Facts: Republic Vs Eugenio GR No. 174629 February 14, 2008
Facts: Republic Vs Eugenio GR No. 174629 February 14, 2008
Facts: Republic Vs Eugenio GR No. 174629 February 14, 2008
GR No. 174629
February 14, 2008
Facts
After the ruling of Agan vs PIATCO nullifying the concession agreement awarded to the later over the NAIA 3 Project, a
series of investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman
and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of petitioner AMLC. The OSG wrote the AMLC requesting the latter’s
assistance in obtaining more evidence to completely reveal the financial trail of corruption surrounding the Project and
also noting that petitioner Republic of the Philippines was presently defending itself in two international arbitration cases
filed in relation to the NAIA 3 Project. The CIS conducted an intelligence database search on the financial transactions of
certain individuals involved in the award, including respondent Pantaleon Alvarez (Alvarez) who had been the Chairman
of the PBAC Technical Committee, NAIA-IPT3 Project. The search revealed that Alvarez maintained eight (8) bank
accounts with six (6) different banks. The AMLC resolved to authorize the Executive Director of the AMLC to sign and
verify an application to inquire into and/or examine the deposits or investments of Pantaleon Alvarez, Wilfredo Trinidad,
Alfredo Liongson, and Cheng Yong, and their related web of accounts wherever these may be found, as defined under
Rule 10.4 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations; and to authorize the AMLC Secretariat to conduct an
inquiry into subject accounts once the Regional Trial Court grants the application to inquire into and/or examine the bank
accounts of those four individuals. The rationale for the said resolution was founded on the cited findings of the CIS that
amounts were transferred from a Hong Kong bank account owned by Jetstream Pacific Ltd. Account to bank accounts in
the Philippines maintained by Liongson and Cheng Yong. The Makati RTC rendered an Order inquire and examine the
subject bank accounts, the trial court being satisfied that there existed probable cause to believe that the deposits in
various bank accounts, details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to the offense of violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by
the Information.
Meanwhile, respondent Lilia Cheng, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with Application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary, directed against the Republic of the Philippines through the AMLC,
Manila RTC Judge Eugenio, Jr. and Makati RTC Judge Marella, Jr.. She identified herself as the wife of Cheng Yong with
whom she jointly owns a conjugal bank account with Citibank that is covered by the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, and
two conjugal bank accounts with Metrobank that are covered by the Manila RTC bank inquiry order. Lilia Cheng imputed
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Makati and Manila RTCs in granting AMLC’s ex parte applications for a bank
inquiry order, arguing among others that the ex parte applications violated her constitutional right to due process, that the
bank inquiry order under the AMLA can only be granted in connection with violations of the AMLA and that the AMLA
cannot apply to bank accounts opened and transactions entered into prior to the effectivity of the AMLA or to bank
accounts located outside the Philippines.
Issue
Whether or not the proscription against ex post facto laws applies to Section 11 of the AMLA, a provision which does not
provide a penal sanction but which merely authorizes the inspection of suspect accounts and deposits.
Ruling
Yes. In this jurisdiction, we have defined an ex post facto law as one which either: (1) makes criminal an act done before
the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it
greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed
to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6)
deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of
a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. As applied to the AMLA, it is plain that no person may be
prosecuted under the penal provisions of the AMLA for acts committed prior to the enactment of the law on 17 October
2001. As much was understood by the lawmakers since they deliberated upon the AMLA, and indeed there is no serious
dispute on that point. (Emphasis supplied)100 Prior to the enactment of the AMLA, the fact that bank accounts or deposits
were involved in activities later on enumerated in Section 3 of the law did not, by itself, remove such accounts from the
shelter of absolute confidentiality. Prior to the AMLA, in order that bank accounts could be examined, there was need to
secure either the written permission of the depositor or a court order authorizing such examination, assuming that they
were involved in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in a case where the money deposited or
invested was itself the subject matter of the litigation. The passage of the AMLA stripped another layer off the rule on
absolute confidentiality that provided a measure of lawful protection to the account holder. For that reason, the application
of the bank inquiry order as a means of inquiring into records of transactions entered into prior to the passage of the
AMLA would be constitutionally infirm, offensive as it is to the ex post facto clause. Still, we must note that the position
submitted by Lilia Cheng is much broader than what we are willing to affirm . She argues that the proscription against ex
post facto laws goes as far as to prohibit any inquiry into deposits or investments included in bank accounts opened prior
to the effectivity of the AMLA even if the suspect transactions were entered into when the law had already taken effect.
The Court recognizes that if this argument were to be affirmed, it would create a horrible loophole in the AMLA that would
in turn supply the means to fearlessly engage in money laundering in the Philippines; all that the criminal has to do is to
make sure that the money laundering activity is facilitated through a bank account opened prior to 2001. Nowhere in the
legislative record cited by Lilia Cheng does it appear that there was an unequivocal intent to exempt from the bank inquiry
order all bank accounts opened prior to the passage of the AMLA. There is a cited exchange between Representatives
Ronaldo Zamora and Jaime Lopez where the latter confirmed to the former that "deposits are supposed to be exempted
from scrutiny or monitoring if they are already in place as of the time the law is enacted." That statement does indicate
that transactions already in place when the AMLA was passed are indeed exempt from scrutiny through a bank inquiry
order, but it cannot yield any interpretation that records of transactions undertaken after the enactment of the AMLA are
similarly exempt. Due to the absence of cited authority from the legislative record that unqualifiedly supports respondent
Lilia Cheng’s thesis, there is no cause for us to sustain her interpretation of the AMLA, fatal as it is to the anima of that
law.