because it (supposedly)
yields good results. While this is a basic trait of what we call soberness and pragmatism and
which we impute to “entrepreneurship” as a driving force of economic development, this
position may also justify whatever is necessary to increase some imaginary “common good”,
implying that the end justifies the means.
Still, this perspective on ethics may be seen as the typically modern one. It is about freely
promoting one's interests, “improving one's lot”, without infringing upon the interests of
others – and certainly without having to care about some traditional (often hypocritical)
canons of morality.
Interactions
“Interactions” focuses on the interpersonal processes involved in decisions. It is about how
decisions are made, which makes them “good”. Morally good decisions are those that have
been derived “the right way”, i. e. based on some sort of dialogue with all those that should
have a say: because they are affected by the decision, because they have to carry it out, or
because they just know much about what's at stake.
An interactions-based
ethics focuses on the This perspective implies what I would like to refer to as “dialogical” ethics, derived from
interpersonal processes ancient Greek διάλογος (diálogos), meaning conversation, discourse or: dialogue.
involved in decision-
making– in extreme The ethical value of the actions that are derived this way is neither judged by the motives
cases, this focus on the
way leads nowhere. of those involved nor by the actual consequences of their decisions, but by the way they are
made. The decisions reached may not be the best ones, as regards motives or ends, but they
are ideally a consensus that all those involved can live with.
What's behind this assumption is a certain “relationist” perspective that holds that there
are different interests and perspectives that may make one decision seem “best” -- but that in
an ideal situation where not power, but the “best argument” or viewpoint wins the trick,
this is then the best decision: in terms of responsibility and sustainability (compared to
monological, authoritarian or paternalistic decisions), and in terms of effectiveness of such
decisions. Examples include:
• democratic decisions
• stakeholder dialogue
• those that are affected should have a say
This perspective may be seen as the typically post-modern one. It acknowledges that
there are many different ethical principles one may call upon. To derive at the best possible
decision, it is therefore necessary to commit oneself to an open dialogue of equals with
those that should have a say.
Actually, this is also the perspective I will try to convey to you throughout this course.
The fact that there are many different views, that (in many a case) none will be absolutely
right or best in terms of determining what's good and right, does not imply that “anything
goes”. Such a “relativist” or “nihilist” position would actually be only one more aspect to
bring to bear in an ethical discourse – and as we will see in a later unit, “ethical relativism”
has some merits, if only to save us from ethical ethnocentrism and bigotry.
Virtues
Virtues refer to agents. They are seen as desirable properties of a person's character.
Virtues have been the subject of ethical reflection ever since, and they remained in its focus
for long. Even if many ethical questions in today's highly complex societies relate to Virtues define good traits
relationships between individuals, the cultivation of character may still be a worthwhile of character, inasmuch
they are deemed
aspiration in many ways. valuable and necessary
to lead a good life.
There are traditional virtues that practically all cultures have tried to define, hold up and
cultivate, because they seemed to be necessary to lead a good life. The western concept of
virtue can be traced back to what the ancient Greeks called ἀρετή (aretḗ) and the Romans
called virtu: Both referred to some state of particular capability or excellence, usually in
relation to heroism or aristocracy. The term “virtuous”, denoting the excellent mastership
of some task (think of musicians or artists in general), reminds of this general meaning.
Both terms also carried a double meaning which we still find today:
• A person may have virtue (in the singular form), meaning that he or she is virtuous
as a whole, has integrity, unity of character.
• A person may have virtues (in the plural form), meaning that she or he has many
good qualities, which may however not have much ethical weight.
As every era has its particular virtues, today's conception of virtue does not only draw on
ancient sources, but also on the Christian tradition and on concepts of virtue that have been
promoted by the bourgeoisie, in its rise to political and economic predominance. This long We have inherited
history has left us a big heritage of different, primary and secondary “virtues”: various catalogues of
virtues, the bourgeois
• the classical “cardinal virtues”, including prudence/sagacity, justice, courage and “business virtues” being
most relevant for
moderation – classical prerequisites to live the good life economic activity.
• Christian virtues, including faith, hope and love (charity), and those seven virtues
defined in opposition to capital sins, such as humility, charity, chastity, patience,
temperance and benevolence
• special “estate” virtues pertaining to different groups of persons, such as soldiers,
men and women, knights or businessmen
• civic/bourgeois or “business virtues” such as fidelity, diligence, obedience, discipline,
sense of duty, timeliness, reliability, orderliness, correctness, politeness, cleanliness
and so on, which are usually referred to as “secondary virtues”, because they do not
refer to some conception of the good life, but instead to economic success and an
orderly and efficient functioning of a society and its economy. Indeed, insofar as
Principles
Principles do not refer to traits of character that one should aspire to, but to properties
that characterize relationships between people: They are meant to define what a good
society should look like.
Principles define good
relationships between While “virtue ethics” is not hard to identify with the first type of ethical paradigms
people, inasmuch they
are deemed to contribute
defined earlier (the one focusing on intentions), the same is not true for most ethical
to a good society. principles. As mentioned earlier, practically all of these principles may either be seen as
motives or as ends of actions – or else as a subject of an ethical dialogue.
At best, it is possible to identify some affinities between them: Respect for the rights and
freedom of persons, e. g., or caring for concrete people will usually be conceived as motives
of actions to be realized immediately, and not left to chance. On the contrary, a principle
such as general welfare is usually defined in terms of an “unintended”, emergent outcome of
self-interested market behaviour.
Some principles, thus, have relatively close affinities with either a deontological, a
teleological or a dialogical perspective – but indeed the main difference is whether they are
aspired to directly or indirectly, vis à vis concrete people or an abstract market or society.
This said, I would like to just sketch some of the core principles of ethical theory – a much
more in-depth discussion of at least some of them will follow in later course units.
Rights
When talking about rights from an ethical perspective, it is important to distinguish
between “moral rights” that are usually bound to specific duties and so-called “human
rights” that people are endowed with unconditionally, qua birth.
Human rights denote “natural” innate entitlements of human beings, rights that are
supposed to be unconditional, universal, equal, non-destructible and independent of any
Freedom
Freedom has been a core principle and motto of modern humanist and Enlightenment
philosophy. One of its basic claims has been to build a new, better human society based on
the free use of human reason – actually a revolutionary idea that implied claims for freedom Freedom is at the core of
of expression (speech and press), freedom to associate and freedom from torture and both economic and
political liberalism, the
servitude. Thus, claims for freedom obviously go into two different directions: former being much more
radical when it comes to
• negative freedom, i. e. freedom from traditional privileges and bonds, authoritarian the free, unhampered
and paternalistic rules, e. g. use of private property.
• positive freedom, i. e. freedom to develop one's capabilities, improve one's lot and
decide for oneself, e. g.
Seen this way, it comes clear that debates on freedom and (positive and negative) rights
have been closely linked ever since. Claims for liberty or specific liberties may be further
distinguished based on their focus and radicality:
• a libertarian view that focuses on the right to private property and its free,
unhampered use as the basis of a free and just society. Roughly speaking, this radical
view is the basis of economic liberalism and “free market” ideology.
• a liberal view that focuses on securing civic liberties by way of limiting some of
them and monopolizing them in the hand of the state, the “res publica”. Roughly
speaking, this republican view is the basis of political liberalism, favouring checks
and balances and mixed economies.
For classical economic liberalism, the free pursuit of one's economic interests lies at the
heart of a functioning, efficient market economy: If everyone is free to follow their interests,
and nobody is able to exert power on any other market player, so the assumption, the ideal
“perfectly competitive free market” will serve the needs, respect the rights and do justice to
people better than any other economic system would (cf. chapter 4). This liberal utopia –
Welfare
Welfare is the second pillar of a capitalist market economy – beside freedom. While
liberalism focuses on freedom in its own right, utilitarianism focuses on the complementary
concept of welfare, roughly speaking. Freedom and welfare, in this view, belong together,
Welfare is the second, promising a self-regulating, anti-authoritarian setting for the efficient creation of value: As
utilitarian pillar of
capitalist market
an ideal, this system reproduces freedom and utility on a regular, sustained basis. Both
economy. liberalism and utilitarianism, thus, can be safely counted among the consequentialist party
of ethical theories. Both claim that the free use of one's capabilities, in the pursuit of
happiness, will eventually promote the welfare of all.
Both liberalism and utilitarianism, therefore, accounted for the “ethical revolution” that
came with a shift of focus from virtues to vices and their potential value for the progress of
society. The ideas behind this paradigm shift, however, had not been entirely new. Welfare,
broadly speaking, is just another word for happiness – and that's what utilitarianism is
actually all about (even if its somewhat special conception may be seen as typically modern
and bourgeois). Such an “eudaemonian” view (from the ancient Greek εὐδαιμονία, most
often translated as felicity or happiness) can actually be traced back to most of ancient
Greek philosophy, most notably Aristotle. Most radically, and in the context of a secular
and atomist world view, it had been expressed as a guiding principle in Epicurean
philosophy. With the Renaissance and the loss of authority of Christian ethics in its wake,
however, eudaemonism was again slowly gaining ground in Europe. Utilitarianism,
therefore, may be seen as a distant, modern heir of this ancient tradition (Ebbersmeyer et al.
2007).
The critique put forward against Epicureans, i. e. that they were overly, even immorally
hedonistic (= “lust-seeking"), may actually be repeated with a little more right against
utilitarians. Indeed, “utility” signifies a more technical, and also a more materialist
conception of happiness -- at least in the classical formulation of Jeremy Bentham (Nasher
2008). In an utterly narrow conception of happiness as material value to be measured,
counted, accumulated and aggregated, it has come to be the paradigmatic forerunner of
“welfare indices” such as the GDP – with all its shortcomings.
Still, the acid test for morally good behaviour from a utilitarian's perspective is not
merely the increase of one's own, personal happiness (however this may be defined), but
whether this promises to increase the happiness (or welfare) of the biggest number. In that
respect, utilitarianism actually proves to be a very rigorous theory of ethics: Every choice of
action that prevents you from doing something more valuable for society is actually
immoral, according to this view.
What welfare – apart from an abstract conception of efficiency which allows no one to be
disadvantaged by a different allocation of resources – does not talk about is how it is to be
distributed. That's what justice is all about.
Care
The principle of care has been introduced into the recent ethical discussion by feminist
thinkers like Carol Gilligan. It claims to be based on many of our immediate moral impulses
and intuitions pertaining to special responsibilities to special people (Velasquez 2011).
Responsibility
Responsibility has again gained popularity with the proliferation of concepts such as
“Corporate Social Responsibility”. As an ethical term, “responsibility” is actually relatively
young – it hadn't been used until the early nineteenth century (Bayertz 1995). Actually, it is
not about any particular ethical principle (such as the ones presented earlier), but about
whether and how some morally bad acts can be rightly attributed to somebody – and,
Responsibility is about therefore, whether and how this person has to answer for these acts.
answering for the
consequences of one's Other than duty or guilt, responsibility focuses on the consequences of one's actions –
actions – even if they
were not intended. even if one had not wanted or been able to foresee these consequences. So, it is basically
about being accountable for the outcomes of one's actions. The growing importance of
responsibility mirrors the development of modern society, which is marked by an extensive
division of labour. Under such conditions, the effects of one's behaviour may be neither
clear nor intended.
Specifically, this issue comes up when we look at organizations, including corporations.
There's an intricate ethical debate going on about whether and in what sense corporations
may be “responsible” in the first place (French 1992; Maring 2005). Even though there are
different views on whether they could and should be made morally responsible, there is
some consensus about a few things:
• Corporations and organizations in general are not mere aggregates of individuals,
therefore the outcomes of corporate behaviour are not merely the sum total of
individual acts, but an emergent result likely not intended by any particular individual.
Thus, it may be unjust to lay the blame on some individual “scapegoat”.
• Corporations contain particular structures and cultures which may “channel”
Corporations can be
made responsible for individual acts in certain directions, i. e. these individuals are not acting freely.
ethical, theoretical and Therefore, it may be more effective to change the organization – not just exchange the
practical reasons – in
addition to individual individuals – in order to prevent irresponsible behaviour in the future.
actors.
• Corporations (or their legal successors) have to take responsibility when individual
actors can no longer be made responsible for what they did. Therefore, it may make
practical sense to make corporations responsible, if otherwise no one would be.
efforts to give answers to these particular “moral crises” of the corporate world.
We will recurrently get back to a discussion of Corporate Social Responsibility
throughout this course. At this point, it will suffice to distinguish the concept (as an ideal
notion) from the two others just introduced. I will distinguish them with respect to their
relation to the process of value creation. Seen this way, CSR – even in a narrow “business
case” sense of the term – still proves to be the most demanding and promising of these
concepts.
• Corporate Citizenship focuses on “giving back to society”, it is basically about “doing
good and talking about it”, a new strategic approach to philanthropy that's concerned
with general “social issues”, not the company's own business, i.e. the process of value Due to constant pressure
creation. by civil society groups,
CSR has become a fairly
• Corporate Governance focuses on “moral risk” (on the part of management), it is demanding concept,
even in the narrow sense
basically about securing the interests of shareholders (the principals), preserving trust of a “business case” – at
and, therefore, the flow of capital, a rather conventional, neo-classical view that least in theory.
identifies corporate social responsibility with profit-maximizing, implying that this
would be per se in the general interest.
• Corporate Social Responsibility focuses on “internalization”, it is basically about
answering legitimate claims made on the part of society, based on an understanding of
the firm as a social institution that's embedded in a moral universe. In such an ideal
understanding, CSR includes responsibility for its core business, along the entire value
chain, for economic as well as social and ecological consequences, and vis-à-vis all
stakeholders that have a legitimate interest in its operations.
Actually, even if CSR in theory is a very demanding concept, there's an ongoing debate
about whether it should be seen as a “business case” (basically counting on changes in
society that a company would react to “voluntarily”) or as a “moral case” (basically
demanding that corporations be responsible for immoral acts no matter what). Practically,
this is also a debate about what binding regulations are needed to hold a company to
account, or whether this should be left to the discretion of management and to the
sanctions of the market.
Democracy
Democracy no doubt constitutes a core institution of our society. We proud ourselves of
living in a democracy, including the rights of free expression and to take part in the political
process. Ironically, still, democracy is very much limited to this political realm, and to
Democracy is an ethical representative forms of democracy – while the citizens' (the sovereign's) say is limited to
ideal based on the belief
that decisions should be
periodic elections and media-informed control of delegates who take the actual decisions. In
made by those affected, the economic realm, democracy is generally a rather exotic phenomenon. While in most
in ways that assure the companies, strict hierarchical structures and chains of command are predominant, there are
emergence of some form
of “communicative individual efforts to initiate democratic structures in companies.
rationality”.
To appreciate the ethical value of democratic decisions, we can reiterate what was said
about the dialogical paradigm of ethics. It actually refers to interactions, to the process of
decision-making – not to the motives of those involved, nor on the eventual results of such
The Cave Rescue, an “ethical dilemma” of sorts Philosophers seem to like caves to make a point: Just
L
think of Socrates' classical “allegory of the cave” to illustrate our limits of perception and conception (we just
see the passing shadows which we stubbornly take for reality). The case at stake is not about ontology (what
“is”?) or epistemology (can we “know”, what and how?), but about ethics: What are we to do?
Think of a group of tourists. They were on an adventurous trip to visit a well-known cave. All of a sudden, a
part of the cave near the entry collapsed. Nobody died, but now the group is caught inside the cave. A rescue
team has been alarmed by the cave authority. The situation as it reveals itself to the rescue team is as such:
The five people (four tourists and their seasoned guide) gathered at a spot with access to an interphone
system, therefore they can communicate with the rescue team. According to the information from inside the
cave, one person was badly hurt by the collapse, and the cave is quickly filling up with water. The captives
will have to be rescued with a winch, through a narrow emergency shaft – one by one, and quick. It is very
likely that the rescue team will be able to rescue one person, yet the odds of any other successful rescue are
getting worse every minute. So, the rescue team faces a dilemma: Whom should they rescue first?
- A little girl, 12 years old. She was seriously wounded in the cave collapse. Her rescue will likely take twice
the time as in the case of the others.
- Her mother, who has another three little children waiting for her at home.
- A medical researcher, a misanthrope, but also a real genius, supposedly about to discover a cure for
cancer. He is so distrustful that he made no notes but has it all in his head.
- A good samaritan who has already saved uncounted lives.
- The cave guide, who is also the brother of one of the rescue team.
Whom would you choose to bring out first, when it is sure that you can save one person? What options are
there to reach a decision that can be ethically justified?