EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6470. July 8, 2014.]

MERCEDITA DE JESUS , complainant, vs . ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-

MALIT , respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO , C.J : p

Before the Court is a disbarment complaint led by Mercedita de Jesus (De Jesus)
against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following
grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become an
officer of the Court.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In the A davit-Complaint 1 led by complainant before the O ce of the Bar
Con dant on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and
notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former as
its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury
and for sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local
government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall was
government-owned. HcDSaT

Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant
legal and financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent
sometime in September 1999 without the signature of the lessees. However, complainant
only found out that the agreement had not been signed by the lessees when she lost her
copy and she asked for another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale
agreement over a property covered by a Certi cate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
which complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998.
Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not advise complainant that the
property was still covered by the period within which it could not be alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently
submitted three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an
A davit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant's secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were
not signed by the principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named
attorney-in-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino's A davit corroborated
complainant's allegations against respondent. 2
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution
requiring respondent to submit her comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days from
receipt of notice. 3 cHaADC

In her Comment, 4 respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared
in the presence of complainant and that the latter had read it before a xing her signature.
However, complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily
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 done. It was only copied from a similar le in respondent's computer, and the phrase
"absolute and registered owner" was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a
cause for disciplinary action, because complainant constructed the subject public market
stall under a "Build Operate and Transfer" contract with the local government unit and,
technically, she could be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage
contract over the same property in which complainant was represented as the property's
absolute owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge
against complainant was not the representation of herself as owner of the mortgaged
property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and encumbrances. The perjury
charge was even dismissed, because the prosecutor found that complainant and her
spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the previous mortgage contract over the
same market stall.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document
attached to the A davit-Complaint was actually new. She gave the court's copy of the
agreement to complainant to accommodate the latter's request for an extra copy. Thus,
respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainant's assurance that the
lessees would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court.
Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent
claimed that complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no
advice on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase agreement
was notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned
nothing about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the property was the subject
of a case pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB);
complainant was thus noti ed of the status of the subject property. Finally, respondent
maintained that the SPAs submitted by complainant as additional evidence were properly
notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally
appeared before respondent; hence, the notarization was limited to the former's
participation in the execution of the document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly
stated that the document must be notarized in the principal's place of residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent submitted her Comment. After
her rejoinder, complainant led an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission of Additional
Evidence. 5 Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized by respondent,
including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs
naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) ve SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the
principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures of the
parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease contract that lacked the
signature of the lessor; (6) ve unsigned A davits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form
(Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter to a potential investor in
Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10) an unsigned Consent to Adoption. aESICD

After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective
Position Papers. 6 Notably, respondent's Position Paper did not tackle the additional
documents attached to complainant's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion. aDHScI

THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP

In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid,
Jr. recommended the immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent
and her disquali cation as notary public for two years for her violation of her oath as such
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 by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties who had purportedly
appeared before her. He accepted respondent's explanations with respect to the lease
agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found
that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract was a su cient basis to
hold respondent liable for violation of Canon 18 7 and Rule 18.03 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility . Thus, he also recommended that she be suspended from
the practice of law for six months. 9
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May
2008, unanimously adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, with the modi cation that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one year. 10
Respondent led her rst Motion for Reconsideration 11 and Second Motion for
Reconsideration. 12 She maintained that the additional documents submitted by
complainant were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the procedural
requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice). 13 Moreover, the Urgent Ex Parte Motion of complainant was actually a
supplemental pleading, which was prohibited under the rules of procedure of the
Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not the proper party to question those
documents. Hence, the investigating commissioner should have expunged the documents
from the records, instead of giving them due course. Respondent also prayed that
mitigating circumstances be considered, speci cally the following: absence of prior
disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or sel sh motive; personal and emotional
problems; timely goodfaith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of her
misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude
toward the proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior
offenses. TSIEAD

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March
2012, denied respondent's motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to
justify a reversal of the IBP's findings. 14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura
Angelica Y. Santiago — through a letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T.
Carpio — transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against
respondent. 15
THE COURT'S RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the
parties' submissions in this case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall
first dispose of some procedural matters raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by
complainant are inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was raised in Tolentino v.
Mendoza, 16 in which the respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth
certi cates of his illegitimate children as evidence of his grossly immoral conduct,
because those documents were obtained in violation Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 1993. 17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as follows:
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 Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that
"evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the
law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth certi cates are
relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules
provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certi cates allegedly for having been
obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993. AHCaES

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides
for sanctions against persons violating the rule on con dentiality of birth records,
but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said
rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the
Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is
obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized,
however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only
to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. In People vs.
Hipol, we explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does
not concern itself with the relation between a private individual
and another individual. It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only
tempers governmental power and protects the individual against
any aggression and unwarranted interference by any department
of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be
extended to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged
"warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant
at the treasurer's o ce, can hardly fall within the ambit of the
constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private
individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against
respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the
Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the
birth certi cates in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and
should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative
case against respondent. 18

Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the
inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly
considered in evidence the other notarized documents submitted by complainant as
additional evidence.
Respondent's argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of complainant constitutes
a supplemental pleading must fail as well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental
pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary pleading. Its usual o ce
is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the
same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint. 19
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion led by complainant was a
supplemental pleading. One of her charges against respondent is that the latter notarized
incomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease agreement attached to the
A davit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred from submitting additional evidence
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 to strengthen the basis of her complaint. AICDSa

Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court nds
that she committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court
has repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but
one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document
into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's con dence
in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined. 20
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to a x the notarial
seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the
circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined, and public con dence in notarial documents
diminished. 21 In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of
the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real
estate mortgage contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only
heightens the latter's liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent's conduct
amounted to a breach of Canon 1 22 and Rules 1.01 23 and 1.02 24 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ACIDTE

Respondent's explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by

complainant sometime in September 1999 25 is incredulous. If, indeed, her le copy of the
agreement bore the lessees' signatures, she could have given complainant a certi ed
photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a rarity in
respondent's practice as a notary public. Records show that on various occasions from
2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or
lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each document may be a ground for
disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial o cer to demand that a document be
signed in his or her presence. 26
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are
the very same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary
public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. 27 Thus, in
acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before her, respondent also
violated Rule 10.01 28 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer
that she shall do no falsehood. 29
Certainly, respondent is un t to continue enjoying the solemn o ce of a notary
public. In several instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to
be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as notaries public. 30 Even so, the rule is
that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an o cer of the court and the Court will not disbar
a lawyer where a lesser penalty will su ce to accomplish the desired end. 31 The blatant
disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a notary public warrants the less severe
punishment of suspension from the practice of law and perpetual disquali cation to be
commissioned as a notary public. cDHAES

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 WHEREFORE , respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating
Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well
as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE
YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY
REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned
as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as
a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Con dant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their
information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED .
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 1-15.
2. Id. at 14-29.
3. Id. at 30.

4. Id. at 33-69.
5. Id. at 142-196.
6. Id. at 256-285; 286-356.
7. Canon 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
8. Rule 18.03. — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
9. Id. at 381.

10. Id. at 365.

11. Id. at 382-413.
12. Id. at 495-572.
13. SECTION 4. Inspection, Copying and Disposal. — (a) In the notary's presence, any
person may inspect an entry in the notarial register, during regular business hours,
provided:
(1) the person's identity is personally known to the notary public or proven through
competent evidence of identity as defined in these Rules;
(2) the person affixes a signature and thumb or other mark or other recognized identifier,
in the notarial register in a separate, dated entry;
(3) the person specifies the month, year, type of instrument or document, and name of the
principal in the notarial act or acts sought; and
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 (4) the person is shown only the entry or entries specified by him.

(b) The notarial register may be examined by a law enforcement officer in the course of an
official investigation or by virtue of a court order.

(c) If the notary public has a reasonable ground to believe that a person has a criminal
intent or wrongful motive in requesting information from the notarial register, the notary
shall deny access to any entry or entries therein.
14. Rollo, p. 575.
15. Id. at 573-592.

16. 483 Phil. 546 (2004).

17. Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records. —
(1) The records of a person's birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no information
relating thereto shall be issued except on the request of any of the following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in administrative,
judicial or other official proceedings to determine the identity of the child's parents or
other circumstances surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the person's death, the nearest of kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at
least two months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos, or both in the
discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)

18. Tolentino v. Mendoza, supra note 16, at 557-558.

19. Planters Development Bank v. LZK Holdings and Development Corp., 496 Phil. 263 (2005).
20. Lustestica v. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6258, 24 August 2010, 628 SCRA 613.
21. Heirs of the Late Spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva v. Atty. Salud P. Beradio, 541
Phil. 17 (2007).
22. CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
23. Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
24. Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
25. Rollo, p. 8; Annex "C" of the Affidavit-Complaint.

26. Realino v. Villamor, 176 Phil. 632 (1978).

27. Cabanilla v. Cristal-Tenorio, 461 Phil. 1 (2003).
28. Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
29. Fulgencio v. Atty. Marlin, 451 Phil. 275 (2003).
30. See Lustestica v. Bernabe, supra note 19; Peña v. Paterno, A.C. No. 4191, 10 June 2013, 698
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 SCRA 1.
31. Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr., 514 Phil. 628 (2005).

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