Ivanova - Conventional Principles

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Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 52 (2015) 111–113

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Studies in History and Philosophy


of Modern Physics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsb

Introduction

Conventional Principles in Science: On the foundations and


development of the relativized a priori

The present volume consists of a collection of papers originally Structuralism and Neo-Kantianism in Poincaré’s Philosophy of
presented at the conference Conventional Principles in Science, held Science,’ Milena Ivanova analyses the nature of Poincaré’s con-
at the University of Bristol, August 2011, which featured con- ventionalism and its implications for his philosophy of science, in
tributions on the history and contemporary development of the particular his neo-Kantian structuralism. Ivanova identifies three
notion of ‘relativized a priori’ principles in science, from Henri main ‘conventionalist’ positions associated with Poincaré’s writ-
Poincaré’s conventionalism to Michael Friedman’s contemporary ings: conventionalism as general instrumentalist philosophy of
defence of the relativized a priori. In Science and Hypothesis, science; conventionalism as a response to the underdetermination
Poincaré assessed the problematic epistemic status of Euclidean of geometry by experience; and conventionalism as an epistemic
geometry and Newton’s laws of motion, famously arguing that category that accounts for the status of constitutive principles in
each has the status of ‘convention’ in that their justification is science. Ivanova argues that Poincaré’s conventionalism is best
neither analytic nor empirical in nature. In The Theory of Relativity understood as an epistemological thesis concerning the status of
and A Priori Knowledge, Hans Reichenbach, in light of the general geometry, and not as a global instrumentalism, and considers the
theory of relativity, proposed an updated notion of the Kantian role of conventions in Poincaré’s wider philosophy of science. In
synthetic a priori to account for the dynamic inter-theoretic status particular, Ivanova focuses on the Kantian aspect of Poincaré’s
of geometry and other non-empirical physical principles. Reich- epistemology, of which geometric conventionalism is key, and
enbach noted that one may reject the ‘necessarily true’ aspect of how it shapes his structuralist philosophy of science. Regarding
the synthetic a priori whilst preserving the feature of being con- the problem of theory change, Ivanova points at passages where
stitutive of the object of knowledge. Such constitutive principles Poincaré explicitly denies the arbitrariness of aesthetic values and
are theory-relative, as illustrated by the privileged role of non- regards values such as simplicity as regulative ideals in science.
Euclidean geometry in general relativity theory. This idea of rela- The choice between alternative geometries, then, for Poincaré
tivized a priori principles in spacetime physics has been analysed whilst guided by considerations of convenience is not arbitrary
and developed at great length in the modern literature in the work and is rationally justified. Finally, Ivanova builds on Friedman’s
of Michael Friedman, in particular the roles played by the light (1999) interpretation of Poincaré’s views on the constitutive ele-
postulate and the equivalence principle – in special and general ments in science, seen as non-arbitrary conventions, showing how
relativity respectively – in defining the central terms of their this position fits with Poincaré’s overall views regarding the aim of
respective theories and connecting the abstract mathematical science.
formalism of the theories with their empirical content. The papers Coordinating principles are predominantly taken to function as
in this volume guide the reader through the historical develop- general mediating principles connecting the mathematical form-
ment of conventional and constitutive principles in science, from alism of a theory to the empirical data. Flavia Padovani’s con-
the foundational work of Poincaré, Reichenbach and others, to tribution, ‘Measurement and the relativized a priori,’ investigates
contemporary issues and applications of the relativized a priori whether the relativized a priori functions solely at the level of
concerning the notion of measurement, physical possibility, and scientific principles, or if it also plays a more basic role in pro-
the interpretation of scientific theories. viding access to phenomena. Padovani explores Reichenbach’s
The first step towards the development of the relativized a original thoughts on the role of constitutive principles as devel-
priori is taken by Poincaré’s modification of the Kantian epistemic oped in his early work, in particular his doctoral dissertation. In
categories in order to accommodate the special status of geometry. this early work, Reichenbach is concerned not only with the
Given the construction of consistent geometric systems that question of coordination between abstract mathematical structure
negate axioms of Euclidean geometry, Poincaré notes that the and the world via general constitutive principles, but with the
Kantian idea of Euclidean geometry being necessarily true is not more basic question of how we ascribe meaning to concepts that
tenable. However, Euclidean geometry does play an important relate to our ability to measure what Reichenbach terms “real
constitutive role in the physical systems in which it is employed, things”. Padovani argues that the importance of Reichenbach’s
and in this sense retains a key feature of a prioricity. Though insight here has been overlooked in the contemporary develop-
geometry is constitutive, it can no longer be regarded as uniquely ment of the relativized a priori. For Reichenbach, coordinating
imposed upon us since we are left with freedom to employ distinct principles function on different levels: (1) at the level of general
geometries. In the first paper of the issue, ‘Conventionalism, scientific principles that aid to give a theory its empirical meaning,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2015.11.003
1355-2198/& 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
112 Introduction / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 52 (2015) 111–113

and (2) at a more basic level of individuation and measurement of sensibility in order for regulative and constitutive principles to be
physical quantities (for example, theoretical terms such as tem- differentiated – by focusing on Cassirer’s account of objectivity.
perature become meaningful only after we have related them to Cassirer takes objectivity to be a regulative ideal of scientific
specific measurement procedures). Padovani’s contribution moti- enquiry, with Everett highlighting that this can be understood in
vates the further development of how to integrate measurement terms the invariant structure of a theory, such that science
procedures into a ‘levelled’ notion of relativized a priori. It also achieves greater objectivity via the broadening of symmetry
calls us to consider the role played by constitutive principles in groups.
theory change. While on the accepted account of relativized a The role of symmetry groups in scientific progress is the topic
priori the change of general constitutive principles implies the of the final paper of the volume. Adam Caulton’s contribution,
revision of the entire framework, coordinating measurement ‘The role of symmetry in the interpretation of physical theories,’
procedures are usually carried over to the new framework, as considers the function of symmetries in a theory and their role in
indicated by concept of temperature, allowing for continuity at how the theory is taken to represent the world. The symmetries
this more basic level.
of a theory mark the class of transformations to the theory’s
The constitutive principles in scientific theories range from the
space of possible states under which it is preserved. Symmetries
basic mathematical language used (e.g. linear algebra, calculus,
standardly present an interpretative dilemma. On the one hand,
geometries, manifold theories) to coordinative principles that
symmetries mark a redundancy in the theory in that the theory
connect the mathematical formalism to measurable physical
has greater mathematical structure than is required to account
properties for which the theories aim to account. Ryan Samaroo’s
for the world and ought to be deemed physically insignificant, as
contribution, ‘Friedman’s Thesis,’ focuses on this distinction
famously debated in the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence in the
between mathematical and coordinating principles and contends
that treating such principles as different in kind, with only the case of absolute space. On the other hand, there is a non-trivial
latter as properly constitutive, strengthens Friedman’s case against and apparently physically significant aspect of symmetries in
Quinean epistemological holism by helping to dispel worries that which they appear to relate distinct physically possible states
purely mathematical principles and coordinative principles are on that happen to be empirically indistinguishable. Caulton argues
a par with regards to confirmation. The central contention of that our understanding of which symmetries of a theory are
Samaroo’s paper is that, contra Friedman, neither Riemannian physically significant informs the interpretation of the theory and
manifolds nor the equivalence principle are properly constitutive our understanding of which symmetries play a constitutive role
in general relativity, insofar as they are not coordinating principles in the theory. Central to Caulton’s analysis is the distinction
connecting physico-mathematical structure to empirical claims, between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ symmetries, loosely analogous
but rather just part of the mathematical background of general to the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions
relativity. This distinction is quite fine – Friedman holds that Rie- central to the logical empiricism of Carnap and others. Symme-
mann’s theory of manifolds is constitutive of general relativity tries of formalism, where multiple distinct mathematical states
insofar as without it “the space–time structure of [general rela- represent a single physical state (also known as gauge symme-
tivity] is not even logically possible” (Friedman, 2001, p. 39; tries in the literature) are labeled ‘analytic’ in that they are (1)
emphasis ours). Samaroo notes that this sense of constitutivity is ‘empty’ of physical content, and (2) hold independently of any
of a different kind from that of coordinating principles, which contingent matters of fact (i.e. independently of the state of the
rather than giving a logical space for scientific inquiry, play a world). The synthetic symmetries of a theory, conversely, are
mediating role between the mathematics and physical systems. physically significant in that they hold of transformations that
Samaroo’s ‘rational reconstruction’ of the formulation of general generate a physical difference. As such, a theory’s analytic sym-
relativity highlights the coordinative role of the geodesic principle metries partition its state space into classes of ‘physically
and non-coordinative roles of Riemannian manifolds and the weak equivalent’ mathematical states. As with relativized a priori
equivalence principle. principles in general, certain symmetries can be analytic (non-
The complex role played by constitutive principles in the con-
physical) in the context of one theory and synthetic (physically
ceivability and physical interpretation of four-dimensional space-
significant) in another; for instance, the transitioning of the
time in general relativity is further explored in Jonathan Everett’s
Galilei and Lorentz groups from synthetic to analytic symmetries
contribution, ‘The constitutive a priori and the distinction between
are marks of scientific progress due to the recognition and
mathematical and physical possibility.’ Everett focuses on the
elimination of surplus structure. Caulton proposes that the set of
sense in which purely mathematical possibilities become physical
analytic symmetries ought to be maximized as much as empirical
possibilities in science, in particular on the Kantian aspects in
adequacy allows.
Friedman’s account of the development of general relativity.
The role of conventional and constitutive principles in science
Everett considers the role of regulative principles in scientific
progress and their relation to constitutive principles, which he continues to generate much discussion in the literature and open
argues add physical content to the theory but should not be new questions about the epistemology and aims of science. We see
understood as making mathematical possibilities physical. In par- in this special issue that many interpretative issues concerning the
ticular, Everett argues that the rotating frame thought experiment, relativized a priori remain, both regarding historical episodes in
which plays a key role in Friedman’s account of constitutivity, the development of theories and in contemporary issues in the
should rather be understood in regulative terms. Doing so, Everett foundations of science. Moreover, whereas the role of relativized a
promotes Cassirer’s account of the development of spacetime priori principles in science has predominantly been analysed using
theories in terms of regulative principles as a viable Kantian case studies from fundamental physics, particularly spacetime
alternative to Reichenbachian constitutivity-based accounts (such theories, it is clear that they have a much wider role in scientific
as Friedman’s). Everett addresses a key concern for regulativity- enterprise, for instance in the special sciences. We take it that the
based accounts – that it requires an independent faculty of research program has much life ahead.
Introduction / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 52 (2015) 111–113 113

Acknowledgments Milena Ivanova


Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy,
We would like to thank Michael Friedman for his invaluable Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitä t Mü nchen, Germany
contribution to the conference Conventional Principles in Science E-mail address: mail@milenaivanova.co.uk
and the feedback he offered to each speaker, and to the editorial
staff and referees of this journal for making the special issue
possible. Milena Ivanova furthermore acknowledges grants from Matt Farr 1
School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry,
the Analysis Trust, the Bristol Institute for Research in the
Humanities and Art, and the Bristol Alumni Foundation towards University of Queensland, Australia
E-mail address: mail@mattfarr.co.uk
the organisation of the conference.

References

Friedman, M. (1999). Reconsidering logical positivism. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-


versity Press.
Friedman, M. (2001). Dynamics of reason. Stanford: Csli Publications.

1
Names appear in reverse alphabetical order. This introduction piece is fully
co-authored.

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