ISBN 978-9934-564-54-3

POLITICS AND PROFIT

IN THE FAKE NEWS FACTORY
FOUR WORK MODELS OF POLITICAL TROLLING
IN THE PHILIPPINES

Published by the
NATO Strategic Communications
Centre of Excellence
ISBN: 978-9934-564-54-3
Authors: Jonathan Corpus Ong, Jason Vincent A.Cabañes
Project manager: Sebastian Bay
Contributor to the project: Yvonne Chua
Design: Kārlis Ulmanis

Jonathan Corpus Ong is Associate Professor of Global Digital Media

in the University of Massachusetts Amherst. He is Co-Editor-in-Chief
of the 20-year-old media studies journal Television & New Media. He
is the author/co-editor of two books and twenty journal articles in the
areas of media ethics and digital politics. His British Council-funded
research “Architects of Networked Disinformation: Behind the Scenes
of Fake News Production in the Philippines” (co-authored with Jason
Cabanes) affected policy change in introducing social media campaign
monitoring in the 2019 Philippines elections.

Jason Vincent A.Cabañes is Associate Professor of Communication

in De La Salle University—Manila. He is Vice Chair of the Ethnicity and
Race in Communication Division of the International Communication
Association. He currently leads a project on ‘The Digital Hijacking of
Deep Stories: On the Narratives of Disinformation in the Philippines’
funded by the Consortium on Democracy and Disinformation. His
works on mediated cross-cultural relationships and digital labour in the
global South feature in his upcoming co-edited book as well as in top
tier journals and other edited collections.

Riga, November 2019

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POLITICS AND PROFIT
IN THE FAKE NEWS FACTORY
FOUR WORK MODELS OF POLITICAL TROLLING
IN THE PHILIPPINES
 This report synthesises findings based on over three
years of ethnographic research, during which we gained
unprecedented access to authors of fake news and
producers of disinformation campaigns.

1. Introduction
The Philippines represents a national As the Digital Disinformation Tracker
context where disinformation is becoming project found from its monitoring of the
ever more entrenched into the political 2019 election,1 influence operations in the
system, in spite of global attention and Philippines have intensified and diversified:
investment in the fight against fake news. both administration and opposition
Three years ago, a toxic election campaign candidates mobilised their click armies,
headlined by misogynistic rape jokes, national and local races were affected by
false papal endorsements, and imposter fake scandals insinuated by conspiratorial
news websites ended with a surprise YouTube channels and seeded in Facebook
outcome that upended the entire political closed groups. Even Instagram celebrities
establishment. In the May 2019 midterm promoted politicians in between posts
election, new interventions such as platform endorsing clothing brands or holiday
bans, fact-check partnerships, and digital destinations.
advertising rules were introduced to curb
the spread of similar tactics. Worryingly for the rest of the world, recent
reports suggest that the fast-growing digital
Recent research discovered, however, that disinformation industry in the Philippines is
the digital disinformation industry has only set to export its services to a more global
further expanded and flourished, with digital clientele.2 The May elections showed that
operators controlling a more substantial the more entrepreneurial actors in the
chunk of the political campaign war chest. country’s disinformation industry have

4 �����������������������������������������������������������������������������
learned to play cat-and-mouse games and PR model, and 3) the clickbait model.
with platforms and fact-checkers, evading We also reference the features of a fourth
detection while maximising profits from model of disinformation production—the
opportunistic clients. If these disinformation state-sponsored model of disinformation—
workers go on to offer their services as drawing on secondary data from journalistic
consultants, producers, and click army investigative reports on digital campaigns
suppliers for politicians elsewhere in the used to promote state policy, delegitimise
world, their damaging effects would be dissenters, and attack opposition figures.
amplified globally.
Mapping out the work arrangements and
As the Philippines is at the forefront of financial reward structures used by the
digital innovation for political trolling in disinformation industry enables us to
today’s polarised and contentious political understand the spectrum of political and
environment, it is crucial to reflect on commercial motivations that fuel fake
lessons gleaned from that experience to news campaigns, which in turn allows us
help us anticipate, and possibly mitigate, to generate policy recommendations to
the continued evolution and expansion of counter digital disinformation. Such policies
disinformation in other democracies. As one must involve insights not only from national
Facebook executive said, the Philippines is institutions, but also civil society groups, the
‘patient zero’ in the global disinformation media, big tech, and academia.
epidemic,3 and many election integrity
interventions have been tested here with the Our study reveals political trolling as an ever-
aim of exporting them to other countries. expanding and financially lucrative industry
with established work hierarchies, reach
This report synthesises findings based on and engagement metrics, and monetisation
over three years of ethnographic research, strategies that do not require a dark web
during which we gained unprecedented to support a black market. The fake news
access to authors of fake news and industry in the Philippines is thriving
producers of disinformation campaigns who because of the complicity of politicians and
provided long-form interviews.4 The main aim industry players in the political consultancy
of this report is to shed light on the variety of business, advertising and PR firms, and
work arrangements of digital political trolling the digital influencer industry. Taking this
that continue to hide in plain sight. broader perspective enables us to zoom
out from present-ist explanations that
We concentrate on three organisational attribute the fake news epidemic in the
models of disinformation production we Philippines to the current administration or
observed in our research, namely 1) the certain villainous personalities as the main
in-house staff model, 2) the advertising ‘purveyors of fake news’.5

���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 5
 Ultimately, this report argues that disinformation
is not produced in a vacuum with a centralised chain of
command.

Ultimately, this report argues that the work that they did. We compared their
disinformation is not produced in a vacuum accounts with our own observations of the
with a centralised chain of command; it conditions in which they work, including
requires collaboration and competition pay structure, work hours, and the locations
among various types of workers in from which they operated their troll
distributed labor arrangements that offer accounts—from call-center-like offices to
clients and strategists a level of plausible five-star penthouses. This allowed us to
deniability regarding responsibility for the build models of disinformation production
real consequences of their hateful speech or that are inherently social, underscoring
conspiratorial messages. Just as the studies how the different workers drew on
it builds on, this report takes a production institutional knowledge, professional skills,
studies approach to digital disinformation— and interpersonal relationships as they
examining this phenomenon as a ‘culture of innovated techniques of political deception.
production’,6 paying attention to the cultural
roots, creative industry logics, and political
system vulnerabilities that have enabled
‘fake news’ innovations and angry populism
to land on well-prepared ground.

We listened to fake news producers

describe their intentions and experiences
in their own words. They shared the stories
of how they came to work in the digital
underground, which provided some insights
into how they could sleep at night knowing

6 �����������������������������������������������������������������������������
 The country has been labelled ‘patient zero’ of the
global epidemic of disinformation.

2. Political Campaigning
in the Context of the Philippines
Today
The perfect storm that has led the based on ideology or issues. Instead, they
Philippines to become one of the world’s seek to cultivate the ‘right image’—branding
most cutting-edge testbeds for digital themselves to resonate with the masses.10
disinformation can be traced to the Because of the intense pressure to secure
confluence of three factors: (1) the country’s a popular base and discredit the opposition,
image-based political system, (2) the rise political campaigning in the Philippines is
of its entrepreneurial and digitally savvy, firmly rooted in the unscrupulous and well-
yet precariously placed workforce, and (3) entrenched practices of political spin and
the growing resentment of populist publics promotional marketing, now largely through
towards the political establishment. digital disinformation.

Image-based politics. As is the case today in Digitally savvy workforce. The rise of the
most electoral democracies, contemporary Philippines’ digitally savvy workforce has
politics in the Philippines is strongly image- also inadvertently contributed to digital
based.7 8 9 The country’s political contenders, disinformation in the country. As one of the
who mostly come from elite backgrounds, leading producers of digital disinformation
do not and cannot differentiate themselves in the country put it, having so much human

���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7
talent at their disposal is like sitting on of resentment against the political
‘stockpile of digital weapons’.11 The country establishment expressed by the country’s
has now become one of the world’s premier populist public.16 As mentioned earlier, the
business capitals—not only for business country has been labelled ‘patient zero’ of
process outsourcing (BPO) but also for the global epidemic of disinformation, as
online platform labor.12 In recent years, the the world’s so-called social media capital17
Philippines has expanded its inventory of saw the proliferation of fake news and
digital expertise to include jobs such as web trolling months ahead of the more talked
design, digital marketing, and data analytics.13 about events of the 2016 US presidential
elections and Brexit vote.
Unfortunately, many of the digital workers
in the Philippines face precarious labor Many commentators link the toxicity of
conditions, which makes workers vulnerable today’s Philippines social media with the
to slipping into the digital underground and success of national-level politicians who
finding themselves party to unsavory digital have played up their populist political style
political operations. The country’s digital to great effect.18 19
labor sector is especially plagued by the
mismatch between its highly educated and They say that the political atmosphere
young workforce and the low-prestige and created opportunities for organised, paid
low-skilled occupations that are available to trolls to do the work of amplifying this
them.14 Not only are these jobs ‘based on a populist style. Such rhetoric has found
narrow job description and offer only limited fertile ground among many Filipinos, who
opportunities for acquisition of knowledge harbour genuine discontent about the
and skills replicable in other professions’, fact that, despite repeated promises of
but they also offer poor prospects for long- political reform, the country continues to be
term employment.15 mired in an oligarchic elite rule.20,21 Digital
disinformation has greatly contributed to
Resentment of populist publics. The rise legitimising uncivil political expression
of digital disinformation in the Philippines online and to unleashing that toxic incivility
must also be understood in light of the on social media in the Philippines at a level
unprecedented increase in the intensity we have never seen before.

FACTORS THAT HAVE AFFECTED DISINFORMATION SPACE IN THE PHILIPPINES

Image-based Digitally savvy Resentment

politics workforce of populist publics

8 �����������������������������������������������������������������������������
 Each of these models occupies a place on what
we call the ‘politics-profit spectrum’, from those that
are primarily state-driven to those that are primarily
commercially driven.

3. The ‘Politics-Profit Spectrum’:

Organisational Models of Political
Trolling in the Philippines
Drawing on our analyses of the digital At the onset, it is important to emphasise
campaigns in the 2016 Philippines national that the three digital disinformation
elections and the 2019 Philippines midterm production models are not mutually
elections,22 this chapter presents three exclusive. Depending on the campaign
emerging disinformation models we being waged, they can be deployed in
personally observed: (1) the in-house staff various combinations. For example, state
model, (2) the advertising and PR model, disinformation producers or political
and (3) the clickbait model. We show that strategists may collaborate with specialists
each of these production models occupies operating clickbait websites.
a place on what we call the ‘politics-profit
spectrum’, from those that are primarily It is also worth saying that our shortlist
state-driven to those that are primarily of organisational models is by no means
commercially driven. We also discuss a exhaustive. If the 2019 midterm elections
fourth model of disinformation production: were any indication of future trends,
(4) the state-sponsored model, which we then rapidly increasing proliferation and
extracted from mainstream media reports innovation in the weaponisation of digital
on how the current government generates disinformation is set to continue, at least
its own fake news.23 into the near future.

���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9
Four emerging
disinformation
models:

State-Sponsored In-house Staff Advertising and Clickbait

Model Model PR Model Model
Politics-Profit Political. Political. Both political and Primarily
Mix profit-driven. profit-driven.

Strategists’ authority Staffers sometimes Chief strategists can be Revenue is dependent

or job positions take on fake account rewarded with official on advertising
are dependent on operations as an add-on government positions technology measuring
maintaining popular to their primary work, and an expanded social pay-per-click and web
support for the current sometimes with no network of powerful traffic
administration additional pay political and business
figures
Leadership Controlled by the chief Controlled by the chief Controlled by chief Commercially driven,
and Strategic of communications of staff strategist, enlisted as guided by social media
Direction an outsourced project- ‘engagement’ metrics
based consultant
Client The Philippine Incumbent politician or Politician, party, or No direct political
state political contender political donor clients initially, but
campaign partnerships
developed over time
Revenue Government funds Government funds if Corporate and political Advertising technology
Stream incumbent; politician’s projects (Google Adsense;
and donors’ funds if Facebook Instant
contender Articles; YouTube Ads)
Categories of Lead Strategist; Writers Chief of Staff; Strategists; Influencers; Administrators and
Workers Administrative Workers community-level Fake a creative team of
account Operators Researchers, Writers,
and Social Media
Community Managers
Main Discredit opposition Defend their politician Image-building; avert Maintain high
Objectives voices; against attacks; scandal; divert public engagement to articles
attention; engineer via likes and shares;
mobilize support for attack opponents; virality; hack public grow follower base
administration policy create illusions attention of social media page;
of support and generate revenue from
engagement for a ad tech
politician
Data Source Rappler reports24 Architects of Networked Architects of Networked Digital
Disinformation26 Disinformation28 Disinformation Tracker30
Vera Files25
Digital Disinformation Digital Disinformation
Tracker27 Tracker29

10 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������
State-sponsored model In-house staff model

Advertising and PR model Clickbait model

��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11
 The State-sponsored
Model of DisinformationProduction
The State-sponsored Model
of Disinformation Production

Background. The state-sponsored model of

disinformation often reported on by news
agencies such as Rappler is a top-down
model of disinformation production with a
centralised chain of command; it involves
cooperation among various government
agencies to consolidate political authority
and legitimacy while muffling opposition
voices. Background
A top-down model of disinformation
production with a centralised chain of
Structure. The state-sponsored model command. The model involves cooperation
and its techniques of formal intimidation among various government agencies to
and digital bullying lead to silencing, consolidate political authority and
legitimacy while stifling opposition voices.
self-censorship, and chilling effects
among dissenters and the public at large.
Journalistic reports about the state-
sponsored propaganda model assume
intentionality from the President himself
to intimidate and harass his critics. His
message is taken forward by a so-called
‘keyboard army’,31 consisting of hyper-
partisan political pundits, social media
influencers, and fans who call themselves
diehard supporters’.32
Structure
Consequences. State-sponsored propa­
Model assumes intentionality from the President
ganda has chilling, far-reaching effects that to intimidate and harass critics. His message is
come about through official intimidation taken forward by a so-called "keyboard army"
hyper-partisan political pundits, social media
as well as online trolling and harassment.
influencers, and so-called fans.
Executive powers have been used to
intimidate media practitioners, opposition
figures, and activists, block the re-licensing
of television networks, and ban individual
journalists and outlets from attending
official functions.
Consequences
Far-reaching effects through official intimidation
as well as online trolling and harassment. The
state-sponsored model leads to silencing,
����������������������������������������������������������������������������
12 self-censorship, and chilling effects among
dissenters and the public at large.
 The In-house Staff Model

Background. Situated at the heart of

the offices of many local and national
politicians, the In-house Staff Model is
the most common kind of political trolling
arrangement we saw in our research.
Supported primarily by government funds
Background for incumbents and by personal or donor
The most common model. The chief of staff funds for challengers, it is also the least
in a politicians' office typically leads an commercially-oriented model, and the most
in-house staff to conduct disinformation
politically motivated.
campaigns.

This model is typically led by the chief of

staff in a politicians’ office. Such individuals
FAKE
FAKE

FAKE
are battle-hardened from their years of
FAKE
experience in the dirty work of traditional
media campaigning—from political
FAKE

FAKE
FAKE
mudslinging to astroturfing media materials
to bribing journalists.33 Bringing their
Structure traditional media savvy to online campaigns,
Consists of confident veterans of political
they use digital disinformation as a shadowy
campaigning and chiefs of staff who usually
lead by example. The chiefs of staff require extension of their official online pages.
their team to take on additional troll work, To help with this work, a chief of staff will
regardless of their official designation and
compel their administrative staff to maintain
without extra pay. They usually take a
stick-over-carrot approach. a handful of fake Facebook accounts to
boost support for their candidates, to parry
critiques against them, and to attack their
opponents.

Structure. Confident veterans of political

campaigning, chiefs of staff usually lead
by example in the In-house Model. They
maintain at least a couple of fake Facebook
accounts to bolster the social media image
Consequences
of their political principals and to troll the
This model leads to a normalisation of online
political trolling, and it forces compliance from the accounts of their political opponents.
junior in-house staff.

��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13
They then require the administrative staff 500 new friends with overtly sexual profile
working under them to do the same. They pictures, her account only had twenty
also require these staff to do offense and Facebook friends.
defense work for their principals in the
closed Facebook groups that they have Consequences. The dynamics cultivated
infiltrated. among political office staff in the In-house
Model normalise political trolling online.
The chiefs expect their staff to take on Because a chief of staff knows how dirty
this additional trollwork, regardless of their campaigns in traditional media can be, he
official designation and without extra pay. has no compunction about wallowing in the
To ensure this happens, they usually take dirty tactics of social media politicking—it’s
a stick-over-carrot approach. The staff is just the latest iteration of what has always
told that this work is a precondition for been done. More dangerous, however, is
promotion. They are reminded that doing this that digital disinformation work becomes
work shows they possess the prized Filipino necessary for junior staff to advance
traits of pakikisama [ensuring smooth through the ranks. As one interviewee said,
interpersonal relationships] and utang they do their best to cope with the work
na loob [fulfilling the debt of obligations]. environment through humorous banter,
This strategy is especially effective for making light of their situation. Those who
motivating younger staff members who are cannot cope are then forced to leave their
fresh out of university and are eager to play jobs. The younger staffer we talked to put it
a bigger role in Philippine politics. this way: ‘It was like a roller coaster ride I
didn’t sign up for!’
Many staff members do take on such work.
One interviewee told us that their chief of
staff’s own disinformation work emboldened
them to troll an opposing candidate’s
Facebook page with a witty hashtag that
exaggerated his ineptitude in managing
the city’s disaster response program. The
more idealistic staffers, however, find that
their hearts and spirits are broken by this
kind of work. One young staffer could not
say so directly, but her stories indicated
that she fought against this disinformation
work by intentionally sabotaging her own
fake account. Unlike her other colleagues
who maintained ‘bikini troll’ accounts luring

14 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������
 The Advertising and Public Relations Model

Background. The commercial imperative

for political trolling comes to the fore in the
Advertising and PR Model. In this model,
politicians and/or their private donors
outsource trolling jobs to disinformation
consultants for hire. These consultants are
Background invariably ad and PR experts at the cutting
Politicians and their private donors edge of weaponizing industry techniques for
outsource trolling jobs to disinformation the political arena.34 Although they profess
consultants for hire who are motivated by
commercial interests. to be working more passionately for clients
whose politics align with theirs, they can work
simultaneously with people from opposite
political camps or even switch mid-stream
from one camp to another. These consultants
are adept at catapulting the image of their
clients to public prominence. And they are also
experienced in torpedoing the public reputation
Structure of their clients’ opponents. These consultants
Hierarchical, but loosely networked, ad hoc
digital disinformation teams. The team often head local ‘boutique’ agencies, smaller
generally consists of three tiers of PR firms handling mostly national or local
disinformation producers.
accounts that are also more flexible to taking
‘dark money’ from political clients. In the
F K E A K F E A shadows of their legitimate corporate and
A E F K E A F K
K F A E F K A E celebrity campaigns, they assemble a team of
E A K F A E K F
F K E A K F E A political disinformation producers who work
A
K
E
F
F
A
K
E
E
F
A
K
F
A
K
E
together on a per project basis.
E A K F A E K F
F K E A K F E A
Structure. In the Advertising and PR Model,
Consequences political trolling is done through hierarchical
The producers can minimise and displace any but loosely networked ad hoc digital
moral responsibility for the social media toxicity disinformation teams. Our research shows
and democratic decay to which they contribute.
that each of these teams generally consists
of three tiers of disinformation producers.

At the helm of this hierarchy are the

consultants or ‘chief disinformation architects’,
who play two key roles in disinformation work.

��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 15
The first is to strategise and orchestrate the infiltrated, creating illusions of engagement
transposition of tried-and-tested industry that fan the zeal of the actual supporters of
techniques such as reputation-building and their political clients.
spin into digital disinformation campaigns for
their political clients. This includes crafting Consequences. A key manifestation
branding-oriented ‘campaign plan designs’ and of the strong commercial orientation
media plans for ‘click army mobilisation’. The of the Advertising and PR Model is the
other is to use their professional image to lend competition both within and among the
an aura of respectability to political troll work digital disinformation teams. In a bid to
as they broker deals between their political impress political clients, the lead consultants
clients and the disinformation producers use a matrix of reach and engagement
who collaborate with them. In this role, they to incentivise the digital producers under
deploy corporate marketing terms such as them to do whatever it takes create the
‘supplemental pages’ and ‘digital support most trending and viral campaigns. The
workers’ to describe what is otherwise known unfortunate effect of this is that the
as ‘fake news sites’ and ‘paid trolls’. producers sometimes create digital content
that can be, among many other forms of
Occupying the second tier of the hierarchy are vitriol, misogynist, racist, and classist. During
the ‘anonymous digital influencers’— usually the course of our research, one meme
aspirational middle-class digital workers went viral by tapping into the Philippines’
moonlighting as operators of anonymous strongly conservative and patriarchal brand
accounts that command 50,000 or more of Catholicism, slutshaming a political
followers on Twitter and Facebook. These operator for her past career. Another popular
digital influencers do the promotional labor for meme banked on the country’s deep-seated
their lead consultants, translating conceptual postcolonial racial hierarchies as it attempted
strategies into actual social media posts to humiliate a politician for having dark skin.
that can mobilise public sentiment in the
favour of their political clients. They pepper One other manifestation of this model that
their messages and memes with popular prioritises profit over politics is that the digital
vernaculars—from local pop culture references disinformation producers involved find it easy
to snarky gay humor to gutter language—in to dissociate themselves from the work they
order to make their clients’ campaigns trend do. The cross-political and ad hoc nature of
on Twitter or go viral on Facebook. the disinformation projects enables these
producers to claim that they are first and
Those at the lowest tier of the hierarchy are foremost corporate marketing professionals
the ‘community-level fake account operators’. or digital workers just doing their jobs. The
They are precarious workers from the middle- pernicious consequence is that they are
class whose task is to share and amplify able to minimise and displace any moral
core campaign messages in the online responsibility for the social media toxicity and
communities and Facebook groups they have democratic decay to which they contribute.

16 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������
 The Clickbait Model

Background. The most politically agnostic

and commercially driven model of digital
disinformation production is the Clickbait
372 Model. Its primary source of revenue
228 10k is the advertising technology inherent
to web and social media platforms
8K
themselves, such as Google’s Adsense and
Facebook’s Instant Articles. These digital
Background infrastructures financially reward content
The most politically agnostic and
commercially driven model of digital
publishers based on ever-changing metrics
disinformation is financially motivated by of web traffic and user engagement,
the 'cost per click' economy. usually measured by platforms, third-party
intermediaries, and advertisers in terms of
‘impressions’ and ‘cost per click’. The term
clickbait thus refers to the emotionally
arousing and salacious headlines
strategically crafted by publishers to lure
visitors to their websites and thus generate
the necessary impressions so meaningful
to advertisers.

Structure In the Philippines, the Clickbait Model is best

Creative staff divided into three
teams—research, writing, and social media exemplified by the case of Twinmark Media
community management. The teams form Enterprises, whose 220 Facebook pages,
strategic collaborative alliances with
political clients to generate revenues from
73 Facebook accounts, and 29 Instagram
political clickbait. accounts were shut down in a high-profile
platform takedown right before the start of
the 2019 election season. Facebook banned
Twinmark for violating its misrepresentation
and spam policies–irrespective of the
quality or trustworthiness of their actual
content.

Previously, the news agency had linked

Twinmark’s fake news website Trending
Consequences News Portal as the ‘top source of news’
The 'cat-and-mouse game' of manipulating of pro-Duterte influencer and (for a time)
platform algorithms to optimise the reach and
engagement of salacious news headlines led to
the proliferation of defamatory content appealing
to the���������������������������������������������������������������������������
worst interests and instincts of online 17
users. The financial incentives have established a
perverse commercial infrastructure for fake news.
 clickbait websites are so profitable from ad tech alone that political
pundits and influencers are happy to cash in by sharing emotionally
appealing but factually misleading stories.

Assistant Secretary for the Presidential alone that political pundits and influencers
Communications Operations Office are happy to cash in by sharing emotionally
Margaux ‘Mocha’ Uson, 35
known for appealing but factually misleading stories.
disparaging opposition political figures.
But, contrary to suspicions that Twinmark Structure. Officially registered as a
Enterprises were contracted by Uson or digital marketing group, Twinmark Media
the state as part of a centrally organized, Enterprises’ creative staff were divided
top-down propaganda machine, an ABS- into three teams—research, writing, and
CBN investigation and our own personal social media community management.
interviews with ex-Twinmark employees Researchers were in charge of monitoring
revealed that Twinmark’s operations were social media for the most popular talking
primarily driven by advertising profit rather points and viral entertainment content;
than by political ideology.36 We learned writers were responsible for crafting an
that Twinmark Enterprises’ revenue effective mix of shocking innuendo and for
from Facebook and Google advertising the breezy, accessible tone of their articles;
technologies could have earned the and social media community managers
company as much as EUR 7M (PHP designed attractive thumbnails for the
400M) over four years. We also learned stories they would strategically share across
about the ad tech-led money trail, where a selection of Facebook and Instagram
Twinmark had actually paid Uson and pages. While writers were fresh graduates,
other popular celebrities and influencers usually of journalism programs from
to repost salacious headlines from their prestigious universities, and compensated
clickbaity news sites in an effort to lure with monthly salaries of approximately
more followers and generate greater EUR 229 (PHP 13,000), researchers and
ad revenues. In other words, clickbait community managers often worked in
websites are so profitable from ad tech precarious conditions, earning as little as

18 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������
 Whether driven by political or commercial imperatives, political chiefs
of staff, advertising and PR consultants, and technopreneurs have come to
normalise, professionalise, and rationalise disinformation work.

EUR 106 (PHP 600) per month with no by which they forged collaborations with
benefits. politically-oriented influencers.

The three teams that comprised the creative According to our respondents, Twinmark’s
staff worked alongside the administrative focus on creating political and pro-Duterte
team measuring website performance. content around the time of the 2016 election
Together they played cat-and-mouse with was a result of commercial experimentation.
Facebook and Google ad tech platforms They observed that in the heat of a loud
to learn and manipulate the algorithms and vitriolic political campaign, pro-Duterte
for advertising revenue. In their infancy, content organically generated many more
Twinmark’s websites and social media clicks, likes, and shares for their websites
pages primarily curated celebrity and compared to content featuring his rival
entertainment content by repackaging presidential candidates. Initially suspected
or plagiarising various stories and video of being hired by the government, Twinmark
clips from social media. In a prescient employees actually enlisted political
business move, Twinmark partnered with commentators on social media to repost the
talent agents and social media community salacious political headlines they authored.
managers for high-profile movie and But according to ex-Twinmark employees
television stars: Twinmark paid placement we interviewed, Twinmark eventually
fees to have entertainment-related content forged more formal strategic collaborative
from their websites reposted to generate alliances with political clients in the wake
impressions and ad revenues (e.g. one of successful revenues from political
website they managed, Chismix.com, clickbait. In late 2016 in the aftermath of
translates roughly to Gossipmix.com). Duterte’s surprise election, the company
Cooperation between clickbait websites and pitched its ‘fake news’ services to political
entertainment celebrities became the model clients and purchased Facebook groups and

��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19
pages with high follower counts in order to The Trajectory of
expand their political portfolio. Eventually, Digital Disinformation Work Models
they grew so greedy and obvious with
their coordinated posts that they attracted The emergence of four disinformation work
the attention of Facebook’s cybersecurity models across the politics-profit spectrum
monitors. powerfully signals that fake news production
is becoming ever more entrenched in the
Consequences. The ‘cat-and-mouse game’ very fiber of contemporary politics. Beyond
of manipulating platform algorithms the disturbing reality that these work
to optimise the reach and engagement models are often deployed together in ever
of salacious news headlines led to the more complex combinations, they reveal an
proliferation of slanderous content alarming trajectory at the heart of digital
appealing to the worst interests and disinformation in the Philippines: Whether
instincts of online users. Appealing to driven by political or commercial imperatives,
the anger and resentment of Duterte’s political chiefs of staff, advertising and PR
populist supporters towards the political consultants, and technopreneurs have come
establishment, Twinmark’s fake news to normalise, professionalise, and rationalise
sites generated content that slandered disinformation work. This has enabled
and slutshamed political opposition them to downplay the political and moral
figures. For instance, headlines touting consequences of what they do, which makes
visual evidence of sex scandals and drug it easy for them to carry on fashioning
charges involving a opposition senator themselves as nothing less than pioneering
were shared across Twinmark’s network explorers shaping the frontier lands of digital
of websites and pages. The gamification– politics. This may very well feed a desire to
and resulting in immediate financial take the next step and go global.
incentives–of generating viral content
with no regard for social and political cost The trajectory of digital disinformation in the
has established a perverse commercial Philippines also signals an equally problematic
infrastructure for fake news. The story future for the country’s many young and savvy
of greed and gamification that led to digital workers. Enticed with promises of
Twinmark’s rapid expansion and eventual promotion or extra income, young Filipinos
takedown is important to understand increasingly find themselves creating fake news
as it sheds light on how the platform and doing political trolling on the side rather
infrastructures creates reward systems than continuing to search for more rewarding
for media producers for the quantity and stable work. No matter how much they
of engagement without any regard of accept or resent this, they are being stockpiled
the quality of content and interactions as digital weapons for a growing disinformation
fostered by these pages or groups. industry ready to take on the world.

20 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������
4. Other Disinformation Actors for Hire
Alongside the digital disinformation producers engaged in the various work models discussed
in the preceding chapter, there are also other freelance actors who get roped into disinformation
projects. These highly skilled specialists increase the scale and effectiveness of digital
campaigns.

This chapter describes who these actors are and underscores that, regardless of whether
these actors are politically or commercially driven, digital disinformation production has
become completely entangled with the broader creative industries. Political disinformation has
had a long history of murky ties with media and communications professionals, and digital
disinformation is also very clearly strongly networked with professional and freelance digital
experts.

��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21
Role Task

Search Engine They facilitate reputation management for their political clients and/or tarnish the
Optimisation reputations of their clients’ rivals. This involves studying and reverse-engineering the
Specialists constantly changing algorithms of search engines in order to upvote positive news and
downvote negative news about their clients. Politicians rarely declare their engagements
with SEO specialists in the campaign expenditure declarations required during elections.
The ‘black hat’ techniques of search engine optimisation include discreetly paying
webmasters who maintain popular websites to include links to a politician’s webpage, thus
boosting its Page Rank on Google. As one SEO specialist who worked for national and local
politicians in the recent elections told us: ‘If you’re an SEO worth your salt, you know you
can’t live off white hat operations. You should be prepared to offer black hat services too.’

Hackers/ DDoS Hackers offer diverse services to politicians, including shutting down social media
(Distributed accounts and/or websites of political rivals and media agencies. One way they do this is via
Denial of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, which can take websites or servers offline.
Service) Hackers can also wreak all sorts of havoc, such as remotely controlling accounts or websites,
Attackers defacing them, or linking rivals’ pages to pornography websites to trip security settings.
Recently, DDoS attackers shut down the websites of alternative/ independent media groups
critical of the Duterte administration (e.g. Altermidya, Kodao Productions, Pinoy Weekly,
and Bulatlat).37 One hacker we interviewed suspected that, unlike other mainstream media
agencies with financial investment in online security, these websites’ security settings were
vulnerable to hacking.

Data Analytics They mine big data from social media to provide data-driven insights about political clients’
Firms brand health and/or target audiences’ attitudes and behaviors towards these clients. They also
advise on how to craft micro-targeted communications based on geographic information.
While many larger PR firms and consultancies offer data analytics services, smaller
data analytics firms have mushroomed in recent years and compete with cheaper rates,
technological hype, and business bundles with other white and black hat services. Data
analytics specialists trade on the hype of big data analysis, modeling themselves after the
Cambridge Analytica portfolio.

Digital Digital influencer agencies operate as intermediaries that link brands and larger
Influencer advertising firms with social media influencers. Managing a portfolio of mega-, micro-,
Agencies and nano-influencers, they assemble the right mix of influencers that resonate with their
communication and brand objectives.
Influencers lend ‘authenticity’ to political messages, having cultivated intimate relationships
with their fans and followers. Influencers prey on regulatory loopholes and rarely disclose
their posts as actual paid ads and formal collaborations.38 The lack of self-regulation around
influencer marketing in the PR industry circumvents campaign finance regulations in the
context of elections.

Corrupt They rely on traditional methods of dirty media politicking, such as astroturfing media
Journalists For campaigns to cover up their sources and doing ‘envelopmental journalism’ to sell news
Hire stories for envelopes of politically tainted money.39 These news stories, in return, provide
credibility and media mileage to online disinformation campaigns because they have been
covered by mainstream news agencies. Journalists/editors can also help ‘kill’ political
scandals afflicting their clients by withdrawing media coverage.

22 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������
5. Conclusion: Process-Oriented Policy
Responses to Digital Disinformation
Because of the complexity of the problem of the Philippines process-oriented rather
of digital disinformation, fighting back than content-oriented policy responses
and inoculating democratic politics from would be most effective. This means
its toxic effects cannot be achieved with that interventions should not be about
a one-size-fits-all solution. There must be speech regulation and censorship, which
global initiatives that address the problem, could potentially inflict myriad harms
including, for instance, creating oversight to free speech. Instead they should be
committees that can foster transparency about ensuring greater transparency
and accountability in the content governance and accountability in campaign finance,
for tech platforms such as Facebook and platform bans, fact-checking, and industry
Google.40 regulation.41 Policy should also focus on
putting social safety nets in place for the
Beyond these global moves, however, many precarious digital workers who are
we also need bespoke solutions heedful constantly exposed to the risk of being
of the kinds of digital disinformation pulled into the digital underground.42
production that emerge in specific local
country contexts. For example, in the case

��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23
PROCESS-ORIENTED RESPONSES SHOULD INVOLVE:

1 Sustaining the public conversation

about the scale of digital disinformation
and how deep these incentives go, leading
4 Encouraging transparency in platform
bans by opening the decision-making
process social media platforms currently
to industry self-regulation amongst local have in place to evaluation and audit,
advertising and PR practitioners and, equally particularly to those communities with
important, amongst digital influencers. whom they aim to collaborate.

2 Pushing for legal reforms that support

initiatives surrounding campaign
transparency and accountability, such as
5 Ensuring that working conditions
for creative workers—especially
young creative professionals—does not
updating electoral laws in the Philippines make them vulnerable to slipping into the
to regulate the finances of campaigns that digital underground by enacting industry
are increasingly shifting to social media for standards for the digital workplace and
their operations. by encouraging industry mechanisms
that reward professionalism and ethical

3 Enabling credible fact-checking

partnerships amongst the media,
academics and specialists, and technology
practices.

platforms, which do not compromise free

speech or fall into political partisanship. This
can be done by creating inclusive oversight
committees that inform social media firms
of local standards and concerns around
‘harmful’ and ‘inauthentic’ content.

24 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������
Endnotes
1 Jonathan Corpus Ong, Ross Tapsell, and Nicole Curato, E. Polson, L. S. Clark, and R. Gajjala (eds), The Routledge
Tracking Digital Disinformation in the 2019 Philippine Companion to Media and Class (forthcoming).
Midterm Election (New Mandala, 2019). 13 David Fogarty and Peter Bell, ‘Should You Outsource
2 Matt Field, ‘Why 2020 Disinformation Campaigns May Analytics?’, MIT Sloan Management Review, 19 December
Be Outsourced to the Philippines’,  Bulletin of the Atomic 2013; Karen Lema, ‘Rise of the Machines: Philippine
Scientists, 23 August 2019. Outsourcing Industry Braces for AI’, Reuters, 9 November
3 Katie Harbarth, ‘Protecting Election Integrity on Facebook’, 2017.
video of the presentation at 360/OS in Berlin, Germany, 14 Kingsley Bolton, ‘Thank You For Calling: Asian Englishes
2018. and “Native-Like” Performance in Asian Call Centres’ in
4 Ong and Cabañes, ‘Architects of Networked Disinformation: A. Kirpatrick (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of World
Behind the Scenes of Troll Accounts and Fake News Englishes, (London: Routledge, 2010); Nedelyn Magtibay-
Production in the Philippines’, 2018. Ramos, Gemma Estrada, and Jesus Felipe, An Analysis of
5 Maria Ressa, ‘Propaganda War: Weaponizing the Internet’, the Philippine Business Process Outsourcing Industry (Asian
Rappler, 3 October 2016. Development Bank, 2007).
6 Jason Cabañes, C.W. Anderson, and Jonathan Corpus Ong, 15 Niels Beerepoot and Mitch Hendriks, ‘Employability
‘Fake News and Scandal’ in Howard Tumber and Silvio of Offshore Service Sector Workers in the Philippines:
Waisbord (eds), Routledge Companion to Media and Scandal, Opportunities for Upward Labour Mobility or Dead-End
(London: Routledge, 2019); Ong and Cabañes, ‘When Jobs?’, Work, Employment and Society Vol 27, № 5 (2013).
Disinformation Studies Meets Production Studies’, 16 Jason Cabañes and Jayeel Cornelio, ‘The Rise of Trolls in
International Journal of Communication (forthcoming). the Philippines (And What We Can Do About It)’ in Nicole
7 Marvin Bionat, How to Win (or Lose) in Philippine Elections: Curato (ed.) A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo
The Dynamics of Winning and Losing in Philippine Electoral Duterte’s Early Presidency (Manila: Ateneo De Manila Press,
Contests (Quezon City: Anvil Publishing, 1998); Sheila 2017).
Coronel, Yvonne Chua, Luz Rimban, and Booma Cruz, The 17 We Are Social. “Digital in 2019.” (2019).
Rule Makers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate https://wearesocial.com/globaldigital-report-2019
Congress (Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative 18 Jason Cabañes, ‘A commentary on the special issue
Journalism, 2004). Performance and Citizenship: Challenging populist political
8 Margaret Scammell, ‘Politics and Image: The Conceptual performances through citizenship as performance?’,
Value of Branding’, Journal of Political Marketing Vol. 14, International Journal of Cultural Studies Vol 22, Issue
Issues 1–2 (2015). 5 (2019).
9 Andrea Schneiker, ‘Telling the Story of the Superhero and 19 Nicole Curato, ‘Flirting with authoritarian fantasies? Rodrigo
the Anti-Politician as President: Donald Trump’s Branding on Duterte and the new terms of Philippine populism’, Journal
Twitter’, Political Studies Review Vol 17, № 3 (2019). of Contemporary Asia Vol 47, № 1 (2017).
10 Glenda Gloria, Ana Maria Tabunda, and Carmela S. 20 Imelda Deinla, ‘Duterte and the Insecurity of the Philippine
Fonbuena, Spin and Sell: How Political Ads Shaped the 2004 Middle Class’, School of Regulation and Global Governance
Elections (Makati City: Foundation for Communication website, Australian National University (2017).
Initiatives and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2004). 21 Richard Heydarian, The Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt
11 Ong and Cabañes, ‘Architects of Networked Disinformation’, Against Elite Democracy (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan,
p. 71. 2018).
12 Emmanuel David, ‘Purple Collar Labor: Transgender Workers 22 Ong and Cabañes, ‘Architects of Networked Disinformation’;
and Queer Value at Global Call Centers in the Philippines’, Ong, Tapsell, and Curato, Tracking Digital Disinformation.
Gender and Society Vol 29, № 2 (2015); Alinaya Fabros, 23 Ressa, ‘Propaganda War; Jake Soriano, ‘Duterte, Allies
Outsourceable Selves: An Ethnography of Call Center Work in Reap the Most Benefits from Disinformation’, Vera Files,
a Global Economy of Signs and Selves (Quezon City: Ateneo 19 December 2018.
de Manila University, 2016); Cheryll Soriano and Jason 24 Ressa, ‘Propaganda War; Natashya Gutierrez, ‘Blogger-
Cabañes, ‘Between “World Class Work” and “Proletarianized Propagandists, The New Crisis Managers’, Rappler.com,
Labor”: Digital Labor Imaginaries in the Global South’ in 20 August 2017.

��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25
25 Soriano, ‘Duterte, Allies Reap.
26 Ong and Cabañes, ‘Architects of Networked Disinformation’.
27 Ong, Tapsell, and Curato, Tracking Digital Disinformation.
28 Ong and Cabañ‘Architects of Networked Disinformation’.
29 Ong, Tapsell, and Curato, Tracking Digital Disinformation.
30 Ibid.
31 Miguel Syjuco, ‘Fake News Floods the Philippines’, The New
York Times, 24 October 2017.
32 Yvonne Chua and Ma. Diosa Labiste, ‘The Philippines’ in
Masato Kajimoto and Samantha Stanley (eds) Information
Disorder in Asia: Overview of Misinformation Ecosystem
in Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines (Hong Kong:
Journalism and Media Studies Centre, 2018) p. 18.
33 Chay Hofileña, News for Sale: The Corruption and
Commercialization of Philippine Media (Quezon City:
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004).
34 Frank A. Pasquale, ‘The Automated Public Sphere’, University
of Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-31’,
SSRN, 8 November 2017.
35 Don Kevin Hapal and Bonz Magsambol, ‘Mocha Uson:
Fake News Victim or Fake News Peddler’, Rappler.com,
21 October 2017.
36 Warren De Guzman, ‘How Social Media “Influencers” Helped
Twinmark Disseminate Fake News’, ABS-CBN, 8 March 2019.
37 Mong Palatino, ‘Groups Denounce Continuous Cyberattacks
Against Independent Media in the Philippines’, Global Voices,
13 March 2019.
38 Paige Ocenolla, ‘Online Influencer and Politics: What
Happens When The Two Meet’, Rappler.com, 13 February
2018.
39 Hofileña, News for Sale.
40 Rahman Sabeel, ‘The New Utilities: Private Power, Social
Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept’,
Cardozo Law Review Vol 39, № 5 (2018).
41 Ong, Tapsell, and Curato, Tracking Digital Disinformation.
42 Ong and Cabañes, ‘Architects of Networked Disinformation’;
Cabañes, Anderson, and Ong, ‘Fake News and Scandal’.

26 ����������������������������������������������������������������������������
 Prepared and published by the
NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE

The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) is a

NATO accredited multi-national organisation that conducts research, publishes studies,
and provides strategic communications training for government and military personnel.
Our mission is to make a positive contribution to Alliance’s understanding of strategic
communications and to facilitate accurate, appropriate, and timely communication
among its members as objectives and roles emerge and evolve in the rapidly changing
information environment.

Operating since 2014, we have carried out significant research enhancing NATO nations’
situational awareness of the information environment and have contributed to exercises
and trainings with subject matter expertise.

www.stratcomcoe.org | @stratcomcoe | info@stratcomcoe.org