[ G.R. No.

240053, October 09, 2019 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO AND JULIUS
LACANILAO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

The peculiar factual circumstances surrounding the present case give rise to a novel question of law.
May a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane Veloso (Mary Jane), who was convicted of drug
trafficking and sentenced to death by the Indonesian Government and who is presently confined in a
prison facility in Indonesia, testify by way of deposition without violating the constitutional right to
confrontation of a witness by the accused? 

This petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the December 13,
2017 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149002 which granted respondent's
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and reversed the August 16,2016 Resolution3 of the Regional
Trial Court (trial court), Branch 88, of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, granting the motion of the
prosecution to take the deposition by written interrogatories of Mary Jane in Indonesia.

The Factual Antecedents

Mary Jane, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius) were friends and
neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation and susceptibility,
Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia. Believing that the job
was a ray of hope, Mary Jane scraped whatever meager money she had and when the amount was
not even enough to pay Cristina and Julius as placement fee, she resorted to borrowing from
relatives. Still, the amount gathered was insufficient prompting Mary Jane's husband to sell even
their precious motorcycle. On April 21, 2010, Mary Jane, together with Cristina, eventually left the
Philippines for Malaysia. However, to Mary Jane's dismay, she was informed by Cristina upon their
arrival in Malaysia that the job intended for her was no longer available. After spending a few days in
Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to Indonesia for a seven-day holiday with a promise that she will
have a job upon her return in Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a
luggage to bring on her trip.

Upon Mary Jane's arrival at the Adisucipto International Airport in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, she was
apprehended by the police officers for allegedly carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin inside her luggage.
She was accordingly charged with drug trafficking before the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta,
Indonesia.

Mary Jane sought comfort from her family in the Philippines and informed them that she was
currently detained in Indonesia. Mary Jane's family immediately confronted Cristina who instead of
helping them even threatened them to keep the matter to themselves and not to divulge the same
especially to the media. She even told Mary Jane's family that she is part of an international drug
syndicate who would spend millions to get Mary Jane out of prison.

However, in October 2010, the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, convicted Mary
Jane of drug trafficking and sentenced her to death by firing squad. After the affirmance of her
conviction by the High Court and the Supreme Court of Indonesia, Mary Jane and eight other felons
who were similarly convicted of drug-related offenses were brought to a prison facility in the island of
Nusakambangan, off Central Java, Indonesia, to await their execution by firing squad, which was
originally scheduled on April 9, 2015 but later rescheduled to April 28, 2015. Eventually, the eight
companions of Mary Jane were executed by firing squad. Presently, Mary Jane is detained at the
Wirogunan Penitentiary in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Meanwhile, in the Philippines, Cristina and Julius were arrested by the operatives of the Anti-Human
Trafficking Division of the National Bureau of Investigation. Thereafter, they were charged with
qualified trafficking in person in violation of Section 4(a) in relation to Sections 3 (a) and 6 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208, otherwise known as "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" docketed
as Criminal Case No. SD (15)-3723.4 Cristina and Julius were likewise charged in two separate
Informations with the crime of illegal recruitment as penalized under Section 6, par. (k) and (1) of
R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Workers Act of 1995,"
and estafa in violation of Section 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. SD (15)-3724,5 and SD (15)3753,6 respectively, filed before the trial court. Upon
arraignment, Cristina and Julius entered a plea of "not guilty" on all charges.

On March 31, 2015, representatives from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
went to Wirugonan Prison to interview Mary Jane. She executed a document known as
"Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Mary Jane Fiesta Veloso. "

In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, Mary Jane maintained her innocence and narrated how she was
recruited by Cristina and Julius. She alleged that while in Malaysia, she and Cristina stayed at Sun
Inn Lagoon since her supposed employer was not in Malaysia. Cristina has a boyfriend named
Prince whom she conversed only by phone. Prince has a brother named "Ike. " On April 24, 2010,
Mary Jane and Cristina went to the hotel parking lot and met with "Ike " who was on board a white
car. They then went inside the car wherein "Ike" handed the luggage to Cristina. When they returned
to the hotel room, Cristina gave Mary Jane the luggage. Mary Jane noticed that it was unusually
heavy but, upon checking, found nothing inside. She then asked Cristina why the luggage was
heavy but the latter simply replied that because it was new. The luggage was the same bag she
used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane
realized that it contained prohibited drugs.

On the basis of her affidavit, the Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to
suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the Indonesian Government that the
recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and her testimony is vital in
the prosecution of Cristina and Julius.

Thus, on April 28, 2015, or a few hours before the scheduled execution of Mary Jane, the President
of Indonesia, His Excellency Joko Widodo, granted her an indefinite reprieve. The Cabinet Secretary
of the Indonesian Government informed the public that President Widodo received reports about the
on-going legal proceedings in the Philippines with respect to the case of Mary Jane, and that her
recruiters were already in police custody.

Hence, pursuant to its obligations under the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
entered into by Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty), the Indonesian
authorities deferred indefinitely the execution of Mary Jane to afford her an opportunity to present
her case against Cristina, Julius, and "Ike" who were allegedly responsible for recruiting and
exploiting her to engage in drug trafficking.

The Indonesian authorities however imposed the following conditions relative to the taking of Mary
Jane's testimony, viz.:
 (a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;   

(b) No cameras shall be allowed;   

(c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and   

(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing. 

Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant Mary
Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories. "7 It averred that the taking of Mary Jane's
testimony through the use of deposition upon written interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the
Revised Rules of Court because she is out of the country and will not be able to testify personally
before the court due to her imprisonment. The prosecution also pointed out that Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court applies suppletorily in criminal proceedings and the use of deposition upon written
interrogatories in criminal cases is not expressly prohibited under the Rules of Court. Further, it
pointed out that the Supreme Court has allowed dispensation of direct testimony in open court under
the Rules of Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule. Lastly, the OSG averred that
Cristina and Julius will still have an opportunity to examine Mary Jane by propounding their own set
of written interrogatories through the designated consular officer who will be taking the deposition;
moreover, they were not precluded from objecting to the questions and answers.

Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should be made before and
not during the trial. The depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the Rules of Court are not designed to
replace the actual testimony of the witness in open court and the use thereof is confined only in civil
cases. Also, they argued that such method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the
witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987
Constitution. Finally, they claimed that the prosecution's reliance on the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases and the Judicial Affidavit Rule was misplaced because the affiants therein
were still subject to cross-examination.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

In its Resolution dated August 16, 2016, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion subject to
the following conditions:

1. Considering that the Prosecution has already submitted their proposed questions in the
written interrogatories, the accused, through counsel, is given a period of ten (10) days from
receipt of this Resolution to submit their comment to the proposed questions on the
deposition upon written interrogatories for the witness Mary Jane Veloso. Upon receipt of the
Comment, the Court shall promptly rule on the objections;    

2. The Court shall schedule the taking of the deposition in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, which
shall be presided by the undersigned trial judge. The final questions for the deposition (after
ruling on the Defense objections), shall be propounded by the Consul of the Philippines in
the Republic of Indonesia or his designated representative. The answers of the deponent to
the written interrogatories shall be taken verbatim by a competent staff in the Office of the
Philippine Consulate in the Republic of Indonesia;   

3. The transcribed copy of the answers of the deponent shall be furnished the accused,
through counsel, who shall thereafter submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to
the Prosecution within ten (10) days from receipt;     
 4. The Prosecution is given the same period often (10) days from receipt of the proposed
cross interrogatory questions of the Defense stating the ground for the objections. Upon
receipt of the comment, the Court shall promptly rule on the objections:   

5. The Court shall schedule the conduct of the cross interrogatory questions for the
deposition of Mary Jane Veloso in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, which shall be presided by the
undersigned trial judge. The final questions for the written cross interrogatories (after ruling
on the Prosecution's objections) shall be propounded by the Consul of the Philippines in the
Republic of Indonesia or his designated representative. The answers of the deponent to the
written cross interrogatories shall be taken verbatim by a competent staff in the Office of the
Philippine Consulate in the Republic of Indonesia;

6. Unless the Prosecution opts to conduct re-direct written interrogatories, the testimony of
Mary Jane Veloso by way of deposition upon written interrogatories shall be deemed
terminated. In case the Prosecution propounds re-direct written interrogatories on the
deponent, the above-mentioned procedure for the conduct of direct and cross interrogatories
shall be observed.8

Cristina and Julius immediately filed their "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Suspend
Period of Time to File Comments to Proposed Questions for Deposition of Mary Jane
Veloso. "9 However, the trial court denied their Omnibus Motion in its November 3, 2016
Resolution.10     

Undeterred, Cristina and Julius filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Urgent Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction11 before the Court of Appeals averring
that the trial court judge gravely abused her discretion in the issuance of the assailed
Resolutions.     

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:     

Finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the appellate court, in its assailed
December 13, 2017 Decision, granted the Petition for Certiorari and reversed the August 16, 2016
Resolution of the trial court. It held that, contrary to the RTC's. findings, the conditional examination
of witnesses in criminal proceedings are primarily governed by Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. According to the appellate court, the State failed to establish compelling reason to depart
from such rule and to apply instead Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure which only applies in
civil cases. Thus, pursuant to Rule 119, the taking of deposition of Mary Jane or her conditional
examination must be made not in Indonesia but before the court where the case is pending, i.e., the
Regional Trial Court of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88, and that Cristina and Julius, being
the accused in the criminal proceedings, should be notified thereof so they can attend the
examination.     

The appellate court further reasoned that to allow the prosecution to take the deposition of Mary
Jane through written interrogatories will violate the right of Cristina and Julius as the accused to
confront a witness or to meet the witness face to face.    

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought for reconsideration12 but it was denied by the
appellate court in its June 5, 2018 Resolution.13     

Aggrieved, the OSG filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court before this Court alleging mainly that: (a) the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to
Crisitina and Julius's petition for certiorari because there was another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of law; in addition, the OSG contended that the Petition
for Certiorari should not have been given due course considering the lack of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court; and; (b) Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court with respect to deposition under written interrogatories can be applied suppletorily in the
taking of the testimony of Mary Jane given her extraordinary circumstances.

Meantime, spouses Cesar and Celia Veloso, parents of Mary Jane, filed a "Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-In-Intervention."14 They prayed to be allowed to intervene,
on behalf of Mary Jane, in the instant proceeding for the purpose of protecting and preserving their
daughter's substantial and immediate interest. Attached to their motion was their Petition-in-
Intervention.15     

The OSG, on the other hand, submitted its Manifestation and Motion.16 It informed the Court that
the trial court proceeded with the hearing of the criminal cases in accordance with A.M. No. 15-06-
10-SC, or the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases. The prosecution has only
Mary Jane to present as a witness. Hence, the OSG prays that the Court immediately resolve the
instant Petition for Review and to suspend the application of A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC in the criminal
proceedings before the trial court.     

In this Court's March 27, 2019 Resolution,17 it denied the motion for intervention of Mary Jane's
parents for failure to establish legal interest in the instant case that is actual and material as well as
direct and immediate. The Court likewise denied the OSG's prayer to suspend the application of
A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC in the criminal proceedings before the trial court for lack of basis.

Issues

(a) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari, and;       

(b) Whether Mary Jane's testimony may be validly acquired through deposition by written
interrogatories.       

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition impressed with merit.    

On Procedural Matters     

The OSG avers that the appellate court erred in giving due course and granting the respondents'
Petition for Certiorari there being other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies in the ordinary course
of law. It further argues that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted
the State's motion to allow the taking of Mary Jane's testimony by deposition through written
interrogatories.     

The Court agrees.     

Impropriety of the writ of certiorari

before the Court of Appeals     

A writ of certiorari is limited in scope and narrow in character. It is available only to correct acts
rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. In other
words, certiorari is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of procedure or mistakes in
the findings or conclusions of the lower court. Thus, any alleged errors committed by the trial court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction and in the exercise of its discretion are mere errors of judgment,
correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and not by a
petition for certiorari.18     

The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Cruz v. People,19 citing Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank

and Trust Company20 is instructive on the scope of certiorari:

We remind that the writ of certiorari - being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character,
whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an
inferior court from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or
to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that courts have no power or authority in law
to perform) - is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every
error committed by a lower court.       

In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out
of Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the
record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the
writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the
inferior court's judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if
allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy
was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected
in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be
exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and
would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.       

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been
in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of
certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in
which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose[.]       

x x x x       

Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of
amending or nullifying the proceeding. (Citations omitted)

It must be emphasized that the errors imputed against the trial court by Cristina and Julius in their
Petition for Certiorari pertained only to its appreciation of the factual milieu, and the application of
pertinent law and rules. Plainly, their Petition for Certiorari did not contain factual allegations that can
support a finding of grave abuse of discretion. These alleged errors, if at all, amounted only to
erroneous exercise of the lower court's judgment, an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction,
which does not justify Cristina's and Julius's resort to a certiorari proceeding.     

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law."21 It arises when a lower court or tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law
or existing jurisprudence.22 The Supreme Court explained in Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio,23 viz.:
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only
be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition
for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or
quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of
discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross, x x x.

In the case at bench, respondents did not even attempt to show that the trial court abused its
discretion, much less that the exercise thereof was so patent and gross and to amount to lack of
jurisdiction; in fact, even the appellate court simply stated in its assailed Decision that the trial court
merely erred, and not abuse its discretion, much more grave, in applying Rule 23 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure instead of Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which particularly deals with
the conditional examination of a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane in this case, in criminal cases.
Notably, the appellate court did not specify the circumstances in support of its conclusion that the
trial court arrived at its conclusion in an arbitrary and despotic manner. On the contrary, a close
examination of the trial court's judgment shows that it was anchored on the peculiar incidents
surrounding the case, and applied jurisprudence and rules which it believed were pertinent. It has in
fact judiciously discussed the rationale for its decision to allow the taking of Mary Jane's deposition
through written interrogatories in this wise:

First, Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring prosecution witnesses
who are either sick or infirm or has left the Philippines without any date of return, to deliver their
testimony in open court cannot be applied to the private complainant, because her situation as a
death row convict in a foreign country incapacitates her from making decisions, on her own, to take
the witness stand. Such decision to testify and the manner by which her testimony is to be given
depends on the Indonesian authorities before whom she was sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of death;       

Second, considering the inapplicability of Sec. 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Court found it appropriate to apply in a suppletory manner, Sec. 23 of the Revised
Rules of Court for the taking of the private complainant's deposition upon written interrogatories.
Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides that the deposition of a person
confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court upon such terms as the court prescribes;       

Third, in the case of People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey Webb xxx, the Supreme Court
categorically declared that "due process is not a monopoly of the defense. The State is entitled to
due process as much as the accused". To deny the motion of the Prosecution would result in a
highly inequitable situation where the sole witness relied upon by the Prosecution to establish their
case would be denied the opportunity to present her case due to procedural technicalities which are
beyond her control;       

Fourth, the deposition sought by the Prosecution is specifically aimed at perpetuating the testimony
of the private complainant, thus said deposition may be allowed at any stage of the proceedings and
even on appeal pursuant to Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court in the separate opinion of former
Chief Justice Hilario Davide in the previously cited case of People vs. Webb, be affirmed that
depositions may be allowed in criminal cases and may be taken at any time after the
commencement of the action whenever necessary or convenient, x x x;       
xxxx       

Fifth, the offense involved in this case, i.e. qualified human trafficking, is a major transnational crime
committed across continents. Unlike the previously cited cases of Cuenco and Go where the
offenses involved are non-index crimes (i.e., estafa and other deceits), the subject suit involves a
major transnational crime that cuts across borders and is a principal policy concern among nations.
Thus, the Court believes that the Prosecution should not be denied the opportunity to prove its case,
thus assuring the global community that the Philippines is committed to fight such modern day
menace[.]24     

Indubitably, there was absence of any proof that the grant of the taking of deposition through written
interrogatories by the trial court was made in an arbitrary, whimsical, and capricious manner. There
was no patent abuse of discretion which was so gross in nature thereby amounting to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law.25 What was only apparent in the instant case was that the trial court properly
considered the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the plight of Mary Jane, in relation to
applicable rules and jurisprudence. Suffice it to state that the Decision of the trial court was not
without rhyme or reason. Clearly, there was an honest effort on the part of the trial court to support
its ratiocination and conclusion based on facts and law.  

As already adverted, the case at hand is unprecedented. It involves novel issues and poses difficult
questions of law. It is settled jurisprudence that "[a] doubtful or difficult question of law may become
the basis of good faith and, in this regard, the law always accords to public officials the presumption
of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties, xxx Any person who seeks to
establish otherwise has the burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive."26 As such, no abuse of
discretion, much more grave abuse of discretion, may be successfully imputed against the trial
court.     

In fine, this Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court and in holding that respondents' resort to a Petition for Certiorari was proper.     

This now brings our discussion to the substantive issues.     

On Substantive Matters     

The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary circumstances, i.e., Mary Jane's conviction by
final judgment and her detention in a prison facility in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, while awaiting
execution by firing squad; the grant by the Indonesian President of an indefinite reprieve in view of
the ongoing legal proceedings against Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions
attached to the reprieve particularly that Mary Jane should remain in confinement in Indonesia, and
any question propounded to her must only be in writing, are more than enough grounds to have
allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.     

The OSG's contentions are meritorious.     

The Court cannot subscribe to the pronouncement by the appellate court that the State failed to
show compelling reasons to justify the relaxation of the Rules and the suppletory application of Rule
23. The Court also cannot agree to its declaration that the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius
to confront a witness will be violated since safeguards were set in place by the trial court precisely to
protect and preserve their rights.     
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court

is inapplicable in the instant case     

In its assailed Decision, the appellate court held that the deposition of Mary Jane's testimony through
written interrogatories in Indonesia is not sanctioned by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and that the pronouncements of the Court in Go v. People27 and Cuenco vda.
De Manguerra v. Risos28 that Section 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure should not be given any
suppletory application. It held that "just like a witness who is sick or infirm, Mary Jane's imprisonment
in Indonesia presents a limitation on her mobility."29 According to the Court of Appeals, Section 15,
Rule 119 which applies to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, Mary
Jane's deposition must be taken before the court where the case is pending. In other words, the
appellate court opines that Mary Jane's testimony must be taken before the trial court, where the
cases of respondents are being heard, and not in Indonesia.     

The Court begs to differ.     

Section 15, Rule 119 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. — When it satisfactorily appears that
a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has
to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined
before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in
his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be
conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to
attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be
admitted in behalf of or against the accused. (Emphasis Ours.)     

Under the foregoing provision, in order for the testimony of the prosecution witness be taken before
the court where the case is being heard, it must be shown that the said prosecution witness is either:
(a) too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave
the Philippines with no definite date of returning.     

Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under either category. She is neither too sick nor infirm to
appear at the trial nor has to leave the Philippines indefinitely. To recall, Mary Jane is currently
imprisoned in Indonesia for having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of drug trafficking,
a grave offense in the said state. In fact, she was already sentenced to death and is only awaiting
her execution by firing squad. Her situation is not akin to a person whose limitation of mobility is by
reason of ill-health or feeble age, the grounds cited in Section 15 of Rule 119. In fact, Mary Jane's
predicament does not in way pertain to a restriction in movement from one place to another but a
deprivation of liberty thru detention in a foreign country with little or no hope of being saved from the
extreme penalty of death by firing squad.     

It thus necessarily follows that the cases of Go v. People and Cuenco vda. De Manguera v.
Risos are not on all fours with the present case. The circumstances of the prosecution witnesses in
the cases of Go and Cuenco demanded and justified the strict adherence to Rule 119. The
witnesses in both cases anchored their allowance to testify by way of deposition on their claims that
they were too sick or infirm to testify before the court. In the case of Go, Li Luen Pen who returned to
Cambodia claimed that he was undergoing treatment for lung infection and could not travel back to
the Philippines due to his illness.    
Similarly, in the case of Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerra averred that she would not
be able to testify before the trial court due to weak physical condition and age. Note, however, that
despite the limitation in the mobility of Li Luen Pen and Concepcion, they can still undoubted
voluntarily take the witness stand and testify before the trial court should they get better or so
decide.     

This is not the same in the case of Mary Jane. She cannot even take a single step out of the prison
facility of her own volition without facing severe consequences. Her imprisonment in Indonesia and
the conditions attached to her reprieve denied her of any opportunity to decide for herself to
voluntarily appear and testify before the trial court in Nueva Ecija where the cases of the
respondents were pending.    

Unfortunately, in denying the State's motion for deposition through written interrogatories and
effectively requiring the presence of Mary Jane before the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the
Court of Appeals appeared to have strictly and rigidly applied and interpreted Section 15, Rule 119
without taking into consideration the concomitant right to due process of Mary Jane and the State as
well as the prejudice that will be caused to Mary Jane or the People with its pronouncement.
Considering the circumstances of Mary Jane, the Court of Appeals demanded for the impossible to
happen and thus impaired the substantial rights of Mary Jane and the State. It was akin to a denial
of due process on the part of Mary Jane as well as of the State to establish its case against the
respondents. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in the present case made it impossible for Mary
Jane to appear before the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Just like when Mary Jane was
recruited by the respondents and taken advantage of because of her poor condition, the same
scenario is being repeated because the respondents are again taking advantage of Mary Jane's dire
circumstances which they themselves put her in, by depriving her the opportunity to speak and
obtain justice for herself. The Court of Appeals did not take into account the fact that the case of the
prosecution against Cristina and Julius can only be erected through the testimony of Mary Jane
herself.     

Moreover, by denying the prosecution's motion to take deposition by written interrogatories, the
appellate court in effect silenced Mary Jane and denied her and the People of their right to due
process by presenting their case against the said accused. By its belief that it was rendering justice
to the respondents, it totally forgot that it in effect impaired the rights of Mary Jane as well as the
People. By not allowing Mary Jane to testify through written interrogatories, the Court of Appeals
deprived her of the opportunity to prove her innocence before the Indonesian authorities and for the
Philippine Government the chance to comply with the conditions set for the grant of reprieve to Mary
Jane.     

It is well to remind the Court of Appeals at this point that as held in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion,30 "[t]he due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only
worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what
their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are
informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character
which make them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from
earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The
requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not
denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to
avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due
process clause 'gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the
decisions of cases as they arise' (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to 'the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play' (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs.
City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 1967). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which
inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366)." Thus, it behooved
upon the Court of Appeals to have provided some leeway in its interpretation of the subject
provision.     

At this juncture, we find the discussion on the matter by Justice Florenz D. Regalado instructive and
relevant, viz.31:

1. Rules 23 to 28 provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a
party to an action, viz

a. Depositions pending action (Rule 23);       

b. Depositions before action or pending appeal (Rule 24);       

c. Interrogatories to parties (Rule 25);       

d. Admission by adverse party (Rule 26);       

e. Production or inspection of documents or things (Rule 27); and       

f. Physical and mental examination of persons (Rule 28);       

Rule 29 provides for the legal consequences for the refusal of a party to comply with such
modes of discovery lawfully resorted to by the adverse party.    

2. In criminal cases, the taking of the deposition of witnesses for the prosecution was
formerly authorized by Sec. 7, Rule 119 for the purpose of perpetuating the evidence to be
presented at the trial, without a similar provision for defense witnesses. However, in the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, only the conditional examination, and not a deposition, of
prosecution witnesses was permitted (Sec. 7, Rule 119) and this was followed in the latest
revision (Sec. 15, Rule 119).

3. Depositions are classified into:

a. Depositions on oral examination and depositions upon written interrogatories;

or      

b. Depositions de bene esse and depositions in perpetuam rei memoriam.     

 Depositions de bene esse are those taken for purposes of a pending action and are
regulated by Rule 23, while depositions in perpetuam rei memoriam are those taken to
perpetuate evidence for purposes of an anticipated action or further proceedings in a case
on appeal and are now regulated by Rule 24.

4. The court may determine whether the deposition should be taken upon oral examination
or written interrogatories to prevent abuse or harassment (De los Reyes vs. CA, et al, L-
27263, Mar. 17, 1975).     

The extraordinary factual circumstances

surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant
the resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary Jane's testimony as a
prosecution witness proper?   

The Court rules in the affirmative.   

At the outset, the Court is always guided by the principle that rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.32 Simply put, rules of procedure should facilitate an orderly administration of
justice. They should not be strictly applied causing injury to a substantive right of a party to case.
This precept has been elucidated by the Supreme Court in De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan33 to wit:

[T]he rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision
this liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and
encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we
are now compelled to do in this case. And this is not without additional basis, x x x

There are several instances wherein the Court has relaxed procedural rules to serve substantial
justice because of any of the following reasons: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (t) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby.34

Nonetheless, the Court always reminds party litigants that bare invocation of "the interest of
substantial justice" is not a magic phrase that will automatically oblige the Court to suspend
procedural rules. To stress, "[procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed."35

The 2004 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, also known as the ASEAN Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty, was entered into by the Southeast Asian countries namely: Brunei
Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of
Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Treaty aims to improve the effectiveness of the
law enforcement authorities of the state parties in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of
offenses through cooperation and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.

Article 1, paragraph 2(a) of the Treaty states that mutual legal assistance can be rendered by the
state parties in case of taking evidence or obtaining voluntary statements from persons, among
others. The legal assistance sought by the Requesting Party from the Requested Party is not without
limitations. In fact, Article 3 of the ASEAN ML AT has laid down guidelines on limitations on
assistance. In particular, paragraph 7 of the said Article states that the Requested Party can render
legal assistance subject to certain conditions which the Requested Party must observe.

To recall, the Indonesia Government imposed the following conditions in taking the testimony of
Mary Jane:     

a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;     

 b) No cameras shall be allowed;       

c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present;       

d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.

Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a deposition, of
a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave offense by final judgment and
imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The
Rules, in particular, are silent as to how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in
open court because he is imprisoned in another country.

Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Although the
rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that it
may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there is compelling reason.

In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court had relaxed the procedural rules by applying suppletorily
certain provisions of the Rules on Civil Procedure in criminal proceedings.

For one, in Caños v. Peralta36 the Supreme Court held that the trial court judge did not abuse his
discretion when it ordered the consolidation and joint trial of the criminal cases that were filed
against petitioner Adela J. Canos. It reasoned, among others, that consolidation of cases is
authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.

The same rule was applied in Naguiat v. Intermediate Appellate Court37 and Cojuangco. Jr. v. Court
of Appeals38 wherein the Supreme Court upheld the consolidation of the criminal case and civil
case that were respectively filed against the petitioners therein.

On that score, the Court finds no reason to depart from its practice to liberally construe procedural
rules for the orderly administration of substantial justice.

The conditions with respect to the taking of the testimony of Mary Jane that were laid down by the
Indonesian Government support the allowance of written interrogatories under Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court, the pertinent provisions of which read:

Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court after jurisdiction has
been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such
leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be
taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories.
The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person confined
in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.   

Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries. — In a foreign
state or country, depositions may be taken (a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before
such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) the
person referred to in section 14 hereof. 

Section 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of interrogatories. — A

party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon written interrogatories shall serve them
upon every other party with a notice stating the name and address of the person who is to answer
them and the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be
taken. Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served may serve cross-interrogatories upon the
party proposing to take the deposition. Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct
interrogatories upon a party who has served cross-interrogatories. Within three (3) days after being
served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve recross-interrogatories upon the party
proposing to take the deposition.

A strict application of the procedural rules will defeat the very purpose for the grant of reprieve by the
Indonesian authorities to Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony, being the victim, is vital in the
prosecution of the pending criminal cases that were filed against Cristina and Julius. This has been
recognized by no less than the Indonesian President, His Excellency Joko Widodo, who granted the
reprieve precisely to afford Mary Jane the opportunity to participate in the legal proceedings
obtaining in the Philippines.

Besides, the disallowance of the written interrogatories is not in congruence with the aim of ASEAN
MLAT, that is to render mutual legal assistance in criminal matters among signatory states including
the Philippines. The ASEAN MLAT is enforced precisely to be applied in circumstances like in the
case of Mary Jane. It recognizes the significance of cooperation and coordination among the states
to prevent, investigate and prosecute criminal offenses especially if perpetuated not only in a single
state just like in the case of drug and human trafficking, and illegal recruitment, the very charges that
were filed against respondents. 

Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the Court sees no reason
not to apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure in the interest of
substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by
written interrogatories is in order.

The deposition by written interrogatories

is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process

Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's right to due process.

The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure that all the parties have
their day in court. It is in accord with the duty of the government to follow a fair process of decision-
making when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an accused is accorded this
constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions. It must
likewise be given an equal chance to present its evidence in support of a charge.39

Here, the trial court acted within its jurisdiction when it granted the taking of Mary Jane's deposition
by written interrogatories. The grant of the written interrogatories by the Indonesian Government
perceives the State's opportunity to present all its desired witnesses in the prosecution of its cases
against Cristina and Julius. It is afforded fair opportunity to present witnesses and evidence it deem
vital to ensure that the injury sustained by the People in the commission of the criminal acts will be
well compensated and, most of all, that justice be achieved. Hence, the right of the State to
prosecute and prove its case have been fully upheld and protected.

Further, the right of the State to prove the criminal liability of Cristina and Julius should not be
derailed and prevented by the stringent application of the procedural rules. Otherwise, it will
constitute a violation of the basic constitutional rights of the State and of Mary Jane to due process
which this Court cannot disregard.
The fundamental rights of both the accused and the State must be equally upheld and protected so
that justice can prevail in the truest sense of the word. To do justice to accused and injustice to the
State is no justice at all. Justice must be dispensed to all the parties alike.40 As aptly held
in Dimatulac v. Villon41:

The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility
in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." He must view himself
as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same
devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the
judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with the public trust and confidence
reposed in him. Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive
jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised within
reasonable confines. The judge's action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor
the right of the State and offended party to due process of law.     

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused
alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally
considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice, and an acquittal is not
necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also
mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand,
and the State and offended party, on the other. (Emphasis Supplied.)

No violation of the constitutional right

to confrontation of a witness

Similarly, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional right to
confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius.

The right to confrontation of a witness is one of the fundamental basic rights of an accused. It is
ingrained in our justice system and guaranteed by no less than the 1987 Constitution as stated
under its Article III, Section 14(2), to wit:

Section 14. (1) x x x     

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)

The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but also in civil
proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers.42 It has
a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the
witness by cross-examination; and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of
the witness.43

True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in light of the
prevailing circumstance.  However, the terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure that
ℒαwρhi ৷
they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of written interrogatories so as
not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina
and Julius, through their counsel, to file their comment and may raise objections to the proposed
questions in the written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge shall
promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions would be asked by the Consul of
the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated representative. The answers of Mary Jane to the
propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the same would be given
to the counsel of the accused who would, in turn, submit their proposed cross interrogatory
questions to the prosecution. Should the prosecution raised any objection thereto, the trial court
judge must promptly rule on the same, and the final cross interrogatory questions for the deposition
of Mary Jane will then be conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewise
be taken in verbatim and a transcribed copy thereof shall be given to the prosecution.

The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been upheld. As aptly
stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition, the trial court judge will be present
during the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane. This will give her ample opportunity to
observe and to examine the demeanor of the witness closely. Although the deposition is in writing,
the trial court judge can still carefully perceive the reaction and deportment of Mary Jane as she
answers each question propounded to her both by the prosecution and the defense.

Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally safeguarded. The parameters
laid down by the trial court are sufficient in detail ensuring that Mary Jane will give her testimony
under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury charge. She is still subjected to cross-examination
so as to determine the presence of any falsehood in her testimony. Lastly, the guidelines enable the
trial court judge to observe her demeanor as a witness and assess her credibility.

Finally, it must be mentioned that a "dying declaration" is one of the recognized exceptions to the
right to confrontation.44 In the case at bar, it will not be amiss to state that Mary Jane's deposition
through written interrogatories is akin to her dying declaration. There is no doubt that Mary Jane will
be answering the written interrogatories under the consciousness of an impending death - or
execution by a firing squad to be exact. To stress, Mary Jane has been convicted by final judgment
and sentenced to death by firing squad. Mary Jane has already availed of all available legal
remedies and there is no expectation that her conviction will be overturned by the Indonesian
authorities. The only purpose for the grant of the reprieve was for Mary Jane to assist the
prosecution in erecting its case against her recruiters and traffickers. There was nary any mention
that the outcome of the legal proceedings here in the Philippines will have a concomitant effect in
Mary Jane's conviction by the Indonesian authorities. That Mary Jane is facing impending death is
undisputed considering the nature of her reprieve which is merely temporary. It is therefore not a
stretch of imagination to state that Mary Jane's declarations in her deposition "are made in extremity,
[she being] at the point of death, and x x x every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the
truth,"45 to vindicate oneself, and to secure justice to her detractors.

All told, the Court finds reversible error in the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals.  It erred
ℒαwρhi ৷

when it gave due course to the Petition for Certiorari of Cristina and Julius considering that the errors
ascribed therein were mere errors of judgment which do not lie in a certiorari proceeding. More
importantly, the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it granted the taking of testimony of Mary Jane by way of deposition through written
interrogatories in light of the conditions of Mary Jane's reprieve and her imprisonment in Indonesia.
These are compelling reasons to liberally construe the procedural rules and apply suppletorily the
Rules on Civil Procedure. Yet still, the fundamental rights, not only of the State, but also of the
accused Cristina and Julius have been fully and equally protected and preserved in the pursuit of
justice.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant petition. The December 13, 2017 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 16, 2016
Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the deposition will be taken before our
Consular Office and officials in Indonesia pursuant to the Rules of Court and principles of
jurisdiction.

The recommendation by the Office of the Solicitor General for this Court to promulgate a set of rules
for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar in transnational cases that may arise in the future, where
a prosecution's vital witness in a criminal proceeding is unavailable for reasons other than those
listed in Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis the enforcement of the
accused's constitutional right to confront witnesses face-to- face is NOTED and REFERRED to this
Court's Committee on Revision of the Rules for its appropriate action.       

SO ORDERED. 

Peralta, Leonen and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Inting, J., on official leave.

Footnotes

   

1 Rollo, pp. 11-81.

2 Id. at 90-107; penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justices Manuel M. Barrios and Renato C. Francisco.

3 Id. at 117-129.

4 Id. 214-216.

5 Id. at 217-219.

6 Id. at 220-222.

7 Id. at 223-233.

8 Id. at 128-129.

9 Id. at 274-297.

10 Id. at 130-146.
11 Id. at 387-414.

12 Id. at 147-191.

13 Id. at 109-116.

14 Id. at 613-618.

15 Id. at 619-655.

16 Id. 751-757.