2009 - The SCADA Challenge - Securing Critical Infrastructure
2009 - The SCADA Challenge - Securing Critical Infrastructure
2009 - The SCADA Challenge - Securing Critical Infrastructure
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Network Security August 2009
FEATURE
many industrial automation and tech- In addition, the ISA Security Compliance meaning the OS cannot be patched or
nology systems. Institute (ISCI) has been working to for- updated as with a conventional compu-
First emerging in the 1960s and devel- malise SCADA security testing, which ter system. “This makes them vulnerable
oping fully when PCs arrived in earnest should bear fruit later this year. This means to a number of well-known hacker and
in the late 1980s, SCADA systems are that the utility industry will soon have a set malware toolkits, so the IT security sys-
normally found in industrial uses such of common benchmarks against which it tem protecting a SCADA-driven system
as energy power plants, electricity supply can measure its protection systems. has to be 100% proof against both mod-
grids, chemical plants and other industrial In parallel with these moves, the ern and old security threats.”
systems that require a high degree of com- SCADA industry has evolved a number Secure Computing has developed three
puterised control – but which also require of private testing companies such as sets of signatures (flavours) for its fire-
total and absolute systems availability. the Achilles certification program from wall technology:
Wurldtech Security Technologies and the 1. SCADA:ICCP: The Inter-Control
Hacker attack ‘Music’ certification from Mu Dynamics. Centre Communications Protocol
Plans call for a set of standards – defined (ICCP or IEC 60870-6/TASE.2) is
But defending SCADA systems – which by the ISCI’s ISA SP99 Working Group now being specified by utility firms
typically tend to be embedded operating 4 – to supersede these initial industry to support WAN-based exchanges of
system-driven environments – is a tricky consortia efforts, but this will probably not data between utility control centres,
task in these hacker and malware-infested happen much before the end of 2010. utilities, power pools, regional control
times. This is because many SCADA centres, and non-utility generators.
systems were developed in the early days Easy customisation 2. SCADA:MODBUS: Modbus is a
of computing, before viruses had hit the serial communications protocol for
headlines and long before the electronic According to Mike Smart, senior prod- use with SCADA-based programma-
threats we now face. uct marketing manager with Secure ble logic controllers, which Secure
In the US, most SCADA-driven sys- Computing, despite SCADA being a Computing says have become the
tems have had dial-up remote access/ highly specialised area of IT security, it is most common method of connecting
supervisory modem connections added a relatively easy task to customise exist- industrial electronic devices.
to them, meaning that – with authen- ing high-availability firewall technology 3. SCADA:DNP3.0: The DNP3.0
tication and encryption (eg, RADIUS) to protect the IT resource. (Distributed Network Protocol) is a
added to the usual ID/password mix – Smart’s company – now part of set of communications protocols used
they are well secured against any form the McAfee IT security group – has between components in process auto-
of hacker attack. In the UK and Europe, developed three signature file types for mation systems. Mainly used in electric-
however, remote access was added to SCADA-specific protocols into its Secure ity and water supply grids, the technol-
many SCADA systems – many of which Firewall offering, which was formerly ogy was developed to allow communi-
are coded for the Windows 98 platform known as Sidewinder. As a result, says cations between various types of data
– much later in the day, meaning that an Smart, Secure Computing is now able to acquisition and control equipment.
IP connection to a SCADA-based sys- offer its firewall technology to the utility
tem is much more commonplace. industries, as well as to chemical compa- An alternative approach
Because IP connections are so inte- nies that transport dangerous products,
gral to the internet, defending an allowing them to control their critical Check Point Software Technologies,
IP-connected SCADA environment, network components. meanwhile, has followed Secure
often connected to a Windows 98 plat- However, while Secure Computing’s Computing down the road of customis-
form, has become something of a black SCADA offerings are based on the firm’s ing existing commercial applications,
art. A number of IT vendors – including firewall technology, Smart admits it’s a although Dorit Dor, the company’s presi-
Byres Security, Check Point, Industrial long way from an off-the-shelf product. dent of products, says that it is important
Defender, Innominate, N-Dimension “It’s a highly customised technology,” to understand that SCADA is mainly
Solutions and Secure Computing – have he says, adding that the problem fac- used for automated environments where
developed a tightly focused range of ing IT managers tasked with protecting there are not many people involved.
specialised industrial firewall and VPN SCADA systems, is that they tend to be “The problem then becomes one of
solutions for IP-based SCADA networks. based on an embedded operating system, securing the occasional times when you
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August 2009 Network Security
FEATURE / EVENTS
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Network Security August 2009