WORKING

PAPER

NO. 38 MAY 2020

China, Africa, and the

Rest: Recent Trends
in Space Science,
Technology, and Satellite
Development
Julie Michelle Klinger

sais-cari.org
 WORKING PAPER SERIES

NO. 38 | MAY 2020 :

“China, Africa, and the Rest: Recent Trends in Space Science, Technology, and
Satellite Development”
by Julie Michelle Klinger

TO CI TE TH IS PAPE R :

Klinger, Julie Michelle. 2020. China, Africa, and the Rest: Recent Trends in Space
Science, Technology, and Satellite Development. Working Paper No. 2020/38. China
Africa Research Initiative, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University, Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.sais-cari.org/
publications.

CO RRES PONDING AUTH OR :

Julie Michelle Klinger

Email: klinger@udel.edu

ACKNOWL E DGE ME NTS :

Research for this paper was funded by the SAIS-CARI 2019 Research Grant,
which enabled the authors to visit Nigeria, Algeria, and Washington, D.C. during
the grant term in 2019.

NOTE:

The papers in this Working Paper series have undergone only limited review
and may be updated, corrected or withdrawn. Please contact the corresponding
author directly with comments or questions about this paper.

Editor: Daniela Solano-Ward

2 C H I N A-A F R I C A R E S E A R C H I N I T I AT I V E
 ABSTRACT

SAIS-CARI WORKING PAPER CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAVE

NO. 38 | MAY 2020 :
received significant attention since the turn of the
“China, Africa, and the Rest:
Recent Trends in Space millennium, but outer space cooperation has scarcely
Science, Technology, and been mentioned in policy and research literature. While
Satellite Development”
most space activity in Africa is driven by Africans, outer
by Julie Michelle Klinger
space cooperation between China and African partner

states epitomizes the intersection of peaceful

development and security interests of all parties involved.

Space infrastructure is crucial to the more commonly

studied dimensions of Africa-China relations. This

working paper reviews the range of bilateral and

multilateral space endeavors through which African

countries partner with China and several other

international entities and provides recommendations for

further research.

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CHINA, AFRICA & THE REST: RECENT TRENDS IN SPACE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION THE IMPORTANCE OF OUTER SPACE TO CHINA-AFRICA RESEARCH & ANALYSIS

CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAVE RECEIVED significant

attention since the turn of the millennium, but outer space cooperation has scarcely
been mentioned in policy and research literature. Outer space cooperation between
China and African partner states epitomizes the intersection of peaceful development
and security interests of all parties involved. Increasingly, China and African countries
are constructing remote sensing satellite networks in order to support logistical
integration of Belt and Road (BRI) partner states and to manage natural disasters, with
some security and surveillance applications.1
This working paper reviews the range of space endeavors through which African
countries partner with China and several other international entities. Within the space
sector, satellite development has seen the broadest bilateral activity and greatest
national investment. This is, in part, because the development of satellite technologies
involves a vast array of complementary industries, from optics to metallurgy to data
management, so public investments in satellite development stimulate a range of
sectors. More fundamentally, national development as it is conventionally understood
requires space-based technologies. Domestic capacity in this field is now considered
essential, not only by the governments of African states, but by the United Nations,
World Bank, and other multilateral organizations that endorse the 2030 Sustainable
Development Goals.
Satellites are crucial to activities that have formed the core of China-Africa
research agendas, such as mineral surveying, infrastructure siting and construction,
agricultural production, deforestation monitoring and climate cooperation, as well as
interoceanic trade.2 While satellite infrastructure is central to these dimensions of
China-Africa cooperation, space cooperation has also demonstrated synergistic effects
on economic and diplomatic relations, both of which have been the subject of more
sustained media, policy, and scholarly attention. For China’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, space cooperation is generally reserved for those governments with which it
has signed “Strategic Partnerships” or “Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative
Partnerships” (CSCP).3 CSCPs are designations reserved for the highest level of
bilateral relations, which involve the full pursuit of cooperation, development, and
coordination on regional and international affairs.4 As such, the paucity of research in
the outer space domain represents a considerable oversight in China-Africa research
and analysis.
This oversight is widespread. There is a general lack of awareness outside of the
space sector, and in the North American context more specifically, of space activities
on the African continent over the past half century. In African countries, staff of
domestic space agencies lament the misperceptions among the general public
regarding the role and status of national space development programs.5 Some
agencies, such as Nigeria’s National Space Research and Development Agency
(NASRDA), have employed media and corporate communications specialists in order
to promote greater public awareness at home and abroad. In African countries and

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elsewhere, promoting space development in national development narratives is

important for justifying annual outlays of public funds in the face of competing
domestic priorities.6 The oversight may also be a result of disciplinary specialization:
What may be self-evident and routine to space scientists engaged in South-South and
transnational collaborations with African counterparts is outside the more
conventional realms of inquiry for most policy researchers.7 Although this is changing,
the result has been that many significant space-related developments in African
countries have gone undocumented.
This is not merely an academic concern. The robust social science research on
China-Africa relations published in the Euro-American world since the turn of the
millennium has informed the foreign policies of many Western governments. In some
cases, this scholarship has served as an important corrective to unsubstantiated
alarmism that periodically circulates in media coverage. By contrast, if one conducts
an English-language Internet search on the subject of China-Africa space
cooperation—which is the typical starting point for civil servants and journalists
looking into the matter—several pages of sensationalized headlines appear, framing
the issue primarily as one of China using space cooperation with African counterparts
in order to compete with the West.
For US audiences, the most basic clarification is this: China is not displacing the
US in satellite cooperation with African countries due to the simple fact that there have
been very few US programs to displace. Space cooperation with African governments
has not been a priority area for contemporary US foreign policy, so it is not accurate to
Although China’s space represent Africa’s space sector as a domain in which China is “taking over.”8 The
exaggeration of China’s role relative to other partners can also have the effect of
agency is often discussed
erasing the agency of African governments, firms, and science and policy leaders in
as a wholly state-owned building extensive space capacity on the continent, not to mention their central roles
in shaping international space law since the 1950s.9 More broadly, outer space is
and state-run organization, enshrined as the “province of all [hu]mankind” and is therefore open to the “peaceful
it behaves like other major use” for all in one of the most robust treaty regimes in modern history, the 1967 Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
space agencies by working including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.10 This treaty, to which all major space-

with private contractors in faring states are party, was formulated with the vision that access to space would
eventually be enjoyed by all, not just the front-runners of the US and the former USSR.
procurement and engaging For the most part, this doctrine of peaceful use has prevailed, enabling the safe

in competitive bidding placement of keystone technologies for scientific research, communications, and
economic globalization in Earth’s orbits.11
processes. As Table 1 shows, fourteen of continental Africa’s fifty-four countries have active
space programs and dozens of others have the capacity to process satellite data.12
Together, they have launched forty-two satellites as of January 2020. Ninety percent of
the space projects in Africa have been funded by African governments and investors.13
Russia has launched the greatest number of satellites for African agencies with
thirteen completed launch contracts, followed by France (10), the US (8), China (5),
India (4), and Japan (2).14 In addition to China’s National Space Agency (CNSA), several

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other agencies have had active partnerships on the continent for many years, including
Brazil’s National Space Research Institute (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais
– INPE), Russia’s Roscosmos, Japan’s Aerospace Exploration Agency, and a number of
European agencies. Space programs in Africa vary in their history and composition,
but they are all internationally embedded: When African space programs request bids
for satellite contracts, Chinese firms compete alongside other international firms to
offer the most competitive package.

Table 1: Continental African Space Agencies

Country Space or Space-related Agency Founded Satellites Launched

Algeria Algerian Space Agency (ASAL) 2003 6

Angola National Space Programme Management Office 2013 1

Egypt Egypt Space Agency 2018 9

Ethiopia Ethiopian Space Science and Technology Institute (ESSTI) 2016 1

L’agence Gabonaise d’Etudes et d’Observations Spatiales

Gabon 2007 0
(AGEOS)

Ghana Ghana Space Science and Technology Centre (GSSTC) 2011 1

Kenya Kenya Space Agency 2017 1

Libya Libya Center for Remote Sensing and Space Science (LCRSSS) 1989 0

Morocco The Royal Center for Remote Sensing Space (CRTS) 1989 3

Nigeria National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA) 2006 6

South Africa South Africa National Space Agency (SANSA) 2010 8

Sudan National Remote Sensing Center 1977 1

Tunisia National Mapping and Remote Sensing Center 1988 Scheduled July 2020

Zimbabwe Zimbabwe National Geospatial and Space Agency 2018 0

The working paper proceeds as follows. The first sections provide an overview of
the development of the space sector in China and on the African continent. The
second section outlines both bilateral and multilateral space cooperation programs in
which African and Chinese counterparts are involved and presents findings on space
cooperation from the two country cases of Nigeria and Algeria.

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CHINA
SPACE
DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA’S NATIONAL SPACE ADMINISTRATION (CNSA) was formed in 1993 as an

CHINA & AFRICA outgrowth of the Number Five Research Academy of the Ministry of National Defense.
The Ministry had been established in 1949 by the newly formed People’s Republic of
China, in the shadow of the US detonation of nuclear weapons in Japan and on Pacific
Islands. This geopolitical context helps explain why the Academy’s first mandate was to
develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in close collaboration with the former
USSR from 1950-57. After the Sino-Soviet split in 1957, China’s planners relied heavily on
scholars educated overseas to advance space and nuclear weapons capability within
the Ministry of Defense.15
Since Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms, China’s space institutions have been
restructured. In 1988, the central government created the Ministry of Astronautics to
oversee space program development. The Ministry was dissolved in 1993 with the
formation of two distinct state-owned enterprises: CNSA, which is responsible for
carrying out China’s international space obligations, and the China Aerospace Science
and Industry Corporation (CASC), which is the primary contractor for CNSA. The
primary contractor for overseas satellite agreements, the China Great Wall Industry
Corporation (CGWIC), is a commercial firm and international platform for CASC.
CNSA has also cultivated extensive international partnerships and supported private-
sector spin-offs.
Although China’s space agency is often discussed as a wholly state-owned and
state-run organization, it behaves like other major space agencies by working with
private contractors in procurement and engaging in competitive bidding processes.
Foremost among these is the CGWIC, which is responsible for commercial launch
services, satellite systems, and international space technology cooperation. Over the
past three decades, CGWIC has won dozens of contracts to build satellites for space
programs across the world, particularly in countries with more recent or smaller space
programs. CGWIC often sub-contracts with the China Academy of Space Technology,
the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, and the China Satellite Launch and
Tracking Control General the way NASA might contract with Boeing or Lockheed
Martin, who might then subcontract to smaller companies specialized in specific
components required to fulfill the order. As their respective names suggest, each is
responsible for a different component of satellite design, development, construction,
launch, and operation.
Since 1990, China’s Long March rockets have been launching satellite payloads for
international partners, including private firms, universities, and national space
programs. China launched Nigeria’s first communications satellite in 2007 and a
second in 2011. Moreover, China launched Algeria’s first communication satellite in
2017, as well as the first satellites for Ethiopia and Sudan in 2019. Each of these
contracts was won through a competitive bidding process. China’s firms do not always
win. For example, Ghana contracted with SpaceX (US) to launch its first satellite in

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2017, while Russia’s space agency launched a satellite for Angola that same year, and
Japan launched satellites for Rwanda and Egypt in 2019.

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

MOST SPACE RELATED ACTIVITY OCCURRING IN AFRICA is driven by Africans.16

Several African countries launched national and multilateral space science and
technology initiatives in the mid-twentieth century. Many of their trajectories were
influenced by multiple domestic and international political factors. Often this is
attributed to changing loyalties following the end of the Cold War, or more frequently,
to misallocated investments due to conflict or corruption. While these are possible
explanations, preliminary analysis suggests that the oil shocks of the 1970s and debt
crises of the 1980s had a more decisive effect on interrupting the advancement of space
science in the Global South. During the so-called “Lost Decade” of the 1980s, no new
space agencies were established in Latin America.17 On the African continent, no new
space agencies were established between 1971 and 1987, which suggests that the
debt-driven development and structural adjustment programs widely implemented
across sub-Saharan Africa during this period were negatively associated with the
advancement of space science and technology in loan-recipient countries.18
Although China’s technological engagement with developing country partners
tends to receive the majority of attention in Anglophone media and policy discourse, it
is important to place China-Africa space partnerships in context. The primary drivers
of space science, technology, and policy development in Africa are African scientists
and officials who strategically leverage international partnerships to fulfill domestic
space mandates. Therefore, space technology development on the African continent is
best characterized as a complex mosaic comprised of diverse actors, country-specific
investment patterns, and robust public-private activity. Echoing space advocates in
newly-independent nations during the heyday of the Non-Aligned Movement, the
African Union Agenda 2063 elaborated a Continental Space Policy, which states that
“Outer space is of critical importance to the development of Africa in all fields:
agriculture, disaster management, remote sensing, climate forecast, banking and
finance, as well as defense and security. Africa’s access to space technology products is
no longer a matter of luxury […]”.19 With this shift in the perception of space
technology from luxury to critical infrastructure, there is also an emerging network of
young professionals, both scientifically and entrepreneurially minded, who are
building peer networks globally and pursuing capital from outside the continent.20
Between 1998 and January 2020, eleven African countries, eight of which are in
sub-Saharan Africa, launched a total of forty-two satellites (see Tables 2a and 2b). The
countries include Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria,
Rwanda, South Africa, and Sudan. Additionally, multilateral African institutions jointly
funded three regional communications satellites. More than half of these satellites
were launched in the last five years, indicating an acceleration of space-related activity.
The satellite applications reflect the domestic development priorities they are meant to

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serve: Earth observation, communications satellites, technology demonstration,

scientific experiments, educational projects, and military radar. In contrast to space
programs in the US, China, and European Union, most African space programs do not
Since 1990, China’s Long prioritize military applications, human spaceflight, or space tourism. Although only
eighteen of the forty-two satellites were built by African engineers, with the others
March rockets have been being constructed by companies that won competitive bidding processes, ninety
launching satellite percent of all financing was reported to come from African sources. In addition to the
CGWIC, a range of other corporations, such as Airbus Defense and Space (France), RSC
payloads for international Energia (Russia), Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (UK), and Thales Alenia Space
partners, including private (France), have won contracts to build satellites for African space programs. As of
mid-2019, approximately 8,500 people were employed in the space sector in Africa; of
firms, universities, and these, approximately 2,000 were in the commercial space sector.21

national space programs. The national budgets for these space programs differ significantly, as does their
position within the respective governments’ institutional landscapes. The majority of
China launched Nigeria’s space programs are located under science, technology, or education ministries (or
equivalent), which shapes the nature of bilateral and multilateral engagement
first communications
undertaken by the respective countries. The national space agencies are part of larger
satellite in 2007 and a networks of international aerospace and astronomical societies, as well as hundreds of
university departments, meteorological stations, telecommunications companies,
second in 2011. Moreover,
navigation and aviation authorities, and geographic research and monitoring centers
China launched Algeria’s on the continent, each of which have their own unique regional and international
engagements.
first communication For example, the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security in Africa
satellite in 2017, as well as program is a joint EU-Africa program which provides earth observation data to EU
member states, forty-five African countries, and more than 120 African institutions,
the first satellites for several of which have regional centers to process and disseminate data. In addition,

Ethiopia and Sudan in there is robust private sector and start-up activity concentrated in major cities,
characterized by hackathons, innovation challenges, maker spaces, start-up labs, and
2019. Each of these competitive grants programs, most of which are funded by African sources. These are

contracts was won through enriched by outreach events by organizations from outside of Africa, such as NASA’s
International Space Apps Challenge, which was hosted at the Pan-African Polytechnic
a competitive bidding Institute in Dakar, Senegal, in October 2018.22 There is also sustained and dynamic
space-related activity with United Nations entities, such as the Food and Agriculture
process.
Organization, the Office for Outer Space Affairs, the Space Generation Advisory
Council, and the Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, to name a few.
There are currently no operational launch facilities on the African continent.
Several were built in the mid-twentieth century by former colonial governments but
are no longer functional. Since 1998, Africa’s satellites have been launched from
facilities in French Guiana (10), Russia (7), the US (7), China (6), Kazakhstan (5), India
(4), Japan (2), and Ukraine (1).

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THIS SECTION PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW AND CONTEXTUALIZATION of bilateral

BILATERAL agreements between African countries and China, and reviews two illustrative country
AGREEMENTS cases: Nigeria and Algeria. China has built and launched satellites for Nigeria, Algeria,

WITH CHINA Sudan, and Ethiopia. It is the fourth largest recipient of satellite contracts from African
countries, and the third largest recipient of launch contracts.23 As of 2019, sixty percent
of Africa’s satellites were built by foreign entities, but the proportion is expected to
diminish as African entities increase indigenous capacity. South Africa is the largest
producer of satellites on the continent, with growing public and private sector space
technology capacity. Both Nigeria and Algeria’s space agencies have developed
domestic satellite production and testing facilities, and Ethiopia’s Space Science and
Technology Institute has engaged in a joint venture with France’s ArianeGroup to
develop satellite assembly, integration, and testing facilities in Addis Ababa.24
This trend is by design. International satellite partnerships undertaken on the
part of African space programs proceed with the proviso that the transfer of know-how
and technology is a cornerstone of the agreement. Using commercial off-the-shelf
technology and focusing on specific missions accelerates the development process,
providing cheaper and faster access to space. The “Learning by Doing” approach
entails sending teams of African scientists and engineers to the contracting party to
work on site for the duration of the design, construction, and test phases. This
accomplishes technology transfer and capacity building goals for African space
programs.25 In some cases, this approach has preceded the development of national
space programs. For example, the Rwandan Utilities Regulatory Authority, which is not
a space agency, signed an agreement to send six Rwandan engineers to Tokyo
University to develop the RwaSat-1 cube satellite.26 The stated purpose of RwaSat-1 is to
enable the country to collect remote sensing data from low earth orbit in order to
monitor progress toward the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.27 Japan launched
RwaSat-1 in December 2019.
It must also be noted that since the 1960s, China’s government has provided
scholarships to students from African countries to complete undergraduate and
graduate education in China. These comprehensive programs have provided
transportation, housing, medical, and living expenses principally (though not
exclusively) for science and engineering students and their families to relocate to
China for the duration of the program of study. In 2018, President Xi Jinping
announced that an additional 50,000 scholarships and 50,000 training opportunities
would be awarded to African students and researchers over the following three years,
increasing both educational and training programs by more than half.28 Each year,
between four and five hundred thousand international students study in China, with
over 80,000 coming from African countries.29 This provides an important legacy of
human capital development and diplomatic engagement between China and African
partner states that is now several generations old.
Table 2a and 2b show the range of engagements between African institutions, by
country, and Chinese entities, while Table 3 shows multilateral engagements.

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Table 2a: African China Space-Related Engagements, by Country

Satellites Bilateral Space Partnership with

Country Space or Space-related Agency Founded
Launched China
AlComSat-1 designed, built,
Algeria Algerian Space Agency (ASAL) 2003 6 and launched by CAST, CGWIC,
CSLTCG, CALVT
Delegate visit from CGWIC in
Angola National Space Programme Management Office 2013 1
September 2019
CGWIC lost satellite contract
Scheduled
Côte d’Ivoire Ministry of Telecommunications n.d. to France’s Airbus Defense and
mid-2020
Space in 2018
Democratic
National Satellite Telecommunications Network Contracted with CAST to build
Republic of 1991 0
(Renatelsate) and launch CongoSat-1 in 2012
Congo
CNSA grants US$ 23 million
(2016), US$ 45 million (2018), and
US$ 72 million for EgyptSat
Egypt Egypt Space Agency 2018 9
program; over 1,500 Chinese IT
and telecommunications
companies in Egypt
ETRSS-1 contracted with CGWIC
in 2018, launched 2019. Contract-
ed with China HEAD Aerospace
Ethiopian Space Science and Technology Technology Co. to build ground
Ethiopia 2016 1
Institute (ESSTI) receiving station in Addis Ababa;
2019 agreement with Chinese
Rocket Company to jointly build a
communications satellite
Receives satellite imagery and
L’agence Gabonaise d’Etudes et d’Observations capacity training from joining
Gabon 2007 0
Spatiales (AGEOS) Brazil-China CBERS for Africa
initiative
In talks with China Development
Ghana Space Science and Technology Centre Bank for financing and CNSA for
Ghana 2011 1
(GSSTC) technical advice for future
satellite programs
In talks with CNSA for assistance
developing satellites; Machako
Kenya Kenya Space Agency 2017 1 University physics experiment
selected to be conducted on
China Space Station
Libya Center for Remote Sensing and Space
Libya 1989 0 None found
Science (LCRSSS)
The Royal Center for Remote Sensing Space
Morocco 1989 3 None found
(CRTS)

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Table 2b: African China Space-Related Engagements, by Country

Satellites Bilateral Space Partnership with

Country Space or Space-related Agency Founded
Launched China
Jointly owned China Telemetry,
Tracking, and Command Station
Namibian Institute of Space Technology at the
Namibia n.d. 0 built in Swakopmund became op-
Namibian University of Science and Technology
erational in 2001; hosted Chinese
astronauts’ visit in 2010 and 2019
NigComSat-1, NigComSat-1R
designed, manufactured, and
launched by CGWIC. Contracted
National Space Research and Development
Nigeria 2006 6 2004 and 2009, launched 2007
Agency (NASRDA)
and 2011, respectively. People’s
Insurance Company of China pro-
vided insurance for NigComSat-1

Rwanda Rwandan Utilities Regulatory Authority n.d. 1 None found

Firm in King Abdulaziz City for

Science and Technology
developed a camera for China’s
Saudi Arabia Saudi Space Commission 2018 16
lunar orbiter satellite Longqiao-2;
data-sharing MOU signed
March 2017
Ministry for Higher Education, Research, Scheduled
Senegal n.d. None found
and Innovation 2021
Developed components for
China’s Chang-e lunar rover,
which landed on the moon in
January 2019; Private firm
South Africa South Africa National Space Agency (SANSA) 2010 8
NewSpace Systems, Ltd produces
satellite components for retailers
in China, India, Japan,
Netherlands and the US
SRSS-1 built by Shenzhen
Aerospace Oriental Red Sea
Sudan National Remote Sensing Center 1977 1 Satellite Co, and launched by
China’s Long March 4B rocket in
November 2019
Ground receiving station for Bei-
Dou satellite navigation system
Scheduled opened near Tunis in April 2018;
Tunisia National Mapping and Remote Sensing Center 1988
July 2020 jointly operated by CNSA and
Arab Information and Communi-
cation Technology Organization

Zimbabwe Zimbabwe National Geospatial and Space Agency 2018 0 None found

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Table 3: Multilateral China Space-Related Engagements

Satellites
Organization Space or Space-related Agency Founded Space Partnership with China
Launched
In talks with China Development Bank for
African Union African Space Agency 2018 3
potential financing
Arab Satellite Communications Broadcasts the Arabic-language edition of
Arab League 1976 13
(ArabSat) China Global Television Network

NIGERIA

MOST RESEARCH ON CHINA-NIGERIA RELATIONS focuses on energy, infrastructure,

and military sectors, which is somewhat surprising given the importance of space
cooperation for both parties. Among African nations, Nigeria has the most extensive
satellite development involvement with China. The two governments established
diplomatic relations in 1971. Since the turn of the millennium, Chinese aid, loans, and
investments in Nigeria have increased precipitously. In 2006, Nigeria became the first
African country to sign a Strategic Partnership Agreement with China’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.30 Moreover, Nigeria has been among China’s largest trading partners in
Africa over the past decade. There are tens of thousands of members of the Chinese
and Nigerian diasporas living in each other’s countries.31
Nigeria’s National Space Development and Research Agency (NASRDA) was
established in 2001. In December 2004, the Nigerian government contracted with
CGWIC to build the country’s second satellite, NigComSat-1. In 2006, Nigeria’s Ministry
of Finance signed an agreement with the China Export and Import Bank for US$ 200
million in preferential buyer’s credit to help fund the project. Nigerian scientists and
engineers traveled to China to receive training and participate in satellite design and
construction.32 In anticipation of the launch of Nigeria’s—and Africa’s—first
communications satellite, NigComSat-1, a private spin-off from NASRDA was
incorporated in 2006 to provide fixed satellite services to much of Africa and Italy. The
satellite launched from Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan, China, in May
2007. Beginning in mid-2008, technical errors in its solar arrays caused the satellite to
fail, and it was de-orbited in November 2008. However, the satellite’s insurance funded
a second contract with CGWIC to build the replacement satellite, NigComSat-1R. Some
technical improvements were made to address the issues with the previous version,
and NigComSat-1R launched again from Xichang in 2011.
Although Nigeria’s subsequent satellite contracts have been with the UK and
Japan, technical cooperation with China has continued. In 2016, China’s Ministry of
Science and Technology offered to build a ground receiving station to enable Nigerian
scientists to collect data from the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) array.
As of this writing, no further plans have been disclosed. However, the agreement under
which China would extend 700 government-funded scholarships and technical training

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to 1,000 space engineers has progressed. As of August 2019, over 500 Nigerian students
have received such scholarships to study in China.
Nigeria-China space cooperation illustrates the nature of Africa-China cooperation
more generally. Nigeria has multiple space partners. Although CGWIC won a contract
for Nigeria’s communications satellite, this did not lock Nigeria into an exclusive
relationship with Chinese agencies. Nor is this a case of Chinese charity. When
The primary drivers of NigComSat-1 failed, insurance money paid for the construction and launch of

space science, technology, NigComSat-1R. For China’s part, the collaboration was an important milestone for
CGWIC. This was the first time a Chinese firm provided in-orbit delivery to an
and policy development in international client. Prior to this, China’s international space contracts consisted
primarily of launch agreements.
Africa are African scientists
and officials who ALGERIA

strategically leverage
IN THE CASE OF ALGERIA, SPACE COOPERATION WITH CHINA is a comparatively
international partnerships smaller dimension of an expansive bilateral technical, economic, cultural, and policy
cooperation portfolio. Algeria and China have been allies since the early 1950s. The
to fulfill domestic space young People’s Republic of China provided military support to Algeria in the country’s
mandates. Therefore, space war for independence from France, and China was the first non-Arab country to
establish full diplomatic ties with the Algerian Provisional Government in 1958. In the
technology development on face of an international boycott, the Algerian government mobilized the support of

the African continent is other African countries for China when the People’s Republic hosted the 2008 Olympic
Games. The two countries foster robust student exchanges, providing scholarships to
best characterized as a Chinese and Algerian students to study in each other’s countries.33

complex mosaic comprised The Algerian Space Agency (ASAL) was established in 2002. The governments of
Algeria and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to cooperate in
of diverse actors, country- outer space development in 2007, established a bilateral Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership in 2014, and signed an MOU to place their bilateral cooperation under the
specific investment
framework of the BRI in September 2018. But while Chinese firms are major players in
patterns, and robust Algeria’s construction and energy sectors, this is not the case in the space sector. In
addition to China, the Algerian government has bilateral space cooperation with
public-private activity.
Argentina, France, India, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, the UK, and the US, and is a founding
member of ArabSat (see page 17). ASAL’s space partnerships are designed to facilitate
technology and knowledge transfer to support the growth of indigenous capacity.
In December 2013, the Algerian government ordered AlComSat-1, a geostationary
communications satellite from CGWIC. Financed entirely by ASAL, this was Algeria’s
fifth satellite and the only one ordered from China to date. The others had been
developed and launched with European, Russian, and Indian partners, and involved
the training of Algerian scientists and engineers in post-graduate studies during the
design and construction phase of the satellite, with programs continuing to date. The
AlComSat-1 contract included the design, manufacture, test, launch, and construction
of associated ground infrastructure necessary for satellite operation.34 CGWIG sub-
contracted parts of the project to the China Academy of Space Technology, the China

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Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, and the China Satellite Launch and Tracking
Control General. Following its successful placement in geostationary orbit by China’s
Long March-3B rocket from Xichang Satellite Launch Center, ASAL assumed control of
in-orbit operation, management, and applications from ground stations in Algeria.35
Alcomsat-1 is used for broadcasting, emergency communications, remote education,
and satellite broadband.
There is much about Algeria, and Algeria-China relations, that cannot be
generalized to the rest of the continent. Nevertheless, the structure of bilateral space
relations is illustrative of both countries’ respective space development strategies.
Consistent with Algeria’s 15-year National Space Programme (2005 – 2020), satellite
contracts with overseas partners were designed to support the growth of Algerian
space infrastructure and human capital while preserving and promoting Algerian
sovereignty. Algeria’s contract with China did not involve any grants or loans; as with
other Chinese construction projects in the country, the Algerian government paid in
full for satellite development and launch. The training component appears to have
been more modest than previous training agreements with European counterparts,
although specific numbers of engineers and scientists trained are not published and
could not be attained from meetings with Algerian counterparts in November 2019.36
For China’s part, the commercial relationship follows a now familiar pattern: CGWIC
acts as the international arm of CASC, and subcontracts components of the assembly
and launch process to an array of private and state-owned Chinese firms in order to
support the increasing specialization and diversification of China’s space sector.
MULTILATERAL
SPACE
COOPERATION ALTHOUGH CHINESE AID, INVESTMENT, LOANS, AND PROJECTS in Africa tend to
receive far more media exposure compared to other donors’ and investors’
interventions, grounded research has shown that China’s activities in Africa take place
within a complex landscape of bilateral and multilateral relations, several of which
began in the mid-twentieth century.37 This is also true for space cooperation. African
protagonists were instrumental in constructing the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and
subsequent international agreements that have provided the framework for the largely
peaceful development of space science and technology over the last sixty years.
Cooperation with a diversity of partners characterizes the international strategies of
space programs in African countries, of which China’s firms and space agencies are
one part. This section outlines eight major multilateral space cooperation initiatives in
which African and Chinese space agencies are engaged.
These multilateral initiatives create conditions for robust science diplomacy,
which can seed additional bilateral engagements. In addition to their central
contributions to advancing global earth and space sciences, these multilateral
initiatives provide a meeting ground for scientists, policymakers, and the publics of
participating countries. As such, they are advancing the science, education, and

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technology essential for achieving development goals, while also forging connections
across diverse societies.

1. THE ASIA-PACIFIC SPACE COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (APSCO)

FOUNDED IN BEIJING IN 2008 WITH SEVEN MEMBER states from Asia and Latin
America, the purpose of APSCO is to foster space research, development, data-sharing,
International satellite and technology transfer among member states. In 2015, APSCO issued the Beijing
Declaration, which realigned the priorities of the organization to use “the Belt and
partnerships undertaken
Road Initiative for facilitating space capabilities building of the Asia Pacific
on the part of African space countries.”38 Algeria, South Africa, and Tunisia, inter alia, have sent representatives to
participate in forums and research workshops. South Africa’s National Space Agency
programs proceed with the (SANSA) has been most actively pursuing affiliation in order to accelerate its
proviso that the transfer of development of advanced satellite capabilities. APSCO delegations have also made
regular research visits to SANSA headquarters in South Africa.39
know-how and technology
is a cornerstone of the 2. THE BRICS REMOTE SENSING SATELLITE CONSTELLATION
AGREEMENT
agreement. Using
commercial off-the-shelf ON OCTOBER 31, 2016, THE HEADS OF SPACE AGENCIES of the BRICS member states
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) met in Zhuhai, China, to discuss the
technology and focusing on construction of joint satellite arrays for Earth observation and remote sensing.40 Less
than a year later, on July 3, 2017, the parties convened in Haikou, China, to draft the
specific missions
BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation Agreement. A technical meeting in
accelerates the Brasília, Brazil, followed on September 18–20, 2017, which served as the first official
BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Forum. At the November 2019 forum in Brasília, as the
development process
formation of the Space Force was being debated in the US Congress, the leaders of the
providing cheaper and five countries proposed a legally-binding agreement that would prevent the placement
of weapons in outer space.41 Among many other applications, the coordination of a
faster access to space. BRICS remote sensing network will provide the BRICS-founded New Development
Bank with the data and imagery that is critical to development project planning,
implementation, and monitoring. South Africa currently does not have an Earth
observation satellite larger than a nanosat (a satellite between 1 and 10 kg), but SANSA
is responsible for aggregating Earth observation data for southern African countries. It
is part of the International Space Environmental Service and monitors weather for the
southern African region. At present, it is contributing terrestrial infrastructure to the
effort, with plans to expand its satellite capabilities in the next decade.42

3. THE CHINA-BRAZIL EARTH RESOURCE SATELLITE (CBERS) FOR

AFRICA PROGRAM

HAILED AS A MODEL OF SOUTH-SOUTH SPACE COOPERATION and an inspiration

for the BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation Agreement, the CBERS program

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began as a joint venture between Brazil’s National Space Research Institute (Instituto
Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais – INPE) and China’s Academy of Space Technology in
1988. The CBERS for Africa Program grew out of the thirty-year bilateral collaboration
between China and Brazil. The decision to provide free imagery to Africa from Brazil’s
cameras on board the CBERS craft in 2007 made Brazil the world’s largest distributor
of free satellite imagery to Africa at the time.43 The program began by making CBERS
images available for free to environmental ministries and organizations in Africa,
accompanied by the necessary software to access the satellite data. The first ground
station to receive the data was in South Africa in 2007, followed by stations in Kenya
and the Canary Islands in 2008.44
This program represented the first time in the history of orbital remote sensing
that multi-spectral high resolution data was downlinked to foreign ground stations
without licensing fees, which meant that satellite imagery was distributed to end users
in Africa immediately upon processing.45 In 2011, China’s Ministry of Science and
Technology incorporated Phase II of the construction of South Africa Hartebeetshoek’s
satellite ground receiving station into its portfolio of international scientific and
technological cooperation projects, which was completed in 2015. The station provides
real-time receiving, processing, and distribution of CBERS-4 Satellite data for thirteen
African protagonists were southern African countries.46 To further the impact of this program, Brazil’s and
China’s space programs offered training to partners in several African countries,
instrumental in exemplified by Brazil’s Capacitree program (see below). The sixth and most recent

constructing the 1967 CBERS satellite was launched from Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center on December 20,
2019.
Outer Space Treaty and
4. CAPACITREE
subsequent international
agreements that have THE CBERS FOR AFRICA PROGRAM COMPLEMENTS BRAZIL’S INPE Capacitree
program, which trains technicians in partner states with tropical forest and savannah
provided the framework for
biomes to process remote sensing satellite data for environment and development
the largely peaceful monitoring.47 Brazil’s INPE has provided training for African scientists and technicians
to use Earth observation data and remote sensing technologies for forest monitoring
development of space from seventeen African countries—Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the
science and technology Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, São Tomé e Principe, South Africa,
over the last sixty years. Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia. Capacitree is supported by the United Nations Food
and Agriculture Organization, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, the
Caribbean Community, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization, and the
Inter-American Development Bank.48

5. THE ARAB SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS ORGANIZATION (ARABSAT)

FOUNDED IN 1976 AND HEADQUARTERED IN RIYADH, Saudi Arabia, ArabSat receives

its US$ 500 million annual operating capital from all twenty-two Arab states, except the

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Comoros Islands. Its satellite control stations are located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and
Tunis, Tunisia. The array provides entertainment and communications services to
eighty countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe. The organization owns
and operates seven satellites located in geostationary orbit. The first six satellites were
built by European contractors and launched by French and US rockets.49 The Arabsat-
6A was built by Lockheed Martin and was the first successful commercial launch by the
SpaceX Falcon Heavy Rocket from Kennedy Space Center in April 2019.
In March 2019, ten member states—Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and UAE—launched the Arab Space

In addition to their central Cooperation Group headquartered in the United Arab Emirates. It is envisioned as a
precursor to an Arab Space Agency, modeled after the European Space Agency. The
contributions to advancing group is currently developing an Earth observation and environmental monitoring
satellite, to be launched in 2023.50 ArabSat has provided a platform through which
global earth and space
individual Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, cooperate with China and other countries
sciences, these multilateral in satellite component development, construction, and data-sharing. For example, a
Saudi-developed camera was installed on China’s lunar orbiter satellite Longqiao-2,
initiatives provide a
which captured images of the lunar surface and provided lunar data to both
meeting ground for countries.51

scientists, policymakers, 6. THE CHINA-ARAB STATES BEIDOU GLOBAL SATELLITE NAVIGATION

and the publics of SYSTEM STATION (BDS)

participating countries. As CHINA’S BEIDOU NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM (BDS) consists of three

such, they are advancing generations of satellite constellations. The first three-satellite constellation provided
navigation services to China and neighboring states between 2000 and 2012. This was
the science, education, and considered important for China’s security purposes to have an indigenous navigation

technology essential for system and to achieve independence from the US-controlled GPS array. The second
constellation of ten satellites was launched in 2011 and 2012 to provide navigation
achieving development services to the Asia-Pacific region. In 2015, CNSA began building up the third
generation of thirty-five ultra-high resolution satellites to provide global coverage and
goals, while also forging
to present BRI partner states with an alternative to the United States’ GPS system or
connections across diverse Europe’s Galileo satellite navigation system.52 In 2016, the Arab League unanimously
voted to establish the first overseas processing station for BDS in Tunisia.53 This
societies. arrangement leverages and expands upon existing ArabSat infrastructure in Tunis.

7. DISASTER MONITORING CONSTELLATION (DMC)

AN INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MONITORING CONSTELLATION was initially

proposed at the Forty-Seventh International Astronautical Federation Conference held
in Beijing in 1996 and led by Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (UK).54 Algeria,
Nigeria, Turkey, the UK, and China joined the DMC, which launched satellites from
2002 to 2005. The Constellation was recommended by the United Nations as part of an
effort to increase coordination among space agencies to better monitor natural

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disasters and support relief planning efforts. The goal was to achieve daily repeat
imagery anywhere in the world transmitted to a variety of ground stations.55 Algeria’s
contribution to the constellation, Alsat-1, was developed through a collaboration
between the UK’s Surrey Satellite Technology Limited and the Algerian National Space
Technology Centre. The arrangement included training for Algerian engineers in the
UK. The first DMC satellite, Alsat-1, launched in November 2002 from the Plesetsk
Cosmodrome in Russia. CNSA launched its indigenously developed Beijing-1 in 2005.56

8. SQUARE KILOMETER ARRAY (SKA)

THE SKA IS AN INTERNATIONAL ASTRONOMY INITIATIVE headquartered at the

Jodrell Bank Observatory, near Manchester, UK. It was established in December 2011
with the goal to build the world’s largest radio telescope, eventually measuring over a
square kilometer (one million square meters), to be completed in South Africa and
Australia with later expansions into other African countries. Other SKA members
include Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Spain, Sweden, and the UK.57 South Africa’s government has assumed responsibility for
developing the MeerKAT telescope as a run-up to SKA, which became operational in
July 2018 and is now the world’s most powerful telescope of its kind. Second is the
National Astronomical Observatories of China, which operates the world’s largest
single dish radio telescope, the five-hundred-meter Aperture Spherical radio Telescope.
China’s Fifty-Fourth Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation
has been leading the international effort to design the SKA dish with principle
partners from South Africa, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the UK.58
Since 2005, South Africa’s African SKA Human Capital Development Program has
awarded more than 1,000 grants to advance studies in astronomy and engineering in
Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Mozambique. African SKA partner countries also
include Botswana, Ghana, Namibia, and Zambia.59 South Africa is perhaps unique
amongst African nations for an explicit focus on astronomy and its commitment to
advancing its data management system specifically for astronomy purposes.60

CONCLUSION MOST SPACE-RELATED ACTIVITY HAPPENING IN AFRICA is driven by Africans. The

roles of China’s institutions in the space development programs of African countries
are diversified and important, but they remain comparatively smaller than those of
other international partnerships maintained by African space agencies. Still, China’s
successes in providing relatively low-cost, reliable, and comprehensive satellites to
African counterparts have brought about important milestones for both sides. As the
current generation of African space scientists, social scientists, and entrepreneurs
continue to grow space capacities on the continent, social science research concerning
the African space community should likewise continue to mature in order to inform
good policies that promote global collaboration and exchange in space sciences and

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technologies. Potentially productive research areas include global data sharing politics
and practice, the domestic determinants of national space priorities, and the impact of
growing space capacity on major domestic and international governance questions. ★

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ENDNOTES

1. Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), “China launches Fengyun-2H meteorological satellite to benefit Belt and Road
countries and APSCO member states,” accessed November 30, 2019, http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/
NewsHighlights/2018-03-09/54-90-1.shtml; Jia, D., X. Chao, and X. Chen, “China’s mission in surveying, mapping, and geographic
information in global governance,” International Archives of Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing, and Spatial Information Sciences 42, no. 3
(2018): 629-632; Degang Sun and Yuyou Zhang, “Building an ‘Outer Space Silk Road’: China’s Beidou Naviation System in the Arab
World,” Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 10, no. 3 (2016): 24-49.

2. Ravi P. Gupta, Remote Sensing Geology (Heidelberg: Springer, 2017); Zhaohan Sheng., “Intelligent Management of Mega Infrastructure
Construction,” in Fundamental Theories of Mega Infrastructure Construction Management: Theoretical Considerations from Chinese
Practices (Heidelberg: Springer, 2018); Wen Xu, Jianya Gong and Mi Wang,, “Development, application, and prospects for Chinese land
observation satellites,” Geo-spatial Information Science 17, no. 2 (2014): 102-109; Douglas O. Fuller, “Tropical Forest Monitoring and
Remote Sensing: A New Era of Transparency in Forest Governance?” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 27, no. 1 (2006): 15-29; Stojce
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Business Media, 2005).

3. African countries with which China has strategic and/or cooperative partnerships are Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Tanzania.

4. There are twenty-four different names assigned to the differing degrees of inter-governmental partnerships initiated by Beijing. For
further reading, see Quan Li and Min Ye, “China’s emerging partnership network: what, who, where, when and why,” International
Trade, Politics and Development 3, no. 2 (2019): 66-81.

5. Klinger Fieldnotes, Abuja, Nigeria, April 2019 and Algiers, Algeria, November 2019.

6. Daniel Sage, How Outer Space Made America: Geography, Organization, and the Cosmic Sublime (London and New York: Routledge, 2016);
Joshua Barker, “Engineers and political dreasm: Indonesia in the satellite age,” Current Anthropology 46, no. 5 (2005): 703-727.

7. With some important exceptions. See, for example: Froelich, A (2019) and Wood, D, and Weigel, A (2012).

8. There are some recent exceptions in the space sector more generally. For example, in August 2019 the U.S. Embassy in partnership with
the Libyan Ministry of Education selected twelve Libyan students (ages 15-18) to attend NASA Space Camp in Huntsville, Alabama.

9. Star Publishing Company Limited, “U.N. Charter,” The Ghanian, no. 1 (1958): 28.

10. United Nations, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, (New York: United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1967).

11. There have been five major transgressions in the more than half century since the treaty entered into force: the first four are the
anti-satellite missile tests conducted respectively by the former USSR, the US, China, and India, and most recently the 2019 US
Congressional decision to create a Space Force as the sixth branch of the US Military, thereby designating outer space as a war-fighting
domain.

12. These are: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Gabon, Nigeria, and Ghana. This
excludes Gulf states, of which Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates have space programs.

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China-India Relations, eds. K. Bajpai, M.C. Miller, and B. Chong (London: Routledge, 2020): 517 - 530.

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CHINA, AFRICA & THE REST: RECENT TRENDS IN SPACE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT

16. This includes media outreach and information dissemination. An excellent resource for all space-related information in Africa is the
news site Space in Africa. The team maintains a directory of all space related activity occurring on the continent as well as a near
real-time news feed of all major global space developments, with an emphasis on those involving African actors and entities. It is an
extremely valuable resource for anyone researching the sector. Because it was founded and is maintained by a young team of
journalists in Lagos, Nigeria, anyone from outside the continent wishing to learn more should purchase a subscription in order to help
the organization pay the bills, pay their staff, and continue to provide this valuable service to the global community. Much of the
information in this working paper is indebted to the Space in Africa team. The fieldwork we were able to undertake benefited
considerably from their facilitation. More information at: https://africanews.space

17. José A. Ocampo, “The Latin American Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective,” in Life After Debt, eds. J.E. Stiglitz and D. Heymann
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18. Ikubolajeh B. and Kidane Mengisteab, “IMF-World Bank adjustment and structural transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Economic
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19. Asif A. Siddiqi, “Science, geography, and nation: the global creation of Thumba,” History and Technology 31 (2015): 420-451; African
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32. Nigerian counterparts reported less satisfactory outcomes as compared to their previous partnerships with the UK, largely due to
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CHINA, AFRICA & THE REST: RECENT TRENDS IN SPACE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT

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24 W W W. SA I S - C A R I .O R G / P U B L I C AT I O N S
AUTHOR BIO
J UL I E M IC H E LLE K LI NG ER: Julie Klinger holds a PhD in Geography from the University of California,
Berkeley, and is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography and
Spatial Sciences at the University of Delaware, where she is core faculty in
the Minerals, Materials, and Society Program. She researches and writes
about development, environment, and natural resource policy and practice,
with emphasis on China, Brazil, the US, and Outer Space. Her recent book
Rare Earth Frontiers: From Terrestrial Subsoils to Lunar Landscapes (Cornell
University Press, 2017) received the 2017 Meridian Award from the American
Association of Geographers.

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25 W W W. SA I S - C A R I .O R G / P U B L I C AT I O N S
ABO U T TH E SAIS CH INA-AF R ICA R E S E AR CH INITIATIVE

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understanding of the relations between China and African countries through
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