COMPULSARY DONATION PPI v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272 (1995)
COMPULSARY DONATION PPI v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272 (1995)
COMPULSARY DONATION PPI v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272 (1995)
examined here:
- one is the necessity for the taking;
- another is the legal authority to effect the taking.
Issue: Whether there was necessity for the taking, i.e. compelling print media companies to
donate “Comelec space.”
Held:
YES, IT amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. BUT
rejected based on requisites
- To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions
specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to
"taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes.
- Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory "donation:"
- only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May
1995?
- or everyday or once a week?
- or as often as Comelec may direct during the same period?
- The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de
minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary
value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged
by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very
substantial indeed.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the public of
expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful
taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the
taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking.
The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by the Comelec. It has not been
suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to
Comelec for election purposes. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated,
that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by
the legislative authority.
A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of
election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. That the taking is
designed to subserve "public use" is not contested by PPI. Only that, under Section 3 of
Resolution 2772, the free "Comelec space" sought by the Comelec would be used not only for
informing the public about the identities, qualifications and programs of government of
candidates for elective office but also for "dissemination of vital election information" (including,
presumably, circulars, regulations, notices, directives, etc. issued by Comelec). It seems to the
Court a matter of judicial notice that government offices and agencies (including the Supreme
Court) simply purchase print space, in the ordinary course of events, when their rules and
regulations, circulars, notices and so forth need officially to be brought to the attention of the
general public.
The taking of private property for public use it, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of "just compensation." Thus, although there is nothing at all to prevent
newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the
purposes contemplated in Resolution 2772; Section 2 of resolution 2772 does not provide a
constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will to provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain.