SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118284 July 5, 1996

SPOUSES MAMERTO REFUGIA and FELIZA PAYAD-

REFUGIA, RODOLFO REFUGIA, and CANDELARIA

REFUGIA, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ARTURO REFUGIA and

AURORA TIMBANG-REFUGIA, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:p

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34647 promulgated on

December 9, 1994 which reversed and set aside the judgment 2 dated April 29, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of

Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Civil Case No. 4347-V-94 affirming with some modifications the decision  3 rendered by the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81, in Civil Case No. 6089 on March 4, 1994.

The records en bloc of the aforesaid cases show that private

respondent-spouses Arturo Refugia and Aurora Timbang-Refugia

are the registered owners of a parcel of land and a duplex

apartment building constructed thereon located at No. 16 Meriales

Street, Marulas, Valenzuela, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate

of Title No. 218979. Apparently, said title was issued pursuant to a

Deed of Absolute Sale executed on September 11, 1975 in favor

of respondent Arturo Refugia, but the purchase price of

P20,000.00 was reportedly advanced by his father, herein

petitioner Mamerto Refugia. Thereafter, respondent Arturo Refugia

obtained a housing loan from the Social Security System, using

the land as collateral to secure payment thereof. In 1976, after the

construction of the duplex apartment building, herein petitioners

immediately began to occupy one door while respondents stayed

in the other unit.

It appears, however, that things did not turn out well between

petitioners and private respondents, especially between petitioner

Feliza Refugia and her daughter-in-law, Aurora, such that in

February of 1993, petitioners were told by private respondents to

vacate the unit that they were occupying because, according to

private respondents, the family of one of their children who is

married needed a place of their own. Petitioners refused to leave,

claiming that they own the unit they are occupying by reason of the

fact that it was actually Mamerto Refugia who bought the lot on

which the duplex apartment stood. Because of this, the matter was

brought before the barangay court of conciliation. No amicable

settlement having been reached between the parties, private

respondents instituted an action for ejectment on October 20, 1993

in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81.

On March 4, 1994, the court a quo rendered judgment dismissing

the complaint for ejectment based on its finding that herein

petitioners are the lawful occupants of the premises. Thus, it held

that:

Like in any other ejectment suit, the pivotal issue is whether the

defendants are unlawfully with(h)olding possession of the

premises in question. The question that perturbs the mind of the

Court which is not fully explained by plaintiffs is whether the stay of

the defendants in the premises was indeed by plaintiffs' tolerance

alone. From the evidence on hand the Court is more disposed to

believe the position of the defendants that it was Mamerto who

bought the lot where the duplex apartment was constructed by

plaintiff Arturo Refugia. As stated earlier, the amount of

P20,000.00 was withdrawn on September 11, 1975, the date the

Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibits F and F-1) was executed. The

consideration of the sale is for P20,000.00. The fact that a two-

door apartment was indeed constructed likewise regenerates the

claim of defendants that they shall be co-owners of the lot and

shall dwell in one of the doors of said apartment. If the averment of

plaintiffs that they exclusively own the property is not to be trusted

— what have motivated them to construct a two-door apartment

instead of a single and a larger house? These facts are small

tributaries that lead us to the bigger lake of truth, that is, the stay of

the defendants in the premises is not on the basis of mere

tolerance.

It may also be pointed out that the certification to file action (Exhibit

E) issued by the Barangay is for Land Dispute not for ejectment.

(Emphasis ours) In the handwritten transcripts of the proceedings

in the barangay, it appears that this case is merely an off-shoot of

a misunderstanding between plaintiff Aurora Refugia and her in-

laws. It was admitted by Aurora that she offered to pay the a

mount of P20,000.00 but that the defendants refused to accept the

same. Then and there plaintiff Aurora said that she would prefer to

sell the unit to another and that out of the proceeds of the sale, she

will pay the defendants. These circumstances lead the Court to

conclude that it is not true that plaintiffs' daughter is in need of the

premises.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in

its aforementioned decision, affirmed with modification the

judgment of the lower court by declaring herein petitioners and

private respondents co-owners of the lot and the two-door

apartment. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,

private respondents duly filed a petition for review before

respondent Court of Appeals.

On December 9, 1994, said respondent court rendered its

questioned judgment which reversed and set aside the aforestated

decisions of the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial

Court, and thereafter ordered petitioners and their privies to vacate

the subject premises and to surrender possession thereof to

private respondents. In so ruling, respondent court declared that

the Regional Trial Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction

over an ejectment case, had no authority to resolve the issue of

ownership and to declare herein petitioners as co-owners because

its power is limited only to a determination of the issue of

possession, that petitioners' bare allegation of ownership cannot

prevail over the transfer certificate of title and deed of sale in favor

of private respondents; and that petitioners have been occupying

the subject premises by mere tolerance.

Hence, this petition wherein petitioners aver that respondent Court

of Appeals erred: (a) in giving due course to respondents' appeal

despite the fact that it was filed beyond the fifteen (15) day

reglementary period to appeal; (b) in disregarding jurisprudence

that factual findings of the trial court should not be disturbed on

appeal; (c) in holding that petitioners' claim of co-ownership of the

subject premises is a mere allegation unsupported by any concrete

evidence; (d) in ruling that the issue of ownership, as raised by

petitioners, is foreign to the issue of possession in an ejectment

case; and (e) in reversing the decisions of both lower courts and

ordering petitioners' eviction from the disputed premises.

Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that private respondents

received a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court on May

4, 1994 and thus they had until May 19, 1994 within which to file a

petition for review before the Court of Appeals. However, private

respondents filed instead a Motion for Reconsideration which was

denied by the Regional Trial Court in its Order dated June 21,

1994. Petitioners argue that since the motion for reconsideration is

a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure and

that the filing thereof did not interrupt the running of the

prescriptive period, the petition for review which was filed by

private respondents only on July 21, 1994 was already way

beyond the 15-day reglementary period and should not have been

given due course by respondent court.

In the case of Jakihaca vs. Aquino, et al.,   this Court categorically

4

ruled that:

The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before

the Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial Courts, pursuant to

Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Summary procedures

have no application to cases before the Regional Trial Courts.

Hence, when the respondents appealed the decision of the

Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the applicable

rules are those of the latter court.

It is thus settled that a motion for reconsideration may be filed from

a decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its

appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the inferior courts in

ejectment cases. Accordingly, this argument of petitioners has to

be rejected.

There is nonetheless appreciable merit in their contention that the

petition for review was belatedly filed in the Court of Appeals. This

is because in case of a judgment or final order of the Regional

Trial Court rendered in an appeal from the judgment or final order

of an inferior court, the former may be appealed to the Court of

Appeals through a petition for review within fifteen days from

receipt of said judgment or final order. If a motion for

reconsideration is filed, the losing party has only the remaining

period within which to file that petition for review. The filing,

therefore, of a motion for reconsideration has the effect of only

suspending the period to appeal. This rule has been clarified in the

case of Lacsamana, et. al. vs. The Honorable Second Special

Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, et. al.,   as5

follows:

3) APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF

APPEALS

The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal

from the final judgment or order of a metropolitan trial court,

municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, may be

appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review in

accordance with Section 22 of BP No. 129 and Section 22 (b) of

the Interim Rules, or to this Court through a petition for review

on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and

Section 25 of the Interim Rules. The reason for extending the

period for the filing of a record on appeal is also applicable to the

filing of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The period

for filing a petition for review is fifteen days. If a motion for

reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the

movant has only the remaining period within which to file a petition

for review. Hence, it may necessary to file a motion with the Court

of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for

review. (Emphasis supplied).

It is not disputed that private respondents received a copy of the

decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela on May 4, 1994,

and that their motion for reconsideration was filed with said court

on the fifteenth day of the reglementary period to appeal, that is,

May 19, 1994. In such a case, the rule is that the aggrieved party

has only one day from receipt of the order denying the motion for

reconsideration within which to file a petition for review before the

Court of Appeals.   In the case at bar, private respondents received

6

a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July

6, 1994, and, without moving for extension of time, were able to file

their petition for review only on July 21, 1994; hence their appeal

was not seasonably perfected. Strictly speaking, therefore, the

appeal should not have been given due course, following the

pronouncement in the case of Miranda vs. Guanzon, et al.   to the

7
effect that the requirement regarding the perfection of an appeal

within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but

jurisdictional.

This rule, however, has been relaxed in the latter case of Tijam, et

al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al.   where it was held that a party, after

8

voluntarily submitting a cause, is estopped from attacking the

jurisdiction of the court simply because it thereafter obtained an

adverse decision on the merits. The Court explained therein that

the "party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment

or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but

for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated —

obviously for reasons of public policy." It will be noted that the

jurisdictional issue involved in the instant case was raised only for

the first time in the present petition for review on certiorari. The

lack or absence of appellate jurisdiction was never questioned by

petitioners either in their Comment   submitted with respondent

9

court or in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal   which was grounded

10

solely on the fact that the petition for review filed before said court

was not verified.

Despite several opportunities to raise the issue of jurisdiction in the

Court of Appeals, petitioners did not challenge its appellate

jurisdiction and did so only after an adverse decision was rendered

against them. To be more precise, they raised the issue of

jurisdiction, for the nullification of the decision of the Court of

Appeals, when the case was already on appeal before this Court.

They are now barred from doing so under the doctrine of estoppel

by laches.   Additionally, having participated actively in the

11

proceedings before the appellate court, petitioners can no longer

question its authority.  12

The main issue in this case demands the determination of whether

the Metropolitan Trial Court, as well as the Regional Trial Court in

the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to resolve

the issue of ownership in an action for unlawful detainer where the

issue of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the

question of ownership. In the affirmative, it becomes necessary to

delineate the extent and legal effect of such adjudication.

Under Republic Act No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as

amended, the jurisdiction of the then municipal and city courts over

actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer was defined as

follows:
Sec. 88. Original jurisdiction in civil cases. — . . . In forcible entry

and detainer proceedings, the municipal judge or judge of the city

court shall have original jurisdiction, but the said municipal judge or

city judge may receive evidence upon the question of title therein,

whatever may be the value of the property, solely for the purpose

of determining the character and extent of possession and

damages for detention. In forcible entry proceedings, he may grant

preliminary injunctions, in accordance with the provisions of the

Rules of Court, to prevent the defendant from committing further

acts of dispossession against the plaintiff. (As amended by

Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828).

The law was subsequently amended by Republic Act No.

5967   which vested in the city courts special jurisdiction to resolve

13

the issue of ownership in conjunction with the issue of possession

whenever the question of ownership is brought in issue by the

pleadings, thus:

Sec. 3. Besides the civil cases over which the City Courts have

jurisdiction under Section eighty-eight of Republic Act Numbered

Two hundred ninety-six, as amended, it shall likewise have

concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance over the

following:
 xxx xxx xxx

(c) In ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in

issue in the pleadings. The issue of ownership shall therein be

resolved in conjunction with the issue of possession.

This special jurisdiction of city courts was differentiated from the

power ordinary accorded the inferior courts to receive evidence of

title only for the purpose of determining the character or extent of

the possession in dispute. This Court had the occasion to apply

and interpret the aforequoted statutory provision in Pelaez

vs. Reyes, et al.   which raised the issue of whether a decision of

14

a city court in an ejectment case involving the question of

ownership was appealable to the Regional Trial Court or to the

Court of Appeals, in this wise:

In the light of these provisions, petitioner insists that respondents

should have appealed to the Court of First Instance. Specifically,

his contention is that the inclusion of the issue of ownership in the

pleadings did not change the character of the proceeding as an

action of unlawful detainer over which city and municipal courts

have original exclusive jurisdiction. He claims that his contention is

supported by the very provision of Section 3, just quoted, to the

effect that when ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings in

an ejection case before the city courts, said courts are to resolve

the issue of ownership only "in conjunction with the issue of

possession." In other words, he posits that since the action is one

of unlawful detainer, the main issue to be settled by the city court

remains to be possession, and that to resolve the issue of

ownership "in conjunction with the issue of possession" is not the

same as resolving it in a judicial litigation where it is the sole issue.

We are not impressed. Regardless of the juridical value of the

significance petitioner is trying to thus draw from the rather

peculiar language of the statute, We are of the considered opinion

that the evident import of Section 3 above is to precisely grant to

the city courts concurrent original jurisdiction with the courts of first

instance over the cases enumerated therein, which include

"ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in

issue in the pleading." To sustain petitioner's contention about the

meaning of the last phrase of paragraph (c) of said section

regarding the resolution of the issue of ownership "in conjunction

with the issue of possession" is to disregard the very language of

the main part of the section which denotes unmistakably a

conferment upon the city courts of concurrent jurisdiction with the

courts of first instance over ejection cases in which ownership is

brought in issue in the pleadings. It is to Us quite clear that the fact

that the issue of ownership is to be resolved "in conjunction with

the issue of possession" simply means that both the issues of

possession and ownership are to be resolved by the city courts.

And the jurisdiction is concurrent with the Courts of First Instance

precisely because usually questions of title are supposed to be

resolved by superior courts. In other words, this grant of special

jurisdiction to city courts is to be distinguished from the power

ordinarily accorded to municipal courts to receive evidence of title

only for the purpose of determining the extent of the possession in

dispute.

It being clear, therefore, that in the main ejection case, . . . , the

issue of ownership is involved as shown by the pleadings therein

filed by the parties, and that under Section 3 of Republic Act 5967,

said city court exercised original jurisdiction over the same

concurrently with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,

the appeal of respondents was rightly made by them to the Court

of Appeals (Emphasis ours.)

However, on August 14, 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the

Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was approved and it

redefined the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, the Regional

Trial Courts and the inferior courts. Specifically, the new law

modified the power of inferior courts to resolve the issue of

ownership in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, subject,

however, to the qualification that a resolution thereof shall not be

for the purpose of determining the issue of possession, to wit:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil

Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and

Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise.

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and

unlawful detainer: Provided, That when in such cases, the

defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and

the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding

the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved

only to determine the issue of possession.

Subsequently, this Court promulgated its Interim Rules and

Guidelines in the implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,

Section 10 of which provides:

10. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases. — Metropolitan trial courts,

municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts, without

distinction, may try cases of forcible entry and detainer even if the

question of ownership is raised in the pleadings and the question

of possession could not be resolved without deciding the issue of

ownership, but the question of ownership shall be resolved only to

determine the issue of possession.

These issuances changed the former rule under Republic Act No.

296 which merely allowed inferior courts to receive evidence upon

the question of title solely for the purpose of determining

the extent and character of possession and damages for

detention, which thereby resulted in previous rulings of this Court

to the effect that if it appears during the trial that the principal issue

relates to the ownership of the property in dispute and any

question of possession which may be involved necessarily

depends upon the result of the inquiry into the title, then the

jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts is lost and the action

should be dismissed. With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg.

129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction over an ejectment

case even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without

passing upon the issue of ownership, with the express qualification

that such issue of ownership shall be resolved only for the purpose

of determining the issue of possession. In other words, the fact

that the issues of ownership and possession de facto are

intricately interwoven will not cause the dismissal of the case for

forcible entry and unlawful detainer on jurisdictional grounds.

The intendment of the law was reinforced by the revision of the

former Rule on Summary Procedures involving special cases

before the inferior courts, which was promulgated pursuant to

Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The old Rule, which took

effect on August 1, 1983, stated that:

Sec. 1. Scope — This Rule shall govern the procedure in the

Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the

Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:

A. Civil Cases

(1) Cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, except where the

question of ownership is involved, or where the damages or unpaid

rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff exceed twenty

thousand pesos (P20,000.00) at the time of the filing of the

complaint.
This Rule was revised pursuant to a resolution of the Court En

Banc which took effect on November 15, 1991, and the

aforequoted provision now reads as follows:

Sec. 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary procedure in

the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,

the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in

the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

A. Civil Cases

(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of

the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered.

Where attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed

twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).

Under the original Rule, ejectment cases were covered by the

summary rules only where the unpaid rentals do not exceed

P20,000.00 and no question of ownership is involved. As presently

formulated, however, all ejectment cases are now unqualifiedly

covered by the summary procedure, which necessarily implies that

even if there is a need to resolve the issued of ownership, such

fact will not deprive the inferior courts of jurisdiction over these

cases.
Subsequently, Republic Act No. 7691, entitled "An Act Expanding

the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the

Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the

'Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980'", was passed and took

effect on April 15, 1994.   The jurisdiction of the inferior courts over
15

forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases as defined under Batas

Pambansa Blg. 129 was retained. In addition, they now exercise

limited original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to, or

possession of, real property or any interest therein depending on

the assessed value and location of the property.

Parenthetically, it might be argued that since inferior courts are

anyway vested with jurisdiction over real actions, then it can very

well resolve the issue of ownership raised in the ejectment case,

under the conditions stated in Section 32(3) of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. It must not be

overlooked, however, that proceedings in ejectment cases are

summary in nature, whereas actions for recovery of ownership

require a full-blown trial on the merits. The difference in the

procedure in special civil actions, like ejectment, and in ordinary

civil actions, such as accion reinvindicatoria, inveigh against the

consolidation of said cases or the joinder of the different causes of

action involved. It could also be violative under certain

circumstances of the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action

since Section 6 of Rule 2 requires inter alia due observance of the

rules on jurisdiction and joinder of parties, and that said causes of

action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation

between the parties.

As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases now

stands, even where the defendant raises the question of

ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot

be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal

Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence

to resolve the issue of ownership albeit only to determine the issue

of

possession.  16

On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that prior to

the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the jurisdiction of

inferior courts was confined to receiving evidence of ownership in

order to determine only the nature and extent of possession, by

reason of which such jurisdiction was lost the moment it became

apparent that the issue of possession was intricately interwoven

with that of ownership. The law, as revised, now provides instead

that when the question of possession cannot be resolved without

deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be

resolved only to determine the issue of possession. On its face,

the new Rule on Summary Procedure was extended to include

within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment cases which

likewise involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean,

however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of

ownership in ejectment suits has been thus conferred on the

inferior courts.

At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution of this

particular issue concerns and applies only to forcible entry and

unlawful detainer cases where the issue of possession is intimately

intertwined with the issue of ownership. It finds no proper

application where it is otherwise, that is, where ownership is not in

issue, or where the principal and main issue raised in the

allegations of the complaint as well as the relief prayed for make

out not a case for ejectment but one for recovery of ownership.

In the case of De la Santa vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,  7 this

1

Court, in making a distinction between the reception of evidence

and the resolution of the issue of ownership, held that the inferior

court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and

possession de jure insofar as said evidence would indicate or

determine the nature of possession. It cannot, however, resolve

the issue of ownership, that is, by declaring who among the parties

is the true and lawful owner of the subject property, because the

resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership

which is not sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful

detainer. With this as a premise and taking into consideration the

amendment introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, it may be

suggested that inferior courts are now conditionally vested with

adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised by

the parties in an ejectment suit.

Withal, it will be observed, that the passage of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 129 has spawned seemingly conflicting jurisprudence on the

proper interpretation and application thereof. Thus, in several

cases decided by the Court after the effectivity of this law,

regardless of whether the complaint for ejectment was filed with

the inferior court prior thereto or otherwise, it was held that the

jurisdiction of the inferior court is lost and the ejectment case

should be dismissed where the issue of possession cannot be

resolved without determining the issue of ownership.   In all of
18

these cases, the Court declared that inferior courts may only admit

evidence and proof of ownership but they cannot adjudicate on the

question of ownership. Conversely, in also not a few instances, the

jurisdiction of the inferior courts to resolve the issue of ownership

in order to determine the issue of possession was upheld by this

Court.   Apparently, it could have been some imprecision in

19

language or a misperception of the statutory text which generated

the ostensible doctrinal variance.

After due deliberation, we find and so hold that by virtue of the

express mandate set forth in Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 129, inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve the question of

ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment case where a

determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete

adjudication of the issue of possession. Certain guidelines,

however, must be observed in the implementation of this

legislative prescription, viz.:

1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of

possession, and that ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in

which case the issue of ownership may be resolved but only for

the purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, as

earlier stated, the legal provision under consideration applies only

where the inferior court believes and the preponderance of

evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of possession is

dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership.

2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint

that what the plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of

possession.   Consequently,
20
where the allegations of the

complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish a case

for the recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery

of possession de facto, or where the averments plead the claim of

material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such claim for

ownership,   or where the issue of ownership is the principal

21

question to be resolved,   the action is not one for forcible entry but
22

one for title to real property.

3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership

where the relationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently

established in the ejectment case,   unless it is sufficiently

23

established that there has been a subsequent change in or

termination of that relationship between the parties. This is

because under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the

tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of
the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between

them.

4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful

detainer, is that a party who can prove prior possession can

recover such possession even against the owner himself.

Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and

whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in

his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to

remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person

having a better right through an accion publiciana or accion

reivindicatoria.   Corollarily, if prior possession may be ascertained

24

in some other way, then the inferior court cannot dwell upon or

intrude into the issue of ownership.

5. Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the

question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the

inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a

declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real

owner.   In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of
25

possession hinges on a determination of the validity and

interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on

which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may

likewise pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be

so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting

ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely

as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action

between the same parties involving title to the land.   Moreover,

26

Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that

the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful

detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and

in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or

building.

The interpretative rules we have herein adopted are not without

justification. It is our considered opinion that they are more in

keeping with the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and

unlawful detainer which have purposely been made summary in

nature so that there may be a peaceful, speedy and expeditious

means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from

unjustly continuing his possession for a long time, thereby insuring

the maintenance of peace and order in the community, as,

otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the

despair of long waiting and decide, as a measure of self-

protection, to take the law into his hands and seize the same by
force and violence.  7 And since the law discourages continued
2

wrangling over possession of property for they involve perturbation

of social disorder which must be restored as promptly as possible,

technicalities or details of procedure which may cause

unnecessary delays should accordingly and carefully be avoided.  28

As a matter of judicial experience, there have been cases where

persons who have failed to adduce any legal ground for their

continued stay on property belonging to another have nonetheless

managed to stave off eviction for several years through the

improper use of procedural technicalities.   Conformably, if we

29

were to allow the dismissal of an ejectment case for the reason

that the question of ownership is incidentally involved in

determining the question of possession, we are in effect providing

the defendants in ejectment cases with the opportunity to prolong

their occupancy of premises, over which they have ceased to have

any valid possessory right, during the time that an action for

recovery of ownership, which involves a more tedious and lengthy

court proceeding, is actually pending in court.

It is indeed ironic that a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case

which is intended to be disposed of in summary fashion has

oftentimes proved to be the most cumbersome and difficult to

decide. It is thus about time that this situation be remedied if only

to contribute to the solution of the worsening problem of court

congestion, by refusing to edify these cases by giving them a full-

blown treatment in all the courts in the judicial structure, and

thereby save the courts the expenditure of precious time and

energy which could otherwise be devoted to more significant and

vital litigations.  30

With these considerations in mind, we now proceed to the merits

of the present case. Petitioners claim to be co-owners of the

subject premises on the basis of an alleged verbal agreement

between the parties to subdivide the property, as well as the

payment made by petitioner Mamerto Refugia for the purchase of

the lot in the amount of P20,000.00. On the other hand, private

respondents' property rights are supported by sufficient documents

and muniments of ownership, namely, the deed of absolute sale,

transfer certificate of title, and building permit in their names, the

regularity in the issuance of which was never controverted nor put

in issue by petitioners.

The Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court are not

in accord on whether to treat the P20,000.00 as a loan or as

payment for petitioners' share in the subject premises, while

respondent Court of Appeals believes that the same is actually a

loan. It bears significant notice that petitioners never refuted nor

denied, in any of their pleadings filed in this case from the court of

origin and all the way up to this Court, the allegation that private

respondents gave P5,000.00 as partial payment for the loan. No

countervailing explanation was advanced by petitioners why such

payment was made to and accepted by them as such.

Furthermore, the allegation of petitioners that there was a verbal

agreement to subdivide the property between them and private

respondents is self-serving and evidentiarily baseless at this stage.

In addition, their theory of an "implied trust" was not raised in issue

in the trial court and cannot therefore be raised for the first time in

the present petition.   At most, it was merely alluded to in

31

petitioners' Rejoinder filed with the Court of Appeals, but

petitioners never bothered to expound on or substantiate the

same. Consequently, it cannot now be raised as an assignment of

error in the present petition.

In sum, and as held by respondent court, the Regional Trial Court

"overstepped its bounds" in ruling that petitioners and private

respondents are co-owners of the property, which issue should be

finally determined in the separate action for specific performance

reportedly pending between the parties. At this juncture, however,

the evidence conduces to a finding that private respondents are in

possession of the premises in the concept of and consequent to

their being owners thereof. Even on such prima facie showing,

therefore, private respondents can maintain the ejectment case

involved.

While it may be argued that petitioners were able to prove prior

possession, such, however, is not the issue involved in this action

for unlawful detainer. An action for unlawful detainer is different

from a forcible entry case in that the former involves an act of

unlawfully withholding the possession of the land or building

against or from a landlord, vendor or vendee or other person after

the expiration or termination of the detainer's right to hold

possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied,   and 32

neither is prior physical possession of the property by the plaintiff

necessary;   whereas in the latter, the main issue is one of priority

33

of possession.  34

In the case at bar, petitioners failed to show that they were legally

entitled to continue occupying the unit in question. On the

considerations hereinbefore detailed, we agree with the position of

respondent Court of Appeals that petitioners would in effect be

occupying the premises by mere tolerance. A person who

occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,

without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an

implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing

which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy

against him.   The status of petitioners is analogous to that of a

35

lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose

occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.  36

It has further been held that such tolerance must be present right

from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize

a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer.   7 Here, it cannot be

3

gainsaid that petitioners' possession was by mere tolerance of

private respondents from the very beginning. At any rate, it has

likewise not been denied by herein petitioners that one of their

sons also owns a residential house where they can live.

Notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, and the

Metropolitan Trial Court for the matter, to qualifiedly resolve the

issue of ownership raised in the present ejectment suit, but their

findings thereon being devoid of basis in fact and in law,

respondent Court of Appeals was fully justified in decreeing a

reversal of their judgments.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Associates Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, ponente, with

Associate Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Conchita Carpio Morales,

concurring. Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 25.

2 Annex C, id.; ibid., 38.

3 Annex B, id.; ibid., 30.

4 G.R. No. 83982, January 12, 1990, 181 SCRA 67.

5 G.R. Nos. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643.

6 Lloren, etc. vs. De Veyra etc., et al., L-13929, March 28, 1962, 4

SCRA 637

7 92 Phil. 168 (1952).

8 L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29.

9 Rollo, CA-G.R. No. SP 34647, 80.

10 Ibid., id., 71.

11 See Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-29264, August 29,

1969, 29 SCRA 419.

12 Navoa, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 59255,

December 29 1995.

13 Enacted on June 21, 1969.

14 L-48168, August 31, 1978, 85 SCRA 233.

15 Per Administrative Circular No. 09-94, dated June 14, 1994.

16 Wilmon Auto Supply Corp., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,

G.R. No. 97637, April 10, 1992, 208 SCRA 108.

17 L-30560, November 18, 1985, 140 SCRA 44.

18 The following cases involved actions for ejectment filed after

the promulgation of BP Blg. 129: Munar, et al. vs. Court of

Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100740, November 25, 1994, 238 SCRA

372; Somodio vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 82680, August

15, 1994, 235 SCRA 307; Heirs of Jacobo Bolus, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 107036, February 9, 1993, 218 SCRA

798; Joven vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 80739, August

20, 1992, 212 SCRA 700; Consignado, et al. vs. Court of Appeals,

et al., G.R. No. 87148, March 18, 1992, 207 SCRA 297; and

Presco, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 82215,

December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 232.

The following involved involved ejectment cases filed prior to the

effectivity of BP Blg. 129: Ching, et al. vs. Malaya, et al., G.R. No.

56449, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 412; De la Santa vs. Court of

Appeals, et al., supra; De la Cruz, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et

al., G.R. No. 57454, November 29, 1984, 133 SCRA 520; and Alvir

vs. Vera, etc., et al., L-39338, July 16, 1984, 130 SCRA 357.

19 De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 96107, June 19,

1995, 245 SCRA 166; Semira vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.

76031. March 2, 1994, 230 SCRA 577; Buazon, et al. vs. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 97749, March 19, 1993, 220 SCRA 182;

Wilmon Auto Supply Corp., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et

al., supra, fn. 16; Sy vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 95818,

August 2, 1991, 200 SCRA 117

20 Mediran vs. Villanueva, et al., 37 Phil. 752 (1918).

21 Bautista vs. Fernandez, L-24062, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 548.

22 Santiago, et al. vs. Cloribel, etc., et al., L-19598, August 14,

1965, 14 SCRA 907.

23 Manuel vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 95469, July 25,

1991, 199 SCRA 603.

24 German Management & Services, Inc. vs Court of Appeals, et

al., G.R. No. 76216, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495.

25 Semira vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra, fn 19; Buazon, et al.

vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra, fn. 19.

26 Semira vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.

27 Vda. de Palanca, et al. vs. Chua Keng Kian, et al., L-26430,

March 11, 1969, 27 SCRA 356.

28 Salvador vs. Salamanca, etc., A.M. No. R-177-MTJ, September

24, 1986, 144 SCRA 276.

29 Dakudao, et al. vs. Consolacion, et al., G.R. No. 54753, June

24, 1983, 122 SCRA 877.

30 Mabalot, et al. vs. Madela, Jr., etc., et al., G.R. No. 56700,

March 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 347.

31 Manila Bay Club Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.

110015, July 11, 1995, 245 SCRA 715.

32 Pharma Industries, Inc. vs. Pajarillaga, etc., et al., G.R. No.

53788, October 17, 1980, 100 SCRA 339.

33 Pangilinan, et al. vs. Aguilar, etc., et al., L-29275, January 31,

1972, 43 SCRA 136.

34 Torralba, et al. vs. Rosales, et al., L-21072, April 29, 1966, 16

SCRA 674.

35 Banco de Oro Savings & Mortgage Bank vs. Court of Appeals,

et al., G.R. No. 85448, February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 464.

36 Calubayan, et al. vs. Pascual, L-22645, September 18, 1967,

21 SCRA 146.

37 Monteblanco vs. Hinigaran Sugar Plantation, Inc., et al., 63

Phil. 797 (1936).