Combating Transnational Terrorism

Combating Transnational
Terrorism
Edited by
James K. Wither and Sam Mullins
COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL
TERRORISM
Edited by
This electronic publication cannot be published online. It

can be disseminated only by the publisher or designated
officials of the George C. Marshall European Center for Se-
curity Studies.
2016
James K. Wither and Sam Mullins, eds., Combating Transna-
tional Terrorism (Sofia: Procon, 2016).
doi: 10.11610/ctt.book
The opinions expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall
European Center for Security Studies, the United States of America, the Federal
Republic of Germany, or any other government or institution.
Original version: English, 2016
Publisher: Procon Ltd., www.procon.bg

3, Razluka Str., ap. 20, Sofia 1111, Bulgaria
Cover photo courtesy of Karlheinz Wedhorn
ISBN 978-954-92521-9-4 (PDF edition)

DEDICATION TO COLONEL (RET.) ANDREW
NICHOLS “NICK” PRATT (1948-2013)
Nick Pratt was a unique human being. He was a soldier, an educator and a
leader, and his achievements in life were many. Starting out as a Second Lieu-
tenant in 1970, he served the United States Marine Corps for more than 30
years. During that time he was awarded the Navy and Marine Corps medal for
Heroism; he served as a Battalion Commander and was part of the CIA Special
Operations Group responsible for covert missions overseas. He also served in
the White House and as the Director of the Marine Corps Command and Staff
College in Quantico, Virginia before retiring as a Colonel in 1996. It was then
that Nick joined the Marshall Center as a Professor of Strategy and Interna-
tional Politics.
As a professional educator, Nick taught and enriched the lives of hundreds
of security professionals from around the world. It is no exaggeration to say
that of the dozens of faculty members who have worked here over the years,
and the literally thousands of people who have passed through these doors,
Nick Pratt was among the most charismatic and influential. He founded the
Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS) shortly after 9/11 and was
its director for more than a decade. PTSS was and remains the Marshall Cen-
ter’s most prestigious course. The program quickly gained the respect of coun-
ter-terrorism experts and professionals around the globe and now boasts over
1,400 alumni (military and civilian) from more than 110 countries – many of
whom still keep in touch with the Marshall Center and each other. This was
Nick’s mission: to create a living network dedicated to defeating those who use
the tactics of terrorism, regardless of their cause or ideology. It is often said—
and yet still poorly appreciated—that it takes a network to defeat a network.
This network is Nick Pratt’s legacy.
Without Nick, the PTSS cannot be the same and he is still sorely missed by
all those who knew him. Yet in line with his vision, the network continues to
grow and the program continues to evolve, as does the adversary. Compiled by
Nick’s colleagues and friends, this book is a product of the continued will and
determination to carry on his life’s work and to ultimately make the world a
safer place. Although we have lost a great man, and a great friend, he continues
to inspire us and he will not be forgotten.
Semper Fi, Nick.
Keith W. Dayton, Lt. Gen., U.S. Army (ret.)
v
FOREWORD
Terrorism is a global security challenge and an existential threat to a grow-
ing number of states. As such, it is a high priority in national security strate-
gies around the world. It is hardly surprising that the subject has already at-
tracted an immense and growing body of literature. Combating Transna-
tional Terrorism adds to this body of work. Uniquely, this book is based
upon and primarily designed for the George C. Marshall European Center
for Security Studies’ (GCMC) long running and highly successful Program on
Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS). Unlike the majority of books on the
subject, it is principally intended for security service professionals and prac-
titioners of counter-terrorism (CT), although we are also confident that stu-
dents of terrorism studies and interested general readers will find much of
value within its pages. All of the authors have taught on the PTSS, in some
cases many times, and bring both scholarly and practical insights to their
chapters. Each of them understands the needs of the CT community given
their years of experience and interaction with professional security force
personnel and government officials from all over the world.
As the title suggests, Combating Transnational Terrorism seeks to high-
light the global nature of the threat and emphasize the need for cooperative,
international responses. Fittingly, there are typically 40 to 50 different
countries represented on any given iteration of the PTSS. The book is
therefore aimed at a truly global audience, including readers for whom
English is often a second or third language. As a result, the writing style
seeks to present complex topics in a way that is accessible for non-native
English speakers. In line with the PTSS, the focus of the book is strategic, ra-
ther than operational or tactical. It is intended to assist CT professionals to
think broadly and strategically about the phenomenon of terrorism and our
responses to it. It recognizes that CT practitioners have to deal on a daily
basis with a highly complex problem that embraces political, economic, in-
formational, judicial, intelligence, military, law enforcement and many other
factors, both domestic and international. However, each chapter also uti-
lizes real world case studies and relevant examples to emphasize the practi-
cal and policy issues involved. Like the course on which it is based, Com-
bating Transnational Terrorism promotes both a comprehensive under-
standing of the nature of the threat and the full range of measures required
to deal with it.
Part 1 of the book is devoted to an understanding of the terrorist threat.
In the first chapter, renowned terrorism expert Alex Schmid addresses the
vexed issue of definitions. Defining terrorism is a logical start to our analy-
sis and the chapter clearly illustrates why security institutions and the in-
ternational community have such difficulties arriving at a consensus on the
vii
viii James K. Wither and Sam Mullins
issue. Chapter 2 deals with terrorist motivations. Egyptian scholar Dina al

Raffie tackles certain myths about what motivates terrorists before provid-
ing a comprehensive survey of the individual and environmental factors
that sometimes combine to result in terrorism. In chapter 3, retired US Ma-
rine Corps Colonel and current PTSS Course Director, James Howcroft,
writes on the subject of terrorist strategies and tactics. Using the common
framework of ends, ways and means, he explains the method behind the ap-
parent madness of terrorism and how “armed propaganda” remains the es-
sence of terrorist strategy. Following on from Howcroft’s chapter, Czech au-
thor Adam Dolnik addresses the subject of terrorist innovation. He dis-
cusses how and why terrorist tactical innovation occurs and the ways in
which terrorist organizations around the world communicate with and
learn from one another. Based on this analysis, the chapter considers the
prospects that the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS) will engage in radical in-
novation. In chapter 5, the editors join forces with retired Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) Special Agent Steve Monaco to address the topi-
cal subject of crime and terror. This chapter analyses the similarities and
differences between terrorism and organized crime and assesses the pro-
spects for closer cooperation, or ‘convergence,’ between groups involved in
each type of activity. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implica-
tions of the crime-terror nexus for CT and law enforcement professionals.
Chapter 6 examines terrorism and the media. This chapter is written by US
State Department official and former PTSS faculty member, Eric Young. He
examines the changing relationship between terrorists and the media and
the impact of the Internet in particular. A major focus within the chapter is
the way in which terrorist organizations are exploiting emerging media
technologies in varied and innovative ways. In Chapter 7, Robert Brannon,
the Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the Marshall
Center, examines the possibilities of terrorist attacks using chemical, bio-
logical, radiological and nuclear weapons. His analysis clarifies the difficul-
ties involved for terrorist groups contemplating such attacks, whilst also
describing how they could take place. In the final chapter of this section of
the book, GCMC Professor of Counter-Terrorism Sam Mullins addresses the
escalating danger presented by jihadist ‘foreign fighters’ and so-called ‘lone
wolf’ terrorists. This chapter describes how these related challenges have
developed over time and explores profiles, motives, processes of radicaliza-
tion and operational activities. It concludes with a discussion of key con-
cerns and opportunities in CT.
Part 2 of the book focuses on countermeasures. It opens with Chapter 9,
in which retired British Army officer and veteran PTSS Professor James
Wither discusses the role of the security forces. This chapter offers a critical
assessment of the evolving role of the military, law enforcement and intelli-
gence agencies in CT. It examines organizational, operational and techno-
Foreword ix
logical developments as well as the continuing challenges and limitations of

using force to combat terrorism. In Chapter 10, Peter Clarke, the former As-
sistant Commissioner (Specialist Operations) and head of the Metropolitan
Police’s Counter Terrorism Command, provides invaluable, personal in-
sights into the development of intelligence-led policing in the UK. This chap-
ter explains the crucial shift towards intelligence-led policing after 9/11 and
addresses the organizational, legal, ethical and technical challenges in-
volved. The following chapter, written by former US Navy Judge Advocate
Dean Dwigans, deals with legal issues in CT. His chapter explains the critical
components of the international legal regime for combating terrorism, high-
lighting “need-to-know” principles for practitioners and examining the di-
lemmas and controversies of international law in practice. In Chapter 12,
James Wither addresses the controversial subject of talking to terrorists. He
demonstrates that governments frequently communicate with terrorist or-
ganizations despite claims to the contrary. This chapter differentiates be-
tween different types of ‘engagement’ with terrorists and provides the
reader with a nuanced understanding of the role of negotiation in combat-
ing terrorism, such as when it is most appropriate and how it should be
conducted. Countering violent extremism (CVE) is the subject of Chapter 13.
Author Sam Mullins begins by explaining key concepts and exploring the
different reasons why people sometimes disengage (or fail to engage in the
first place) with violent extremism. He outlines different tools that can be
applied in CVE and includes case studies of targeted interventions aimed at
both the prevention of violent extremism and the rehabilitation of cap-
tured/convicted terrorists. Principles of best practice are identified and dis-
cussed, together with ongoing challenges and potential ways to overcome
them.
The next chapter addresses terrorist financing, written by another PTSS
veteran, Duquesne University Professor John Sawicki. He explains why it is
important to understand how terrorists finance their operations, the multi-
ple ways in which terrorists seek to acquire money and some of the more
novel techniques that terrorist groups are turning to. The chapter concludes
with an outline of key measures against terrorism financing that the author
recommends all states adopt. In Chapter 15, retired Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI) Supervisory Special Agent Joe Airey combines with Slove-
nian scholar, Iztok Prezelj, to produce an analysis of interagency coopera-
tion in CT. Based on the authors’ combined academic and practical experi-
ence, this chapter identifies key capacities that need to be coordinated as
part of a comprehensive approach to CT. It further analyzes two examples of
good practice (Joint Terrorism Task Forces and intelligence fusion centers)
before concluding with general recommendations for practitioners on how
to improve interagency cooperation in CT. Chapter 16 brings together many
of the key recommendations raised in earlier chapters and demonstrates
x James K. Wither and Sam Mullins
how they can be incorporated into the framework of a comprehensive CT

strategy. The author, US Army Ranger and former PTSS Course Director,
Colonel Joseph King, discusses the elements and characteristics of effective
strategy making and provides clear and practical guidance through what is
inevitably a complex and difficult process.
Taken together, these chapters represent decades’ worth of combined
academic research and hands-on operational experience in CT. We are con-
fident that you will find Combating Transnational Terrorism useful, inter-
esting and valuable in your work. Above all, we sincerely hope that it makes
a positive contribution to the global struggle against terrorism.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
James K. Wither is Professor of National Security Studies at the George C. Mar-
shall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) where he has been a mem-
ber of the PTSS faculty since 2008. He is a retired British Army Officer and for-
mer researcher in 20th Century Warfare at the Imperial War Museum. He has
published widely on the subject of warfare and terrorism and taught or pre-
sented terrorism-related subjects at a wide variety of institutions, including the
FBI Academy, the UK Defence Academy, the NATO School, the Geneva Centre
for Security Policy and the Afghan Army Staff College.
Sam Mullins is Professor of Counter-Terrorism at the GCMC. He is also an
Honorary Fellow at the University of Wollongong, Australia and serves on the
Editorial Board of Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression and
Perspectives on Terrorism. Dr. Mullins holds an MA in Psychology, an MSc (with
distinction) in Investigative Psychology and a PhD in the field of Terrorism
Studies. He has presented his research for a wide variety of government insti-
tutions involved in CT, from the FBI to the Indonesian National Armed Forces
and is the author of ‘Home-Grown’ Jihad: Understanding Islamist Terrorism in
the US and UK, published by Imperial College Press.
Joseph Airey is a retired Supervisory Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. He currently lectures on terrorism at the University of Colorado
Denver and has served as an adjunct professor at the GCMC on PTSS and the
program on Countering Transnational Organized Crime.
Dina Al Raffie is a Research Fellow with the Program on Extremism at George
Washington University. She is also a regular adjunct professor for the GCMC’s
PTSS and is currently completing a PhD at the University of Zurich. Al Raffie’s
research explores the impact of nonviolent radical Islamist narratives on reli-
gious identity in Western diaspora contexts. She studies and has published on a
variety of terrorism-related topics including identity dynamics of radicaliza-
tion, terrorist leadership, terrorist motivations, and countering violent ex-
tremism.
Robert Brannon is the Dean of Academics at the College of International and
Security Studies, GCMC. Formerly, he was a member of the faculty at the Na-
tional Defense University’s National War College, where he served for three
years as Chairman of the Department of Security Studies and Professor of
Strategy. Dr. Brannon is a retired US Navy officer, who specializes in Russian
political and military affairs and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD). He is a frequent speaker on GCMC programs on the subject of
WMD and terrorism and holds a PhD from the Catholic University of America in
World Politics and Russian Studies.
Peter Clarke was formerly the Assistant Commissioner, Specialist Operations
and Head of the Anti-Terrorist Branch at New Scotland Yard. For nearly six
xi
xii James K. Wither and Sam Mullins
years, he led the investigation into all acts of terrorism in the UK and against
British interests overseas, including the London bombings of 2005, the trans-
atlantic airliners liquid bomb plot in 2006, and attacks against British interests
in Bali, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar. Since he retired from the police service
in 2008, he has worked as a highly sought-after independent security consult-
ant. Mr. Clarke has an Honorary Doctorate in Law from Bristol University; he
has been a Fellow of the Center on Law and Security at New York University
and is a Patron of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at
King’s College, London.
Adam Dolnik serves as a consultant on Addressing and Preventing Kidnapping
for Ransom at the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task
Force. He is also a Counterterrorism Negotiations Advisor to the FBI’s Crisis
Negotiation Unit. Dr. Dolnik’s previous appointments include Professor of Ter-
rorism Studies at the University of Wollongong, Australia, Professor of Coun-
terterrorism at the GCMC in Garmisch, Germany and Chief Trainer at the Inter-
national Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore. Dr.
Dolnik is the author of six books and over 50 reports and articles on terrorism
related issues.
Dean Dwigans is a retired U.S. Navy Captain (Judge Advocate) and former
Professor of International Law at the GCMC. Mr. Dwigans has had multiple as-
signments in Europe and Asia as a career navy prosecutor and legal advisor,
and commanded the navy’s largest overseas prosecution office in the Pacific.
His assignments have included senior navy attorney at the National Security
Agency, Office of General Counsel, and at the Naval Criminal Investigative Ser-
vice where he was responsible for advising over 1,500 Special Agents world-
wide. Mr. Dwigans has a Juris Doctor from Creighton University and a LLM in
international law from Georgetown University.
James Howcroft is currently the Director of the PTSS at the GCMC. Mr.
Howcroft retired from active duty as a Colonel after 30 years of service as an
Intelligence Officer in the United States Marine Corps. He has taught intelli-
gence collection and analysis to thousands of US, European and African part-
ners engaged in counter-terrorist, counterinsurgency and peace support opera-
tions around the world. Mr. Howcroft has written numerous articles on intelli-
gence and operational cultural issues and is a frequent contributor to Small
Wars Journal.
Joseph B. King is the Director of Plans and Strategy at the GCMC. He is a Colo-
nel in the US Army, serving as a Eurasian foreign area officer with a back-
ground in infantry and special operations. Colonel King served as the director
of the PTSS in 2014 and continues to provide occasional lectures on terrorism
and irregular warfare in various resident and outreach programs.
Steven R. Monaco is a GCMC professor and the director of the Program on
Countering Transnational Organized Crime. Mr. Monaco joined the GCMC in
December 2013 after serving as a career Special Agent with the U.S. Drug En-
About the Authors xiii
forcement Administration (DEA) and as a regional law enforcement adviser for

the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Mr. Monaco also served as an as-
sistant criminal prosecutor in Baltimore County, MD and as assistant counsel
for the DEA.
Iztok Prezelj is an associate professor and Head of the Department of Defence
Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. His
teaching and research activities cover counter-terrorism, national security,
threat and risk assessment, intelligence and crisis management. He has pub-
lished more than 100 articles, including books and edited volumes on these
subjects. He is a member of the European Expert Network on Terrorism Issues
and a member of the Editorial Boards of the Journal of Criminal Justice and Se-
curity, and Security, Terrorism and Society.
John Sawicki is an assistant professor in political science and director of the
Center for International Relations at Duquesne University. He has served nu-
merous times as an adjunct professor on the PTSS and holds a PhD from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Dr. Sawicki teaches national security
courses in Political Science and International Relations at Duquesne and lec-
tures in counter-terror finance and religious violence topics at the GCMC, as
well as other US embassy and military command venues around the world.
Alex P. Schmid is Editor-in-Chief of the peer-reviewed online journal Perspec-
tives on Terrorism and a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Coun-
ter-Terrorism in The Hague. He is editor and principal author of the Routledge
Handbook of Terrorism Research and co-editor of the forthcoming volume Ter-
rorists on Trial (Leiden University Press, 2016). Dr. Schmid’s previous positions
include Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence
at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland and Officer-in-Charge of the Terror-
ism Prevention Branch of the United Nations in Vienna.
Eric T. Young is a Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Department of State and
has served in Africa, the Middle East and Europe. From 2011–2015 Dr. Young
served as a Professor of National Security Studies at the GCMC during which
time he presented his research for a wide variety of government institutions
and international conferences. Dr. Young has published frequently in academic
journals, writing on African security issues and terrorism.
C ONTENTS
Dedication to Nick Pratt ................................................................................................... v
Foreword .............................................................................................................................. vii
About the Authors .............................................................................................................. xi
List of Case Studies ........................................................................................................ xvii
1. Defining Terrorism ........................................................................................................ 1
Alex P. Schmid
2. Terrorist Motivations .................................................................................................17

Dina Al Raffie
3. The Strategy and Tactics of Terrorism ................................................................33

James Howcroft
4. Terrorist Innovation....................................................................................................49
Adam Dolnik
5. Terrorism and Crime ..................................................................................................67

Sam Mullins, James K. Wither, and Steven R. Monaco
6. Terrorism, Media, and the Rise of the Internet ................................................85

Eric Young
7. Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction..................................................99

Robert B. Brannon
8. Jihadist Foreign Fighters and ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorism ................................. 115

Sam Mullins
9. The Role of the Security Forces in Combating Terrorism ........................ 131

James K. Wither
10. Intelligence-led Policing in Counter-Terrorism: A Perspective

from the United Kingdom ............................................................................... 149
Peter Clarke
11. Legal Issues in Combating Terrorism ............................................................ 163

Dean L. Dwigans
12. Talking to Terrorists.............................................................................................. 181

James K. Wither
xv
xvi James K. Wither and Sam Mullins
13. Countering Violent Extremism .......................................................................... 199

Sam Mullins
14. Counter-Terrorist Financing .............................................................................. 217

John Sawicki
15. Interagency Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism ....................................... 235

Iztok Prezelj and Joe Airey
16. A Comprehensive Strategy for Combating Terrorism ............................. 253

Joseph B. King
Acknowledgements and Credits............................................................................... 271

Index ................................................................................................................................... 273
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... 279
Case Studies
Case Study 1.1. The Euro-Mediterranean (Euromed) Anti-Terror Code
of Conduct ............................................................................................................................... 10
Case Study 2.1. Anwar al-Awlaki ........................................................................................... 26
Case Study 3.1. Armed Propaganda: The Core of Terrorist Strategy...................... 36
Case Study 3.2. The Attack on Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Taiba, November 2008... 42
Case Study 4.1. IS and the Prospects for Innovation ..................................................... 62
Case Study 5.1. D-Company...................................................................................................... 76
Case Study 5.2. The Drug Enforcement Administration .............................................. 80
Case Study 6.1. Al-Shabaab on the Frontlines of the New Media Battlefield ...... 93
Case Study 6.2. IS and New Frontiers in Terrorist Use of the Internet .................. 94
Case Study 7.1. IS Steals Chemical Weapons at al-Muthanna ................................. 100
Case Study 7.2. The Rajneesh and Salmonella .............................................................. 102
Case Study 7.3. Stolen Radiological Materials ............................................................... 105
Case Study 7.4. Broken Arrows and Loose Nukes ....................................................... 108
Case Study 8.1. The Charlie Hebdo Attacks ..................................................................... 119
Case Study 8.2. Martin Couture-Rouleau......................................................................... 123
Case Study 9.1. Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate (F3EAD) . 135
Case Study 9.2. International Intelligence Cooperation – Operation
Alberich, Germany, 2007................................................................................................ 142
Case Study 10.1. Operation Springbourne ...................................................................... 151
Case Study 10.2. Operation Crevice and Operation Rhyme ....................................... 157
Case Study 10.3. Operation Overt ........................................................................................ 159
Case Study 11.1. Operation Phoenix ................................................................................... 165
Case Study 11.2. Dr. Haneef .................................................................................................. 177
Case Study 12.1. Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) ................................................. 190
Case Study 12.2. The Prospects of Dialogue with al-Qaeda ..................................... 193
Case Study 13.1. The Saudi “Care Rehabilitation Center” ........................................ 205
Case Study 13.2. The UK Channel Project ....................................................................... 207
Case Study 14.1. Al-Qaeda in Iraq....................................................................................... 222
Case Study 14.2. Terrorist Use of Diamonds and Other Gems ............................... 226
xvii
xviii Combating Transnational Terrorism
Case Study 15.1. The Anders Breivik Terrorist Attacks in Oslo and Utøya,
July 2011 .............................................................................................................................. 237
Case Study 15.2. Najibullah Zazi’s New York Subway Plot ...................................... 242
Case Study 16.1. Examples of CT Strategy Ends and Ways ...................................... 256
Case Study 16.2. “Bayanihan”: The Armed Forces of the Philippines
Internal Peace and Security Plan (AFP-IPSP) ....................................................... 261
Chapter 1
Defining Terrorism
Alex P. Schmid
Introduction
If you Google “definition of terrorism,” in less than half a second you get 48
million hits. The search for a definition of terrorism has been equated to the
search for the Holy Grail.1 It has also been called the “Bermuda triangle of ter-
rorism research.”2 Indeed, “terrorism” is a controversial and essentially con-
tested concept, politically loaded and emotionally charged, since it involves
moral judgment and matters of life and death. It is contested in politics as well
as in the academic community. The following brief list of contested elements 3
is illustrative of this challenge:
1. Some observers stretch the concept of terrorism to include attacks on
the military, while at the same time excluding certain activities by the
military.
2. Some people include attacks on the military outside zones of combat
and outside wartime as terrorism, while others do not.
3. Some are prepared to label the destruction of property as terrorism.
4. Some are also prepared to label certain harmful acts like computer
hacking as terrorism, even when there is neither direct violence, nor
fear involved (as has been the case so far with so-called ‘cyber-terror-
ism’).
5. Some authorities tend to label all forms of violence by militant groups
as terrorism, once a group has been designated a terrorist organization.
6. Some people exclude from their understanding of terrorism acts car-
ried out by, or on behalf of, states or governments.
7. Some exclude certain intimidating violent activities committed by orga-
nized crime groups from being labeled terrorism.
8. Many people exclude ‘freedom fighters’ (either those who are strug-
gling for national liberation or who are trying to rid a territory of for-
eign occupation). Often, this is without regard for how popular, or un-
1 Geoffrey Levitt, “Is Terrorism Worth Defining?” Ohio Northern University Law Review
13 (1986): 97.
2 Brian M. Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 1980), 10.
3 Alex P. Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (London:
Routledge, 2011), 84-85.
1 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch01
2 Alex P. Schmid
popular, their actions may be, and is despite the fact that there is no
definition of “nation” or “people” in international law.
9. Some include assassinations in the concept of terrorism, while others
do not.
10. Some argue that terrorism has nothing to do with religion, while others
see a link between terrorism and faiths which claim to be in possession
of absolute truth (as Karl Marx once stated, terrorists are “dangerous
dreamers of the absolute”).
In the face of such complexity, some have called for a ‘common sense’ ap-
proach. As Jeremy Greenstock, British Ambassador to the United Nations, ar-
gued in 2001 “Let us be wise and focused about this: terrorism is terrorism ...
What looks, smells, and kills like terrorism is terrorism.” 4 This may seem an al-
luring argument, however, as President Emile Lahoud of Lebanon proclaimed
in 2004 “It is not enough to declare war on what one deems terrorism without
giving a precise and exact definition.”5 Similarly, Ben Saul pointed out that “In
the absence of a definition of terrorism, the struggle over the representation of
a violent act is a struggle over its legitimacy.”6 Finally—and contrary to what
many believe—Boaz has argued that “an objective definition of terrorism is not
only possible; it is also indispensable to any serious attempt to combat
terrorism.”7
Terrorism and Political Violence

According to the United Kingdom’s Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1974, ter-
rorism is “the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence
for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.”8 How-
4 John Collins, “Terrorism,” in Collateral Language: A User’s Guide to America’s New War,
ed. John Collins and Ross Glover (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 167-
68.
5 “Beirut Wants ‘Terrorism’ Defined,” AlJazeera, January 13, 2004, accessed September
6, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/01/200841010738460226.html.
6 Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006).
7 Boaz Ganor, “Terrorism: No Prohibition Without Definition,” October 7, 2001, as
quoted by Jeffrey S. Helmreich, “Beyond Political Terrorism: The New Challenge of
Transcendent Terror,” Heshvan, November 15, 2001, accessed September 6, 2015,
http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp466.htm.
8 Cited in Alex P. Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 107. The
UK definition has been revised in 2007 and can be found in Part I, section 1,
Terrorism Act 2000, as amended:
“1 Terrorism: interpretation
(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where—
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international
governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
Defining Terrorism 3
ever, if we simply equate terrorism with political violence, we end up with an

unhelpful circularity. There are many forms of political violence other than ter-
rorism, of which some might overlap (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1. Forms of Political Violence other than Terrorism.9
x Hunger strike/ self-burning (political suicide)

x Blockade/ public property damage/ looting/ arson/ sabotage
x House arrest/ arbitrary arrest
x Internment/ concentration camps
x Violent repression of peaceful demonstrations
x Hate crime/ lynching/ vigilantism
x Violent demonstration/ mob violence/ rioting
x Raids/ brigandry/ 'warlordism'
x Political justice/ show trials
x Razzia/ mass eviction/ unlawful deportation
x Torture/ mutilation/ mass rape
x Political murder/ liquidation/ targeted killing/ tyranny
x Summary extra-judicial execution/ massacre
x Disappearances (kidnapping, torture/ maiming, murder)
x Ethnic cleansing/ purge/ pogrom
x Subversion/ rebellion/ revolt/ banditry/ peasant uprising/ urban insurrec-
tion/ national liberation struggle/ guerrilla warfare/ low-intensity conflict
due to insurgency/ irregular warfare/ unconventional warfare
x Military intervention/ invasion/ interstate aggression (war)
x Resistance to invasion/ occupation/ partisan warfare
x (Elite) coup d'état/ (mass) revolution
x Civil war/ armed intrastate conflict with, or without, state participation
x Ethnocide/ politicide/ genocide/ democide
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or
ideological cause.”
See Terrorism Act 2000, accessed September 5, 2015, www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2000/11/section/1.
9 For a discussion, see Alex P. Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Re-
search, 5-7.
4 Alex P. Schmid
In terrorism studies, there is a certain ‘definition fatigue.’ Do we need a legal

definition of terrorism at all? It has been argued that:
All terrorist actions and offences, substantive and inchoate, are covered by ex-
isting criminal law. No special laws are needed, and no definition of terrorism.
The creation of a definition and special measures for terrorism bring with
them an inevitable deficit in individual freedoms. This is more likely to lead to
arbitrary and unconstitutional action by the State.10
While this might be true from a legal perspective, many states have never-
theless adopted specialized legislation. Certainly, in trying to study and analyze
terrorism we cannot do without a definition. And yet we have collectively failed
to produce a universally accepted definition, either in the field of international
law or in the field of social sciences. There are many national definitions11 and
some regional ones in criminal law, but none that has the legitimacy that comes
from endorsement by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
The Need for a Social Science Definition

Fatigue or not, definitional debates, while often boring, are important. As David
de Vans points out: “Different definitions produce different findings. Conse-
quently, defining concepts is a crucial state of research.” 12There are good rea-
sons to be clear about the definition of terrorism. Roberta Senechal de la Roche
has pointed out that “without a useful definition of terrorism, a theory of the
subject is not even possible.”13 She adds, “That others may use the term terror-
ism pejoratively—or that violent actors or their opponents may like or dislike
the word—is irrelevant to a scientific definition of the phenomenon. A defini-
tion is not a value judgment and cannot be evaluated from a moral or ideologi-
cal point of view. And because it is a conceptual rather than a factual or explan-
atory statement, a definition cannot be evaluated as right or wrong. Instead we
evaluate a scientific definition solely by its usefulness in the ordering of
facts.”14 Jenny Teichman, in turn, has pointed out that moral judgments can
only be made when the question of definition has been adequately answered.15
10 The Definition of Terrorism. A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Independent

Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State
for the Home Department, by Command of Her Majesty, March 2007, 19. Accessed
September 6, 2015, http://tamilnation.co/terrorism/uk/070301carlile.pdf.
11 Ben Saul noted in 2006 that “In national criminal legislation, almost half of States
now define terrorism generically (either in simple or composite definitions), although
half of States still treat terrorism as ordinary crime.” Saul, Defining Terrorism in
International Law, 319.
12 David de Vans, Research Design in Social Research (London: Sage, 2001), 25.
13 Roberta Senechal de la Roche, “Toward a Scientific Theory of Terrorism,” Sociological
Theory 22, no. 1 (March 2004): 1.
14 Senechal de la Roche, “Toward a Scientific Theory of Terrorism,” 1.
15 Jenny Teichmann, “How to Define Terrorism,” Philosophy 64 (1989): 505.
There are at least two debates: one about a social science definition and one
about a legal definition. There is also a political debate and a media debate, and
these overlap with each other to some extent.
Historical Origins of the Terms Terror and Terrorism

Terrorists themselves had their definitional debate about “the philosophy of
the bomb” in the 1870s and 1880s, when two recent inventions—dynamite and
the rotary press—began to interact: the terrorists killed prominent people and
the newspapers rewarded them with front-page coverage, making possible
their “propaganda by the deed.” One of the early terrorist theorists was Nicho-
las Morozov, who in 1880 wrote that:
… terroristic struggle has exactly this advantage that it can act unexpectedly
and find means and ways which no one anticipates. All that the terroristic
struggle really needs is a small number of people and large material means.
This really represents a new form of struggle. It replaces by a series of individ-
ual political assassinations, which always hit their target, the massive revolu-
tionary movements…. The [terrorist] movement punishes only those who are
really responsible for the evil deed. Because of this the terroristic revolution is
the only just form of revolution. At the same time it is the most convenient
form of revolution. Using insignificant forces it had an opportunity to restrain
all the efforts of tyranny which seemed to be undefeated up to this time. Do not
be afraid of… despotic rulers because all of them are weak and helpless against
secret, sudden assassination, it says to mankind.16
Andrei Ivanovich Zhelaybov, another strategist of the People’s Will con-

cluded that “history moves frighteningly slowly, one has to give it a push.” 17
Those who did the ‘pushing’ were ‘terrorists’ – a term coined in 1793 by Grac-
chus Babeuf, a French journalist and political agitator, who himself became a
victim of the guillotine four years later.18 The ‘terrorists’ first created terror
and then tried to exploit it for furthering their political objectives. Terror—as
extreme fear—is the most powerful of human emotions:
“Terror” is, first of all, a state of mind characterized by intense fear of a threat-
ening danger on an individual level and, by a climate of fear, on the collective
level. If the production of “terror” and exploitation thereof is a deliberate pol-
icy of a conflict party, we are dealing with political terrorism. Those parts of
the terrorist audience identifying with the victims of terrorism also experience
various levels of traumatization, ranging from anxiety to despair. Terrorists
play on our fear of sudden violent death and try to maximize uncertainty and
16 Nicholas Morozov, Terroristicheskaya Borba [Terrorist Struggle] (Geneva, 1880),

cited in Feliks Gross. Violence in Politics. Terror and Assassination in Eastern Europe
and Russia. The Hague: Mouton, 1972, 106. Morozov was a member of the People’s
Will.
17 Cited in Barry Rubin and Judith Colb Rubin, Chronologies of Modern Terrorism (Ar-
monk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2008), 15.
18 Rubin and Rubin, Chronologies of Modern Terrorism, 7.
6 Alex P. Schmid
hence anxiety to manipulate actual and prospective victims and those who
have reason to identify with them. Depending on the setting, prospective vic-
tims can be shocked by numbing fear (as in a hostage situation when the dead-
line for an ultimatum approaches) or they can panic and flee, having witnessed
one atrocity and being anxious to avoid becoming a victim of the next.19
Maximilien Robespierre, who in 1793 had advocated for making “terror”

against internal and external enemies “the order of the day,” had already been
guillotined in 1794. Since the French National Convention, led by the Jacobines,
had authorized terror the year before, Robespierre had to be blamed for some-
thing else and that was ‘terrorism,’ a term that had an illegitimate and repulsive
flavor of despotic, arbitrary and excessive violence – a criminal abuse of pow-
er.20 While at the end of the 18th century terrorism referred to indiscriminate
state terror against suspects, towards the end of the 19th century, the term ter-
rorism was applied primarily to anarchists who opposed the very idea of a
state. With heads of state and government becoming targets of terrorism,
making terrorism an international crime became more pressing.
The debate about reaching a legal definition of terrorism has been going on
since 1926 when Rumania first asked the League of Nations to draft a conven-
tion that would render terrorism universally punishable.21 As so often, the ini-
tiative was in response to a terrorist attack: in April 1925 a bomb exploded in
the main cathedral in Sofia, killing 124 people. However, it took another assas-
sination before the League of Nations took up the challenge of proscribing ter-
rorism after the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia by Croatian
separatists in 1934. The result was the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of Terrorism. The League of Nations’ Convention defined “acts of
terrorism” as “criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated
to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of per-
sons or the general public.”22 That convention was signed by 24 states but ulti-
mately ratified by only one – India. As a result, it never entered into force.
The Definitional Debate in the United Nations

Shortly after its creation, the UN was confronted by Jewish terrorism, commit-
ted by the underground LEHI organization or Stern Gang, which assassinated
the UN Peace Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte in August 1948. 23 Despite this,
19 Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 2-3.

20 Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 42.
21 Ben Saul, “Attempts to Define ‘Terrorism’ in International Law,” Sydney Law School
Research Paper No. 08/115 (The University of Sydney, October 2008), 2.
22 Art. 1, para. 2, Convention for the Prevention and Repression of Terrorism (1937),
quoted in Paul Wurth, La repression international du terrorisme (Lausanne: Impri-
merie la Concorde, 1941), 50.
23 The leader of the Stern Gang, Yitzhak Shamir had apparently ordered his assassina-
tion. See http://mondoweiss.net/2012/07/shamir-ordered-count-bernadotte-
the definitional debate, with the exception of the issue of hijacking, only began
in earnest in 1972 after 28 people (mostly Puerto Rican nuns) were killed by
Japanese terrorists at Lod airport in May, which was followed by the attack on
the Munich Olympic Games in September. In response, the General Assembly
established an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism.24 This was done
alongside a failed initiative of the United States, which had presented a draft
“Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International
Terrorism” to the General Assembly in September 1972.25
Tasked with coming up with a legal definition of international terrorism, the
Ad Hoc Committee, which included legal experts from 35 member states, de-
bated the issue for seven years, with contested issues of self-determination and
national liberation struggles heavily influencing discussions. When the Com-
mittee failed to reach a consensus in 1979, it did not ask for a renewal of its
mandate. It was only re-established by the General Assembly in 1996 and re-
sumed the definitional debate in 1999. This second round of definitional de-
bates has now been going on for fifteen years, without a final result. 26 The defi-
nition contained in article 2 of the draft Comprehensive Convention against In-
ternational Terrorism goes as follows:
Any person commits an offense within the meaning of this [the present] Con-
vention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
(a) Death or serious injury to any person; or
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public
use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an
infrastructure facility or to the environment; or
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in para-
graph 1 (b) of this [the present] article, resulting or likely to result in
major economic loss; when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an in-
ternational organization to do or abstain from doing any act. 27
assassination-to-save-jerusalem-for-jews-but-will-his-obits-tell-you-that, accessed
September 13, 2014.
24 Eva Herschinger, “A Battlefield of Meanings: The Struggle for Identity in the UN
Debates on a Definition of International Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence
25, no. 2 (2013): 183-4. On December 8, 1972, the first Ad Hoc Committee on
Terrorism was established (A/Res.3034 (XXVII) by the UN General Assembly); a
second Ad Hoc Committee on the issue was established on 17 December 1996 (GA
Res. 51/210). See Ghislaine Doucet, “Terrorism: Search for a Definition or Liberticidal
Drifting,” in Terrorism, Victims, and International Criminal Responsibility, ed. Ghislaine
Doucet (Paris, SOS Attentats, 2003), p. 280n.
25 Saul, “Attempts to Define ‘Terrorism’ in International Law,” 12.
26 Herschinger, “A Battlefield of Meanings,” 189.
27 Annex II. Informal text of articles 2 and 2bis of the draft Comprehensive Convention,
prepared by the Coordinator. Article 2, reproduced from document A/C./6/56/L.9,
annex 1.B. This text represents the stage of consideration reached by the Working
Group of the Sixth Committee. Cited in United Nations, Report of the Ad Hoc
8 Alex P. Schmid
To the author’s knowledge, this broad and vague definition has not been
significantly changed or improved in the last twelve years as the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee has mainly debated the Convention’s Preamble and article 18 in recent
years. Eva Herschinger has explained the inability of the United Nations to
reach a legal definition in four different ways:
1. States “have been reluctant to identify certain behavior as terrorist,
largely as a result of national self-interest.”
2. Because the concept of what counts as a terrorist offence is highly de-
pendent on national interests, a universally accepted definition is thus
considered to delimit sovereign power, since it entails giving up the
right to define terrorism according to one’s own rationale.
3. The institutional context of the UN and its treatment of politically moti-
vated violence are not conducive to fostering an agreement.
4. Each nation has its own national legislative traditions and states are
generally unwilling to accept guidance from international law.28
To put it succinctly, we will not have an international definition of terrorism
as long as the “political value of the term… prevails over its legal one.”29
Terrorists as Freedom Fighters?

The misleading adage: “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”
has confused the debate for many years.30 Use of the euphemism ‘freedom
fighter’ for ‘terrorist’ was popularized by Menachem Begin and has been ea-
gerly embraced by all sort of militants, rebels, insurgents, resistance fighters
and guerrillas engaged in struggles for national liberation. 31 Freedom is a goal,
Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of December 17,

1996. Sixth session (January 28 – February 1, 2002). General Assembly. Official
Records. Supplement No. 36 (A/57/37), 6. Emphases added by the author.
28 Herschinger, “A Battlefield of Meanings,” 184-185.
29 Sami Zeidan, “Desperately Seeking Definition: The International Community’s Quest
for Identifying the Specter of Terrorism,” Cornell International Law Journal 36, no. 3
(2004): 491.
30 Boaz Ganor, “Defining Terrorism – Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom
Fighter?” Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2010, accessed
September 6, 2015, http://www.ict.org.il/Article/1123/Defining-Terrorism-Is-One-
Mans-Terrorist-Another-Mans-Freedom-Fighter.
31 Menachem Begin was the leader of the Jewish underground organization Irgun Zvai
Leumi (National Military Organization) which used terror tactics, including the
blowing up of the King David Hotel, to drive the British (whom he labelled
“terrorists”) out of Palestine. He later became Israeli Prime Minister and winner of
the Nobel Prize for Peace. See Menachem Begin, The Revolt (London: W.H. Allen,
1951). However, the term was coined in 1850 by Karl Heinzen, author of “Murder and
Liberty.” See Daniel Bessner and Michael Stauch, “Karl Heinzen and the Intellectual
Origins of Modern Terror,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 2 (2010): 143-76,
which contains a full translation into English of Mord und Freiheit (pp. 153-176).
terrorism is a tactic and one does not exclude the other. While this distinction
is logical, many have nevertheless followed the illogic of Yasser Arafat who, in
1974, declared at the United Nations:
The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason
for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the
freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colo-
nialists cannot possibly be called terrorist, otherwise the American people in
their struggle for liberation from the British colonialists would have been ter-
rorists, the European resistance against the Nazis would be terrorism, the
struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples would also be ter-
rorism, and many of you who are in this Assembly hall were considered ter-
rorists. This is actually a just and proper struggle consecrated by the United
Nations Charter and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As to those
who fight against the just causes, those who wage war to occupy, colonize and
oppress other people, those are the terrorists. Those are the people whose ac-
tions should be condemned, who should be called war criminals: for the justice
of the cause determines the right to struggle.32
At face value, such emotive speeches can sound compelling. However, to de-
liberately confuse goals (ends) and tactics (ways) is an attempt to excuse acts of
terrorism based on the perceived justness or nobility of the cause. A group may
have suffered the worst of injustices and may be fighting for the most worthy of
causes and, yet, if they employ the tactics of terrorism, they are still terrorists.
Of course, in reality labeling problems are rife. For instance, on 28 June 1914
Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sara-
jevo. One hundred years later people in Sarajevo—Bosniak Muslims, Orthodox
Serbs and Catholic Croats—still cannot agree on whether what Princip did was
‘terrorism’ or ‘heroism.’33
Moreover, labels matter (see Case Study 1.1). Recently Petro Poroshenko,
President of Ukraine, asked the West to do him a favor by calling the Russian-
supported separatists ‘terrorists.’34 In another practical example, the US anti-
terrorism watch-list has grown exponentially and, according to former FBI spe-
cial agent David Gomez, is “revving out of control.” Indeed, as Gomez remarked,
“If everything is terrorism, then nothing is terrorism.” 35
32 Yasser Arafat, Chairman, Exec. Comm. Palestinian Liberation Assembly Org. Speech
before the General Assembly of the United Nations. U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2282nd plen.
Mtg. at 861, 48, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 2282 and Corr. 1 (November 13, 1974).
33 Dan Damon, “Bosnia and WW1: The Living Legacy of Gavrilo Princip,” BBC, June 25,
2014, accessed September 6, 2015, www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28016999.
34 Polly Mosendz, “Poroshenko: There Are No Separatists, Only Terrorists,” The Wire,
July 21, 2014, accessed September 6, 2015, www.thewire.com/global/2014/07/
poroshenko-there-are-no-separatists-only-terrorists/374772/.
35 Jeremy Scahill and Ryan Devereaux, “Watch Commander: Barack Obama's Secret Ter-
rorist-Tracking System, by the Numbers,” The Intercept, August 5, 2014, accessed
September 6, 2015, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/05/watch-
commander.
10 Alex P. Schmid
Case Study 1.1. The Euro-Mediterranean (Euromed) Anti-Terror Code of

Conduct.
In November 2005 the EU member states and their partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel,
Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) in the Eu-
romed group agreed on a code of conduct on countering terrorism.36 British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, who co-chaired the conference, stated that the code was “a strong
statement” reflecting a “unified determination to fight terrorism in all its forms.”37
However, the summit’s outcome was unsatisfactory and reflected deep disagree-
ment among the delegates about the definition of terrorism and the distinction be-
tween a terrorist and a freedom fighter. Representatives from several Arab states in-
sisted that any definition of terrorism and any measures agreed to counter it should
recognize a people’s legitimate right to resist against an occupying foreign military
force. The EU, on the other hand, argued that self-determination could not be consid-
ered a justification for terrorism. In particular, hopes for a ‘common vision’ statement
foundered on divisions over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Commentators at the time
criticized the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism from the “Code” as
undermining its authority and influence.38
It is not clear in hindsight whether the absence of a definition of terrorism entirely
discredited the Euromed Anti-Terror Code of Conduct, but the agreement appears to
have had minimal impact on facilitating anti-terror cooperation between the EU and
its neighbors.
Given such politicization of the term terrorism, it is tempting to conclude

that terrorism “…does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which
seek to enclose it.”39 It is not just politicians who play politics with terrorism.
But to claim that “terrorism is … a social fact rather than a brute fact”40 would
not likely be accepted by all those who watched the recent beheadings which
were broadcast across social media.
Comparing Academic Definitions

Although the importance of a definition of terrorism is generally accepted, and
there is often agreement on many of the conceptual issues that must be ad-
dressed, even among prominent terrorism experts we find considerable varia-
tion. The Handbook of Terrorism Research contains 260 different definitions of
36 Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism, Final Text, accessed

September 6, 2015, www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/summit1105/terrorism_en.pdf.
37 “Euromed Summit Ends with Anti-Terror ‘Code’,” Deutsche Welle, November 28,
2005, accessed September 6, 2015, http://www.dw.de/euromed-summit-ends-with-
anti-terror-code/a-1795154.
38 See, for example, “Euro-Med Adopts Anti-Terror Code,” BBC News, November 28,
2005, accessed September 5, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/44770
54.stm.
39 Richard Jackson, Marie Been Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning, eds., Critical Terrorism
Studies: A New Research Agenda (London: Routledge, 2009), 75-76.
40 Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, eds., Critical Terrorism Studies.
terrorism.41 Here we will consider just a few. For instance, Paul Wilkinson
made several attempts at defining terrorism, beginning in 1974:
Our main concern is with political terror: that is to say with the use of coercive
intimidation by revolutionary movements, regimes or individuals. ... We have
thus identified some of the key characteristics common to all forms of political
terror: indiscriminateness, unpredictability, arbitrariness, ruthless destruc-
tiveness and the implicitly amoral and antinomian nature of a terrorist’s chal-
lenge. ... Political terrorism, properly speaking, is a sustained policy involving
the waging of organized terror either on the part of the state, a movement or
faction, or by a small group of individuals. Systematic terrorism invariably en-
tails some organizational structure, however rudimentary, and some kind of
theory or ideology of terror.42
In 1987, Wilkinson described terrorism in these terms:

Terrorism can briefly be defined as coercive intimidation, or more fully as the
systematic use of murder, injury and destruction, or threat of same, to create a
climate of terror, to publicize a cause and to coerce a wider target into submit-
ting to the terrorists’ aims.43
Notably, Wilkinson’s latter definition gives more prominence to the com-

munication dimension of non-state terrorism. The importance of publicity is
also recognized in one of the most widely utilized definitions within the United
States, produced by Bruce Hoffman:
We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation
and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pur-
suit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of vio-
lence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological
effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is
meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider “target audience”
that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a na-
tional government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is
designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where
there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists
seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect
political change on either a local or an international scale.44
41 Appendix 2.1: 250-plus Academic, Governmental and Intergovernmental Definitions

of Terrorism. Compiled by Joseph J. Easson and Alex P. Schmid, in Alex P. Schmid, ed.,
The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 99 – 157.
42 Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism (London: Macmillan, 1974), 11.
43 Paul Wilkinson, “Pathways out of Terrorism for Democratic Societies,” in Contempo-
rary Research on Terrorism, ed. Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart (Aberdeen:
Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 453.
44 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised and expanded edition (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2006), 40-41.
12 Alex P. Schmid
In particular, Hoffman’s definition stresses the terrorist’s pursuit of political

change. However, both vigilante and state terrorists often use terrorism to pre-
vent change. In addition, Hoffman’s statement that “All terrorist acts involve vi-
olence or the threat of violence”45 can also be contested. Certainly, from a legal
perspective there is an ever-growing range of non-violent proscribed offences
including such activities as incitement, glorification or fundraising in support of
terrorism. Governments must therefore concern themselves not only with the
core definition of terrorism, but also with a multitude of legal definitions which
describe the activities of terrorist supporters and are robust enough to stand
up in a court of law. Nevertheless, the core definition remains the primary hur-
dle. Richard English defined terrorism in these words:
Terrorism involves heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a political
aim; it can involve a variety of acts, of targets, and of actors; it possesses an
important psychological dimension, producing terror or fear among a directly
threatened group and also a wider implied audience in the hope of maximizing
political communication and achievement; it embodies the exerting and im-
plementing of power, and the attempted redressing of power relations; it rep-
resents a subspecies of warfare, and as such it can form part of a wider cam-
paign of violent and non-violent attempts at political leverage.46
This definition is quite broad and appears to incorporate most of the more
recent insights into terrorism. However, his categorization of terrorism as a
‘subspecies of warfare’ can be challenged. Indeed, there is more to terrorism
than this. Muhammad Fayyezhas identified no less than eight different narra-
tive frameworks for terrorism:
1. As an expression of religious constructions
2. As a protest and rallying symbol (ideological)
3. As an instrument of policy (political)
4. As violent criminal behavior (organized crime)
5. As an instrument of warfare
6. As a propaganda tool (visual warfare through media)
7. As vengeance (a social norm)
8. As vigilantism (state functionalism).47
The Revised Academic Consensus Definition

Although there are several recurring themes in definitions of terrorism, the
preceding discussion helps to highlight just how difficult it is to capture this
45 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 40, emphasis added.

46 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
24.
47 Muhammad Feyyaz, “Conceptualizing Terrorism Trend Patterns in Pakistan – an
Empirical Perspective,” Perspectives on Terrorism 7, no. 1 (2013): 96.
complexity within a brief description. The “Academic Consensus Definition” is

based on the replies to three questionnaires sent out to some two hundred ex-
perts over the past thirty years. While the earliest consensus definition from
198448 contained 22 elements and the second attempt from 1988 contained 16
elements,49 the most recent one from 2011 contains 12. Together, these ele-
ments have been combined to form the revised academic consensus definition,
which follows. It is a collective effort of the many scholars who volunteered
their comments and criticism on consecutive versions of the text:
1. Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed ef-
fectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political vio-
lence. On the other hand, it also refers to a conspiratorial practice of calculated,
demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting
mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and
psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.
2. Terrorism as a tactic is employed in three main contexts: (1) illegal state
repression, (2) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace
or outside zones of conflict and (3) as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare em-
ployed by state- and non-state actors.
3. The physical violence or threat thereof employed by terrorist actors in-
volves single-phase acts of lethal violence (such as bombings and armed as-
saults), dual-phased life-threatening incidents (like kidnapping, hijacking and
other forms of hostage-taking for coercive bargaining), as well as multi-phased
sequences of actions (such as in ‘disappearances’ involving kidnapping, secret
detention, torture and murder).
4. The publicized terrorist victimization initiates threat-based communica-
tion processes whereby, on the one hand, conditional demands are made to in-
dividuals, groups, governments, societies or sections thereof. On the other
hand, terrorists also seek the support of specific constituencies based on ties of
ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and the like.
5. At the origin of terrorism is terror—instilled fear, dread, panic or mere
anxiety—spread among those who identify, or share similarities with the direct
victims, generated by some of the modalities of the terrorist act – its shocking
brutality, lack of discrimination, dramatic or symbolic quality and disregard of
the rules of warfare and punishment.
6. The main direct victims of terrorist attacks are not, in general, members
of the armed forces but are usually civilians, non-combatants or other innocent
and defenseless persons who bear no direct responsibility for the conflict that
gave rise to acts of terrorism.
48 Alex P. Schmid, ed., Political Terrorism. A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984), 111.
49 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman. Political Terrorism. A New Guide to Actors,
Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (Amsterdam: North Holland,
1988), 28.
14 Alex P. Schmid
7. The direct victims are not the ultimate target (as in a classical assassina-
tion where victim and target coincide) but serve as message generators, more
or less unwittingly helped by the news values of the mass media, to reach vari-
ous audiences and conflict parties that identify either with the victims’ plight or
the terrorists’ professed cause.
8. Sources of terrorist violence can be individual perpetrators, small
groups, diffuse transnational networks, as well as state actors or state-spon-
sored clandestine agents (such as death squads and hit teams).
9. While showing similarities with methods employed by organized crime,
as well as those found in war crimes, terrorist violence is predominantly politi-
cal – usually in its motivation but nearly always in its societal repercussions.
10. The immediate intent of acts of terrorism is to terrorize, intimidate, an-
tagonize, disorientate, destabilize, coerce, compel, demoralize or provoke a
target population or conflict party in the hope of achieving from the resulting
insecurity a favorable power outcome, e.g. obtaining publicity, extorting ran-
som money, submission to terrorist demands and/or mobilizing or immobiliz-
ing sectors of the public.
11. The motivations to engage in terrorism cover a broad range, including
redress for alleged grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punish-
ment, revolution, national liberation and the promotion of diverse ideological,
political, social, national or religious causes and objectives.
12. Acts of terrorism rarely stand alone but form part of a campaign of vio-
lence which can, due to the serial character of acts of violence and threats of
more to come, create a pervasive climate of fear that enables the terrorists to
manipulate the political process.50
To go beyond the current stage of knowledge incorporated in the Academic
Consensus Definition is quite a challenge. It is perhaps better to focus further
definitional construction efforts on a legal definition that is acceptable to the
General Assembly of the United Nations. The current draft version of the UN’s
Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism, presented earlier, is certainly in dire need of
improvement.
Conclusion
Far from being a purely academic debate, the failure to agree on definitions of
terrorism has important practical implications. Indeed, the way that we define
terrorism fundamentally shapes the way that we confront it. Despite the work
of the Ad Hoc Committee, 14 UN conventions on counter-terrorism and a uni-
versally agreed upon UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the lack of a UN defini-
tion raises serious doubts about our ability to cooperate internationally in the
fight against terrorism, given that we cannot agree on what it is. Both scholars
of terrorism and counter-terrorism professionals alike must strive for an objec-
50 Schmid, ed., Handbook of Terrorism Research, 86-87.

tive definition that facilitates not only common understanding, but also com-
mon action.
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Chapter 2
Terrorist Motivations
Dina Al Raffie
Introduction
Despite the prevailing lack of consensus in the international community on a
definition of terrorism, it is now widely agreed that terrorists are neither hope-
lessly irrational nor ‘insane.’ In fact, as Louise Richardson observes, the “prima-
ry shared characteristic [of terrorists] is their normalcy.” 1 Unfortunately, how-
ever, this is where the similarity ends, as no single profile is exemplary of all
terrorists. Rather, most studies find that the path to terrorism is paved with
both individual and environmental factors that combine in different ways for
different individuals. Similarly, whereas such combinations of factors may have
a radicalizing effect, ideological radicalization alone does not necessitate a
transition to violence, although it may increase the probability.
This chapter summarizes the various motivations of terrorists, based on
several decades’ worth of scholarly research. It begins by presenting a number
of myths, and what terrorists are not, before proceeding with an overview of
motivations that can broadly be categorized as either ‘individual’ or ‘environ-
mental.’ In particular, the chapter emphasizes that terrorism is an over-
whelmingly sane phenomenon, which is driven by a number of both individ-
ual/dispositional and environmental factors that are consciously mobilized by
actors and/or organizations for the pursuit of political ends. Most importantly,
radicalization relies heavily on socialization processes that not only build on
existing predisposing risk-factors, but also create further motivations for en-
gaging in terrorism. There is no one pathway to terrorism, no one profile of a
terrorist, and no one magic formula to counter terrorism. However, a keen un-
derstanding of the potential predisposing risk-factors and motivations can bet-
ter position governments to develop comprehensive responses to radicaliza-
tion and terrorism in their respective states.
Terrorist Motivation Myths

There are numerous myths about terrorist motivation, with two being the most
predominant. The first is that terrorists suffer from specific psychopathologies
that predispose them to violence. Whilst some studies have found certain per-
sonality traits common to individuals at differing levels and in different roles in
terrorist organizations, there is little reason to believe that terrorists in general
1 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the
Threat (New York: Random House, 2006), 14.
17 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch02
18 Dina Al Raffie
are driven by psychological disorder. For example, early researchers, such as

Jerrold Post, suggested that individuals in leadership positions in terrorist or-
ganizations tend to exhibit higher degrees of narcissistic and paranoid person-
ality disorders.2 A similar observation has been made regarding lone actor ter-
rorists, where there is an above-average documented incidence of mental ill-
ness.3 However, it has not been established that terrorist leaders in general suf-
fer from personality disorders. Indeed, as Post later concluded, the “concepts of
abnormality or psychopathology are not useful in understanding terrorist psy-
chology and behavior.”4 More importantly, both leaders and lone actors only
make up a small percentage of all terrorists, meaning that they are atypical.
Furthermore, people suffering from mental illness, or exhibiting erratic be-
havior are more likely to be rejected by a terrorist organization, since behav-
iors resulting from such traits could be threatening to both the leadership’s
control over such individuals as well as the security and cohesiveness of the
group. Excessively risky behavior exposes the terrorists’ clandestine activities
to possible detection and disruption by the authorities. Therefore, the ideal
member of a terrorist organization is someone who is mentally stable.
To give an example, although the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) does not specifically
address mental health in its recruitment propaganda, it nevertheless makes it
quite clear who they are looking for. According to one of their members, Abu
Sa'eed al-Britani, the group seeks skilled individuals from a variety of profes-
sions to help maintain the ‘state.’5 This is an indication that IS, a jihadist insur-
gency deemed too extreme by even the likes of al-Qaeda (AQ), requires
“normal,” disciplined individuals who are capable of following orders and per-
forming a variety of duties in close cooperation with others, which could create
difficulties for people suffering from mental disorders.6
2 See respectively Phillip W. Johnson and Theodore B. Feldmann, “Personality types

and terrorism: Self-psychology perspectives,” Forensic Reports 5, no. 4 (1992): 293-
303; and Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of
Psychological Forces,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies,
States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,
1990), 25-40.
3 See, for example, Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: From the
Klan to Al Qaeda (New York: Routledge, 2003).
4 Jerrold Post, “When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-cultural Foundations of
Contemporary Terrorism,” Political Psychology 26, no. 4 (2005): 616.
5 “Isis Advertises 10 Jobs in the ‘Caliphate’ Including Press Officers, Bomb Makers and
Teachers,” The Independent, April 10, 2015, accessed April 13, 2015,
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-advertises-10-jobs-in-the-
caliphate-including-press-officers-bomb-makers-and-teachers-10168485.html.
6 There are, however, select cases of mentally ill individuals joining IS. For instance,
Australian jihadist Khaled Sharrouf reportedly suffers from chronic schizophrenia.
See Sean Rubenstein-Dunlop, “Khaled Sharrouf: The Australian radical fighting for
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,” ABC News, August 14, 2014, accessed June 18, 2015,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-14/khaled-sharrouf-the-australian-radical-
fighting-in-iraq/5671974.
Terrorist Motivations 19
The second myth is that poverty, poor education, and lack of employment
opportunities are at the root of all terrorism. Profiles of terrorists spanning
various ideologies call this into question. For example, a biographical study of
approximately 400 Salafi jihadists, drawn from different countries, by psychia-
trist Marc Sageman found that a significant majority (around two-thirds) were
from upper/middle class families and were well-educated, based on a high per-
centage of college attendance figures.7 Similarly, studies on both Chechen and
Palestinian female suicide bombers found that most were from middle-income
families and attained the level of education pursuant to national standards and
their age groups.8
There are some cases where poverty or material factors do play a role. For
example, it has been documented that men living in the Syrian stronghold of IS,
Ar-Raqqa, have joined the insurgency in exchange for reduced taxes and im-
proved standing in society.9 A similar motivation is noted for women marrying
IS commanders and other fighters in the area. The total control of Ar-Raqqa’s
economy by IS is part of a calculated strategy to ensure obedience from the lo-
cal population and to attract supporters using economic incentives and other
benefits. It would, however, be inaccurate to label forced participation as a le-
gitimate motivation for terrorism, since joining the group is essentially beyond
the control of the individual. Others will accept money from terrorist organiza-
tions in return for services that facilitate the groups’ activities. 10 However, such
motivations generally do not fall under most definitions of terrorism, as a fun-
damental element is the political nature of the goals pursued. Overall, poverty
in general does not seem to correlate strongly with a tendency towards politi-
cal violence. As Khalil Shikaki rightly notes, the constant misery of poor living
conditions is hardly “... a crucial factor; if it were half the Somali population
would have already blown itself up.”11 The same argument can be made for mil-
lions of people living in similar conditions who have not opted for violence.
7 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century

(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
8 Anat Berko and Edna Erez, “Martyrs or Murderers? Victims or Victimizers? The
Voices of Would-Be Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers,” and Anne Speckhard and
Khapta Akhmedova, “Black Widows and Beyond: Understanding the Motivations and
Life Trajectories of Chechen Female Terrorists,” in Female Terrorism and Militancy:
Agency, Utility, and Organization, ed. Cindy Ness (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2008),
146–66 and 100–21 respectively.
9 “How the Islamic State Uses Women to Control Women,” Syria: Direct, March 25,
2015, accessed April 8, 2015, http://syriadirect.org/main/30-reports/1938-how-
the-islamic-state-uses-women-to-control-women.
10 For example, there have been documented examples of Boko Haram bribing fruit
sellers to spy on government officials and burn churches. See Jacob Zenn, “Boko
Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region,” CTC
Sentinel 7, no. 10 (2014): 6.
11 Quoted in Christopher Reuter, My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide
Bombing (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), 10.
20 Dina Al Raffie
Finally, although a correlation between the degree of state failure and inci-
dents of terrorism has been found,12 such findings are not consistent across dif-
ferent studies.13 Current conflicts also suggest that state failure is not a direct
cause of terrorism, but rather may provide terrorist groups with opportunities
to establish safe havens due to the collapse of central government.
The Individual Level of Terrorist Motivation

Research has identified a number of factors that can account for individual mo-
tivations for terrorism. Not surprisingly, among the most important is sympa-
thy with the terrorists’ cause. Individual belief in any given cause is, therefore,
an important mobilizing factor. Terrorism scholar David Rapoport has identi-
fied four primary ‘waves’ of terrorism that characterize many of the terrorist
organizations of the last century.14 Each of these waves represents groups that
fought on behalf of similar causes. The ‘anti-colonial wave,’ which included
groups like the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), brought together individuals that
had a strong desire to free their territories from Western colonial powers. Alt-
hough constituting only a fraction of the populations in which they were em-
bedded, such groups enjoyed popular support, as they were acting on behalf of
wider constituencies that desired the same goals. The ‘terrorists’ were altruis-
tic in that they strongly believed in a cause which was representative of a wider
social group and were driven by deep-seated feelings of injustice, discrimina-
tion, and real and/or perceived grievances.
Altruism thus plays an important role as both a motivator and a tool for re-
cruitment.15 Recent terrorist campaigns, like those promoted by AQ for exam-
ple, similarly claim to be acting on behalf of a particular social group. Although
violent jihadists may not enjoy much actual support, they have nevertheless
promoted their cause as a struggle on behalf of all Muslims. They encourage
youth to join in defense of the Muslim community of believers, the ummah,
claiming that all of its ills are part of an intentional plan of the so-called “Cru-
sader-Zionist” alliance (i.e. the primarily Christian West and Israel) to destroy
Islam. They further argue that it is an individual religious duty, or fard ’ayn, on
Muslims to fight. As a result, it is not unusual to find individuals who join up
12 See Dipak Gupta, Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence: The Life Cycle of
Birth, Growth, Transformation, and Demise (London: Routledge, 2008): 69–71.
13 See, for example, The Global Terrorism Index 2014: Measuring and Understanding the
Impact of Terrorism (New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015), accessed
May 22, 2015, http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/
Terrorism-Index-Report.pdf.
14 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements
of a Grand Strategy, eds. Audrey Kurth Cronin et al. (Washington, D.C: Georgetown
University Press, 2004), 46–73.
15 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 37.
because they believe they are actually doing good on behalf of a larger social
identity to which they belong.
Belief in a cause is often linked to the existence of grievances, injustice and
discrimination. Whether real or perceived, they can motivate an individual for
action (and here the word ‘action,’ rather than ‘terrorism,’ is used intentionally
because there are several ways people respond to such conditions). Indeed,
most successful terrorist campaigns will capitalize on grievances faced by
those they claim to fight for. If these grievances do not exist, they will create
them. For example, by framing otherwise normal daily challenges of Muslim
youth in the diaspora as a deliberate strategy of discrimination against the
religion, ideologues create grievances and support for their narrative that the
West is in a ‘war against Islam’ – a cornerstone of the Salafi jihadist rhetoric.
Youths may thus be incentivized to join as a means of addressing these
grievances, or because they feel that governments are unable or unwilling to do
so.
Traumatic experiences in an individual’s life can also be a strong motivator.
Returning to the previous example of female suicide bombers, many of them
had suffered the loss of someone close to them (often killed by the security
forces of the state), which left them with a strong desire to avenge their loved
ones.16 The desire for revenge is particularly strong in situations where a mi-
nority population, ethnicity or religion, is being oppressed by a state and/or
the majority. A similar motivation also plays a role in many Muslim-majority
countries, where there is a strong dislike of certain Western foreign policies.
This creates a sense of victimization among civilian populations and conse-
quently broadens the potential pool of recruits for terrorist organizations.
A good example of an unpopular policy is the use of drones in CT operations.
This has alienated many people in affected countries and has facilitated radi-
calization and granted credibility to the jihadist narrative of a “war on Islam.”17
Individuals are thus sometimes motivated to join terrorist organizations that
provide them with resources and an avenue to take revenge on their oppres-
sors. They may join terrorist organizations because of a strong commitment to
the group’s ideology, but perhaps even more often as a means to address other
needs.
A more strategic reason why terrorists adopt the tactics that they do is to
draw attention to their cause. As one jihadist propaganda poster aptly put it,
“As soon as we picked up the gun they started to listen.” For many, opting for
violence is not just a way to vent frustrations, but also to air grievances and
make them known. Another motivation linked to grievances is known as ‘rela-
tive deprivation.’ Notably, this involves a combination of both individual and
16 Speckhard and Akhmedova, “Black Widows and Beyond.”

17 See, for example, Nico Prucha, “Death from Above: Jihadist Virtual Networks Respond
to Drone Strikes in Yemen,” Jihadica.com, May 15, 2014, accessed May 22, 2015,
http://www.jihadica.com/death-from-above-jihadist-virtual-networks-respond-to-
drone-strikes-in-yemen/.
22 Dina Al Raffie
environmental factors, as it is an individual perception of existing social condi-

tions and therefore operates on both levels. In this case, grievances result from
a feeling of deprivation relative to another social group. Such feelings can cre-
ate frustration, especially amongst youth who wish to occupy more prestigious
positions in their societies, but are barred from doing so for a number of rea-
sons.18
The effects of deprivation can be explained by its relationship to identity
and self-worth. People in general seek identities that provide them with a posi-
tive sense of self, meaning in life, and direction. When the realities of life chal-
lenge their abilities to uphold such identities, it can create tremendous frustra-
tion and trigger a search for meaning. Put differently, when the expectation of
entitlement does not meet an individual’s lived experiences, that sense of dep-
rivation can undermine self-worth and generate negative emotions. As will be
shown in the next section, this feeling of relative deprivation can also be man-
ufactured by ideologues of terrorist organizations. They can convince members
of a certain group that they should be entitled to more and that their disadvan-
taged situation results from discrimination by a government or different ethnic
or religious group.
Finally, identity crises resulting from factors other than deprivation are an-
other vulnerability upon which radicals prey. An example of such a ‘crisis’ is
seen in the experience of some Muslims from diaspora communities in primar-
ily non-Muslim majority countries.19 In these cases, Muslim second and third
generation immigrants feel disconnected from the values of both their families
and their societies. Traditional religious values can seem incompatible with
some of the experiences of Muslims in secular societies. For example, such val-
ues tend to encourage the public practice of religion and yet secular societies
are generally perceived to frown upon open displays of religiousness. In the af-
termath of 9/11, the increased focus on Islam, in particular, combined with
such conflicting values to create a religious identity crisis among some Muslims
living in the West. This crisis then encouraged a search for meaning and truth
about what it meant to be a Muslim: a question that many jihadist ideologues
had long since been ready to answer.
The Terrorist’s Environment

Terrorism is a form of political violence that occurs in almost all countries and
under all forms of governance. This being the case, there must be some social,
political and cultural, i.e. environmental, factors that contribute to creating a
fertile ground for terrorism, regardless of how a state is governed. An in-depth
18 Michael King and Donald M. Taylor, “The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A

Review of Theoretical Models and Social Psychological Evidence,” Terrorism and
Political Violence 23, no. 4 (2011): 609.
19 Dina Al Raffie, “Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the
Diaspora,” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 4 (2013): 67-91.
discussion of the history of public protest, activism, and political violence is be-
yond the scope of this chapter. However, several observations are necessary.
To begin with, it has been suggested that there may be a link between ter-
rorism and certain forms of repressive governance, such as military autocra-
cies.20 Authoritarian regimes monopolize political power and deny opportuni-
ties for political participation. This fuels grievances which may then manifest
themselves in rebellion and/or political violence.21 Whilst such an explanation
appears logical, authoritarian regimes also exercise tight control over their re-
spective populations, giving them little opportunity to organize an armed re-
sistance.
In fact, the opportunities for terrorism may be even greater in democratic
societies. A cursory glance at the recent history of Europe and the US shows
that, prior to the rise of contemporary violent Islamism, both continents had
suffered from violent left-wing extremism for many years, despite democratic
systems of governance. For instance, during the 1970s, the US experienced a
wave of bombings, largely attributable to groups such as the Weather Under-
ground.22 Similarly, the current exodus of ‘foreign fighters’ to Syria and Iraq has
involved thousands of volunteers from Western countries, many of whom are
not clearly disadvantaged or oppressed. Whereas some terrorist organizations
will emerge in response to forms of real and/or perceived state oppression
(e.g. terrorism in the Israel-Palestine conflict), the reality is that state practices
alone are not sufficient as drivers of terrorism. Indeed, there is little evidence
to support a causal connection between governance type and terrorism.
A more necessary ingredient for mobilization in all cases of terrorism is the
existence of an ideology. Ideologies play an important role in terrorism, pri-
marily because of their ability to manipulate how people see the world and to
provide convincing arguments for why and how individuals should act, i.e. they
frame the cause on behalf of which individuals should fight. Robert Benford
and David Snow identify three primary frames that ideologues use, of which
the first two are of particular significance.23 The first is the “diagnostic” frame,
which provides explanations for why individuals face the problems they do. In-
dividual motivating factors such as grievances, traumas, and injustices that are
faced by potential recruits are explained as being symptomatic of a larger injus-
20 For a detailed discussion see Matthew C. Wilson and James A. Piazza, “Autocracies
and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist At-
tacks,” American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 4 (2013): 941–55.
21 For more on political drivers of violent extremism, see Guilain Denoeux and Lynn
Carter, Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism (Washington, D.C.: United States
Agency for International Development, 2009), 27–38, accessed May 22, 2015,
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadt978.pdf.
22 Caron E. Gentry and Laura Sjoberg, “The Gendering of Women’s Terrorism,” in
Women, Gender and Terrorism, ed. Laura Sjoberg et al. (Athens, GA: University of
Georgia Press, 2011), 66.
23 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An
Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 611–39.
24 Dina Al Raffie
tice that is intentionally being directed at members of a specific social group.

For example, a typical jihadist narrative argues that the social ills faced by Mus-
lims are a result of them shirking their religious duties in the face of an ag-
gressive infidel campaign to destroy Islam. This element of ideology is the most
important since “before collective action can get underway, people must collec-
tively define their situation as unjust.”24 Initial framing is thus crucial to the
radicalization process.
As individuals begin to adopt and internalize the frames offered by terrorist
ideologues, they increasingly begin to reinterpret their surroundings in terms
of injustice, which leads to a heightened sense of victimization. Because ideo-
logical frames tend to simplify issues, depicting them in a black and white
manner, they often result in confirmation biases, whereby radicalized individ-
uals only pay attention to things that confirm their beliefs, despite there being
evidence to the contrary. This is a vicious cycle, which can eventually lead to
violence. This becomes increasingly likely if he or she perceives that there are
no credible alternatives to solving the problems that the ideology identifies. Vi-
olent ideological narratives try to ensure that such a conclusion is reached by
emphasizing the futility of peaceful avenues of action and stressing the need for
violence. This is readily apparent with violent jihadist organizations such as IS,
which view peaceful engagement with the infidel enemy as inconceivable,
while any form of coexistence is written off as religiously prohibited.
The second important aspect of ideology, the ‘prognostic’ frame, builds on
the first by offering alternative solutions to the problems which have been
identified. Carrying on from the previous example, dying for the sake of ‘jihad’
by way of fighting on behalf of the embattled ummah is viewed as a noble, re-
ligious deed that will elevate the status of Muslims and effectively counter the
Western conspiracy. The prognostic element is important as it clearly de-
scribes the ‘enemy’ and demarcates the in-group from the out-group. Blame is
assigned to the latter, which is also often represented as subhuman. This is an
important rhetorical tactic used to break down psychological barriers that re-
cruits may have against killing other human beings. Dehumanization lowers
the threshold for violence, and is designed to reduce the psychological stress
associated with taking human life.25
The prescribed solutions provide the individual an opportunity to act, vent
his/her frustrations, and gain a sense of purpose and meaning. In this context,
the terrorist organization, as the social unit in which the ideology is practiced,
shares a single, collective identity that generates a sense of belonging and acts
as a surrogate family for its members. As Post remarks, “...what a wonderful
feeling it is to find that one is not alone, to find other like-minded individuals,
to have one’s inner doubts quelled and shored up with an ideology, to be ac-
24 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 51.
25 Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel, and Alan S. Waterman, “Terrorism: An Identity
Theory Perspective,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 6 (2009): 540–42.
cepted at last.”26 Responsibility and agency no longer rest with the individual,
but with the group, which collectively decides on the actions to be taken and
continues to ideologically justify them. Related ‘groupthink’ eclipses inde-
pendent decision-making and fosters compliance, regardless of how irrational
or extreme the proposed action may seem.27
As one study of a member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) noted, “O’Grady
[IRA member] observed that he did not grow up hating Protestants but had
adopted the hatreds of his chosen group. He said: “They [Protestants] are the
enemy of my people. The IRA targeted these people, and I was their instrument
of death. I carry the hatred of my own group”.”28 The psychosocial impact of the
group on the individual’s willingness to join and stay should not be underesti-
mated.
Similarly, the role of leaders cannot be overlooked when discussing terrorist
motivations. Organized action requires organizers, and terrorist leadership of
some description is often crucial for mobilization. Leaders are responsible for
articulating and spreading the group’s vision, and act as role models or proto-
types for those that join. Charismatic leaders that demonstrate commitment to
a group’s cause are viewed as key to the success of an organization and its ide-
ology.29 For instance, despite the many luxuries that his wealth could have af-
forded him, Osama bin Laden always made an effort to demonstrate his com-
mitment to the cause by living a Spartan lifestyle. It is perhaps easy to under-
stand the appeal that such leaders may have on individuals who suffer from
identity crises, are seeking direction, or else are moved by traumatic experi-
ences that create a need for certainty and assurance. Just as Hollywood celebri-
ties command deep admiration and loyalty from fans, so too can charismatic
terrorist leaders and ideologues (see Case study 2.1).
Nevertheless, governments should take caution not to base their counter-
terrorism (CT) efforts purely on ‘decapitating’ the top leadership of terrorist
groups. Although there are a number of cases where the capture or killing of
leaders has had a significant effect on a group’s operations, e.g. the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK), others suggest that decapitation can have a negative ef-
fect. Indeed, the killing of a leader can create a ‘martyr’ and breathe new life
into an organization’s momentum.30
26 Jerrold M. Post, “Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior,” Terrorism:

An International Journal 7, no. 2 (1984): 248.
27 Eteri Tsintsadze-Maass and Richard W. Maass, “Groupthink and Terrorist Radicaliza-
tion,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 5 (2014): 735–58.
28 Stephen Worchel, Written in Blood: Ethnic Identity and the Struggle for Human
Harmony (New York: Worth, 1999), 121.
29 For more on charisma see Haroro J. Ingram, The Charismatic Leadership Phenomenon
in Radical and Militant Islamism (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2014).
30 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist
Groups,” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 22.
26 Dina Al Raffie
Case Study 2.1. Anwar al-Awlaki.

The following case study is an adaptation of an in-depth report 31 which traces the
radicalization of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-Yemeni member of al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) who was killed in Yemen in 2011 by a drone strike. At the
end of his life, he was one of AQ’s most prominent ideologues, responsible for inspir-
ing a number of terrorist attacks. His story helps to illustrate how individual, social
and environmental factors can progressively combine to result in increasing radicali-
zation.
Awlaki’s career as a preacher started in the mid-1990s in the US. The young
cleric’s religious interpretations had a distinctly conservative, Salafist flavor, which at
times drew critiques from others within the community. Notably, he was openly sup-
portive of the armed jihad in Chechnya, which he actively promoted to his followers. 32
Nevertheless, during this period Awlaki attributed Muslim troubles to a weakness in
Islamic identity that was partly influenced by corrupting ‘Western’ values, which
were causing disunity. This internal discord was aided by conflicts that were taking
place in Muslim countries, further weakening the religion and its place in the world.
His prognosis, as articulated in his sermons, was to strengthen Islamic identity
through prioritizing observance of Islam over and above other identities. He similarly
sought to raise awareness of the plight of Muslims worldwide and was obviously
moved by the suffering of his co-religionists in all corners of the globe.
However, not long after the events of September 11, Awlaki disappeared from the
US after reports emerged alleging connections to some of the 9/11 suicide bombers.
Despite a lack of sufficient evidence at the time, increased scrutiny eventually drove
him to the UK, where he became more exposed to non-violent Islamist organizations
including the Muslim Brotherhood-founded Jamiat Ihyaa Minhaaj al-Sunnah (JIMAS).
There, his already conservative views became more aggressive and he began to adopt
more politicized opinions. Around this time, a US-led coalition invaded Taliban-gov-
erned Afghanistan, which Awlaki perceived as intentional Western hostility against
Muslims. Consequently, he began shifting the blame for Islamic disunity from the lack
of strong, individual faith, to what he believed was an intentional Western foreign
policy of war against Islam. Coupled with an increase in Western CT efforts against
violent extremists at home, Awlaki’s rhetoric took on an increasingly hostile tone
against non-Muslims, especially in the West. Muslims were encouraged not to inte-
grate with others in society and those who did were painted as traitors for colluding
with infidel governments to entrap their own people. Here we already begin to see the
demonization of the out-group, which later became a legitimate target of violence in
Awlaki’s later propaganda efforts.
In 2004 Awlaki moved to Yemen, which is where his radicalization reached its
peak. He was arrested in 2006 and spent time in a Yemeni prison at the behest of US
authorities. Given the fact that the charges against him originated in the US (a country
whose foreign policies he already perceived in an extremely negative light), it is likely
that this further cemented his views that the Western “War on Terror” was really a
global conspiracy against Islam. These combined experiences eventually led him to
31 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Be-

came the Face of Western Jihad (London: International Centre for the Study of Radi-
calization, 2011).
32 Meleagrou-Hitchens, As American as Apple Pie, 25.
pledge allegiance to the leader of AQAP, Nasser al-Wuhayshi.

In the final stage of radicalization, Awlaki attributed what he believed was the de-
cline of Islam to the failure of Muslims to wage armed jihad against their enemies.
Further, Islam could only regain its supremacy on the world stage through the im-
plementation of sharia. The only way to attain these goals, in his view, was by waging
war on anyone who stood in their way. In the last few years of his life, Awlaki pro-
duced a plethora of jihadist propaganda that continues to be influential to this day. He
was also directly or indirectly connected to a number of failed and successful attacks,
including the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, the attempted underwear bombing of North-
west Airlines Flight 253, and the 2010 stabbing of a British Member of Parliament.
This case study illustrates how individual and environmental factors can reinforce
each other in the radicalization process. In Awlaki’s case, his increasingly extreme
convictions, changes in his personal circumstances and global events combined to
strengthen his perception that the West was at ‘war’ with Islam.
Another social unit that can influence terrorist recruitment and motivation
is the family. In a study of the Southeast Asian Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), research-
ers found strong normative support amongst families for terrorist actions car-
ried out by their kin.33 Terrorist organizations may intentionally adopt a policy
of intra-organizational marriage to create loyalty and ensure the radicalization
of future generations. Some studies of Western home-grown terrorists have
found similar effects. In a case study of an AQ-affiliated Tunisian network
based in Milan, Lorenzo Vidino demonstrated how the radicalization of one
brother eventually led two of his siblings to follow suit.34 In addition to imme-
diate family and kinship ties, there are other facilitators of radicalization,
among them the Internet and social media, which are discussed in Chapter 6.
Besides ‘virtual’ facilitators, likeminded, non-violent groups that share ideo-
logical affinities with terrorist organizations can also play a role in the overall
radicalization process.
In a groundbreaking study on Islamist activism, Quintan Wiktorowicz high-
lights the role of ostensibly non-violent Islamist organizations in promoting
many of the narratives that their more violent counterparts also subscribe to. 35
These groups often present themselves as legitimate religious institutions act-
ing on behalf of minorities, primarily in the West. Examples of groups that have
since been banned in many countries due to their strong potential for radical-
izing youth include Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), the UK-based al-Muhajiroun and the
Sharia4 organizations that have branches in several countries.
33 Michael King, Haula Noor, and Donald M. Taylor, “Normative Support for Terrorism:
The Attitudes and Beliefs of Immediate Relatives of Jema'ah Islamiyah Members,”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 5 (2011): 402–17.
34 Lorenzo Vidino, “The Buccinasco Pentiti: A Unique Case Study of Radicalization,” Ter-
rorism and Political Violence 23, no. 3 (2011): 398–418.
35 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloom-
ington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004).
28 Dina Al Raffie
Certain radical Salafi preachers, both political and apolitical, have also fea-
tured as contributors to the growth of Islamist extremism. Although not neces-
sarily inciting violence, the puritanical religious interpretations taught by such
preachers often serve a similar purpose to terrorist narratives in that they are
divisive and highly critical of anyone who does not share their interpretation of
the faith. Increasingly, extremist preachers will also combine strong anti-West-
ern, anti-democratic rhetoric based on comparable critiques of Western do-
mestic and foreign policies, and similarly call for a reformation of societies
based on select readings of the Islamic sharia. It is thus easy to see how these
facilitators, with their many ideological parallels to violent Islamist organiza-
tions, can help to ideologically prime their followers into potentially accepting
more radical, violent ideas.36 Nevertheless, it is also important to realize that
mainstream Salafism is by no means an inevitable conveyor belt towards vio-
lent extremism and some believe that it may in fact help prevent people from
turning to terrorism.37 As Vidino has noted, “it can be argued that in some cases
non-violent Islamist groups act as firewalls while in others as conveyor belts.”38
A final point of interest regarding the environment and radicalization re-
lates to research on prisons as incubators of violent extremism. Prisons facili-
tate radicalization and recruitment to terrorism when imprisoned radicals are
kept together or else left to mingle with ‘ordinary’ convicts. Essentially the
same social dynamics that bring together individuals in support of extremist
ideology on the outside can also play out in prisons. For example, Mark Hamm
has researched a number of cases where individuals were radicalized behind
bars, including shoe bomber Richard Reid and several of the 2004 Madrid train
bombers.39 More recent reports have suggested that Camp Bucca, an American
military prison in Iraq, played a significant role in the development of the cur-
rent leadership of IS.40 It provided the insurgents with an opportunity to as-
semble, analyze each other’s strengths and weaknesses, and establish a hierar-
36 For accounts of the experience in Germany, see Stefan Malthaner, “Contextualizing

Radicalization: The Emergence of the “Sauerland-Group” from Radical Networks and
the Salafist Movement,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37, no. 8 (2014): 638–653;
“Salafist Efforts: Content and Objectives of Salafist Ideology,” Bundesamt für Verfas-
sungsschutz, Undated, accessed April 14, 2015, www.verfassungsschutz.de/en/fields-
of-work/islamism-and-islamist-terrorism/what-is-islamism/salafist-efforts.
37 For useful discussions of these issues see Alex P. Schmid, Violent and Non-Violent Ex-
tremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin? (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-
Terrorism, 2014), accessed June 18, 2015, http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-
Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf; Lorenzo Vidino, “Sharia4:
From Confrontational Activism to Militancy,” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 2
(2015): 2-16; Lorenzo Vidino, “The Role of Non-Violent Islamists in Europe,” CTC Sen-
tinel 3, no. 11 (2010): 11.
38 Vidino, “The Role of Non-Violent Islamists in Europe.”
39 Mark Hamm, The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist
Threat (New York: New York University Press, 2013).
40 Martin Chulov, “Isis: The Inside Story,” The Guardian, December 11, 2014, accessed
May 22, 2015, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story.
chy that was eventually to form the backbone of the insurgent group as we
know it today. Indeed, prisons play a dual role. They not only protect society
from dangerous individuals, but also protect dangerous individuals from being
hunted on the outside. In the case of the Iraqi insurgency, being in prison
meant that prominent AQ members were kept alive and could continue their
efforts to radicalize and recruit.
Conclusion
This chapter aimed to provide an overview of widely documented motivating
factors for terrorism. It is a phenomenon that is driven by a complex array of
elements that emerge from an individual’s predispositions, experiences and
environment. Motivations to commit acts of terror are thus multilayered.
Therefore, in order to successfully counter terrorism we first need to distin-
guish between the different layers and sources of terrorist motivation. It is ob-
vious that no single approach will suffice in challenging terrorist motivations.
This is because there are various drivers at both the individual and environ-
mental levels which, when taken together, may present multiple pathways into
radicalization and violence. Not all of the factors need to be present in each in-
dividual’s radicalization ‘formula.’ Likewise, different ideologies present dif-
fering narratives which emphasize certain factors over others. Even more
confusing is the unanticipated effects that the same factors can have on differ-
ent individuals, as the majority of aggrieved, disenfranchised youngsters who
face identity crises will not turn to terrorism.
However, the fact remains that the risk-factors identified above will have a
negative impact on a number of individuals and, for some, will provide suffi-
cient motivation to commit acts of terrorism. Despite the complexity of the
subject, the knowledge that we have gained on the ‘why’ of terrorism is enough
to enable development of empirically informed policies to counter violent
extremism. Although in all likelihood we will never be able to put an end to
terrorism, we may be able to lessen its appeal over time.
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Chapter 3
The Strategy and Tactics
of Terrorism
James Howcroft
Introduction
Terrorists exist for political reasons. Groups that practice terrorism do so in
order to bring about political change of some type. Usually, these groups are
small and often lack broad public support. Therefore, they are unable to
achieve their desired goals through a peaceful political process. Instead, they
use acts of violence, inflicted upon deliberately chosen noncombatant targets,
in order to bully and intimidate governments into changing policy or granting
concessions.
Despite the prominence of terrorism as a global security threat, the majority
of terrorist groups do not survive long. Seventy per cent of terrorist groups
perish within a year after their first attack.1 There are a number of possible ex-
planations that may clarify why some groups survive and thrive and others do
not. However, one of the determining factors is the degree to which the group’s
leadership has effectively planned their campaign, exploited the group’s re-
sources and selected appropriate methods and tools to achieve their objectives,
i.e. their strategy and tactics.
The core characteristics of strategy remain the same for both states and
non-state actors. Hundreds of books by great thinkers such as Sun Tzu, Machi-
avelli, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart and Lawrence Freedman have addressed the
enduring features of strategy and its intricacies and nuances. For our purposes,
however, we will employ a practical approach focused upon ends, ways and
means. Ends are the goals and objectives of the terrorist group. Simply put,
what they say about why they are carrying out their actions. Ways are the
methods of influence and persuasion used by terrorist groups to achieve their
stated goals. Means are the resources and tactics employed on the ground. The
means reflect the broad methodologies (ways) which support the accomplish-
ment of the goals (ends) of the group.
Terrorists can be quite open in laying out their strategy. It is useful for coun-
ter-terrorism (CT) professionals to examine and analyze these strategies
whenever possible. They communicate their grievances, identify whom they
1 Joseph K. Young and Laura Dugan, “Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups En-
dure,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 2 (2014): 2-23, accessed May 22, 2015,
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/334/html.
33 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch03
34 James Howcroft
hold responsible, and tell their followers what they should do about it. Terror-
ist strategies also provide insights into the group’s goals, likely targets, tactics
and the audience they are trying to recruit. Gaining an understanding of these
elements helps to illuminate the points at which governments must apply the
instruments of national power to defeat, degrade or destroy these groups.
Terrorists’ Goals
Terrorists must communicate their goals to three primary audiences that they
wish to influence. The first audience consists of the leadership and decision-
makers of the state whose policies they are trying to change. A second audience
is the public, the noncombatants, who are the medium against whom violence
will be used. Lastly, terrorist groups need to advertise their cause to potential
supporters, so that the organization can grow in power and influence. Groups
often produce slick-looking propaganda which outlines aspects of their strat-
egy in order to inform and recruit new followers. The ‘Islamic State’ (IS) journal
Dabiq and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) Inspire magazine openly
provide detailed insights into each group’s intent and activities.
The ends or goals of terrorist groups are different depending on their griev-
ances and can be categorized in a number of ways. One method is to place
groups into one of five categories that have proven their relevance over time:
1) regime change, 2) territorial change, 3) policy change, 4) social control, and
5) maintenance of the status quo.2 Regime change is the replacement of a
government either by the terrorist group or a regime more acceptable to them.
Left wing terrorist groups of the 1970s and ’80s, such as the Shining Path in
Peru, would fit this model. Separatist movements, aiming at territorial change,
were the biggest drivers of terrorism in the second half of the 20 th century.
These groups fought for freedom from an occupying power or colonial regime,
or for certain ‘rights’ or protection for an ethnic minority (e.g. the ETA in Spain
or the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka). While some of these factors remain
significant, there has been little change in the number or severity of attacks by
separatists over the past decade.
An example of policy change would be al-Qaeda’s (AQ’s) demand that the
United States withdraw its forces from the Middle East and end support for
“corrupt” Arab regimes. An example of terrorism aimed at social control would
be violence against ethnic or racial minorities, such as committed by certain
neo-Nazi groups. Other forms of right wing terrorist violence are aimed at pre-
serving a political status quo against groups fighting for change. Examples
would include Colombian paramilitaries or violent Protestant groups in North-
ern Ireland. Often the goals of terrorist groups are interrelated and comple-
mentary, e.g. AQ’s desire for US withdrawal from the Middle East (political
change) supports the goal of overthrowing the Saudi Kingdom (regime change).
The establishment of a caliphate by IS in the territory formerly controlled by
2 Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International

Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 52.
The Strategy and Tactics of Terrorism 35
governments in Damascus and Baghdad is an example of territorial change,

leading to regime change, which could also lead to long-term social change.
Examining the goals of a particular group will help to determine the type of
target they are likely to attack. Separatist groups are most likely to attack the
symbols or figureheads of the enemy government. Assassinations of senior of-
ficials and attacks on government headquarters or buildings that house civilian
officials are common, in addition to assaults on the police and critical infra-
structure. Terrorists may also bring the fight to the homeland of an occupying
force in order to demonstrate their reach and power and to cause fear among
its citizens, which in turn is aimed at generating political pressure to withdraw.
Groups whose goal it is to replace an existing regime will frequently target the
security forces. In addition to the tactical gain of weakening the opposition,
such attacks can undermine the confidence and will of the police and military
to carry out their mission. The slaughter of Iraqi military captives by IS fol-
lowing the capture of Mosul in 2014 is a case in point. The group’s subsequent
propaganda campaign included a video series called The Clanging of the
Swords, which featured brutal scenes of interrogation and murder of soldiers
and government officials. This appears to have thoroughly demoralized the
Iraqi security services and contributed to their subsequent collapse when con-
fronted by advancing IS forces.3 For groups like IS, whose goal is not merely to
obtain territory but to also essentially wipe out another social, ethnic or reli-
gious group, targets also frequently include schools, churches, cultural centers,
media outlets and other cultural symbols.
Terrorists’ ‘Ways’ or Methods of Influence

The general methods of influence and persuasion used by terrorists have not
varied greatly over time (see Case Study 3.1). In general terms, terrorists use
violence against civilian populations in order to pressure governments to
change certain policies. Publicity is vital to spreading or amplifying the scale of
the violence as a form of psychological warfare. Governments of course feel
compelled to react. However, inept, ill-disciplined or poorly coordinated
overreaction can be manipulated to feed the terrorist narrative, gain support
and weaken the will to resist the terrorists’ demands.
Terrorists use violence as a psychological weapon against civilian or non-
combatant targets. The use of violence is intended to cause fear and uncer-
tainty in the target community. A conscious decision is often made to attack so
called soft targets, which are lightly guarded, easy to access and destroy, rather
than directly targeting government security forces. Attacking poorly protected
3 Muhammed al-‘Ubaydi, Nelly Lahoud, Daniel Milton and Bryan Price, The Group That
Calls Itself a State: Understanding the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State
(West Point, NY: The Combating Terrorism Center, 2014), 87, accessed May 19, 2015,
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-group-that-calls-itself-a-state-understanding-
the-evolution-and-challenges-of-the-islamic-state.
36 James Howcroft
Case Study 3.1. Armed Propaganda: The Core of Terrorist Strategy.

At the end of the 19th Century, Italian anarchists coined the phrase “propaganda by
the deed” to describe the mobilizing and symbolic power of acts of revolutionary vio-
lence. In 1969, Brazilian urban terrorist, Carlos Marighella, referred to this process as
“armed propaganda” in his book, the “Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla.” In
Marighella’s words “…armed action is the primary way of making armed propaganda.
These actions carried out with the specific objectives and aims in mind inevitably be-
come propaganda material for the mass communication system.”4
Marighella was killed in action by the Brazilian police shortly after his book was
published, but it influenced a whole generation of leftist terrorist groups in the 1970s
and ’80s. More recently, Australian counterinsurgency analyst and Pentagon adviser,
David Kilcullen, described groups such as AQ and the Taliban as “…essentially armed
propaganda organizations. They switch between guerrilla activity and terrorist activ-
ity as they need to, in order to maintain the political momentum, and it’s all about an
information operation that generates the perception of an unstoppable, growing in-
surgency.”5
Armed propaganda reflects an enduring characteristic of terrorist strategies, that
they are usually more concerned with the psychological than the physical impact of
their violence, even when they indulge in mass casualty attacks. Shaping public per-
ception is therefore the strategic center of gravity of most terrorist campaigns. World-
wide media coverage, the Internet, and social media sites allow contemporary terror-
ist groups a global reach for their propaganda that their anarchist predecessors could
only have dreamed about.
civilian targets is obviously less dangerous and risky to the terrorists and tends
to have a stronger resonance within the wider society. Attacks on school chil-
dren in particular have an impact far beyond those directly affected. The 2004
Beslan siege in Russia, Tehreek-e-Taliban’s attack in Peshawar in 2014, Boko
Haram’s kidnapping of school girls in Chibok in April 2014 and the al-Shabaab
attack in Garissa, Kenya in 2015 are recent examples.
Affecting the security and well-being of the population can be powerful
methods of achieving leverage for a terrorist group. In a Gallup Poll in 2013, 40
percent of the American public still professed worry that they or a family
member might become a victim of terrorism, despite the fact of very few suc-
cessful attacks in the US since 9/11.6 From a terrorist’s perspective, fear is in-
tended to make citizens pressure their governments to agree to terrorists’ de-
mands or moderate policies in exchange for refraining from violence. Al-Sha-
baab’s attacks in Kenya on the Westgate shopping mall in 2013 and on the stu-
4 Carlos Marighella, “Armed Propaganda,” in Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, June

1969, accessed September 10, 2015, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-
carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/ch31.htm.
5 George Packer, “Know the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the ‘War on
Terror’?” The New Yorker, December 18, 2006, accessed May 22, 2015,
www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2006/12/18/knowing-the-enemy.
6 “Terrorism in the United States,” Gallup.com, undated, accessed May22, 2015,
www.gallup.com/poll/4909/Terrorism-United-States.aspx.
dents of Garissa in 2015 were meant to pressure the Kenyan government into
curtailing their military operations against the group in Somalia.7 The July 2010
bombing in Uganda, which targeted civilians watching a World Cup football
match, was likewise intended to impose a cost on Ugandan society for their
government’s contribution of forces to AMISOM, the African Union military
mission in Somalia. Similarly, AQ’s leadership directly linked the attacks on
public transport in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 to continuing coalition
military operations in Iraq.8
Terrorist groups depend on the publicity generated by the media to amplify
their actions and influence a larger audience beyond the immediate reach of
their violence. As British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously stated in
1985, terrorists depend upon “the oxygen of publicity” and violent, destructive
actions inevitably draw widespread media attention. Terrorism analyst Brian
Jenkins famously commented during the 1970s that terrorists wanted a lot of
people watching rather than a lot of people dead, but sadly only the former part
of this statement still holds true. Terrorists are increasingly willing to indulge
in mass casualty attacks in order to gain the attention that they crave.
In the past, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was masterful at
exploiting and manipulating the media. The 1972 Munich Olympics was the
first live, globally televised sporting event, with an unprecedented audience of
up to a billion viewers. As a result, targeting the Games was incredibly effective
in drawing world attention to the Palestinian cause. During the same era, the
Italian Red Brigades timed their actions and communications to newspapers to
meet the news cycle of the higher circulation Thursday and Sunday editions in
order to reach the largest audience.9 Similarly, American right wing terrorist
Timothy McVeigh chose to target the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City because it had plenty of open space around it to allow the best possible
media coverage.10 In a letter intercepted by the authorities in 2005, Ayman al-
Zawahiri (then second in command for AQ) admonished Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
for his brutal tactics, explaining that “We are in a battle, and more than half of
this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media, we are in a media
battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our people.”11
7 See, for example, Jamal Osman, “Why Did al-Shabaab Strike at the Heart of Kenya’s
Capital?” Channel 4 News, April 23, 2013, accessed May 22, 2025,
http://www.channel4.com/news/kenya-somali-islamist-group-al-shabaab-nairobi-
westgat-mall.
8 See, for example, “US Rejects bin Laden’s Tape’s Truce Offer,” CNN, January 20, 2006,
accessed May 20, 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2006/US/01/19/binladen.tape/
index.html.
9 Harvey W. Kushner, Encyclopedia of Terrorism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 227.
10 Michel Lou and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma
Bombing (New York: HarperCollins, 2001): 168-169.
11 “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi,” GlobalSecurity.org, July 9, 2005, accessed
May 22, 2015, www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-
zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm.
38 James Howcroft
Would terrorists be defeated if simply deprived of publicity? Pressure by

governments on the media not to publicize terrorist actions or demands may
seem an attractive option, but the media has an obligation to inform the pub-
lic—particularly when they may be at risk—and a free media is a cornerstone
of democratic societies. In any case, the debate regarding government censor-
ship is increasingly irrelevant, given the terrorists’ ability to directly spread
their messages via the Internet (see Chapter 6). Groups are now able to rapidly
produce and disseminate large amounts of high quality content online within
minutes. During his January 2015 assault on a kosher grocery store in Paris,
Amedy Coulibaly used a personal body camera to film the attack and then ed-
ited the images on his laptop and uploaded them to the Internet while waiting
for the police to intervene.12 During the 2013 Westgate mall attack in Nairobi,
al-Shabaab claimed responsibility via social media as soon as the attack com-
menced and then used Twitter and other online platforms from within the
shopping mall to provide live updates as the attack unfolded over several
days.13 IS has been extremely successful at recruiting young men and women
worldwide using Internet sites and social media tools, including Facebook,
YouTube, Twitter, Instagram and AskFM.14
Undermine Confidence in the Legitimacy and Capability

of the Government
Terrorist attacks against civilian targets are planned to demonstrate not only
the power of the group, but also the impotence of the government. One of the
most basic responsibilities of a government is to provide security for its citi-
zens in return for their support. When terrorists undermine that ability, they
also undermine the legitimacy of the government.
The political leadership is therefore anxious to swiftly and publicly demon-
strate to their people that they are taking resolute action. Often, terrorist at-
tacks are designed with the hope that they will provoke a poorly disciplined
and disproportionate response. “Bloody Sunday,” which took place in January
1972, was an overreaction by British paratroopers during a civil rights demon-
stration in Londonderry, which led to the deaths of fourteen civilians. The inci-
dent resulted in widespread condemnation of the British government and dra-
12 Rukmini Callimachi and Jim Yardley, “From Scared Amateur to Paris Slaughterer,”
New York Times, January 18, 2015.
13 Alexander Harriet, “Tweeting Terrorism: How al Shabaab Live Blogged the Nairobi
Attacks,” The Daily Telegraph, September 22, 2013, accessed May 22, 2015,
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/10326863/T
weeting-Terrorism-How-al-Shabaab-live-blogged-the-Nairobi-attacks.html.
14 Christina Schori Liang, “Cyber-Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State
Propaganda,” Policy Paper 2015/2 (Geneva: Geneva Center for Security Policy,
February 2015), 1.
matically boosted support for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).15
The French government’s deployment of 10,000 troops onto the streets of Paris
following the Charlie Hebdo attack was meant to reassure the public, but also
succeeded in amplifying the impact of what was (by global standards) a com-
paratively small-scale incident. Repeated military operations against Hamas in
Gaza have increased support for the ‘resistance’ and led to widespread inter-
national criticism of Israel.
Violent overreaction weakens a government’s legitimacy and erodes public
support, while increasing sympathy for terrorists. In particular, persecuted mi-
norities whom the terrorists claim to represent are often pushed into siding
with the militants, who readily offer them protection. Indeed, government op-
pression risks alienating the ethnic or religious group that the terrorists are
trying to attract, and reinforces their narrative of injustice. This dynamic was
evident when members of the Sunni minority in Iraq gave support to IS in 2014
in response to Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s oppressive and divisive
sectarian policies. Significant government overreaction may inadvertently as-
sist terrorist groups in achieving their core objectives. The attack on America in
2001 was a provocation that threatened the very survival of AQ as it brought
down the full weight of the world’s only superpower on the organization. But
post 9/11, US military action in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced AQ’s narrative
that the West was at war with Muslims. From a longer-term perspective, it
could be argued that Western overreaction to the events of 9/11 helped AQ
gain additional worldwide support and at least partially advanced its goal of
“bleeding the enemy,” while making it appear a greater threat than it could ever
be in reality.16
The US Patriot Act and similar legislation in Europe have weakened civil lib-
erties. The use of the military base at Guantanamo to detain prisoners without
trial has done great damage around the world to the American image as an ad-
vocate for human rights and the rule of law. As noted above, AQ was certainly
effective at portraying the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan as a war against
Islam. These wars cost trillions of dollars and caused the deaths of thousands
of soldiers and hundreds of thousands of civilians. In the US alone, expenditure
on homeland security grew by more than $1 trillion in the decade after 9/11.17
The psychological, human and financial toll of combating AQ and its affiliates
since 2001 has undoubtedly made the US and its European allies question the
utility of deploying military forces to the Middle East, as evidenced most re-
cently by unwillingness to commit troops on the ground in Libya or against IS
in Iraq and Syria.
15 Eamonn McCann, The Bloody Sunday Enquiry – The Families Speak Out (London: Pluto
Press, 2006), 4-6.
16 John Mueller and Mark Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought
Response to September 11,” International Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 103.
17 “Is America Spending Too Much on Homeland Security?” The Economist, April 30,
2011.
40 James Howcroft
The Means or Tactics of Terrorism

The particular means that a terrorist organization employs depends on the re-
sources available to them, the ease of carrying out attacks and the imagination
of group members. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) provides a comprehen-
sive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism from 2000–
2013 and includes over 125,000 terrorist incidents. According to this database,
the primary targets of terrorism have been private citizens and the police. Of
course, this makes sense since terrorism is defined as violence against non-
combatants for political purposes, while the police are a symbol of the state
and also present one of the biggest threats to terrorists. As for weaponry, this
remained constant over the course of the study – approximately 60 percent
used explosives, 30 percent were attacks with firearms and 10 percent used
other types of weapons.18
Bombings
While the use of explosives may not be new, they have grown over time in le-
thality and complexity. Indeed, as terrorist incidents have seemingly become
more common and religious ideology has emerged as a dominant motivating
factor, terrorists have developed a greater desire to kill more victims in order
to generate publicity and simultaneously annihilate the enemy. For example,
large, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) can cause exten-
sive damage to targeted buildings and generate large numbers of casualties, as
well as powerful images that are irresistible to the media, as illustrated by at-
tacks in Beirut, Dar as Salaam, Nairobi, Oslo, and many other places.
Bombs contained in backpacks or in the form of suicide vests have become
an immensely popular and effective way of striking against desired targets. Im-
provised explosive devices (IEDs) using innocuous commercial products, such
as fertilizer or hydrogen peroxide, have been exploited by terrorists for dec-
ades. However, easy online access to information needed to build such devices
is a troubling recent development. For instance, the Boston Marathon bombers
in 2013 were able to manufacture simple “pressure cooker bombs” using in-
formation from an AQ magazine.19
Suicide Bombing
According to the GTI data only 5 percent of terrorist attacks since 2000 have
been suicide bombings.20 But they have proven to be highly effective. A suicide
bomber acts as a human guided missile, able to get close to the desired target
and strike with precision. Moreover, the inherent flexibility of using a human
18 The Global Terrorism Index (New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015), 29,
accessed May 2, 2015, http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global
%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014.pdf.
19 Evan Perez, Devlin Barrett and Andrew Grossman, “Boston Bomb Clues Surface,” The
Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2013.
20 The Global Terrorism Index, 30.
carrier, sometimes combined with the option of remote detonation or booby-

trapped devices, makes them exceptionally difficult to guard against. Conse-
quently, suicide bombings are on average five times more deadly than other
types of attack.21 In addition, suicide bombings tend to attract greater media in-
terest and are thus ideal for gaining publicity for the terrorists and their cause.
Demonstrating the willingness to deliberately sacrifice cadres for the ‘greater
good,’ or simply to inflict pain on the enemy, is a powerful psychological
weapon. With the right publicity, it can give terrorists an almost supernatural
aura of ruthless commitment.
Armed Assaults
Armed assaults have a number of features which make them an extremely ef-
fective terrorist tactic. To begin with, they often generate huge media interest
and publicity, especially if they take place within crowded urban areas. These
attacks are extremely challenging to respond to and may go on for days, as was
the case in Mumbai in 2008 and the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi in 2013
(see Case Study 3.2). Both of these incidents were protracted by hostage-taking
and resulted in hundreds of hours of global media coverage for the respective
terrorist organizations. Assaults of this type are also powerful because they
appear random to the general population, thereby emphasizing a personal
sense of vulnerability. By the same token, they demonstrate the inability of the
government to protect its citizens as they go about their daily lives.
The end of the Cold War and recent conflicts in the Balkans, the Middle East,
South Asia and Africa have resulted in an uncontrollable global flood of cheap,
easily concealed automatic weapons which are simple to operate. Most of the
world’s 875 million small arms are in civilian hands, 22 which benefits groups
such as AQ and IS that frequently encourage their followers to independently
conduct attacks on their behalf using any means available.
Conspiracies to conduct these types of attacks involving small, close-knit
groups or individuals are extremely difficult for security services to detect
while in the planning and preparation stage.23 Unless the conspirators some-
how reveal their plans, for example in their interactions with friends and family
or in their social media postings, there may be few opportunities to detect
them. The June 2014 Jewish Museum attack in Brussels, the October 2014
shooting at Parliament Hill in Ottawa and the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo at-
21 The Global Terrorism Index, 32.

22 Small Arms Survey 2012 (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International and Develop-
ment Studies, 2012), accessed May 22, 2015, www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-
and-markets/stockpiles/civilian-inventories.html.
23 Steven Erlanger, “Europe Focuses on Emerging Threats From Smaller Crews of
Terrorists,” New York Times, January 13, 2015, accessed May 19, 2015,
www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/world/europe/europe-focuses-on-emerging-
threats-from-smaller-crews-of-terrorists.html.
42 James Howcroft
Case Study 3.2. The Attack on Mumbai by Lashkar-e-Taiba, November

2008.24
In November 2008, 10 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists mounted a ‘commando-style’
attack on the Indian city of Mumbai, assaulting eight different high profile ‘soft’ tar-
gets including the Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels, a railway terminus, restaurants and a
Jewish community center. The attack lasted 60 hours and claimed the lives of 165 ci-
vilians and security personnel, as well as nine of the terrorists. Among the dead were
28 foreign nationals from 10 countries.
The Mumbai attack was by no means the first seaborne terrorist assault, nor was it
the first to feature indiscriminate shooting of civilians. However, it was arguably the
most sophisticated urban assault by terrorists to date. The attack was carefully
planned and extensive reconnaissance had been conducted at the target sites. The ter-
rorists were well trained, motivated and equipped for their assault, knowing their as-
signed targets well and easily outgunning the local police. Attacks were mounted on a
variety of soft targets, initially convincing the Indian authorities and media that a
much larger assault force was involved. The situation was also greatly complicated
and prolonged by the fact that the terrorists took control of two exceptionally large
hotels, each with hundreds of rooms, and further proceeded to take hostages.
The iconic Taj Mahal, in particular, provided a spectacular propaganda oppor-
tunity and once the terrorists set it on fire the images of the blazing hotel were broad-
cast around the world. Using mobile phones, the terrorists’ handlers back in Pakistan
were able to exercise remote command and control. By monitoring live international
media coverage of events, they could pass information and direction to the terrorists
on the ground, including the position of security forces and the location of potential
hostages. Later, when the attackers came under pressure and began to tire, their han-
dlers kept them motivated, encouraging them to kill the remaining hostages and fight
to the death.
The Mumbai attack was a ‘wake up call’ to security services around the world as it
demonstrated just how vulnerable modern cities can be to ruthless and determined
attackers armed just with assault rifles, grenades and improvised explosives. The
Mumbai police were taken by surprise, inadequately armed and unable to mount a
coordinated response for several hours. The local anti-terrorist squad at least had ad-
equate armament, but had not trained for such a scenario. The National Security
Guard (NSG), India’s elite CT unit, eventually neutralized the attackers but did not ar-
rive until nearly 10 hours after the attacks began. India’s lack of preparedness pro-
vides a stark warning to other countries facing similar potential threats.
tack in Paris are examples of relatively unsophisticated, low cost, difficult to de-
tect assaults which generated tremendous publicity.25
Group assaults on infrastructure such as the January 2013 attack on the In
Aminas gas plant in Algeria can also be an effective tactic for terrorists. While
24 See, for example, Adam Dolnik, “Fighting to the Death: Mumbai and the Future Fi-
dayeen Threat,” RUSI Journal 155, no. 2 (2010): 60–68.
25 Note that this is despite the fact that both Mehdi Nemmouche (the alleged shooter in
Brussels) and the Kouachi brothers (who attacked Charlie Hebdo) had all trained
with terrorists overseas.
assaults like this need to be well planned and coordinated, the majority of the
operational team would not need to possess sophisticated skills beyond how to
handle an automatic weapon. The large work force and employee turnover in
such facilities also provide opportunities for infiltration and acquisition of in-
telligence on vulnerabilities in security systems and potential hostages. Once
an attack is underway, the size of these facilities makes them difficult to defend
and secure. The resultant chaos is likely to gain significant media coverage.
Attacks on tourist infrastructure, especially in countries which are depend-
ent on revenues generated by international visitors, can have an especially
acute debilitating impact on both the short- and long-term economic health of a
country. This was certainly the case following the attacks at Luxor in Egypt in
1997. Western travel warnings concerning Kenya in 2014 also had a cata-
strophic effect on an economy heavily reliant on the tourism industry, which in
turn appears to have undermined efforts to address marginalization and job-
lessness and complicated measures to counter violent extremism. 26 The March
2015 attack on tourists visiting the Bardo National Museum in Tunis caused
major cruise lines to indefinitely cancel visits to Tunisia, resulting in the loss of
badly needed income for the struggling economy. The resultant increase in
visible and intrusive security measures meant to reassure tourists can also
magnify the impact of the initial attack, months or years after it takes place.
Assassination
Terrorists have used assassinations throughout history. The Sicarii killed fel-
low Jews who supported the Roman occupation in the first century AD. The as-
sassination of Archduke Ferdinand by a Serbian terrorist in Sarajevo on June
28, 1914 was the trigger that led to the First World War. Assassination is often
used against symbolic targets or the leadership of a state. The PIRA assassina-
tion of Lord Mountbatten in 1979 and the subsequent attempt on the life of
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Brighton in 1984 are illustrative exam-
ples, as is the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1989 and
former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. The targeted killing of
senior leaders such as these not only attracts intense interest from interna-
tional media, but also demonstrates the power and ability of the group to strike
successfully even against the most senior and well-protected members of a
government.
Hostage-Taking
Hostage-taking represents yet another opportunity to gain media attention and
influence public opinion. The seizure of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists
at the 1972 Olympic Games was not just a defining moment in modern terror-
ism. It also brought the political agenda of the PLO to the forefront of the
world’s attention. Hostage dramas can play out over days, weeks or even
months, adding to their political impact. Such incidents present a significant
26 Jeffrey Gentleman, “A Catch-22 in Kenya: Western Terrorism Alerts May Fuel Terror-
ism,” New York Times, February 24, 2015, A1.
44 James Howcroft
dilemma. Governments can be accused of appeasement if they choose to nego-

tiate, and yet the alternative—armed intervention—is exceptionally difficult to
conduct successfully and often ends in tragedy. A notable example is the Beslan
school siege of 2004 which ended in the death of more than 380 hostages
(most of them children) after Russian forces stormed the building. However,
barricade hostage taking can also be a high-risk tactic for terrorists. In 1997,
the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) seized the Japanese am-
bassador’s residence in Lima, Peru and held dozens of high-ranking hostages
for four months. This attracted global media attention for what was previously
a little-known group. But it also led to the complete destruction of the MRTA
when commandos stormed the embassy and killed all of the hostage takers.27
The potential impact of hostage scenarios has become even greater in recent
years, thanks to advances in video and online technology. The beheading of
American, British and Japanese hostages by IS and the associated threats
against their respective governments captivated a global audience and created
immense political pressure to act. The revulsion that a single beheading can
generate is far greater than most other terrorist tactics, and yet it simultane-
ously inspires additional support.28 Nevertheless, excessive violence can also
backfire. When IS burned alive a caged Jordanian pilot they attracted signifi-
cant criticism, even from other jihadists, and subsequently struggled to offer
ideological justification for such a depraved act.
Of course, hostages are also an important source of revenue. The leader of
AQAP, Nasser al-Wuhayshi, declared that “kidnapping hostages is an easy spoil,
which I may describe as a profitable trade and a precious treasure.” 29 A 2014
New York Times investigation reported that AQ and its affiliates had taken in at
least $125 million in revenue from kidnappings since 2008, $66 million of
which was paid in 2013 alone.30 Contrary to guidance issued by the UN, many
governments continue to pay ransoms to terrorists, despite the fact that this
only encourages the continued capture of their citizens. A senior US official re-
portedly told the family of James Foley (who was beheaded by IS in August
2014), that they would be prosecuted if they paid a ransom.31 Along similar
lines, the Counter Terrorism and Security Bill, which was introduced in British
Parliament in November 2014, banned insurance companies from reimbursing
27 Christopher C. Harmon, “Illustrations of Discrete Uses of Force,” in Toward a Grand

Strategy Against Terrorism, ed. Christopher C. Harmon, Andrew Nichols Pratt, and
Sebastian L. V. Gorka (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010), 114-115.
28 M.J. Gohel and Sajjan M. Gohel, “The Legacy and Agenda of Hostage Taking,” Asia
Pacific Foundation, International Policy Assessment Group, January 28, 2015.
29 Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” New York
Times, July 30, 2014, A1.
30 Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror.”
31 Adam Dolnik, “Four Myths About Ransoms,” Foreign Affairs, January 13, 2015,
accessed February 3, 2015, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142773/adam-
dolnik/four-myths-about-ransoms.
payments made to terrorists.32 In contrast to these policies, many nations have

paid for hostages directly, or else have allowed the victims’ families or employ-
ers to pay the ransom instead. In other cases, states have been willing to re-
lease terrorists from prison in exchange for hostages. In 2011, Israel exchanged
a thousand Palestinian prisoners for a single soldier, Gilad Shalit, who had been
kidnapped by Hamas five years earlier.33
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 34
Terrorist use of so-called ‘WMDs,’ whether chemical, biological, radiological or
nuclear (CBRN), would certainly have a significant psychological impact, even if
the attack itself was not especially destructive. In reality, however, very few
terrorist organizations have been able to effectively weaponize CBRN materi-
als. The most successful effort to date was the attack on the Tokyo subway in
1995 by the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo. Yet it is important to realize that it
required highly specialized expertise, took years of effort, cost tens of millions
of dollars and resulted in only a dozen deaths. In comparison, the London
bombings of 2005, which used ‘conventional’ IEDs, killed 52 people at a frac-
tion of the cost.
Nevertheless, terrorists are nothing if not persistent. It is therefore vital to
closely guard CBRN technology, to remain vigilant for signs that a group might
be trying to obtain and use these weapons, and to continue to invest in conse-
quence management capabilities should such an attack take place.
Conclusion
Groups such as the Taliban and AQ have proved remarkably resilient in the face
of sustained efforts by the world’s most powerful countries to eliminate them.
It is not clear whether their survival is down to effective strategy or, as is often
the case in warfare, the mistakes and inadequacies of their opponents. Cer-
tainly, contemporary terrorist organizations have proved more adept than
governments at exploiting the opportunities presented by globalization and
technology to publicize their cause, broadcast their narratives and influence
potential supporters and recruits. Armed propaganda, which remains the es-
sence of terrorist strategy, has never been easier.
Bombings and shootings remain the tactics of choice as they have been for
over a century, although the lethality of individual terrorists has increased ex-
ponentially over time. The ruthlessness of today’s religiously motivated ter-
rorists all but guarantees the continuation of spectacular, mass casualty at-
32 Matthew Holehouse, “Counter-Terrorism Bill: What It Contains,” Telegraph,

November 26, 2014, accessed February 3, 2015, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/islamic-state/11254950/Counter-terrorism-Bill-What-it-contains.html.
33 Laura Smith-Spark and Deborah Feyerich, “How ISIS New Hostage Strategy is Shifting
the Goalposts,” CNN, January 30, 2015, accessed February 4, 2015,
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/30/middleeast/isis-hostage-strategy/.
34 This subject is addressed at length in Chapter 7.
46 James Howcroft
tacks. Another 9/11 would be hard to achieve, but another ‘Mumbai’ is entirely
feasible. Major recent incidents suggest a trend towards attacks on critical in-
frastructure combined with barricade hostage incidents involving citizens of
Western states. These incidents attract media attention, humiliate govern-
ments and exploit the inherent opportunities and vulnerabilities of modern ur-
ban landscapes. The sheer viciousness of contemporary groups like IS and
Boko Haram is also an important part of their recruitment strategy. Yet at the
same time, this limits the number of their supporters to a tiny minority of co-
religionists. Excessive violence and a fixation on tactical successes at the ex-
pense of strategy are ultimately self-defeating.
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48 James Howcroft
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view/334/html.
Chapter 4
Terrorist Innovation
Adam Dolnik
Introduction 1
Innovation is defined here as “the introduction of a new method or technology,
or the improvement of an already existing capability.” Generally speaking, ter-
rorist innovation falls into the realm of emulation and adaptation, since the
technologies used by terrorists are never completely new. Terrorists have ef-
fectively engaged in ‘evolutionary innovation’ (i.e. incremental) as opposed to
‘revolutionary’ (i.e. radical) innovation.2
This chapter begins with some observations about the general trends in tac-
tical and technological innovation in terrorist campaigns, followed by a discus-
sion of the reasons why different terrorist organizations display varying levels
of innovation. In particular, four key scenarios which may act as triggers for
terrorist innovation are identified, and these are then considered using the
‘Islamic State’ (IS) as a case study.
Historical Trends in Terrorist Innovation

An exhaustive survey of all recorded terrorist incidents over the last 60 years
reveals, contrary to popular perception, that the range of terrorist tactics and
technologies is relatively limited and remarkably unchanging. In fact, very few
incidents are creative in any way. This seems to confirm Hoffman’s observation
that terrorists are conservative by nature.3 The main advances that we have
seen in both tactics and technologies have been incremental, in that terrorists
have arguably improved in using traditional tactics and have made better use
of already existing dual-use technologies. Technological innovation in terrorist
campaigns has thus been a direct result of “technology push” – the situation in
which advances in civilian technologies drive military innovations, as opposed
1 This chapter has been adapted from Adam Dolnik, “The Dynamics of Terrorist
Innovation,” in Understanding Terrorism Innovation and Learning: Al-Qaeda and
Beyond, ed. Magnus Ranstorp and Magnus Normark (Oxon and New York: Routledge,
2015), 76–95. Content reprinted with permission.
2 Barry Buzan, Strategic Studies: Military Technology & International Relations (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 18; Williamson Murray, “Innovation: Past and Future,”
in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, ed. Williamson R. Murray and Allan R.
Millet (London: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 306.
3 Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities,” Terrorism
and Political Violence 5, no. 2 (1993): 13.
49 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch04
50 Adam Dolnik
to the “demand pull,” where military innovations drive advancement in civilian

technologies.4
Examples of incremental innovation include the increasing range of home-
made artillery, miniaturization and improvements in detonation of explosive
devices, and the greater incorporation of commercially available technologies
such as Internet applications, smart phones, computers and GPS into terrorist
operations at the planning and execution phases. Another important tactical
trend has involved the synchronization of attacks and the incorporation of
various tactics into a single operation. This is especially evident in the rela-
tively recent proliferation of ‘Mumbai style’ suicidal assaults, which have be-
come the model for many of today’s most spectacular attacks.5 Perhaps more
surprising is the increasing emphasis in modern terrorism on technologically
crude modes of attack, as well as an apparent understanding among the ter-
rorists of the hurdles involved in successful weaponization of chemical, bio-
logical, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents. Contrary to popular percep-
tion, the current wave of global terrorism is not moving in the direction of high
technology, confirming Hoffman’s earlier prediction that “terrorists continue to
rely—as they have for more than a century—on the gun and the bomb: rarely
do they deviate from an established modus operandi.”6
This has several important implications. Firstly, the assumption that ter-
rorists always seek new technologies in order to boost the ever-increasing le-
thality of their attacks is simply not supported by empirical evidence. Never-
theless, there have been several highly innovative groups, such as Aum Shin-
rikyo, al-Qaeda (AQ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General
Command (PFLP-GC), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Rather
than talk about ‘terrorist innovation’ in general, it is more fruitful to focus on
the specific factors and conditions that distinguish the rare but influential in-
novative terrorist organizations from the more common but operationally con-
servative groups. This in turn may enable us to predict innovation before it oc-
curs.
Exploring Variance between Innovative Tendencies of

Individual Groups
The following eleven variables (summarized in Table 4.1) were originally
tested on four different case studies – Aum Shinrikyo, the PFLP-GC, Riyadus
Shaliheen Suicide Battalion (RAS), and November 17th (17N).7 This section pro-
4 Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military
(London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 52.
5 Adam Dolnik, “Fighting to the Death,” RUSI Journal 155, no.2 (2010): 60-68.
6 Hoffman, Terrorist Targeting, 14.
7 Adam Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global
Trends (London: Routledge, 2007). The credit for generating the initial list of
variables that were further refined and operationalized in the book goes to Brian
Jackson, “Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed
Terrorist Innovation 51
Table 4.1. Potential triggers of terrorist innovation.
Variable Key considerations

Ideology and strategy* ends
ways
means
urgency
clarity
Dynamics of the struggle urban/ rural
restrictive/ unrestrictive
territorial control
frequency of combat
Countermeasures target hardening
action and reaction
Targeting logic discriminate/ indiscriminate
rigid/ flexible
Expressive attachment to particular continuous obsession with certain
weapons/tactics** weaponry, technology or the
process of innovation itself
Group dynamics* leadership
organizational structure
group size
unity
discord
Relationship with other organizations* rivalries
cooperation
Resources* financial
material
sponsorship
quality of membership
Openness to new ideas decision-making
contact with technology
tolerance for risk
Durability age of the group
Nature of technology* difficulty of acquisition and use
** Most important variable
* Key variable
by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption,” Studies in Conflict and

Terrorism 24, no. 3 (2001): 183-213.
52 Adam Dolnik
vides a summary of these findings, in order to attempt to explain the circum-

stances and characteristics that determine the level of a group’s tactical and/or
technological innovation.
Role of Ideology and Strategy
It is an organization’s ideological foundation that frames the worldview of its
members and thus provides a sense of collective identity. Ideology is also in-
strumental in identifying the enemy, while also providing the necessary expla-
nation and justification for targeting. Moreover, ideology determines a group’s
core objectives and the strategy for how and by what means these objectives
are to be achieved. Finally, ideology is a critical component in determining the
perception of urgency for armed action in order to fulfill the group’s ambitions.
At the operational level, the group’s core strategy dictates the frequency and in-
tensity of its military operations. This is where ideology, strategy and innova-
tion meet, given that innovation may be partly driven by the desire to achieve a
certain level of intensity preferred by the group.
Undoubtedly, understanding the ideology and strategic objectives of a group
is a key component of threat assessment, as both of these elements provide us
with an insight into the logic behind a particular group’s decision-making. But
while these aspects of a group’s ideology can tell us a lot about where a terror-
ist group might be headed in terms of innovation, we must also be aware of cer-
tain limitations. In some cases ideology seems to be disassociated from strat-
egy, in that it merely seems to serve as a retrospective justification for violence,
rather than determining the group’s operations.8 Our analysis must therefore
go deeper than a simple compartmentalization of ideological types if we are to
accurately predict the potential of a given group for engaging in innovative op-
erational methods.
Furthermore, we must be careful to make a distinction between ideology
and practicality. The ‘cosmically-scientific’ ideology of Aum Shinrikyo may sig-
nal a clear predisposition to becoming technologically innovative. However, it
would be a mistake to assume that ideologically conservative groups are inca-
pable of innovation. For instance, both AQ and IS share a desire to return to the
time of the Prophet and reject modernity and globalization, yet this has not
constrained them from reaping the benefits that modern technology brings for
operational purposes. AQ’s practicality is further demonstrated in the instruc-
tions given to operatives to help them avoid detection in the West, such as
drinking alcohol, shaving their beards, watching television and avoiding usual
prayer times and places.9 This level of ideological pragmatism may at times be
necessary among innovative groups that embrace conservative ideologies, as
they will need to possess the will to act in conflict with their own belief system
in order to succeed operationally. Contrary to popular perception, however,
8 Stephen Sloan and Sean Anderson, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism, 2nd ed. (London:
The Scarecrow Press, 2002), 45.
9 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commis-
sion Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 232.
very few conservative groups have actually demonstrated such qualities,

providing one possible explanation as to why innovation has been rare.
Overall, organizations are more likely to demonstrate a higher level of tacti-
cal and/or technological innovation when a) their ideology identifies an ideal
outcome with regards to definite objectives, and b) it also prescribes a time
frame and a specific course of action for reaching those objectives. Conversely,
organizations with vaguely defined goals, a low sense of urgency, and a low
level of strategic planning are less likely to innovate. The principal reason for
this might be because organizations with a greater sense of urgency for attain-
ing their goals within their lifetime are generally more inclined to continually
escalate in order to achieve those goals, which can sometimes trigger a deci-
sion to pursue innovative means.
However, while many terrorist groups encounter a need to escalate at some
point throughout their lifespan, this step usually involves only the increased
frequency and intensity of attacks, as well as the broadening of targeting cate-
gories, as opposed to radical changes to the modus operandi. As a result, it ap-
pears that an increased perception of urgency can serve as a reliable indicator
of the potential to escalate, but not necessarily a reliable predictor of the deci-
sion to innovate. Whether escalation will coincide with innovation will appar-
ently be determined by other factors.
In the groups examined for this research, innovative tendencies generally
corresponded to shifts in ideology and strategy. Thus, it may not necessarily be
the ideology itself, but rather the frequency of shifts in the ideological and stra-
tegic outlook that determine the innovativeness of a group. Therefore ideologi-
cally flexible and strategically adaptive groups are likely to be more innovative
than groups whose ideology and strategy remain constant throughout their
lifespan.
To conclude, terrorist ideologies and strategies have some predictive value
with regards to understanding a group’s motivation to innovate, but by itself
this factor is not sufficient in explaining why some groups innovate while oth-
ers do not.
Dynamics of the Struggle
There are likely to be great differences between organizations that are located
in an area in which they can operate freely, and those which exist in urban en-
vironments and have to rely on safe houses and training grounds concealed
within built-up areas. While the former have the option to conduct research
and training without immediate fear of detection, the latter have to take tre-
mendous security precautions to ensure that they do not arouse suspicion. The
nature of the struggle also reflects on its frequency and intensity, having a
profound impact on both the decision to innovate and the likelihood of success.
Guerilla organizations in territorial control of a safe haven usually engage the
enemy on a larger scale and with greater intensity and therefore have a greater
need for sophisticated weaponry. Furthermore, when groups that are involved
in reciprocal clashes with the government decide to innovate, their greater
54 Adam Dolnik
overall combat exposure not only translates into more experience with han-
dling weaponry, but also provides ample opportunity to battle-test the new in-
novations in the field. Thus, greater frequency of attacks is likely to affect both
the desire as well as the capability of terrorists to innovate.
Overall, it seems that terrorist organizations are likely to be both more
willing and more capable of innovation when they display guerilla characteris-
tics such as frequent clashes with enemy forces and control of territory. By
comparison, urban terror groups that are confined to municipal settings are
less likely to innovate. However, while some aspects of the “dynamics of the
struggle” were apparently relevant, this variable alone fails to provide a viable
explanation why Aum Shinrikyo, PFLP-GC and RAS’s innovation practices were
so radically different from other groups that have operated in very similar
working conditions.
Looking at other examples, some innovative groups that operated in safe
havens like AQ, LTTE, or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
show a high level of relevance of this variable. On the other hand, why did ur-
ban groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) or Red Army
Faction (RAF) engage in technologically more innovative practices than groups
with guerilla characteristics such as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) or the
Sendero Luminoso (SL)? The answer apparently lies elsewhere, and therefore
it seems that while favorable “dynamics of the struggle” can provide a group
with the working conditions that can generally increase the chances for suc-
cessful innovation, the decision to engage in innovative practices in the first
place is driven by other considerations.
Countermeasures
Target hardening efforts that render the tactics previously used by terrorists
ineffective may provide the critical push for a group’s decision to innovate. This
dynamic was evident in three of the four examined case studies and there are
many more historical examples. It is not universally true that organizations
whose methods are countered display higher levels of innovation than other
groups. Still, most groups that have demonstrated innovative tendencies in the
past have done so partly because of countermeasures. Indeed, the majority of
groups have responded to the introduction of security obstructions by switch-
ing to ‘softer’ objectives as opposed to choosing to innovate in order to defeat
hardened targets.
What sets the innovative groups aside is a specific desire to overcome the
enemy countermeasures as a symbolic gesture. Alternatively, new devices have
sometimes been the product of a lack of access to modern weapons, as opposed
to a forward-looking innovation. This suggests that, although unconventional
weapons are typically associated with escalation, in reality they can also be
employed out of desperation or a simple lack of conventional options. Such
causes of technological innovation, however, are unlikely to progress to a mass
destruction capability.
While in many cases terrorist innovation has indeed been the product of an
“arms race” between the terrorists and their enemies, terrorist groups are not
necessarily limited to reactive strategies, and there are clearly other drivers of
innovation.
Targeting Logic
It is believed that groups which embrace a very narrow and discriminate
choice of targets will depend on a modus operandi that will allow such target-
ing. Alternatively, organizations which are indiscriminate in their targeting are
more likely to innovate in order to obtain sufficiently destructive means of at-
tack. In addition, organizations that take a highly rigid approach to targeting
throughout the period of their existence are thought to be less likely to demon-
strate technologically innovative tendencies than organizations whose target-
ing logic is flexible in terms of frequency and types of target. Both of these
tendencies were confirmed by this research. Organizations that were more in-
discriminate, more lethal and more flexible in their choice of targets were also
more likely to innovate.
However, it is also important to note that indiscriminate and highly lethal
targeting is not always achieved through innovative means. For instance, some
of the historically most lethal terrorist groups such as GIA or the Lord’s Re-
sistance Army (LRA) are among the least operationally innovative. Meanwhile,
comparatively discriminate groups such as the PIRA have engaged in much
greater levels of innovation. In fact, highly discriminate operations are likely to
require more skill, as in the example of targeted assassinations of well pro-
tected persons.10 For instance, the RAF’s six assassinations of heavily guarded
Germans all involved sophisticated weaponry, including state of the art remote
controlled bombs triggered by a light beam and high-powered rifles.11 Simi-
larly, the assassination of Louis Blanco by ETA involved more than 12 months
of surveillance, the digging of a 20 foot tunnel from a basement under the road,
and the placing of three large devices timed to detonate at intervals of one-
tenth of a second to match the speed of the Admiral’s car.12 Both of these
groups were certainly more sophisticated in their approach than the GIA dur-
ing its village massacres in the 1990s. As a result, it seems that even highly dis-
criminate and very rigid organizations can sometimes be driven to innovate in
order to conduct ‘surgical strikes’ against their desired targets, even after these
have been hardened. This makes it clear that lethality cannot automatically be
equated with innovation, just as innovation is frequently not associated with
indiscriminate targeting.
To sum up, organizations that embrace a highly lethal and indiscriminate
targeting logic are more likely to pursue radical innovation, such as CBRN at-
10 J. Bowyer Bell, The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle (London: Frank Cass, 1990), 88.
12 Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists, Their Weapons, Leaders and
Tactics (New York: Facts on File, 1982), 134.
56 Adam Dolnik
tacks. However, differences in targeting do not necessarily explain incremental

or tactical innovation.
Attachment to Weaponry
An organization’s preferences in terms of modus operandi and weapon selec-
tion can sometimes be driven more by non-rational factors rather than purely
strategic or cost-benefit considerations. In fact, this non-rational attachment to
a particular tactic or weapon has been found to be one of the key determinants
of modus operandi.13 Examples of this are abundant. For instance, the first ter-
ror groups to use dynamite—the Russian Narodnaya Volya, the transnational
Anarchists and the Irish Fenians—reportedly worshiped this explosive as the
ultimate revolutionary weapon of the people, believing that it would topple the
old world order and bring about the new secular millennium through its scien-
tific, humane, and even mystical powers.14
Perhaps the most glaring example in this regard is the expressive nature of
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, in which Timothy McVeigh meticulously
followed the scenario described in the Turner Diaries, a novel that has become
the “bible” of right wing militias in the US. 15 Not only did the target, tactic, and
the explosive mixture correspond precisely to the scenario described in the
book – even the size of the explosive device was imitated. Given the obsession
of the American militia movement with the Turner Diaries, tactical improvisa-
tion with dual use items is a much more likely scenario for these groups than a
quest for highly novel technologies. In the same way, seminal AQ texts such as
the “Declaration of Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders” and Ayman al Zawa-
hiri’s “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner” perpetuate the groups’ operational
fixation with suicide bombings. Indeed, since 1998, every single attack
launched directly by AQ has involved suicide delivery.
Another contemporary aspect of terrorist tactics that deserves close atten-
tion is the beheading practice used by Islamist groups in Bosnia, Algeria, Tajiki-
stan, Abkhazia, Chechnya, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Here we can
trace the origin of this tactic to the literal interpretation of the line in the
Quran: “When you encounter those [infidels] who deny [that Islam is the truth]
then strike [their] necks.”16 While this quote is certainly taken out of context
when used to justify terrorist beheadings, for groups like Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in
Iraq, it represents a strict observance of the Quran in the purest sense. Inter-
estingly, the slitting of throats has also been practiced by non-Islamist groups,
such as SL, for punishment purposes. Here again the expressive element was
present, this time however rooting from Andean mysticism, where a person
13 Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends.

14 David Ronfeld and William Sater, “The Mindset of High-Technology Terrorists: Future
Implications from the Historical Analog,” in Political Terrorism and Energy, ed. Yonah
Alexander and Charles K. Ebinger (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 22.
15 Written by the leader of the National Alliance, William Pierce.
16 Qur’an sura 47, verse 4. Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah (London:
Ta-Ha Publishers, 1996), 192.
who is killed in this way cannot be saved spiritually because their soul is
unable to escape through their mouth.17 As we can see from these examples,
the attachment to a particular tactic or weapon is one of the key determinants
of the terrorist modus operandi.
Of all of the variables examined in this research the attachment to a partic-
ular weaponry or tactic seems to have the strongest predictive value with re-
gards to providing an indicator of a group’s attraction to using innovative
means. While conservative groups often embrace a similar attachment, they ei-
ther do not require significant deviations from their present capability, or the
emphasis is on values other than innovation. Of course, other factors such as
‘ideology and strategy’ or ‘countermeasures’ can also have a profound impact
on the way in which a group operates, but whether or not this process is ac-
companied by innovation will be determined directly by its attachment to par-
ticular weaponry.
Group Dynamics
The background, value system, and authority of terrorist leaders may be key
determinants of the motivation of these individuals to instigate radical innova-
tion, as well as their ability to successfully impose such decisions on the rest of
the group. Group structure is also extremely important. This shapes the deci-
sion-making dynamics, determining whether major operational decisions are
based purely on top-down leadership, or whether there is also room for egali-
tarian input. Finally, ideological, operational, or power disputes within a group
can also sometimes trigger escalation or innovation as a way of overcoming
differences.
What seems to be the most important implication here is that radical inno-
vation is likely to be driven by a group’s leadership, whose decisions are likely
to be influenced by the presence of other critical variables, namely the attach-
ment to a particular weapon, tactic, or the process of innovation itself. In con-
trast, incremental innovation and the operational evolution of groups over time
has most frequently been a bottom-up process.
Relationship with other Organizations
Throughout history, various organizations have modified their operational
preferences as a result of both cooperation and competition with other terror-
ist groups. Cooperation has allowed groups to gain access to others’ opera-
tional and technological know-how, while competition can drive a group’s deci-
sion to innovate in order to achieve prominence over competitors. Interest-
ingly, these dynamics are not necessarily driven by ideology. In fact, organiza-
tions with similar ideologies are more likely to engage in competition, rather
than cooperation. The reason for this is simple: the closer the ideologies and
aims of groups within the same operational theater, the more they will be com-
peting for the same pool of potential supporters. As a result, there is a greater
17 Tom Marks, “Making Revolution with Shining Path,” in Shining Path of Peru, ed. David
Scott Palmer (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994), 214.
58 Adam Dolnik
need for these groups to differentiate themselves from one another in order to
gain a monopoly on the goal that they all claim to strive for. Competition is es-
pecially likely in contexts where terrorism is generally seen as an initial step
towards taking over governance and therefore control over the population.
Resources
Larger organizations with hefty budgets, outside sponsors, and highly qualified
membership are more likely to demonstrate both motivation and capability for
innovation. Notably, however, state sponsorship (or lack thereof) does not ap-
pear to be a predictor of innovation. Contemporary terrorist organizations
have learned to adapt to the reality of self-financing, in some cases so well that
their budgets even exceed those of many state sponsored entities. Fur-
thermore, group size by itself does not necessarily increase the likelihood of
innovation – rather, it is the qualitative attributes of the cadres. Indeed, the
availability of quality human resources is absolutely key to a group’s motiva-
tion and ability to innovate. Importantly, a group’s decision to innovate can
thus take place quite suddenly if, for instance, it finds itself in the possession of
a key human resource with the idea or the skill to introduce a new method.
Luck and coincidence can therefore play a considerable role in determining
terrorists’ modus operandi. Whether a group will be able to take advantage of
such a surprise acquisition will to a great extent depend on the following varia-
ble – openness to new ideas.
Openness to New Ideas
In highly autocratic organizations, where members are closely watched and
controlled and where dissent is not tolerated, the likelihood of innovative pro-
posals coming from individual group members seems lower than in the case of
groups with a more democratic approach to decision-making. It would appear
that, in order to facilitate innovation, a group’s leadership would have to be
open to suggestions from below. However, open communication links have not
proven to be a critical variable for providing the push for a decision to inno-
vate.
A second element here is the technological awareness of a group. Intuitively,
organizations whose members are in everyday contact with modern technolo-
gies such as cell phones, computers or laboratory equipment would seem more
likely to incorporate these into their operations than groups whose members
are secluded from the rest of the world. However, this has not universally been
true in the case studies examined.
A third potentially important component of ‘openness to new ideas’ is a
positive attitude toward risk taking (regarding both the risk of failure and
physical risks associated with conducting experiments with unfamiliar wea-
ponry). Virtually any terrorist is willing to die for his or her cause. However,
while some organizations have shown a great keenness to sacrifice the lives of
some of their members during suicide operations, others have gone out of their
way to avoid physical dangers, even sacrificing the effectiveness of their opera-
tions in order to see their operatives fight another day. It was thus thought that
innovative groups would be likely to demonstrate higher tolerance for opera-
tional failure and a greater willingness to sacrifice their members. However,
this was not always found to be the case. Further, it should be emphasized that
a group’s attitude toward danger constantly fluctuates. Based on the principle
of ‘risky shift’ associated with the psychological processes of group decision-
making, known as ‘groupthink,’ terrorist groups can be expected to take greater
risks over time.18
Ultimately, democratic decision-making, contact with modern technology
and a high tolerance for risk are of limited utility for threat assessment pur-
poses. On the one hand, a high tolerance towards the risks of failure and physi-
cal risks can be highly important as a precondition to radical technological in-
novation such as the adoption of CBRN weapons. On the other hand, low toler-
ance towards physical risks can drive groups to innovate incrementally, pre-
cisely in order to improve the safety of their members during operations. Fur-
thermore, social or physical isolation does not necessarily mean that a group is
informationally secluded, and when an organization’s leadership is in favor of
innovation, open communication and democratic decision-making are not re-
quired for innovation to occur.
Durability
Logically, it would seem that organizations that exist longer have more time to
progress in terms of their motivation and capability to innovate. Yet all four of
the organizations studied for this research (Aum Shinrikyo, the PFLP-GC, RAS
and 17N) reached their peak of capability relatively quickly from the outset of
their campaigns. Certainly, many organizations have improved over time as
they have gathered experience and learned from past mistakes. For example,
the RAF’s study of past court cases led to innovations including a special oint-
ment designed to prevent fingerprints.19 Nevertheless, we cannot assert that
the length of time a terrorist group has been in existence will correlate with its
demonstrated level of radical innovation. Indeed, the emergence of an innova-
tive group can be rather sudden, meaning that a mass-casualty attack could po-
tentially come out of nowhere, rather than necessarily being preceded by a
string of lower-level attacks using conventional weapons.
Nature of the Technology
Once the decision to innovate has been made, additional factors that will de-
termine the success of the innovation process will also come into play. These
variables include some of the above stated factors such as the level of outside
support, availability of financial and material resources, expertise, time, quality
of membership, intensity of the struggle, and the security environment in
which the group operates. The one obvious variable that is likely to have the
18 Richard Nel Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1981), 101-119.
60 Adam Dolnik
strongest impact on the level of innovational success, however, is the nature of

the technology or tactic in question. Quite simply, the more complicated the
new modus operandi, the less likely it is to be successfully adopted.
The nature of the technology has proven to be significant when it comes to
the success of terrorist innovation. In this regard, the fact that most terrorist
organizations have suffered significant setbacks and failures with even rela-
tively primitive technologies may be one of the main reasons why radical inno-
vation in terrorist campaigns has been a rare phenomenon. In terms of threat
assessment, two of the most useful indicators of whether we can expect an or-
ganization to succeed in its innovative endeavors are 1) the nature of the tech-
nology being pursued, and 2) the accuracy of the group’s own assessments
about the challenges of mastering this technology.
Four Key Scenarios that Drive Innovation

As we have seen, terrorist innovation is a highly complex process, and only a
few of the variables examined have demonstrated potential applicability for
distinguishing an innovative group from a conservative one. However, the
presence of a certain combination of these variables allows us to make some
predictive judgments about future radical innovators.20 Innovation essentially
depends upon a terrorist organization’s decision to innovate, combined with
the capability to do so successfully. With respect to the motivational com-
ponent, there are four distinct triggers to innovation.
1. Inherent Innovative Tendencies
A critical factor is the presence of an inherent ideological pre-disposition to
using modern technologies, or the need to innovate in order to achieve the de-
sired level of destruction. These innovative tendencies can be expected to occur
right from the outset of the organization’s existence, especially if a) the given
group is founded on an apocalyptic ideology or b) it is a splinter group of an-
other organization that was deemed not radical or innovative enough. Innova-
tion towards more destructive means may also coincide with escalatory shifts
in strategy, ideology, and targeting logic. As such, changing patterns in the
statements and actions of a group can provide early warning signals that the
group might be moving toward the direction of radical innovation.
In the case of apocalyptic organizations (which aim to destroy the world in
order to ‘save’ it), key indicators may include an escalatory pattern of violence,
the broadening of target categories, radicalization of statements, a decreasing
concern for constituency or international opinion, increased influence of an al-
20 Another aspect that must be pointed out is that some factors such as “targeting logic”
or “openness to new ideas” have proven to be a double-edged sword, having the
capacity to contribute to both directions of the innovation scale. But since we are
particularly concerned with the prospect of radical innovation possibly leading to
mass destruction, such variables will mainly be considered in terms of their potential
to lead to escalation.
lied group or state sponsor, a demonstrated high level of tolerance towards

risks and, most importantly, an expressive fascination with a particular
weapon or technology or the process of innovation itself. Alternatively, a
group’s decision to innovate can sometimes be sudden, for example, if trig-
gered by the perception of a grave threat to the group, leading to the belief that
there is no choice but a large scale decisive strike as a last desperate attempt to
survive. However, the likelihood of success in such a scenario is relatively low,
given the fact that organizations under such pressure are unlikely to have
enough patience and calmness to radically alter their operational methods with
a positive outcome.
2. Competition with other Groups
The second situation in which we can expect a group to innovate is associated
with the emergence of competition with other organizations operating in the
same operational theater. Whether innovation will become a product of this ri-
valry will depend on a number of factors, among them the density of the opera-
tional theater, ideological similarity and clashes between group leaders. Most
importantly, the occurrence of innovation will again depend on the presence of
an expressive attachment to a particular modus operandi or an emphasis on
spectacular operations as a source of pride and prestige. Condescending reac-
tions to the operations of rival groups, a lack of ideological distinctiveness, a
demonstrated high level of tolerance towards operational failure, as well as a
strong emphasis on its own operational superiority will provide good early
warning signs of a group’s propensity to innovate.
3. Countermeasures
The third situation in which a group can be expected to alter its operational
methods in a novel direction comes in the presence of countermeasures, such
as target hardening efforts which effectively blunt existing tactics. While most
groups can be expected to switch to alternative targets, an innovative organiza-
tion will strive to circumvent these countermeasures using alternative means
that the enemy has failed to consider. Indicators of such characteristics are
statements praising operational success in the face of difficult conditions, an
emphasis on overcoming the far greater resources of the enemy, repeated at-
tempts to attack the same target even after having previously failed, a demon-
strated high level of tolerance towards operational failure, and an expressive
emphasis on military skills or the process of innovation itself. In most cases
however, innovations aimed at overcoming specific countermeasures are likely
to be incremental, rather than radical.
4. Chance Acquisition of Key Human/Material Resources
The last possible trigger to terrorist innovation is an incidental or unintended
acquisition of a particular human or material resource. This scenario has cer-
tainly been seen in the past in the case of AQ, whose innovations were primar-
ily driven by entrepreneurial individuals like Ramzi Yousef, Khalid Sheikh Mo-
62 Adam Dolnik
hammed 21 and Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri.22 It is these terrorist entrepreneurs

and middle managers—driven by a burning desire to be good at what they
do—that continue to play the most important role in driving AQ’s innovation.23
Having outlined the four main scenarios that may act as triggers for innova-
tion, these are now considered in the case of IS (see Case Study 4.1).
Case Study 4.1. IS and the Prospects for Innovation.

Inherent Innovative Tendencies
Two key characteristics of IS increase the chances of radical innovation: 1) its in-
creasingly obsessive apocalyptic ideology which foretells an epic final battle between
the forces of good and evil in the town of Dabiq in northern Syria,24 and 2) the fact
that it is a splinter organization, deemed to be far more extreme even than AQ. In ad-
dition, IS employs an exceptionally broad targeting logic and extremely brutal tactics,
is unafraid of taking risks (as witnessed, for example, in the battle for Kobane), has no
obvious concern for local or international opinion, and clearly perceives itself to be
under attack. However, the one element that appears to be lacking here is also the
most important – an expressive fascination with a particular weapon/technology, or
the process of innovation itself. Granted, IS has proven to be highly innovative in its
use of online technology, but this has so far centered around propaganda, communi-
cations and recruitment rather than operational uses. In addition (and in contrast to
AQ) it has not historically invested in spectacular operations outside of its own re-
gion. If the group has fixated on anything, it has been beheadings and executions and
this has been its primary area of innovation in terms of offensive action, most notably
the burning of a Jordanian pilot in February 2015. Nevertheless, since the start of the
bombing campaign against it, the group has clearly signaled its intent to strike against
the West, which would have the added benefit of potentially provoking the US and its
allies into a military confrontation on the ground, thus ushering in the prophesized
“End of Times.”
Competition
IS’s bitter rivalry with AQ and its intense hostility towards other groups operating
within its theater of operations, along with freedom of movement and increasing ex-
perience with a range of military hardware, unambiguously raises the risk of tactical
innovation. Moreover, this may become more acute a) if and when they begin to
weaken militarily (thereby becoming less distinct from rivals) or b) if AQ commits
another spectacular operation that appears to overshadow them. Yet again, the caveat
21 National Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, 145-149

22 Sudarsan Raghavan and Peter Finn, “Al-Qaeda bombmaker Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri
has tried to attack the U.S. three times, officials say,”Washington Post, May 8, 2012,
accessed August 5, 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/al-qaeda-
bomb-maker-ibrahim-hassan-al-asiri-has-tried-to-attack-the-us-three-times-
officials-say/2012/05/08/gIQ A16pkBU_story.html.
23 For an excellent in depth discussion of this phenomenon see Assaf Moghadam, “How
Al Qaeda Innovates,” Security Studies 22, no. 3 (2013): 466-97.
24 Guy Taylor, “Apocalypse Prophecies Drive Islamic State Strategy, Recruiting Efforts,”
Washington Times, January 5, 2015, accessed January 5, 2015,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/5/apocalypse-prophecies-
drive-islamic-state-strategy.
here is that there is no obvious obsession with some form of innovative mass-scale at-
tack and (notwithstanding the attacks in Paris in November 2015) they have not so
far pursued spectacular operations to the same extent as AQ, preferring to focus on
insurgent operations and mass executions within their own territory. However,
another possibility is that as IS continues to draw pledges of allegiance from splinter
groups in a variety of locations around the world, these ‘satellite’ groups will engage
in innovative practices in order to out-do local rivals.
Countermeasures
Compared to AQ, which continues to obsessively target aviation, countermeasures are
of less relevance in driving IS towards innovation. Certainly, the group has had to ad-
just its tactics in response to airstrikes and increasing confrontations with ground
forces, but this has had mixed results 25 and has not moved it in the direction of esca-
lation of terrorist attacks within its own territory. However, the group clearly feels
threatened, issuing a steady stream of threats against the West in the lead up to the
aforementioned attacks in Paris. If indeed IS directed these attacks, this represents a
shift in targeting preference but not, by any means, radical innovation. Of course this
does not rule out gradual escalation of tactics, and there is an added element of un-
predictability given that the group has also encouraged its sympathizers to conduct
acts of freelance terrorism on its behalf, using any means available. While untrained
sympathizers have historically proven limited in terms of operational capabilities, the
widespread call to arms coupled with a lack of command and control allows for bot-
tom-up creativity, which is constrained only by the skills and opportunities available
to those who heed the call.
Acquisition of Human/Material Resources
Historically, acquisition of human resources has certainly played a role in IS’s innova-
tive use of the Internet. For example, a young Moroccan living in London named
Younis Tsouli was instrumental in facilitating the online distribution of beheading
videos during the group’s earlier incarnation as al-Qaeda in Iraq.26 Furthermore, IS
has attracted significant numbers of educated and skilled professionals, some with a
demonstrated interest in CBRN weaponry 27 and this may yet prove to be critical in
driving innovation towards spectacular, mass casualty attacks. Of equal concern,
however, is the possible ‘chance’ acquisition of chemical weapons or other CBRN ma-
terials in Syria or Iraq. The previous takeover by the group of the al-Muthanna chemi-
cal weapons compound did not bear fruit as the weapons had not been maintained,
and uranium stolen from Mosul University was not weapons-grade material. Never-
theless, it is quite possible that similar opportunities will open up in the future, thus
allowing for radical, mass-casualty innovation. There have already been documented
cases where IS added chlorine to improvised explosive devices, and although this has
had relatively little effect, it is indicative of a willingness to deploy unconventional
25 Alexandre Mello and Michael Knights, “The Cult of the Offensive: The Islamic State on
Defense,” CTC Sentinel 8, no. 4 (2015): 1–6.
26 Gordon Corera, “The World’s Most Wanted Cyber-Jihadist,” BBC News, January 16,
2008, accessed May 15, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7191248.stm.
27 Harald Doornbos and Jenan Moussa, “Found: The Islamic State’s Terror Laptop of
Doom,” Foreign Policy, August 28, 2014, accessed August 29, 2014,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/28/found-the-islamic-states-terror-laptop-of-
doom/.
64 Adam Dolnik
weapons, given the opportunity. Ultimately, when all four scenarios are considered
together, there is a significant risk that IS will move towards radical innovation in the
future. The one ‘saving grace’ at this time is the lack of an obvious obsession with in-
novation in and of itself.
Conclusion
Although the above-described situations are likely to be encountered by most
terrorist groups throughout their life span, only some can be expected to inno-
vate. This will depend on a combination of factors, most importantly on the
presence of an expressed fascination with a sophisticated weapon or technol-
ogy, or the process of innovation itself. This non-rational component (espe-
cially when combined with overly-high operational ambitions) serves as the
strongest and most universal pre-indicator of the propensity of a terrorist
group to innovate. Without the presence of this component, groups that are
forced to change their strategy, adapt to countermeasures, or prevail in compe-
tition with similar organizations can be expected to react by modifying their
modus operandi, broadening their target categories, or intensifying their at-
tacks, but not necessarily by engaging in radical innovation.
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Chapter 5
Terrorism and Crime
Sam Mullins, James K. Wither,
and Steven R. Monaco
Introduction
Most discussions of the so-called crime-terror nexus revolve around a very
simple observation: terrorists and insurgents frequently engage in criminal ac-
tivity as a source of revenue. There is no question that crime has been and con-
tinues to be a lucrative source of funding for all kinds of terrorists. However,
there is still ongoing disagreement about the extent of overlap between the
worlds of terrorism and organized crime (OC). Often there is a tendency to
over-generalize from specific cases, to speculate or, at times, to overlook the
available evidence. Confusion over the nature of the threat in turn acts as a bar-
rier to developing more effective countermeasures. Based on a combination of
the authors’ engagement with academic literature on the subject and opera-
tional experience, this chapter begins by examining the similarities and differ-
ences between terrorists and criminals including profiles, methods, systems of
organization, and motives. In other words, the who, what, how and why of ter-
rorism and OC. This is followed by a discussion of the crime-terror nexus and
the concept of “convergence,” i.e. the relationships between terrorism and
crime. The chapter then concludes with a brief discussion of implications for
counter-terrorism (CT) and law enforcement (LE).
Similarities and Differences

By systematically breaking down the similarities and differences between ter-
rorists and criminals we can gain a better appreciation of who they are, what
they do, how they operate and why they do what they do. We can then better
understand the parallels between these two worlds as well as the potential for
cooperation.
Profiles
It is often thought that factors which seem to protect against involvement in
crime (namely, being married, better educated and of higher occupational sta-
tus), fail to reduce the likelihood of involvement in terrorism.1 On the one hand,
higher socioeconomic status may reduce the motivation to engage in criminal
activity for financial gain, while being married can counter negative social in-
1 Andrew Silke, “Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radi-
calization,” European Journal of Criminology 5, no.1 (2008): 99–123.
67 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch05
68 Sam Mullins, James K. Wither, and Steven R. Monaco
fluence. By contrast, the ideological/political motives of terrorists appear to

override these factors. Nevertheless, this overlooks the tremendous diversity
among both terrorists and criminals. The bottom line is that while the single
biggest risk-factor for involvement in either terrorism or crime is being a
young male, there is no single demographic profile of either population and
there is a great deal of overlap between the two.
Methods
To appreciate the extent of overlap in terms of terrorist and criminal method-
ology, it is useful to begin by breaking down the different types of crime that
terrorists engage in, in order to achieve different objectives:
1. Inherent/ Violent
Acts of terrorism inherently involve a variety of different criminal offences re-
lating to the use of violence, often including (but not limited to) murder, as-
sault, threatening behavior, property damage, kidnap and weapons/explosives
offences. In fact, because the majority of terrorist behaviors are already pro-
scribed in law, some feel that specialized CT legislation is unnecessary. While
this is open to debate, there is no doubt that organized criminals commit all of
these same offences. However, criminal use of violence, generally speaking, is
more discriminate 2 and more deliberately covert, whereas terrorists strive for
publicity. In connection with this (as discussed below) the motivation or pur-
pose is also different.
2. Preparation/ Facilitation
Terrorists must frequently break the law in order to prepare or facilitate at-
tacks. Offences here can include arms trafficking, forgery, immigration viola-
tions, smuggling, and bribery. When it comes to these, and other ostensibly
non-violent crimes aimed at making attacks possible, terrorists are much more
similar to criminals in the sense that they want to remain ‘under the radar.’
3. Funding
As previously noted, much of the discussion of terrorism involvement in crime
tends to focus on crimes committed for financial gain. Although drug-traffick-
ing is the most lucrative and widely documented criminal endeavor that ter-
rorists are involved in, other profitable offences include kidnap-for-ransom
(KFR), smuggling, robbery, extortion, fraud, counterfeiting, theft, trading in il-
licit goods, illegal mining and money laundering. Indeed, since the apparent de-
cline of state sponsorship, terrorists have become increasingly self-reliant and
engage in just about every criminal act imaginable in order to fund their opera-
tions. The only real difference compared to organized criminals is how the
money is spent.
2 Louise I. Shelley and John T. Picarelli, “Methods Not Motives: Implications of the
Convergence of International Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Police Practice and
Research: An International Journal 3, no. 4 (2002): 305–18.
Terrorism and Crime 69
4. Specialized Terrorism Offences

Despite the fact that much of what terrorists do is already covered by ‘ordinary’
legislation, in a number of countries specialized crimes have been created in
order to deal with behaviors which are more or less unique to terrorism. These
include training for terrorist purposes, membership in a terrorist organization,
possession of terrorist-related documents or other materials, preparing or
conspiring to commit an act of terrorism, encouragement, incitement or glorifi-
cation of terrorism, fundraising for terrorism (which might otherwise involve
legal means), and providing material support to terrorist organizations. Some
of these offences have very close parallels in ordinary legislation – for example,
incitement of hatred or violence, and conspiracy. However, the ‘terrorist’ com-
ponent ties these offences to legal definitions of terrorism and specific, desig-
nated organizations. Together, specialized terrorism offences enable prosecu-
tion of a broader range of behaviors and often denote added severity (and
therefore harsher punishments) for actions which may still have a rough
equivalent in ordinary criminal law. Perhaps most importantly, specialized
legislation facilitates pre-emptive arrest and prosecution before an attack takes
place.
5. Public Relations/ Vigilantism
Because terrorists often want to gain support from a certain constituency, they
will sometimes commit crimes which are at least partially aimed at increasing
their own popularity and legitimacy. For example, both republican and loyalist
paramilitaries in Northern Ireland engaged in vigilante ‘policing’ within their
communities, subjecting drug-dealers, joy-riders and other ‘anti-social’ crimi-
nals to various punishments including beatings, maiming, murder and some-
times banishment from the country.3 Similarly, organized crime groups such as
the mafia have been reported to police their own neighborhoods.4 In more ad-
vanced cases, vigilantism becomes governance, as for example with the ‘justice’
administered by the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) in Syria and Iraq.
6. Miscellaneous/Spontaneous/Unrelated Offences
Terrorists are only human. As a result, they sometimes commit miscellaneous
offences during the commission of terrorist operations, or while going about
their daily lives. In particular, traffic offences, from failing to pay for insurance,
to speeding or running a red light can sometimes bring them into contact with
law enforcement and potentially compromise their security. For instance, a
plot to attack an English Defence League (EDL) demonstration in the UK was
3 Rachel Monaghan, “‘An Imperfect Peace’: Paramilitary ‘Punishments’ in Northern

Ireland,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 3 (2004): 439-61.
4 Hollianne Elizabeth Marshall, “Defended Neighborhoods and Organized Crime: Does
Organized Crime Lower Street Crime?” (Master’s Thesis, University of Central Florida,
2009), accessed May 17, 2015, http://etd.fcla.edu/CF/CFE0002751/Marshall_
Hollianne_E_200908_MA.pdf.
discovered purely by chance in June 2012 after an alert traffic policeman

stopped a suspicious vehicle and found that it was uninsured.5
7. Previous Criminal Records
A final issue worth mentioning involves previous criminal offences. Much has
been made of the fact that terrorists are sometimes radicalized and recruited
from within prison while serving time for unrelated crimes. Prisoners may in-
deed be vulnerable to recruitment by terrorists given that they are socially
marginalized and have ample reason to be angry at the state. In addition, they
may have specialized skills that can be applied to all manner of terrorist activ-
ity, from fundraising and facilitation to conducting attacks. Nevertheless, alt-
hough radicalization and recruitment do take place within prisons (and the
scale of the problem varies from country to country), terrorists, generally
speaking, are not career criminals. The majority of them do not appear to have
criminal records and among those who do, it is frequently for non-violent of-
fences.6 There is also little evidence to suggest that terrorists attempt to recruit
convicts over and above anyone else, given that ‘cleanskins’ (people with no
prior convictions and unknown to security services) are perhaps even more
valuable. Ultimately, most people who join a terrorist organization appear to do
so outside prison.
Organization
When we think about organizations we tend to think of hierarchical, bureau-
cratic structures like the police or military. Numerous terrorist organizations
have modelled themselves after armies and have adopted strict lines of au-
thority based on rank – among them the Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).7 The Co-
lombian Medellin and Cali cartels, which were dominant during the 1970s and
’80s, are often described in similar terms.8 Indeed, most, if not all, relatively
large terrorist and criminal organizations have designated leaders. However,
contemporary groups of both kinds have adopted less formal, more fluid net-
work structures which defy easy classification and allow for significant auton-
5 “Six Admit Planning to Bomb English Defence League Rally,” BBC News, April 30,
2013, accessed May 17, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-22344054.
6 See, for example, Sam Mullins, ‘Home-Grown’ Jihad: Understanding Islamist Terrorism
in the US and UK (London: Imperial College Press, 2016).
7 We should not assume, however, that these organizations have been equally success-
ful in implementing military systems of organization, or that they have remained
stable over time. See, for example, Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Surreptitious Lifelines: A
Structural Analysis of the FARC and the PKK,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24,
no. 2 (2012): 235–58.
8 Jana S. Benson and Scott H. Becker, “The Organizational Structure of International
Drug Smuggling,” Journal of Criminal Justice 38, no. 2 (2010): 130–38.
omy among lower and mid-level operatives.9 This evolution is at least partially
a reaction to successful CT and LE efforts 10 and has also been facilitated by ad-
vances in travel and communications technology. Perhaps most importantly in
the context of this discussion, networked systems of organization are not only
more resistant to offensive operations, but also increase the potential for col-
laboration among terrorist and criminal actors as a result of increased auton-
omy.11
Motives
As with offender characteristics and systems of organization, there is consider-
able overlap in terrorist and criminal motivations. To begin with, both are pri-
marily group-based activities and, as such, there are important social motives
for both joining and staying involved in terrorism and crime, including friend-
ship, solidarity, belonging and status.12 Perhaps the number one risk-factor for
becoming involved in either type of activity is having terrorist/criminal family
members or friends. In the short-term, terrorists and criminals also commit
many of the same crimes for the same reasons – at least as far as fundraising
goes. Whether it be drug-trafficking, bank robbery or any other form of crime
that provides profit, they both want to make money.
The difference, of course, lies in the long-term. Terrorists want to commit
high-profile attacks aimed at gaining publicity and eventually bringing about
some form of social and political change. At the same time, they often believe
that they are acting on behalf of a particular social group whom they wish to
protect or liberate and therefore frequently express altruistic intentions. By
comparison, criminals seem to be concerned almost exclusively with selfish
gains and have no apparent interest in either publicity or politics, unless it can
benefit them financially. Mexican cartels frequently behead their rivals, leave
the dismembered corpses in public places, distribute videos of the execution
taking place and make overt claims of responsibility. However, there is no clear
political motivation and the violence is instrumental, aimed at intimidating
their opponents and protecting their “turf.”13 Similarly, although organized
crime groups do occasionally assassinate politicians or other prominent offi-
cials, it is invariably meant to protect themselves and their illicit enterprises
from being shut down. It is thus the political/ideological end-goals of terrorists
that represent the critical difference between them and criminals.
9 John Picarelli, “Osama bin Corleone? Vito the Jackal? Framing Threat Convergence
through an Examination of Transnational Organized Crime and International Terror-
ism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 2 (2012): 180-98.
10 Michael Kenney, “From Pablo to Osama: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from the War on
Drugs,” Survival 45, no. 3 (2003): 187–206.
11 Picarelli, “Osama bin Corleone?”.
12 Sam Mullins, “Parallels Between Crime and Terrorism: A Social-Psychological Per-
spective,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 9 (2009): 811–30.
13 For a detailed discussion, see Phil Williams, “The Terrorism Debate over Mexican
Drug Trafficking Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 2 (2012): 259–78.
The Crime-Terror Nexus and “Convergence”

In its broadest sense, the “crime-terror nexus” simply refers to any and all con-
nections between terrorists and crime. At least four overlapping types of rela-
tionship can be identified:14
1) Interaction, where terrorists and criminals either work together some-
how, or else compete or come into conflict with one another
2) Appropriation, where one incorporates the methods of the other (i.e.
where terrorists rely on their own ‘in-house’ criminal capabilities, or
where criminals use the tactics of terrorism)
3) Assimilation, where ‘hybrid’ organizations emerge, which regularly en-
gage in both terrorism and crime to the extent that it is difficult to say
which is predominant; and
4) Transformation, where a change in identity occurs, so that one becomes
the other.
Interaction
There are numerous anecdotal examples of interaction between terrorists and
criminals. A recent study of 2,700 illicit actors spread across 122 countries
found that 46 percent of terrorists’ connections were to people involved in
other illegal activities.15 Similarly, according to the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA), close to half of US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations
have ties to drug traffickers.16 Although the focus tends to be on cooperation,
interactions vary significantly. They may be cooperative, exploitative or com-
petitive; short or long-term; small or large-scale; voluntary or involuntary; di-
rect or indirect; deliberate or unknowing. During the early 1980s, at a time
when both groups were under pressure, the Italian Red Brigades (BR) sought
the help of the Naples Camorra and the two groups reportedly assisted one an-
other in the kidnapping of a senior politician and several assassinations. 17 In
14 This classification draws upon Glenn Curtis and Tara Karacan, The Nexus Among
Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime
Networks in Western Europe (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of
Congress, 2002); and Phil Williams, “Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Latin
American and Caribbean Center (2014), accessed May 23, 2015, https://lacc.fiu.edu/
research/publications/working-paper-2-williams.pdf.
15 Scot Helfstein with John Solomon, Risky Business: The Global Threat Network and the
Politics of Contraband (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2014), accessed
May 25, 2015, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Risky
Business_final.pdf.
16 Douglas Farah, “Fixers, Super Fixers and Shadow Facilitators: How Networks Con-
nect,” International Assessment and Strategy Center (2012), 2, accessed May 25,
2015, www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20120423_Farah_FixersSuperFixersShadow.pdf.
17 Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime and Transformation,” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 24, no. 1 (2001): 53–54.
the case of Northern Ireland, there was clear conflict between paramilitaries
and criminals. At the same time, there were allegations that the PIRA used its
vigilante activities as a pretext to control the drug market, providing ‘licenses’
to selected dealers whom they allowed to continue operating, whilst simulta-
neously wiping out their competitors.18 Along similar lines, the Paraguayan
People’s Army (EPP) is believed to tax the cultivation of drugs within its terri-
tory, whilst also providing protection to drug traffickers in exchange for arms.19
Meanwhile, the oft-cited nexus between terrorism and crime in West Africa is
generally viewed as evidence of cooperation between Latin American drug
traffickers and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In reality, however, it
seems that the latter may simply be taxing the former.20
While the relationships may not be entirely harmonious, terrorists are often
reliant on criminal actors for goods or services. The illicit networks which
make the trafficking of drugs, arms or other contraband possible are highly
complex and adaptable. Within these networks, ‘fixers’ and ‘facilitators’ with
specialized knowledge, connections and capabilities often play particularly im-
portant roles in connecting all types of terrorists and criminals to international
markets.21 Arms dealers, smugglers, money launderers, purveyors of false
documents and corrupt/sympathetic officials are some of the key contacts that
terrorists are likely to rely upon. For instance, the FARC was able to acquire
weapons from Australian arms dealers by way of an individual named José Luis
Merino – a former commander of the El Salvadorian Communist Party with ties
to El Salvador’s political leadership.22 More recently, IS is known to rely upon
various human traffickers, smugglers and corrupt border guards in order to
help facilitate the entry of foreign fighters,23 as well as the external flow of oil 24
and looted artifacts 25 to regional and international markets.
As this brief discussion illustrates, the interactions between terrorists and
criminals are varied, complicated, dynamic and difficult to accurately discern.
Nevertheless, it appears that interactions are more often tactical, born of ne-
18 John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ – Financing the Provisional
IRA: Part 1,” Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 2 (1999): 30–31.
19 Marguerite Cawley, “Narcos Exchanging Arms for Protection from Paraguay's EPP:
Officials” InSightCrime, August 27, 2013, accessed August 28, 2013,
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/narcos-exchanging-arms-for-protection-
with-paraguays-epp-officials.
20 Williams, “Organized Crime and Terrorism,” 4.
21 Farah, “Fixers, Super Fixers and Shadow Facilitators.”
22 Farah, “Fixers, Super Fixers and Shadow Facilitators.”
23 Hannah Lucinda Smith, “The Jihadi Transporter,” Vice, January 31, 2014, accessed
January 31, 2014, http://www.vice.com/read/meeting-the-jihadi-transporter.
24 Fazel Hawramy, Shalaw Mohammed, and Luke Harding, “Inside Islamic State’s Oil
Empire: How Captured Oilfields Fuel Isis Insurgency,” The Guardian, November 19,
2014, accessed November 19, 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/19/-
sp-islamic-state-oil-empire-iraq-isis.
25 Simon Cox, “The Men Who Smuggle the Loot That Funds IS,” BBC News, February 17,
2015, accessed February 17, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31485439.
cessity or circumstance and relatively short-term, as opposed to long-term and

strategic.
Appropriation
The direct involvement of terrorists in criminal activity is perhaps the most
widespread aspect of the crime-terror nexus. Besides their somewhat ambigu-
ous relationship with the drug trade, during the mid-1990s the PIRA was able
to bring in somewhere between US $6–$15 million a year, largely from criminal
exploits.26 Illegal activities included robbery, KFR, extortion, ‘legitimate’ busi-
nesses (e.g. security companies, taxi cab firms, restaurants and pubs), money
lending, smuggling of contraband, video and audio piracy, welfare fraud and
money laundering.27 Notably, however, the group was always acutely aware of
the potential damage to their reputation that could result from being exposed
as criminals and went to great pains to obscure and publicly deny these activi-
ties.28
Islamist terrorists have also engaged in a great deal of criminality in order
both to fund and facilitate their operations. Supporters of al-Qaeda (AQ) based
in Europe and North America established a number of highly lucrative ‘chari-
ties’ that in reality were sending funds to militant organizations in places like
Afghanistan and Chechnya.29 In addition, they were adept at many other types
of fraud and forgery of false documents.30 These activities continue today, but
generally appear to be on a smaller scale and more deliberately covert as the
terrorists are now well aware that authorities may be watching them. Never-
theless, they continue. In one recent example, a group of suspected jihadists in
Britain had been calling pensioners over the phone and impersonating police-
men in order to trick their victims into divulging their bank details, netting
more than £280,000 in the process.31
On the other side of the crime-terror equation, organized crime groups
(OCGs) also utilize tactics of terrorism when it suits their purposes. The afore-
mentioned use of beheadings and assassinations to eliminate and intimidate
rival gangs and government authorities are prime examples. OCGs have utilized
26 Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’,” 10.

27 Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’.”
28 Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’.”
29 See, for example, “Transcript of Attorney General John Ashcroft Regarding Guilty Plea
by Enaam Arnaout,” US Department of Justice, February 10, 2003, accessed June 12,
2013, http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2003/021003agenaamaranout
transcripthtm.htm.
30 See, for example, Sean O’Neill, “Algerians ‘Used Card Fraud to Fund Jihad’,” The
Telegraph, February 6, 2003, accessed June 22, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/uknews/1421201/Algerians-used-card-fraud-to-fund-jihad.html.
31 Arthur Martin and Richard Spillett, “Conned by Jihadi Cold Callers: Yard Reveals
Pensioners are Being Fleeced out of Savings by ISIS Backers,” Daily Mail, March 5,
2015, accessed March 5, 2015, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2979381/Counter-
terror-police-arrest-three-men-cold-call-scam-targeting-elderly-victims.html.
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in a similar way. For example, the Colom-
bian Medellin and Cali cartels frequently used car bombings during their 1988–
1993 internecine war, while contemporary Mexican cartels were responsible
for at least 21 car bombings from 2010-2012, mostly targeting police.32 How-
ever, while criminals sometimes exhibit the same behavior as terrorists, they
rarely share the same motives. It is far more common for terrorists to appro-
priate criminal methodologies (ranging from ad-hoc, individual crimes to en-
during, organized conspiracies), rather than the other way around.
Assimilation
Several terrorist organizations have become so successful in their criminal ac-
tivities that they are often accused of being just as, if not more, concerned with
making money than achieving their ideological goals. In the case of the Afghan
Taliban, “[s]ome observers argue that that the line between ‘the definition of
Taliban member and drug smuggler is blurring’ as Taliban commanders be-
come more directly involved in the trade —running their own heroin laborato-
ries, for example—and are more motivated by profits and power than ideologi-
cal considerations. In this way, the definitional boundaries between ‘insurgent’
and ‘organised criminal group’ begin to collapse.” 33 Similar claims have been
made about the FARC, which reportedly makes somewhere in the region of
$2.4-$3.5 billion a year from the cocaine trade,34 and the Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG) in the Philippines, which appears to have fluctuated between terrorism
and banditry over time.35 Although clearly a deeply ideological group, it could
also be argued that IS qualifies as a hybrid organization, given the millions of
dollars it makes on a daily basis from oil smuggling, as well as extortion and
trading in illegal antiquities. From the other end of the spectrum, the closest
example of a criminal-terror group is Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company, which
was responsible for perhaps the most dramatic instance of criminal use of
terrorism in history – the Bombay bombings of 1993 (see Case Study 5.1).
D-Company, like other hybrid organizations, has not lost its original identity,
nor indeed, have the Taliban, FARC, Abu Sayyaf or IS. The degree to which any
hybrid is a terrorist or criminal organization is always open to some debate.
Nevertheless, recognizing the extent of terrorist involvement in crime helps to
highlight the fact that these groups should be of more or less equal concern to
both LE and CT.
32 Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Cartel Car Bombings in Mexico,” Letort Papers
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2013).
33 David Bewley-Taylor, “Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime in Afghanistan,” RUSI
Journal 158, no. 6 (2013): 9.
34 John Otis, “The FARC and Colombia’s Illegal Drug Trade,” Wilson Center Latin Ameri-
can Program, November 2014, 9, accessed May 24, 2015, www.wilsoncenter.org/
sites/default/files/Otis_FARCDrugTrade2014.pdf.
35 McKenzie O’Brien, “Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror: The Case of Abu Sayyaf’s
Kidnapping Activities,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 2 (2012): 320–36.
Case Study 5.1. D-Company.

D-Company is an international criminal-terror syndicate founded in Mumbai in 1976
by Dawood Ibrahim. In the mid-1980s, pressure from the Indian authorities forced Ib-
rahim to re-locate to Dubai. Here he was able to take advantage of a more permissive
environment and D-Company expanded its operations to include smuggling, weapons
and drug trafficking, extortion, protection rackets and illegal hawala transfers.36
During the early 1990s, D-Company switched from purely profit-driven activities
as the group developed a radical Islamist agenda.37 This was apparently driven by
Ibrahim’s anger at what he believed was the persecution of Indian Muslims by the
Hindu majority. D-Company’s first overt involvement in terrorism was a series of
bombings on March 12, 1993 in Mumbai, which killed 257 people, injured hundreds
more and caused billions of Rupees worth of damage.38 Ibrahim is alleged to have
both financed and organized the operation. D-Company’s involvement in terrorism
continued and in 2003 the US labeled Ibrahim a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
due to his suspected cooperation with AQ and Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT). Among other
operations, the group is believed to have provided logistical support to the LeT as-
sault on Mumbai in November 2008.39 At the same time, D-Company continues to op-
erate as a transnational criminal syndicate covering Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
Transformation
The fourth possible type of relationship between terrorism and crime is the
least clearly documented and most open to interpretation. It is sometimes sug-
gested that the FARC and AS fall into this category; however, this overlooks the
fact that they still clearly retain their respective political/religious identities
and continue to pursue an ideological agenda. The FARC is still engaged in on-
going peace talks with the Colombian government and AS has reportedly
pledged allegiance to IS. Another possible candidate for “transformation” is the
group behind the 2004 Madrid train bombings. This operation succeeded
thanks to the radicalization and recruitment of a former drug-dealer named
Jamal Ahmidan who used his criminal connections to secure funding as well as
the stolen dynamite used in the attacks.40 However, there is a difference be-
tween transformation at the individual level (i.e. radicalization of individual
36 Ryan Clarke and Stuart Lee, “The PIRA, D-Company, and the Crime-Terror Nexus,”
Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008): 385.
37 Clarke and Lee, “The PIRA, D-Company, and the Crime-Terror Nexus,” 385, 390.
38 Ryan Clarke, “Lashkar-i-Taiba: The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of
Islamist Terrorism in India,” Letort Papers (Carlile, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and
US Army War College Press, 2010), accessed May 24, 2015,
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=973.
39 See, for example, Thomas Burghardt, “Organized Crime, Intelligence and Terror: The
D-Company’s Role in the Mumbai Attacks,” Centre for Research on Globalization,
December 13, 2008, accessed June 14, 2015, http://www.globalresearch.ca/
organized-crime-intelligence-and-terror-the-d-company-s-role-in-the-mumbai-
attacks/11385.
40 Williams, “Organized Crime and Terrorism,” 8–9.
criminals) and organizational transformation. The former process is quite

common, while the latter is much rarer and usually open to debate.
Northern Ireland is again relevant in this context, where—more than 15
years since the Good Friday Agreement—paramilitary groups remain deeply
entrenched in organized crime. As the Independent Monitoring Commission
noted in 2011, “Some members and former members of all groups remain
heavily involved in a wide range of serious crime, exploiting the contacts and
expertise they acquired during the Troubles and thereby presenting a chal-
lenge to law enforcement which is significantly more serious than it would oth-
erwise have been.”41 Nevertheless, politically motivated violence continues and
it would be an over-simplification to suggest that either republican or loyalist
organizations were nothing more than OCGs. With this in mind, there may be a
greater risk of transformation occurring in societies that are transitioning away
from conflict. Under such circumstances, armed groups may have ostensibly
demobilized, but clandestine structures are left intact and are able to morph
into heavily armed and well-trained OCGs. This appears to have been the case
in El Salvador and Guatemala and may develop further in Colombia as the
peace process with FARC moves forward.42
In conclusion, although there is no clear analytical boundary between any of
the four types of relationship discussed here, the dividing line between assimi-
lation and possible transformation is particularly difficult to determine.
Convergence of Terrorism and Crime?

The term “convergence” implies that terrorist involvement in crime is increas-
ing. There is reason to believe that this has occurred to some extent, at least in
terms of interaction and appropriation. Following the relative decline in state
sponsorship of terrorism since the end of the Cold War, terrorists today must
be self-reliant in order to survive. The increased ‘criminalization’ of terrorism
has also been facilitated by the shift towards decentralized network structures
of both types of organization along with increased opportunities for criminal
activity, in particular within conflict zones. Besides these global developments,
there are sometimes more specific indicators of terrorists’ increasing involve-
ment in crime. For example, the prominent jihadist ideologue Abu Qatada went
to considerable effort to justify and sanction not only murder, but also stealing,
cheating, fraud, kidnap and rape.43 Increased criminality may also be brought
about by the killing of terrorist leaders who are then replaced by less ideologi-
41 Independent Monitoring Commission, Twenty-Sixth and Final Report of the Independ-

ent Monitoring Commission (London: The Stationery Office, 2011), 57, accessed May
26, 2015, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/imc/imc040711.pdf.
42 See, for example, Douglas Farah, “Central America’s Northern Triangle: A Time for
Turmoil and Transitions,” PRISM 4, no. 3 (2013): 97.
43 Omar Othman (aka Abu Qatada) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
Special Immigration and Appeals Commission, Appeal No. SC/15/2005, February 26,
2007, 8–9, accessed April 1, 2010, http://www.icj.org/IMG/QATADA.pdf.
cal, more pragmatic individuals – as appears to have been the case with Abu
Sayaaf in the Philippines.44
Despite such developments, we must bear in mind that there are also poten-
tial barriers to increased convergence of terrorism and crime. Although it is
clearly not a universal deterrent, the risk of getting caught increases substan-
tially both when terrorists commit crime by themselves and when they cooper-
ate with criminals who do not share their ideology. As PIRA clearly recognized,
getting caught not only jeopardizes an organization’s operations, but also risks
undermining its legitimacy and popular support. Under the same circum-
stances, criminals open themselves up to greater scrutiny and heftier punish-
ments. Perhaps more importantly, terrorists and criminals will only continue to
cooperate as long as they both continue to gain somehow, and as long as they
are able to trust one another. As an Italian policeman once commented on the
alliance between the BR and Camorra, “We don’t think any such alliance will
work because, while they have a common enemy in the police and the estab-
lishment, their aims and ideological beliefs are so vastly different… their alli-
ance at best would be superficial and short-lived because neither of them
would want to compromise the group’s secrets.”45
Taking all of these different factors into account, it is clear that terrorist ap-
propriation of criminal skills is now the norm. But although certain OCGs do
show similarities to terrorists, there is little to suggest that criminal use of ter-
rorist tactics is increasing. Furthermore, although examples of interaction be-
tween terrorists and criminals are not hard to come by, in general, it is far from
clear that these interactions are becoming deeper, longer-lasting or more prev-
alent. In other words, it is not apparent that terrorist and criminal organiza-
tions are merging with one another on a global scale to create new ‘super
threats.’ Similarly, when it comes to assimilation and especially transformation
(described above), there is a very short list of potential candidates that fall into
these categories and little to indicate that these are the new norm.
In the final analysis, it is essential that we do not over-generalize. Terrorist
involvement in crime (and vice versa) varies tremendously from group to
group and over time and is largely dictated by geographic opportunities,
changing political landscapes and interpersonal connections. Rather than think
in terms of a global convergence of terrorism and crime, it is enough to simply
be aware of the fact that all terrorism relies on criminal activity to some extent
and—whether or not this involves collaboration with otherwise independent
criminal actors—this presents us both with challenges and opportunities for
LE and CT.
44 O’Brien, “Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror.”

45 Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime and Transformation,” 54.
Implications for Law Enforcement and Counter-

Terrorism
There is increasing recognition of the need to coordinate initiatives to combat
the nexus between terrorism and OC. One way of doing this is to make crime-
terror cooperation less profitable and more risky for the organizations in-
volved. However, these objectives cannot be achieved if agencies dedicated to
fighting OC and terrorism remain ‘stove-piped,’ either domestically or interna-
tionally. Effective strategies require the exchange of information, interagency
cooperation, adequate resources and appropriate legal frameworks. Just as
OCGs and terrorists learn from one another, so too can LE and CT professionals.
Indeed, their respective tradecrafts are remarkably similar in many ways. In-
vestigating a terrorist attack and developing the evidence to prosecute the per-
petrators has much in common with a complex criminal investigation. Of
course LE and CT tools are already integrated to a large extent and there is in-
creasing cooperation between the two – in particular in the area of intelligence-
led policing (see Chapter 10).
However, while the threat from both crime and terrorism has ‘gone global,’
LE responses are still predominantly national and limited by a continuing re-
luctance to share information across national jurisdictions.46 National police
forces also remain hard pressed to counter terrorists and OCGs that are often
better equipped, better armed and more agile than themselves. One potential
possibility for dealing with this would be the creation of a global law enforce-
ment agency that would have both the necessary authority and resources at its
disposal.47 Arguably, the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is already
performing this role, at least as far as the international illegal drugs trade is
concerned (see Case Study 5.2).
Despite ongoing difficulties, the proliferation of joint task forces and intelli-
gence fusion centers (see Chapter 15) since 2001 has provided opportunities
for much closer cooperation between agencies involved in LE and CT. This has
produced ‘cross trained’ professionals that can operate in both worlds. In the
US, cooperation between government agencies is enhanced by organizations
such as the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) within the
Treasury Department. This involves a series of interrelated bureaus and offices
designed to combat threats related to crime, terrorism and the closely associ -
46 A Dangerous Nexus: Crime, Conflict, and Terrorism in Failing States (International

Peace Institute, 2013), 4, accessed June 8, 2015, http://www.ipinst.org/2013/11/a-
dangerous-nexus-crime-conflict-and-terrorism-in-failing-states. It is worth stressing
that unwillingness to share information may be entirely justified in cases where
corruption fostered by OC has permeated senior levels of the government and
security forces.
47 A Dangerous Nexus: Crime, Conflict, and Terrorism in Failing States.
Case Study 5.2. The Drug Enforcement Administration.

The DEA was founded in 1973 to enforce federal drug laws. It did not become an inte-
gral part of the US “war on terror” until after 9/11, when it received substantial in-
creases in funding, manpower and intelligence gathering capabilities.48 The DEA’s
operations against “narco-terrorism” are led by its Special Operations Division (SOD).
This unit comprises two dozen partner agencies, including the FBI, CIA, NSA, Internal
Revenue Service and the Department of Homeland Security. The SOD forwards infor-
mation from wiretaps, intercepts and databases from various sources to federal
agents and local LE officials. SOD agents have also coordinated ‘sting’ operations
against so-called king-pin, crime-terror facilitators – notably arms dealers Viktor Bout
and Monzer al-Kassar.49 In addition, the DEA has developed enforcement capabilities
in the form of Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams (FASTs). These ten-man
teams are trained by US Special Forces in small unit tactics and close-quarters battle
and are interoperable with elite military units.
FASTs were originally developed for operations in Afghanistan, where the DEA has
been active for more than a decade. The main purpose of DEA operations there is “to
deny narcotics-generated funding to terrorism and the insurgency,” while seeking
more broadly to reduce drug trafficking and combat corruption.50 However, as the US
presence has reduced, the DEA has focused on developing the capability and capacity
of specialized vetted units of the Counternarcotics Police Afghanistan (CNP-A), in par-
ticular the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and the Sensitive Investigative Unit
(SIU).51 Strong relationships with foreign counterparts in Afghanistan and elsewhere
remain an essential feature of DEA operations. Given its ability to take direct action
and to develop partner capacity internationally, the DEA is perhaps the closest the
world has come so far to a global LE/CT organization.
ated problem of corruption.52 The TFI maintains links with international agen-
cies such as Interpol, Europol and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
At the international level, a range of different agencies are working to ad-
dress the threat of crime-terror linkages. The United Nations Office on Drugs
48 Malcolm Beith, “A Single Act of Justice: How the Age of Terror Transformed the War
on Drugs,” Foreign Affairs, September 8, 2013, accessed June 14, 2015,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2013-09-08/single-act-justice.
49 Johnny Dwyer, “The DEA’s Terrorist Hunters: Overreaching Their Authority,” Time,
August 8, 2011, accessed June 15, 2015, http://content.time.com/time/
world/article/0,8599,2087220,00.html; Farah, Fixers, Super Fixers and Shadow Facili-
tators.
50 Statement of James L. Capra, Chief of Operations DEA Before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, “Future US
Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” February 5, 2014, 1, accessed June 15,
2015, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20140205/101709/HHRG-113-
FA13-Wstate-CapraJ-20140205.pdf.
51 Statement of James L. Capra, 3–5.
52 “Terrorism and Financial Intelligence,” US Department of the Treasury, June 28, 2013,
accessed June 8, 2015, http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/
offices/Pages/Office-of-Terrorism-and-Financial-Intelligence.aspx.
and Crime (UNODC) is a major player and offers a broad range of assistance
that includes practical support for CT legislation, counter illicit trafficking
measures and anti-money laundering and corruption initiatives. In 2002, In-
terpol created a Fusion Task Force to address the linkages between crime and
terrorism and provide data that could assist LE agencies to disrupt and dis-
mantle criminal entities that support terrorism. However, Interpol, like the UN,
depends on contributions from member states and its budget remains con-
strained.
International cooperation and coordination to address the crime-terror
nexus remains a work in progress. However, initiatives cannot be limited to
operational matters such as border security and improvements in intelligence
sharing and policing. The international community broadly recognizes that
more comprehensive strategies are needed to tackle governance, economic and
social issues that make so many states vulnerable to criminal and terrorist ac-
tivity.
Conclusion
Much of the discussion of the crime-terror nexus tends to focus upon terrorist
fundraising and cooperation with OCGs. However, it is important to bear in
mind that terrorists engage in a wide range of criminal activity for a variety of
reasons and their involvement in crime is not limited to cooperation with sep-
arate criminal entities. Indeed, of the four different types of relationship iden-
tified, appropriation appears to be just as, if not more common than interaction.
Above all, however, it is vital to realize that the nexus between crime and ter-
rorism is not uniform across the globe but varies from country to country and
over time. When it comes to addressing this problem, although there have been
some encouraging developments, there are still many ongoing challenges, not
least of them being bureaucratic boundaries between different organizations.
Looking for more effective ways of disrupting the crime-terror nexus and using
it to our advantage should be a priority in CT.
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Chapter 6
Terrorism, Media, and the Rise
of the Internet
Eric Young
Introduction
There is a great deal of debate concerning the relationship between terrorism
and the media. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher described
media publicity as the “oxygen” of terrorism.1 The former leader of al-Qaeda
(AQ), Osama bin Laden, had, according to a former close associate, an “extreme
infatuation” and was “obsessed” with international media attention. 2 Indeed,
terrorists need people beyond the immediate geographic area of an attack to
know about their actions in order to spread fear and gain popular support. As
Bruce Hoffman concludes: “without the media’s coverage the act’s impact is ar-
guably wasted, remaining narrowly confined to the immediate victim(s) of the
attack, rather than reaching the wider ‘target audience’ at whom the terrorists’
violence is actually aimed.”3
While the relationship between terrorism and the media may at first seem
straightforward, it is in fact complex and dynamic. Terrorist groups have used
mainstream media as well as their own propaganda products as a means of
gaining publicity. In doing so, they simultaneously attempt to influence multi-
ple audiences, including (but not necessarily limited to) government officials,
the mass public of a particular country, their own constituents, and/or a larger
international audience.4 It is evident that terrorism and the media are inti-
mately linked in a dynamic relationship. Over time, however, this has become
increasingly complex, with radical changes in the media landscape, in particu-
lar the emergence of ‘new,’ Internet-based media platforms. This poses signifi-
cant challenges for combating terrorist use of the media in democratic coun-
tries.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the fundamental relationship be-
tween terrorism and the media, followed by an overview of historical devel-
1 Speech to the American Bar Association, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, July 15, 1985,
accessed January 7, 2015, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096.
2 As quoted in Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 193.
3 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 174.
4 Brigitte Nacos, Terrorism and the Media (New York: Columbia University Press,
1994), 8.
85 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch06
86 Eric Young
opments. Particular attention is paid to the emergence of new media and how it
is transforming the terrorist-media relationship. In this context, two case stud-
ies are included in order to illustrate how contemporary terrorist groups are
making use of emerging media technologies – these focus upon al-Shabaab in
Somalia and the self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State’ (IS). The concluding section
then highlights some of the challenges involved from a combating terrorism
perspective.
A Complex Relationship
The following brief review of the academic literature provides a starting point
for understanding the relationship between terrorism and the media, although
it is by no means an exhaustive assessment of the topic. Before we proceed, it is
first necessary to provide some definitions. In this chapter, terrorism is defined
as the use of violence, or the threat thereof, by non-state actors against non-
combatants for political gain (see Chapter 1 for an-depth discussion of defini-
tions of terrorism). In essence, terrorism is a strategy for communicating objec-
tives and thus the media is a vital aspect. “Media” is defined as the channels of
communication of information and entertainment in a society such as publish-
ing (newspapers, magazines, books), radio, television, and the Internet. The
former three types of media are often considered to be ‘traditional’ or ‘classic’
media, while the Internet is often described as ‘new’ media. This is a distinction
that will be used throughout the chapter.
A caveat is also necessary. Although the focus of discussion is primarily on
democratic societies where freedom of speech is the norm, in states where the
media is not open and free, terrorists will inevitably find using the media for
their own ends considerably more difficult. In general, where the state has con-
trolled the media, terrorists have struggled to flourish, and while authoritarian
governments unconcerned about democratic freedoms can, of course, also im-
pose restrictive counter-terrorism (CT) measures, arguably part of the failure
of terrorism in repressive regimes is their lack of access to media outlets. How-
ever, this appears to be changing as access to the Internet is becoming increas-
ingly widespread and difficult to control. The discussion of ‘new’ media in par-
ticular is therefore relevant despite cultural, political and legislative differences
around the world.
Regardless of the political context, a clear link between terrorism and the
media is difficult to establish. Although terrorists strive to achieve political
change by inflicting fear upon their target audience, it is not at all clear that
greater media coverage results in greater ‘success,’ whether that be heightened
levels of fear, desired changes in behavior or in the political landscape. 5 Along
similar lines, Crenshaw points out that “the causal link between media cover-
age and the diffusion of terrorism has rarely been investigated, much less es-
5 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 173–195.

Terrorism, Media, and the Rise of the Internet 87
tablished.”6 Interestingly, it has been suggested that a relative lack of access to

media (suggesting a failure to be ‘heard’) might act as a driver of terrorism.
Taken to its logical conclusion, egalitarian, open-access to media (such as pro-
vided by the Internet) could eventually lead to a decline, if not outright end, of
terrorism.7 Although there is no evidence that this is currently taking place
(and in fact quite the opposite appears to be true), it is a complicated area
where little can be said with absolute certainty.
Most of the literature on terrorism and the media focuses on how and why
terrorists make use of it to their advantage. In an early assessment, Yonah Al-
exander described three purposes terrorists have in interacting with the me-
dia: 1) to gain attention for their cause, 2) to gain recognition for their organi-
zation, and 3) to gain legitimacy for both.8 Brigitte Nacos expands on this to ex-
plain that gaining attention or awareness is really about conditioning the target
audience. In addition, she adds a fourth purpose – to gain respect and/or sym-
pathy.9 Similarly, Robin Gerrits argues that terrorists use the media to demor-
alize the government, demonstrate their strength, gain sympathy and create
fear and chaos. The publicity obtained is an instrument used to pursue their
political ends.10 Ultimately, whether or not terrorists actually achieve their de-
sired outcomes, engaging the media is an important part in trying to reach their
goals.
However, while terrorists seek to manipulate the media to their advantage,
it is important to remember that the media is neither monolithic, nor does it
play a passive role. It is often argued that in covering terrorist acts, traditional
media sources have benefitted from terrorism since the drama involved inevi-
tably gives a boost to sales and viewership, and thus ultimately increases prof-
its. Hoffman points out that as the media has become increasingly decentral-
ized, competition has intensified. This has resulted in excessive coverage of
dramatic events such as terrorism, as mainstream media outlets struggle to
remain relevant. When terrorist attacks take place, “the media respond to these
overtures with almost unbridled alacrity, proving unable to ignore what has
been accurately described as ‘an event …fashioned specifically for their
needs’.”11 This is in part because public interest in terrorism (or any other is-
sue in the news) quickly diminishes and the media therefore seeks to over-
6 Martha Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences (Lon-

don: Routledge, 2011), 194.
7 Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communications: Insurgent Terrorism and
the Western News Media (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982).
8 Yonah Alexander, “Terrorism and the Media: Some Considerations,” in Terrorism:
Theory and Practice, ed. Yonas Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson (Boul-
der: Westview Press, 1979), 162.
9 Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism
and Counterterrorism, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 20.
10 Robin Gerrits, “Terrorists’ Perspectives: Memoirs,” in Terrorism and the Media, ed.
David L. Paletz and Alex Schmid (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 29-61.
11 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 174.
88 Eric Young
dramatize events to retain readers and viewers. Although it has not been con-
clusively proven, such coverage is widely believed to contribute to dispropor-
tionate levels of public fear and anxiety about terrorism.12 The dynamics of this
seemingly symbiotic relationship may have been altered to some extent with
the rise of new media and the even greater proliferation of freely-accessible
news sources. Nevertheless, although terrorists and the media may be some-
what less dependent on one another than in the past, they still clearly share an
intense, mutual interest based upon the perceived potential for self-interested
gains.
Although many journalists pride themselves on professional integrity, the
media is not politically neutral and often deliberately frames stories about ter-
rorism in a particular way. “Framing” describes how a particular news story or
subject is presented and how this influences the way that it is understood and
interpreted by the audience.13 For example, many major newspapers avoid us-
ing the word “terrorist” or “terrorism” altogether, preferring to use “guerilla,”
“insurgent” or “violent extremist” instead. Indeed, news outlets often grapple
with terminology in the wake of a major attack and have either implicit or ex-
plicit internal policies on the use of “terrorist” and “terrorism.”14 Of course, the
language used by government officials also influences the media and vice versa.
“Agenda setting” refers to decisions made by media outlets regarding the
amount of coverage to give certain phenomena, which in turn may lead the
public to attribute more or less importance to a given issue over others. Ulti-
mately, terrorism is still widely covered by the national and international me-
dia, making it a prominent issue despite efforts to be objective. Terrorist at-
tacks in Western countries in particular gain widespread international public-
ity even though they tend to injure or kill a very small number of people com-
pared to other man-made or natural disasters, especially in comparison to non-
Western countries. For instance, there was a massive amount of media atten-
tion given to the January 2015 attack on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in
Paris, which initially left twelve people dead (plus another five in connected in-
cidents). This can be compared to the attacks on Baga and several nearby vil-
lages in northern Nigeria during the same month, which reportedly killed as
many as 2,000 people and yet received very little international media atten-
tion.15
12 James Igoe Walsh, “Media Attention to Terrorist Attacks: Causes and Consequences,”
Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (2010), accessed January 7, 2015,
http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/IHSS_Research-Brief_Walsh.pdf.
13 Pippa Norris, Marion Just, and Montague Kern, eds., Framing Terrorism. The News
Media, the Government and the Public (London: Routledge, 2003).
14 Philip Seib and Dana Janbek, Global Terrorism and New Media: The Post-Al Qaeda
Generation (London: Routledge, 2011), 6–10.
15 Maeve Shearlaw, “Why Did the World Ignore Boko Haram's Baga Attacks?” The
Guardian, January 12, 2015, accessed January 13, 2015, www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/jan/12/-sp-boko-haram-attacks-nigeria-baga-ignored-media.
Historical Waves of Terrorism and the Media

As already noted, the relationship between terrorism and the media has
evolved over time. While there has always been a dynamic interplay between
terrorist groups and communications technology used by the media, the ‘new’
media landscape has changed this relationship considerably. David Rapoport’s
four waves of modern terrorism are useful for analyzing these developments. 16
In the first wave, during the late 1800s, anarchist terrorists in Russia and Eu-
rope focused on “propaganda of the deed” and most of their targets were secu-
rity or political officials whom they assassinated, often using dynamite, which
was then a new invention. This wave coincided with the advent of the tele-
graph, railways, and the proliferation of daily newspapers in the last quarter of
the 1800s, all of which helped anarchists spread their message. It no longer
took days or weeks for news to travel from country to country, but instead be-
came a matter of hours. Importantly, the anarchists retained a high level of con-
trol over their message because they mostly printed their own pamphlets or
gave public speeches that were then re-printed in local newspapers or carried
by telegraph.
Terrorists’ control over their message changed during the second wave,
which Rapoport refers to as the “anti-colonial wave” and which lasted from the
late 1920s to the late 1960s. Anti-colonial terrorism emerged mostly in coun-
tries in which colonial powers resisted withdrawal, such as Palestine, Algeria,
Ireland and Cyprus. As the term “terrorists” had gained negative connotations
during the anarchist wave, the anti-colonial terrorists were often re-branded
by the media as ‘freedom fighters,’ leading to the famous cliché “one man’s ter-
rorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” As the media became more global and
access to new technology, such as radio, became more widespread, terrorists
harnessed this new media to gain greater regional and international attention,
recognition, and legitimacy. Yet this came at a time when governments still
controlled much of the media in many countries. This had both advantages and
disadvantages.
On the one hand, a government could easily limit the coverage of an attack
or the message of the terrorist group. On the other, terrorist organizations in-
creasingly operated or were based outside of their home country within dias-
pora communities. Frequently, these host-states were sympathetic to the ter-
rorists’ cause and governments used their control over the media to promote
the cause of ‘friendly’ terrorist organizations (i.e. ‘freedom fighters’). Media
corporations with global reach were also on the rise and terrorists’ control
over their message decreased somewhat as the international news media set
the agenda and framed the stories. Increasingly, the new ‘language’ of terror-
ism was seen to be a critical factor. As Rapoport notes, “the media, hoping to
16 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism, ed.

Audrey Cronin and James Ludes (Washington: Georgetown University press, 2004),
46-73.
90 Eric Young
avoid being seen as blatantly partisan, corrupted language further. Major

American newspapers, for example, often described the same individuals al-
ternatively as terrorists, guerrillas, and soldiers in the same account.” 17
Rapoport’s third wave of terrorism – the ‘new left’ of the 1960s and 1970s,
which also included nationalist organizations such as the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) coincided with the advent of global television coverage.
This changed the media landscape dramatically, with increased access and
competition. At the same time, the media often proved sympathetic to the left-
wing causes of the times. Terrorism became increasingly theatric and attacks
were carefully choreographed in order to attract a global audience. Airline hi-
jackings, dramatic political assassinations, and hostage-takings became the fa-
vored methods of attack, thanks to their high publicity value.
Probably the most significant international terrorist attack at the time was
the hostage-taking of the Israeli Olympic team at the 1972 Munich Olympics.
Millions watched the live coverage as closely as the games themselves and the
photograph of a hooded Black September terrorist on the balcony of an Olym-
pic Village apartment became the iconic photograph of terrorism in the televi-
sion age. As Schmid and de Graaf noted shortly thereafter, “the twentieth-cen-
tury communication revolution has changed the face of … terrorism.” 18
For Rapoport, the fourth wave of terrorism (i.e. ‘religious’) began in 1979
and continues today. It began with the Islamic revolution in Iran and coincided
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These events put Islamism—both
Sunni and Shia—at the center of the religious wave of terrorism, overshadow-
ing Jewish, Christian, and millenarian terrorist organizations that also emerged
at this time (including extreme Zionist groups in Israel, Christian Identity
groups in the US, and Aum Shinrikyo in Japan). For the first fifteen years or so
of this phase, terrorist use of media remained relatively unchanged. Terrorist
organizations continued to use the media technology of the day, from pam-
phlets to audio tapes and of course high-profile attacks designed to attract tel-
evision coverage. As the new technology of video became more popular and
widespread, terrorist groups started to produce their own propaganda videos.
Things then changed quite dramatically during the mid-1990s with two coin-
ciding events: the dramatic rise of the Internet and the use of spectacular at-
tacks by AQ.
The above discussion demonstrates the fundamentally symbiotic, yet dy-
namic relationship between the media and terrorism. Terrorists employ the
media by conducting public attacks that they hope will capture the attention of
the media and thereby reach their intended audience. Evidently, this relation-
ship has not been static, but has changed with the technology and nature of the
‘media’ of the times, with terrorists proving to be as adaptable as any organi-
zation in using new and emerging technologies to convey their message.
17 Rapoport, The Four Waves of Terrorism, 54.

18 Schmid and De Graaf, Violence as Communication, 16.
The Rise of New Media

In 2007, long-time terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman wrote that
… much like previous information revolutions … that also profoundly affected
terrorist and insurgent external communications, a new information revolution
has occurred to empower these [terrorist] movements with the ability to shape
and disseminate their own message in their own way, enabling them to com-
pletely bypass traditional, established media outlets.19
This is an accurate summary of the situation today. As mentioned above, the
fourth wave of terrorism was dominated, at least until mid-2014, by one or-
ganization: AQ. Under Osama bin Laden’s leadership, AQ emerged on the world
scene at the same time as the Internet was fast becoming a part of everyday
life. Combined with the rise of mobile-based platforms, this radically changed
the relationship between terrorism and the media.
The rise of the Internet opened new spaces for terrorists to operate, com-
municate their message, motivate and even train potential recruits, fundraise,
facilitate and plan their attacks. Importantly, terrorists are no longer depend-
ent on “traditional” media companies to carry their message. Gone are the days
of simply conducting an attack and waiting for the media to cover it, or else de-
livering statements and audio recordings to media outlets in an attempt to con-
vey one’s message. Terrorists can now cover their own attacks, write their own
stories and disseminate them via the Internet to a global audience. Indeed, new
media in particular has become not only an extension of the terrorists’ activi-
ties, but also an intrinsic part of terrorist organizations themselves. Of course,
terrorists have always produced their own propaganda such as pamphlets,
press releases and audio tapes, but historically it was nowhere near on today’s
scale. There has also been significant change in the sense that communications
are no longer one-way. Indeed, perhaps the most important point when it
comes to terrorist use of the Internet is that it is increasingly interactive. This
interactivity, combined with the ability to produce and distribute content, has
fundamentally re-shaped the relationship between terrorism and media.
AQ’s coming of age is illustrative of this process of change. The group moved
from spreading its message by audio and video tapes in the 1980s to creating
websites in the mid-1990s. Their focus on spectacular attacks against the West,
particularly the United States, was not only central to their media strategy, but
it was also particularly suited to the top-down website model of the time,
which was more informative than interactive. AQ’s media wing al-Sahab Foun-
dation for Islamic Media Publication (aka as-Sahab, or “The Cloud”) created the
content and crafted the message. The first issue of AQ’s online magazine Sawt
al-Jihad (Voice of the Jihad) appeared in October 2003.20 These developments
19 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 198.

20 See, for example, Fred Burton, “Sawt al Jihad: Signs of Saudi al Jihad Resurgence,”
Islam Daily Observing Media, February 2, 2007, accessed January 8, 2015,
92 Eric Young
allowed the leadership to reach a wider audience whilst maintaining control

over the message.
In the mid-2000s, AQ’s hierarchical media model began to change with the
proliferation of web forums and blogs, as the leadership, which was then in
hiding, had more pressing issues to attend to. This was particularly true in Iraq,
where individuals both within and outside the terrorist organization began to
communicate directly with each other, often in password-protected forums. As
Marc Sageman contends, the Internet revolution also brought about changes
within the terrorist social environment.21 For example, while AQ and its affili-
ate organizations advocate strict gender divisions, interactions between men
and women have become increasingly common as a result of greater online
freedom. At the same time, the average age of those involved online has seem-
ingly declined. Cyberspace, which in many ways is the domain of the young and
is essentially gender-neutral, has thus begun to impact upon who the terrorists
are able to radicalize and recruit.22
The above trends were part of a wider shift in communications technology
and terrorist use of the Internet, particularly in the mid- to late 2000s. This
shift in the relationship between the media and terrorism was not part of a
strategic move by AQ, but rather part of a spontaneous evolution. Furthermore,
as ‘AQ Core’ gave rise to regional organizations with varying degrees of auton-
omy (including official branches in the Sahel, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia), these
groups also embraced new social media technologies and platforms. Some of
these groups proved both highly adept at exploiting social media and adapting
it to serve their particular interests and needs. Using the Internet, al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) began publishing its now infamous instructional
magazine Inspire, while al-Shabaab emerged as a leader in using Internet plat-
forms such as YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook (see Case Study 6.1 below).
By contrast, the leadership of AQ, likely for reasons of operational security,
did not directly embrace these new social-media platforms, but rather contin-
ued to produce ‘classic’ media products such as audio and video recordings.
Instead, its affiliates and like-minded groups took the lead, quickly surpassing
anything the core senior leadership was producing. Not surprisingly, interna-
tional analysts and the media often focus upon terrorist use of the Internet for
propaganda, recruiting, fundraising, operational planning as well as the possi-
bility of cyber terrorism. However, probably the most important aspect of re-
cent trends has been the fact that ‘new’ media technologies enable, and indeed
are premised upon, individual participation.
This two-way communication is often highly personal even though it is not
face-to-face. Virtual technology also collapses time and eliminates space, al-
lowing people to connect with one another around the world, which is partic-
www.islamdaily.org/en/saudi-arabia/5298.sawt-al-jihad-signs-of-a-saudi-al-qaeda-
resurgence.htm.
21 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2008), 111.
22 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.
Case Study 6.1. Al-Shabaab on the Frontlines of the New Media

Battlefield.
Years before the September 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, the
Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab had a sophisticated media strategy. Its ‘news ser-
vice,’ al-Kataib News Channel, created documentaries and specialized in ‘insurgent
journalism.’ Individual members, such as the American Abu Mansoor al-Amriki (Omar
Hammami), produced rap songs which were distributed via YouTube. Most of these
products were of reasonably high quality that appealed to an international audience
as well as to existing members of the group. In 2011, they launched the HSMPress
feed on Twitter. Most famously, HSMPress engaged in direct battlefield debates with
the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF), particularly its official spokesman Major Em-
manuel Chirchir. Once, responding to a claim that the KDF had captured the strategic
port city of Kismayo, HSMPress tweeted that the Kenyan “boys are a grotesque parody
of an army! They can outpace [your] world-class runners by far. Indeed, they ‘Run like
a Kenyan’.”23
With the attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, al-Shabaab took its use of the In-
ternet to a new level. In particular, they demonstrated sophistication in using micro-
blogging (particularly Twitter) as an integral part of a comprehensive strategic com-
munications plan. HSMPress provided a stream of ‘updates’ and commentary during
the attack, reiterating their central narrative: that suffering in Somalia is caused by
Kenyan military intervention, as well as actions of the West and the African Union
(AU) against Muslim Somalis more generally. While al-Shabaab made press state-
ments and released audio recordings during the attack as part of its media campaign,
HSMPress tweets showed considerable sophistication in that they tailored different
feeds to different audiences. They were also effective in capitalizing quickly on events
on the ground, providing timely information and exploiting contradictory statements
made by the Kenyan government and international media. This continued days after
the three-day siege ended. Throughout, al-Shabaab’s media agents were able to
“skillfully exploit [their] enemies’ mistakes on the battlefield and in the information
war, as well as manipulating the news cycle by inserting sensational claims.”24
Ultimately, for al-Shabaab, which had recently experienced several battlefield set-
backs and internal disputes, the Westgate Mall attack and the international media at-
tention which it generated was successful as it “provided the group with a media tri-
umph that catapulted it back onto the public stage.”25
ularly well-suited for terrorist operations. Importantly, it is not just terrorists

communicating a monologue to a wider audience, but also terrorists communi-
cating amongst themselves and their leadership and using ‘new’ media to in-
teract with their followers directly. Examining mostly online chat forums that
were popular in the mid- to late 2000s, Sageman noted that for Salafi jihadists
23 HSMPress, “Twitter / @MajorEChirchir Your boys are a ...,” Twitter, December 16,
2011, accessed December 24, 2011, as quoted by Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Al-Shabaab_(militant_group)#Twitter_account, accessed March 25, 2015.
24 Christopher Anzalone, “The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab’s Media Strategy,” CTC
Sentinel 6, no. 10 (2013): 2.
25 Anzalone, “The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab’s Media Strategy,” 5.
94 Eric Young
“Internet egalitarianism provides a concrete example of what the utopian um-

mah can look like: a community of friends, where everyone is equal and cares
for everyone else.”26
The Internet can also exacerbate biases and ‘groupthink’ as individuals self-
select which forums they participate in or which feeds they subscribe to,
thereby narrowing the scope of discussion and debate that they are exposed to
and allowing increasingly extreme ideas to become the norm. The heavy online
presence of new, tech-savvy terrorists such as IS and their supporters is ex-
posing more and more people to violent ideology and potentially increasing the
spread of radicalization. The Internet has thus facilitated worldwide recruit-
ment and the geographical spread of IS (see Case Study 6.2). In particular, IS
members’ use of the social networking site AskFM to interact with prospective
recruits and provide them with practical advice on how they can join is an illus-
tration of the evolution of terrorists’ use of the Internet.
As is evident in the case of IS, terrorist groups today are in competition with
the mainstream news media, including movies, television, gaming, music
videos and other self-organizing groups and individuals that are active online.
Terrorists have adopted the vocabulary and visual style of Hollywood, reality
TV and international advertising to great effect, which has enabled them to in-
Case Study 6.2. IS and New Frontiers in Terrorist Use of the Internet.
As quickly as IS took over large swaths of Iraq and Syria, likewise they were able to
conquer the online battle space between Salafi-jihadist terrorist organizations. Fluent
in YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and Tumblr, as well as newer platforms
such as AskFM and Kik, IS has proven itself to be a powerful media machine. It has
several official or semi-official media production wings including the Al Hayat Media
Center, al-Furqan Media, Fursan al-Balagh media, and Asawirti Media, among others.
They are able to utilize the language skills of numerous international actors in Iraq
and Syria, but also abroad. The content is not only in Arabic and English, but also in
French, German, Indonesian, Russian and Turkish.27 This content is frequently trans-
lated again into dozens of other languages. Thus far, Al Hayat and associated groups
and individuals have proven to be relatively sophisticated and highly efficient at pro-
ducing a variety of slick-looking online videos on a regular basis. This combination of
quality and quantity represents a new level of development in terrorist use of the In-
ternet and may provide a glimpse into the future of terrorism and the media.
IS’s media operations have two key strategic aims: to recruit individuals from out-
side of Iraq and Syria and to provoke the United States and its allies into a military re-
sponse. IS does this using several platforms: it has an online English-language maga-
zine (Dabiq) and produces in-depth reports (Insight into the Islamic State), both of
which bear some similarity to AQAP’s Inspire. However, IS movies, such as the Clang-
ing of the Swords, are often filmed in high definition (HD) video and contain quality
graphics and logos. This also includes their much talked about and highly stylized
26 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 117.

27 Mustapha Ajbaili, “How ISIS Conquered Social Media,” Al Arabiya News, June 24, 2014,
accessed March 26, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/digital/2014/06/
24/How-has-ISIS-conquered-social-media-.html.
videos of beheadings and other grizzly executions. IS has also been extremely active
on Twitter and other micro-blogging platforms, reportedly producing some 90,000
tweets and other social media outputs every day. These include ‘Mujatweets,’ a high-
definition video series with sophisticated graphics that appears to be designed to ap-
peal specifically to Western audiences.
IS is also adept at using techniques such as hashtag campaigns, to give the impres-
sion of a larger social-media presence and online network than it actually has. 28 They
have also created various applications, such as “Fajr al-Bashaer” (Dawn of Good Tid-
ings, @Fajr991) to target specific audiences and spread their message. In addition,
there are hundreds of amateur videos and other independent pieces of propaganda
that are uploaded onto YouTube and other platforms which are not officially pro-
duced by IS, but rather by individual members and supporters acting on their own.
Although the quality of IS’s official propaganda is much better than what has been
produced by terrorist groups in the past, in reality it is still relatively basic, shot using
readily-available commercial high-definition and digital single-lens reflex (DSLR)
cameras and edited using equally available, user-friendly software and mobile Apps.
Nevertheless, these productions have proven to be popular and highly effective re-
cruitment tools. These developments, however, should not be surprising. As men-
tioned above, terrorist groups simply adapt to the media technology of the time and IS
is doing just that. What is more interesting is IS’s particular media style and the inter-
national reaction to it. As The Guardian succinctly described it:
Pinning down Isis’s visual style is harder. The martial triumphalism has inevitably
drawn comparisons with Triumph Of The Will but the connection is tenuous – not least
because Leni Riefenstahl had the funds, hardware and ranked personnel of the Third
Reich at her disposal. Others have likened Isis’s fast-cutting stylistic overkill to Oliver
Stone’s Natural Born Killers, or even horror movies like Saw. At times, the fetishised,
HD, slo-mo combat brings to mind The Hurt Locker, Kathryn Bigelow’s Oscar-winning
Iraq war drama; at others, the cheap production values and portentous narration re-
semble a bad History Channel documentary. None of these quite capture it. What no-
body wants to admit is that Isis could have fashioned a visual aesthetic of its own.29
Much of IS’s media is likely for its own, internal consumption, to motivate its fol-
lowers and fighters. But it also clearly targets the international media, creating con-
tent which is designed to capture the attention of a global audience. With such strong
competition within the international media, along with easy online access to its in-
tended audiences, IS has been highly successful in having its story told and re-told
again. However, it is important to realize that this is largely thanks to the style of their
online productions, rather than simply content. The question is whether IS will be
able to sustain people’s interest over the long term. Will it have the capability, tech-
nical competence, and savvy to continue to produce content which seems both rele-
vant and compelling to an international audience which is already sensitized to their
brand?
28 Kathy Gilsinan, “Is ISIS’s Social-Media Power Exaggerated?” The Atlantic, February
23, 2015, accessed February 24, 2015, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2015/02/is-isiss-social-media-power-exaggerated/385726/.
29 Steve Rose, “The Isis Propaganda War: A Hi-Tech Media Jihad,” The Guardian, October
7, 2014, accessed March 24, 2015, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/07/isis-
media-machine-propaganda-war.
96 Eric Young
fluence existing and new audiences alike. They have become skilled producers
and distributors of interactive content and have thus been able to successfully
brand their product and ‘sell’ it. In that respect, terrorists are similar to inter-
national corporations and businesses in their use of new media platforms. As
well as making use of off-the-shelf technologies, they will continue to develop
their own applications and tools, and will continually adapt as technology ad-
vances in order to exploit the ever-changing media landscape to their ad-
vantage.
Countering Terrorist Use of the Media in the Future

Strategies to combat terrorist use of traditional and new media fall essentially
into three categories.30 First, governments can choose to censor content that ei-
ther covers terrorist attacks or propaganda or has been produced by terrorists
themselves. Second, governments can take a laissez-faire approach and rely
solely on self-censorship by media companies and content providers. A third
option is to take an approach somewhere in between these two poles. Censor-
ship in a democracy is not only difficult, but also often self-defeating, and ter-
rorist groups and extremist organizations are adept at remaining just within
the legal boundaries of free speech.
There is also understandably a high public demand for news about terrorist
attacks. At the other end, media entities, including Internet companies such as
Twitter and Facebook, frequently do impose some limits on the coverage or at
least access they give to terrorist organizations, and they do impose limits on
content that can be posted. Twitter, for example, frequently shuts down ac-
counts associated with terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab and IS,
though they often reappear soon thereafter under a different account. Inevita-
bly, government officials are often involved in the debate on terrorist use of the
media and are faced with difficult choices. For instance, the use of censorship
potentially undermines civil liberties and results in lost opportunities to collect
intelligence. In addition, it is government officials who are tasked with re-
sponding to and managing the consequences of successful attacks and are often
dependent upon the media themselves for information.31
The new media landscape and terrorists’ use of modern communications
technology present a variety of challenges beyond basic questions of censor-
ship. What was once a relatively simple relationship between terrorists, media
companies, and governments has been transformed and now includes terror-
ists, Internet service providers, content providers, media companies, govern-
ments and international organizations, not to mention members of the general
public who are now empowered by the same technologies. Combating terror-
30 For a good discussion on these three approaches, see COT Institute for Safety,
Security and Crisis Management, “Terrorism and the Media,” July 23, 2008, accessed
March 15, 2015, https://docs.google.com/document/preview?hgd=1&id=1X6a-
7OLuTZZN4S6Q8vBqSzNJ6DSkxf9P4be8raiW4gA&pli=1.
31 For more on this point, see Nacos, Terrorism and the Media, 122–148.
ism on this new battlefield will thus take a comprehensive, inter-agency, inter-
national and whole-of-society approach. However, given the relatively sluggish
ability of bureaucracies to adapt, this will be extremely difficult to achieve, es-
pecially given the rapid pace of change in the digital environment. Terrorists
have proved far more agile and adaptable than their government opponents
and they have readily embraced new media to the extent that it is now an inte-
gral part of their strategy and tactics.
Conclusion
Terrorist use of the media is nothing new. Terrorist groups over the last one
and a half centuries have used emerging technologies to spread their message
beyond the immediate impact zone of their attacks. Although gaining an appre-
ciation of this does not necessarily make it any easier to combat terrorist use of
the media, it certainly puts it in perspective. The fundamental challenge of try-
ing to counter terrorist exploitation of communications technology is an ongo-
ing problem. However, terrorist use of the Internet and the multitude of plat-
forms now available online have exacerbated the situation. The terrorists’ abil-
ity to produce and distribute content globally, combined with greatly enhanced
opportunities for two-way interaction are significant developments that pose
important challenges for counter-terrorism. If publicity is the “oxygen of ter-
rorism,” terrorists are now able to breathe more freely and deeply.
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Chapter 7
Terrorism and Weapons
of Mass Destruction
Robert B. Brannon
Introduction
When we think about terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it is
tempting to focus on the potential consequences. After all, almost any attack
with WMD, whether in the hands of terrorists or any other perpetrator, would
be very grave indeed. However, in order to truly understand the level of risk, it
is necessary to conduct a more detailed and objective analysis. Do terrorist or-
ganizations have the means and the will to obtain WMD or to weaponize the
necessary materials, and then also maintain, transport and successfully deploy
such weapons? Do they present a credible threat? Our perception of this pro-
cess is the key to understanding the problem and how best to deal with it.
The major focus of this chapter is on the different types of WMD, their par-
ticular characteristics and the difficulties associated with their weaponization
by current terrorist groups. The final part of the chapter examines the potential
for proliferation of harmful technologies that might allow terrorists to acquire
WMD in the future and the efforts being made by the international community
to minimize these dangers.
Chemical Weapons
Chemical weapon (CW) components are inexpensive and relatively easy to ob-
tain, but they are hard to use in tactical situations because of dispersal prob-
lems, especially when deployed in unpredictable weather conditions. In addi-
tion, there are problems of decay, meaning that CWs have a limited shelf-life
(see Case Study 7.1). This is not to say that such weapons are ineffective – quite
the opposite in fact. CWs have been described as the poor man’s atomic bomb. 1
In the hands of a savvy terrorist organization bent on causing massive harm
and hysteria, they could be very effective indeed. The ingredients necessary to
develop a CW are also easy to obtain and hard to track.
By definition, CWs use the toxic properties of chemical substances to cause
physical injury or physiological harm. CWs, namely chlorine and phosgene,
were first used in combat during the First World War. These weapons were ac-
1 The phrase has been attributed to the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Hashemi
Rafsajani in 1988. See Lord Lyell, “Chemical and Biological Weapons: The Poor Man’s
Bomb,” Committees of the North Atlantic Assembly, October 4, 1996, accessed May
22, 2015, http://fas.org/irp/threat/an253stc.htm.
99 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch07
100 Robert B. Brannon
tually made from readily available commercial ingredients. Used as choking

and blood agents, they caused respiratory damage and asphyxiation and led to
recriminations that eventually contributed to international conventions that
declared the use of these weapons to be universally unacceptable. Neverthe-
less, blister agents, such as mustard gas, were used during the Iran-Iraq war of
the 1980s and various CWs are still deployed today.
Nerve gases include highly volatile and toxic substances such as G agents
(sarin) or V agents (VX). Originally developed by Germany in the years leading
up to the Second World War, these agents were the first truly weaponized ap-
plications of chemical warfare. Sarin gas was reportedly used by the Assad re-
gime against opposition forces in Jobar, Syria in August 2013.2
Case Study 7.1. IS Steals Chemical Weapons at al-Muthanna.

In Iraq, approximately 60 miles north of Baghdad, near the town of Samarra, there is a
site referred to as al-Muthanna. In a letter dated 30 June 2014, the Permanent Repre-
sentative of Iraq to the United Nations reported to the Secretary General that al-
Muthanna had been recently occupied by the ‘Islamic State’ (IS). The letter alleged
that any weapons-related materials still remaining at the site were probably now in
the hands of IS, thus establishing the basis for a potential WMD threat. According to a
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report in 2007, al-Muthanna was a 100-square-
kilometer complex that had been the center of Iraq’s chemical weapons program since
the 1970s. At the time, it was identified publically as the State Establishment for
Pesticide Production (SEPP), a front company that was actually dedicated to the
production of CWs. The CIA reported that during the 1980s, ‘SEPP’ produced
hundreds of tons of sarin, VX, and mustard agents at al-Muthanna.3 Aerial bombing
during Desert Storm destroyed the site’s research and production capabilities.
Any CWs or other WMD materials that might have been taken by IS would be ob-
solete by now. Even if they had been maintained under ideal conditions, these materi-
als would almost certainly be useless after decades of neglect. The volatile contents of
CWs require careful attention to detail at every stage of development and mainte-
nance. As Stephen Hummel explains, “a chemical weapon is analogous to a glass of
salt water – left in the open, the water will evaporate, leaving behind remnants of the
original solutes.”4
After years of decay, any CW rounds discovered at al-Muthanna by IS were likely
empty, perhaps with some limited and essentially useless residue remaining as a thin
powder or solid inside the metal canisters. This residue could not realistically be re-
constituted into a threatening form today.
2 Michelle Nichols, “Syria Accuses Rebels of Planning Gas Attack Near Damascus,”
Reuters, April 2, 2014, accessed September 15, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/
article/2014/04/02/syria-crisis-chemicalweapons-un-idINL1N0MU12820140402.
3 “Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 23,
2007, accessed May 22, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-
1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5_annxB.html.
4 Stephen Hummel, “The ISIL’s Theft of WMD Components in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 7
(July 2014): 2-3.
Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction 101
Deployment of functioning CWs is not difficult, at least hypothetically. There

exists a very wide array of options for delivery of these agents as weapons, in-
cluding bombs, rockets, artillery shells, diffusion spray machines, and missile
warheads. But the large quantities required to produce mass casualties would
be very difficult to manage, regardless of the delivery option chosen for de-
ployment, and all of these options depend on suitable weather conditions.
Despite its low cost and relatively simple methodology, achieving mass cas-
ualties with a CW would require large amounts of chemical agents. Simply
stated, it is difficult to achieve lethal concentrations of most chemical agents in
sufficient quantities to cause wide-scale harm. Nonetheless, the threat is real.
Making comparisons about potential casualties associated with specific vari-
ants of WMD is inherently difficult. A study by the US Office of Technology As-
sessment conducted in 1993 5 explained hypothetically that several metric tons
of sarin gas carried in bombs and deployed by aircraft or missiles could kill as
much as half of the population of a small city whereas, by comparison, a Hiro-
shima-sized nuclear bomb of 12-kiloton yield would probably kill about half of
the population over a much larger area. But deploying several metric tons of
concentrated gas in such an operation would be a daunting challenge even for a
state actor, and much more so for a terrorist organization. The Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency has stated that “terrorist organizations are work-
ing to acquire and employ chemical, biological, and radiological materials.”6 De-
spite this dire warning, it would be exceedingly difficult for a terrorist organi-
zation to mount such an attack successfully.
There have been very few actual terrorist attacks with CWs. The best known
is probably the 1995 Japanese case involving Aum Shinrikyo’s use of sarin gas
on the Tokyo subway. The end results of the attack included 12 dead and sev-
eral thousand injured. Another attack by the same group was conducted in
Matsumoto, leading to 7 deaths and about 200 injured persons. 7 Although cer-
tainly serious, these attacks do not appear to have been cost effective given the
years of experimentation and considerable expenditure by the group. There-
fore, we may conclude that a large-scale terrorist attack with CWs is not very
likely. A more likely scenario involves combining chemical agents with conven-
tional explosives, but with relatively little additional impact. For example, this
5 Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
August 1993).
6 Testimony of Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 16 February 2012, NSA
Archive, 24, accessed May 22, 2015, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4
39/docs/Underground-BurgessThreat.pdf.
7 Dana A. Shea, Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report on Characteristics and Effects
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 13, accessed May 22, 2015,
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc227842/m1/1/high_res_d/R4286
2_2013Sep13.pdf.
has been the case when IS has added chlorine to conventional improvised ex-
plosive devices (IEDs) – mass effect perhaps, but not mass destruction.
Biological Weapons
Biological weapons (BWs) represent the use of living organisms to infect in-
tended victims with disease. These infectious diseases are generally rare in na-
ture. Biological agents can be divided into several categories, including bacteria
(anthrax), viruses (smallpox), rickettsiae (Q fever), and toxins (ricin).
Because these biological agents are alive, they spontaneously replicate. This
factor potentially increases the lethality if used as a weapon – an attractive op-
tion for a terrorist intent on perpetrating widespread harm in a specific popu-
lation. This makes BWs second only to nuclear from the perspective of num-
bers of people potentially killed or injured. Simple infrastructure associated
with agriculture, cooking, food storage, hospitals or pharmacies would be suffi-
cient to develop and maintain an arsenal of these weapons. Like CWs, BWs are
thus theoretically inexpensive and relatively easy to obtain, but also like CWs
they are very difficult to employ with any reasonable expectation of achieving
specific, desired results (see Case Study 7.2).
The fact that biological agents are alive is perhaps the principal reason they
are so hard to use as weapons. For example, the heat resulting from an explo-
sion in dispersal would likely result in killing the organisms before they could
cause significant harm. Weather could have equally debilitating consequences
because either wind or rain might cause physical changes to the basic elements
of composition. Using biological agents as weapons is therefore much more
complicated than most people realize.
Terrorist attempts to use biological agents have mostly fallen short of suc-
cess. Almost all threats to use BWs have proven to be false alarms. In one fa-
mous example, Aum Shinrikyo tried to produce and weaponize botulinum toxin
Case Study 7.2. The Rajneesh and Salmonella.8

In 1984 a cult-style group in Oregon called the Rajneesh, or Rajneeshees, decided to
use salmonella bacteria to infect the local population in an effort to preclude a ‘fair’
election. The group decided to place small amounts of the infectious toxin into salad
bars at certain restaurants. In the end, hundreds of people succumbed to the ill effects
of salmonella. Nevertheless, the election (though somewhat disrupted) went ahead.
No one died, and it was months before the attack was attributed to its source.
One wonders how the decision to conduct this attack was reached. There was no
effort to target a specific segment of the voting population. The attack was neither
claimed nor credited for a long time (and thus there was no real fear) and it failed to
achieve the desired results. This case, while relatively minor, helps to illustrate the
limitations and difficulties associated with BWs. Even more toxic biological agents
lack accuracy and are unlikely to achieve ‘mass destruction.’
8 Kristin Crowe, “Salad Bar Salmonella,” Forensic Examiner 16, no. 2 (2007): 24.
and weapons-grade anthrax bacteria. However, their efforts failed, ultimately

leading to the decision to develop CWs instead. When the long feared bioter-
rorism attack finally took place, it was not what the experts had predicted. In
the United States in October 2001, letters containing anthrax were sent to
members of congress and the media. The perpetrator either did not realize that
sophisticated dispersal mechanisms were required for mass casualties from
anthrax or else simply did not care. Tragically, the letters killed 5 and infected
18, but this incident created mass hysteria rather than mass destruction.
Radiological Weapons
Radiological weapons (RWs), or so-called ‘dirty bombs,’ are not nearly as de-
structive as nuclear weapons, and yet pose a serious danger, particularly as a
terrorist threat. Dirty bombs are weapons that use conventional explosives to
disseminate radioactive materials. It would be relatively simple to build and
easy to use a common explosive such as dynamite or C4, with some form of ra-
dioactive material attached, perhaps in the physical form of a powder or even
gas. However, the scale of destructive impact would be directly related more to
the explosion than to the radioactivity.
Dirty bombs are just one form of radiological dispersal device (RDD). Dis-
persion is also possible by depositing radioactive material in soil, food or wa-
ter, or using some form of airborne distribution system such as a crop-duster.9
In January 2014, the US Attorney’s office indicted Glendon Crawford and Eric
Feight for planning to develop a lethal radiation emitting device. According to
the FBI, the essence of the scheme was the creation of a mobile, remotely oper-
ated device capable of silently killing targeted individuals with lethal doses of
X-ray radiation.10 Despite these intentions, radiation scientists concluded that
the plan was not possible, describing it as “the stuff of comic books.” 11 Nev-
ertheless, the case demonstrates terrorists’ creativity and serves as an im-
portant reminder that all dual-use technologies must be safeguarded.
As with chemical and biological agents, the invisible and uncertain danger
from RWs would probably cause widespread fear and panic. A terrorist act in-
volving the dispersal of radioactive materials could contaminate a wide area,
making the treatment of casualties more difficult. Commercial and economic
losses might be sizable and long lasting, with recovery depending upon expen-
sive removal and cleansing operations.
9 “Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs),” Radiation Emergency Medical Management,

November 21, 2014, accessed May 22, 2015, http://www.remm.nlm.gov/rdd.htm.
10 “Capital District Man Indicted on Three Felony Charges Related to Development of
Lethal Radiation Device,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, January 17, 2014, accessed
April 6, 2015, http://www.fbi.gov/albany/press-releases/2014/capital-district-man-
indicted-on-three-felony-charges-related-to-development-of-lethal-radiation-device.
11 Michael Virtanen, “X-Ray Plot: Judge Says Glendon Scott Crawford, Eric J. Feight
Should Stay Jailed,” Huffington Post, June 20, 2013, accessed May 22, 2015,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/20/x-ray-plot_n_3474109.html.
RWs may be attractive options for terrorists owing to the relative ease of
their acquisition and use, as well as for their mass disruption potential. In
2007, a sting operation in the Republic of Georgia led to the arrest of a man
who was trying to sell a small amount (reportedly only 3.5 ounces, or about
100 grams) of highly enriched uranium.12 Although not enough material to
make a weapon, had it been strapped to a stick of dynamite and detonated, it
would have resulted in considerable panic. This incident represents one of the
most serious cases of smuggling of nuclear/radioactive material in recent
years, although there have been many other such incidents (see Case Study
7.3).
Despite the potential danger, it is important to remember that a dirty bomb
is not a nuclear device. The impact would be significant, but not truly mass de-
struction. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that internal consumption of ra-
diological material would be more harmful than the side-effects of a so-called
dirty bomb.13 Radiological threats can also rise from nuclear-related accidents
or sabotage. If someone flew an airplane into a nuclear power plant, conceiva-
bly it could cause an accident on the scale of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986,
which resulted in long-lasting radiological fallout. However, such an effect
could not be guaranteed and the event would not cause a nuclear reaction.
Nuclear Weapons
Of the four types of WMD, terrorist use of nuclear weapons arguably has the
lowest probability. Because of this, it is often all-too-easily dismissed. Yet nu-
clear weapons also have by far the greatest destructive capabilities – they are
the only true weapons of mass destruction. Few states have them, and as far as
we know, no terrorist organization has yet obtained them. We often speak of
these special weapons in terms of zero tolerance. What that means is simply
that there is no room for error. When the first nuclear weapons were devel-
oped, the process was so difficult and so expensive that it was thought that the
potential for proliferation was extremely limited. However, it is also true that
the gap between peaceful, or commercial, use of a nuclear program and poten-
tially harmful, or offensive, capability has narrowed. It is indeed possible that a
terrorist group could possess, and perhaps even use, a nuclear weapon in the
future.
12 Desmond Butler, “Georgian Sting Seizes Bomb Grade Uranium,” Washington Post,
January 24, 2007, accessed May 20, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/24/AR2007012401673_pf.html.
13 For example, Alexander Litvenenko died as a result of ingesting polonium 210 that
allegedly had been slipped into his tea at a London hotel in 2006 (see Luke Harding
and Ian Sample, “Polonium-210: The Hard-to-Detect Poison that Killed Alexander
Litvinenko,” The Guardian, November 6, 2013, accessed May 22, 2015,
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/06/polonium-210-poison-alexander-
litvinenko.
Case Study 7.3. Stolen Radiological Materials.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented 16 cases, confirmed
by the various states involved, of unauthorized possession of plutonium or highly en-
riched uranium (HEU) over the past decade.14 The number of thefts (or otherwise
missing inventory) of other forms of radioactive materials is much greater. In fact, the
record of lost material that could be used to build a dirty bomb is so long that it is
surprising that there has not yet been a terrorist attack using one or more of these
crude devices. The reason may simply be related to the dangers involved. Most cases
involving radioactive materials have led to death or injury for the perpetrators. Of
course, we will never know the true extent of attempted use, but it is probably fair to
conclude that these risks have had some deterrent effect.
Still, the terrorist use of some kind of dirty bomb remains a credible threat. In
1995, Chechen terrorists working under Shamil Basayev left a container of cesium
137, a radiological isotope commonly used in medical devices, at Ismailovsky Park in
Moscow.15 Basayev issued a statement to the media, threatening to detonate this de-
vice along with several others already in place around the city. When the plot was
defused and the device recovered, there was no explosive attached, but the cesium
was there as advertised.
More recently, in December 2013 in Mexico, a crew of men hijacked a cargo truck
that was transporting a 40 gram cache of radioactive cobalt. Apparently without re-
alizing what they had until it was too late, the crew opened the container, discovered
the dangerous material, and fled. All of the material was recovered and the six men
involved were eventually arrested and given medical treatment for radiation poison-
ing.16 Cobalt-60 is used in medical radiotherapy and to sterilize certain foods because
the gamma rays kill bacteria without damaging the product. If released into the envi-
ronment, however, it can be harmful. As with many other radioactive materials, it is a
viable, yet risky candidate for making dirty bombs.
The purpose of this section is not to explain in detail every aspect of the sci-
ence involved in building and maintaining a nuclear weapon. Yet, it is helpful to
explain the essentials of that process in order to understand its risks and limi-
tations. Understanding these requirements enables us to grasp the scope of the
problem, and perhaps to know how best to deal with it. Nuclear explosions re-
lease energy by way of fission or fusion. Damage results from extremely high
temperatures as well as shock waves and enduring residual radiation. The
14 James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, CNS Global Incidents and Traffick-
ing Database 2014 Annual Report (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2015), 6, accessed May
22, 2015, http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/global_incidents_and_trafficking2015_
2.pdf?_=1430242792.
15 See, for example, Jeffrey Bale, “The Chechen Resistance and Radiological Terrorism,”
The Nuclear Threat Initiative, April 1, 2004, accessed April 6, 2015, www.nti.org/
analysis/articles/chechen-resistance-radiological-terror/.
16 Gabriella Martinez and Joshua Partlow, “Stolen Cobalt-60 Found in Mexico,” Washing-
ton Post, December 5, 2013, accessed June 9, 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/
world/stolen-cobalt-60-found-in-mexico-curious-thieves-likely-doomed/2013/12/
05/262ef990-5d66-11e3-8d24-31c016b976b2_story.html.
scale of destruction is enormous. One relatively compact nuclear weapon can

destroy a mid-sized city, as demonstrated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.
A basic knowledge of nuclear science is readily accessible online, but it can
be difficult to understand and apply. Nuclear fission weapons produce energy
by splitting the nucleus of an atom, usually of HEU or plutonium, into two or
more parts by bombarding it with neutrons. Each nucleus that is split releases
energy and additional neutrons that bombard nearby nuclei and sustain the
chain reaction that leads to an explosion. Significantly, nuclear materials are
difficult to obtain in the right specifications. Uranium appears in nature pri-
marily in two isotopes: 238 and 235. When the nucleus of a uranium-235 atom
absorbs a neutron, it undergoes nuclear fission, splitting into two “fission
products” and releasing energy, along with other neutrons, thus setting off a
chain reaction. Uranium-238, on the other hand, absorbs neutrons and does not
fission, effectively putting a stop to any ongoing reaction. Therefore, an atomic
bomb based on uranium would need to be made of almost completely pure
uranium-235.
Plutonium can also be used to create a fission reaction. In fact, plutonium is
highly fissile, unstable, and potentially dangerous. There are a number of other
radioactive, or nuclear, elements such as certain isotopes of cesium, thorium,
and polonium, the latter made famous in the case of the unfortunate Mr.
Litvenenko (see note 13). Most of these other elements are not inherently ‘fis-
sile.’ They will kill if ingested but are not suitable for making a nuclear bomb.
In order to understand how difficult it is to build a nuclear weapon, consider
these facts. For a fission type weapon to work there must be a critical mass of
fissile material bombarded with neutrons in order to set off a nuclear chain re-
action. This ‘mass’ must be sufficiently dense and compact to achieve exactly
the right physical conditions. Too much and it explodes too soon; too little and
it will not explode at all.
The simplest form of nuclear weapon would be a gun-type fission weapon.
Such a weapon brings together two sub-critical masses of uranium 235 which
are literally shot into one another. The result would be a super-critical mass
which, when bombarded with neutrons, would undergo fission at a rapid rate,
resulting in a nuclear explosion. Another approach involves using chemical ex-
plosives to implode a sub-critical sphere of the more highly fissile and unstable
plutonium, which would increase its density until it forms a critical mass. Plu-
tonium is too unstable for a gun type weapon because of the likelihood of
premature detonation, but it is far more effective in that it can produce much
more energy. The difficulties with implosion involve making the chemical ex-
plosives that deliver a perfectly uniform shock wave upon the plutonium
sphere. If even slightly asymmetric, the weapon would merely fizzle creating a
toxic, messy and expensive failure.
Although it might be easy to obtain information about the manufacture of a
nuclear bomb, this is not the same as having a detailed working knowledge of
what is an exceptionally difficult process. At least two things must be present to
make a nuclear weapon: expert knowledge and requisite materials. So far,
these essential ingredients have been the exclusive property of states. Today,
only nine nations (including the recent addition of North Korea) are known to
have nuclear weapons. Iran is known to have a nuclear program but its ambi-
tions to become a nuclear-armed state are still uncertain. However, there is no
guarantee that nuclear weapons will be the exclusive purview of states in the
future.
Despite the scientific and technological challenges, it only takes approxi-
mately fifteen pounds (about 8 kilograms) of plutonium, or about 25 kilograms
for HEU, to build the smallest and ‘simplest’ nuclear weapon. This material
could be placed in a lead shielded cylinder measuring roughly 12 by 6 centime-
ters. With sufficient lead shielding, the material could potentially evade detec-
tion by screening machines in airports or at border crossings that use simple
radiation detection devices. Consequently, the possibility that terrorists might
obtain the requisite materials to build a bomb is very real (see Case Study 7.4).
In the context of this discussion, nuclear proliferation may be the greatest
threat to international security as the knowledge required to build nuclear
weapons is now far more widespread. Proliferation risks essentially fall into
four categories: 1) the knowledge and technological capability to make the
weapons; 2) materials that can be weaponized; 3) the weapons themselves,
and 4) the means to deliver them. Despite the fact that knowledge is readily
available, and technology can be bought or coerced, terrorist organizations al-
most certainly do not have the capability to build and maintain a nuclear arse-
nal of their own. Attention is perhaps better directed at how proliferation could
connect a terrorist organization with an existing weapon or nuclear materials
held by a state.
Paradoxically, future expectations are raised both for reducing nuclear
weapons arsenals and for the possibility of the first hostile atomic explosion
since 1945. The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) remains the pillar of international nuclear security. The treaty
recognizes only five nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russia, China,
France, and the United Kingdom) that enjoy special rights and privileges under
international law. The NPT regime remained remarkably stable until after the
Cold War. However, since then the development of nuclear weapons by India,
Pakistan and North Korea, as well as suspicions concerning Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram, have shaken confidence in the NPT regime to control nuclear prolifera-
tion. Therefore, the risk that terrorists could purchase or steal nuclear materi-
als from a ‘rogue state’ is arguably greater than ever before.
One such state is North Korea, which was included on the State Depart-
ment’s list of state sponsors of terrorism until 2008. North Korea boasts of an
active nuclear weapons program and has conducted tests with cruise missiles
as well as medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In addition, the
country has a large stockpile of chemical and possibly biological weapons. A
decade of international efforts to quell North Korea’s nuclear ambitions has so
far been unsuccessful.
Case Study 7.4. Broken Arrows and Loose Nukes.

Since any current terrorist organization would likely find it impossible to build a nu-
clear weapon, the easiest route to acquisition would be theft. To date, there is no evi-
dence that a terrorist organization has actually stolen a ‘nuke,’ but there have been
several significant incidents that cast doubt on nuclear security.
In United States nuclear parlance, a “Broken Arrow” is defined as an unexpected
event involving nuclear weapons that results in the accidental launching, firing, deto-
nating, or loss of the weapon. Despite extraordinary efforts to safeguard these weap-
ons, since 1950 there have been 32 documented nuclear weapon accidents identified
as Broken Arrows, including six nuclear weapons that have been lost and never re-
covered.17 Furthermore, when the Soviet Union collapsed there were many rumors of
‘loose nukes,’ meaning lost or stolen nuclear weapons. Usually these stories involved
smaller, so-called ‘suitcase’ weapons, but despite colorful details and several trails of
evidence, there has been no proof to date that any were actually stolen. Even if there
were lost or stolen nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the Cold War, by now they
would almost certainly have been rendered useless by the passage of time and lack of
maintenance.
Despite substantial security measures, theft of a nuclear weapon today is not im-
possible. In 2012, three anti-war activists breached security at a site in Tennessee
where most of the uranium used to maintain America’s nuclear arsenal was stored.
The activists gained access to weapons grade nuclear materials after apparently
breaking through three barriers, including a faulty electric fence, using ordinary bolt
cutters. They evaded capture until they had hung up anti-nuclear banners and daubed
blood on the walls of the complex.18 Although the protesters’ motives were peaceful,
had they been terrorists the resultant security compromise could have had much
more serious consequences.
Notwithstanding remote probabilities, it is still conceivable that a terrorist group
could gain possession of a nuclear weapon. Even one would be enough to wreak un-
imaginable havoc in almost any terrorism scenario – hence the need for a zero toler-
ance approach to gaps in security.
Although not a “rogue state,” Pakistan (like North Korea), is not a member of
the NPT. Concerns about Pakistan’s role in proliferation were highlighted by
the case of Dr. Abdul Quadeer (AQ) Khan. A respected and highly regarded sci-
entist and citizen of Pakistan, AQ Khan sold blueprints, technical design data,
specifications, components, machinery, enrichment equipment, and gas cen-
trifuges in a kind of nuclear shopping mall enterprise that ran unchecked for
years. He used middle-men and transit points in Dubai, Germany, Malaysia,
17 “Broken Arrows: Nuclear Weapons Accidents,” Atomic Archive.com, undated,

accessed May 22, 2015, http://www.atomicarchive.com/Almanac/Brokenarrows_
static.shtml.
18 Devika Bhatt, “I’ll Do Jail, Says Nun, 84, Who Broke into Nuclear Warhead Site,” The
Times, February 17, 2014, 34.
South Africa, Turkey, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, to name some of
the more than 30 countries that were involved.19
Iran remains within the NPT, but its nuclear development program has
raised international concerns and is currently the subject of intense negotia-
tions. A recent IAEA report expresses guarded optimism. Iran has broadly co-
operated with monitoring and verification arrangements, but significant areas
of disagreement remain.20 If negotiations break down, Iran could pursue a nu-
clear weapons program legally by withdrawing from the NPT. If that should
happen, other states in the region might initiate or revive their nuclear weap-
ons programs in response, and of course Israel might find it impossible to re-
sist the urge to act preemptively in its own self-defense.
Add to this already volatile cocktail of instability the presence of a terrorist
group such as IS and we have a recipe for risk that may prove intolerable for
the entire global community. Some alarmist and unsubstantiated reports in the
media quoted ‘IS sources’ claiming that the group already has WMDs, including
a ‘nuclear’ weapon.21 There is evidence that AQ, especially prior to 9/11,
showed an active interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and even concocted
the religious arguments justifying their use.22 It is therefore unlikely that IS
would have ideological qualms about employing such weapons, should they ac-
tually acquire them. However, it is by no means clear that the group’s leader-
ship has any real intent, let alone the capability or opportunity to pursue the
development and weaponization of a nuclear device.
Although such an attack remains improbable, the international community
recognizes the particular hazard that nuclear terrorism represents. For exam-
ple, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), co-founded by
the US and Russia, includes 86 member states. The GICNT’s mission is to
“strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terror-
ism by conducting multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies,
procedures, and interoperability of partner nations.”23 UN resolution 1540 was
enacted in the aftermath of the discovery of the AQ Khan network. The resolu-
tion calls upon states to “refrain from providing any form of support to non-
19 For a detailed description of the AQ Khan case see William Langewiesche, “The Wrath
of Khan,” The Atlantic, November 2005, accessed May 22, 2015,
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/the-wrath-of-khan/304333/.
20 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of
Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, March 4, 2015, accessed
May 22, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2015-15.pdf.
21 See, for example, Reissa Su, “ISIS Threatens Use of Nuclear Bomb in London,”
International Business Times, December 2, 2014, accessed May 22, 2015,
http://au.ibtimes.com/isis-threatens-use-nuclear-bomb-london-un-ambassador-
warns-weapons-mass-destruction-1393880.
22 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and Against
Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, January 2011).
23 “The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” US Department of State,
undated, accessed May 22, 2015, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18406.htm.
state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport,

transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of de-
livery.”24
A number of specific measures have also been taken to address the nuclear
terrorism threat since 9/11. Among these is the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI), established in 2003, which aims to interdict shipments of cargo that
might contain WMD components. Although membership of the PSI is voluntary,
102 nations were participating in efforts to block the transfer of weapons and
technology to terrorists by 2013.25 Other initiatives have addressed vulnera-
bilities such as container security, commercial radioactivity sources and the
storage and transportation of nuclear materials. However, much work remains
to be done. In a speech to the American Nuclear Society in 2013, Senator Sam
Nunn summed up the situation with the following statement: “Today, the ele-
ments of a perfect storm are in place around the world: an ample supply of
weapons-usable nuclear materials, an expansion of the technical know-how to
build a crude nuclear bomb, and the determination of terrorists to do it. This
should be a grave concern for all of us. Terrorists don’t need to go where there
is the most material; they are likely to go where the material is most vulnera-
ble.”26 Similarly, Barrack Obama acknowledged early in his presidency that
“Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear ma-
terials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are de-
termined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are
centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations
break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.”27
Conclusion
Despite the currently threatening landscape of proliferation, there is an estab-
lished international norm that countries should not possess or use either bio-
logical or chemical weapons. Most of the world’s known stockpiles of BWs have
been destroyed and the bulk of the global CW arsenals will hopefully be elimi-
nated in the next ten years. Global expectations are that the existing stockpiles
of nuclear weapons will also be reduced, even if their elimination remains a
distant prospect. However, these optimistic forecasts apply only to states and
are not valid for violent non-state actors. Few, if any, terrorist groups currently
24 UN Security Council, Resolution 1540 (2004), April 28, 2004, accessed May 22, 2015,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540%20(2004).
25 Naeem Salik, “Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Danger,” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 2
(2014): 180.
26 Sam Nunn, “Remarks to the American Nuclear Society,” November 11, 2013, accessed
June 9, 2015, http://www.nti.org/analysis/speeches/remarks-senator-sam-nunn-
american-nuclear-society/.
27 “Remarks by President Barrack Obama,” The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, April 5, 2009, accessed May 22, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.
possess the necessary combination of intent, capability and opportunity to ac-

quire and employ CBRN weapons. But the potentially catastrophic conse-
quences of such an attack mean that it has to be accorded a CT risk assessment
priority out of all proportion to its likelihood.
Contemporary independent, networked groups, underpinned by an apoca-
lyptic jihadist ideology, might posses the motivation to use CBRN in terrorist
attacks. Thankfully however, as this chapter has argued, these groups face sig-
nificant practical and technological barriers before they can produce viable
weapons, transport them to their targets and mount successful mass casualty
attacks. To summarize, CWs are easy to manufacture, but they inflict relatively
limited damage over small areas and dissipate fairly quickly. Harmful biological
agents can be grown in most medical laboratories, but it is very difficult to turn
these agents into effective weapons. Prompt inoculation and quarantine could
also limit the number of victims and the areas affected. Radiological weapons
are relatively easy to build and deploy and yet they also place their users at
risk. Furthermore, they are not truly weapons of mass destruction. More accu-
rately, they are weapons of mass effect. As for nuclear weapons, despite the fact
that it takes relatively small amounts of plutonium or HEU to build such a de-
vice, these materials are extremely difficult to produce and weaponize.
In light of this assessment, terrorist attacks using strictly conventional
weapons remain by far the most likely threat. Nonetheless, the combined de-
structive and disruptive capabilities of CBRN technologies will continue to
make them attractive to violent, non-state actors. Worryingly, the possibility of
terrorists acquiring such technology has increased. There are no grounds for
complacency.
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un-idINL1N0MU12820140402.
Nunn, Sam. “Remarks to the American Nuclear Society,” November 11, 2013.
Accessed June 9, 2015. http://www.nti.org/analysis/speeches/remarks-
senator-sam-nunn-american-nuclear-society/.
Office of Technology Assessment. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, August 1993.
Salik, Naeem. “Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Danger.” Strategic Analysis 38,
no. 2 (2014): 173-84.
Shea, Dana A. Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report on Characteristics and Ef-
fects. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. Accessed
May 22, 2015. http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc227842/
m1/1/high_res_d/R42862_2013Sep13.pdf.
Su, Reissa. “ISIS Threatens Use of Nuclear Bomb in London.” International Busi-
ness Times, December 2, 2014. Accessed May 22, 2015. http://au.ibtimes.com/
isis-threatens-use-nuclear-bomb-london-un-ambassador-warns-weapons-
mass-destruction-1393880.
Testimony of Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Director, Defense Intel-
ligence Agency, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 16 Febru-
ary 2012, NSA Archive. Accessed May 22, 2015. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB439/docs/Underground-BurgessThreat.pdf.
UN Security Council. Resolution 1540 (2004), April 28, 2004. Accessed May 22,
2015. www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540%20
(2004).
US Department of State. “The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,”
undated. Accessed May 22, 2015. http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18406.htm.
Virtanen, Michael. “X-Ray Plot: Judge Says Glendon Scott Crawford, Eric J.
Feight Should Stay Jailed.” Huffington Post, June 20, 2013. Accessed May 22,
2015. www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/20/x-ray-plot_n_3474109.html.
Chapter 8
Jihadist Foreign Fighters
and ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorism
Sam Mullins
Introduction
By April 2015, it was estimated that more than 25,000 ‘foreign fighters’ from
perhaps as many as 100 different countries around the world had flocked to
Syria and Iraq.1 Most are believed to have joined the so-called ‘Islamic State’
(IS) or al-Qaeda’s (AQ) official representative in the region, Jabhat al-Nusra
(JN). Not only does this contribute to continued instability in the Middle East,
but it also raises the risk of terrorist attacks committed by foreign fighters if
and when they return home. Indeed, this has already begun to happen with
successful attacks in Egypt in September 2013,2 Belgium in May 2014 3 and
Paris in November 2015. This is not to mention many historical cases as well as
continued terrorism threats emanating from Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen
among other places. At the same time, there are increasing reports of ‘lone
wolf’/ lone-actor terrorism where people inspired by IS or AQ, who have not
received terrorist training overseas, carry out attacks on their behalf. As a
result, we have seen unprecedented levels of mobilization to violent jihad and
an increased threat of terrorism worldwide.
This chapter begins by clarifying what is meant by ‘foreign fighters’ and
‘lone wolf’ terrorism and then describes how these related challenges to global
security have developed and escalated over time. It then examines who is get-
ting involved, how and why they are becoming radicalized and what they are
doing in pursuit of violent jihad. The chapter concludes with a discussion of key
concerns for counter-terrorism (CT).
1 “UN says 25,000 foreigners have joined IS group, al Qaeda,” France 24, April 2, 2015,
accessed April 2, 2015, http://www.france24.com/en/20150402-un-report-25000-
foreign-fighters-joined-islamic-state-qaeda.
2 “Cairo Suicide Bomber Identified as a Former Army Officer,” The National, October
27, 2013, accessed April 21, 2014, www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/cairo-
suicide-bomber-identified-as-a-former-army-officer.
3 “Brussels Jewish Museum Killings: Suspect ‘Admitted Attack’,” BBC News, June 1,
2014, accessed June 1, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27654505.
115 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch08

116 Sam Mullins
Terminology
Foreign fighters are defined here as anyone who leaves their country of resi-
dence, receives paramilitary-style training with a foreign terrorist organization
(FTO) and/or participates in related combat. Autonomous groups and individ-
uals operating independently of a FTO—without having been trained—will be
referred to collectively as freelance terrorists, while the term lone wolf, or lone
actor terrorist will be reserved specifically for those individuals who have
planned and/or conducted terrorist attacks entirely by themselves (lone actor
terrorism is thus a specific type or sub-set of freelance terrorism). In all cases
the focus will be upon violent jihadists who are ideologically aligned with
groups like AQ and IS and share the fundamental belief that violence against
the perceived ‘enemies of Islam’ is both justified and necessary.
From Afghanistan to Syria: The Evolution of AQ and the

‘Global Salafi Jihad’
Although Syria and Iraq are the latest destinations of choice for jihadist foreign
fighters, the practice of volunteering for violent jihad abroad has been ongoing
since the war in Afghanistan during the 1980s, which attracted tens of thou-
sands of people from around the world, including the founding members of
AQ.4 During the 1990s, foreign volunteers continued to train at camps estab-
lished by bin Laden and his associates in Afghanistan and fought in a variety of
other conflicts including Kashmir, Bosnia and Chechnya. 5 At the same time,
there was growing resentment against the United States and AQ exploited the
opportunity both to expand its network and to promote the idea of attacking
the West.
This shift towards targeting the ‘far enemy’ became increasingly evident
from 1993 onwards. In January of that year, a lone actor terrorist named Mir
Amal Kasi gunned down five CIA operatives outside the spy agency’s headquar-
ters in Langley, Virginia.6 Less than a month later, a group led by Ramzi Yousef
(the nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who had received explosives train-
ing in Pakistan) bombed the World Trade Center.7 There were also links be-
tween the training camps in Afghanistan and the group of mainly Algerian ter-
rorists responsible for the series of bombings on the French metro system in
1995, as well as French veterans of the war in Bosnia who were behind another
4 Bryan Glyn Williams, “On the Trail of the ‘Lions of Islam’: Foreign Fighters in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1980–2010,” Orbis 55, no. 2 (2011): 216–39.
5 For further details see Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters:
Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” International Security 5, no. 3 (2010): 53–94.
6 Gretchen Lacharite, “Kasi Gets Death in CIA Killings,” Washington Times, January 24,
1998, accessed July 4, 2012, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-58330821.html.
7 Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI - The Untold
Story (New York: ReganBooks, 2003).
Jihadist Foreign Fighters and ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorism 117
attempted bombing in France in 1996.8 None of these early operations were di-
rected by AQ. However, bin Laden declared war against America in August of
1996, which was followed by the formation of the “World Islamic Front against
Jews and Crusaders” and the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tan-
zania in 1998. If there was any remaining doubt that AQ meant business, this
was erased by the subsequent bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 and the attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
In the fifteen years since then, events have combined to facilitate the contin-
ued rise of jihadist foreign fighters as well as incidents of freelance and lone ac-
tor terrorism. The destruction of AQ’s base of operations in Afghanistan and
the continuous capture and killing of key operatives around the world forced
the terrorists to re-organize in order to survive. In doing so, they have been
able to capitalize on conflict and instability in Africa, the Middle East and Asia,
establishing no less than six official branches of AQ over the years and attract-
ing thousands of international supporters. Prior to the conflict in Syria, hun-
dreds of foreign jihadist volunteers made their way to train and fight in Af-
ghanistan and Northwest Pakistan after 2001.9 As many as 5,000 foreigners—
mostly from the Middle East and North Africa—fought in Iraq between 2003
and 2008.10 Several hundred travelled to Somalia to join with al-Shabaab begin-
ning around 2006,11 while significant—but unknown—numbers also joined
with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen and al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in West Africa, as well as a variety of other organiza-
tions.
AQ was thus able to transform during this period from a relatively finite or-
ganization into a sprawling, transnational franchise. As a result, they were able
to inspire, train and sometimes directly utilize foreign volunteers for a variety
of terrorist attacks, including bombings in Casablanca and Istanbul in 2003,
Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. In spite of these successes, however, AQ’s
ability to strike against priority targets in the West diminished and its most
ambitious plans were disrupted, including the 2006 liquid bomb plot, the 2009
attempt to bring down an airplane over Detroit, and the 2010 attempted
bombing of two cargo planes also bound for the US.
No doubt frustrated by these continued failures, AQ officials have increas-
ingly sought to encourage acts of freelance and lone actor terrorism as a means
of attacking the West. There is no greater example of this than Abu Musab al-
Suri’s ‘Global Islamic Resistance Call’ which was published online in 2005. In it,
8 Stewart Bell, “Terrorist Returns: Tory Urges Ottawa to Consider Revoking Citizen-
ship,” National Post, February 26, 2005, accessed April 4, 2015, http://army.ca/
forums/index.php?topic=27388.0.
9 Williams, “On the Trail of the ‘Lions of Islam’.”
10 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Return of Sunni Foreign Fighters in Iraq,” The Washington Insti-
tute, June 12, 2014, accessed June 13, 2014, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/the-return-of-sunni-foreign-fighters-in-iraq.
11 Christopher Anzalone, “Kenya’s Muslim Youth Center and Al-Shabab’s East African
Recruitment,” CTC Sentinel 5, no. 10 (2012): 9–13.
118 Sam Mullins
al-Suri introduces the concept of nizam, la tanzim (system, not organization),

which bears some similarity to the doctrine of fourth generation warfare and
emphasizes the need for further decentralization of the movement to allow for
increasingly autonomous acts of terrorism.12 In line with this strategy, promi-
nent jihadists such as Adam Gadahn have repeatedly called on supporters liv-
ing in the West to conduct attacks on their own initiative. This has also been a
recurring theme in Inspire magazine, which beginning in 2010 published a se-
ries of articles on “open source jihad,” including instructions on “bomb making
techniques, security measures, guerilla tactics, weapons training and all other
jihad related activities.”13 In the spring of 2013, these articles were compiled to
form the “Lone Mujahid Pocketbook” – a “step-by-step guide” to becoming a
freelance terrorist.14
Against this backdrop, jihadist-inspired freelance terrorism has steadily in-
creased since 9/11 with attacks taking place in the US, UK, Netherlands, France,
Germany, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Canada and Australia. Lone actors in partic-
ular are difficult to detect in advance and have been responsible for the vast
majority of attacks completed on Western soil.15 At the same time, they are
generally less capable than those who are trained and supported by a FTO and
rarely succeed in killing large numbers of people. Indeed, AQ’s ability to train
and dispatch operatives to the West was severely reduced and by 2011 the
‘global jihad’ appeared to be struggling. Yet neither the ‘Arab Spring’ nor the
death of bin Laden were enough to finish it. Instead, the war in Syria and the
renewal of conflict in Iraq breathed new life into the movement. Five factors in
particular have combined to feed the ever-growing surge of foreign fighters to
the region: 1) the widespread perceived legitimacy of the fight against Assad;
2) the political and theological significance of the region; 3) the success of IS in
actually creating an ‘Islamic State’; 4) the widespread use of social media for
networking and distribution of propaganda, and 5) the relative ease with which
volunteers are able to enter the conflict zone.
As a result, there are now more jihadist foreign fighters than ever before,
while at the same time there is an increased threat from freelance terrorists
and lone actors. Although AQ has been overshadowed by IS since it officially
became a separate entity in February 2014 and the two remain bitter rivals, IS
has followed AQ’s example by calling on Muslims everywhere to “kill any disbe-
12 Andrew Black, “Al-Suri’s Adaptation of Fourth Generation Warfare Doctrine,”

Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 18 (2006), accessed April 4, 2015, www.jamestown.org/
programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=908.
13 Al-Malahem Media, Inspire, 1 (2010), p. 32, accessed April 5, 2015,
http://jihadology.net/2010/06/30/al-qa%e2%80%99idah-in-the-arabian-
peninsula-releases-it-first-english-language-magazine-inspire/.
14 Al-Malahem Media, Lone Mujahid Pocketbook (2013), accessed April 5, 2015,
http://jihadology.net/2013/03/02/al-mala%E1%B8%A5im-media-presents-a-new-
booklet-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-peninsula-the-lone-mujahid-pocketbook/.
15 Sam Mullins, ‘Home-Grown’ Jihad: Understanding Islamist Terrorism in the US and UK
(London: Imperial College Press, 2016), chapter 2.
liever” using any means available.16 Numerous acts of freelance terrorism per-
petrated since then appear to have been at least partially inspired by IS,
although the reality is sometimes complicated (see Case Study 8.1). What is
abundantly clear, however, is the fact that both foreign fighters and freelance/
lone-actor terrorists present significant challenges to global security and will
continue to do so for the foreseeable future.
Case Study 8.1. The Charlie Hebdo Attacks.17

On January 7, 2015 two brothers, Said and Cherif Kouachi, attacked the offices of the
French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, killing a total of 12 people, including
a Muslim police officer. The motivation for the attack was revenge for having printed
cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. The next day, Amedy Coulibaly (an associate of
the Kouachi brothers who had met Cherif whilst in prison) gunned down a female po-
lice officer and fled the scene. On January 9, the Kouachis were tracked down to
Dammartin-en-Goele, where they took a hostage at a printing factory and were sur-
rounded. That same day, Coulibaly (believed to have been assisted by his wife, Hayat
Boumeddiene), took several hostages at a Jewish deli in Paris, killed four and de-
manded the release of his friends. Both sieges came to an end that evening after the
Kouachis came out shooting at police and special forces stormed the deli shortly af-
terwards. All of the terrorists were killed with the exception of Boumeddiene, who is
thought to have fled to Syria.
In the aftermath of the attacks it emerged that the Kouachi brothers had previ-
ously trained with AQAP in Yemen, where they had met with Anwar al-Awlaki and
had allegedly received ongoing support for the operation. Coulibaly, it seems, had not
received terrorist training overseas. However, prior to taking hostages at the deli he
had recorded a video in which he declared allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and IS,
and also claimed to have coordinated his actions with the Kouachis. It seems Coulil-
baly had also received instructions via email from an address located in Syria, alt-
hough there is no evidence at present that he had been there himself. This particular
case therefore involved a combination of trained foreign fighters and freelance terror-
ists, who were affiliated/inspired by rival organizations and yet together were able to
perpetrate a series of highly effective terrorist attacks.
Profiles
Research has consistently shown that there is no single demographic profile of
a terrorist. Young males of course make up the majority of foreign fighters and
freelance terrorists, but increasing numbers of females are also getting in-
16 Abdul Hameed Bakier, “The Islamic State Issues a Statement in an Effort to End the
Inter-Jihadist Rivalry,” Terrorism Monitor 12, no.19 (October 2014), accessed April 5,
2015, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%
5d=42941.
17 Greg Botelho and Ray Sanchez, “France: Raids Kills 3 Suspects, Including 2 Wanted in
Charlie Hebdo Attack,” CNN, January 21, 2015, accessed April 6, 2015,
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/09/europe/charlie-hebdo-paris-shooting/.
120 Sam Mullins
volved and there is a great deal of diversity. People who are socially, politically,
and economically marginalized may be particularly susceptible to radicaliza-
tion and recruitment. However, there are many well-educated people with rela-
tively good prospects in life who are also drawn to terrorism. For instance,
Walid Badr, who trained in Syria and blew himself up in Cairo in September
2013, had previously risen to the rank of major in the Egyptian army.18 In Au-
gust 2014, it was reported that a Tunisian chemistry and physics student was
the owner of a laptop found in Syria which contained instructions for chemical
and biological weapons.19 In March 2015, it was reported that a group of nine
British medical students had gone to join IS.20 There are many more examples
like this from recent history, which demonstrate that it is not simply poor and
uneducated people who are involved in jihadist terrorism. Similarly, although
the majority of foreign fighters who have gone to Syria and Iraq are believed to
come from the Middle East and North Africa, up to 20 percent have come from
Western Europe, with significant numbers coming from elsewhere around the
globe – thus demonstrating that it is an incredibly diverse phenomenon.21
Given that there is no uniform profile of a foreign fighter and reliable data
are generally lacking, it is unclear to what extent lone actor jihadists are differ-
ent. In contrast to foreign fighters, it appears that most appear to come from
the West. However, there have also been cases in the United Arab Emirates, for
example, and as far afield as Indonesia. A growing number of non-Western
countries are therefore becoming affected. Perhaps most significantly, research
suggests that lone actors are more likely to be suffering from some form of psy-
chopathology and are more likely to be described as socially isolated at the
time of conducting an attack.22 Nevertheless, and despite the relatively small
numbers involved, there is still a wide variety of people who are willing to re-
sort to acts of terrorism by themselves, just as there is among those who
choose to join with FTOs.
18 “Cairo Suicide Bomber Identified as a Former Army Officer.”

19 Harald Doornbos and Jenan Moussa, “Found: The Islamic State’s Terror Laptop of
Doom,” Foreign Policy, August 28, 2014, accessed August 29, 2014,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/28/found-the-islamic-states-terror-laptop-of-
doom/.
20 “Nine British Medics Feared to Have Crossed into Syria,” BBC News, March 27, 2015,
accessed March 27, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32006445.
21 Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000;
Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,” International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation, January 27, 2015, accessed January 27, 2015, http://icsr.info/2015/
01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-
conflict-1980s/.
22 See, for example, Paul Gill, John Horgan and Paige Deckert, “Bombing Alone: Tracing
the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists,” Journal of Fo-
rensic Sciences 59, no. 2 (2014): 425–35; Ramón Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf
Terrorism: An Assessment,” Studies in Conflict in Terrorism 33, no. 9 (2010): 854–70.
Motivations
The motives which drive jihadist foreign fighters and freelance terrorists are as
varied as their demographic profiles.23 Among foreign fighters, there is fre-
quently an altruistic desire to help and defend their fellow Muslims and to af-
fect political change. In addition, there are motives of revenge, sectarian rival-
ries, desires for meaning and adventure, a macho fascination with violence, and
the idealistic wish to live in a ‘true’ Islamic society as they see it. Some are also
motivated by a desire for redemption from a life of crime, or simply by eco-
nomic reasons for those who are living in poverty and are promised a salary to
fight for an organization like IS. For many, social motives, such as loyalty,
friendship and peer-pressure also come into play. Even lone actors see them-
selves as part of the broader social movement despite their physical isolation. 24
They are also clearly influenced by jihadist propaganda and ideology, and yet at
the same time personal motivations relating to social or psychological difficul-
ties often contribute as well.25 Ultimately, the precise mix of motivations and
goals will vary from person to person and may change over time, depending
upon circumstances (see Case Study 8.2). Realizing this complexity, jihadist or-
ganizations deliberately try to appeal to a range of different motivations in
their propaganda in order to attract as many people as possible.
Radicalization and Recruitment

Radicalization is a complex process, often involving social, behavioral and emo-
tional components as well as changes in belief. Actual recruitment to a terrorist
organization can begin as a result of bottom-up initiative on the part of ‘self-
radicalized’ groups and individuals, or as the result of top-down efforts by ac-
tive recruiters.26 For foreign fighters, social networks are crucial. For instance,
a 2009 study of foreign fighters in Iraq found that more than 80 percent of
them were recruited via local social networks within which veteran fighters
23 Frank Ciluffo, Magnus Ranstorp, and Jeffrey Cozzens, Foreign Fighters: Trends,
Trajectories and Conflict Zones (Washington, DC: George Washington University
Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2010); Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim
Foreign Fighters”; Orla Hennessy, “The Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters in Europe,”
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (2012), accessed April 14 2014,
www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Hennessy-Phenomenon-of-Foreign-Fighters-
Europe-July-2012.pdf; Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism”; Williams, “On
the Trail of the ‘Lions of Islam’.”
24 Lars Erik Berntzen and Sveinung Sandberg, “The Collective Nature of Lone-Wolf
Terrorism: Anders Behring Breivik and the Anti-Islamic Social Movement,” Terrorism
and Political Violence 26, no. 5 (2014): 759–79.
25 Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism.”
26 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 2004).
122 Sam Mullins
acted as facilitators.27 Social interaction is also likely to be important for free-

lance terrorist groups whose members effectively radicalize themselves as they
compete with one another in order to demonstrate their commitment to the
cause.28 However, for lone actor terrorists the situation is quite different. Alt-
hough lone actors are sometimes affiliated with other extremists to some ex-
tent, what is unique about them from a psychological perspective is their will-
ingness to push ahead with such violent and dangerous activity in the absence
of direct social support. This decision may be driven in part by social or psy-
chological problems, and sometimes by an apparent obsession with previous
freelance terrorists whom they wish to emulate (an apparent contagion effect).
For example, in August 2014 police in the UK arrested a young convert named
Brusthom Ziamani, who was infatuated with the killers of British soldier Lee
Rigby and was planning to conduct a similar attack.29
As noted above, lone actors, much like other freelance terrorists and foreign
fighters, are also heavily influenced by jihadist propaganda, which they fre-
quently obtain via the Internet. Indeed, the Internet has grown in significance
in recent years and social media in particular has become a vital aspect of ji-
hadist operations including propaganda, recruitment, facilitation and fundrais-
ing.30 Thus, although face-to-face interaction remains important for all but the
most isolated individuals, the Internet now plays a key role in exposing people
to extremist ideology, creating opportunities to connect with likeminded
others, and providing people with know-how. As such, it has helped to facilitate
the rise in both foreign fighters and freelance terrorism.
Operational Activities
Prior to departing their home country, foreign fighters often prepare by en-
gaging in domestic training exercises in order to improve their physical fitness.
They may also spend time raising funds (which sometimes involves criminal
activity) and conducting online research concerning details of travel and their
intended destination. Following advice issued by FTOs, they will often try to
avoid attracting attention to themselves or revealing the nature of their trip, for
example by purchasing return tickets, trying to look like tourists, taking an in-
27 Clinton Watts, “Foreign Fighters: How Are They Being Recruited? Two Imperfect
Recruitment Models,” Small Wars Journal, June 22, 2008, accessed April 14, 2014,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/foreign-fighters-how-are-they-being-
recruited.
28 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks.
29 Kiran Moodley, “Brusthom Ziamani’s Girlfriend: ‘He’d Mimic the Speech of Lee
Rigby’s Killer’,” The Independent, February 20, 2015, accessed February 20, 2015,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/brusthom-ziamanis-girlfriend-hed-mimic-
the-speech-of-lee-rigbys-killer-10059609.html.
30 For example, see Sam Jones, “Jihad by Social Media: How Thousands of Young Mus-
lims are Being Radicalised Through Social Networks and Propelled Towards Violence
in Syria,” FT Magazine, March 28, 2014, accessed March 28, 2014, www.ft.com/cms/
s/2/907fd41c-b53c-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0.html.
Case Study 8.2. Martin Couture-Rouleau.31

On the morning of October 20, 2014, a Canadian convert named Martin Couture-Rou-
leau deliberately ran down two soldiers in his car outside a mall in Quebec, killing
one. Shortly after fleeing the scene of the attack he crashed his car and emerged from
the vehicle brandishing a knife, at which point he was shot and killed by police.
Previously, Couture-Rouleau had suffered from personal problems including drug-
use, financial loss and the break-up of his marriage. He appeared to have converted to
Islam as a way of dealing with his problems, but had radicalized after absorbing ex-
tremist material online and became angry when Canada started bombing IS in Iraq.
His Internet history and social media accounts made it abundantly clear that he was
an IS supporter, and the attack took place just a few weeks after IS had called on Ca-
nadians to carry out lone-wolf attacks. In fact, he was already known to Canadian au-
thorities who had cancelled his passport three months earlier in order to prevent him
from travelling to Syria, but they had insufficient evidence to prosecute and were un-
able to dissuade him from violence. This is one of several cases where individuals
have tried, unsuccessfully, to travel abroad to become a foreign fighter and so have
resorted to lone actor terrorism instead.
direct route to the conflict zone, creating a cover story and avoiding carrying
incriminating materials.32
Once they arrive at their final destination they must undergo basic training,
which typically involves several weeks of physical exercise, instruction in fire-
arms and ideological indoctrination. More advanced courses, such as training
in explosives, are also sometimes available. However, the exact nature and
length of training varies from group to group and depending on circumstances,
as do subsequent opportunities. Some will receive nothing more than a short
course on making improvised explosive devices (IEDs) before being sent home
to conduct an attack. Others may volunteer to become suicide bombers or be
given the opportunity to participate in combat roles against opposition forces.
Occasionally, foreign fighters (such as Omar al-Shishani from Chechnya, or Abu
Sulayman al-Muhajir from Australia) obtain leadership positions. However,
such cases are relatively rare and foreign fighters often find themselves at the
bottom of the organizational hierarchy.33 Indeed, because they are generally in-
experienced, they are not particularly effective fighters and are therefore used
as cannon-fodder, or else given mundane tasks to do such as guard duty. Alter-
31 Mark Gollom and Tracey Lindeman, “Who is Martin Couture-Rouleau?” CBC News,
October 22, 2014, accessed October 23, 2014, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/who-is-
martin-couture-rouleau-1.2807285.
32 For example, see Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “ISIS
Updates Security Tips to Operatives Traveling to Syria,” American Center for
Democracy, March 25, 2015, accessed April 13, 2015, http://acdemocracy.org/isis-
updates-security-tips-to-operatives-traveling-to-syria/.
33 Hannah Lucinda Smith, “Death Row Prisoner Tells of Escape from ISIS Jail,” The
Times, April 10, 2015, accessed April 13, 2015, www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/
world/middleeast/article4406569.ece.
124 Sam Mullins
natively, they may assist in welfare activities, translation and production of

propaganda, training, recruitment, fundraising or facilitation.34
Aside from their limitations on the battlefield, foreign fighters can create
problems. They frequently struggle with local language and customs, and are
known for being particularly zealous and brutal – all of which can contribute to
alienating the local population and making life more difficult for the terror-
ists.35 In addition, they are susceptible to illness; often complain of hardship
and boredom, and attract increased, unwanted attention from international au-
thorities. On the other hand, they nevertheless add to an organization’s overall
manpower and bring with them valuable capabilities such as foreign language
and IT skills. Furthermore, they increase the ability of FTOs to strike against
overseas targets, particularly in the West, and one of the greatest concerns to-
day is the potential for returning foreign fighters to carry out terrorist attacks.
For those fighters who do return home, it seems that the majority disengage
from violent extremism. Some are deeply disillusioned by their experiences
and may even assist the authorities or actively try to dissuade others from go-
ing. However, others engage in a variety of non-violent, logistical support
roles 36 and a smaller number will actively plan and conduct attacks.37 The num-
bers involved may be few, but it is impossible to predict with certainty who will
turn to violence and who will not, or how long they may lie in wait. Ostensibly
non-violent returnees who radicalize and recruit others also present a signifi-
cant threat which may grow over time unless it is somehow controlled.
In addition, of course, there are the freelance terrorists and lone actors who
are willing to conduct attacks without any organizational support. That lack of
support generally means they are less capable, but also more difficult to detect.
The amount of time that they invest in planning and preparation varies signifi-
cantly but sometimes lasts no more than a few days, and they are increasingly
willing to use readily-available, easy-to-use weapons such as firearms, motor
vehicles, axes and knives, which are usually used to attack soft targets. As a re-
sult, freelance terrorism presents relatively few opportunities for intervention.
Challenges and Opportunities in Counter-Terrorism

Regarding foreign fighters, a great deal of effort has been made to prevent or
deter people from travelling overseas for purposes of terrorism. Governments
have broadened the range of proscribed terrorism offences to include, for ex-
34 Ciluffo, Ranstorp and Cozzens, Foreign Fighters.

35 Barak Mendelsohn, “Foreign Fighters- Recent Trends,” Orbis 55, no. 2 (2011): 189–
202.
36 Sam Mullins, “Foreign Fighters in Syria: Tracking the Trends and Assessing the
Threat,” Per Concordiam 5, no. 3 (2014): 36–43.
37 For varying estimates see Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Ex-
plaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign
Fighting,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 1–15; Mullins, ‘Home-
Grown’ Jihad, chapter 8.
ample, training or preparing for acts of terrorism as well as travelling overseas

to take part in armed hostilities. But although there have now been numerous
successful prosecutions of people who were planning to join a FTO, it is difficult
to gather sufficient evidence to be able to demonstrate prior intent before a
person acts. A popular alternative has been to make use of special administra-
tive sanctions which do not require a conviction, such as confiscation of iden-
tity or travel documents or legal restriction of civil liberties, sometimes in-
volving house arrest and limited access to Internet, communications and fi-
nances. In addition to these measures, pressure has been placed on airlines and
shipping companies to share passenger information with police as required
and border controls have been strengthened. Despite all this, thousands of
people have still been able to join FTOs in Syria and elsewhere.
Once a person is already overseas and suspected of training and fighting on
behalf of a FTO, there is relatively little that can be done. Security services do
what they can to gather intelligence and evidence that might be used in subse-
quent prosecutions, and social media has proven to be particularly valuable in
that regard. Some countries have the power to prosecute people in absentia,
however this has little impact other than to deter them from coming home. A
variety of special sanctions can also be applied at this stage, including cancella-
tion of passports, withholding of social benefits, freezing financial assets, strip-
ping a person of citizenship if they are a dual national, temporarily barring
them from returning home, and—in extreme cases—targeting suspects with
missile strikes. Putting aside arguments about whether or not such powers are
effective, their application depends on a range of legal and practical factors, and
the reality is that they are often simply not possible.
If and when a foreign fighter returns home, the general preference is to
prosecute them using whatever legislation is available, but again this is de-
pendent on sufficient evidence which is often hard to come by, since investiga-
tions within conflict zones are extremely difficult. If prosecution is not an op-
tion, there are few alternatives but to conduct a risk assessment and then con-
tinue to monitor suspects depending on the level of danger that they pose.
However, risk assessment is far from perfect and few countries have the neces-
sary resources to be able to monitor everyone effectively.
Freelance terrorists, and especially lone actors, are frequently even more of
a challenge since they tend to operate ‘under the radar.’ Nevertheless, they do
sometimes exhibit outward signs which identify them as extremists and as po-
tential threats. Extremist indicators (which also generally apply to foreign fight-
ers) include possession of terrorist propaganda, visiting certain websites, con-
nections to other extremists, and things that they say or post online in support
of terrorism. Such factors may be useful for identifying someone as a person of
interest, but—depending on legislation—provide little opportunity for legal in-
tervention. Suspects might be talked to informally, or sometimes prosecuted
for a low-level offence, but often there will be nothing that can be done.
Threat indicators are far more valuable since they tell us that a person is a
potential terrorist. It seems that freelance terrorists and lone actors frequently
126 Sam Mullins
tell other people about their plans, but are simply not taken seriously at the
time.38 What’s more, due to their inexperience and lack of training, they tend to
have three particular points of vulnerability:39 1) during the acquisition or
manufacture of weapons or improvised explosives; 2) whilst conducting sur-
veillance of targets; and 3) when actually deploying to conduct an attack. Naser
Jason Abdo, who was planning a jihadist-inspired attack on a restaurant near
Fort Hood in Texas, is an illustrative example. In July 2011 he visited a local
gun-store to buy ammunition and smokeless gunpowder needed to make ex-
plosives. However, he raised the suspicion of the clerk at the store because he
arrived in a taxi, asked what the powder he was buying was actually for and
paid in cash.40 The clerk promptly reported him to police, after which he was
arrested at a motel in possession of a variety of incriminating materials.
Slightly unusual behavior and attention to details on the part of ordinary mem-
bers of the public can sometimes make the difference between life and death.
The problem with threat indicators, however, is that the information may seem
unreliable, they tend to provide only a very limited window of opportunity for
intervention, and it is not always possible to follow them up, given limited re-
sources. In addition, similar to the challenges of dealing with foreign fighters, it
is not always possible to detain or prosecute freelance terrorists based on in-
telligence alone.
That said, intelligence of course is vital for dealing with all manner of ter-
rorism threats, and there are three areas in particular where there is always
room for improvement:41 1) international cooperation and sharing of infor-
mation between relevant government agencies; 2) cooperation with the private
sector (especially online companies such as Facebook and Twitter); and
3) positive engagement with communities and families of people affected by
extremism, for example by way of public information campaigns, community
policing, dedicated family liaison officers or work with NGOs. Enhanced
cooperation with partners, including members of the public can stimulate the
flow of information and help to identify potential foreign fighters or freelance
terrorists before they have a chance to act.
However, the question remains of what to do with suspects once they have
been identified. Ultimately, repressive measures can only hope to treat the
symptoms of the problem rather than the underlying causes, and they have
38 Gill, Horgan and Deckert, “Bombing Alone.”

39 Ramón Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and
Prevention (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 69, 83.
40 Ashley Powers and Richard Serrano, “Ft. Hood Suspect Cries Name of Defendant in
2009 Rampage,” Los Angeles Times, July 29, 2011, accessed December 24, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/29/nation/la-na-suspect-fort-hood-20110730.
41 For example, see “First Expert Meeting of the GCTF “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”
Initiative: Police and Border Law Enforcement, Judiciary, and Information Sharing,”
Global Counterterrorism Forum, May 15, 2014, accessed September 10, 2014,
https://www.thegctf.org/documents/95472/109184/14May27_Summary_First+Ex
pert+Meeting+of+FTF+Initiative_14-15+May+2014+Marrakech.pdf.
failed to prevent the growth of both foreign fighters and freelance terrorism. In
recognition of this, more and more countries are investing in so-called soft in-
terventions which are collectively referred to as countering violent extremism
(CVE – see Chapter 13). Indeed, the UN has formally noted that CVE measures
are a vital component for dealing with the problem of foreign fighters 42 and
they may also have a role to play in combating the threat of freelance terrorism.
In particular, targeted ‘de-radicalization’ programs may be used to directly en-
gage both with suspected and convicted terrorists in an attempt to reduce the
threat of violence. In other words, they may be used to prevent a person from
further radicalization, or to rehabilitate them if they are already involved in
terrorist activity, whether at home or abroad.
Such programs are by no means perfect and they are certainly no guarantee
of success. However, they add another set of tools to the CT toolbox, expand the
resources available for dealing with the problem and go some way towards
achieving a more comprehensive, ‘whole-of-society’ approach. Softer interven-
tions can also help to fill some of the gaps in ‘traditional’ CT – in particular,
what to do with: 1) people like Martin Couture-Rouleau, who have been pre-
vented from travelling abroad but who cannot be prosecuted (and therefore
present a terrorism risk at home); 2) known, radicalized freelance extremists
who have not yet broken the law; 3) people currently overseas fighting for
FTOs; 4) terrorists who are currently in prison; 5) those who have recently
been released from prison; and 6) returned foreign fighters. Even if such inter-
ventions fail to steer a person away from violence, they nevertheless raise the
level of visibility of that person and enable ongoing risk assessment.
Conclusion
Jihadist foreign fighters and freelance terrorists are often thought of as being
distinct from one another, and they do indeed represent quite different chal-
lenges to security, especially regarding visibility and capability. In addition,
genuine lone actors tend to exhibit higher rates of psychological disorder and
follow comparatively individualized pathways of radicalization. Nevertheless,
the development of both has been tied at least in part to the evolution of AQ
and the “global Salafi jihad.” Furthermore, experienced foreign fighters often
recruit and cooperate with untrained violent extremists. Sometimes people
only turn to freelance terrorism because they are unable to become a foreign
fighter, and there are overlaps on practically every dimension, from motives to
modus operandi. It is also evident that both types of terrorism have become
more common in recent years.
From the perspective of CT, it is vital to understand the similarities, connec-
tions and differences between foreign fighters and freelance terrorists and to
look for ways to prevent, manage and mitigate the threat that they pose. In do-
42 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2178, September 24, 2014, accessed
September 16, 2015, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178
(2014).
128 Sam Mullins
ing so, it is important to recognize that repressive measures alone are not
enough to solve what is a highly complex and long-term problem. In particular,
there is a need to counter the appeal of extremist ideology and to address un-
derlying political and social grievances, which cannot be achieved using law
enforcement or military operations.
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Chapter 9
The Role of the Security Forces
in Combating Terrorism
James K. Wither
Introduction
The conventional wisdom is that counter-terrorism (CT) involves a “whole of
government” or “holistic” approach. Each government department plays a role
in a comprehensive strategy that incorporates security measures, but also eco-
nomic, legal, political and informational initiatives. While this is true, it is the
security services that continue to play the lead, active role in CT, particularly at
the operational and tactical levels. The security sector incorporates many dif-
ferent agencies and institutions, which can include the armed forces, police,
paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies, border security, governmental over-
sight bodies, the judiciary and correctional systems, non-state security bodies,
and civil society organizations. All of these agencies have a part to play in CT,
but the focus of this chapter is on the main actors – the armed forces, the police
and the intelligence services.
Although this chapter addresses the three elements separately, it is evident
that contemporary CT operations have fostered interagency cooperation and
coordination on an unprecedented scale, resulting in considerable overlap be-
tween the roles of the intelligence, law enforcement and the military. The pre-
viously well-defined roles of these services have largely disappeared in the last
decades as CT operations have become more urgent, complex and transna-
tional. The demands of contemporary CT have also resulted in significant
changes to size, composition and roles of all of these agencies.
The Use of Military Force

The declaration of the “war on terror” by the US following the 9/11 attacks
suggested that George Bush’s administration had adopted an overtly military
approach to containing and defeating terrorism. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
which were fought to counter the perceived threat against the US from interna-
tional terrorism, reinforced a perception that the armed forces were the most
important element of national power in CT. Many critics in the US and else-
where found the concept of a “war on terror” misguided as it gave al-Qaeda
(AQ) and its affiliates an undeserved status as an existential threat to the West
and sanctioned a war-fighting approach to CT that estranged many neutral
131 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch09

132 James K. Wither
Muslims.1 History is filled with cases of overtly military responses to terrorism

that have alienated public opinion and undermined support for the govern-
ment’s CT campaign. Among these examples is the infamous “Battle of Algiers.”
In 1960, the French Army successfully destroyed the Front de Libération Na-
tionale urban terrorist cells in Algiers. However, the brutal methods employed
by the army, including widespread torture, directly contributed to the collapse
of French political and public support for the wider war in Algeria. It is hardly
surprising that a perennial feature of terrorist strategy is to provoke an overre-
action by a state’s security forces, which frequently results in the deaths of in-
nocent civilians, discredits the government and increases recruitment to the
terrorists’ cause.
Negative reactions to the concept of a “war on terror” should not diminish
the vital role played by the military in CT. Operation Serval, the French military
intervention in Mali in January 2013, demonstrated how the appropriate use of
force can prevent a terrorist group from establishing a safe haven. A sophisti-
cated armed attack, such as that mounted by Lashkar-e-Taiba in Mumbai in No-
vember 2008, normally requires a military response as few police forces have
the capacity to handle such an event unaided. If a terrorist group is powerful
enough to mount a full blown insurgency on a scale that threatens the integrity
of a state, the armed forces will be drawn into large scale military operations.
Protracted military campaigns were required to defeat well-armed and orga-
nized groups of guerrilla fighters in Colombia, Chechnya, and Sri Lanka. The lat-
ter two cases involved human rights violations and civilian deaths on a scale
that would be unthinkable in liberal democratic states. Large-scale military op-
erations will also eventually be required to destroy the so called ‘Islamic State’
(IS) in Iraq and Syria.
Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have traditionally proved challenging
for even the most well-trained and professional military forces, especially as
the lessons of past COIN campaigns are often forgotten. In Iraq from 2003–
2007, the US Army relearned under fire that tactics for conventional warfare
are usually inappropriate in an environment where the enemy fights from
among a neutral or supportive civilian population. Much emphasis was placed
during the latter period of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan on ‘popula-
tion-centric’ COIN. Drawing on lessons from previous successful campaigns,
efforts were made to secure the civilian population, avoid excessive force and
advance effective governance through the application of non-military COIN
measures.2 Relatively overlooked at the time were the concurrent Joint Special
Operations Command (JSOC) hunter-killer raids that decimated terrorist lead-
1 See, for example, Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, December 2003); Tarak Barkawi, “On the Pedagogy of
Small Wars,” International Affairs 80, no. 1 (2004): 19–37; and Adam Roberts, “The
War on Terror in Historical Perspective,” Survival 47, no. 2 (2005): 101–30.
2 A useful summary of this approach is provided in Max Boot, Invisible Armies (New
York: Liveright, 2013), 535 – 46.
The Role of the Security Forces in Combating Terrorism 133
ership, disrupted planned attacks, and unearthed valuable intelligence from

captured computers and cell phones. In Iraq alone, US and British Special Op-
erations Forces (SOF) captured or killed 15,000 insurgents between 2003 and
2009 3 (see Case Study 9.1).
The US government no longer uses the term “war on terror,” but the ulti-
mate destruction of AQ, IS and their allies remains a key objective of US na-
tional security policy.4 After the politically and economically costly wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan in the last decade, the US and its Western allies are very reluc-
tant to engage in large-scale military interventions. Instead, the emphasis is on
the discrete use of force, employing SOF when expedient to capture or kill high-
value terrorist leaders. JSOC’s reach and capabilities were dramatically demon-
strated in June 2014 when a joint Delta Force/FBI Team captured Ahmed Abu
Khattah in Benghazi. Khattah was suspected of being the ringleader in the fatal
attack on the US diplomatic mission in Benghazi in 2012.
Traditionally, the SOF of Western states such as the US, UK, France and Can-
ada have also played a key role in helping to train the armed forces of partner
states. Building partner capacity to combat terrorism through training pro-
grams and intelligence and logistical support has become even more important
in an era when large-scale Western military intervention is unlikely.5 Small
footprint military assistance programs have successfully developed the CT ca-
pacity of security forces in Colombia and the Philippines during the last decade
and it is notable that long-established terrorist organizations in both countries
have come to the negotiating table. The demand for CT capacity-building pro-
grams is continuous and growing. In Nigeria, the army’s response to Boko Ha-
ram in 2013 allegedly involved abuses such as the extrajudicial killings of sus-
pects, indiscriminate arrest and torture, and destruction of property.6 The
shortcomings of Kenyan police and soldiers have been vividly demonstrated
during recent major attacks by al-Shabaab terrorists. Basic capacity building
programs, however, are no panacea. Initiatives that have focused too narrowly
on training and equipping a state’s security forces without seeking broader
3 Mark Urban, Task Force Black: the Explosive Story of the SAS and the Secret War in
Iraq (London: Abacus, 2011), 270–71.
4 National Security Strategy, The White House, February 2015, 9-10, accessed May 21,
2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_
strategy_2.pdf.
5 Michael D. Lumpkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict, Statement to the Senate Armed Forces Committee, March 11, 2014,
accessed May 21, 2015, www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Lumpkin_
03-11-14.pdf; and Eric Schmidt, “US Strategy to Fight Terrorism Increasingly Uses
Proxies,” New York Times, May 29, 2014.
6 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2014: Nigeria, undated, accessed May 21, 2015,
http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/nigeria.
134 James K. Wither
governance and institutional reforms have often ended in failure.7 Despite the
billions of dollars lavished on the Iraqi army prior to the US withdrawal in
2011, many units collapsed without a fight when confronted by IS fighters. In
Mali in 2012, a coup by army officers trained by the US deposed a democrati-
cally elected president. Potentially more successful is the Trans Sahara Counter
Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). This covers ten countries in the Sahel and Ma-
ghreb and attempts to embed CT military capacity building in a broader context
of security sector reform, civilian government capacity building and regional
cooperation programs.8
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), popularly known as drones, have proved
to be a highly effective means of applying discrete military force. Predator and
Reaper drones can linger for long periods over a target, collect real time intelli-
gence and use precision-guided munitions that can engage individuals, vehicles
or even hit specific rooms in buildings. Obtaining accurate statistics for the
number of militants killed in drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia is
difficult. For example, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism figures for the pe-
riod 2004–2015 suggest a minimum of 3200 and a maximum of 5133 persons
killed.9 The Bureau estimates that up to 1121 of these deaths may have been
non-combatants. However, it is likely that precision-guided attacks by un-
manned aircraft cause far less collateral damage than traditional air strikes
with standard ‘dumb’ bombs. Air raids have become the tactic of choice for
states seeking revenge for terrorist attacks against their citizens or territory. It
is not known how many civilians have been killed in recent air raids against IS
and other Salafi-jihadist groups by the air forces of states such as Jordan, Egypt
and Pakistan, not to mention the ‘barrel bombs’ employed by President Assad’s
forces in Syria.
SOF raids and drone strikes have proved tactically successful, killing much
of AQ’s leadership since 2001. However, although ‘decapitation’ strikes can
weaken a terrorist organization temporarily, well-established groups with
strong communal support appear to be resilient enough to survive the loss of
their leadership.10 The use of drones and hunter-killer raids has also had a
wider strategic impact that has proved potentially damaging to the overall CT
7 See, for example, Gordon Adams, “Ties that Bind,” The Foreign Policy Group, October
1, 2014, accessed May 21, 20015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/01/ties-that-
bind-2/.
8 Lesley Anne Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership: Building
Partner Capacity to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” The Center for
Complex Operations, March 2014. See also Eliza Griswold, “Can General Linder’s
Special Operations Forces Stop the Next Terrorist Threat?” New York Times Magazine,
June 13, 2014.
9 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism website was accessed in March 2015. It
includes details of the Bureau’s data collection methodology. Available at
www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/.
10 Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive
Decapitation Strikes,” International Security 38, no. 4 (2014): 7–38.
Case Study 9.1. Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate
(F3EAD).
US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has exploited the micro-electronic innova-
tions of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) of the 1990s to create an in-
telligence and operations fusion which has been summarized as “find, fix, finish, ex-
ploit, analyze and disseminate (F3EAD).”11
F3EAD is a continuous process that allows SOF to use imagery and signals intelli-
gence (IMINT/SIGINT) as well as human intelligence (HUMINT) to anticipate enemy
operations, to identify, locate, and target their forces, and to exploit and analyze intel-
ligence gathered from captured enemy personnel and materials. For example, the US
Navy SEALS’ raid in Pakistan in May 2011 that killed AQ figurehead Osama bin Laden
unearthed a treasure trove of documents that provided the intelligence community
with significant insights into the current state of AQ and its membership. However,
operations generally seek to capture rather than kill terrorist suspects, as the interro-
gation of detainees can lead to vital information on additional terrorist operatives and
a group’s strategy and tactics. The fusion of operations and intelligence functions is
critical to produce the actionable intelligence (namely information that is accurate,
timely and detailed), that drives counter-terrorism at the tactical level. Former
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn has
described information and intelligence as “the fire and maneuver of the 21st Cen-
tury.”12
effort. SOF night raids angered Afghan civilians in affected areas. Although
most operations did not involve firefights, villagers complained that their
homes had been forcefully entered and the privacy of their families violated. As
a result, former President, Hamid Karzai placed a total ban on night raids in
2013.13
Most UAVs are used for reconnaissance and intelligence purposes, and close
air support to soldiers in combat. Their use in these roles in recognized conflict
zones has not generated controversy. However, the unilateral use of drones by
the US in foreign, sovereign countries has provoked criticism on moral, legal
and political grounds. Although estimates of the number of non-combatants
killed in drone strikes vary considerably, the perception that significant num-
bers of civilians have been killed has helped to fuel anti-American feelings in
Pakistan and Yemen. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have justified
targeted killings by invoking the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN
Charter given that the US is at war with AQ and affiliated groups. But lawyers
on both sides of the Atlantic have questioned the legality and morality of tar-
11 Jon R. Lindsay, “Reinventing the Revolution: Technological Visions, Counterinsurgent

Criticism, and the Rise of Special Operations,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 3
(2013): 422-53.
12 Michael T. Flynn, “Sandals and Robes to Business Suits and Gulf Streams,” Small Wars
Journal, April 20, 2011, 3, accessed May 21, 2015, http://smallwarsjournal.com/
blog/journal/docs-temp/739-flynn.pdf.
13 The ban was lifted by current Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani in November 2014.
136 James K. Wither
geted killings, not least because executed militants have been denied judicial
process.14 As a result of growing controversy, President Obama introduced
tighter controls on the use of drone strikes in 2013. The decision was taken to
curtail strikes in areas that were not recognized war zones and to shift respon-
sibility for drone operations in Yemen from the CIA to the military in order to
provide greater accountability.15 Nevertheless, drones remain an attractive op-
tion for targeting individuals that represent the greatest threat to the US and its
allies, since their use avoids placing military personnel at risk. Former CIA Di-
rector, Leon Panetta described drones as “the only game in town in terms of
confronting or trying to disrupt the al-Qaeda leadership.”16
Law Enforcement and Counter-Terrorism

Governments also employ specialized military and law enforcement units for
high-end operations in cases of domestic terrorism, most notably during barri-
cade hostage crises. The successful conclusion of the Iranian Embassy hostage
crisis in London in 1980 was an early demonstration of the Special Air Service’s
(SAS) ability to apply effective force in such situations. Often elite counterter-
rorism units, such as France’s Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Natio-
nale (GIGN) form part of national paramilitary police forces. Italy’s Carabinieri
and Spain’s Guardia Civil can deploy similar CT teams. In January 2015, GIGN
teams eliminated terrorists involved in the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris.
Barricade hostage situations are more lethal than in the 1970s and 1980s and
the timeframe for dealing with them has grown shorter. Contemporary, reli-
giously motivated terrorists are more likely to kill hostages and are usually
prepared to die. As a result of major barricade hostage incidents such as those
in Beslan (2004) and Mumbai (2008), the GIGN and Israel’s Yamam special unit
have adopted what they refer to as the “shorter battle process.” This includes
heightened readiness and the legal authority and technical ability to take action
if necessary the moment a team arrives at an incident site.17
As the US does not have a national paramilitary police force, FBI and local
police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams perform the high-end do-
mestic CT role. In addition, the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) based in
Quantico, Virginia acts as a national SWAT team for especially serious kidnap-
14 Jonathan Masters, “Targeted Killings,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 23, 2013,
accessed May 21, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/tergetd-killings/p9627.
15 “Text of President Obama’s May 23 speech on national security,” Washington Post,
May 23, 2013, accessed May 21, 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
president-obamas-may-23-speech-on-national-security-as-prepared-for-delivery/
2013/05/23/02c35e30-c3b8-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7c1_print.html. In practice, CIA
operations have not substantially changed.
16 Leon Panetta, “AFPAK Drone Strikes are the Only Game in Town,” New Perspectives
Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2009): 33–9.
17 Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Contre-terrorisme: le GIGN est en avance dans la guerre
du temps,” L’Opinion, July 2, 2013, accessed May 21, 2015, http://www.lopinion.fr/1-
juillet-2013/contre-terrorisme-gign-est-en-avance-dans-guerre-temps-1606.
ping and hostage-taking incidents. HRT agents train with elite military units
and many have taken a direct part in SOF raids outside of the US. One of the
oldest and most famous elite CT units is Germany’s Grenzshutzgruppe 9 (GSG-
9). The GSG-9 was formed within the Federal Border Police Force in 1973 as a
direct result of the German police’s tragic handling of the Black September ter-
rorist attack during the 1972 Munich Olympics. To date, GSG-9’s most distin-
guished public CT operation was the hostage rescue at Mogadishu in 1977,
when an assault team successfully saved all of the passengers from a hijacked
Lufthansa aircraft. Most GSG-9 activities remain classified, but they were em-
ployed at the conclusion of Operation Alberich in 2007, when a team arrested
three terrorists plotting major bomb attacks against American bases in Ger-
many (see Case Study 9.2).
Although kinetic operations grab the headlines, intelligence gathering is the
most common task for police and military CT units. In Northern Ireland, under-
cover operatives of the British Army’s 14 Intelligence Company and the Royal
Ulster Constabulary’s (RUC) Special Branch E4A unit were an effective means
of gathering intelligence on both Republican and Loyalist terrorist groups. Con-
currently, the UK’s Security Service, known colloquially as MI5, RUC Special
Branch and the Army’s Force Research Unit (FRU) were employed to recruit,
turn and run informers with links to terrorist organizations. By the 1990s, the
British security services were in a position to disrupt most terrorist plots in
Northern Ireland. However the security forces’ activities provoked controversy
as plain-clothes units were accused, with some justification, of operating out-
side of the rule of law. The Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) political
wing, Sinn Fein, gained support from claims that covert police and military
units colluded with Loyalist terrorist organizations and had adopted a “shoot-
to-kill” policy against suspected PIRA members.18 Similar accusations were
made against the German government when Red Army Faction member, Wolf-
gang Grams, was shot during an attempted arrest by a plain-clothes GSG-9 unit
in 1993.
Sometimes government officials have deliberately created or backed para-
military forces that have operated illegally. The Grupos Antiterroristas de Liber-
ación (GAL) was established by rogue elements within the Spanish government
during the 1980s to conduct a ‘dirty war’ against members of ETA and Basque
nationalist sympathizers. Investigations into GAL’s activities caused significant
embarrassment to Felipe González’s Socialist government and some police of-
ficers and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Jose Barrionnuevo, were jailed. 19 Un-
18 Geraint Hughes, “The Use of Undercover Military Units in Counter-Terrorist

Operations: A Historical Analysis with Reference to Contemporary Anti-terrorism,”
Small Wars and Insurgencies 21, no. 4 (2010): 561-90; and Michael Kirk-Smith and
James Dingley, “Countering Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Role of Intelligence,”
Small Wars and Insurgencies 20, no. 3–4 (2009): 551-73.
19 A detailed account of GAL’s activities and the consequences is provided by Paddy
Woodworth, Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, The GAL and Spanish Democracy (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003).
138 James K. Wither
leashing so called ‘death squads’ or ‘pseudo gangs’ can bring short term tactical
benefits, but their methods invariably undermine government legitimacy and
the rule of law. In democracies, their use supports the terrorists’ ultimate stra-
tegic objective of destroying the integrity of the state.
Historically, most democratic states have dealt with terrorism as a domestic
law enforcement issue rather than an existential threat that required a military
response. Consequently, the police, backed by the intelligence services, have
taken the lead in CT and terrorist perpetrators have been dealt with under the
criminal justice system. Until recently, the police emphasis was normally on
crime scene investigation, the collection of evidence, and the prosecution of ar-
rested terrorists. However, since the early 2000s, police services have had to
adapt to the changing character of terrorism. Against informal, networked ter-
rorist groups that aim to carry out indiscriminate, mass casualty attacks
against civilians, the law enforcement emphasis has had to shift to an intelli-
gence-led approach that seeks to disrupt plots and arrest suspects at the earli-
est opportunity.20 This requires police forces to work ever more closely with
domestic and, increasingly, foreign intelligence services and usually involves
additional legal sanctions to conduct intrusive surveillance such as access to
property and the interception of personal communications. Close cooperation
between MI5 and the Metropolitan Police, for example, was essential for the
successful conclusion of Operation Crevice in 2004, which prevented a major
vehicle-based bombing campaign in London. At the time, Crevice was the larg-
est CT operation ever mounted by the British police and MI5. During the height
of the operation in February-March 2004 alone, the investigation absorbed
34,000 man-hours of police and intelligence activity.21
Despite major terrorist atrocities such as the bombings in Madrid (2004)
and London (2005), intelligence-led policing has proved to be effective and has
thwarted numerous AQ affiliated terrorist plots in North America and Europe
before the general public was placed in danger. As with most CT initiatives,
preemptive elements of intelligence-led policing have provoked criticism from
civil rights groups and community leaders. The New York Police Department’s
Intelligence Division is just one police agency that has been accused of unwar-
ranted, covert surveillance of local Muslim communities in recent years.22 Un-
fortunately, such setbacks can threaten the good working relationships be-
tween the police and community leaders that often help to provide early
warning of suspicious activity and generate a hostile local environment for
would-be terrorists. The so called “war on terror” has also been a factor in
what is often referred to as the “militarization of the police.” This has been es-
20 For details see Chapter 10 in this book.

21 “Waiting for al-Qaeda’s Next Bomb,” The Economist, May 3, 2007, accessed September
18, 2015, http://www.economist.com/node/9111542.
22 Don Babwin, “NYPD Surveillance Jeopardizes Access to Muslim Communities, Say
Mayors and Cops Across Country,” Huffington Post, March 11, 2012, accessed May 21,
2015, www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/11/nypd-surveillance-jeopardizes-access-
to-muslim-communities-say-mayors-and-cops-across-country_n_1337609.html.
pecially evident in the US and, to a lesser extent, in Canada – both countries

that lack ‘third force’ national gendarmerie police units. An increasing number
of local police forces have established military trained SWAT teams and ac-
quired surplus military hardware including assault rifles and armored person-
nel carriers. The subsequent use of heavily armed police in routine law en-
forcement situations has caused mounting public concern. 23 Once again this il-
lustrates the perennial challenge for the security forces of striking a balance
between the need for security and the importance of preserving civil liberties.
If police forces have become ‘militarized,’ it is also apparent that the military
has had to adopt many of the skills normally associated with law enforcement.
Troops deployed on peace support operations have frequently had to under-
take temporary policing tasks in the absence of functioning law enforcement
agencies in post-conflict environments. Soldiers have also had to assist in
training host nation police forces, usually because there were insufficient num-
bers of deployed civilian police to undertake the task. The challenges of con-
temporary CT have increased the acquisition by the military of skills normally
associated with law enforcement. SOF soldiers, in particular, have had to learn
to collect and preserve evidence for criminal prosecutions and, when neces-
sary, present testimony in court. As the arrest of terrorist suspects can yield
valuable information, soldiers involved in raids to capture high value targets
have taken arrest warrants in the same manner as civilian police officers. SOF
operators need to know the jurisdiction in which a terrorist may be prosecuted
and ensure that they follow the appropriate set of rules. 24 SOF have also
worked closely with the FBI outside of the US since 9/11. For example, SOF
teams have helped the FBI secure and investigate crime scenes and the pres-
ence of FBI agents on raids has assisted soldiers with the preservation of evi-
dence, site exploitation and interrogations.25
Good Intelligence: The Most Important Factor

Writing in 2007, Robert Art and Louise Richardson concluded that “The first
and most important rule for successful CT is “know your enemy” and the key to
knowing your enemy is good intelligence.”26 The validity of this statement
should be evident from the discussion above. Contemporary transnational,
23 See, for example, Arthur Rizer and Joseph Hartman, “How the War on Terror has
Militarized the Police,” The Atlantic, November 7, 2011, accessed May 21, 2015,
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/11/how-the-war-on-terror-
has-militarized-the-police/248047/; and “Cops or Soldiers?” The Economist, March
22, 2014, accessed September 18, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/united-
states/21599349-americas-police-have-become-too-militarised-cops-or-soldiers.
24 For a detailed analysis of these issues see John B. Alexander, Convergence: Special
Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement (MacDill, Fl: The JSOU Press, 2010).
25 Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, “Inside the FBI’s Secret Relationship with the Mili-
tary’s Special Operations,” Washington Post, April 11, 2014.
26 Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism (Washington
DC: USIP, 2007) 565.
140 James K. Wither
networked terrorism creates a significantly greater intelligence challenge than

earlier campaigns against nationalist separatist groups. The protracted nature
of the latter campaigns allowed time for security forces to build intelligence
gathering capacity and recover from initial misjudgments. Domestic intelli-
gence agencies normally had an understanding of the terrorists’ language and
culture, while international cooperation, although important, was not so criti-
cal to success. Above all, the contemporary extremists’ desire for mass civilian
casualties contrasts with the relative restraint shown by earlier terrorist
groups. One outcome of this development has been a more proactive role for
intelligence agencies in disrupting attacks and killing or capturing individual
terrorists.
Intelligence agencies can provide governments with a covert means of pur-
suing terrorists while offering politicians the cover of “plausible deniability”
when things go wrong. Post 9/11, this resulted in the involvement of intelli-
gence services in controversial detention, rendition and interrogation measu-
res. The CIA’s Special Activities Division has engaged to an unprecedented ex-
tent in military operations, collaborating closely with JSOC, conducting drone
strikes and, in the case of Afghanistan, operating a proxy militia. Some of the
perceived excesses of the “war on terror,” such as the CIA’s system of secret
prisons, have already been curtailed by lawyers and policy makers. But the US
Patriot Act and similar CT measures elsewhere have granted security agencies
unprecedented peacetime powers, especially as regards SIGINT surveillance of
citizens not suspected of terrorist activities.27 The leak of stolen intelligence
material by former National Security Agency (NSA) employee Edward Snowden
in June 2013 revealed the extent of the surveillance program and caused wide-
spread international public unease. However, a major investigation into SIGINT
surveillance by the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament
acknowledged that the Government Communications Headquarters’ (GCHQ)
bulk interception was a “valuable capability that should remain available to
them” provided that legislative arrangements and practice continued to pre-
vent innocent people’s communications from being read by intelligence
agents.28 The collection of SIGINT may be controversial, but it is a vital compo-
nent of CT. SIGINT can provide critical information on planned attacks, terror-
ist travel and financing, and operational information that allows an attack to be
disrupted.29 It was, for example, essential to stop AQ’s most ambitious planned
attack since 9/11, the so-called ‘Liquid Bomb Plot’ in 2006, when terrorists in
27 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on Review of
Signals Intelligence, January 17, 2014, accessed May 21, 2015, www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence.
28 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Security: A Modern
and Transparent Legal Framework, HC 1075, March 12, 2015, 112, accessed May 21,
2015, http://isc.independent.gov.uk/files/20150312_ISC_P+S+Rpt(web).pdf.
29 Daniel Byman, “The Intelligence War on Terrorism,” Intelligence and National Security
29, no. 6 (2013): 847.
London planned to use liquid explosives to destroy multiple passenger aircraft

over the Atlantic.
The challenge of contemporary terrorism demands that the intelligence cy-
cle be completed as rapidly as possible, while developments in information
30
and communications technologies have significantly increased the availability

of data gathered from publicly available sources. The growth of open-source in-
telligence (OSINT) challenges the intelligence community to identify useful and
reliable sources from the vast amount of information on the Internet and social
media sites. IS, for example, has undertaken particularly sophisticated social
media campaigns to disseminate its activities, spread propaganda, communi-
cate with supporters, solicit donations and recruit new members. The current
US Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr. has made the integra-
tion of collection and analysis, as well as the broader access to data his main
priorities.31
Traditionally, security and intelligence services have been inherently reluc-
tant to share information. The failure of the FBI and CIA to share data prior to
the 9/11 attacks has been well documented. In Northern Ireland, the British
Army, RUC Special Branch and MI5 clashed over their respective intelligence
responsibilities. Although sharing information does not come naturally to in-
telligence services, collaboration between agencies and analysts, both nation-
ally and internationally, is essential to produce the rigorous, precisely focused
information needed to address contemporary threats. The 9/11 Commission
and other studies have urged intelligence services to transition from a Cold
War era principle of the “need-to-know” to a “need-to-share” policy. Conse-
quently, the last decade has seen the proliferation of intelligence fusion centers
and joint terrorism task forces at regional, national and international levels to
facilitate this process. Essentially, fusion centers collect and analyze infor-
mation from all available sources across jurisdictional and geographical bound-
aries to produce and disseminate actionable intelligence to all relevant stake-
holders.
The US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), established in 2004, is
perhaps the prime example of a national fusion center. The NCTC includes per-
sonnel from all appropriate government departments led by an independent
Director. However, in the US at least, the rapid expansion of fusion centers has
not necessarily proved a cost effective CT initiative. A critical Senate report in
2012 concluded that Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-led state and lo-
cal fusion centers had “…not produced useful intelligence to support federal
30 The intelligence cycle is normally summarized as: requirements, planning and direc-
tion, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination.
31 Remarks by James R. Clapper to the AFCEA/INSA National Security and Intelligence
Summit, September 18, 2014, accessed May 21, 2015, www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/speeches-and-interviews/202-speeches-interviews-2014/1115-
remarks-as-delivered-by-the-honorable-james-r-clapper-director-of-national-
intelligence-afcea-insa-national-security-and-intelligence-summit.
142 James K. Wither
counterterrorism efforts.”32 Nevertheless, fusion centers have proliferated both

domestically and internationally. Examples of the latter include the NATO In-
telligence Fusion Center established in the UK in 2006. This facilitated the
sharing of intelligence among the 17 members of the alliance with troops de-
ployed on CT operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan. In November 2013,
the “Rabat Declaration” established a nineteen-nation CT intelligence fusion
center led by France to help counter AQ’s North African affiliates. The potential
of international fusion centers was demonstrated by the secret Western Coun-
terterrorism Intelligence Center, known as Alliance Base, founded in Paris in
2002. This organization included intelligence operatives from the US, France,
Germany, UK, Australia and Canada. Collaboration between German, French
and US agencies led to the arrest and imprisonment of AQ terrorist, Christian
Ganczarski, who had planned the Djerba, Tunisia synagogue bombing in 2002
in which 21 tourists died. Unfortunately, a diplomatic quarrel over a proposed
no spying agreement between the US and France led to the closure of Alliance
Base in 2010.33
Case Study 9.2. International Intelligence Cooperation – Operation

Alberich, Germany, 2007.
Operation Alberich was the biggest German police and intelligence CT operation since
the height of the campaign against the Red Army Faction in 1977. It prevented an AQ
linked terrorist group from mounting car bombing attacks against Ramstein air base
and Frankfurt airport, among other targets. Operation Alberich illustrated the im-
portance of international intelligence cooperation and close liaison between domestic
intelligence services and law enforcement agencies in combating transnational ter-
rorism.
The operation began in October 2006 when the US National Security Agency inter-
cepted suspicious emails between Germany and Pakistan and passed the information
to the BfV, Germany’s domestic intelligence service. The NSA and CIA continued to
provide critical SIGINT to the German authorities throughout the operation. Given the
seriousness of the anticipated attacks, a joint CIA, BfV and German Federal Criminal
Police (BKA) task force was set up in Berlin and liaison conducted between Germany
and the US at ministerial level. The plotters were subjected to extensive surveillance
by the BfV and the BKA searched suspects’ apartments, installed video cameras and
bugged the suspects’ car. The operation was assisted by the amateurish behavior of
the suspects, who made a series of errors that alerted the authorities to their activi-
ties. The principal members of the group were arrested by a GSG-9 team in September
2007, shortly before their planned attacks.34
32 US Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Federal Support and Involve-

ment in State and Local Fusion Centers, Executive Summary, October 3, 2012, accessed
May 21, 2015, https://info.publicintelligence.net/HSGAC-FusionCenters.pdf.
33 David Servenay, “Terroisme: pourquoi Alliance Base a fermé ȧ Paris,” Rue 89, L’Obs,
May 24, 2010, accessed May 21, 2015, http://rue89.nouvelobs.com/2010/05/24/
terrorisme-fermeture-dalliance-base-a-paris-152349.
34 Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach, and Holger Stark, “Operation Alberich: How the
CIA Helped Germany Foil Terror Plot,” Spiegel Online, October 9, 2007, accessed May
Contemporary terrorist plots often involve international communications,

travel and the movement of materiel. International intelligence cooperation
founded on mutual threat perception is crucial to interdict these activities.
Most successful international intelligence-led operations depend on close bi-
lateral, sometimes back-channel, cooperation between field grade operatives
and analysts founded on professional understanding and trust. The struggle
against transnational terrorism often forces Western intelligence agencies to
work with unsavory regimes and local intelligence agencies with poor human
rights’ records. But local intelligence agencies have language and cultural
knowledge, a better chance of placing spies inside a terrorist organization and
may have the power to coerce individuals into providing information. For ex-
ample, the former head of MI6, Sir John Sawers, has acknowledged that his
agency received a ‘tip-off’ to foil AQAP’s printer-cartridge bomb plot in 2010
following the torture of a terrorist suspect by the Saudi security services.35
The US has established joint intelligence centers in over two dozen coun-
tries to track and capture terrorists in cooperation with foreign agencies. US in-
telligence agencies often perform a coordination function – sometimes with
states that do not normally cooperate with each other. For example, the cap-
ture of Jemaah Islamiyya leader Hambali involved US coordination and action
with agencies from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thai-
land.36 Conflicting government stances on terrorism and differing legal systems
can sometimes undermine trust and thwart cooperation. The US felt unable to
share its intelligence on Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts with Pakistan’s Inter-
services Intelligence (ISI) agency because of justifiable fears that the infor-
mation would be leaked. Although the US and UK have a particularly close,
longstanding intelligence partnership, this relationship was placed in jeopardy
in 2010, when sensitive, shared information from the CIA was brought into the
public domain as the result of a judicial ruling by a British court in the case of
former Guantanamo inmate Binyam Mohamed.37
Significant improvements have been made since 9/11 in the collection,
analysis and dissemination of intelligence at both national and international
levels, but many problems remain. The sheer volume of raw data defies even
the most sophisticated, existing information processing systems. The “need to
know” cultural legacy and human error, often due simply to pressures of work,
21, 2015, www.spiegel.de/international/germany/ operation-alberich-how-the-cia-

helped-germany-foil-terror-plot-a-504837-druck.html.
35 Jamie Merrill, James Hanning, Mark Leftly, and Nick Clark, “Revealed: How Torture
Was Used to Foil Al-Qaeda’s 2010 Plot to Bomb Two Airliners 17 Minutes Before
Explosion,” The Independent, March 1, 2015, accessed May 21, 2015.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/revealed-how-torture-was-
used-to-foil-alqaeda-plot-to-bomb-two-airliners-17-minutes-before-explosion-
10077722.html.
36 Byman, The Intelligence War on Terror, 854.
37 Philip Sherewell and William Lowther, “American Spy Chiefs Alarmed by Binyam
Mohamed Ruling,” Daily Telegraph, February 14, 2010.
144 James K. Wither
can result in crucial information not being passed on. In March 2015, an other-
wise complimentary, Congress-directed report on the FBI’s role in CT was criti-
cal of the Bureau’s response to recent high-profile terrorist plots and attacks in
the US. It identified failings in the FBI’s confidential human source program, in-
telligence analysis, and communication, coordination and collaboration both
within the Bureau and with external partners.38 One of the cases highlighted by
the report was the Boston Marathon bombing in April 2013, when the FBI were
unable to prevent the attack despite indicators pointing to the main plotter
Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s growing extremism.39
Conclusion
Unprecedented inter-agency cooperation and information sharing, combined
with the exploitation of information technology, has given security forces a tac-
tical edge over their terrorist opponents. Nevertheless, there are no grounds
for complacency. As this chapter illustrates, agencies involved in CT continue to
face a range of operational, technical, legal, and moral challenges. Salafi-jihadist
terrorists remain ingenious, persistent, adaptive, and ruthless. Transnational
networks, returning foreign fighters, the exploitation of social media, cyber
hackers and the possible use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
weapons are among a range of new and emerging CT challenges. Balancing
public expectations on human rights and individual freedoms with collective
security demands remains problematic. Europe and North America in particu-
lar face an increase in attacks by so called lone actors. Unlike conspiracies by
established terrorist groups, these are more likely to escape the attention of in-
telligence and law enforcement agencies prior to an assault. Recent armed at-
tacks and barricade-hostage incidents in Africa and South Asia have revealed
continuing inadequacies in security force readiness, training and equipment in
those states most affected by terrorism. Building partner states’ CT capacity is
an enormous challenge as training and advisory programs will provide at best
only short term benefits without concurrent large scale developmental efforts
to address the failings in governance that ultimately fuel terrorist grievances.
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Chapter 10
Intelligence-led Policing in
Counter-Terrorism: A Perspective
from the United Kingdom
Peter Clarke
Introduction
In the years since 9/11 the approach to counter-terrorism (CT) in the United
Kingdom (UK) has been re-calibrated to take account of the nature of the threat
and the context in which that threat impacts upon the safety of the British pub-
lic. The transition from a domestic, politically-inspired Irish terrorist campaign
to a global, ideologically driven movement, which aspires to mass murder with
no apparent political endgame, has become the catalyst for fundamental change.
The pre-emption of terrorist attacks through taking early action in response to
accurate intelligence is now seen as vital to securing public safety. At the same
time, there is a need to conduct those operations in such a way as to undermine
the violent extremist narrative of grievance and discrimination.
A key means of achieving this was through the rigor and transparency of the
criminal justice system, but to do this required new ways of working and un-
precedented co-operation between the police and intelligence agencies. This
approach has been proven to be effective, but an essential pre-requisite is an
operating environment that is sufficiently permissive for police investigations
and judicial process to take place. If there is insurgency and violence to the
point that evidence gathering and police work is impossible, military opera-
tions will be required to degrade terrorist networks to the point where they
become susceptible to policing. Along that path, the police and military roles
may at times overlap and be complementary. This commentary is largely
drawn from the author’s experience of CT policing in the UK over the past 15
years, but it is suggested that the underpinning principles will be relevant in
many jurisdictions.
The Transition from a Domestic to a Global Terrorist

Threat to the United Kingdom
I very much doubt that many of us who were involved in the investigation of
terrorist crime in the UK in the aftermath of 9/11 had any idea what the next
few years would bring. Although it was obvious that there were going to be
some fundamental changes to the way that we worked, I do not think anyone
149 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch10

150 Peter Clarke
could have predicted the scale and pace of those changes. To an extent, those
changes were driven by events. As the volume and seriousness of those events
grew, we saw not only that the nature of the terrorist threat was changing, but
that our operational response and underpinning concept of operations had to
change too. For over 30 years we had experienced an unrelenting and vicious
terrorist campaign conducted by Irish terrorists who were intent on removing
British rule from Northern Ireland. The campaign had been long and bloody,
the terrorists had become ever more sophisticated, and the CT machinery had
developed both in capability and in its ability to deliver effective operational
outcomes. Despite our significant experience and capability, we were entering
a new era.
Although there had been a growing realization in the UK during the 1990s
that there were a number of people within the country (many originating from
the Middle East or the Maghreb) who were engaged in radical Islamist activity,
the prevailing attitude among police and intelligence agencies was that they did
not pose an imminent threat to the safety of the British public. It was known
that they were propagandizing and fundraising on behalf of organizations in
their countries of origin, but there was no real sense until at least 2000 that any
of them posed a threat to the safety of the British public. In any event, the focus
of the British CT machinery was firmly on the Irish terrorist groups that had
inflicted enormous physical, human and financial damage in the UK.
However, the focus began to shift following the Good Friday Agreement in
1998, which helped to reduce (although far from eliminate) the threat from
Irish terrorism. Around the time of the new millennium there were a number of
attacks planned or delivered by Islamist terrorists in Europe, Jordan, the US,
and Indonesia. These events, the discovery of the first Islamist bomb factory in
the UK in 2000, and in particular the 9/11 attacks triggered a reassessment of
the terrorist threat facing the UK. The reality was that the intelligence picture
of Islamist groups was not as complete as it might have been and a period of in-
tensive police and intelligence activity throughout 2002 and early 2003 taught
us a great deal about what we were facing. In particular, there was an investi-
gation into a loose-knit group of militants, mainly Algerians, which came to be
known by the police as Operation Springbourne (see Case Study 10.1).
We learned much from the Springbourne investigation. First, that there was
indeed a threat to the British public from Islamist extremists. Second, that the
police and intelligence agencies would need to find new ways of working to-
gether if the threat posed by 21st century terrorists was to be countered effec-
tively. Third, that the footprint of terrorism in the UK was no longer confined to
the major cities, nor indeed confined to the UK. The defense of the country
would in future have to be global, in response to what we were quickly learning
was a global threat. It also became apparent that the conduct of CT operations
would in the future be subject to more intense scrutiny than ever before. In-
deed, the police and intelligence agencies would be held closely to account by
interest and community groups who would be vigilant to ensure that there was
no hint of discrimination or insensitivity toward those from minority commu-
Intelligence-led Policing in Counter Terrorism: UK Perspective 151
Case Study 10.1. Operation Springbourne.

Investigations into a group of mainly Algerian Islamists in 2002 focused on their ac-
tivities in raising money through high volumes of check and credit card fraud. This so-
called ‘micro-financing’ would not normally attract the attention of CT units. How-
ever, the lack of clear intelligence as to whether they posed a threat to the UK or were
merely supporting dissident or insurgent activity in their countries of origin, meant
that a different approach had to be taken.
In order to find out whether they did indeed pose a threat, CT police undertook a
series of operations, based on the low-level criminality of the suspects. These were
designed to (a) glean intelligence as to whether they posed a terrorist threat and (b)
to disrupt their activities through persistent enforcement of the criminal law against
them. In effect this marked a reversal of the usual intelligence cycle where intelligence
would flow from the intelligence agencies to the police, who would then take action
upon it. In this case, when the police took action against low-level criminality, the in-
formation that was gleaned was fed back into the intelligence agencies, which in turn
helped to identify the next targets for executive action by the police.
For several months this cycle continued until the autumn of 2002, when, during a
search in the rural county of Norfolk, a document giving instructions on how to make
the lethal poison ricin was found. The series of arrests continued, until in January
2003 intelligence suggested that at an address in north London there were the mate-
rials for manufacturing ricin. The premises were searched by police and a copy of the
document that had been discovered in Norfolk was found, along with chemicals and
other items for use in the manufacture of ricin. The main suspect, an Algerian called
Kamel Bourgass, had fled. Later in the month he was found in Manchester, in the
north of England, and during his arrest murdered a police officer.
Evidence recovered during the operation showed that Bourgass had been closely
associated with a mosque in north London that had become notorious for radical
preaching by its Imam, Abu Hamza al-Masri. A search warrant was obtained for the
mosque. A large amount of stolen and forged identity documents, credit cards and
check books were found inside. There was also a significant amount of paramilitary
training equipment including imitation firearms, respirators, camouflage uniforms
and other equipment believed to have been used at training camps in the UK. Bour-
gass was subsequently convicted of murdering the police officer and of conspiring to
produce poisons to use against the British public. Abu Hamza served a sentence of
imprisonment in the UK, and after a long legal battle was extradited to the US, where
in January 2015 he was sentenced to life imprisonment in respect of a number of ter-
rorist charges.
nities (whether those communities were identified by faith, ethnicity or na-

tional origin). In short, there was a need to develop new ways of working,
drawing upon lessons learned from the past but also recognizing the changed
dynamic of terrorist activity.
The Irish terrorist campaign in the UK, waged for over 30 years, had been
both bloody and savage. However, it was in fact fought by the terrorists within
a set of parameters that to an extent helped to define the response from the CT
authorities. As becomes clear from the following comparison, the emerging Is-
152 Peter Clarke
lamist terrorism threat was almost a mirror opposite of that from Irish ter-
rorists.
Geographic Parameters
The campaign by Irish terrorists was essentially fought within the UK, pre-
dominantly within Northern Ireland but also with a large number of high pro-
file attacks on the British mainland. There were a few attacks on UK interests
overseas, notably against the British military in Germany and an attempted at-
tack in Gibraltar in 1988. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) were
at one point found to be training terrorists in Colombia, and there was also
concern about funding from sympathizers in the US and the supply of terrorist
materiel from overseas, in particular Libya. However, for the most part it was a
domestic campaign that drew a domestic response. The Islamist terrorist
threat on the other hand proved to be global in origins, reach and ambition.
Those committing terrorist acts were often drawn from groups that had their
origins in national conflicts across the globe. Their communications were
global, as was their travel. In order to investigate the Springbourne case, CT
police had to travel to well over 20 countries, something that would have been
inconceivable in any investigation into Irish terrorism.
Tightly Structured Networks
Irish terrorist groups operated in tightly structured networks that gave them a
degree of internal security, but also meant that once they had been infiltrated
by the authorities or had an informer within their midst, an entire cell could be
compromised. The Islamist groups that were encountered in the UK in the
years following 9/11 were much more loosely structured. It was difficult to de-
fine their shape. Key members came and went. It was not easy to decide where
to probe or infiltrate. As networks were disrupted, either through arrests or
other action, so they would re-form. They have been compared to a multi-
headed beast which, as soon as it suffers a decapitation, simply grows another
head.
Determination to Avoid Capture
A determination to avoid capture and incarceration was a recurrent theme
throughout the Irish campaign. The terrorists became adept at operational se-
curity, counter surveillance, identifying and punishing informants, and avoid-
ing leaving forensic evidence which could yield irrefutable evidence of guilt.
Indeed, the release of prisoners became a key part of the negotiations that
eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Islamist terrorists on the
other hand often appear not to care whether they escape or survive their at-
tacks. To date, they have not been consistently forensically aware, and the use
of suicide as an attack methodology is clearly the complete antithesis to the
concept of avoiding capture so as to be able to continue the fight. The use of
suicide bombers and attackers has had a profound impact on the operational
tactics and considerations when countering Islamist terrorism.
The Number of Casualties

Although the Irish campaign was brutal and at times there were terrible casual-
ties, the number of people killed was in fact deliberately restricted. The worst
single loss of life occurred in 1998 when a bomb exploded in Omagh, killing 29
people. One of the reasons the terrorists deliberately tried to restrict civilian
casualties was because they feared losing public support. The terrorists had a
twin track strategy of ‘military’ confrontation while at the same time seeking to
gain support through the electoral system and thereby gain credibility within
the political process. Indiscriminate slaughter would have jeopardized their
claims to political legitimacy. The comparatively low number of casualties (and
this is not meant in any way to minimize the ghastly atrocities that were com-
mitted during this campaign) was in part due to the fact that Irish terrorist
groups often used warnings so that the authorities had time to evacuate civil-
ians before bombs were detonated. In complete contrast, Islamist terrorists
have often been determined, put simply, to kill as many people as possible. As
such, attacks on civil aviation, public transport, shopping centers and other
crowded places have been designed to inflict mass casualties. To date, the 9/11
attacks have been the most extreme example of this, but the desire to inflict
vast numbers of casualties has been seen repeatedly and on every continent.
Conventional and Unconventional Weapons
By and large Irish terrorists used conventional weaponry in the form of the
bomb and the gun. At times, they did use their own version of economic war-
fare which involved making coded bomb warnings to road and rail infrastruc-
ture and other sites where maximum disruption would be caused. The code
words used by the terrorists had been used previously in genuine attacks and
so the threats could not be ignored by the authorities. However, even when
novel methods were used to cause disruption, the threat was still essentially
from the bomb and the bullet. In addition to using conventional weapons, Is-
lamist terrorists have shown a persistent determination to gain access to and
use unconventional weaponry in the form of chemical, biological or radiologi-
cal agents. Aside from the ricin case in the UK (Operation Springbourne), there
was the case of Dhiren Barot and his network (Operation Rhyme, 2004) which
had ambitions to make a ‘dirty’ radiological device. Islamist terrorist training
manuals have often contained instructions on making unconventional weap-
ons. As with suicide attacks and mass casualty attacks, the threat of unconven-
tional weapons has had an enormous impact on the operational response from
CT agencies.
A New Concept of Operations – Intelligence-led and Risk

Based
What does all this mean for the law enforcement practitioner in practical
terms? In reality, in the UK it has led to a complete reappraisal of how intelli-
gence-led operations are delivered, and in effect has resulted in nothing less
154 Peter Clarke
than a new concept of operations. It used to be the case that law enforcement,
in the shape of the detective looking for evidence to support a criminal prose-
cution, was to an extent divorced from the work of the intelligence agencies or
police Special Branches. In the UK, the Special Branches were the part of the
police that handled CT intelligence, leaving other officers to handle the eviden-
tial aspects of a case and act as the link into the prosecutorial and judicial au-
thorities. The disciplines of intelligence gathering, collation and assessment
tended to operate separately from the evidential investigator. This usually
worked well enough, despite some difficulties. There were occasions when of-
ficers who were trying to construct an evidential case struggled to understand
the background to the investigation. They were frequently left in the dark in re-
spect of the role of intelligence sources in investigations or other important as-
pects of the enquiry, of which in reality it was vital that they should have been
aware.
In an effort to co-ordinate CT activity, since the early 1990s every major ter-
rorist investigation on the mainland of the UK has been managed through an
Executive Liaison Group (ELG). This group is chaired by a senior police officer
called the National Coordinator of Terrorist Investigations, and comprises sen-
ior representatives from the Security Service (known as MI5), the Special
Branch of the police and the affected territorial police forces. And yet for many
years the senior evidential detective was excluded. He or she was not entitled
to attend, nor be part of the process of setting the strategy for the investigation.
This was usually explained as being in his or her best interests, so that they did
not find themselves in difficulty when giving evidence at Court – such as being
put under pressure to divulge the sources of intelligence. The thinking was that
if they did not know the answer to the question, they could not inadvertently
give away sensitive details of intelligence gathering. It was a conscious act of
policy to separate the intelligence and evidential strands of investigation. This
had to change.
Traditionally, the objective of the evidential investigator was to intercept
the terrorist as near as possible to the point of attack, i.e. to capture him with
the bomb or gun, and thereby have the strongest possible evidence to put him
before a court. A good example of this in the days of the Irish terrorist threat
was the arrest of Rab Friars, a PIRA terrorist, as he made his way into central
London in 1993. He was followed to London from Scotland, carrying a bomb all
the way. He was allowed to reach the outskirts of London, and was still in pos-
session of the bomb when he was arrested while waiting to board a bus into
central London. I cannot imagine a similar operation being considered as either
desirable or permissible today. It is inconceivable in the age of the suicide
bomber that a suspect would be allowed to travel into a city, carrying his bomb,
before being challenged by police. We have seen the near impossible challenges
that operational commanders face when trying to find a safe and appropriate
way of interdicting potential suicide bombers. The mistaken shooting of Jean
Charles de Menezes in London following the bombings in July 2005 is a graphic
example of this. These examples on their own (and there are many more across
the world) show the changed approach to managing risk that has to be mas-
tered by the modern CT investigator.
The obvious conclusion is that evidential opportunities have to be sought at
every stage of an investigation. The police need to have as wide a range as pos-
sible of intervention opportunities available to them so that they can make the
decision as to which tactic will best meet the absolute objective of preserving
public safety against catastrophic attack. This has to be balanced against the
other vital objective of securing sufficient evidence to prosecute terrorists in
the criminal courts. This is because the transparency of the criminal trial pro-
cess is a vital part of securing community trust and confidence in CT opera-
tions, which in turn is likely to release vital intelligence from communities.
However, in reality, given the now common terrorist objective of causing mass
casualties in suicide attacks, or where the terrorist does not care if he survives,
public safety is always the dominant factor in decision making.
Another key change in the operational environment in the UK has been the
extent to which the conduct of an operation sits within the sole control of the
police officer in charge. In the vast majority of criminal investigations, the sen-
ior investigator has a great deal of freedom, within law and policy, to set the
operational strategy and choose the tactics to deliver the operation. This way of
working has been supported by the fact that police in the UK are operationally
independent from the executive and the judiciary. This is different in an intelli-
gence-led CT investigation. The complex and frequently international web of
stakeholders in a modern CT operation has to be taken into account. The scale
of the threat and the potential impact if an attack is successfully mounted are
so great that the traditional operational independence of the police has to be
attuned to the wider environment. The operational commander, while bearing
risks on behalf of his or her own operation, often has to be sensitive to events,
fears, influences and legal considerations in multiple jurisdictions. Many of
those jurisdictions have very different law enforcement traditions where po-
litical influence or direction may have an acknowledged and entirely proper
impact upon the conduct of an investigation.
The changed nature of the risk and sheer scale of threat from Islamist ter-
rorism has also led to a fundamental change in the nature of the relationship
between MI5 and the police. No longer can the evidential investigators be reli-
ant upon whatever information the intelligence world chooses to share with
them as an investigation reaches the critical phase. Nowadays, the police and
MI5 have to be true working partners from a much earlier stage in an investiga-
tion than ever used to be the case. Because of the increased scale of risk to the
public, there now needs to be a collective ability to have the full range of inter-
vention options open at every stage of a terrorist conspiracy. So instead of fo-
cusing on the attack itself, we now look to be able to disrupt terrorist planning,
either through arrest and prosecution or by other means, at every stage of the
process. This in turn means that, as far as possible, every aspect of the investi-
gation, from the very beginning, needs to be carried out to evidential standards.
This does not mean that there are no longer any secrets, or that the intelligence
156 Peter Clarke
agencies are not able to protect from public scrutiny those things that should
properly remain secret. What it does mean is that when an investigation is
started, all parties will work to a rebuttable presumption that information will
be gathered in a way that will allow it to be admitted as evidence in a criminal
court.
Figure 10.1 shows how the strands of intelligence and evidence now run in
parallel from the very early stages of terrorist planning, and will often be coor-
dinated by the Executive Liaison Group. As can be seen, the various stages at
terrorist planning and preparation are accompanied by generic operations that
are designed to gather evidence and intelligence of those activities from an
early stage. For example, in the case of Operation Lightning shown below, the
objective was to collate all the available information from all sources that could
give indications of hostile reconnaissance. This enabled not only vertical analy-
sis within a defined plot to take place, but also horizontal analysis across dis-
parate locations and target sets.
In the past, it was quite likely that the first the police might know of a spe-
cific terrorist network’s activities might be at the right hand end of the scale in
Figure 10.1, towards the point of execution of the attack. Now, the police and
the intelligence agencies work together from a much earlier stage, looking for
Figure 10.1. The Concept of Operations for CT Operations in the UK.

opportunities to gather evidence. This means that if the risk to the public in a
particular investigation becomes too great or unmanageable, or if intelligence
gaps appear, effective action can be taken to disrupt the plot at earlier stages
than might have been the case in the past (see Case Study 10.2).
The importance of effective evidence-based pre-emption lies not only in the
ability to protect the public from harm. It can also reassure them that what is
being done in their name against terrorists is being done with integrity and
within the rule of law. There is every chance that this will be demonstrated
publicly through the transparency of the criminal trial process. The experience
in the UK is that this has been of great importance. For instance, the allegation
Case Study 10.2. Operation Crevice and Operation Rhyme.

In early 2004, intelligence was received by MI5 that a group of Islamists in the UK
were planning to build and detonate a large bomb. It was not known what their in-
tended target was to be, when the attack was to take place, or how far advanced they
were in their planning. The suspects were placed under surveillance in early February
2004. As the days and weeks progressed, the operation grew—overseen by daily ELG
meetings—until it developed into the largest surveillance operation ever seen in the
UK. The strategy was to gather enough evidence to mount a criminal prosecution, but
at the same time to keep surveillance at such a level that the suspects would not be
able to mount a ‘surprise’ attack.
As time went on, it was learned that the terrorists had stored over half a ton of
precursor material for making explosives. However, the evidence needed to mount a
successful prosecution that would reflect the true criminality of what they were plan-
ning was not yet available. For the first time, MI5 came to an arrangement with the
police whereby some of the secret surveillance material that in the past would never
have been made available as evidence in court, was used. The evidential case began to
build, aided by this unprecedented joint working. Meanwhile, public safety was pre-
served through the extent of the surveillance operation. Only when a doubt arose as
to whether there was complete control over the terrorists was the order given for
them to be arrested. Executive action was coordinated not only across the UK, but in-
ternationally as well. The terrorists were eventually convicted largely on the basis of
evidence gathered prior to their arrest.
By contrast, later that same year a group of terrorists in the UK, led by the veteran
jihadist Dhiren Barot, were known to be planning acts of terrorism. As with the Oper-
ation Crevice enquiry, the timescales, targets and methods of attack were not known
and so another large-scale surveillance operation under the codename Operation
Rhyme was mounted. However, Barot and his network were adept at evading surveil-
lance, and it became impossible to exercise sufficient coverage of the group to be sure
that there was no imminent threat to public safety. They were therefore arrested in
August 2004, but at the time of their arrest there was no evidence that would enable
criminal prosecutions to take place. However, once they were in custody, evidence
was found on their computers and storage devices. Three years later, eight members
of the cell were found guilty of serious terrorist offences.
In both of these cases, public safety was the deciding factor in determining the in-
vestigative strategy, and in both cases close working and information sharing be-
tween the police and intelligence agencies was critical to success.
158 Peter Clarke
has been made by some critics that the terrorist threat has been exaggerated by
the police acting as agents of the government in order to justify the UK’s foreign
policy. The suggestion was that Muslim communities were being unfairly tar-
geted. This was a very damaging allegation to make in terms of the police’s re-
lationships with the communities they serve. Intelligence from communities
can be crucial, and any suggestion that it will be used unfairly, illegally or inap-
propriately has the potential to inhibit effective CT operations. In the UK, from
2005 onwards there have been a large number of terrorist trials, conducted in
the ordinary criminal courts, that have demonstrated very clearly how the use
of recognized judicial process is a powerful tool against radicalizers and ter-
rorist apologists. However, the challenge still remains, as there is a continuing
need for police to show impartiality and integrity in the way in which they use
and communicate information relating to young Muslims wishing to travel to
Syria, for example, for purposes of terrorism.
Clearly, the ability of intelligence agencies and the police to work closely to-
gether will vary from one jurisdiction to another. In some cases, there may be a
lack of mutual confidence. In others, there may be constitutional or legal hur-
dles to overcome. However, it is more than likely that an honest assessment of
what is actually possible might yield some surprising and beneficial results. At
the heart of developing a close working relationship are strong personal con-
tacts and trust, supported by an administrative and legal framework that
should aim to be as open as possible, while protecting vital intelligence equi-
ties.
Given the global nature of the modern terrorist threat, international cooper-
ation between CT agencies and governments has had to move to a more ad-
vanced level, demanding high levels of mutual trust and confidence. Time and
again, this has proved to be vital in intercepting terrorist plots, and securing
the transfer of evidence from one jurisdiction to another. However, it would be
wrong to suggest that in every case there has been seamless mutual under-
standing of different jurisdictions’ approaches to managing the risk presented
by modern terrorists. As explained above, the key and determining factor
should always be the safety of the public. But a shared understanding, even be-
tween the closest of allies, has sometimes been difficult to achieve. For in-
stance, the case of Operation Overt in 2006 provides a stark example of how
sometimes different perceptions of acceptable risk can have a major impact on
the delivery of CT operations (see Case Study 10.3).
Strengths and Limitations of the Rule of Law in Counter

Terrorism
Extremist ideology is invariably underpinned by a narrative of grievance and
persecution. The prosecution of terrorists, who by definition are trying to sub-
vert existing constitutional processes, shows the strength of the rule of law and
the confidence that the government of the day has in it. Exposing terrorist vio-
lence and outright criminality can help to show that debate and persuasion are
Case Study 10.3. Operation Overt.

Operation Overt was an investigation into intelligence that a group of UK-based ter-
rorists were acquiring bomb making material. As is so often the case, the target and
timing of the attack were not known. The investigation gathered pace during the early
part of 2006, and knowledge grew of who was involved in the network, their commu-
nications, buildings to which they had access, and their vehicles. Technical surveil-
lance showed that they were making liquid bombs using a novel methodology, and
eventually it became clear that the terrorists’ intentions were to smuggle the devices
on a number of transatlantic airliners and bring them down in mid-flight. From the UK
perspective, public safety was secured by unprecedented levels of physical and tech-
nical surveillance. The police and MI5 were content that any potential risk to the pub-
lic was under control. The terrorist bomb factory was technically infiltrated, their
communications comprehensively monitored and their movements fully tracked. Evi-
dence that would be crucial in a court of law was accumulating by the hour.
However, the authorities in the United States took a different view and, it appears,
were working to a concept of operations prioritizing disruption of terrorist activity in
the short term over securing evidence to be used in court. The US therefore precipi-
tated an intervention by the Pakistani authorities that forced the British police to
bring forward their planned executive action and make arrests earlier than they had
intended. The terrorists were eventually convicted of planning to bring down airlin-
ers, but the intervention shows just how difficult it can be to hold international coop-
eration together when parties are operating to different priorities. A separate debate
could also be had as to whether there will inevitably be different approaches to such a
case when the operational lead in one country rests with an intelligence agency, but
with a coalition of law enforcement and intelligence in the other.
preferable to violence and intimidation as a means of pursuing political objec-

tives. It also shows that terrorists are nothing more than criminals and should
be treated as such. It helps to deny them any perception of legitimacy. Adher-
ence to recognized judicial process, particularly where there is a well-defined
and recognized separation of powers, can help to remove partisan politics from
CT.
However, it would be naïve to assume that fair and transparent judicial pro-
cesses are readily available ‘off the shelf’ in every jurisdiction. The pernicious
effects of terrorism tend to be most acute in unstable countries that are war-
torn or where it is difficult or impossible for civil police to operate in the way
that is possible in more peaceful environments. Thus, there are several steps
that have to be taken along the path that can eventually lead to a position
where intelligence-led policing against terrorist activity may reach its full po-
tential.
First, there must be an environment that is sufficiently peaceful, or permis-
sive, for civil police to be able to gather evidence, secure the cooperation of
witnesses and go through all the relevant processes in bringing terrorists to
trial. Levels of violence, intimidation and corruption must be such that the
route from criminal investigation through to trial is actually navigable. If ter-
rorist activity is at the level of insurgency, where the ability of government to
160 Peter Clarke
exercise its functions are under threat, then clearly the situation will need to be
brought under control by a military or paramilitary force. For instance, it is
rarely feasible for forensic evidence to be gathered in conflict zones or during
combat operations, although much has been achieved in this regard. Experi-
ence, not least in Northern Ireland, shows that there are overlapping and com-
plementary roles for the police and the military that will alter as circumstances
change and as it becomes more feasible for civil police to carry out their duties.
The model depicted in Figure 10.2 shows how, as the environment becomes
more permissive, the role of the military can diminish and that of the police in-
creases. In essence, when the environment is not permissive, terrorism will be
categorized as insurgency and must be combated with military operations.
When terrorist capability has been degraded, the environment will become
more permissive and the civil police will be able to treat terrorism as criminal
activity. Clearly, there will be variations on this model from one country to an-
other and the roles of police and military may well overlap or be separated ac-
cording to circumstances.
What is clear though is that in the long term there will be a need for police
and military to have a clear understanding of their respective roles, both at the
strategic and the tactical level. For instance, in a war zone, to what extent is it
Figure 10.2: The transition from insurgency to crime and the declining role
of the military as the police role increases.
(Copyright, Peter Clarke Associates. Reprinted with permission)
reasonable to expect the military to be engaged in gathering evidence? In the

fog of war it is obviously unreasonable to expect the military to engage in the
type of forensic examination that would be carried out at a crime scene in an
otherwise peaceful environment. Nevertheless, the intelligence and evidence
gathered at the scene of Osama bin Laden’s death shows what can be achieved
even in the most testing and difficult of circumstances.
Conclusion
The concept of preemption through intelligence-led policing in CT is driven by
the need to protect the public from mass casualty attacks, delivered without
notice and with the intention of killing as many people as possible. However,
the risk of preemption is that an early intervention, even if successful in pre-
venting an attack, may mean that there is insufficient admissible evidence to
mount a successful prosecution. This can fuel the terrorist narrative of griev-
ance and discrimination, i.e. that communities are being unfairly targeted by CT
authorities on the basis of faith, ethnicity or nationality. The use of recognized
and trusted judicial process is one means of countering this, but in order to do
so, there must be a very clear CT strategy and concept of operations.
The intelligence agencies, police, and in some situations the military must be
aligned in a cooperative coalition against terrorist activity. In some cases, this
will require the intelligence agencies to put more of their material at the dis-
posal of the courts than has traditionally been the case. In support of this the
military should, where possible, take account of the desirability of gathering
evidence as part of their mission. All of this needs to receive legal, judicial, po-
litical, media and community support. When all of these elements are in place,
it is possible to realize the full potential of truly collaborative, intelligence-led
CT. Military and law enforcement activity is essential, but it will not defeat the
ideology that drives terrorism by itself. However, the influence of radicalizers
and ideologues can be undermined by demonstrable integrity on the part of
law enforcement and the judicial process.
Chapter 11
Legal Issues in Combating
Terrorism
Dean L. Dwigans
Introduction
The legal response to transnational terrorism is constantly evolving. For exam-
ple, after the unprecedented destruction caused by the 9/11 attacks, there was
a shift towards the use of military force as the primary tool in transnational
counter-terrorism (CT), rather than an approach based on a law enforcement
paradigm. However, CT is not simply a choice between either military or law
enforcement options. Both approaches remain vital and have become more re-
fined over time, facilitated by an increased level of international cooperation
guided by the rule of law. However, much work remains to be done.
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of strategic considerations of
military versus law enforcement approaches to CT, with particular focus on the
issues of legitimacy, liberty and security. The military legal regime is then ex-
plored in greater depth, with a focus on key challenges currently faced by CT
professionals in this area. This is followed by a discussion of the law enforce-
ment regime with an emphasis on international cooperation and the continued
development of law enforcement tools needed to investigate and bring terror-
ists to justice.
An Overview of the Law and CT

The law governing the use of force by domestic law enforcement agencies is
quite different from that which applies to military force. Law enforcement
agencies are guided by domestic laws, administrative and procedural rules, and
judicial systems developed over many years. These include guidelines on the
use of force and escalation of force which are subject to judicial review. In addi-
tion, there are limitations and protections built in which are designed to safe-
guard the civil liberties of individuals. The use of military force is guided by
different domestic laws, although large bodies of international law also apply.
The use of the law enforcement regime is the traditional response to ter-
rorism, which is favored by most societies. The rule of law reflects the will of
the people and helps to demonstrate the legitimacy of the state over those who
violate it. Progress towards international peace and security also begins within
states since domestic legal systems help contribute to international coopera-
tion. The stronger law enforcement cooperation becomes, the less reliant the
163 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch11

164 Dean L. Dwigans
international community should be on the use of military force for countering

transnational terrorism.
In spite of the benefits of a law enforcement approach, many contemporary
terrorist campaigns necessitate a military response as the level of violence is
beyond the capabilities of most law enforcement agencies. Under such circum-
stances civilian casualties are unavoidable. This can weaken the legitimacy of
the state, whilst increasing support for the terrorists. At the same time, legal
regimes often become harsher and civil liberties tend to suffer as security takes
precedence over individual rights. The result is often increased surveillance
and search powers, lengthier periods of detention without charge, restrictions
on financial institutions, greater information sharing, broader CT legislation
and enhanced penalties for terrorism offences. The introduction of the Patriot
Act 1 after 9/11 in the US and the authorization of military force against al-
Qaeda (AQ) are illustrative examples.2
Although sometimes necessary, the resort to military force and the adoption
of extraordinary legal powers are not intended to be permanent measures. In
order to avoid unintended negative consequences, they need to be used spar-
ingly, proportionally and in as targeted a manner as possible. Because of this,
the use of military force is often restricted to particular terrorist groups or lo-
cations, while special CT laws are subject to periodic review and often have a
built-in ‘sunset clause,’ meaning they will automatically expire at a predeter-
mined date unless renewed. Ideally, reliance on the military and the use of ex-
ceptional legal powers for CT should give way to a ‘standard’ law enforcement
approach once a terrorist threat becomes more manageable.
The Use of Military Force

It is essential for the use of military force to be grounded in international law.
To ensure that the sovereignty of states is respected, the UN Charter contains a
general prohibition on the threat or use of force against another state.3 In turn,
states have an obligation to ensure that their territory is not used to the detri-
ment of other states, for example by providing sanctuary for terrorists, as the
Taliban did for AQ in Afghanistan. The appropriate initial response is to ask the
offending state to police its territory. However, if the offending state ignores
such a request, refuses or is unable to eliminate the threat, a victim state may
in certain circumstances enter the relevant territory in order to address the
threat directly4 (see Case Study 11.1).
1 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-

cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
2 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
3 UN Charter, art. 2, para. 4.
4 Raffaella Nigro, “International Terror and the Use of Force Against Non-State Actors,”
ISPI Policy Brief 150, 2009, accessed August 11, 2015, http://www.ispionline.it/it/
documents/PB_150_2009.pdf.
Legal Issues in Combating Terrorism 165
There are two exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force against an-
other state. The first is a mandate of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter. If under Article 39 of Chapter VII the Security Council de-
termines that a particular situation amounts to a “threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression,”5 it may mandate nonforceful actions under
Article 41 or the use of force under Article 42. The ultimate goal of Chapter VII
is to maintain international peace and security rather than to punish or facili-
tate retribution.
Case Study 11.1. Operation Phoenix.

In 2008, the government of Colombia was in the 45th year of its war against the Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The Colombian armed forces were en-
gaged in intense military operations to reduce the territory under FARC’s control and
cripple the group’s combat capabilities. Under pressure, FARC had begun using the
territory of Ecuador for supplies and recuperation. On March 1, 2008, a Colombian
combined arms team struck a FARC base just over the border. The camp was bombed
and subject to a ground assault. Raúl Reyes, a senior FARC commander, was killed
along with 20 other members of the group. Reyes’ computer and other electronic me-
dia were collected from the site, providing valuable intelligence.6
Because of fears the operation would be compromised, Colombia did not seek Ec-
uador’s consent for the attack. As a result, Operation Phoenix was condemned as an
illegal violation of Ecuador’s sovereignty by some members of the international com-
munity, including the Organization of American States. Both Venezuela and Ecuador
broke off diplomatic relations with Colombia and moved troops to their borders,7 alt-
hough Colombian President Álvaro Uribe eventually defused tensions by making a full
apology.
From an international law perspective, the condemnation of Colombia ignored the
right of a state to self defense and also the duty of states to prevent their territory
from being used for terrorist activity. In particular, later examination of the captured
FARC electronic documents by Interpol provided confirmation of long suspected close
ties between Ecuador’s political elite and the terrorist organization.8 However, the le-
gal principles involved remain in tension. Some lawyers put territorial integrity first,
some argue for the primacy of the right to self defense and others give priority to sov-
ereign states’ broader responsibilities to the international community. The Operation
Phoenix case is one of many that illustrate the difficulties of applying international
law designed for state-on-state armed conflict to operations against non-state armed
groups.
5 UN Charter, Chapter VII, Art. 39

6 For information on Operation Phoenix see Philip Sherwell, “Inside the FARC Camps in
Ecuador,” Daily Telegraph, March 9, 2008; and Dana Priest, “Covert Action in Co-
lombia: US Intelligence, GPS Bomb Kits Help Latin American Nation Cripple Rebel
Forces,” Washington Post, December 21, 2013, accessed August 11, 2015,
www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2013/12/21/covert-action-in-colombia/.
7 “On the Warpath,” The Economist, March 6, 2008.
8 Frank Walsh, “Rethinking the Legality of Colombia’s Attack on the FARC in Ecuador,”
The Pace International Law Review 21, no. 1 (2009): 146.
166 Dean L. Dwigans
Under Article 39, the UN Security Council has repeatedly identified interna-
tional terrorism as a serious threat to the peace, but it has never authorized the
use of force against terrorists under Article 42. Instead, it has encouraged in-
ternational cooperation and left the decision to use force to the individual
states acting in self-defense or in the defense of another state under Article 51
of the Charter.9 Self-defense is the second exception to the prohibition on the
use of force. Though authorized in Article 51, the right of self-defense is a long-
standing and inherent right of states and is grounded in customary interna-
tional law.
Under Article 51, a state may act in self-defense in the event of an armed at-
tack. Up until 2001 an armed attack was generally understood to be an act per-
petrated by a state rather than a non-state actor – the implicit assumption be-
ing that the latter would be dealt with by law enforcement. This shifted in re-
sponse to the 9/11 attacks, after which the UN Security Council affirmed the
inherent right to individual or collective self-defense in the context of attacks
by non-state actors.10
Any decision to use military force must comply with the international law
principles of necessity, proportionality and immediacy. Necessity requires that
a) reasonable alternatives must be exhausted prior to the use of force and b) a
threatening state—or non-state actor—has both the intention and capability to
attack. Proportionality means the amount of force used must be limited to that
required to defeat or deter an armed attack (though this does not necessarily
mean it must be of the same scale as employed by the enemy). The last require-
ment is immediacy. Defensive action must not occur too soon in anticipation of
an attack since non-forceful measures should be attempted and given time to
yield results first. Alternatively, it must not come too late as it could be viewed
as an act of retaliation rather than one of defense.
Applying these requirements to cases of international terrorism can be
challenging. It may be difficult to determine necessity and immediacy given the
unpredictability of terrorist networks, the varying scale of attacks and the diffi-
culty in assessing the impact of non-violent countermeasures. The requirement
of proportionality can be more easily resolved in response to individual at-
tacks, but is much more difficult when acts of terrorism form part of an ex-
tended campaign and are not necessarily tied to one specific organization.
In the US, the use of military force against AQ has been authorized by law. 11
Such an authorization to use military force is subject to review and should be
repealed once the threat has been eliminated. Even with the increased interna-
tional acceptance of the use of military force to combat terrorism, the US may
eventually reach a ‘tipping point’12 when efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and de-
9 UN Charter, Chapter VII, Art. 51

10 United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1368 and 1373.
11 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
12 Jeh Charles Johnson, “The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It
End?” (paper presented at the Oxford Union, Oxford University, Oxford, UK, Novem-
feat AQ and its affiliates have succeeded to such an extent that the campaign
can no longer be classified as an armed conflict. Instead, law enforcement, in-
telligence, foreign assistance and diplomacy would be the primary US methods
to counter any remaining AQ related threat.
The body of international law governing the right of states to use military
force is called jus ad bellum. It is aimed at deterring the use of armed force by
states against each other. A parallel body of international law called jus in bello
dictates the rules which apply to the use of force once a conflict has begun. Jus
in bello is also referred to as international humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of
armed conflict. The goal is to limit the suffering of combatants, noncombatants
and civilians to what is necessary to achieve the legitimate political goals of the
conflict. Under IHL, any military force used must adhere to the principles of dis-
tinction and proportionality. Distinction requires that force be restricted to
military targets and that civilians are protected. However, it is also recognized
that civilian casualties will sometimes be unavoidable in the course of striking
legitimate military targets. The principle of proportionality is designed to limit
such “collateral damage” by forbidding civilian casualties disproportionate to
any military advantage to be achieved by the use of force. In other words, the
expected loss of civilian life must be weighed against the military value of the
intended target. Conduct during war is further restrained by the Geneva and
Hague Conventions which also fall under the jus in bello body of international
law. The Geneva Conventions apply to the treatment of detainees and actions of
an occupying force while the Hague Conventions apply to targeting and uses of
certain types of weapons.
Importantly, the Geneva Conventions apply almost exclusively to interna-
tional armed conflicts between states and not to non-international armed con-
flicts, as between states and non-state actors such as AQ and IS. The exception
to this is Common Article 3, so named because it is common to all four of the
Geneva Conventions.13 It applies to non-international armed conflicts by estab-
lishing fundamental rules of humane treatment for all individuals in enemy
hands, including, for example, the unlawful combatants being held by the US in
Guantanamo Bay. It is considered a mini convention within the Geneva Conven-
tions from which no exceptions are permitted.
The jus in bello is a complex body of law and is discussed only briefly in this
chapter as it relates to targeting of force and detaining battlefield belligerents.
However, in addition to the issues highlighted above, it is important to be
ber 30, 2012), accessed August 14, 2015, www.state.gov/documents/organization/

211954.pdf.
13 1949 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75 UNTS 31/ [1958] ATS No 21; 1949 Geneva
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 UNTS 85/ [1958] ATS No 21; 1949
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 UNTS 135/
[1958] ATS No 21; 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287/ 1958 ATS No 21.
168 Dean L. Dwigans
aware of the difference between IHL and international human rights law (HRL).
Theoretically, IHL applies during armed conflicts and HRL applies during
peacetime. The US view is that during armed conflicts, HRL yields to IHL,
meaning that certain actions are permissible during wartime that would not
otherwise be allowed. This view is not necessarily shared by other states, par-
ticularly in Europe, which results in different legal interpretations regarding
the use of force.
Applications of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello

Having outlined the fundamentals of international law which govern the use of
military force, we now consider four real world applications pertaining to the
detention, rendition, interrogation and targeted killing of suspected terrorists.
1. Detention
Detention of suspected terrorists can be imposed by domestic law enforcement
under existing criminal law and judicial procedures in a state, similar to anyone
suspected of a crime. The purpose of such detention is investigation, trial and
punishment. This is the preferred approach to the detention of terrorism sus-
pects, but is not always possible.
Suspected terrorists can also be detained as enemy combatants during
armed conflict under IHL. Such detainees can then be held until hostilities
cease. The purpose of continued detention is to prevent them from returning to
the battlefield and taking up arms again. Enemy combatants are members of
hostile forces engaged in armed conflict. Upon capture, they enjoy certain pro-
tections under the Geneva Conventions which specify three different categories
of individuals: prisoners of war (POWs), unlawful combatants and civilians. A
POW is a lawful combatant and enjoys the highest protections. In order to be
classified as a POW, a detainee must have conducted himself in accordance
with the laws and customs of war, which is rarely, if ever, the case with terror-
ists. The killing of civilians, the failure to wear a uniform and the use of civilians
as human shields are in violation of these rules and can result in a detainee
being designated an unlawful combatant. Unlawful combatants are not entitled
to the rights and privileges of a POW and they are subject to trial by military
tribunal for their participation in hostilities. However, unlawful combatants
must still be treated humanely as required by Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. Civilians are those who have not directly participated in hostili-
ties; however, whether or not civilians have taken a direct part in an armed
conflict is open to wide interpretation. If civilians are deemed to have directly
supported hostilities, they may be treated as unlawful combatants.
Following the 9/11 attacks, US troops detained many suspected foreign ter-
rorists pursuant to the US congressional authorization to use military force. 14 A
total of 779 individuals were detained at the Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay in
Cuba. None of those detained met the criteria to be designated a lawful com-
14 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
batant due to their failure to comply with the laws of war. As of mid-2015, 663
of these detainees had been released, transferred or died in captivity and a fur-
ther 51 had been cleared for release to other states willing to accept them. The
remaining detainees are subject to prosecution for terrorist offenses or contin-
ued detention for the duration of the “war on terror” based on a determination
that they still represent a threat to the US.
The detention camp at Guantanamo Bay has been fraught with controversy
since it opened. In 2009, a Presidential order decreed that the facility should
close.15 Military commission proceedings set up to try detainees were also
halted pending a comprehensive review. The commissions resumed in late
2009 upon passage of the Military Commissions Act by the US Congress, 16 but
to date Congress has blocked any attempt to close the facility because it does
not want detainees transferred to the US. Although President Obama remains
determined to close the detention camp, the question of what to do with cur-
rent and any future unlawful combatant detainees in cases where there is in-
sufficient evidence to prosecute, but continued detention is warranted, remains
unresolved.17
2. Rendition
Rendition refers to the taking or surrender of a suspected terrorist from one
state to another. Rendition for law enforcement reasons is almost always pur-
suant to an agreement or treaty, such as an extradition treaty, and usually for
the purpose of a criminal prosecution or to serve out a sentence after a convic-
tion. This type of rendition is a legal and formal process normally conducted
through diplomatic channels.
Extraordinary rendition was used during the 1990s when terrorists were
captured and then subsequently transferred to another state for the purposes
of serving out a conviction obtained in absentia. It became more frequent after
9/11, when suspects were transferred to other states for the purposes of inter-
rogation. The term “extraordinary” is used because the process is beyond the
law and so is not pursuant to a treaty, formal agreement or judicial process in
the state where the capture is made. Extraordinary rendition is thus illegal and
exposes any government agents involved to legal action. For instance, in 2003
agents of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Italian Military In-
telligence and Security Service (SISMI) captured a terrorism suspect named
Abu Omar in Milan and transferred him to Egypt for interrogation. When the
15 Exec. Order. No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan 27, 2009), accessed August 14, 2015,
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/2009-obama.html.
16 Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009), Title XVIII of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Pub.L. 111–84, H.R. 2647, 123 Stat. 2190,
enacted October 28, 2009).
17 Tim Mak and Nancy A. Youssef, “The Pentagon is Keeping Half of Gitmo Locked Up
Against the White House’s Wishes,” The Daily Beast, August 9, 2015, accessed August
11, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/09/he-s-keeping-half-
of-gitmo-locked-up-against-the-white-house-s-wishes.html.
170 Dean L. Dwigans
incident became public in 2005, twenty-six CIA and nine SISMI operatives were
indicted by Italian prosecutors. Although the Italian government did not re-
quest the extradition of the CIA agents, twenty two European arrest warrants
were issued. Many convictions (mostly in absentia) were obtained and sen-
tences imposed, with several Italian agents imprisoned and fined.
3. Interrogations
There has also been significant controversy concerning the transfer of terror-
ism suspects to countries with poor human rights records and allegations of
torture have later been made against the US and other states related to some
transfers.
Torture is prohibited under US and international law and is universally de-
nounced. However, in the US the application of the law with regard to the con-
duct of interrogations has been subject to varying interpretation. Confusion
persisted despite multiple attempts at clarification, including the 1994 US rati-
fication of the UN Convention on Torture; the 1994 US Torture Act; the De-
tainee Treatment Act of 2005, plus various US Department of Justice Memo-
randums, Executive Orders and legal interpretations concerning the applica-
bility of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. In a further attempt to
provide legal clarity, Executive Order 13,491 “Ensuring Lawful Interrogations”
was signed in 2009. This order cancelled previous directives, established
Common Article 3 as the baseline for all interrogations, closed CIA detention
facilities and provided the International Red Cross access to detainees. It also
restricted interrogation methods to those authorized in the US Army Field
Manual, thereby clarifying more precisely what is permissible. Nevertheless,
the issue of conduct during interrogations remains a hotly debated issue, as
seen in the controversy which arose following the publication of the so-called
‘torture report’ in 2014.18
18 CIA Response on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study on the Former De-
tention and Interrogation Program, www.cia.gov/library/reports/CIAs_June2013_
Response_to_the_SSCI_Study_on_the_Former_Detention_and_Interrogation_Program.pdf,
June 27, 2013, accessed September 1, 2015; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation
Program, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, accessed August 11, 2015,
https://web.archive.org/web/20141209165504/http://www.intelligence.senate.go
v/study2014/sscistudy1.pdf; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee
Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program,
Minority Views, June 20, 2014, accessed September 1, 2015, https://web.archive.org/
web/20141209225230/http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/study2014/sscistudy3.pdf;
George J. Tenet, Porter J. Goss, Michael V. Hayden, John E. McLaughlin, Albert M. Cal-
land, and Stephen R. Kappes, “Ex-CIA Directors: Interrogations Saved Lives,” Wall
Street Journal, December 10, 2014, accessed September 1, 2015, www.wsj.com/
articles/cia-interrogations-saved-lives-1418142644.
4. Targeted Killings
In policing, force is used in self-defense, the defense of others and to effect a
lawful arrest according to domestic law. It is based on HRL. Lethal force can
only be used if there is no other choice, for example, in a hostage situation,
bank robbery or terrorism incident where it is the only option to eliminate a
threat to the public. In such cases, the use of force is subject to administrative
and judicial review and must conform to the principles of necessity and pro-
portionality.
As noted above, the US view is that IHL applies in operations against inter-
national terrorists rather than HRL. After 9/11, the US adopted targeted killing
as a crucial means of crippling AQ’s leadership. The intention was to apply le-
thal force against those already determined to be combatants. Under IHL, an
analysis is conducted to determine the appropriateness of force against a target
using the principles of distinction and proportionality. Once the subject is de-
termined to be a legitimate battlefield target—an individual who is taking a di-
rect part in the hostilities—the analysis turns to the protection of civilians (dis-
tinction) and weighs potential casualties against the military advantage it is
hoped to achieve by the use of force (proportionality). This analysis ultimately
dictates whether a particular individual will be targeted at a specific time and
place. However, targeted killings outside of recognized conflict zones remain
legally contentious. Proponents argue that only IHL applies to the use of lethal
force against military targets engaged in armed conflict no matter where they
are targeted.
Opponents of these operations argue that as lethal strikes have been con-
ducted outside of conflict zones they should be governed by HRL and associ-
ated law enforcement norms.19 So-called ‘signature strikes,’ where individuals
in the vicinity of a specific leadership target have also been attacked in sepa-
rate follow-up strikes, are particularly controversial.20
The use of unmanned aerial vehicles or drones to carry out targeted killings
has become increasingly common and, although tactically effective, is also con-
troversial, in particular when state sovereignty is violated and civilians are
killed. This has increased resentment of the US in affected areas and led to
heightened support for extremists in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.21 However,
the legal/military analysis is no different just because the weapon is an un-
manned drone. The procedure is the same as when using any battlefield weap-
19 Jeffery Scott Bachmann, “The Lawfulness of US Targeted Killing Operations Outside

Afghanistan,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38, no. 11 (2015): 2.
20 Bachman, “The Lawfulness of US Targeted Killing Operations Outside of Afghanistan,”
11–14.
21 See, for example, Hassan Abbas, “How Drones Create More Terrorists,” The Atlantic,
August 23, 2013, accessed August 11, 2015, www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2013/08/how-drones-create-more-terrorists/278743/; Ibrahim Mothana,
“How Drones Help Al Qaeda,” New York Times, June 13, 2012, accessed August 11,
2015, www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/opinion/how-drones-help-al-qaeda.html.
172 Dean L. Dwigans
on against a legitimate target. Furthermore, the use of drones reduces the ex-
posure of military personnel to danger and allows for more precise targeting,
which helps to minimize civilian casualties in comparison to conventional air
strikes.
The Law Enforcement Regime

Just as terrorism and the use of military force in CT have evolved over the past
fifteen years, so too has law enforcement. Nevertheless, an effective police-led
response to transnational terrorism must be rooted in traditional law enforce-
ment activities and procedures. These include establishing jurisdiction, inter-
national cooperation and the use of both formal and informal tools to obtain
custody of suspects and ensure successful prosecutions.
1. Jurisdiction
Law enforcement authorities must have jurisdiction over a crime to exercise
their authority, or else have an agreement to assist another state possessing
such jurisdiction. In many cases authorities lack the appropriate legal powers
because domestic laws are outdated and fail to adequately address terrorism
offenses. There are five legal principles of state jurisdiction, all of which are
based on the strength of the link between the state and the person or conduct
in question:
1) Territorial principle: jurisdiction over all conduct within the state’s ter-
ritory
2) Nationality principle: jurisdiction over its nationals anywhere
3) Passive Personality principle: jurisdiction over conduct anywhere that
injures its nationals
4) Protective principle: jurisdiction over conduct anywhere that threatens
its security
5) Universality principle: jurisdiction over conduct universally dangerous
to all nations and nationals, such as piracy and genocide, and some acts
of terrorism.
Jurisdiction is dependent on national legislation and not all states choose to
take advantage of each of these principles. However, in many cases concurrent
jurisdiction exists, meaning that more than one state has jurisdiction over the
same acts. In order to keep pace with the ever-expanding threats associated
with transnational terrorism, it is in a state’s interest to adjust its domestic
laws to ensure maximum jurisdiction. Such changes are often a requirement for
states joining certain international agreements. Sometimes existing gaps in a
state’s domestic laws can be overcome through international cooperation. For
instance, in 2003 British police arrested an individual named Babar Ahmad,
who ran a website called Azzam Publications in support of the Taliban.22 The
UK was unable to prosecute him, but he was re-arrested in 2004 (and later
pleaded guilty to terrorism charges) on the strength of a US extradition request
which claimed jurisdiction based on Ahmad having used an Internet Service
Provider in the US.
2. International Cooperation
Since 1963, sixteen multinational conventions and protocols23 have been devel-
oped under the auspices of the UN to enhance domestic legal responses to ter-
rorism by committing parties to strengthen their domestic laws, remove barri-
ers to investigations crossing international borders and enhance prosecutions.
These agreements define specific terrorist acts, require domestic criminaliza-
tion of these activities, establish criminal jurisdiction over the defined offenses
(including extraterritorial jurisdiction), mandate state assistance in investiga-
tions and demand that states either prosecute or extradite for the defined of-
fenses in order to deny safe havens to terrorists.
Member states are currently negotiating a Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism intended to criminalize all forms of international ter-
rorism and deny terrorists and their supporters access to money, arms and
safe havens. Unfortunately, negotiations are currently deadlocked, not least be-
cause of the perennial difficulty of agreeing on a universal definition of terror-
ism.24
A Convention would reinforce UN Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) from
2001 and 2004 25 which established terrorism as one of the most serious
threats to international peace and security, reaffirmed the right of self defense
for all nations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and mandated all member
states to combat terrorism. Unlike treaties where individual states must con-
sent to the terms, UN SCRs are binding on all member states. SCR 1373, in par-
ticular, is comprehensive and requires states to prevent and prosecute acts of
terrorism, including action against planning, support, recruitment, and financ-
ing, as well as movement of terrorists. However, the effective implementation
of these measures remains an ongoing challenge.
22 Philip Sherwell, “Babar Ahmad sentenced to 12.5 years for supporting Islamic
terrorists,” The Telegraph, July 16, 2014, accessed August 7, 2015,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10971189/Babar
-Ahmad-sentenced-to-12.5-years-for-supporting-Islamic-terrorists.html.
23 “United Nations Actions to Counter Terrorism: International Legal Instruments,”
United Nations, undated, accessed August 14, 2015, www.un.org/en/terrorism/
instruments.shtml.
24 “Speakers Urge That Differences Be Resolved in Draft Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism, as Sixth Committee Begins Session,” UN Press Release,
October 7, 2014, accessed August 11, 2015, www.un.org/press/en/2014/gal34
75.doc.htm.
25 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sep. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1566 (Oct. 18, 2004).
174 Dean L. Dwigans
3. Obtaining Custody
Despite improvements in international cooperation, it remains difficult to in-
vestigate, convict and punish terrorists who operate across national bounda-
ries. Legal assistance to facilitate investigations and prosecutions is vital, but is
often time consuming due to the formal process needed to coordinate actions
through diplomatic or judicial channels. To streamline this process, many
states have entered into Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs). These
agreements are typically bilateral treaties which define the obligation and
scope of legal assistance and the process for making requests. 26 These treaties
vastly improve the effectiveness of judicial assistance between nations and
usually include the power to summon witnesses, compel the production of
documents and other evidence, issue search warrants, serve judicial process
and assist with the seizure and forfeiture of assets. In addition, there are vari-
ous international organizations which facilitate informal cross border police
and judicial cooperation, to include Interpol, Europol and Eurojust.
Detention of suspected terrorists for law enforcement purposes is primarily
dictated by domestic law. In the US, constitutional protections exist to prevent
unreasonable search and seizure 27 and ensure due process.28 Police must have
probable cause to suspect that a person has committed an offense before
making an arrest. Once detained, due process prevents indefinite detention
without charge. If a person is charged, their case must be processed swiftly. Af-
ter 9/11, many suspected terrorists were arrested for immigration violations
or document fraud under domestic laws. Notably these were ‘ordinary’ crimi-
nal violations and were largely dealt with in accordance with long-established
due process requirements. Detainees also have rights under international law.
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 29 provides the right for a for-
eigner to have their government notified upon arrest, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 30 prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention
without court review.
International cooperation is required if a suspected terrorist is located out-
side a state’s borders. Obtaining custody of a suspect in another state is known
as extradition. This process is usually detailed in a bilateral agreement or
treaty. Formal extradition requires that certain detailed conditions be met such
as an arrest warrant, a description of the facts and an explanation of the
charges. A judicial review may be required and inevitably political factors in-
fluence proceedings. Within the European Union, however, the European Ar-
rest Warrant has replaced traditional extradition since 2004. The process fol-
26 Other agreements, such as extradition treaties, can contain similar terms.

27 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
28 U.S. Const. amend. V.
29 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; 23 U.S.T.
3227.
30 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
part 3, art. 9.
lows procedures outside political channels and has reduced some restrictions
and prohibitions, such as the ability of a state to refuse to extradite its own na-
tionals.
Every treaty or agreement has limitations that can present a bar to extradi-
tion. A request can be denied in terrorist cases, for example, because of con-
cerns about human rights violations. Several European states have struggled to
deport terrorism suspects to African or Middle Eastern countries where they
are at risk of torture. European human rights law prohibits the extradition of
suspects without certain assurances regarding conditions of imprisonment and
potential use of the death penalty. As a result, it has also sometimes proven
difficult to extradite terrorism suspects from Europe to the US. The High Court
of Ireland recently refused to extradite a terrorism suspect named Ali Damache
because he would likely be held in a federal ‘supermax’ prison, which it ruled
amounted to “cruel and unusual punishment.” 31 The British Government’s dis-
putes with the European Court of Human Rights over the extradition of Abu
Hamza and Abu Qatada to the US and Jordan respectively further illustrate the
extent of these problems.32
However, even without an extradition agreement, a state may simply hand
over suspects or use its immigration laws to expel or deport a suspect. Unilat-
eral and nonconsensual methods have also been used, such as luring a terrorist
suspect into another jurisdiction or into international waters. For example, in
2002, intelligence reports linked German citizen, Christian Ganczarski, to the El
Ghariba synagogue bombing in Tunisia. Although German authorities lacked
sufficient evidence for a prosecution, he was instead lured to Paris where he
was arrested and tried by the French.33
4. Prosecutions
The ultimate goal of the law enforcement approach to CT is to ensure that ter-
rorist offenders are tried and convicted. In principle, this is no different than
dealing with any other criminal offense and requires sufficient evidence to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the prosecution of terrorists
involves a number of distinct challenges. Prior to 9/11 many states did not have
specific CT legislation and even those that did have had to update their laws.
New CT legislation has been required because of offenses unique to terrorism,
31 Richard A. Serrano, “U.S. ‘Supermax’ Prison: ‘Alcatraz of the Rockies’ is Seen as

‘Inhuman and Degrading’,” Los Angeles Times, August 9, 2015, accessed August 13,
2015, http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-84172928/.
32 Matthew Holehouse, “Extradition of Abu Hamza and four others for terrorism
offences can go ahead, European court rules,” The Telegraph, April 10, 2012, accessed
August 12, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/
9195024/Extradition-of-Abu-Hamza-and-four-others-for-terrorism-offences-can-go-
ahead-European-court-rules.html.
33 Bruce Crumley, “French Terror Conviction: Lesson for the US?” Time, February 6,
2009, accessed August 12, 2015, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,1877570,00.html.
176 Dean L. Dwigans
such as participating in terrorist training or providing financial support, and by

the requirement for a proactive CT approach. A vast amount of legislation has
been introduced in a short space of time, with a shift towards proactive inves-
tigation and prosecutions and ever closer cooperation between police and in-
telligence services.
This has proved challenging. Establishing sufficient evidence of intent to
commit an act of terrorism, sometimes before a specific target has even been
identified, is especially difficult. In the UK, it took three separate, costly trials to
secure appropriate convictions in the so-called “liquid bomb plot” of 2006.
Even then most of the plotters were cleared of the main charge of conspiring to
explode aircraft. It is now rare for UK terrorism suspects to be charged with
conspiracy. In practice, this has been replaced by the charge of “engaging in
conduct in preparation for acts of terrorism,” which has a lower threshold of
proof.34 On other occasions, when evidence has been insufficient to support a
more serious terrorism charge, prosecutors have resorted to ordinary criminal
charges such as immigration violations or fraud.
Difficulties can be exacerbated when cases have an international dimension,
in particular where multiple agencies are involved, the relevant legislation is
relatively new and there is pressure to act swiftly (see Case Study 11.2). Fur-
ther challenges have arisen as a result of the need to collect and preserve intel-
ligence in a format that is admissible as evidence in court and where intelli-
gence officers have had to testify.35 In exceptional cases, it can be damaging to
national security to reveal the sources or methods of intelligence collection at
trial. Some countries (including the UK, Canada and Australia) have therefore
resorted to special administrative sanctions 36 which severely restrict the civil
liberties of terrorism suspects in the absence of a conviction. Such measures
have been used sparingly 37 but have still faced significant legal and political
challenges.38
34 Frank Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the
Shadow of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), Kindle Edition,
chapter 4.
35 See, for example, “British Spies Don Wigs and Makeup to Testify at US Trial of Al-
Qaida Suspect,” The Guardian, February 24, 2015, accessed August 13, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/feb/24/british-spies-wigs-makeup-
testify-al-qaida-suspect.
36 Known as Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, security certificates and
control orders respectively.
37 David Anderson, Control Orders in 2011: Final Report of The Independent Reviewer on
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (London: The Stationery Office, 2012).
38 See, for example, David Barrett, “Q&A: Terror Controls Explained,” The Telegraph,
August 22, 2014, accessed August 13, 2015, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
terrorism-in-the-uk/11051120/QandA-Terror-controls-explained.html.
Case Study 11.2. Dr. Haneef.39

On June 29, 2007 two unexploded car bombs were found in London. The next day a
burning jeep was driven into the terminal building of Glasgow airport in Scotland in
an attempted suicide attack. One of the attackers, Kafeel Ahmed, subsequently died
from his injuries while his accomplice, Bilal Abdulla, was arrested and later convicted.
Two others, including Kabeel’s brother Sabeel, were also arrested and later cleared of
all charges. Meanwhile, on July 2nd, British authorities discovered that a SIM card in
Sabeel’s possession had been given to him by his cousin, Dr. Mohamed Haneef, who
had since left the UK for Australia. Acting on information provided by British police,
Australian officers arrested Haneef as he prepared to board a one-way flight to India.
Twelve days later he was charged with recklessly providing support to a terrorist or-
ganization, after which his visa was cancelled. However, following a review of the in-
vestigation all charges against him were dropped, his visa was reinstated and in 2010
he was awarded substantial compensation.
An inquiry into the case confirmed that there was no evidence Haneef had commit-
ted an offence. It concluded that multiple factors had contributed to mistakes in the
investigation, including a reliance on partial information provided from overseas and
the limited time to act, given the possibility a terrorist was about to board an interna-
tional flight. There was thus significant pressure to detain Haneef, even though ar-
resting officers doubted they had reasonable grounds to believe he had committed an
offence. The decision to press charges appears to have been driven in part by confu-
sion surrounding new legislation, whereby the police opted to follow the advice of the
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions despite their misgivings about the
lack of evidence. These problems were compounded by a lack of clarity concerning
the roles, functions and responsibilities of the various agencies involved. Among other
recommendations, the inquiry called for amendments to the criminal code, the ap-
pointment of an independent reviewer of CT legislation and the development of a Na-
tional CT Handbook to specify operational protocols and a standard investigative
structure.
Conclusion
International and domestic legislation lies at the heart of all CT. It dictates and
constrains our actions, whether military or law enforcement, domestic or in-
ternational. Adhering to the rule of law is important and can have significant
implications if not developed and applied appropriately. For instance, law en-
forcement has clearly become more effective at preventing, investigating and
prosecuting terrorist acts, in large part due to more robust domestic legal sys-
tems and greater international cooperation. However, these successes have
sometimes been at the expense of civil liberties.40 It is incumbent on all states
to find the appropriate balance between the rights of individuals and the rights
39 Matthew John Robert Clarke, Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed
Haneef, Volume 1 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2008), accessed February
2, 2015, http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/35146207.
40 Such as more expansive domestic legislation, i.e. post 9/11 in the US (Patriot Act) and
UK, after the Paris attacks in France and more recently in Egypt.
178 Dean L. Dwigans
of society based on the threat faced. It is likewise imperative that CT practi-

tioners accept it is an individual responsibility to abide by the law, even under
the most difficult circumstances. The debates surrounding encryption of elec-
tronic communications, government surveillance, the response to foreign ter-
rorist fighters, the use of drones and the impact of cyber attacks that test the
historical analysis of the use of force, will all be influenced by how much bur-
den and intrusion individuals are willing to tolerate, and how much states are
willing to impose on their citizens. If an appropriate, acceptable and effective
balance is not found, then terrorism and extremism will fill the void.
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Chapter 12
Talking to Terrorists
James K. Wither
Introduction
Legitimate governments do not talk to terrorists. This is the standard, public
response of political leaders throughout the world when asked about the pos-
sibility of negotiations with violent non-state groups. President George W. Bush
famously claimed that “No nation can negotiate with terrorists. For there is no
way to make peace with those whose only goal is death.” 1 In 1979, British
Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher declared with typical irony: “I have never
done business with terrorists until they become prime ministers.” 2 As this
statement implies, despite the rhetoric, governments can and do talk to terror-
ists.
An oft-quoted RAND Corporation study on the reasons for the end of ter-
rorist campaigns between 1968 and 2006 found that a transition to a non-vio-
lent political process took place in 43 percent of the 648 examples studied.3 In
most cases, this transition could not have taken place without a willingness on
the part of governments to negotiate. At the time of writing, talks are taking
place to end long-standing terrorist campaigns in the Philippines and Colombia.
Successful engagement with terrorists has previously ended bloody armed con-
flicts in countries as diverse as South Africa, the UK (Northern Ireland), Indone-
sia (Aceh) and El Salvador. As conflict analyst Roger Mac Ginty pithily states:
“The phrase ‘we shall never negotiate with terrorists’ lacks one obligatory
word: ‘yet’.”4
1 “Extracts from Bush’s Speech,” BBC News, April 4, 2002, accessed May 22, 2015,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1911665.stm.
2 Cited in Alan Travis and Owen Bowcott, “Papers Released under the 30 Year Rule
Reveal the Full Force of Thatcher’s Fury,” The Guardian, December 30, 2009, accessed
May 22, 2015, www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/dec/30/30-year-rule-thatcher-
papers-released.
3 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering
al Qa’ida (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 18–19, accessed May 22, 2015,
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf.
Note that the figures in the study and its methodology can be disputed, but the
transition to a political process still emerges as an essential element in ending many
terrorist campaigns.
4 Roger Mac Ginty, “Look Who’s Talking, Dialogue and Conflict Transformation,” Criti-
cal Studies on Terrorism 6, no. 1 (2013): 219.
181 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch12

182 James K. Wither
This chapter examines the potential advantages and dangers of talking to

terrorists and addresses practical and technical issues such as who to talk with
and when and how to talk. It also identifies good and bad practice from the ex-
perience of dialogue with terrorist groups around the world. The final section
addresses the prospects of talks in an era characterized by ideologically ex-
treme, religiously motivated terrorists. The chapter deals with the option of
talking to terrorists as part of a broader counter-terrorism (CT) strategy,
where a government has a choice whether or not to open dialogue with a ter-
rorist organization. It does not address the tactical level negotiations that are
an essential element in the response to terrorist kidnapping and barricade hos-
tage incidents. In these situations, government security forces usually have no
choice but to talk to the terrorists involved in order to save civilian lives.5
What is Talking to Terrorists?

In this context, talking to terrorists refers to three inter-related types of en-
gagement. The first is contact. As used here, this refers to those normally secret
links maintained between representatives of governments and terrorist or-
ganizations. These are used to exchange insights and demands and often even
continue through the most intense period of a terrorist campaign. Being secret,
these talks provide political leaders with the cover of “plausible deniability” if
they are leaked to the public. The second category is dialogue. Here, this refers
to exploratory talks, again usually undisclosed, that are intended to influence
thinking and develop a working relationship between government representa-
tives, terrorist leaders and, frequently, trusted third parties. The final term is
negotiations, which refers to formal talks to attempt to end a conflict. They are
usually announced to the public, have a formal agenda and involve the difficult
concessions and commitments that can lead to binding agreements. Contacts
and dialogue with terrorist groups can take place over many years and often
break down. For example, between 1975 and 1988 there were up to thirty at-
tempts to negotiate with the Basque separatist group, ETA, all of which failed.6
Parties to a violent conflict may have to be persuaded over time of the value of
formal negotiations. Research by terrorism analyst, Audrey Kurth Cronin, led
her to conclude that “[t]he vast majority of negotiations that do occur yield nei-
ther clear resolution nor cessation of conflict. A common scenario has been for
negotiations to drag on, occupying an uncertain middle ground between a sta-
ble ceasefire and high levels of violence.”7
5 For an analysis of terrorist hostage crises see Adam Dolnik and Keith M. Fitzgerald,
Negotiating Hostage Crises with the New Terrorists (Westport CT: Praeger Security
International, 2008).
6 Robert Clark, Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country 1975 -
1988 (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1990), 3.
7 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Negotiating with Groups that Use Terrorism: Lessons for Pol-
icy-Makers,” Background Papers (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2008), 6,
Talking to Terrorists 183
A framework for dealing with conflicts involving terrorism has been de-
scribed by Vicenç Fisas of the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. He
suggests that the sequence of contacts between parties to a conflict leading to
formal negotiations is as follows:8
1) Informal indirect contact
2) Formal indirect contact
3) Informal direct contact
4) Formal direct contact
5) Informal explorations
6) Formal explorations
7) Informal dialogue
8) Formal dialogue
9) Formal negotiations.
Although Fisas does not make the differences between the individual stages
clear, this framework does capture the convoluted nature of the preliminary
talks required before real negotiations to end a conflict can begin.
The Potential Advantages of Talking to Terrorists

Talks with terrorists can potentially encourage non-violent politics. Govern-
ments often find it difficult to defeat militants that have gained a measure of
public support without committing abuses against civilians and employing co-
ercive measures against terrorist suspects that undermine democratic values.
A government that is unable or unwilling to use brute force to crush a terrorist
organization may well be forced to accept some kind of political engagement
and accommodation. Governments that talk to terrorists have been accused of
appeasement, but talking is not the same as agreeing with the terrorists’ aims
or methods. Besides, a refusal to attempt dialogue with a terrorist group’s
leadership leaves both sides with no alternative but continued armed struggle.
Arguably, a potential opportunity for substantive dialogue with Hamas was lost
after the movement’s electoral victory in January 2006. Despite indications that
some Hamas leaders in the Palestinian Authority supported a two-state solu-
tion or a long-term truce (hudna) with Israel, neither Western powers nor Is-
rael were prepared to engage in talks unless Hamas met stringent pre-condi-
tions.9 As a result of this failure and the economic embargo placed on the Ha-
accessed May 22, 2015, www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/91AudreyKurth-Cronin

Negotiatingwithgroupsthatuseterrorism.pdf.
8 Vinceç Fisas, The Design and Architecture of Peace Processes: Lessons Learned in the
Wake of Crises (Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2015), 3, accessed
May 22, 2015, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/procesos/NOREFin.pdf.
9 Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid, Hamas: Ideological Rigidity and Political Flexibil-
ity (Washington DC: USIP, June 2009), accessed June 12, 2015, www.usip.org/
publications/hamas-ideological-rigidity-and-political-flexibility.
184 James K. Wither
mas government, moderates in the movement appear to have lost power to the
hardliners.
Engagement can save lives. For example, during the extended negotiations
to end the terrorist campaigns in Northern Ireland between 1998 and 2007, the
overall level of violence dropped dramatically as all sides involved in the peace
process exercised restraint.10 More recently, reported civilian deaths fell by
73 percent during the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC) uni-
lateral ceasefire to facilitate peace talks with the Colombian government.11
Talks do not have to be part of a peace process to have value. Sometimes they
can change the situation on the ground through influence and persuasion even
while kinetic operations continue. In 2006, coalition forces in Iraq established a
Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC) to woo Sunni insurgent leaders regard-
ed as “reconcilables” and enlist their help against the “irreconcilables” of al-
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The FSEC achieved a notable success when Abu Wail, the
religious emir of the Ansar al-Sunnah group, declared his opposition to AQI.12
Eventually, engagement with the Iraqi resistance led to a Sunni political net-
work that was willing to work with the US in order to fight a common enemy.
Talks can also help divide the leadership of terrorist organizations. Sri
Lanka offers a notable example. Although the peace talks between the Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government initiated in
2002 were unsuccessful, the process led to the defection of Colonel Karuna, an
LTTE commander in the east of the country, along with thousands of his fight-
ers. This left the LTTE gravely weakened when fighting restarted in 2006 – a
significant factor in their eventual defeat in 2009.13
The old adage “know your enemy” is also relevant in this context. Dialogue
with a terrorist group’s leadership and/or individual members can provide
valuable intelligence insights that can help security officials assess a group’s
priorities, capabilities and leadership characteristics. Analyst Louise Richard-
son claims that years of covert discussions between government officials and
Republican terrorists in Northern Ireland provided critical intelligence insights
that facilitated the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. 14 Measures that encourage
individual members of a terrorist group to seek contact with the authorities
10 “Deaths from Conflict in Northern Ireland by Year and Status,” Conflict Archive on the
Internet (CAIN), University of Ulster, accessed September 22, 2015,
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbcGhOdG0zTG1EWkV
NMkpwa3A1ZTBsZFE#gid=0.
11 “Bullet Proof: Colombia’s Peace Process,” The Economist, May 30, 2015, accessed May
30, 2015, www.economist.com/news/americas/21652332-despite-escalation-
violence-talks-continue-bullet-proof.
12 Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task: a Memoir (New York: Penguin, 2013), 247–
248, 262–264.
13 Jonathan Powell, Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts (London: The
Bodley Head, 2014), 270.
14 Louise Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism, ed.
Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: USIP, 2007), 95–96.
can also prove productive. The aforementioned FSEC, for example, gathered
valuable intelligence about the workings of AQI from disaffected supporters. In
1980, the Italian government introduced tough new CT legislation and en-
hanced police powers in its battle against the Marxist-Leninist Red Brigades.
Notably, these measures were combined with a highly successful initiative to
encourage defections. Terrorists who “repented” and provided information
about the Red Brigades’ membership and activities received reduced sentences
for their crimes and were offered the prospect of a return to normal life. 15 By
1983, the group had been defeated.
The Hazards of Talking to Terrorists

There may be persuasive arguments in favor of talking to terrorists, but the
reluctance of governments to contemplate such engagement is understandable.
Violent non-state actors undermine the concept of national sovereignty, the
rule of law and international norms. Engagement with terrorists legitimizes
their behavior and appears to reward illegal violence against lawful state secu-
rity services and civilians. Therefore, it is rarely an easy option. American Lieu-
tenant General Raymond Odierno summed up the feelings of many soldiers
when he commented on negotiations with Iraqi tribal leaders in 2006–2007:
“We are going to be striking deals with people who have killed American sol-
diers. That may turn your stomach but that’s the way forward.”16
Talking openly to terrorists poses considerable political risks as it may be
viewed by the general public, as well as the terrorists themselves, as appease-
ment and weakness. As noted above, talking to terrorists is not the same as
giving in to their demands, but that is not the way it is sometimes perceived.
For example, dialogue with ETA has proved highly divisive in Spain. When the
Socialist Party government launched talks with the group in 2006, they were
quickly condemned by the conservative Partido Popular opposition party and
the right wing press, which accused the government of granting “concessions
to terrorists” in order to appease them.17
There are cases where terrorist groups have deliberately exploited govern-
ment talks and attendant ceasefires as an opportunity to regroup and re-arm
for renewed hostilities. Notorious examples of organizations that have taken
this cynical approach to a ‘peace process’ include the aforementioned FARC
and LTTE. Of course, talks with these groups were also used by the respective
governments and security forces to prepare for the next round of fighting. It is
15 Leonard Weinberg, “The Red Brigades,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism, ed.

Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington DC: USIP, 2007), 25–62, 53.
16 Raymond Odierno, cited in Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the
Untold Story of the American Surge in Iraq 2006-2008 (London: Allen Lane, 2009),
205.
17 “Zapatero’s Dilemma: the Issue of Terrorism Returns to the Heart of Spanish Politics,”
The Economist, March 15, 2007, accessed May 23, 2015, www.economist.com/node/
8864534.
186 James K. Wither
evident from electronic correspondence, captured during the raid that killed
Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011, that he supported negotia-
tions with the Pakistan government. However, the same documents make it
clear that any such talks were to be exploited to provide a temporary ceasefire
“in the interest of the mujahidin at this time” rather than to make peace with a
government that AQ continued to regard as an enemy.18
Governments can also anger allies if they talk to terrorist groups that they
oppose. Israel has repeatedly protested any suggestions by the US or British
governments that they might engage with Hamas or Hezbollah. For similar rea-
sons, personal relations between British Prime Minister John Major and Presi-
dent Clinton were irreparably damaged when the US government granted Sinn
Fein leader Gerry Adams a visa to visit the White House in 1994.19
Who to Talk To
In an article in Foreign Affairs in 2007, analyst Peter Neumann stated that “The
first and most obvious question for any government considering negotiations is
whether the terrorists it faces can make good negotiating partners.” 20 It cer-
tainly helps if terrorists have negotiable aims. Those with territorial goals tend
to be more amenable to talks than groups which espouse extreme ideological
or religious causes. Most so-called Islamist terrorist organizations broadly
share a religious agenda, have a common antipathy to Israel and America, and
oppose Muslim governments they perceive to be corrupt. But the majority of
these groups, including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) and the Afghan Taliban, have little ambition to create a caliphate or
wage global jihad against non-believers.21 As with Marxist-Leninist terrorist
groups of the Cold War era, their rhetoric and propaganda may obscure the fact
that local political objectives trump ideological purity. The government of the
Philippines, for example, has been able to secure an agreement with the
avowedly Islamist MILF on the basis of regional autonomy.
A terrorist group’s leadership and level of internal cohesion are also im-
portant factors to consider when considering who to talk to. Jonathan Powell,
who was the British government’s chief negotiator in the Northern Ireland
peace process, stresses the importance of strong and consistent leadership, not
just of the terrorists, but of all parties involved in negotiations.22 Terrorist lead-
18 “Al-Qaeda and Pakistan: The Evidence of the Abbottabad Documents (Part Three),”
Jihadica.com, accessed May 24, 2015, www.jihadica.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/03/422-10-CR-109-S-4-RJD-Translation.pdf.
19 See, for example, Daniel Byman, “The Decision to Begin Talks with Terrorists: Les-
sons for Policy Makers,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 5 (2006): 408.
20 Peter R. Neumann, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (2007):
129.
21 James K. Wither, “Selective Engagement with Islamist Terrorists: Exploring the Pro-
spects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 1 (2009): 25–26.
22 Jonathan Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland
(London: Bodley Head, 2008), 309–12.
ers need to have credibility with the rank and file of their organization. Credi-
bility and control are essential to minimize the threat from ‘spoilers’ who op-
pose talks and may seek to take over the leadership of the movement. Leaders
on all sides require cool heads to deal with the inevitable crises that accom-
pany negotiations. It is good practice to agree procedures for dealing with
these crises in advance of formal talks. A recent kidnapping case in Colombia,
which temporarily suspended talks with FARC, illustrates the importance of
robust crisis-management arrangements during peace negotiations.23
Those seeking dialogue with a terrorist organization need to make sure that
their interlocutors actually represent the leadership of the group in question.
In 2005, the German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND) held talks with the
Taliban in neutral Switzerland. The talks were broken off when the BND real-
ized that the Taliban ‘representatives’ did not speak for the movement’s leader,
Mullah Omar.24 Given the networked and fragmented character of contempo-
rary terrorist organizations, this is a growing problem for would-be negotiators
and mediators alike.
Most long-standing terrorist organizations have political representatives or
a political wing. This can facilitate talks as government officials can claim that
these individuals are not directly involved in terrorist violence. In 2009, for ex-
ample, the British government reopened dialogue with senior officials from
Hezbollah who were members of Lebanon’s parliament and Unity Government,
while talks with the military wing of the movement remained proscribed.25 The
US government was highly critical of the British initiative because the State De-
partment does not accept that a distinction can be made between the military
and political wings of terrorist organizations. As a radical Shia movement, Hez-
bollah is sponsored by Iran. In such cases, where a terrorist group acts a proxy
force, talks may be better aimed at the organization’s state sponsors. As of mid-
2015, the US Department of State lists three countries as state sponsors of ter-
rorism: Iran, Sudan and Syria.26 However, most states, including the US, have
employed proxy ‘terrorists’ as an instrument of foreign policy at some point in
their history.
When dialogue suggests that there might be prospects for a viable peace
process, it is important to include all parties to the conflict. Although the main
negotiating partners in the Northern Ireland peace talks were the British gov-
ernment and Sinn Fein, representatives from the Irish Republic and Northern
23 “Colombia’s War: Picking Up Where They Left Off,” The Economist, December 6, 2014,
accessed May 25, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21635481-
release-kidnapped-general-allows-peace-talks-resume-picking-up-where-they-left.
24 Sonia Phalnikar, “Report Says German Secret Service Held Talks With Taliban,”
Deutsche Welle, August 20, 2007, accessed June 19, 2015, http://www.dw.de/report-
says-german-secret-service-held-talks-with-taliban/a-2745686.
25 “UK Envoy in first Hezbollah Talk,” BBC News, June 18, 2009, accessed June 18, 2015,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8107837.stm.
26 “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” US Department of State, undated, accessed June 19,
2015, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.
188 James K. Wither
Ireland political parties, as well as Protestant paramilitaries, were also directly

involved and essential to success. Interested parties excluded from negotia-
tions can act as spoilers. In 2010, Pakistani officials felt sidelined by direct ne-
gotiations between President Karzai’s government and the Taliban. As a result,
they stymied the process by detaining a Taliban leader.27 Negotiations are
facilitated if a government has a domestic political consensus supporting its ac-
tions. As noted above, this was not the case in Spain when the government ne-
gotiated with ETA in 2006. By contrast, Tony Blair’s government in 1997 had
both a large majority in parliament and the tacit support of the Conservative
opposition, when it began negotiations in Northern Ireland.
When to Talk
The question of timing can be critical. Seek to open dialogue too soon and a ter-
rorist group might be encouraged to think that its violent methods are proving
successful; leave talks too late and an opportunity to end a terrorist campaign
might be lost. A recent study of attempts to negotiate with the Taliban high-
lights the US’s missed opportunities to engage the group when it was weak af-
ter its defeat in Afghanistan in 2001. By the time the US fully accepted peace
talks in 2011, the Taliban had once again become a formidable military and po-
litical force.28 Some commentators talk of a “strategic juncture,” when a terror-
ist group begins to question the utility of violence. 29 Such a situation can occur
after major changes in the international environment. After the Cold War, for
example, negotiated settlements ended a number of terrorist campaigns in
Central and South America and sub-Saharan Africa. A “strategic juncture” for a
terrorist group can also occur due to pressure from the security services. From
2003, the Colombian government, with US assistance, put FARC under sus-
tained military pressure. By 2013 the group’s combatants had dropped from
around 20,000 in 2002 to approximately 8,000.30 It is hardly surprising that the
FARC declared a unilateral ceasefire in December 2013 and is currently en-
gaged in peace talks with the Colombian government that have a good chance
of finally ending their decades-long campaign. This is just one example that
demonstrates that negotiations alone are unlikely to end a terrorist campaign
in the absence of parallel, robust measures by the security forces.
Sometimes it is the government side that is most anxious to talk because the
political and economic damage inflicted by terrorist violence has driven them
to the negotiating table.31 Governments have sometimes entered into prema-
27 James Dobbins and Carter Malkasian, “Time to Negotiate in Afghanistan: How to Talk
to the Taliban,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 4 (2015): 55.
28 Dobbins and Malkasian, “Time to Negotiate in Afghanistan,” 54–56.
29 Neumann, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” 130.
30 Matt Ince, “Filling the FARC-Shaped Void,” RUSI Journal 158, no. 5 (2013): 27.
31 For an example in the case of Boko Haram and the Nigerian government see Jakana
Thomas, “Actually, Sometimes Terrorism Does Work,” Washington Post, April 22,
ture and costly agreements with terrorist groups as a result. An earlier “peace
process” with the FARC illustrates this point. In 1998, the Colombian govern-
ment relinquished control of a demilitarized zone the size of Switzerland
where the group could operate without interference from the security forces.
Instead of encouraging peace talks as the government intended, FARC used the
opportunity to rearm, recruit and go on the offensive.32 However, military and
political stalemates can offer an appropriate juncture for talks. Analysts fre-
quently refer to this situation as a “mutually hurting stalemate” (see Case Study
12.1).
How to Talk
A willingness to talk has to be communicated to the other party, which can be
problematic in the absence of formal contacts. Fisas states that it is common for
one of the parties to send out “smoke signals” to indicate a readiness to engage
in preliminary dialogue.33 These signals may take the form of speeches by lead-
ers, media interviews or messages sent through trusted intermediaries. 34 Be-
cause of the need for secrecy, it is often intelligence agencies that start contacts
on the government side. Contacts can also be made through trusted, discrete
neutral parties, like the Catholic priest Alex Reid, who acted as a longstanding
go-between in Northern Ireland.35 Initial dialogue between representatives of
both sides is also likely to remain covert. This process is unlikely to address
fundamental issues but instead can allow the representatives of each side to
become acquainted. In the case of initial meetings between the African National
Congress (ANC) and the ruling National Party in South Africa in 1990, Robert
Mnookin states that the talks had a “powerful psychological impact” and were
the first step in “reversing their mutual demonization.”36
Third-party mediation often plays an important role in facilitating talks be-
tween terrorists and the governments they oppose, since there is likely to be
significant mistrust between the protagonists. Although governments are natu-
rally suspicious of outside interference in their internal affairs, experience sug-
gests that the involvement of trusted third parties can make it easier both to
reach and implement an agreement.37 International institutions, friendly or
neutral governments and skilled, individual interlocutors have all played a sig-
nificant role in attempts to end terrorist campaigns. Recently, non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) have taken an increased role in mediation.
2014, accessed June 1, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/

wp/2014/04/22/actually-sometimes-terrorism-does-work/.
32 Neumann, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” 130.
33 Fisas, The Design and Architecture of Peace Processes, 7.
34 This process is described concisely in Byman, “The Decision to Begin Talks with Ter-
rorists,” 404–405.
35 Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room, 63, 75, 175.
36 Robert Mnookin, Bargaining with the Devil: When to Negotiate, When to Fight (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 129.
37 Powell, Talking to Terrorists, 164.
190 James K. Wither
Case Study 12.1. Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS).

The phrase “mutually hurting stalemate” was coined by negotiations’ theorist
William Zartman.38 He described a condition of stalemate that was harmful to
the interests of both sides in a conflict. It was also an impasse where one or
both of the protagonists lacked the means or the political will to escalate the
level of violence. In such a situation, Zartman recognized that governments
had to be willing to provide terrorists with a ‘way out’ from violence and that
this required leaders on both sides to be willing to take risks to exploit the
opportunity presented by a MHS. Strong leadership is certainly critical, not
least to fend off accusations of appeasement or betrayal.
Commentators often refer to a “hurting stalemate” as a strategic turning
point for potentially productive dialogue with terrorist groups.39 The US
Institute of Peace (USIP) defines a MHS as “a situation in which neither party
thinks it can win a given conflict without incurring excessive loss, and in
which both are suffering from a continuation of fighting. The conflict is
judged to have entered a period of ripeness, a propitious moment for third
party mediation.”40 By the early 1990s, the security forces in Northern Ire-
land and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) both realized that nei-
ther side could win the armed struggle and that some sort of political com-
promise would be necessary.41 The mutual perception of a MHS was a major
factor in initiating and sustaining the extended all-party dialogue that even-
tually led to a peace agreement in Northern Ireland.
The MHS concept may help us to understand when a negotiation with ter-
rorists might succeed. Although it does not guarantee that there will be a
positive result from talks, a MHS may provide the minimal conditions for
them to occur. However, there are examples where productive dialogue has
taken place without an obvious military stalemate or where a continued
stalemate has actually proved “mutually bearable” to adversaries in a violent
conflict.42
38 I. William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe
Moments,” Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1, no. 1 (2001): 8–12.
39 For two recent examples see “Civil Wars: How to Stop the Fighting, Sometimes,” The
Economist, November 9, 2013, accessed June 12 2015, www.economist.com/news/
briefing/21589431-bringing-end-conflicts-within-states-vexatious-history-provides-
guide; Caroline A. Hartzell, “A Comparative Perspective on an Afghan Peace Process:
Why, When, Who and What?” Afghanistan: Opportunity in Crisis Series no. 7 (London:
RIIA, December 2014), 3, accessed June12, 2015 , www.chathamhouse.org/sites/
files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20141204AfghanPeaceProcessHartzell.pdf.
40 United States Institute of Peace, “Mutually Hurting Stalemate,” USIP Glossary of Terms
for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, 2011, accessed June 11, 2015,
http://glossary.usip.org/resource/mutually-hurting-stalemate.
41 Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room, 309–10.
42 Robert L. Rothstein, “The Timing of Negotiations: Dueling Metaphors,” Civil Wars 9,
no. 3 (2007): 263–66. See also Powell, Talking to Terrorists, 175–77.
The Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, for example, has suc-
cessfully facilitated dialogue and negotiations between the Free Aceh Move-
ment (GAM) and the Indonesian government and between the Nepalese gov-
ernment and the Maoist, Free People’s Army.43 NGOs tend to be more flexible
than government officials and lack the political baggage that diplomats bring to
talks. State officials are normally prohibited from direct contact with groups
that have been formally designated as terrorists by their respective govern-
ments.44
The decision to transition from secret to formal, direct talks is always con-
text dependent. However, the USIP offers four generic criteria to help guide
government negotiators:45
1) The terrorist group has demonstrated that it is committed to negotia-
tions and does not regard them as an opportunity to rearm and re-
group.
2) A degree of mutual trust and confidence has been established on the ba-
sis of both sides honoring commitments.
3) Public and political opposition to negotiations has been shown to be
manageable.
4) The terrorist group has shown itself to be internally cohesive and able
to exercise control over its supporters so that it can implement an
agreement in due course.
The issue of pre-conditions often thwarts dialogue. The Middle East Quartet
(the UN, US, Russia, and the EU) sets three preconditions for talks with Hamas.
These include an insistence that Hamas recognizes the state of Israel as a pre-
condition, rather than as a goal of talks. This stance has received widespread
international criticism.46 Powell advises that “[i]t is always an error to set a
precondition to a negotiation,” arguing instead that issues should be resolved
43 See, for example, “Privatising Peace,” The Economist, July 2, 2011, accessed June 15,
215, http://www.economist.com/node/18895458.
44 This can act as a significant barrier to talks. See, for example, Robert Fisk, “Talking to
ISIS Could Lead to Peace, Yet for Some Reason We’re Not Allowed to Do It,” The Inde-
pendent, February 20, 2015, accessed June 26, 2015, www.independent.co.uk/
voices/comment/talking-offers-hope-of-a-peaceful-solution-but-were-not-allowed-
to-do-it-10047640.html.
45 Nigel Quinney and A. Heather Coyne, eds., Talking to Groups That Use Terror (Wash-
ington, D.C.: USIP, 2011), 51–52.
46 See, for example, Carolin Goerzig, “Engaging Hamas: Rethinking the Quartet Princi-
ples,” European Institute for Security Studies, March 2010, accessed June 22, 2015,
www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/engaging-hamas-rethinking-the-
quartet-principles/; “Open Letter on Middle East Policy: Lasting Peace Only Possible
with Hamas on Board,” Spiegel Online International, June 10, 2011, accessed June 22,
2015, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/open-letter-on-middle-east-
policy-lasting-peace-only-possible-with-hamas-on-board-a-767819.html.
192 James K. Wither
during negotiations rather than made into a prior test.47 A frequent demand is
that a terrorist group disarms before formal talks. Terrorist leaders will usually
declare their intention to end violence before formal negotiations begin, but
undefeated terrorists will not give up their arms at this stage. John Major’s gov-
ernment’s insistence on prior disarmament delayed negotiations with PIRA for
several years during the 1990s. Tony Blair’s government after 1997 adopted a
more flexible approach. It dropped disarmament pre-conditions, accepted
“progressive decommissioning” and introduced independent verification. De-
spite these measures, the issue of PIRA disarmament remained a difficult
problem until the final peace agreement in May 2007. 48 In the case of the MILF,
complete disarmament is not scheduled to take place until the Philippine Con-
gress passes legislation to finalize the peace agreement. Instead, symbolic dis-
armament gestures have taken place to demonstrate the MILF’s commitment to
non-violence and reassure the public.49
Like permanent disarmament, the legal status of terrorist combatants and
members of the security services, who may have committed atrocities, is best
left to the end of peace talks when the process already has plenty of momen-
tum and support. The release of “comrades” from jail is usually a core terrorist
negotiation demand, but allowing individuals accused or convicted of murder
to go free can be difficult for ordinary citizens to accept. Nevertheless, amnes-
ties are normal following a peace deal and may be essential to discourage dis-
sidents from continuing violence. The creation of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) has, however, made general amnesties much more difficult. Put
crudely, the balance has swung in favor of retributive justice rather than peace
at all costs. This trend creates additional difficulties for governments engaged
in negotiations with terrorists groups. For example, the ICC indictment of
Lord’s Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony made a peace agreement with the
group impossible.50
Talks with ‘Irreconcilable’ Terrorists

As discussed above, talks with terrorists have a greater chance of being pro-
ductive when the organization concerned has practical political goals, a meas-
ure of popular support and is prepared to set limits to violence. By contrast, a
group like the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) has millenarian objectives and employs ex-
treme violence. Writing in 1988, terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman described
how religiously inspired terrorists were more likely than secular, politically
motivated terrorists to view their struggle in uncompromising terms because
47 Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room, 317.

48 Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room, 203, 245–247.
49 Floyd Whaley, “Philippine Rebels Give Up Dozens of Weapons in Step Toward Peace
Deal,” International New York Times, June 16, 2015.
violence against unbelievers was considered a sacred act. 51 The accepted wis-
dom is that religious zealots make unlikely negotiating partners. US Special
Operations Commander, Admiral Bill McRaven, expressed a typical view during
his remarks to Congress in 2014. McRaven warned that terrorist leaders in
Somalia, Yemen, Syria and North Africa were ‘irreconcilable’ and that “…no
amount of negotiations, no amount of placation, is going to put them in a posi-
tion where they are prepared to support universal values as we know them”. 52
Zartman describes the most extreme terrorists as “total absolutes,” whose ob-
jectives and methods allow no room for compromise and who might regard any
attempt at dialogue as encouragement to intensify their violence. 53 Most com-
mentators place AQ in this category, but there are a surprising number of dis-
senters (see Case Study 12.2).
Contemporary terrorists such as AQ tend to be organized into loose net-
works, rather than the more hierarchical structures of 20th century groups.
These networks blur the boundaries between groups fighting for local auton-
omy, terrorists engaged in global jihad and transnational criminal gangs seek-
ing profit. This makes the prospects of finding reliable negotiating partners, as
discussed above, more difficult. Nevertheless, regional affiliates of AQ and even
IS may ultimately be more motivated by local political and social issues than
global jihad. In the case of ‘lone actors’ or returning foreign fighters that oper-
ate in small autonomous cells (see Chapter 8), it is hard to envisage any “talk-
ing to terrorists” in the accepted sense.
Case Study 12.2. The Prospects of Dialogue with al-Qaeda.

Osama bin Laden’s mentor, Abdullah Azzam’s slogan was “The rifle and jihad alone;
no negotiations, no conferences, no dialogues.”54 As leaders of AQ, both bin Laden and
his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri repeatedly condemned efforts by groups such as
Hamas and Hezbollah to engage in political discourse, reinforcing a perception in the
West that dialogue with AQ was unthinkable.
Scholar, Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, was one of the first to question
this assumption after 9/11. Writing in 2005, he criticized the prevailing view that AQ
was irrational and apocalyptic. He argued that the organization’s political goals
51 Bruce Hoffman, “The Contrasting Ethical Foundations of Terrorism in the 1980s,”

RAND Paper 7416 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1988), 14–15, accessed June17, 2015,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P7416.pdf.
52 Admiral McRaven testimony to the US Senate Sub Committee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, March 11, 2014, 21, accessed June 4,
2015, www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/14-17%20-%203-11-14.pdf.
53 I. William Zartman, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” International Negotiation 8, no. 3
(2003): 443–50.
54 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York:
Alfred A Knopf, 2007), 95.
194 James K. Wither
should be distinguished from its religious rhetoric and controversially advocated en-
gagement by the US to address the group’s grievances.55 Sociologist Michael Mann
also described bin Laden as a “rational man,” who attacked the US in response to
American imperialism in the Middle East. Although bin Laden’s message was explic-
itly Islamist, Mann identified his grievances as political and therefore not inherently
non-negotiable.56
Perhaps more surprising is the willingness of CT practitioners to contemplate
talks with AQ. Baroness Manningham-Buller, former head of the British Security Ser-
vice (MI5) has publically endorsed the possibility of talks with AQ on tangible issues
such as Western policy in the Middle East, although she acknowledges that formal ne-
gotiations are a long way off.57 In an interview in 2008, Sir Hugh Orde, then head of
the Police Service of Northern Ireland, claimed that his experience fighting terrorism
in Northern Ireland had convinced him that talking to AQ was not “unthinkable” but
rather a matter of “timing.”58
Powell argues that almost all terrorist groups have been branded at some point as
“total absolutes” by their opponents, but have eventually been engaged in talks. 59
Arguably, the rise of IS has made the chances of dialogue with AQ more likely. Since
the formal split between IS and AQ in 2013, al-Zawahari has tried to distance his
movement from the brutal methods and sectarian extremism of its former ally. AQ’s
Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), appears to be following this strategic guidance.
The group avoids sectarian killings and has taken steps to protect non-combatants,
including non-Muslims.60 This apparently pragmatic approach to jihad in contrast to
IS’ uncompromising extremism has led a number of commentators to suggest that it
might be appropriate for the US to cooperate with JN.61 Maybe the timing is finally
right for talks with AQ.
55 Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohammadou, “Non-Linearity of Engagement: Transna-

tional Armed Groups, International Law, and the Conflict Between Al Qaeda and the
United States,” Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, July 2005,
accessed June 17, 2015, www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/
Non-Linearity_of_Engagement.pdf.
56 Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: Verso, 2003), 169.
57 Eliza Manningham-Buller, “Securing Freedom Lecture One: Terror,” BBC Reith
Lectures, September 6, 2011, 30–32, accessed June 23, 2015,
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/rmhttp/radio4/transcripts/2011_reith3.pdf.
58 Vikram Dodd, “Time to Talk to al Qaeda, Senior Police Chief Urges,” The Guardian,
May 30, 2008, accessed June 23, 2015, www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/
30/alqaida.terrorism.
60 John Turner, “Strategic Differences: Al Qaeda’s Split with the Islamic State of Iraq and
al-Sham”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 26 (2) (2015): 208–225, 216–217.
61 See, for example, Lina Khatib, “The Nusra Front’s Game Changing Rise in Syria,” Car-
negie Middle East Center, March 24, 2015, accessed June 24, 2015, http://carnegie-
mec.org/2015/03/24/nusra-front-s-game-changing-rise-in-syria/i557; Barak Men-
delsohn, “After Disowning ISIS, al Qaeda is Back on Top,” Foreign Affairs, February 13,
2014, accessed June 24, 2015 www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-
02-13/after-disowning-isis-al-qaeda-back-top; Gerald F. Seib and Bill Wall, “Strange
Bedfellows: Brutal Rise of Islamic State Turns Old Enemies into New Friends,” Wall
Street Journal, August 30, 2014.
Conclusion
It is not always a good idea to talk to terrorists, and dialogue and negotiations
alone will not bring a terrorist campaign to an end. Nevertheless, talks should
never be ruled out in principle. As part of a comprehensive CT strategy, it is not
unusual for fighting and talking to take place at the same time. Dialogue can
offer the more moderate elements in a terrorist group a political alternative to
violence and marginalize irreconcilables. If a terrorist group’s ideological
stance rules out the prospect of any formal negotiations, then at least contact
and dialogue can help provide a better understanding of the movement’s objec-
tives, thinking and leadership. It is only through such engagement over an ex-
tended period of time that enemies will be able to identify common interests,
explore potential compromises and build the trust necessary for formal negoti-
ations.
Talking has the potential to transform perceptions and influence thinking
even if there are few concrete outcomes. As Dolnik and Fitzgerald advise: “Do
not negotiate with the terrorist, negotiate with the rational human being who,
for some set of reasons, has chosen—or felt forced into—an extreme, violent
course of action.”62 As successful case studies demonstrate, although talks can
be tortuous, prolonged and frustrating, they can potentially deliver peaceful
outcomes to long-standing violent conflicts.
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Chapter 13
Countering Violent Extremism
Sam Mullins
Introduction
The term “countering violent extremism” (CVE) has become like a buzzword in
recent years – frequently used and yet rarely defined. Although there is no sin-
gle definition of CVE, it refers primarily to ‘soft’ approaches to undermining the
appeal of violent extremism and terrorism. This includes a wide variety of
different measures, some of which are preventive, while others aim at rehabili-
tation. They may be narrow or broad in scope; state-run or non-governmental;
in-person or online; large or small-scale. Perhaps most importantly, efforts to
counter violent extremism are often culturally unique and so we cannot as-
sume that what works in one country will work in the next. While clearly di-
verse, all CVE programs nevertheless share the same fundamental goal: to re-
duce the risk of engagement or re-engagement in extremist-related violence.1
Importantly, there is growing consensus that CVE can play a significant role
as part of a comprehensive counter-terrorism (CT) strategy and an increasing
number of countries around the world are establishing CVE programs. Never-
theless, it is vital to appreciate that although CVE draws upon lessons learned
from other areas, it is still relatively new, both in terms of concept and practice.
In addition, there are considerable challenges involved in trying to measure the
efficacy of CVE and, because of this, it is difficult to establish with certainty just
how effective (or sometimes ineffective or even harmful) these types of inter-
vention are. As a result, there are also many CVE skeptics. The aim of this chap-
ter is not to persuade the reader either way, but to offer an objective assess-
ment. The reality is that an increasing number of CT professionals will come
into contact with CVE programs, and in some cases may be directly involved in
them. It is therefore essential to develop an informed understanding of what
these different projects entail and what they have to offer.
This chapter begins by explaining key concepts and exploring the different
reasons why people sometimes disengage (or fail to engage in the first place)
with violent extremism. It then outlines the range of different tools that can be
applied in CVE before describing case studies of targeted interventions aimed
at rehabilitation of captured/convicted terrorists in Saudi Arabia and preven-
tion of potential violent extremism in the UK. Principles of best practice which
1 John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in As-
sessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs,” Terrorism and Political Vio-
lence 22, no. 2 (2010): 267–91.
199 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch13

200 Sam Mullins
seem to be important to perceptions of ‘success’ across different types of in-

tervention are identified, followed by a discussion of key, ongoing challenges
and potential ways to overcome those challenges.
Key Concepts: From Radicalization to De-Radicalization

Radicalization is often thought of in terms of changes in belief. However, the
reality is more complex than this. Radicalization is defined here as the psycho-
logical, social, emotional and behavioral process which precedes involvement
in violent extremism and terrorism.2 This is important, because when it comes
to countering this process, it is necessary to address each of these different
components. It is also worth noting that the term violent extremism is broader
than terrorism and therefore is inclusive of other forms of ideologically moti-
vated violence that might fall short of legal definitions of terrorism, such as
hate crimes. In accordance with this, CVE is broader than CT and can be used to
tackle any form of violent extremism, regardless of severity.
Besides gaining an appreciation of radicalization and motivations for ter-
rorism (see Chapter 2), it is important to try and understand how and why
people sometimes walk away from violent extremism. Here, a distinction is
made between disengagement (meaning changes in behavior) and de-radicali-
zation (meaning changes in beliefs).3 Although these two processes are related,
one can occur without the other, meaning that a person can disengage without
drastically altering their beliefs, and vice versa.4
For some, disengagement can begin involuntarily and sometimes quite sud-
denly, e.g. as a result of arrest. However, it should be thought of as a process ra-
ther than an event, and involves a range of competing influences that can cause
a person to rethink their situation and adjust their behavior.5 Push factors are
things which are bad about an extremist/terrorist lifestyle, such as risk of ar-
rest or death, loss of status, disillusionment with the leadership, group mem-
bers and/or the ideology, or experiencing ‘burnout’ or exhaustion. As a former
member of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in Colombia once suc-
2 Note, however, that radicalization does not inevitably lead to violent behavior.
3 Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, “Introduction,” in Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual
and Collective Disengagement, ed. Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (Oxon and New York:
Routledge, 2009), 1–14.
4 Bjørgo and Horgan, “Introduction.”
5 The following discussion of factors which influence disengagement draws upon: Tore
Bjørgo, “Processes of Disengagement from Violent Groups of the Extreme Right,” in
Leaving Terrorism Behind, ed. Bjørgo and Horgan, 30–48; Froukje Demant et al., De-
cline and Disengagement: An Analysis of Processes of Deradicalisation (Amsterdam: In-
stitute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, 2008); John Horgan, “Individual Disengage-
ment: A Psychological Analysis,” in Leaving Terrorism Behind, ed. Bjørgo and Horgan,
17–29; John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from
Radical and Extremist Movements (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2009).
Countering Violent Extremism 201
cinctly put it, “War is really hard. Plus, the commanders keep all the money.” 6
At the same time, there are pull factors which can draw people towards a le-
gitimate lifestyle.7 These can include wanting to spend more time with family
(especially new-born babies), the desire for a wife, material possessions, edu-
cation, a career or simply a ‘normal’ life free from the stress and pressure as-
sociated with being part of a clandestine organization. However, there are often
significant barriers or inhibitors to leaving such groups – most obviously the
risk of physical harm, imprisonment or death, either from one’s own comrades,
security forces or rivals. There are also important psychological barriers in-
cluding friendship, loyalty and fear or uncertainty about whether an alternative
life is possible. Similarly, there may be a feeling of “sunk cost,” i.e. reluctance to
walk away from something for which sacrifices have been made and a great
deal of time and effort has been invested. On the other hand, there may also be
facilitators of disengagement that can trigger a “cognitive opening” 8 or else
support the transition process. For example, a defector from the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA), who later became an informant, first began to
question his involvement after one of his commanders, having just learned that
they had killed a female police officer in a bombing attack, declared “I hope she
was pregnant, and we got two for the price of one.”9 Significant others (friends
or family) can also sometimes influence a person to question their involvement
in terrorism and/or support the process of disengagement.
With all this in mind, the challenge for CVE is to cultivate a sense of disillu-
sionment with extremist/terrorist organizations and/or their ideology; to
make an alternative, legitimate lifestyle both attractive and attainable; and—if
a person is already involved—to overcome any inhibitors to leaving extremism
behind, and to ultimately facilitate the transition away from violence towards
becoming a productive member of society.
6 Kimberley Theidon, “Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia,” International Journal of Transi-
tional Justice 1, no. 1 (2007): 82.
7 For a discussion of how the “push/pull framework” may be theoretically refined, see
Mary Beth Altier, Christian Thoroughgood, and John Horgan, “Turning Away From
Terrorism: Lessons from Psychology, Sociology, and Criminology,” Journal of Peace
Research 51, no. 5 (2014): 647–61.
8 A cognitive opening refers to an experience which causes a person to “become more
receptive to the possibility of new ideas and worldviews.” See Quintan Wictorowicz,
Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield,
2005), 85.
9 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 128–129; William
D. Montalbano, “Defector Takes on the IRA,” Los Angeles Times, February 28, 1997,
accessed May 29, 2015, http://articles.latimes.com/print/1997-02-28/news/mn-
33434_1_ira-leader.
202 Sam Mullins
Options for CVE

The range of tools that can be applied for CVE is extremely broad and includes
the following categories, which overlap with one another to varying extents.
Counter-Messaging/ Strategic Communications
Perhaps the most obvious option is to utilize messaging or strategic communi-
cations, aimed at discrediting extremists and their ideology (offensive), and/or
promoting a positive image of the state/society (defensive). 10 This can be done
using conventional media, from billboards to television, but increasingly takes
place online and also forms an important part of many targeted interventions
(see below). In terms of technique, one possibility is to take an intellectual ap-
proach, challenging extremists on logical or evidential grounds and highlight-
ing flaws and inconsistencies in their narratives. A second approach is more
emotional and aims to discredit terrorist leaders and their organizations by
highlighting their hypocrisy and lies, for instance by drawing attention to the
fact that groups like al-Qaeda (AQ) kill more Muslims than disbelievers. A third
approach, which is becoming increasingly popular, is the use of humor to ridi-
cule and mock terrorists, as seen, for example, in the Iraqi television show
Dawlat al-Khurafa (Mythical State), which makes fun of IS.11 Notably, offensive
counter-messaging, both by governments and civil society, appears to be much
more prevalent than defensive messaging.
Education and Outreach
Another option involves trying to increase resilience against extremist ideas by
educating children about relevant issues from a young age. The idea is that by
getting to youths first (before extremists have the opportunity to do so) they
may be less likely to accept hateful ideologies and will therefore be less suscep-
tible to radicalization and recruitment in later life. For example, the German
state of Hesse recently introduced special training for teachers and now pro-
vides Islamic studies in school for children as young as six with the hope of “in-
oculat[ing] young people against more extreme religious views while also sig-
naling state acceptance of their faith.”12 In addition, governments worldwide
conduct various forms of outreach aimed at informing ‘at risk’ communities
10 For a more thorough discussion see Rachel Briggs and Sebastien Feve, Review of
Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism: What Works and What are the
Implications for Government? (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2013) accessed May
29, 2015, http://www.strategicdialogue.org/CounterNarrativesFN2011.pdf.
11 David Sim, “Iraqi TV Show Mocks Isis: Dawlat al-Khurafa (Mythical State) Turns Jihad
Into Satire,” International Business Times, October 15, 2014, accessed May 29, 2015,
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iraqi-tv-show-mocks-isis-dawlat-al-khurafa-mythical-
state-turns-jihad-into-satire-1470082.
12 Alison Smale, “Germany Adds Lessons in Islam to Better Blend Its Melting Pot,” New
York Times, January 6, 2014, accessed January 7, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/
01/07/world/europe/germany-adds-lessons-in-islam-to-better-blend-its-melting-
pot.html.
about issues relating to terrorism, CT and CVE, whilst simultaneously trying to

build trust in order to establish a more positive relationship and undermine “us
versus them” extremist narratives.
Capacity-Building, Training and Support
A related possibility is to raise awareness of violent extremism and create the
necessary mechanisms so that people in society are able to identify and re-
spond to radicalized groups and individuals. This has been an important aspect
of the UK’s Prevent strategy, which is aimed at stopping people from becoming
involved in violent extremism and terrorism. The first step was to identify key
institutions and areas of society, where people are most vulnerable to radicali-
zation, and/or where responsible individuals are able to identify processes of
radicalization and recruitment taking place.13 The government then developed
a Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP), based around a DVD. By
2011, more than 15,000 ‘frontline staff’ had received WRAP training and
80 percent reported that they felt they had an enhanced or excellent under-
standing of radicalization and how to identify and refer a vulnerable person for
support.14 In addition to this, the government directly funded a wide variety of
community organizations with an interest in CVE (although as we shall see, this
also created problems).
Targeted Interventions
The most direct approach to CVE—and the one that tends to receive the most
attention—involves targeted engagement either with suspected or convicted
violent extremists and terrorists in order to ensure that they do not engage, or
re-engage, in violence. In this context, preventive interventions are sometimes
referred to as counter-radicalization programs, while rehabilitative efforts are
frequently described as disengagement or de-radicalization programs. Targeted
interventions of both types exist in numerous countries in a wide variety of
formats – some of which are highly structured and operate on generous budg-
ets, while others are ad-hoc and relatively disorganized.
Generally speaking, however, there are two main approaches which in prac-
tice are often combined. The first involves questioning and challenging ex-
tremist beliefs and ideology, using the same kinds of technique as in counter-
messaging, but applied in the context of direct interactions with radicalized
groups or individuals. This is one of the most innovative developments in this
field which was pioneered in Yemen and Saudi Arabia beginning around 2002–
2003 and acted as the impetus behind the current, ongoing wave of interest in
CVE. The second main approach here is practical and includes measures like
education, vocational training, help relocating, finding a job and readjusting to
13 These include the education sector, health care, the criminal justice system, charities,
faith institutions and the Internet. See HM Government, Prevent Strategy (London:
The Stationery Office, 2011), 8, accessed May 30, 2015, www.homeoffice.gov.uk/
publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-review.
14 HM Government, Prevent Strategy, 57–58.
204 Sam Mullins
a ‘normal’ life. Interventions of this kind try to address the “pull factors” de-
scribed above and to facilitate the transition away from violence without nec-
essarily targeting a person’s beliefs. Practical approaches to disengagement
thus have much in common with disarmament, demobilization and reintegra-
tion (DDR) programs, which have existed for at least 25 years.15
Other approaches which are sometimes incorporated within targeted inter-
ventions include social and psychological counselling; offers of amnesty or re-
duced sentencing; promotion of non-violent political activity; one-to-one men-
toring; group-based discussions; and restorative justice. Government institu-
tions are sometimes directly involved in running targeted interventions for
CVE. For example, in Pakistan the military (assisted by civilians) is responsible
for operating at least six disengagement/de-radicalization programs for former
militants, including one for minors.16 The program in Saudi Arabia is also state-
run (see Case Study 13.1). In many other countries, however, the government’s
role is primarily limited to funding and facilitation, while most of the ‘hands
on,’ specialized counter-/de-radicalization and disengagement work is done by
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting
that several European countries also incorporate existing, mainstream social
services into their CVE strategies, and in the UK the police play the lead role in
coordinating service delivery (see Case Study 13.2).
Other Options
In addition to the methods listed above, it is possible to support CVE in a num-
ber of other ways. For instance, aid and development projects, either at home
or abroad, can potentially help to counter extremist narratives by actively
demonstrating state benevolence, whilst at the same time addressing social,
economic or political grievances that terrorists seek to exploit. Another course
of action that lies within the more ‘traditional’ realm of CT is to try and stop the
extremists’ messages from getting out in the first place. Specific measures here
may include censorship, banning of extremist organizations and targeting
terrorist ideologues and recruiters for arrest or other forms of punitive inter-
vention. Such actions can certainly be useful; however, it is important to realize
that they have their limitations and experience has shown that repression
alone is rarely, if ever, an effective solution.
15 For example, see DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective (New York: United
Nations, 2010), accessed May 30, 2015, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/
DDR_retrospective.pdf.
16 Shehzad H. Qazi, “A War Without Bombs: Civil Society Initiatives Against
Radicalization in Pakistan,” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2013,
accessed June 9, 2013, www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU_Brief_CounterDeradicalization_2_
14.pdf.
Case Studies in Rehabilitation and Prevention

The following case studies of targeted intervention programs in Saudi Arabia
and the UK help to illustrate two very different approaches to the organization
and implementation of ‘frontline’ CVE. Both countries have invested heavily in
these programs, which arguably form the central component within their
respective CVE strategies. Whilst they do serve to highlight certain factors that
seem to be important to achieving favorable outcomes, perhaps even more
importantly they also highlight some of the key challenges involved in this
arena.
Case Study 13.1. The Saudi “Care Rehabilitation Center.”17

In 2003, the Saudi government launched a three-pronged CVE strategy involving Pre-
vention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare (PRAC). The prevention component is very
broad in scope and largely consists of strategic communications using the media, as
well as various outreach and education projects aimed at discrediting terrorists and
promoting religious understanding in society. The focus here is upon rehabilitation
and aftercare, which are targeted specifically at individuals who have been detained
for terrorism-related offences, with the aim of de-radicalizing them and reintegrating
them into society.
The rehabilitation process is administered by a special Advisory Committee, which
has four subcommittees responsible for different aspects of the program – one reli-
gious, one psychological and social, one focused on security issues, and one which
handles media and outreach. Rehabilitation is largely centered on religious and psy-
chological counseling, which begins when individuals are still in prison. Initial coun-
seling sessions with prisoners are on a one-to-one basis but then typically involve
groups. There is a short course for less committed extremists that lasts no more than
a few hours, and a longer course which lasts for six weeks and is run by clerics work-
ing with social scientists. The focus of lectures and discussion is mainly upon key reli-
gious concepts which Islamist terrorists such as AQ use to justify violence. Among
others, these include jihad, takfir (denouncing other Muslims as apostates), walah
(loyalty), and bay’ah (allegiance). The clerics demonstrate how terrorists misinter-
pret these concepts and deceive people into believing a flawed ideology. Detainees are
also taught how to recognize legitimate religious authority and are given psychologi-
cal counseling which focuses on self-esteem. At the end of the process there is an
exam.
Providing that prisoners pass the exam and are eligible for release, they can then
progress to the Care Rehabilitation Center, where the process continues for a further
2–3 months. Historically, the center housed three different groups of detainees that
received separate, specially tailored rehabilitation programs to suit their situation:
domestic offenders; attempted or returning foreign fighters; and former Guantanamo
detainees. Compared to prison, the center is very relaxed – detainees live together in
dormitories, cook meals together and even play sports with the guards, who do not
17 This case study is based mainly upon Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’
Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare,” Carnegie
Papers 97 (September 2008), accessed June 1, 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/
files/cp97_boucek_saudi_final.pdf.
206 Sam Mullins
wear uniforms. Religious re-education, psychological counseling and assessment con-

tinue, supplemented by activities such as art therapy. In addition to this, a great deal
of effort is made to include families in the process, bringing them to the center and
allowing phone calls around the clock. Importantly, a detainee’s family or tribe must
also sign a contract before he is released, so that if he reoffends the family will be held
accountable.
One of the most significant aspects of the Saudi program involves the provision of
substantial social and economic support to program participants, which begins during
their stay at the rehabilitation center and continues on into the aftercare phase. This
can include: financial support for the detainee’s family; education; vocational training;
help finding a job; access to benefits; assistance with accommodation and buying a
car; business loans; and even help finding a wife and getting married. Although
somewhat controversial, these measures are important for addressing the pull factors
away from terrorism and facilitating the transition back into society. In the final stage,
once detainees are released, they continue to be monitored and must periodically
check in with the authorities. Social assistance also continues and they are encour-
aged to maintain contact with clerics and counselors from the program.
Although there are no definitive figures available for the Saudi rehabilitation pro-
gram, as of November 2007 it was reported that 3,000 people had been through it and
only 35 had been re-arrested for security-related offences. However, the rate of re-
cidivism appears to have increased somewhat over time. By January 2014, it was es-
timated that between 4,000 and 6,000 people had completed the program, with
around 80–100 who “either picked up arms again or drifted back into jihadi ideol-
ogy,”18 including a small number of high-profile terrorist offenders. More recently
still, in May of 2015 the program was said to have an 88 percent success rate,19 which
would suggest an increase in the “failure” rate from 1 to 12 percent over a period of
eight years. Nevertheless, these are still extremely low rates of reoffending compared
to ordinary criminals.20
Despite the appearance of success, questions still remain about the efficacy of the
Saudi program. In particular, it appears that many of the people who went through it
were relatively low-level offenders (for instance, prior to 2008 only around a third
had travelled or attempted to travel for violent jihad). It is thus unclear how effective
this approach may be in de-radicalizing more committed and violent terrorists. In re-
lation to this, it is also unclear whether the program is cost-effective, given the enor-
mous level of resources involved, which most other countries would be unable to
match. Similar to the UK, Saudi Arabia remains committed to this approach and have
expanded the number of rehabilitation centers over time.
18 Peter Beaumont, “‘Living Suicide Bomb’ Rejoins Al-Qaida After Saudi Depro-
gramming,” The Guardian, January 18, 2014, accessed June 1, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/18/suicide-bomb-al-qaida-saudi-
ahmed-al-shayea.
19 Taylor Luck, “Returning Jihadis: At Luxurious Rehab Center, A Saudi Cure for
Extremism,” Christian Science Monitor, May 17, 2015, accessed June 1, 2015,
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0517/Returning-jihadis-At-
luxurious-rehab-center-a-Saudi-cure-for-extremism.
20 For a comparison of rehabilitation programs for terrorists and criminals see Sam
Mullins, “Rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists: Lessons from Criminology,” Dynamics
of Asymmetric Conflict 3, no. 3 (2010): 162–93.
Case Study 13.2. The UK Channel Project.21

The Channel Project began in 2007 when the Prevent strategy was first implemented.
It was rolled out nationwide in 2012, and in 2015 it became a statutory duty for local
authorities. It is aimed at identifying people at risk of radicalization and providing
support, which is designed to prevent them from becoming involved in violent ex-
tremism/terrorism. Channel is coordinated around the country by designated police
officers who work with multi-agency panels chaired by local council authorities.
These include representatives from a wide array of services, often involving health
care, social services, education, criminal justice, immigration, and housing.
The program consists of three main stages: 1) identification and referral; 2) risk
assessment; and 3) delivery of support. Vulnerable individuals (i.e. who are at risk of
radicalization) are identified by people who know them and become concerned
enough to refer them to the program.22 Although there is no fixed ‘check-list’ for how
to identify a vulnerable person, relevant training is provided in WRAPs (see above)
and may include some of the indicators listed in Table 13.1 below. Once a referral has
been received, the multi-agency panel conducts a risk assessment based on three sets
of criteria: 1) Engagement with a group, cause or ideology; 2) Intent to cause harm;
and 3) Capability to cause harm. A decision is then made about what type of support
package (if any) is most appropriate.
Providing that the person is judged to be in need of support and either they or
their parents provide consent, the intervention itself then begins. This can include any
combination of the following, tailored to suit the individual’s needs: mentoring; ‘life
skills’; anger management; cognitive/behavioral therapy; educational support; career
advice; support with family/health/housing issues; drug and alcohol counselling;
theological/ideological support. Importantly, specialized disengagement/de-radicali-
zation programs, which deal directly with extremist beliefs, are delivered by non-gov-
ernmental service providers, approved by the Home Office. Regardless of the nature
of support package, cases are reviewed at six and 12 months.
There have been very few cases reported where someone went through the
Channel Project and went on to become involved in terrorism, suggesting that it may
work to some extent. Nevertheless, it has also been at the center of significant
controversy surrounding the Prevent strategy more generally. In particular, because
of the focus on Islamist terrorism, British Muslims felt as if they were being singled
out and treated like terrorism suspects. Channel came to be widely perceived as an
extension of CT aimed at spying on Muslim communities and thus created additional
grievances and anger at the state. The program attracted even more criticism when it
emerged that, in some instances, local authorities—in searching for community
partners to assist in CVE—had unknowingly allocated funds to anti-democratic,
extremist organizations.23
21 This case study draws primarily upon: HM Government, Channel Duty Guidance
(London: The Stationery Office, 2015), accessed May 31, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty
_Guidance_April_2015.pdf.
22 Channel also receives referrals from the prison service and thus supports rehabilita-
tion as well as prevention, although the primary emphasis is on the latter.
23 Shiraz Maher and Martyn Frampton, Choosing Our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engage-
ment with Muslim Groups (London: Policy Exchange, 2009), accessed May 21, 2012,
208 Sam Mullins
Table 13.1. Potential Indicators of Radicalization according to the 2010 Channel

Guidance.24
POTENTIAL INDICATORS OF RADICALIZATION

Expressed These may include:
opinions xsupport for violence and terrorism
x rejection of rule of law/ Government authority
Material The following may be relevant:
xpossession of violent extremist literature/ videos
xaccessing extremist websites/ chat-rooms
xpossession of material regarding weapons/ explosives
x possession of literature regarding military training and skills
Behavior Relevant changes may include:
& xwithdrawal from family, peers, social activities
behavioral xhostility towards former associates and family
changes
xassociation with proscribed organizations
x association with non-violent anti-democratic associations
Personal The following may be relevant:
history xinvolvement in organizations espousing violent ideology
(domestic/ overseas)
xattendance at military/terrorist training (domestic/ overseas)
xinvolvement in combat/violent activity (particularly on behalf
of extremists)
x low level criminality
As a result of these problems, Prevent and the Channel Project have undergone
significant reforms since 2011 and are now more clearly aimed at addressing all
forms of extremism, rather than singling out Islamists alone. However, there is still a
negative stigma attached to these efforts and, in light of the vast increase in
radicalization in response to events in Syria and Iraq, some commentators have
concluded that CVE in the UK has failed.25 In spite of this, the British government has
clearly reaffirmed its commitment to Prevent more generally and the Channel Project
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/Choosing_Our_Friend
s_Wisely.pdf.
24 See “Channel: Supporting Individuals Vulnerable to Violent Extremists: A Guide for
Local Partnerships,” HM Government, accessed May 31, 2015, https://www.counter
extremism.org/resources/details/goto_url/95/3835.
25 James Brandon, “The UK’s Counter-Radicalization Strategy Just Failed; What Now?”
War on the Rocks, September 18, 2014, accessed September 21, 2014,
http://warontherocks.com/2014/09/uk-attempts-to-create-moderate-islam-just-
failed-what-now/.
in particular. Between 2012 and 2015, over 2,000 people were referred to Channel
and hundreds received support.26 In addition to this, increasing numbers of
community groups throughout the country are mobilizing against violent extremism,
with or without the support of government.
Principles of Best Practice

The case studies above provide just two, brief examples of targeted CVE pro-
grams. There are dozens, if not hundreds more around the world and although
each program is more or less unique, it is possible to identify certain recurring
themes that seem to be important for increasing the chances of ‘success’ in
CVE.
Credibility of Messengers
Regardless of the specific type of intervention, a point that is repeatedly em-
phasized is the need to have credible messengers in order to be able to influ-
ence the target audience. This is why secular governments in particular must
partner with NGOs if they wish to be able to address religious extremism. It is
also why respected clerics and former extremists are employed in CVE pro-
grams around the world. Without credibility, it is impossible to gain influence.
Targeting the Right Audience
A closely related point involves choosing who to influence. Target audiences
must be chosen according to the goals of the program, beginning with whether
it is about prevention or rehabilitation (although this is just a start). The audi-
ence and goals combined will then dictate to a large extent which messengers,
messages and methods are likely to be effective.
Multiple Methods
As is the case in Saudi Arabia, the UK, and in many other programs, it seems
important to address both push and pull factors and to target both beliefs and
behavior. In particular, it is useful to incorporate practical measures such as
social services which help to facilitate disengagement.27
Supportive Approach
Another commonality of the Saudi and British approaches is that they are both
framed as forms of support for vulnerable/misguided individuals, rather than
26 HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism:

Annual Report for 2014 (London: The Stationery Office, 2015), 16, accessed May 31,
2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/415711/contest_annual_report_for_2014_print.pdf.
27 For more on the importance of reintegration into society see Kate Barrelle, “Pro-Inte-
gration: Disengagement from and Life after Extremism,” Behavioral Sciences of Ter-
rorism and Political Aggression 7, no. 2 (2015): 129–42.
210 Sam Mullins
as forms of punishment. Participation is also voluntary 28 and efforts have been

made in both cases to separate CVE from more intrusive or punitive aspects of
CT. Certainly, it seems unlikely that a forceful approach would be productive in
this context;29 however, this is significantly different to the usual tendency to
be tough on terrorists.
Involving Civil Society, Communities and Family
A very obvious lesson here is that governments cannot counter violent ex-
tremism alone. The UK relies heavily on the work of community-level NGOs,
and although the Saudi government is able to speak directly on religious mat-
ters, they have nevertheless gone to great pains to include families and tribes in
the rehabilitation process. Non-governmental individuals and organizations
often have much greater credibility than governments, as well as better access
to target audiences. Civil society will also play a key role in whether or not CVE
efforts are generally accepted.
Ongoing Challenges
The practice of CVE faces significant ongoing challenges, including risk assess-
ment, program evaluation, potential backlash and concerns regarding civil lib-
erties.
Risk Assessment
Although significant progress is being made in this area, 30 structured risk as-
sessment for potential/convicted violent extremists and terrorists is still very
much in the early days of development. Without scientifically validated risk as-
sessment tools (in particular ones that are able to measure changes over time),
there is greater likelihood of error, meaning that it is extremely difficult to
make reliable judgments about the level of risk that any given individual pre-
sents. This in turn means it is difficult to decide what level and type of ‘treat-
ment’ should be given to different individuals, which then also means it is hard
to tell whether resources are being used efficiently.
Defining and Measuring ‘Success’
Program evaluation is crucial, yet impossible without a clear definition of suc-
cess and the ability to measure it.31 Committing an extremist-related offence is
28 Although, notably, the British government has indicated that de-radicalization will be
mandatory for jihadist foreign fighters returning from Syria/Iraq.
29 Note that this does not preclude the use of sarcasm and mockery in more broadly tar-
geted strategic communications, although it is unlikely that these techniques would
work in targeted interventions.
30 Most notably, the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment tool (VERA-2). See D. Elaine
Pressman and John Flockton, “Calibrating Risk for Violent Political Extremists and
Terrorists: The VERA 2 Structured Assessment,” British Journal of Forensic Practice
14, no. 4 (2012): 237–51.
31 For a practical guide to monitoring and evaluation in CVE see Laura Dawson, Charlie
Edwards, and Calum Jeffray, Learning and Adapting: The Use of Monitoring and
the most obvious indicator of failure but is also problematic. In a preventive in-
tervention, the people being targeted have not yet committed an offence. If they
still have not committed an offence following participation in a CVE program of
some kind, it is difficult to say what has been achieved without some other
measurements taking place, since there is no guarantee that they would have
broken the law in the absence of intervention. Similarly, to be able to evaluate
the efficacy of a rehabilitation program in terms of recidivism, it is necessary to
know the average base-rate of re-offending. However, because terrorism is a
relatively low-probability activity and there is a general lack of systematic data
collection, this information is largely unavailable. An 88 percent ‘success rate’
might seem impressive, but if only 12 percent of terrorists re-offend anyway,
the impact would appear to have been negligible. It is therefore necessary to
develop and measure multiple indicators of success (including such things as
changes in individual attitudes, beliefs and behavior) that will enable a more
refined assessment.
Backlash, Infiltration and Abuse
As noted above, CVE in the UK was met with considerable backlash within
Muslim communities by those who felt it was excuse to spy on them. Extremist
organizations also actively encouraged these sentiments, whilst some effec-
tively infiltrated the program to the extent that they were given funding by the
government.32 This latter point illustrates the related challenge of choosing
non-governmental partners to work with. Indeed, without clear criteria and a
working knowledge of the issues at hand, as well as specific groups, it can be
difficult to tell who is able to effectively assist and who might have ulterior mo-
tives. In connection with this, unfair or uneven distribution of government
support can foster tensions within communities.33 At the same time, support
from government institutions which do not view CT or CVE as their business
(notably the education sector), is far from guaranteed. Therefore, achieving a
true “whole-of-government,” let alone a “whole-of-society” approach to CVE is
a monumental task.
Furthermore, it is important to note that these issues are not restricted to
Western society, although they may manifest themselves differently in other
environments. Terrorists have spoken out against de-radicalization efforts in
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere and have also directly targeted rehabilita-
tion centers and reformed terrorists. For instance, the head of education at the
Sabaoon center in the Swat valley in Pakistan was assassinated by the Pakistani
Evaluation in Countering Violent Extremism (London: RUSI, 2014), accessed June 2,

2015, https://www.rusi.org/publications/rusibooks/ref:O53D0E70CA1731/.
32 Maher and Frampton, Choosing Our Friends Wisely.
33 See, for example, Adam Gartrell, Natalie O’Brien, and Michael Bachelard, “Secret
Grants for Countering Violent Extremism Programs Split Communities,” Sydney
Morning Herald, May 31, 2015, accessed June 1, 2015, www.smh.com.au/nsw/secret-
grants-for-countering-violent-extremism-programs-split-communities-20150530-
ghcojw.
212 Sam Mullins
Taliban,34 while rehabilitated/disengaged terrorists have been targeted for

execution in Colombia 35 and in Afghanistan.36 In addition, infiltration and abuse
are always potential problems where program participants are given financial
or other forms of necessary support. In Afghanistan, biometric screening had to
be introduced to confirm people’s identities and prevent fraudulent enrolment
in programs.37 These types of challenges must be anticipated and steps must be
taken to try and minimize them.
Security vs. Liberty
A final key challenge relates to the potential erosion of civil liberties in favor of
security. Although preventive interventions are generally supportive and vol-
untary, the idea of state intervention based on a person’s beliefs—before they
have committed an offence—is often met with significant opposition. In rela-
tion to this, “extremism” is even more difficult to define than “terrorism” and
attempting to counter people’s beliefs potentially leads to loss of liberty. Like-
wise, when it comes to rehabilitation, although ongoing aftercare appears to be
important for protecting against recidivism, it raises questions about how long
monitoring should continue once a person has completed their sentence. On
top of all these issues, CVE is likely to face considerable practical, legal, finan-
cial and political challenges, depending on the particular context.
The Way Forward

The challenges associated with CVE are not easily overcome. However, over
time they may be minimized. To begin with, governments must realize that CVE
is a long-term investment that will take time and resources if it is to pay off.
Compared to traditional CT, budgets allocated for CVE are tiny. Additional out-
lays will be necessary for these endeavors to have any real impact. The recent
establishment of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund
(GCERF),38 which aims to raise over $200 million for CVE initiatives worldwide
over the next ten years, is a positive development.
Of course, it is also essential that CVE programs are carefully designed to in-
clude a clear target audience and measurable goals. Although governments may
not be directly responsible for many of these programs, they can nevertheless
assist in facilitating the sharing of information and the building of capacity of
34 Qazi, A War Without Bombs, 7.

35 Theidon, “Transitional Subjects,” 72.
36 Azam Ahmed, “Afghan Amnesty Program Falls Short, Leaving Ex-Insurgents Regretful
and Angry,” New York Times, January 9, 2013, accessed June 2, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/10/world/asia/many-afghan-ex-insurgents-
regret-laying-down-arms.html.
37 “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program,” ISAF, undated, accessed September
9, 2013, www.isaf.nato.int/article/focus/afghanistan-peace-and-reintegration-
program.html.
38 See Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, accessed June 2, 2015,
http://www.gcerf.org/.
NGOs with the aim of professionalizing program design and delivery. One
example of this type of initiative is the European Commission’s Radicalisation
Awareness Network (RAN), which was established in 2011 with the aim of
helping “first-line local practitioners [involved in CVE] and… facilitat[ing] the
exchange of experiences and best practices between them.”39
Perhaps most importantly of all, there is a continuing, acute need for re-
search and evaluation of CVE in order to refine both understanding and prac-
tice. Here too, there have been many positive developments. The establishment
of the Hedayah Center in Abu Dhabi in 2012 is a notable example. Also known
as the Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, it aims “to serve
as the premier international institution for training, dialogue, collaboration,
and research to counter violent extremism in all of its forms and manifesta-
tions, in support of long-term, global efforts to prevent and counter terror-
ism.”40 In time, these sorts of efforts may provide more definitive answers to
the key questions that remain about CVE – in particular, how effective are these
different programs, and which specific approaches have the greatest impact?
Conclusion
Soft approaches to CT, now collectively referred to as CVE, are extremely di-
verse and are becoming ever more popular. While there is a considerable body
of anecdotal and empirical evidence to suggest that at least some CVE pro-
grams can be effective, many questions still remain and there are still numer-
ous challenges that must be overcome. In spite of this continuing uncertainty,
CVE is growing in practice and has been repeatedly highlighted by the UN as a
necessary component of a comprehensive CT strategy.41 However, it is im-
portant to note that CVE is not intended to replace more traditional CT
measures, nor is it seen as a magical solution to all violent extremism. Rather, it
may serve to complement ‘harder’ approaches to CT by filling certain gaps and
militating against some of the negative repercussions that sometimes result
from these measures. CVE—like all CT—is imperfect, yet it appears to be here
to stay. As a result, it is important that CT practitioners gain an understanding
of this field, including both the positives and the negatives.
39 “Radicalisation Awareness Network,” European Commission, April 24, 2015,

accessed June 2, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/
networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/index_en.htm.
40 “About Hedayah,” Hedayah, undated, accessed June 2, 2015, www.hedayah.ae/about-
hedayah/about-hedayah/.
41 “Analysis and Recommendations with Regard to the Global Threat from Foreign
Terrorist Fighters,” UN Security Council, May 19, 2015, accessed June 10, 2015,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/358.
214 Sam Mullins
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Chapter 14
Counter-Terrorist Financing
John Sawicki
Introduction
Napoleon’s famous proclamation that “an army marches on its stomach” might
be applied to the operations of terrorist organizations. Shadowy and fearsome
they might be, but they still must eat, drink, clothe and equip themselves, and
be able to pay for their logistical and other needs. If counter-terrorism (CT) ef-
forts can break terrorist financing, this can break the organization. This chapter
explores the value of counter-terrorist financing (CFT), outlining its im-
portance and then identifying four typologies, based on revenue origin, which
help us to understand terrorist funding. It will look at two illustrative case
studies (one on the operations of al-Qaeda in Iraq and the other on the use of
gemstones in terrorist financing) and concludes by surveying money launder-
ing operations and emerging trends in terrorist financing in the digital age.
Why Study Counter-Terrorist Financing?

It is possible to argue that CFT is relatively insignificant for countering terrorist
operations, simply because many attacks cost relatively little to conduct.
Therefore, it may appear futile to “chase the money.” Indeed, terror operations
often seem to be highly cost effective. The cost of the spectacularly successful
9/11 attack on the US is purported to have been about $500,000 compared to
over a trillion dollars in subsequent costs to the American economy. Likewise,
the amounts of money needed to mount the Madrid train bombings in Spain in
2004 and the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005 were insignificant relative to their
impact. The dazzling results from token expenditures speak for themselves.
There is much more to such cases, however, than meets the eye. For exam-
ple, estimates of monetary expenditure rarely take into consideration the years
of training, organizational maintenance and preparation necessary for the at-
tacks. An individual terror attack may be relatively inexpensive, but the logisti-
cal infrastructure that makes it possible is often costly. 1 Large, well organized
and dangerous groups, which have high operational capability, require steady
transfusions of money. Moreover, groups attempting to maintain a high tempo
of operations naturally consume more resources and thus need to replenish
their materials and lost cadres. Larger, better organized groups often have con-
1 Estimates for large organizations run into millions, even billions of dollars. See Peter
Romaniuk, “The State of the Art on the Financing of Terrorism,” RUSI Journal 159,
no. 2 (April/May 2014): 9.
217 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch14

218 John Sawicki
centric personnel obligations – just as professional military forces. Simply put,

cadres require support, but so do their families and dependents.2
Counter-finance operations against terror groups are an assault on their
“Achilles Heel.” Terrorists and their families require food, clothing, housing,
etc. Equipment must be purchased and both materiel and money must be
transferred. Thus, raising and spending money for operations can be exploited
as an important weakness of terrorist organizations.
Why is Counter-Terrorist Financing Important?

CFT is one of the main weapons in the CT arsenal for several reasons. First, it is
universally reinforced by international convention (treaty). Many of the interna-
tional agreements—often between states which might not normally cooper-
ate—cover financial processes such as bank transfers, money laundering and
tax evasion. Even countries which cannot agree on definitions of terrorism can
agree on financial practices which they consider illegal. Consequently, coopera-
tion against the financial practices used by terrorists can often be called upon
even if states may not agree on other aspects of a terrorist group’s identity.
Secondly, CFT is generally non-violent. Human rights advocates often balk at
the hardline tactics that CT forces employ, such as in interrogation. The process
of discovering financial crimes, however, is much less intrusive, is seldom vio-
lent and usually involves agencies of the State which do not employ brute force
to conduct their investigations, such as tax officials and treasury personnel.
Where armed police are employed (some states have Treasury Police), the re-
sults are almost always non-lethal.
Thirdly, CFT targets activities that would be illegal for anyone. Terrorist or
insurgent groups can sometimes claim they are being singled out by the police
for their ideology or religious identity. Prosecutions for illegal financial activi-
ties are a much less controversial method to curtail the activities of a group.
The state is merely enforcing laws against illegal activity which are applicable
to everyone in the country. Some common conditions for arrest and prosecu-
tion of terror financiers include income tax evasion, illegal money transfers,
fraud, currency smuggling and the operation of a banking institution without a
license.
Additionally, proving financial crimes is often easier politically, compared to
other solutions. Because of its emphasis on irregular financial activity that is
illegal, CFT is unlikely to be objectionable to political forces that wish to avoid
confrontation with a violent group. Moreover, the pursuit of the terror group’s
financial activities is less likely to require special laws, special prosecutorial
powers or controversial arrests. The financial architecture necessary to guar-
antee the country’s smooth economic operation is normally sufficient to handle
these cases.
2 Martin A. Weiss, “Terrorist Financing: The 9/11 Commission Recommendation,” CRS

Report for Congress RS21902 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service,
2005), accessed July 10, 2015, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21902.pdf.
Counter-Terrorist Financing 219
Finally, countries without violent terrorism may still be important to the logis-
tical and financial functions of those organizations. It is not unusual for coun-
tries to maintain that since they have no incidence of violent political acts—
particularly those one might call terrorist—they have no problem with terror-
ism. Terror groups rely upon financial networks all around the world to trans-
fer their funds, raise additional sources of revenue and provide safe havens to
train, equip and, in general, to act as a logistical base. The absence of terrorist
violence in a country does not necessarily mean that terrorists are not present.
For instance, al-Shabaab is not known to carry out attacks in Sierra Leone or
Senegal, yet is active in the illegal trafficking of wildlife products such as rhino
horn and elephant ivory.3 Colombia’s FARC does not engage in overt violence in
West Africa but uses several of these countries as conduits to ship cocaine to
Europe.4
Four Ways to Think about Terror Funding

In general, terror groups will try to raise funds using the most advantageous
means available to them – the most money for the least trouble and risk to
themselves. Ideally, funds are supplied by a wealthy sponsor who sympathizes
with the terrorists’ cause. Historically, that was the case for many terror groups
across the world. More recently, terror organizations have proven themselves
adept at finding money on their own initiative. Michael Freeman and Moyara
Ruehsen suggest that terrorists fund their operations on the basis of the utility
of the fund-raising process: volume, risk, convenience, simplicity, costs and
speed.5 With this in mind, there are at least four, broad types of sources that
terrorists exploit: 1) voluntary/involuntary contributions; 2) group-specific
sources 3) criminal enterprises; and 4) illicit nexus sources of funding. Alt-
hough there is considerable overlap between these categories (for example, ex-
tortion covers both involuntary contributions and criminal enterprise), it is a
useful exercise to begin to break down the ways in which terrorists sustain
themselves and then look for ways to counter them.
Voluntary/Involuntary Contributions
Many terrorist organizations utilize multiple channels of both voluntary and
involuntary support. State sponsorship, an established group of fundraisers
and sympathetic, wealthy patrons can help provide groups with regular in-
3 Catrina Stewart, “Illegal Ivory Trade Funds al-Shabaab’s Terrorist Attacks,” The Inde-
pendent, October 6, 2013, accessed July 10, 2015, www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/africa/illegal-ivory-trade-funds-alshabaabs-terrorist-attacks-88613 15.html.
4 See, for example, UNODC, Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability
and Development (with special reference to Guinea-Bissau), United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, December 2007, 21, accessed July 10, 2015, www.unodc.org/
documents/data-and-analysis/west_africa_cocaine_report_2007-12_en.pdf.
5 Michael Freeman and Moyara Ruehsen, “Terrorism Financing Methods: An
Overview,” Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 7 (2013): 5–26, accessed July 10, 2015,
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/279.
220 John Sawicki
come. In some cases the terrorists themselves may be personally very wealthy,
as was the case with Osama bin Laden before AQ was proscribed and his assets
were frozen.6 AQ also benefited from outside donations from a number of Saudi
and Gulf State millionaires, collectively known as Osama’s “Golden Chain.”7
As the power of a group grows, it may also find that it can generate revenue
from the territory it controls through popular taxation, extortion or racketeer-
ing, e.g. the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in Mali
and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Of course, a variety of voluntary and involuntary
contributions are frequently combined. For instance, the Peruvian terror or-
ganization Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) received cash and weapons from
Cuba and Communist East Bloc nations during the Cold War. Marginal cash in-
come was generated from a limited involvement in cocaine production while
‘revolutionary levies’ and ‘voluntary contributions’ were solicited from peas-
ants in the areas which they controlled.8
Group-Specific Sources of Funding
We may speak of group-specific sources of funding to the extent that they are
only made possible by the specific ethnic or religious identity of the group in
question and are therefore either difficult to replicate outside of that organiza-
tion, or are genuinely unique to it. This includes a group’s ability to call upon
dedicated religious or cultural charities, which they may control, specific dias-
pora communities, or seemingly legitimate businesses. The operations of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are illustrative of this aspect of finan-
cial support. The Tamil Tigers made extensive use of heroin trafficking, human
trafficking and popular taxation. But their main support came from donations
and exploitation of the Tamil diaspora throughout the world, especially in Can-
ada and India. It would be difficult even for another Tamil group, much less a
non-Tamil one, to exploit this source of funding, and support for the LTTE re-
mains strong despite their military defeat.9
Criminal Enterprise
Criminal enterprises of varying sorts are the most common source of terrorist
funding today. Generally, if a criminal organization engages in a particular be-
6 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 103–4.
7 Steven Emerson with Jonathan Levin, “Terrorism Financing: Origination, Organiza-
tion, and Prevention: Saudi Arabia, Terrorist Financing and the War on Terror,”
Testimony to the US Senate Committee on Government Affairs, 31 July 2003, 24–25,
accessed September 25, 2015, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/emerson-
testimony.
8 Rensselaer W. Lee III, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power (New Bruns-
wick, NJ: Transaction, 1998), 13.
9 International Crisis Group, The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE, Asia Report
no.°186, February 23, 2010, accessed July 10, 2015, www.crisisgroup.org/
en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/186-the-sri-lankan-tamil-diaspora-after-the-
ltte.aspx.
havior, it is likely that it can be replicated by terrorists. Criminal endeavors

may be ongoing or sporadic enterprises and will seek to take advantage of
whatever opportunities are available, especially if the effort involved is rela-
tively easy, as well as lucrative.10 The most common criminal activities which
terrorist organizations utilize are kidnapping-for-ransom and drug trafficking.
Kidnapping has emerged as a major financial driver for these groups. During
the late 1990s, for example, Chechen militants and criminal gangs operating in
the North Caucasus conducted a large scale kidnapping campaign, seizing over
a thousand Russian and Western citizens and charging ransoms of up to $2
million.11 Countries which are known to pay ransoms for the release of their
citizens, such as Japan, France and Italy, have made these nationals attractive
targets to terrorist groups operating in Africa and Asia. The continued payment
of these ransoms is clearly self-defeating and yet many states still feel
compelled to pay because of domestic political pressures. Likewise, the inter-
national drug trade is so rewarding that the sums it generates can provide a
steady source of income despite competition from criminal gangs and the risk
of added pressure from law-enforcement agencies. As the value of the illegal
global drugs trade is estimated to be worth $300 billion annually,12 many ter-
rorist organizations are able to generate significant revenue from this traffic
and some, such as the Taliban and FARC, raise millions of dollars this way.
Terror groups can produce income from a variety of additional sources.
Some of the more profitable and widely employed are identity theft, phishing
scams, credit card fraud, wildlife poaching and trafficking, insurance scams,
mortgage fraud, racketeering and trafficking in stolen goods. Bank robbery,
ATM fraud and also more petty crimes are also useful to local terror cells.
Criminality among terrorists is so prevalent, and yet varies so much, that it
overlaps significantly with all of the other types of funding identified in this
chapter. The case of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) helps to demonstrate this (see Case
Study 14.1).
Illicit Nexus Sources of Funding
Illicit nexus sources of funding involve cooperation between terrorists and
transnational organized criminals in a way that is mutually beneficial to both
parties and expands the capabilities of terrorists beyond their own ‘in-house’
10 Jayesh D’Souza, Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, and Tax Evasion: Examining
the Performance of Financial Intelligence Units (London: CRC Press, 2011), 53–87.
11 See, for example, Celestine Bohlen, “4 Foreigners Are Found Beheaded in Chechnya,”
New York Times, December 9, 1998, accessed July 8, 2015, www.nytimes.com/
1998/12/09/world/4-foreigners-are-found-beheaded-in-chechnya.html; “Russian/
Kidnapping,” GlobalSecurity.org, October 15, 1999, accessed July 8, 2015,
www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/1999/10/991015-chechen30.htm.
12 “The Wars Don’t Work: As One War on Drugs Ends, Another is Starting. It Will Be a
Failure, too,” The Economist, May 2, 2015, accessed July 8, 2015,
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21650112-one-war-drugs-ends-another-
starting-it-will-be-failure-too-wars-dont-work.
222 John Sawicki
Case Study 14.1. Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Daesh, otherwise known by its claim to be the ‘Islamic State’ (IS), surprised the interna-
tional community with its swift rise to power and deadly use of disturbing violence. Its
direct antecedent, AQI, emerged during the US-led occupation of Iraq and was likewise an
extremely brutal and formidable group. AQI was thought to have been effectively crippled
by the death of its founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006, combined with the hostility of
local Iraqis known as the “Sunni Awakening.” During the backlash by local Sunnis against
AQI, a windfall of intelligence was captured, which included the financial ledgers of the
group. It offers one of the best snapshots of the financial activities of a terrorist organiza-
tion ever found. The RAND group published an extensive analysis of these materials,
which included some revealing insights on AQI operations in Anbar Province from 2006
to 2007.13
AQI was highly centralized, but left most decisions—including the allocation of
funds—with local commanders. Interestingly, members of AQI made less than the local
Sunnis living in Anbar. On average, AQI paid the equivalent of USD $1,331 per year,
compared to the local average household income of USD $6,177 per year. However, this
disparity did not appear to diminish the enthusiasm of AQI recruits, partially because
many were foreign fighters who had come for combat, but also because local members
could expect their families to be looked after financially in the event that they were
imprisoned or killed. The costs associated with providing this added measure of social
security were no doubt substantial and yet were clearly important for maintaining overall
group commitment and morale.14 In order to generate the necessary funds, AQI exploited
a diverse range of local sources, routinely using extortion, theft and black market sales to
fund its activities, in addition to kidnapping for ransom. This resulted in large, steady
sources of revenue and was so successful that the group was able to send surplus money
to AQ Central, presumably using an alternative remittance system (ARS) or some other
form of courier. Furthermore, as funds increased, so did the tempo of operations. A
subsequent decline in revenue coincided with a slowdown of attacks on coalition forces in
the country.15
According to the US Treasury, the creation of the Iraq Threat Finance Cell (ITFC) in
2005 enhanced the collection, analysis, and dissemination of timely and relevant financial
intelligence information. Senior military commanders relied on the ITFC’s analyses to
help disrupt the terrorists’ financial networks.16 Indeed, it was judged to be such a success
that a similar entity was subsequently established in Afghanistan. It is important to
realize, however, that CFT measures in Iraq were just one component within the overall
coalition effort. As the RAND report concluded, “… financial interdiction can serve as one
tool in counterinsurgency but is unlikely on its own to bring about the demise of a militant
group.”17
13 Benjamin Bahney, Howard J. Shatz, Carroll Ganier, Renny McPherson and Barbara
Sude, An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa‘ida in Iraq (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2010), 23–44, accessed July 8, 2015, http://www.rand.org/pubs/
monographs/MG1026.html.
14 Bahney et al., An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa‘ida in Iraq, 45–56.
16 “Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey Testimony,”
US Department of the Treasury, April 1, 2008, accessed July 9, 2015,
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp898.aspx.
criminal enterprises. In such cases, the terrorist finance structure has both na-
tional and international layers and legitimate, as well as illegitimate compo-
nents. For example, terrorists, including AQ and the Taliban, are believed to
have tapped into Viktor Bout’s global weapons trafficking network which sold
arms from Ukraine and utilized Lebanese middlemen and Israeli organized
crime figures.18
In a separate case in 2013, a Colombian national named Perez Guberek
Ravinovicz and several of his family members and associates were named by
the US Treasury as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers for their alleged
involvement in a global money laundering scheme. It was alleged that Ravi-
novicz (who operated out of Colombia and ran legitimate textile firms in Israel,
Colombia and Asia) had assisted a major narcotics trafficker named Ayman
Saied Joumaa, whose operations in South America and Africa had benefited a
number of terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah. In addition to Ravi-
novicz, another 31 individuals and 21 separate companies around the world
were indicted, although there were no charges in relation to terrorism.19 The
highly complex, transnational nature of some funding schemes thus presents
significant challenges for CT. Even though the illicit nexus may expose terror-
ists to a wider array of law enforcement agencies, it certainly gives them access
to many potentially lucrative financial and material resources. Regardless of
the particular source or method of funding, terrorists also frequently engage in
money laundering in order to conceal their sources and to be able to move and
spend their funds more freely.
Money Laundering
CFT is properly understood as the active search for financial support of terror-
ist organizations. However, there can be little doubt that international coopera-
tion in CFT has largely centered around anti-money laundering (AML). This can
partly be understood by the universal importance that states attach to
controlling the movement of money and possible taxable income by entities
that are trying to elude scrutiny. These include everyone from tax dodgers to
huge corporations, smugglers and organized criminals. Terrorists are just
another category within this list of potential targets. Nevertheless, because
terrorists must launder money to profit from criminal enterprises or to move
their assets around the world in support of their activities, this potentially
exposes the fiscal jugular of these groups to observation and interdiction.
Generally speaking, funds can be described as either ‘clean’ (legitimate and
reported to the government’s banking and tax authorities) or ‘dirty’ (originat-
18 Noah Rosenberg, “Guilty Verdict for Russian in Arms Trial,” New York Times, Novem-
ber 2, 2011, accessed July 9, 2015, www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/nyregion/
viktor-bout-guilty-in-arms-trafficking-case.html.
19 “Treasury Targets Major Money Laundering Network Operating Out of Colombia,” US
Department of the Treasury, July 9, 2013, accessed September 325, 2015,
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2002.aspx.
224 John Sawicki
ing from illegal sources or being used for illegal purposes). The goal of crimi-
nals generally, and terrorist financiers specifically, is to ensure that their
money is untraceable so that their illegal enterprises cannot be discovered.
Ideally, this is accomplished through money laundering – a process where ille-
gal, dirty funds become legitimate, clean money. Loosely speaking, this also de-
scribes moving money around the world to evade detection. For example, AQ
was able to send finances to the 9/11 hijackers in the US via wire transfers
from locations in the Middle East despite UN financial sanctions against the
group in place at the time.20
Ultimately, money laundering (ML) seeks to move funds into legitimate
banking institutions, especially those in a country known for its rigorous scru-
tiny of banking activity. Money is typically moved from locations around the
world, where no questions are asked about its origins, through many layers of
accounts in several banks in multiple countries. The end goal is to get the cash
deposited in a reputable bank in a secure country, where the money may be
used by front companies or charities, which then disburse the funds for their
intended purposes.
A large number of banks are required by the supervising financial institu-
tions of their country, usually called Financial Intelligence Units (FIU), to report
cash transactions above a certain limit. This is often referred to as a Cash
Transaction Report (CTR). Even if a cash transaction is below the designated
amount, a bank may always alert the FIU, if it suspects financial irregularity, by
filing a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR).21 The act of making small cash
transactions below the CTR level without triggering a SAR is sometimes re-
ferred to as ‘smurfing.’ The money is successfully laundered if it arrives in a
respected bank and is presumed to belong to a legally acceptable entity which
can now spend those funds as it pleases. These structured deposits and with-
drawals may be made with enough skill to avert a CTR or SAR.
Money laundering employs a bewildering array of mechanisms. These might
include legitimate charities and companies which use a system of false billing
or donations to simulate real activity, but in fact are the ‘beard’ used to conceal
the appearance or expense of laundered cash. Criminal organizations, such as
drug cartels and several terrorist organizations, still largely employ some form
of cash smuggling to repatriate their cash or to launder it. Cash couriers or
whole cash cargoes may still be the most common ways to physically move
money, although cleaning it is always an intricate process. Terrorists, often in
some form of cooperation with criminals, are constantly looking for new ways
to move and launder money. The use of diamonds and other precious stones,
20 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: 2004), 172, accessed July 10, 2015,
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
21 Shima D. Keene, Operationalizing Counter Threat Finance Strategies (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, December 2014), 16–18.
such as tanzanite, gives a good demonstration of the multilevel value of illegal

commodities (see Case Study 14.2).
Alternative Remittance Systems (ARS)

The attempt to curtail financial support to international terrorism post-9/11
alerted many banking authorities to the pervasiveness of the role of ARS’s.
These systems, called hawalas in the Middle East and hundis in South Asia, are
found throughout the world under many names. AQ had its own dedicated ha-
walas to handle cash transactions around the world.22 These ancient systems of
money transfer rely upon the primitive origins of modern international bank-
ing and allow varying amounts of cash to cover vast distances usually with little
or no records. Prosperous hawalas may have offices in dozens or even hun-
dreds of cities around the world, and alliances with smaller dealers or hawala-
dars – in still more locations. A deposit may be made in one city and ten thou-
sand miles away a representative transfers the exact amount to an authorized
representative, sometimes within minutes.
This system relies on secrecy, but above all confidence and trust. It is enor-
mously successful in Asia and Africa, and has become the banking system of the
migrant poor. Efforts have been made to regulate the system and to shut down
hawaladars who handle cash for terrorist groups. Nevertheless, these organiza-
tions are too widespread, too important and too loosely run to be effectively
regulated. As such, they remain a significant factor in terror financing. It would
be a mistake to shut them down, however, because of the vital role they play
for the world’s working poor. In sum, since this mechanism of cash transfer
cannot be suppressed, it must at least be kept under surveillance in order to
detect and deter exploitation by terrorists.
Emerging Trends in Terrorist Financing

The growth of the Internet, cyber banking and the global availability of cheap
smartphones with satellite connections has greatly empowered modern ter-
rorists’ financial arrangements. It makes transferring funds easier, allows for
new and innovative fundraising and opens up vast areas for exploitation as
sources of revenue. Most of all, it allows for highly secretive communication.
Advances in technology play a key role in the evolution of terror-finance.
Terrorist fundraisers for IS, for example, have canvassed supporters in the Gulf
States for donations via cell phone contact information and WhatsApp ac-
counts.23 Identity theft, hacking of bank accounts and credit card fraud are also
22 David C. Firth, “The Hawala System,” Global Security Studies 2, no. 1 (2011): 26.
23 Charles Lister, Dynamic Stalemate: Surveying Syria’s Military Landscape (Doha, Qatar:
Brookings Doha Center, May 2014), 18, accessed July 10, 2015, www.brookings.edu/
~/media/research/files/papers/2014/05/19-syria-military-landscape-lister/syria-
military-landscape-english.pdf.
226 John Sawicki
Case Study 14.2. Terrorist Use of Diamonds and Other Gems.

Terrorists have proved inventive in finding novel sources of financing. For example,
diamonds and other precious stones have provided a source of funding for some ter-
rorist and insurgent organizations over the last two decades. So-called ‘blood dia-
monds’ were employed to fund operations of violent groups in the Liberian and Sierra
Leone civil wars. It was also reported that AQ used diamonds as a means of storing
liquid assets.24 How does this occur?
Gems have high value, they are easily moved and their demand is universal. Large
gem firms, such as De Beers, no longer hold a monopoly, and the international trade in
these items is long established. As a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report ob-
served: “The closed and opaque nature of the diamonds markets and the high value of
diamonds combined with a lack of expertise in this area on the part of the authorities
have left this industry susceptible to abuse by criminals.”25 The report goes on to note
that “Diamonds and the diamond trade can be used in all stages of ML (placement,
layering and integration) and for the stages of TF [terrorist finance] (collection,
transmission, and use).”26 The FATF study further notes the action of the Belgian Fi-
nancial Intelligence Unit CTIF-CFI in breaking a ring of diamond merchants connected
to a Mideast terrorist organization.27
The experience of Canada, which has one of the best monitored and administered
financial systems in the world, is illustrative. Canada is the third largest producer of
diamonds in the world, but a 2011 report by its FIU, FINTRAC, highlighted that Can-
ada lacked legislation to prevent the use of diamonds as a financial instrument that
would fall under the country’s own AML legislation. The FINTRAC report noted that
“the Canadian diamond market remains largely unregulated and highly fragmented
with approximately 6,500 dealers of precious metals and stones within the country.
In addition, the jewelry business is often a “family affair” and reliant on personal con-
tacts, making it even more difficult for police to monitor and investigate criminal ac-
tivities conducted within the industry.” Valuable gemstones require specialized
knowledge to purchase and sell. Known groups using them seem to have no trouble
retaining the skilled artisans necessary to do this. Moreover, the gems are exchangea-
ble in most countries of the world and are thus reasonably liquid. Some gemstones—
such as diamonds—can be uniquely traced back to their geographic origin based on
spectroscopic analysis. But the market is awash with so many stones from conflict
zones (the aforementioned ‘blood diamonds’) that the liquidity of the stones is barely
affected. Therefore gems are a potentially attractive means for financing terrorist op-
erations; they are highly portable assets and may be sold as needed to raise funds for
an organization.
24 See, for example, Amelia Hill, “Bin Laden’s $20m African Blood Diamond Deals,” The
Guardian, October 20, 2002, accessed July 10, 2015, www.theguardian.com/
world/2002/oct/20/alqaida.terrorism.
25 See FATF, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing through Trade in Diamonds
(Paris: FATF, October 2013), accessed July 10, 2015, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
media/fatf/documents/reports/ML-TF-through-trade-in-diamonds.pdf.
26 FATF, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing through Trade in Diamonds, 2.
27 FATF, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing through Trade in Diamonds, 126.
becoming ever-more widespread and lucrative given the opportunities which

online banking and transmission present.
New technologies such as Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp have become
virtual command centers for terrorist organizations. Commercially bought en-
cryption systems, some as mundane as Virtual Private Networks (VPN) for
email, are almost unbreakable for intelligence services and the private compa-
nies responsible are not easily compelled to cooperate. These developments
provide terrorist organizations with secure communications and ways to move
money, which are more difficult to detect even than an ARS. Two particularly
worrying developments—terrorist use of the “dark web” and so-called crypto-
currencies—are discussed below.
The Dark Web
Michael Chertoff and Tobby Simon describe the Dark Web as that “portion of
the deep Web that has been internationally hidden and is inaccessible through
standard Web browsers. Dark Web sites serve as a platform for Internet users
for whom anonymity is essential, since they not only provide protection from
unauthorized users, but also usually include encryption to prevent monitor-
ing.”28
Within this framework, websites offer a toxic array of opportunities, in-
cluding financial services, of which terrorists and criminals alike are able to
take advantage. Stolen credit card numbers, personal identity data, hacked in-
formation about financial transactions, and services to transmit money are all
available. In most cases they are known primarily to previous users or those
they invite, and can only be accessed, or searched for by using special brows-
ers. The TOR 29 system is perhaps the most well-known, but others are also
available and some websites will only reveal themselves if accessed through a
particular browser. In addition, the browsers themselves provide secure en-
cryption.
Chertoff and Simon thus note that “the Dark Web and terrorists seem to
complement each other – the latter need an anonymous network that is readily
available yet generally inaccessible … While the Dark Web may lack the broad
appeal available on the surface Web, the hidden ecosystem is conducive for
propaganda, recruitment, financing and planning, which relates to our original
28 Michael Chertoff and Tobby Simon, “The Impact of the Dark Web on Internet Govern-
ance and Cyber Security,” GCIG Paper Series no. 6 (Global Commission on Internet
Governance and Chatham House, February 2015), 3, accessed July 10, 2015,
https://www.cigionline.org/publications/impact-of-dark-web-internet-governance-
and-cyber-security.
29 TOR was originally developed by the US Navy. It is an acronym which stands for “The
Onion Router” and operates by passing Web browsing through a global series of
computers (routers) repeatedly so that detection is almost impossible. It has other
features which can add encryption and make online Web surfing almost invisible. Its
software bundle, currently called Vidalia, combines powerful features which can
permit remarkable anonymity. The software is freely available online.
228 John Sawicki
understanding of the Dark Web as unregulated space.”30 The US believes that IS

is already using the Dark Web to recruit fighters, share intelligence and po-
tentially plan attacks.31
Cryptocurrencies
Commerce on the Dark Web would be pointless if standard methods of pay-
ment had to be used. A purchase using any aspect of the established banking
system can ultimately be traced and account owners’ identities revealed. As the
Web has enabled anonymous browsing, the invention of cryptocurrencies has
allowed for anonymous financial transactions.
A cryptocurrency is an electronically created standard of value. The mathe-
matical algorithms used to create cryptocurrencies are highly complex and the
currency space is still largely unregulated. But as an increasing range of indi-
viduals and businesses are willing to accept them, they have begun to function
as the standard currency of the Dark Web. The currency units are generated
through cryptographic coding along with proof-of-work which may be verified
by those interested in buying them. This serves to guarantee that the units are
genuine and unique. There may be hundreds of them in existence, but the most
well-known are names like Bitcoin, NameCoin, PPCoin and LiteCoin. Applica-
tions have been developed to facilitate their use and a growing number of busi-
nesses accept them as payment.
The value of cryptocurrencies to terror financing is that they provide a fully
anonymous instrument with which to conduct illegal financial transactions that
can be sent instantly over the Web to others around the world. In effect, this
creates a digital financial market that currently cannot be subject to surveil-
lance or disrupted by the authorities. The thin line of identification, which is
essential for cryptocurrencies, lies in their unique mathematical signatures.
These are akin to serial numbers in paper currency, which can authenticate
them and of course identify their creators and holders. Legal cryptocurrencies
function this way, but terrorist or criminal sites on the Dark Web can use Third
Party anonymous exchanges which effectively launder the coins and conceal
identities so that the actual transactions can indeed be free of exposure. Not
only do cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin make money laundering much easier, but
they may also allow for swift, sophisticated and secret logistical support for
terrorist activities.32
Currently, there are few clearly documented examples of terrorists making
use of these technologies. However, they are certainly aware of the potential
that the Dark Web and cryptocurrencies have to offer, and there are reports
30 Chertoff and Simon, “The Impact of the Dark Web on Internet Governance and Cyber
Security,” 4–5.
31 Barbara Starr and Jamie Crawford, “Pentagon Hunts for ISIS on the Secret Internet,”
CNN Politics, May 12, 2015, accessed July 10, 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/
12/politics/pentagon-isis-dark-web-google-internet/.
32 Aaron Brantly, “Financing Terror Bit by Bit,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 10 (2014): 1–5,
accessed July 10, 2015, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/financing-terror-bit-by-bit.
that terrorists are indeed utilizing these instruments to their advantage and
encouraging their use more widely.33 The notorious jihadist forum Shumukh al-
Islam, for instance, has posted instructions on how to use the Dark Web on
YouTube, which is clearly aimed at educating as many potential supporters as
possible.34
What Can Be Done?

Nations are not powerless in the financial struggle against terrorism. There are
important things which they may do to increase their capacity to detect, shut
down and prosecute terrorist-related financial activity. Jody Myers, writing for
the International Monetary Fund, notes several key measures every nation
needs to have in place:
x Legislation to combat money laundering and terrorist financing
x Criminal justice systems capable of prosecuting money launderers
and terrorist financiers, and confiscating their assets
x Measures to enable financial and non-financial institutions to iden-
tify their customers and verify the information they are providing,
known as customer due diligence
x Supervision of financial and non-financial institutions
x Measures to prevent criminal control or misuse of legal entities,
such as companies, foundations, and associations
x Financial intelligence units
x Domestic and international cooperation.35
It is important to emphasize here that the AML power of every state is mag-
nified by cooperation and intelligence sharing in a timely manner. Signing Mu-
tual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) with other countries can assist in
transnational intelligence sharing, criminal prosecution and evidence admis-
sion issues in partner countries.
In short, states require the national capacity to monitor, investigate and
prosecute financial actions that are linked to terrorist logistics. This means
constructing the legal framework which makes investigation and prosecution
possible, chiefly by criminalizing illegal financial activities and developing the
forensic investigative ability to penetrate the maze of accounting and book-
keeping techniques which can conceal illegal activity. To this end, the Financial
33 Frank Gardner, “How the Dark Web Spurs a Spying ‘Arms Race’,” BBC News, March
19, 2015, accessed April 30, 2015, www.bbc.com/news/technology-31948818.
34 Gardner, “How the Dark Web Spurs a Spying ‘Arms Race’,” 4.
35 Jody Myers, “Blow, Bling and Bucks: IMF Work Against Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing,” IMFDirect, June 27, 2011, accessed July 10, 2015, http://blog-
imfdirect.imf.org/2011/06/27/blow-bling-and-bucks-imf-work-against-money-
laundering-and-terrorist-financing/.
230 John Sawicki
Action Task Force (FATF) was formed by the G7 in 1989 to address the grow-
ing problem of money laundering – mainly as a result of the growth of the Co-
lombian drug cartels. Today it encompasses 34 member states and two re-
gional organizations (namely the European Commission and the Gulf Co-Opera-
tion Council). The real value of FATF lies in its recommendations for best prac-
tices to maximize AML efforts by the global community, including such actions
against terror groups’ finances. To facilitate this, in 1990 FATF issued the well-
known “FATF 40” recommendations for financial standards. After 9/11, FATF
adopted nine “Special Recommendations” on terrorist financing. In 2012, these
recommendations were integrated into the 40 original FATF recommendations
to address the key areas of money laundering, terrorist financing and prolifera-
tion financing.36
Furthermore, to encourage financial intelligence sharing and to provide mu-
tual assistance in national capacity building for healthy AML, the FIU of a great
number of the world’s nations have formed the Egmont Group. This coopera-
tive association was established initially in 1995 at the Egmont Ahrenberg Cha-
teau in Brussels, but its secretariat is now based in Toronto. It has 139 mem-
bers and its five working groups 37 provide a robust array of technical and in-
formation programs to strengthen FIUs. If CFT is to become more effective, it is
important that the central banks of all states should follow the FATF Recom-
mendations and be members of the Egmont Group.
Conclusion
It is important that states engage in CFT/AML activities as they expose the op-
erations of terrorist organizations even when violent acts are not being com-
mitted within their territory. They may also be undertaken by any state using
the financial architecture which is already in existence. Because it is non-vio-
lent, CFT/AML avoids many of the ethical and human rights objections which
have been raised by kinetic CT responses. More to the point, these efforts do
not create martyrs or heroes, but expose criminals and fraudsters. Global intel-
ligence sharing and cooperation in dynamic groups such as FATF and the Eg-
mont Group magnify a state’s CT capacity exponentially. Finally, if the RAND
analysis of AQI is accurate, there may be a direct correlation between an in-
crease in terror financing and the tempo of violent attacks. Attrition of terrorist
finances may therefore reduce the intensity of their operations. The more ro-
bust the national technical means in CFT/AML becomes, the more effective the
pressure on terrorist organizations. It is an area where almost any country may
be in the CT fight without fielding large military or police forces.
36 FATF, International Standards on Combatting Money Laundering and the Financing of

Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (Paris: FATF, 2012), accessed
July 10, 2015, www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/
FATF_Recommendations.pdf.
37 The Egmont Group has IT (Information Technology), Legal, Operational, Training,
and Outreach Working Groups (see http://www.egmontgroup.org/).
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D’Souza, Jayesh. Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, and Tax Evasion: Ex-
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Chapter 15
Interagency Cooperation in
Counter-Terrorism
Iztok Prezelj and Joe Airey
Introduction
The need for more effective interagency cooperation in counter-terrorism (CT)
was highlighted in the aftermath of 9/11, when it became clear that the reluc-
tance to coordinate and share information between security agencies could no
longer be tolerated if terrorist attacks were to be prevented in the future. The
9/11 Commission made it clear that the threat of modern global terrorism re-
quired a “quick, imaginative, and agile response,” and that it would be neces-
sary to coordinate a wide array of resources in order to achieve an effective
“unity of effort.”1 It has been argued that, without such cooperation, “institu-
tional gaps, duplication of effort, and overlapping responsibilities are inevita-
ble,” and that such weaknesses can be “exploited by terrorists.”2
After 2001, many governments worldwide have undertaken comprehensive
reforms of their national security systems. In particular, they have taken steps
to improve and expand horizontal interagency cooperation in the fight against
terrorism. New CT strategies have thus tried to incorporate the lessons from
9/11 and have created a variety of new structures aimed at achieving this, such
as intelligence fusion cells, national CT centers, governmental working groups,
joint task forces, etc. It is widely believed that these actions have contributed to
improvements in the efficiency of national and international CT efforts. Indeed,
it is self-evident that to effectively detect, deter, and defeat contemporary ter-
rorism a coordinated approach by all national security agencies is required. It
is also clear that no single agency can deal with this problem alone because ter-
rorism cuts across multiple jurisdictions. Uncoordinated actions by one agency
can produce only limited results in the fight against such a complex threat. In
recognition of this, government organizations engage in a variety of different
forms of interagency cooperation to include: sharing information, the exchange
of staff (liaison officers), participation in joint threat assessments, cooperative
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission
Report (Washington D.C., 2004): 399–428.
2 Lindsay Clutterbuck, “Law Enforcement,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand
Strategy, eds. Audrey Cronin and James Ludes (Washington D.C.: Georgetown Univer-
sity Press, 2004), 143.
235 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch15

236 Iztok Prezelj and Joe Airey
or mutually reinforcing planning, and participation in joint training, exercises

and operations.
However, research shows that interagency cooperation in CT is a much
more complex endeavor than some might think. In practice, many problems
have emerged, including bureaucratic competition among agencies, a failure to
share intelligence, and the duplication of effort.3 In one study, a SWOT 4 assess-
ment was used to analyze interagency cooperation using a sample of one hun-
dred European CT experts. The findings revealed that, although much had been
achieved in relation to the exchange of information and the creation of trust
among agencies, further improvement was needed. Agencies seemed to be
aware of the importance of trust, and yet still found it difficult to put their faith
in one another. Although there had been a shift from the “need to know” to the
“need to share,” mutual wariness between partners still limited the exchange of
information.5 According to Strom and Eyerman, interagency cooperation in CT
is a challenge at all levels.6 Effective interagency cooperation requires breaking
down what are often formidable barriers based on law, institutional culture,
organizational structure, jurisdictional responsibilities, and trust, to name but a
few factors. An example of the impact of a failure to communicate and coordi-
nate across agencies is illustrated by the Anders Breivik case in Norway in
2011 (see Case Study 15.1).
Based on the authors’ combined academic and practical experience, this
chapter identifies several capacities that need to be coordinated as part of a
comprehensive approach to CT and describes two examples of good practice –
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and intelligence fusion centers. The chap-
ter concludes with some general recommendations for practitioners on how to
improve interagency cooperation in the field of CT in their countries.
Core Counter-Terrorism Capabilities and Their

Coordination
Each country possesses a large spectrum of CT-relevant tools. Key capabilities
include intelligence services, law enforcement agencies, the armed forces, dip-
lomatic resources, immigration and border control services, civil protection
agencies, financial intelligence units, and critical infrastructure entities, not
forgetting engagement by civil society and community organizations. Each of
these elements needs to be coordinated individually, and the state needs to
3 Iztok Prezelj, “Inter-Organizational Cooperation and Coordination in the Fight against

Terrorism: From Undisputable Necessity to Paradoxical Challenges,” Comparative
Strategy 33, no. 4 (2014): 329.
4 Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats.
5 Iztok Prezelj, “Improving Inter-organizational Cooperation in Counterterrorism
Based on a Quantitative SWOT Assessment,” Public Management Review 17, no. 1-2
(2015): 209–35.
6 Kevin Strom and Joe Eyerman, “Interagency Coordination: A Case Study of the 2005
London Train Bombings,” National Institute of Justice Journal 260 (2008): 8-11.
Interagency Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism 237
Case Study 15.1. The Anders Breivik Terrorist Attacks in Oslo and
Utøya, July 2011.
On 22 July 2011, Norway suffered its deadliest attack since World War II. The perpe-
trator was a young right wing extremist named Anders Behring Breivik. The first at-
tack was a car bomb in Oslo’s government district that killed eight and injured over
200. Approximately an hour-and-a-half later, Breivik mounted an assault on a Work-
ers’ Youth League Summer Camp on Utøya Island. He shot dead 69 young people on
the island and injured over a hundred.
After these attacks, the Norwegian Parliament commissioned an investigation to
find out whether the bombing in Oslo could have been prevented and why there had
not been a more rapid response to Breivik’s shooting spree. The result was the Gjorv
Report, presented to the Prime Minister in August 2012.7 It concluded that the attack
on the government office complex could have been prevented and that the police had
failed in their duty to protect people on the island of Utøya. In addition to leadership,
staffing and equipment deficiencies, the report highlighted failings that were due to
poor communication and coordination both within and between security agencies. It
was thus concluded that “the ability to coordinate and work together has been defi-
cient.”8 Police information sharing, for example, was described as “subject to formida-
ble weaknesses.”9 During the attack, available information was not shared, the armed
forces were not immediately informed and there was a serious failure of the “nation-
wide message” service. Prior to the attack, there had also been inter-department bu-
reaucratic failings that had left government buildings in the center of Oslo vulnerable.
Furthermore, Norway’s internal intelligence service had failed to act on a tip from a
customs official concerning Breivik’s purchase of suspicious chemicals from Poland.
One of the recommendations of the report stated that “The Police Security Service
must take more initiatives and show more willingness to cooperate and share infor-
mation with other agencies, including the ordinary police and the Intelligence Ser-
vice.”10
Following Breivik’s attack and the recommendations of the Gjorv Report, the Nor-
wegian government and security services have enacted a number of measures to im-
prove CT preparedness. These measures include the creation of a new security de-
partment, improved information and communications technology, and enhanced co-
operation between the police and the armed forces.
provide for their overall strategic cooperation if and when necessary. Addi-
tional competencies may also be required in order to enable the imaginative
and agile CT capability espoused by the 9/11 Commission. Therefore, an effec-
tive CT strategy needs to facilitate intensive interagency cooperation by creat-
7 The 22nd July Commission Report: Preliminary English Version of Selected Chapters
(Oslo: Norwegian Government, 2012), 13–24, accessed May 8, 2015, www.sintef.no/
globalassets/project/nexus/01--report-22-july-gjorv-commision-summary_english_
version.pdf.
8 The 22nd July Commission Report,15.
9 The 22nd July Commission Report, 17.
10 The 22nd July Commission Report, 26.
ing several functional networks and an overall “network of networks” (usually

coordinated by a National Security Council or a similar body).
Figure 15.1 below shows key national CT capabilities and their coordination.
At face value, the diagram suggests that these capabilities are pillars (vertical
organizations), but in fact they are networks of a large number of different
agencies. It should also be noted that, in practice, interagency coordination de-
pends upon having appropriate provisions in a state’s constitution and sup-
porting extant legislation. However, these factors should not represent an
insurmountable hurdle to employing an innovative combination of resources
across agencies.
Interagency Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism
Immigration and Border Control Services
Critical Infrastructure Entities

Financial Intelligence Units
Law Enforcement Services
Community Organizations
Civil Protection Agencies
Intelligence Services
Diplomacy
Military
Counter-Terrorism Strategy
Constitution, Legal Basis
Figure 15.1: National counter-terrorism capabilities and their coordination.
Agencies Involved in Counter-Terrorism

It is hardly surprising that law enforcement agencies usually have the lead role
in CT. As noted by Lindsay Clutterbuck, an act of terrorism is a crime and the
perpetrator of the act is a criminal even though he/she may be designated as a
terrorist.11 Terrorists may violate a wide array of local, national, or interna-
11 Clutterbuck, “Law Enforcement,” 140.

tional laws, and the detection, investigation, and prosecution of terrorism is

typically the responsibility of law enforcement. Cooperation and coordination
among law enforcement agencies can be as difficult and complex as it is among
intelligence agencies and may involve national, state and local law enforcement
services, as well as various judicial offices. As stated previously, the key is to
identify those agencies which have core competencies that support CT and
then include them in the coordination effort. The example of the JTTF de-
scribed below is a model for operational interagency coordination involving
law enforcement.
Terrorist organizations are typically small and inherently secretive. Intelli-
gence activity is therefore essential for identifying terrorists and countering
their plans and operations.12 The effective collection, analysis, and sharing of
information and intelligence is essential for effective interagency cooperation.
These efforts will naturally include both domestic and foreign intelligence
agencies, but increasingly also involve a wide variety of other organizations
such as those involved in law enforcement, travel and immigration, finance,
border control, community and emergency services, health care, education, and
industry.13 The challenge is to coordinate this diverse network of dedicated or
potential intelligence providers. The example of state and regional fusion cen-
ters, created in the US in the aftermath of 9/11, is discussed later in this paper.
Border security, immigration and customs agencies also make a critical con-
tribution to CT, since millions of people cross national boundaries on a daily
basis by ship, airplane, rail, automobile, and on foot – both legally and ille-
gally.14 Recently, there has been increased concern about terrorists returning
from global hotspots such as Iraq and Syria, and subsequently becoming in-
volved in acts of terrorism in their countries of origin. 15 It is therefore more im-
portant than ever to ensure effective coordination with agencies involved in
the monitoring and surveillance of international travel.
12 John LeBeau, “Intelligence and Counter Terrorism: Examining the Critical Tools of Se-
crecy and Cooperation,” in Toward a Grand Strategy Against Terrorism, eds. Christo-
pher C. Harmon, Andrew N. Pratt, and Sebastian Gorka (New York: McGraw-Hill,
2011), 195; Paul Pillar, “Intelligence,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand
Strategy, eds. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2004), 116–121.
13 Pillar, “Intelligence,” 130–135; Jonathan R. White, Terrorism and Homeland Security
(Wadsworth: Cengage Press, 2012), 471-505; James Q. Roberts, “Building a National
Counter Terrorism Capacity,” in Toward a Grand Strategy Against Terrorism, eds.
Christopher C. Harmon, Andrew N. Pratt and Sebastian Gorka (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 2011), 134.
14 Larry K. Gaines and Victor E. Kappeler, Homeland Security (New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
2012), 327–351; White, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 515–519.
15 Brian Michael Jenkins, When Jihadis Come Marching Home (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2014), accessed February 22, 2015, www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE130-
1.html.
Naturally, military force also represents a powerful CT tool enabling nation

states to engage in either preemptive or reactive self-defense against the most
violent terrorist threats. However, the armed forces have to be used in careful
coordination with other CT tools and are preferably subject to strong civilian
control by the government and parliament.16 As a result, domestic CT in many
countries is predominantly the responsibility of the police and other civilian
agencies. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the armed forces in the overall CT ef-
fort is often essential as other security agencies usually lack the military’s
combined ability to deliver fire-power, intelligence, surveillance, communica-
tions and protection against chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
(CBRN) incidents. Therefore, the armed forces can play a critical supporting
role in a predominantly civilian interagency process, although specific legisla-
tion, plans and procedures need to be in place to facilitate this before a crisis
occurs.
Since modern terrorism is a political act without borders or boundaries, CT
must also include international cooperation, which largely lies within the realm
of diplomacy. Agreements on information sharing, capacity building, and legal
cooperation all therefore require close coordination between domestic security
agencies and the diplomatic corps.
Another important dimension of CT strategy is to “deny or eliminate the
funding [that] terror organizations require to operate.”17 Terrorists are imagi-
native in their methods of obtaining and distributing operational funds, exploit-
ing criminal acts, donations from supporters, contributions from charities,
money laundering, formal and informal money transfers and also “legitimate”
businesses. A coordinated CT effort therefore requires the cooperation of fi-
nancial intelligence units and anti-money laundering agencies, as well as other
financial institutions, such as banks, money transfer businesses and credit card
companies. By working together, these agencies have a stronger chance of
identifying and tracking suspicious financial activity that might be indicative of
terrorist activity. However, conflicts of interest are likely to arise. Private sec-
tor institutions in particular may be hesitant to implement additional security
measures if they cause inconvenience to their customers or cut into profits.
Other organizations peripheral to the core CT effort, like financial institutions,
may be reluctant to collaborate fully. For CT professionals, overcoming these
hurdles may be challenging, but will be vital to achieve a truly collaborative,
multi-agency effort.
Civil protection agencies, responsible for dealing with fires, hazardous mate-
rials, emergency medical situations, and natural disasters, must also be in-
cluded in the interagency process. Not only will these organizations be first-re-
sponders to acts of terrorism, they can also become important sources of intel-
16 Timothy Hoyt, “Military Force,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy,

eds. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 2004), 162–85.
17 Gaines and Kappeler, Homeland Security, 301.
ligence as they may be first to reach the scene and come into contact with ter-
rorist suspects.18 Interagency coordination in this field includes cooperation
between fire services, medical services, police, occasionally military, and large
numbers of highly specialized professional associations.
Related to these are agencies involved in the protection of critical infrastruc-
ture (CI), i.e. those “assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual,
so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect
on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination thereof.”19 A large number of organizations are responsible for the
management and protection of these structures, including both public and pri-
vate entities. Coordination between central government and organizations re-
sponsible for CI can support the flow of information and intelligence, as well as
enable infrastructure to more effectively protect itself through the sharing of
potential threat information. As Jonathan White points out, connections should
be established between local law enforcement and infrastructure security func-
tions in order to share intelligence and develop plans for both the prevention
of, and response to, acts of terrorism.20 Ideally, a successfully integrated, cross-
sectoral policy needs to focus on the following: joint threats and risk-assess-
ment, identification of entities with similar functions across sectors, and infra-
structure clusters that would have an instant and severe impact on society if
disrupted or shut down.21
Finally, an interagency approach must address community organizations and
institutions, not least because local community leaders may be best placed to
identify suspicious activity early on. Developing trusted partnerships with
community organizations, including schools in areas where extremists are
known to operate, can help to identify radicalization, recruitment and travel
indicative of a terrorist threat.22 It is also beneficial for law enforcement or-
ganizations to form partnerships with a diverse range of local business enter-
prises.23 Local businesses, for example, may come into contact with individuals
who purchase goods or services in preparation for a terrorist attack. This was
18 Michael F. Cahill et al., “New York State’s Counterterrorism Zone Z4: A Model of Inter-
agency Cooperation to Fight Terrorism,” The Police Chief (February 2010), accessed
September 7, 2015, www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=
display_arch&article_id=2012&issue_id=22010.
19 “What Is Critical Infrastructure?” Department of Homeland Security, last modified,
August 26, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure.
20 White, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 519–521.
21 See Iztok Prezelj, Erik Kopač, Uroš Svete, and Aleš Žiberna, “Cross-sectoral Scanning
of Critical Infrastructures: From Functional Differences to Policy-relevant Similari-
ties,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 9, no. 1 (2012): 1-5,
accessed September 7, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/1547-7355.1901.
22 Dan Silk, “Community Policing to Prevent Violent Extremism,” FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin (October 2012), accessed September 7, 2015, https://leb.fbi.gov/2012/
october/community-policing-to-prevent-violent-extremism.
23 White, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 519–521.
certainly the case with Najibullah Zazi, who bought precursor chemicals from
local retailers in preparation for a planned suicide attack on the New York
subway in 2009 (see Case Study 15.2).24 Terrorists also sometimes store mate-
rials at commercial facilities, purchase firearms, and buy fertilizers from agri-
cultural suppliers in order to make explosives.
Case Study 15.2. Najibullah Zazi’s New York Subway Plot.

In August 2008, Najibullah Zazi, Adis Medunjanin and Zarein Ahmedzay from Queens,
New York travelled to Pakistan where they met with members of al-Qaeda who gave
them training in explosives and instructed them to return home to conduct suicide at-
tacks in the US. By September 2009 the plan was moving into the final stages. Zazi
(who had relocated to Denver) purchased the chemicals he needed to make explo-
sives from local beauty stores and began mixing them at a hotel. However, the notes
he had taken during training were inadequate and so he sent a series of emails re-
questing help from his handler back in Pakistan – an individual known as “Ahmad.”25
Thanks to good international interagency cooperation, this proved to be the un-
doing of the plot. Ahmad had been using the same email address to communicate with
a number of other plotters from different countries, including a Pakistani national
named Abid Naseer who had been arrested in the UK in April 2009 on suspicion of
planning an attack on a shopping center. British authorities continued to monitor the
account and passed on the information to their American counterparts. As a former
minister in the British foreign office later commented, “that was the operation that led
to the initial data links to Zazi.”26 This was confirmed by FBI agent Eric Jurgenson,
who testified, “My office was in receipt – I was notified, I should say. My office was in
receipt of several email messages... Those email communications, several of them re-
solved to an individual living in Colorado.”27
International cooperation between the US, UK, Pakistan and other countries con-
tinued long after Zazi and his two accomplices were convicted. Authorities in the UK
had been unable to secure enough evidence to use against Naseer in a British court of
law. Instead, he was eventually extradited to the US to stand trial in New York and
members of the British security services testified against him, as did Zazi. As a result,
Naseer was finally prosecuted in March of 2015 – the result of almost six years’ worth
of international interagency collaboration.
24 “New York Terror Case,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 24, 2009, ac-
cessed April 27, 2015, www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/september/zazi_092409.
25 “Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al-Qaeda Plot to Attack the
United States and United Kingdom,” US Department of Justice, July 7, 2010, accessed
May 4, 2015, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/charges-unsealed-against-five-alleged-
members-al-qaeda-plot-attack-united-states-and-united.
26 Ed Pilkington and Nicholas Watt, “NSA Surveillance Played Little Role in Foiling
Terror Plots, Experts Say,” The Guardian, July 12, 2013, accessed May 4, 2015,
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/12/nsa-surveillance-data-terror-attack.
27 Pilkington and Watt, “NSA Surveillance Played Little Role.”
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)

In several countries, an interagency task force approach has worked well to in-
crease levels of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. 28 The JTTFs in the
US are an example of a way of overcoming many of the complications of inter-
agency cooperation. According to William Dyson, the terrorism task force con-
cept revolutionized the way in which the US law enforcement community ad-
dressed the problem of terrorism.29 JTTFs are small cells of highly trained local,
state, and federal law enforcement officers, intelligence analysts, linguists, and
other specialists. The first JTTF was established in New York City in 1981; the
numbers have since grown to include 104 JTTFs involving more than 4,000
members nationwide, representing more than 500 state and local organiza-
tions and 55 federal agencies.30 JTTFs are located regionally across the US, but
are nationally directed from FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC. They enable
local police to expand their role into intelligence collection and national de-
fense, and comprehensive membership allows intelligence information to be
shared effectively with a wide array of partner agencies.31 JTTFs have been in-
strumental in almost all CT investigations in the US since 9/11. Examples in-
clude dismantling terrorist cells such as the “Portland Seven,” the “Lackawanna
Six,” and the aforementioned plot led by Najibullah Zazi.32
As might be expected, due to its interagency nature the JTTF is a complex
entity. It involves the participation of a wide variety of organizations with dis-
parate cultures, jurisdictions, and expectations. According to Robert Martin, the
key to the success of the JTTF concept remains the melding of personnel from
various law enforcement and intelligence agencies into a single, focused unit.33
Referring to the above discussion on interagency cooperation, a CT task force
should at a minimum include those agencies whose core competencies are best
suited to effectively deal with terrorism. Some agencies will have CT as their
primary mission, and they should provide the bulk of resources. In the US, the
FBI is the lead agency for investigating acts of domestic terrorism and there-
fore it typically provides most assets and funds. Other key agencies typically
include major city police departments and sheriffs’ offices, federal agencies
28 Paul Schmella, “Building Effective Counterterrorism Institutions,” in Fighting Back:

What Governments Can Do About Terrorism, ed. Paul Schmella (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2011), 157.
29 William Dyson, Terrorism: An Investigator’s Handbook (New York: Elsevier, 2012),
247-51.
30 “Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” Federal
Bureau of Investigation, undated, accessed February 11, 2015, www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs.
31 Gaines and Kappeler, Homeland Security, 229–230.
32 “Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces.”
33 Robert Martin, “The Joint Terrorism Task Force: A Concept that Works,” FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, March 1999, accessed May 27, 2015, http://archive.adl.org/
learn/jttf/.
with overlapping jurisdictions, such as the Department of Homeland Security

(with responsibilities for immigration, customs, airport security, border con-
trol), the Department of State (passports, travel visas, and diplomatic security),
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.
However, the real strength of the JTTF lies in the inclusion of representa-
tives from a wide variety of agencies at different levels that may not have do-
mestic CT as their primary mission – including the armed forces, local law en-
forcement, intelligence agencies, financial institutions and the state prosecu-
tor’s office. Each of these agencies not only supplies much needed personnel,
but also provides a wide array of jurisdictional authority that can enable poten-
tial terrorists to be detected and interdicted before they mount an attack. Ex-
amples include the targeting of financial fraud, theft, tax evasion, document
fraud, and immigration violations. Experience with JTTFs has shown that there
are several elements that are critical to the long-term viability of this type of in-
teragency cooperation. Dyson identifies a list of factors that includes manage-
ment, manpower, information sharing, jurisdiction, participation, vehicle
agreements, equipment, training, arrest powers, prosecution, and access to
classified information.34 Funding arrangements and formal operational agree-
ments are also significant. Addressing these factors in a positive and profes-
sional manner has been important in establishing enduring interagency coop-
eration. Several practical issues which arise in the context of JTTFs are elabo-
rated below.
Management
For an operational task force, it will be necessary to establish a management
team that is acceptable to all participating agencies. This will typically be the
responsibility of the organization with the primary CT mission which will likely
have the largest amount of manpower and resources dedicated specifically to
dealing with this issue. As noted above, the FBI is the lead federal agency for
the investigation of acts of terrorism, and protecting the country from terrorist
attacks is its top priority. Consequently, the top management position within
each JTTF is an FBI Supervisory Special Agent. In other countries, however,
lines of authority may not be so clear, and arriving at an agreed-upon manage-
ment structure may take more time.
Participation and Manpower
Participation in any interagency cooperative effort needs to be balanced and
fair. The surest way to damage cooperation is to set up a system where some
participants have more influence and privileges than others. That is not to say
that larger agencies should not provide more manpower than smaller agencies.
Dyson recommends that all JTTF members should be assigned on a full-time
basis.35 Experience has reinforced this, as full-time investigators can dedicate
themselves fully to the CT mission, while part-time participants will continue
34 Dyson, Terrorism: An Investigator’s Handbook, 251–255.

35 Dyson, Terrorism: An Investigator’s Handbook, 247.
to be assigned duties by their home agency, making their contribution difficult

to manage effectively. It is also important that the agencies contributing per-
sonnel assign them on a long-term basis, ideally between three and five years.
Although each member of the task force maintains their own agency identity,
they operate under the direction of JTTF leadership to accomplish the CT mis-
sion. Typically, it takes a significant amount of time and expense to provide the
security clearances, jurisdictional authorizations, training, and experience
needed to function effectively in the JTTF environment. Ideally, after a three to
five year assignment to a JTTF, the participant returns to their agency as an ex-
perienced CT specialist who can continue to influence future cooperation be-
tween the participating agencies.
Information and Intelligence Sharing
The horizontal exchange of information on terrorist threats and activities has
been identified as a key strength of interagency cooperation. However, in order
to effectively exchange information there is an ongoing need to establish and
maintain trust and overcome the barriers caused by the classification of infor-
mation.36 Both the contribution and sharing of information by all JTTF mem-
bers is imperative to success. Using the JTTF as the collection point for infor-
mation from all participating agencies ensures that participants are aware of
CT-related information and operations. This also helps to deconflict potentially
competing operations by participating agencies outside of the JTTF environ-
ment.
Because JTTFs deal with international terrorism issues, they often utilize
national security information. Access to such information usually requires a se-
curity clearance not typically held by local and state participating agencies.
Within the JTTF, all members are required to hold a security clearance.
Providing the resources to obtain and maintain clearances for those partici-
pants outside of the federal government is typically the responsibility of the
FBI. As all full-time JTTF participants have the same security clearances, they
have the same access to information and facilities. Participants not only have
the same access, but are held to the same standards of trust and responsibility
in dealing with such information. The FBI also provides security clearances for
executive managers of participating agencies, as needed, in order to ensure that
information available to JTTF participants can also be shared with the
leadership of the respective organizations. This is intended to address a key
concern of participating agencies – that information and intelligence developed
within the JTTF is appropriately distributed outside of the structure as well.
Resources
CT is a complex effort that requires a significant commitment in personnel and
equipment. At a minimum, operations require sufficient office space, communi-
cations equipment, computers, vehicles, surveillance equipment, and both
36 Prezelj, “Improving Inter-Organizational Cooperation in International Terrorism,”

218.
basic and advanced training. Some agencies will have greater budgets to pro-
vide such resources than others. However, it is important to interagency coop-
eration that all participants have access to what they need to do their job. For
the JTTF, the FBI provides office space, computers, communications equip-
ment, and vehicles to ensure consistency of access and operations. Specialized
training in such areas as terrorist tactics, surveillance, intelligence gathering,
evidence collection, weapons of mass destruction, etc. is provided to partici-
pating members. The FBI typically coordinates specialized CT training for JTTF
members through partner intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Training
is the key to making JTTF participants CT specialists – skills which are then
taken back to their home agencies at the completion of their assignment.
Arrest Powers and Prosecution
In the US, arrest powers and prosecution vary among local, state, and federal
police agencies and prosecutor offices. Within the JTTF, all participants are
deputized as federal agents to ensure uniform arrest powers for those investi-
gations involving violations of federal law. However, the strength of the JTTF is
that it is not limited to federal law, but can also use local and state powers of
arrest and prosecution as needed to disrupt potential or actual terrorists. The
most important aspect of this category is uniformity of authority. It is opera-
tionally complex, and a potential liability, to have participants in a task force
environment with limited jurisdictional authorities.
Memorandums of Understanding
Interagency cooperation can be informal and ad hoc, or else formal and bound
by a signed document, often known as a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU). The MOU may be a contract used to set forth the basic principles and
guidelines under which the parties will work together to accomplish their
goals.37 JTTFs utilize a nationally prepared but locally executed MOU outlining
issues such as management, manpower, information sharing and clearances,
resources, jurisdictional authorities, and participant expectations. The MOU
clearly establishes responsibilities and sets rules and expectations for partici-
pation and performance.
Motivation
Experience has shown that motivation is not typically an issue within the JTTF.
Participants are hand-selected by their agencies and often compete for the one
or two available slots. They view membership in the JTTF as important to coun-
tering acts of terrorism within their region and see the accompanying training
and operational experience as having a positive impact on their careers. Man-
agers of the JTTF need to take the issue of motivation seriously, as it will be
imperative to long-term success. If the mission is deemed important, and the
37 “Memorandum of Understanding: Law and Legal Definition,” US Legal.com, undated,

accessed January 15, 2015, http://definitions.uslegal.com/m/memorandum-of-
understanding/.
JTTF experience is perceived as a positive aspect of the participant’s career, fu-

ture candidates will continue to be of the highest caliber. The positive efforts of
JTTF participants need to be regularly shared with executives in their home
agencies. However, if participants are not properly motivated, or view the as-
signment in a negative light, they can have a demoralizing effect on the other
members and damage long-term cooperation.
State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

As noted above, in the aftermath of 9/11 there was significant concern that the
lack of information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence agencies
exacerbated the risk of additional attacks. As reviews of the events surrounding
9/11 were undertaken, it became clear that numerous actual and perceived
barriers to information sharing existed at the local, state, federal, and private
levels, which were made worse by the pervasive commitment within the intel-
ligence community to the “need to know” principle. As a means of addressing
such concerns in the US, Fusion Centers (FCs) were introduced. These operate
at a local, regional, or state level and are able to draw upon a wide variety of
federal, state and local resources.38
FCs are defined as a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that pro-
vide resources, expertise, and information with the goal of maximizing the
ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist ac-
tivity.39 According to the National Preparedness Report, FCs are focal points
within the state and local environment for the receipt, gathering, analysis, and
sharing of threat-related information between federal, state, and local govern-
ments, as well as private sector partners.40 They are intended to position law
enforcement, public safety, emergency management, fire services, health, criti-
cal infrastructure protection, and private sector security personnel to under-
stand the local implications of national intelligence. As of 2013, there were 78
FCs in the US national network, up from 40 in 2007.41
38 Eric Rosenbach and Aki J. Peritz, “State and Local Fusion Centers,” Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs and Harvard Kennedy School, July 2009, accessed
January 15, 2015, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/state-local-fusion.pdf.
39 “Fusion Center Guidelines - Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a
New Era,” United States Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice,
2006, accessed January 15, 2015, https://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_
guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf.
40 “National Preparedness Report 2014,” United States Department of Homeland
Security, March 2014, accessed January 15, 2015, www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1409688068371-d71247cabc52a55de78305a4462d0e1a/2014%20NPR_
FINAL_082914_508v11.pdf.
41 Michael T. McCaulin and Peter T. King, “Majority Staff Report on the National
Network of Fusion Centers,” United States House of Representatives Committee on
Homeland Security, July 2013, accessed April 27, 2015, http://homeland.house.gov/
sites/homeland.house.gov/files/documents/CHS SLFC Report 2013 FINAL.pdf.
The US FC concept was developed during a time of heightened national

threat perception. Consequently, FCs were able to take advantage of federal
funding in the form of DHS grants. Being relatively new, FCs are still dealing
with a number of issues that illustrate many of the complexities and challenges
of interagency cooperation. These include differing agency mission perspec-
tives, continuing gaps in intelligence and information sharing, disparities in the
level of security clearances, the retention of high-quality personnel, and uncer-
tainties regarding sustainable funding.42 Moreover, FCs have received signifi-
cant criticism – in particular for producing low-quality intelligence and inter-
fering with civil liberties.43 Thus, although progress has been made, they serve
to highlight some of the difficulties involved in organizational reform aimed at
improving interagency coordination.
Still, in many states and localities, FCs serve a critical federal, state, local,
and regional information sharing and analytic function and are considered to
be a force multiplier in understanding local and regional threats in a more ho-
listic way.44 Collaboration has also been established between FCs and JTTFs.45
FCs collect local and regional information, including suspicious activity reports,
from a wide variety of local, state and private agencies and organizations,
which is then shared with the JTTF for subsequent investigation. In turn, JTTFs
work with FCs on analyses, distribution of threat information, and recommen-
dations for protective measures or preventative actions.
Conclusion and Recommendations

This chapter argues that a key factor in improving the efficiency and effective-
ness of CT is strong interagency cooperation. This is a complex horizontal pro-
cess that connects all the relevant governmental and non-governmental actors
in a multi-level network. Effective interagency cooperation requires breaking
down what are often formidable barriers that can be based in law, institutional
cultures, organizational structures, jurisdictional responsibilities, inter-de-
partmental competition and a lack of trust. The recommendations outlined be-
low are intended for CT policy makers and practitioners in any country or se-
curity environment who are seeking to establish or improve interagency coop-
eration:
42 Mike Sena, “The National Preparedness Report: Assessing the State of Preparedness,”
Statement to the Homeland Security Committee, June 6, 2012, accessed January 15,
2015, http://homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Sena.pdf.
43 Jason Barnosky, “Fusion Centers: What's Working and What Isn’t,” Brookings, March
17, 2015, accessed April 29, 2015, www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/
03/17-fusion-centers-barnosky.
44 McCaulin and King, Report on National Network of Fusion Centers.
45 “Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” Department of Homeland Security,
accessed January 15, 2015, www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-joint-terrorism-task-
forces.
x Understand that the value of interagency cooperation in CT is not self-

evident and should not be taken for granted. The process needs to be
actively encouraged, agencies motivated and people educated. Leader-
ship plays a key role in this.
x Develop interagency trust before terrorism strikes. This can be done
through interagency exercises and simulations.
x Practice makes perfect. Develop joint CT plans and test them together
through exercises. Organizations that do not practice working together
will be unable to do so effectively when it matters.
x Sign interagency MOUs where all conditions of cooperation will be
agreed and defined.
x In interagency bodies, establish a management team that is acceptable
for all participating agencies. Take into account the fact that organiza-
tions will differ according to their lead or supporting role.
x Assign representatives to interagency bodies on a long-term basis and
ensure that they are able to fully integrate into these organizations
while still retaining their own agency identity.
x Build a CT knowledge network where all participating agencies share
information (intelligence, experiences, etc.) and appreciate the long-
term positive consequences. Knowledge in these networks should be
concentrated around common problems and interests.
x Ensure that positive feedback is given to participating agencies in joint
endeavors. For example, the leaders of those agencies providing per-
sonnel and resources need to see results of their investment, especially
in the area of information and intelligence sharing. The degree of par-
ticipation by agencies will never be entirely equal, but all organizations
should feel that their contribution is important. Beware of ‘free-riders’
that might undermine the motivation for participation on the part of
more active agencies.
x Take care to ensure interagency organizational learning after exercises
and joint operations. Joint debriefings and the implementation of find-
ings in practice are essential for improving interagency cooperation in
the future.
From the above list of recommendations, it should be evident that building
trust is one of the most fundamental and yet formidable tasks in interagency
cooperation. Effective inter-organizational working chemistry requires the ex-
istence of mutual trust. Organizations and individuals have to be able to rely on
each other and this requires a relationship based on frankness and honesty.
Both the benefits and limitations of inter-organizational trust come to light
during the process of information sharing. Organizations that do not have mu-
tual faith in one another will simply not exchange a sufficient quantity or qual-
ity of information. Moreover, trust built over many years can also be lost if it is
betrayed. Interagency cooperation, like marriage, requires constant work. It is
not sufficient to simply create new, bureaucratic structures and assume that
they will solve the problem. If we are to truly achieve our potential in counter-
ing terrorism—both nationally and internationally—we must recognize that
effective cooperation remains a work in progress and needs long-term commit-
ment.
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Chapter 16
A Comprehensive Strategy for
Combating Terrorism
Joseph B. King
Introduction
Terrorism is a deadly problem with a long history. From the earliest accounts
of the Zealots-Sicarii in Jerusalem in the first century 1 to the violent atrocities
of the ‘Islamic State,’ al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram in current times, terrorism
has remained a perennial scourge. Many have tried to eliminate the threat of
terrorism, but always with mixed and incomplete results. The main reason for
this discouraging record is that terrorism is ultimately a tactic used by individ-
uals and groups who want to force political change by means of violence
against non-combatants. One cannot completely eradicate terrorism any more
than one can stop murder, suicide, or theft. Therefore, counter-terrorism (CT)
strategies are considered successful only to the extent that they reduce the
incidence of terrorism to some manageable level.
The elusive characterization of terrorism also complicates the development
of comprehensive CT strategies. Insurgents frequently employ acts of terrorism
against civilians, while also conducting guerrilla warfare against state security
forces. For this reason, many CT strategies necessarily include elements of
counterinsurgency. Additionally, some view terrorism as a form of warfare
while others consider it an extreme form of criminal activity. President George
W. Bush’s declaration of the “Global War on Terror” is the starkest example of
the former approach and one that immediately attracted criticism that it would
be no more conclusive than a “war on drugs” or a “war on poverty.” 2 There are
few absolutes and no magic solutions in CT. Sadly, history provides many ex-
amples of misguided CT strategies and relatively few success stories. Nonethe-
less, most effective strategies recognize terrorism as a complex political and
social phenomenon and use a wide range of tools that are selectively targeted
against specific threats.
1 James J.F. Forrest, The Terrorism Lectures: A Comprehensive Collection for. Students of
Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and National Security (Santa Anna, CA: Nortia Press,
2012), 26.
2 Mark A.R. Kleiman, Peter Reuter, and Jonathan P. Caulkins, “The ‘War on Terror’ and
the ‘War on Drugs’: A Comparison,” Federation of American Scientists Public Interest
Report 55, no. 2 (2002): 3-5, accessed April 5, 2015, http://fas.org/faspir/2002/
v55n2/waron.htm.
253 DOI: 10.11610/ctt.ch16

254 Joseph B. King
Terrorism is increasingly transnational in nature. This characteristic de-

mands a ‘home game’ and an ‘away game,’ as well as extensive international
cooperation.3 Good CT strategy requires simultaneous offense, defense, and
consequence management. It is only as good as the organizations, people, and
procedures used to implement it. Security remains a fundamental responsibil-
ity of the state, and therefore CT strategy is a necessary, albeit imperfect, en-
deavor.
Elements of Strategy
CT strategy shares three essential elements with all other forms of strategy:
ends, ways, and means. The ends are the essential aims of the strategy; what
does it seek to achieve? The ways are the tools and methods employed; how will
the end be achieved? The means are the resources required to employ the ways;
what personnel, materiel, and funds are required to achieve the ends? Good strat-
egy should always start by defining the end, but that end must be tempered by
the ways and means at the disposal of the state. In this manner, strategy-
building is an iterative process; a dynamic equation developed by the constant
interplay of ends, ways, and means. Like other forms of strategy, CT strategy
must at once have a long view as well situational adaptability, i.e. interacting
elements of continuity and agility.
Attributes of a Good CT Strategist

In order to visualize this interplay between ends, ways, and means, a good
strategist must be both a creative and a critical thinker. It is rare that individu-
als possess both these attributes and very few people have the necessary ex-
pertise in all of the realms of CT to be able to formulate a good strategy on their
own. Nonetheless, just as collaboration contributes to diversity of thought,
group effort also requires focus and leadership to produce a coherent product.
Terrorists are imaginative in plotting their attacks. CT professionals need to
be just as creative. Creative thinking involves considering the entire spectrum
of the problem—from root causes to the aftermath of an attack—to envision
the tools that may be applied to prevent, protect, respond, and recover. Often
creativity applies to the creation of new security structures, novel concepts of
interagency coordination, clever methods of tracing terrorist financing, or even
the recruitment of new actors and media to counter radicalization.
Even the most imaginative plans have to be able to work in practice. Good
strategists are also critical thinkers who test hypotheses, measure results, and
challenge assumptions. These aspects of critical thinking in CT strategy devel-
opment require the constant revision of ends, ways, and means. Are the bene-
fits worth the costs? Does a particular course of action generate unforeseen
negative consequences? Is the strategy sustainable? As strategy formulation is
3 Richard A. Posner, Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps (Plymouth, UK:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 205.
A Comprehensive Strategy for Combating Terrorism 255
a human endeavor, it will inevitably be flawed. A critically thinking strategist

will uncover those flaws and make necessary adjustments.
Ends: Determining the Objective

Starting with the first of the three essential elements of strategy, the CT strate-
gist must determine the ends. What does the strategy seek to achieve? Some
strategies codify the ends in both negative and positive terms – almost in a
formulaic structure.4 The ‘negative’ part of the formula addresses terrorism it-
self and uses verbs like prevent, reduce, and eliminate. The ‘positive’ part of the
formula describes the better society or condition that the CT effort hopes to
achieve and usually begins with a transition such as “in order to…” This state-
ment of ends must be clear and concise. It serves to guide subsequent strategy
development and without clear guidance it is easy to become lost. As the
renowned British author Lewis Carroll wrote in Alice in Wonderland, “If you
don’t know where you are going, any road will get you there.”
In developing the ends for CT strategy, it is helpful to carefully select verbs
to deliberately quantify the intended effect against terrorism. Some CT strate-
gies take an aspirational approach and use more absolute terms, such as elimi-
nate, to imply eventual progress toward the complete eradication of terrorism.
Other strategies use more relative terms, such as reduce, to acknowledge the
futility of attempting to completely eliminate a particular tactic of violence.
Both methods are viable, although the relative verbs may be more realistic.
Even the term reduce implies an understood, although perhaps not initially de-
scribed, threshold of threat reduction.
The second, ‘positive’ part of the formula addresses why terrorism should
be countered. It qualifies a better world in the absence or the reduced occur-
rence of terrorism. This section will usually cite such goals as the protection of
citizens, territory and sovereign interests of the state. Many CT strategists will
extend this to include a broader vision of a peaceful, secure and prosperous so-
ciety. Others will add an additional qualifier by noting that the ends will be
achieved in a manner consistent with the state’s laws and values. By way of ex-
ample, Case Study 16.1 lists the end-statements contained within the CT strat-
egies of the UK, Australia, Canada and Sweden, along with the ways in which
the states will try to achieve them.
Ways: Points of Interdiction – “Left and Right of Boom”

One useful method for building CT strategy is to envision the various points of
possible intervention. As already noted, terrorism cannot be completely eradi-
cated. In spite of the best efforts and committed resources of states and socie-
ties, terrorist acts will still occur. Imagine then, a timeline with a terrorist act
4 HM Government, Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism

(2011), 3, accessed April 5, 2015, www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/97994/contest-summary.pdf.
256 Joseph B. King
Case Study 16.1. Examples of CT Strategy Ends and Ways.

The CT Strategy ends of the UK, Australia, Canada and Sweden are listed below. The
ways are then compared in Table 16.1 below. Note that each country describes their
ends and ways in quite similar terms. Sweden uses just three “pillars” (Prevent, Pur-
sue, Prepare) to organize its CT strategy while the others use four. Nevertheless, each
strategy covers a broadly comparable range of activities, albeit with differing empha-
ses and levels of resources invested.
x United Kingdom:5 To reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from ter-
rorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.
x Australia:6 To protect Australia, its people and interests from terrorism.
x Canada:7 To counter domestic and international terrorism in order to protect
Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests.
x Sweden:8 To prevent the emergence of terrorism, pursue terrorist attacks and
prepare for the eventuality of a terrorist attack occurring nevertheless.
Table 16.1. The CT Strategy ‘Ways’ of the UK, Australia, Canada and Sweden.
UK Australia Canada Sweden Focus of Effort

Prevent Resilience Prevent Prevent Counter-radicalization
Pursue Analysis Protect Pursue Proactive investigation
Protect Protection Deny Target hardening
Prepare
Prepare Response Respond Contingency planning
somewhere in the middle. This timeline will delineate three key phases for CT
interdiction: before, during, and after the attack. This visualization is sometimes
called “left and right of boom.” The timeline only depicts a single, discrete
attack although it illuminates the full spectrum of activities that must be con-
sidered in an effective CT strategy.
The ‘before’ phase is the most crucial and must include all of those measures
to prevent attacks and to prepare defenses against attacks if they happen.
Prevention is of course preferable to response. However, the ‘before’ phase
is complicated. It is the realm of so-called “root causes” and addresses topics
5 HM Government, Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 3,

6.
6 Australian Government, Counter-Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia - Protect-
ing Our Community (2010), i, iii, accessed April 5, 2015, www.dsto.defence.gov.au/
sites/default/files/basic_pages/documents/counter-terrorism-white-paper.pdf.
7 Government of Canada, Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-
Terrorism Strategy (2013), 10, 14, accessed April 5, 2015, www.publicsafety.gc.ca/
cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm-eng.pdf.
8 Government Offices of Sweden, Sweden’s National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Gov-
ernment Communication 2011/12:73 (Stockholm: Ministry of Justice, 2011), 1, ac-
cessed September 25, 2015, www.government.se/legal-documents/2012/06/skr.-
20111273/.
such as education, socio-economic opportunity, immigration policy, political

representation of minorities, and other often difficult societal factors which
may create the preconditions for terrorism.9 In this respect, prevention is the
least appropriate area for the armed forces or law enforcement agencies. On
the other hand, preparation must also occur in the ‘before’ phase and does re-
quire a greater role for the security forces. Preparation includes the defensive
hardening of potential terrorist targets; forming, training, and equipping CT
forces; community policing; and the collection and analysis of intelligence.
Comprehensive and visible preparation measures also reinforce prevention by
creating a deterrent for would-be terrorists.
When the inevitable terrorist attack does occur, CT strategy must consider
those actions to limit further violence, contain the effects of the attack, share
information, and capture or kill the perpetrators. The organizations, equip-
ment, tactics, and procedures essential for effectively dealing with an ongoing
terrorist incident must be developed and practiced in the ‘before’ phase. Crisis
management and emergency response are easily perishable sets of operational
skills and must be exercised regularly.10 Good CT strategy anticipates the need
for these capacities and provides appropriate resources within the available
means.
Finally, CT professionals need to consider the recovery phase after the at-
tack. Terrorism has physical and psychological effects, and both must be mini-
mized in the ‘after’ phase. Resilience is a key concept that encompasses many
of the requirements of recovery. Societies and states must be structured to be
able to absorb the shock of an attack.11 Terrorists generally intend to use fear
more than destruction to influence political change. They want to garner sym-
pathy for their cause by provoking states to overreact in a heavy-handed man-
ner. They also seek to create psychological shock to disrupt economies. Resili-
ent societies are ones that can return to normal, with heightened vigilance, as
soon as possible without bending to terrorists’ demands. This requires the re-
dundancy of key systems, a culture of institutional learning, an expectation of
justice, a high degree of state legitimacy, and a sense of enduring values that
cannot be shaken by adversity – all qualities that must be generated before an
attack takes place.
Ways: Points of Interdiction and the Anatomy of Terrorism

A second helpful way to visualize the possible points for CT interdiction is to
consider the essential components of terrorism. Esteemed terrorism expert
9 Forrest, The Terrorism Lectures, 62-67.

10 John L. Clarke, “Managing Counterterrorism Crises,” in Toward a Grand Strategy
Against Terrorism, ed. Christopher C. Harmon, Andrew N. Pratt, and Sebastian Gorka
(New York: McGraw Hill, 2011), 308-9.
11 Jean-Paul Raffenne and Jean-Francois Clair, “The French Counterterrorism System,”
in Toward a Grand Strategy Against Terrorism, ed. Christopher C. Harmon, Andrew N.
Pratt, and Sebastian Gorka (New York: McGraw Hill, 2011), 356.
258 Joseph B. King
Brian Jenkins famously noted that “terrorism is theater.”12 This analogy high-
lights that terrorism consists not only of an actor, an act, and a victim, but also
of a message, an audience, and an environment. All of these elements are inter-
connected and can serve as potential lines of effort for the CT strategist.
Regarding the actor – the state should focus resources on stopping known
terrorists, either by capturing or killing them. Additional effort should be spent
to identify and track suspected terrorists. Moreover, CT strategies should in-
clude measures to examine the message or grievances of terrorists to address
the environment that may engender radicalization. Careful study of the in-
tended audiences of terrorist acts may reveal ways to counter and discredit the
distorted narratives of extremist groups. Potential victims or targets of terror-
ist violence should be prioritized and protected. Finally, examination of the
particulars of the act itself, or the various tactics of terrorism, may suggest
ways to isolate terrorists from the means used to conduct their attacks.
Some have used Clausewitz’s concept of enemy ‘centers of gravity’ to or-
ganize ways for CT strategy. Paul Shemella suggests that more points of inter-
diction may be uncovered by examining the terrorists’ legitimacy, funding,
training, weapons, mobility, communications, leadership, unit cohesion, sanctu-
ary, and ideology.13
Ways: The CT Toolbox

One way to consider the tools available to build a comprehensive CT strategy is
to list broad state functions and relevant societal institutions. Various combina-
tions of these elements have been collectively labeled “instruments of national
power,” but this grouping (traditionally including diplomacy, information, mili-
tary, and economy) is not expansive enough to cover the full range within the
CT toolbox. A more complete listing includes intelligence, legislature, judiciary,
law enforcement, and civil society. Some states have ministries solely dedicated
to these roles. Other states organizationally share functions across agencies. 14
Finally, some elements such as information, economy, and civil society may be
influenced by governments, but are ultimately outside of strict state control in
democratic countries with free-market economies. With such complications in
mind, each of the primary tools of CT are briefly discussed in the next section.
Diplomacy
The transnational nature of modern terrorism demands international CT coop-
eration. At the high end, diplomacy allows for globally recognized international
action, such as United Nations Security Council Resolutions. At the bilateral
12 Brian Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare,” The RAND Paper
Series P-5261 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1974), 6.
13 Paul Shemella, “Tools and Strategies for Combating Terrorism,” in Fighting Back:
What Governments Can Do About Terrorism, ed. Paul Shemella (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2011), 137-9.
14 Shemella, “Building Effective Counterterrorism Institutions,” 155-7.
level, diplomats may develop CT extradition treaties between states. Under the
right circumstances, diplomats may coordinate negotiations to disarm and de-
mobilize former extremist groups.
Information
This includes terrorist propaganda, state provided public information, and the
media. With the advent of the Internet and 24 hour news coverage, information
is ubiquitous although not always accurate or complete. Both terrorists and
states compete in this domain to dominate narratives and counter-narratives.
As Margaret Thatcher famously noted, “publicity is the oxygen of terrorism,”
but information can also be a powerful CT tool.
Military
The armed forces of states have a very visible and essential role in CT from
high-end special operations to support for the police. Deployment of the mili-
tary in these roles demonstrates state commitment, although over-reliance on
the military can feed into terrorist narratives of occupation and oppression.
When using armed forces in CT roles, precision is more important than mass,
and thoughtful employment is more important than deployment.
Economy
The economy can be a tool for CT just as it can be a target for terrorists. Ter-
rorists also require resources and funding and, as a result, tracking their finan-
cial transactions has proven to be an effective way to uncover and thwart their
activities. Economic sanctions have a mixed record of influencing the behavior
of state sponsors of terrorism, but they remain a viable CT tool when used in
conjunction with other instruments.
Intelligence
Good intelligence is a must for targeted CT operations and for preventing ter-
rorism before it manifests itself in violence. Many terrorist organizations are
small and rely on clandestine operations to avoid detection. Intelligence must
be collected and analyzed in a timely manner if it is to be useful. More im-
portantly, actionable intelligence must be disseminated to security forces and
declassified at some level to protect and inform the public.
Legislature
States hold the moral high ground in the CT fight so long as they operate within
the law. Therefore, it is incumbent upon parliaments to pass laws that crimi-
nalize terrorist behavior and authorize effective CT measures. At the same
time, a balance must be struck between security and civil liberties. The legal
framework is an essential part of legitimizing the CT effort. Additionally, legis-
latures typically hold the purse strings of the state, so they are responsible for
resourcing the CT strategy.
260 Joseph B. King
Judiciary
Also profoundly important to state legitimacy, an independent judiciary is es-
sential to try terrorists and apply appropriate penalties to those convicted.
Terrorism cases often involve classified intelligence that increasingly must be
used as evidence. For this reason, some states have adopted special courts for
terrorism cases that involve closed hearings and security-cleared judges and
attorneys. This can be an effective compromise, however all courts must main-
tain some degree of transparency to maintain due process and requisite legiti-
macy.
Law Enforcement
Police forces are typically the most visible and locally connected organs of state
security. As such they must earn and maintain the trust and confidence of the
people they serve and are often the first line of defense in cases of domestic
terrorism. Police officials must enforce the CT laws enacted by the legislature
and cooperate with the judiciary to investigate and aid the prosecution of sus-
pected terrorists. Law enforcement officials are among the first responders
during and immediately after a terrorist attack.
Civil Society
This consists of non-governmental organizations, academic and research insti-
tutions, religious groups, and the private sector. Civil society is a loosely de-
fined and diverse grouping of social activity beyond the control of the state.
Civil society organizations work in the social space where people live. This
gives them great insight and credibility in dealing with the social ills that may
create the preconditions for extremism. States can multiply their reach and ef-
fect by cooperating with civil society in CT.
Importantly, each of the above elements of national power frequently inter-
act and overlap with one another, and are most effective when they are com-
bined together within the framework of a comprehensive and coordinated
strategy (see Case Study 16.2 for an example of different CT tools combined).
Means: Resourcing the Strategy

Means can be the cold reality that reins in the ambition of strategy. It is also
one of the primary determinants of capacity. A state may have necessary CT
capabilities, but means may dictate whether the country has enough capacity to
achieve its ends. Comprehensive CT strategies will require material and per-
sonnel resources (which all cost money) and political will. Resourcing is all
about priorities, choices, and trade-offs. Political leaders have to decide how
much time, energy, manpower, and money to expend on CT efforts. In demo-
cratic societies, those choices will need to be backed up by popular support in
order to be sustainable.
Case Study 16.2. “Bayanihan”: The Armed Forces of the Philippines

Internal Peace and Security Plan (AFP-IPSP).15
For decades the Philippines has been plagued by various terrorist and insurgent
groups. These include the Communist New People’s Army (NPA), the Muslim sepa-
ratist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF), the jihadist Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). By 2010, it
was apparent that the AFP, which had taken the lead in operations against these
groups, had failed to defeat them. Moreover, the military was accused of human rights
abuses, which limited public support for the government in regions affected by the vi-
olence.
President Benigno Aquino Ш, elected in June 2010, tasked the AFP with devising a
new “whole of society” CT strategy. Consequently, the AFP-IPSP was launched in 2011
with a target completion date of 2016. This strategy acknowledged that a purely mili-
tary solution to internal conflict in the Philippines was not possible and instead
sought a complementary and concerted effort from all government and civil society
stakeholders. The overall strategic objectives are to create a situation where internal
armed threats are reduced to a level where they can no longer threaten the stability of
the state, and civil authorities can take over responsibility for public safety and well-
being from the AFP in conflict zones.
The use of the traditional Filipino term “bayanihan” (meaning “working together”
or “community effort”) aptly reflects the inclusive theme of the strategy. Although ini-
tially led by the AFP, the IPSP has put equal emphasis on the combat and non-combat
dimensions of all operations. It contains elements that address governance, delivery
of basic services, economic reconstruction, sustainable development and security sec-
tor reform. The IPSP actively seeks contributions from every government agency, as
well as civil society organizations and local communities. Each of these components is
viewed as vital to ensure success, not least because the main insurgencies have com-
plex roots encompassing political and socio-economic dimensions. The IPSP pre-
scribes different, targeted solutions for dealing with each armed group. This involves
negotiated settlements with the NPA and Muslim separatist groups, while pursuing
the uncompromising defeat of jihadist terrorists.
The AFP-IPSP is an ambitious strategy, especially given the timeframe for its com-
pletion. To date, there have been significant successes including a peace agreement
with the MILF, a much improved military human rights record and a reduction in the
number of provinces that suffer from insurgent and terrorist attacks. However, con-
siderable challenges remain. For example, the NPA is still committed to violence and
peace talks with government officials in 2014 made little progress. Meanwhile, the
ASG remains a small, yet persistent criminal-terrorist threat.
CT strategies will compete for finite material resources against other na-
tional priorities, which may have stronger public support. In this regard, all na-
15 The AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan, accessed November 23, 2015,
http://www.army.mil.ph/ATR_Website/pdf_files/IPSP/IPSP%20Bayanihan.pdf; and
Internal Peace & Security Plan – “Bayanihan,” briefing by General (Ret.) Emmanuel T.
Bautista, Chief of Staff AFP at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies, July 2015.
262 Joseph B. King
tional strategies are interdependent and a CT strategist will have to be mindful

of the cost of his or her strategy in terms of other security efforts and, more
broadly, in terms of public economic and social welfare programs. This is the
classic “guns vs. butter” trade-off that stacks security against things like public
infrastructure, health care, and pensions. Comprehensive CT strategies have
one advantage in this competition because many of the “left of boom” CT efforts
also serve broader public goals. Better education, increased socio-economic
opportunity, and enhanced youth programs are good for social stability and
prosperity, while they may also prevent radicalization in support of CT.
The best CT strategy cannot be implemented without decisive leadership.
Political will is an indispensable factor. While material resources are always fi-
nite, courageous and visionary leaders can generate public support for a well-
considered CT strategy if they clearly articulate the threat and the steps to
counter it. Political leadership is also necessary to manage large government
bureaucracies that will ultimately consist of winners and losers in the competi-
tion for resources.16 In democracies, leaders must effectively communicate
their strategies to convince the taxpayers of the necessity of expenditure on CT
and settle the political and social controversies that may arise from these poli-
cies.
Risk Assessment
Prioritization is essential when dealing with finite resources. This can be diffi-
cult for CT strategists because of the wide array of potential terrorist threats.
The task is further complicated by the emotionally evocative nature of terror-
ism. There is a tendency—and one that terrorists count on—to exaggerate the
threat; to be alarmist rather than rational. To avoid this pitfall and to commit
resources to the most dangerous and the most likely threats first, governments
must develop a logical process of risk assessment.
Risk assessment is not an exact science, but neither is it black magic. The in-
surance industry does it routinely, developing actuary tables that predict the
probability and consequence of various catastrophes, including terrorism. CT
strategists and policy makers must also consider the less quantifiable psycho-
logical impacts of terrorism as part of risk. Pundits are quick to note that more
Americans die from car accidents than from terrorist attacks, although this is
hardly reassuring to a public reeling from the shock of a mass casualty terrorist
incident.
The most basic form of risk assessment involves the correlation of likelihood
and impact. The risk-assessment table depicted in Figure 16.1 is an example of
a relatively straightforward way to approach this, using numerical values to
denote priorities (with 1 being the highest).
16 Lawrence E. Cline, “Interagency Decision Making,” in Fighting Back: What Govern-

ments Can Do About Terrorism, ed. Paul Shemella (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2011), 163-64.
IMPACT
Negligible Minor Major Critical Catastrophic
Very likely 4 3 2 1 1
Likely 5 4 3 2 1
LIKELIHOOD
Unlikely 6 5 4 3 2
Very
unlikely 7 6 5 4 3
Figure 16.1: A Basic Risk-Assessment Matrix.
In simple terms, likelihood is the chance that a specific type of terrorist inci-
dent will occur. Impact is the damage (physical, psychological, and economic)
that the terrorist incident will create. There are some threats that are less
probable (for example the terrorist use of a nuclear weapon) but would be cat-
astrophic in their effects. Other threats are far more likely, such as terrorist use
of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, but are likely to be far less con-
sequential in terms of casualties. The goal of this process is to identify those
threats that are most likely and most consequential and prioritize resources
against them. The sad fact is that states cannot afford to counter every possible
terrorist threat; therefore risk assessment becomes a crucial step in CT strat-
egy development.
Interagency Collaboration
A CT strategy that employs all of the tools of national power requires a mecha-
nism for collaboration between various governmental agencies. One of the
most tragic, yet frequent, discoveries after a terrorist attack is that the incident
could have been prevented if different ministries had shared information and
sorted out their roles in advance. This sad and all-too-common phenomenon is
the result of what is known as ‘stove piping’ whereby each agency has a sepa-
rate and protected lane of responsibility.17 Many times the reasons for stove
piping are well-intentioned. For example, firewalls are established between the
military and police, the intelligence agencies and the courts, or domestic and
foreign security services to protect civil liberties and safeguard classified in-
formation.18 These admirable goals can be obstacles to the types of collabora-
tion essential for effective CT operations unless they are carefully managed.
17 Posner, Countering Terrorism, 33-69.

18 Cline, Interagency Collaboration, 165.
264 Joseph B. King
The most basic form of collaboration is interagency communication. None-

theless, even this task can be difficult. The first challenge is bureaucratic. Agen-
cies have an institutional tendency to centralize key information. A second
challenge is technical. Often different ministries have separate and incompati-
ble information technology systems. A third challenge is classification. For ex-
ample, an intelligence agency may be concerned that sharing key information
with prosecutors may lead to the exposure of sensitive sources and methods in
open court. In addition, different agencies often have very different organiza-
tional cultures and operating procedures, which make it difficult for them to
understand one another.
The next level of collaboration is interagency coordination. This requires not
only the sharing of information, but also awareness of each agency’s activities
to prevent unwanted interference and to ensure that there are no gaps or
excessive overlaps in the broader CT effort. An example of interagency coordi-
nation might be delaying the arrest of a narco-trafficker by a counter-drug
agency until an intelligence ministry can determine the suspect’s links to ter-
rorist financing.
The highest level of collaboration is interagency cooperation. This entails
both communication and coordination, but also involves combined effort
among agencies whereby personnel, resources, and information are shared for
joint CT operations. As difficult as each of these levels of collaboration may be,
there are various techniques for making it all work (for more on this, see Chap-
ter 15).
One of the most rudimentary models for interagency collaboration is the use
of liaison officers. This method involves embedding an official or team of offi-
cials from another agency within the headquarters or a specific department of
the hosting agency. Successful liaisons rest upon the selection of the right peo-
ple, adequate access to the hosting agency, secure communications links be-
tween the liaison and his or her home organization, delegation of appropriate
authority to the liaison from the sending agency, and leadership support from
both organizations. Actual liaisons involving co-location of outside officials
within a hosting agency are far more effective than virtual liaisons, although
modern communications can enable this as a cheaper option.
A second technique for interagency collaboration is the establishment of
joint task forces (JTFs). In this case groups of officials and even subordinate
units are assigned to a combined organization with the authority to work to-
gether toward a common task. JTFs work best when they are established by a
higher authority, are co-located, are jointly and equitably funded, and are led
by a clearly designated joint commander. The advantage of JTFs is unity of ef-
fort and speed of action. The disadvantage is that they drain resources from the
contributing agencies. Common examples of JTFs are intelligence fusion cen-
ters.19 These cells are limited, however, in that they are sometimes separate
from the operational agencies that might act on their information.
There are various combinations of the two broadly described interagency
collaboration models. Practice has shown that formal agreements work better
than ad hoc arrangements. Effective collaboration usually requires a legal
framework and political leadership emphasis. The bedrock of all good inter-
agency collaboration is trust, shared work, shared credit, and shared accounta-
bility.
International Cooperation
Transnational terrorism may be thought of as a form of deviant globalization.
The ease of transcontinental air travel, the spread of global telecommunica-
tions and information technology, and the interconnectedness of international
markets have allowed terrorists to move more freely and achieve greater reach
and influence. For these reasons, interagency CT collaboration at the national
level is not enough. Regional cooperation is a start, especially when states
share borders, but a global effort is required to counter a truly transnational
threat.20
All of the challenges at the national level related to interagency collabora-
tion also apply in the international arena. In many ways these difficulties are
magnified at the interstate level. In spite of the advance of globalization, state
sovereignty is still the prominent feature of the international system. 21 To
cooperate internationally requires states to yield portions of their sovereignty.
Nonetheless, where national interests converge, some states have found the
benefit to be worth the cost. Examples of international collaboration in CT in-
clude information sharing (although countries are very selective in what they
share and with whom they share it), border coordination, and even combined
military efforts. Good CT strategy acknowledges the need for partners in the CT
effort, particularly for overseas operations, and recognizes the complementary
effects of a multinational approach in coordinating the ‘home game’ with the
‘away game.’
The Role of Citizens

Beyond the necessity of intra- and inter-governmental collaboration, good CT
strategy requires the effort of citizens, non-governmental organizations, aca-
demic and research institutions, and the private sector. Civil society as a CT
tool was addressed earlier in this chapter, but the role of individual citizens
warrants a closer look. First, every citizen is a sensor. Each person knows what
19 Jonathan R. White, Terrorism and Homeland Security (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth,

2014), 345-346.
20 Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach, Find, Fix, Finish (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 220-
222.
21 Jack Donnelly, “State Sovereignty and International Human Rights,” Ethics and Inter-
national Affairs 28, no. 2 (2014): 225-8.
266 Joseph B. King
‘normal’ looks like in his or her community and may be the first to notice an
anomaly that may indicate terrorist activity.22 Close relationships between
communities and police, particularly at the local level, can greatly enhance the
situational awareness necessary to detect and prevent terrorism. Second, each
citizen plays a role in establishing societal norms that may discourage radicali-
zation. Parents, teachers, coaches, and clergy all play a key role in this dimen-
sion. Third, each citizen, at least in a democracy, has the power to influence po-
litical change through their elected leaders. This final aspect of public support
can generate the political will needed to enact the state-controlled portions of a
comprehensive CT strategy.
Caveats: First Do No Harm

While comprehensive CT strategy should apply various tools across the entire
spectrum of terrorist activity, good strategists will be vigilant about the pro-
portionality, timing, and intensity of disparate countermeasures. An approach
relying heavily on the security forces has a greater likelihood of producing col-
lateral damage which may generate sympathy for the terrorist cause. 23 Con-
versely, a purely non-kinetic stance may reduce new recruiting, but may not be
enough to thwart the lethal capabilities of hard-core extremists. This balance
between hard and soft power is delicate. The wrong combination can easily
lead to unintended consequences and may ultimately be counterproductive to
the overall CT effort.
The hard and soft power mix is not the only difficulty for democratic states
implementing CT strategy. The balance between security and liberty is equally
challenging and just as important to CT outcomes. It is almost reflexive for
states to restrict civil liberties in the wake of terrorist attacks. 24 Curfews are
imposed, surveillance is increased, movement is controlled, standards of evi-
dence are reduced, due process is circumvented, and security forces seem to be
everywhere.
The security vs. liberty challenge has two aspects: one moral and one practi-
cal. Shemella makes the interesting observation “…that democracies are more
vulnerable to terrorism in the short term but … they are less vulnerable over
time.”25 This statement is only true if democracies maintain their commitments
22 See, for example, Al Baker and William K. Rashbaum, “Police Find Car Bomb in Times
Square,” New York Times, 1 May, 2010, accessed 5 April 2015, www.nytimes.com/
2010/05/02/nyregion/02timessquare.html.
23 Ally Jamah, “Heavy-handed Counter-Terrorism Tactics Added Pepper to Injury This
Year,” Standard Digital News, December 29, 2014, accessed 5 April 2015,
www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000146165/heavy-handed-counter-terrorism-
tactics-added-pepper-to-injury-this-year.
24 Carroll Doherty, “Balancing Act: National Security and Civil Liberties in Post-9/11
Era,” Pew Research Center Fact Tank, June 7, 2013, accessed 5 April 2015,
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/07/balancing-act-national-security-and-
civil-liberties-in-post-911-era/.
25 Shemella, Fighting Back, 145.
to individual freedoms. From a moral perspective, a state must be true to its

values – even in times of adversity. Curtailing personal freedoms as a CT meas-
ure, while unarguably necessary at some level, should be thoughtfully consid-
ered, selectively implemented, and be of short duration. At the same time, a
state will compromise its values and respect for human rights if it authorizes
the use of extrajudicial killing, torture, or unlawful detention under any cir-
cumstances.
From a practical perspective, the long-term restriction on personal free-
doms and the violation of international human rights norms have a very nega-
tive and counterproductive effect. First, by provoking states to broadly limit
civil liberties, terrorists are successful in expanding pain and terror beyond the
immediate victims of their violence. These measures can also have a damaging
impact on the economy, particularly in the tourism and travel sectors.26 Second,
terrorists will seize the propaganda initiative if states resort to an illegal and
immoral prosecution of a CT campaign or the deliberate maltreatment of cap-
tured terrorists. Whether they were aberrations or systemic abuses, incidents
such as the Abu Ghraib prison scandal are windfalls for extremists’ depiction of
the West as morally bankrupt. 27 The first measure of any CT effort must be to
provide a better alternative than an ideology of hate, intolerance, and eternal
strife. CT professionals must always return to the ends elaborated in the
strategy and ask themselves: Are our actions reducing more terrorism than
they are generating?
Assessment: Measuring Performance

In the final analysis, CT strategies are only worthwhile if they work. The only
way to know for certain is to measure the reduction of terrorist activity, i.e. to
assess performance, once implementation begins, and to compare that reduc-
tion with some established benchmark. States are loath to admit that there is
an ‘acceptable’ level of violence and will more likely be private than public in
their estimates of ‘good enough’ thresholds.28 But this form of assessment,
known as effectiveness, is only half of the task. The second part of assessment is
determining efficiency. Can we match or improve on current effectiveness by
doing things better or cheaper?
Like risk assessment, performance assessment is not an exact science.
Common pitfalls include causal fallacy where outcomes are erroneously asso-
ciated with specific CT measures when no direct link exists. Another challenge
for assessors is selecting metrics that are both measurable and relevant. A re-
26 David Mc. A. Baker, “The Effects of Terrorism on the Travel and Tourism Industry,”
International Journal of Religious Tourism and Pilgrimage 2, no. 1 (2014): 64-65,
accessed 5 April 2015, http://arrow.dit.ie/ijrtp/vol2/iss1/9.
27 Sam Dagher, “Fresh Paint and Flowers at Iraqi House of Horrors,” New York Times,
February 21, 2009, accessed April 5, 2015, www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/world/
middleeast/22iraq.html.
28 Clarke, Managing Counter Terrorism Crises, 305.
268 Joseph B. King
lated difficulty is trying to quantify intangibles such as public confidence and

psychological impacts. A final challenge is balancing different variables such as
number versus lethality of attacks in order to arrive at meaningful conclusions.
Statisticians and social scientists have developed ways to minimize these diffi-
culties, but strategists must be mindful that all assessments retain an element
of subjectivity and may want to leave this task to an external agency to avoid
bias. Sadly for the world, but fortunately for assessors, there is a wealth of data
on terrorist attacks collected by states and academic research institutions.29
The question of improved efficiency relies heavily on the ability of CT pro-
fessionals to think innovatively. The best organizations are learning organiza-
tions and this is the true value of assessment. CT strategy is never a “fire-and-
forget” proposition. It is an ongoing process of informed trial and error, as-
sessment and adjustment, measure and countermeasure. At the same time, and
because of the enduring nature of the threat, CT strategy must be persistently
pursued with skill and determination that exceeds that of the adversary. We
must outthink, outlearn and outperform!
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Acknowledgements and Credits
We wish to thank the Marshall Center leadership, in particular LTG (Ret.) Day-
ton, Dr. Bob Brannon and Mr. Rick Steinke. Of course, we are extremely grateful
to each of the authors for making the time to write for us, despite their busy
schedules, and to everyone at Procon, especially Todor and Petya. We will also
be forever in debt to the late COL (Ret) Nick Pratt, without whose vision and
dedication the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies might not exist, and
to all the course participants who make this program so special. Last, but by no
means least, a very special thank you to Ms. Jeanie Callaghan for her guidance
on contracting and publishing issues.
Disclaimer
The opinions expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not neces-
sarily reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European
Center for Security Studies, the United States of America, the Federal Republic
of Germany, or any other government or institution.
Credits
Cover photo courtesy of Karlheinz Wedhorn.
Chapter 4 has been adapted from Adam Dolnik, “The Dynamics of Terrorist
Innovation,” in Understanding Terrorism Innovation and Learning: Al-Qaeda and
Beyond, ed. Magnus Ranstorp and Magnus Normark (Oxon and New York:
Routledge, 2015), 76–95. Content reprinted with permission.
Figure 10.2 is reprinted with permission. Copyright, Peter Clarke Associates.
271
Index
Q fever, 102
A ricin, 102, 151, 153
rickettsiae, 102
Abu Sayyaf Group, 75 smallpox, 102
Afghanistan, 26, 39, 74, 80, 90, 116, 117, toxins, 102
131, 132, 140, 164, 188, 212, 221 Black September, 90, 137
al-Muhajiroun, 27 Boko Haram, 36, 46, 133, 253
al-Qaeda, 34, 50, 74, 85, 131, 136, 164, 193, Bourgass, Kamel, 151
202, 242
Breivik, Anders, 236, 237
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), 56, 62, 184, 217,
221 Broken Arrows, 108
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), 26, 34, 92, 117 C
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Camorra, 72, 78
73, 117
Carabinieri, 136
al-Shabaab, 36, 86, 92, 93, 96, 117, 133,
219 CBRN. See Weapons of Mass Destruction;
Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), 115, 193 chemical weapons; biological weapons;
radiological weapons
alternative remittance system, 221, 225,
227 chemical weapons
chlorine, 62, 99
al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 37, 56, 193
mustard agents, 100
anarchists, 6, 36, 56, 89 nerve agents, 100
anthrax, 102, 103 phosgene, 99
AQ Khan, 108, 109 sarin, 100, 101
armed forces, 1, 10, 28, 37, 39, 131, 132, VX, 100
133, 136, 140, 149, 160, 164, 166, 168, collaboration, 141, 254, 264, 265
236, 237, 240, 258, 259 interagency, 144, 248, 264, 265
Armed Islamic Group (GIA), 54, 55 international, 80, 141, 142, 213, 242, 265
Aum Shinrikyo, 45, 50, 52, 54, 59, 90, 101, Colombia, 34, 75, 76, 77, 132, 133, 152,
102 165, 181, 184, 187, 188, 189, 200, 212,
219, 223, 230
B cooperation
interagency, ix, 79, 131, 235, 236, 237,
Barot, Dhiren, 153, 157 239, 240, 242, 243, 244, 245, 248,
Basayev, Shamil, 105 249, 264
Battle of Algiers, 132 international, 79, 126, 142, 158, 163,
Bin Laden, Osama, 25, 85, 91, 116, 117, 172, 173, 174, 223, 229, 240, 242, 258
118, 135, 143, 161, 186, 193, 220 coordination
biological weapons interagency, 131, 238, 239, 240, 241,
anthrax, 102, 103 244, 248, 249, 254, 263
bacteria, 102 international, 81, 97, 100, 157, 242
273
274 Combating Transnational Terrorism
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), 127, F

199, 201, 202, 203, 207, 209, 211, 212,
213 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 80, 103,
counter-radicalization programs, 203 133, 136, 139, 141, 144, 242, 243, 244,
de-radicalization, 200, 211, 254 246
de-radicalization programs, 203, 207 Fenians. See Provisional Irish Republican
disengagement, 200, 201, 203, 207, 209 Army
rehabilitation, 127, 205 Financial Action Task Force, 80, 226, 230
violent extremism, 200 foreign fighters, 23, 73, 115, 116, 118, 119,
counterinsurgency, 132, 221, 253 120, 121, 124, 126, 127, 144, 193, 205,
Counternarcotics Police Afghanistan, 80 221
counter-terrorist operations, 21, 131, 142 Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support
Operation Alberich (Germany), 137, 142 Teams, 80
Operation Crevice (UK), 138, 157 Free Aceh Movement, 191
Operation Lightning (UK), 156 freelance terrorism, 62, 116, 117, 119, 121,
Operation Overt (UK), 158, 159 122, 124, 125, 127
Operation Phoenix (Colombia), 165 Front de Libération Nationale, 20, 132
Operation Rhyme (UK), 153, 157
Fusion Center. See intelligence
Operation Serval (Mali), 132
Operation Springbourne (UK), 150, 151,
153
G
crime-terror nexus, 67, 72, 74, 81 Gjorv Report, 237
groupthink, 25, 59
D Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación, 137
Daesh. See Islamic State Guantanamo, 39, 143, 167, 169, 205
D-Company, 75, 76 Guardia Civil, 136
definition
terrorism, 19 H
Department of Homeland Security, 39, 80, Hamas, 39, 45, 183, 186, 191, 193
141, 244 Hezbollah, 186, 187, 193, 220, 223
dirty bombs. See radiological weapons Hizb-ut-Tahrir, 27
drone. See Unmanned Aerial Vehicles hostage-taking, 6, 13, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 90,
Drug Enforcement Administration, 72, 79, 119, 136, 137, 171, 182
80 human rights. See law
drug-trafficking, 68, 71
I
E
intelligence
Egmont Group, 230 cycle, 141, 151
Ejército de Liberación Nacional, 200 financial, 79, 218, 219, 224, 226, 229,
Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), 34, 55, 137, 230, 236, 240, 244, 259
182, 185, 188 fusion center, 79, 141, 142, 236, 239,
extradition, 169, 170, 173, 174, 259 247, 265
human (HUMINT), 135
extremism. See Countering Violent
imagery (IMINT), 135
Extremism
open-source (OSINT), 141
Index 275
sharing, 81, 126, 141, 142, 157, 164, 229, Counter Terrorism and Security Bill, 44
230, 235, 239, 240, 241, 244, 245, human rights, 9, 39, 132, 143, 144, 168,
247, 249, 264 170, 175, 218, 230, 267
signal (SIGINT), 135, 140, 142 international humanitarian law, 167, 168
intelligence organizations law of armed conflict, 167
Bundesamt für Verfassungsshutz (BfV), Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, 174, 229
142 Patriot Act, 39, 140, 164
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), 187 rendition, 140, 168, 169
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 100, targeted killing, 135, 168, 171
169 torture, 13, 132, 133, 143, 170, 175, 267
Force Research Unit (FRU), 137 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Government Communications See Tamil Tigers
Headquarters (GCHQ), 140 Liquid Bomb Plot. See terrorist plots and
Interservices Intelligence Agency (ISI), attacks
143 lone actor, 18, 115, 116, 117, 120, 122, 123,
National Security Agency (NSA), 80, 140 124, 125, 127, 193
Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), 143
lone wolf. See lone actor
Security Service (MI5), 137, 138, 141,
154, 155, 157, 193, 242 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 55, 70, 192
Servizio per la Informazioni e la
Sicurezza Militare (SISMI), 169 M
intelligence-led policing, 79, 138, 153, 159 McVeigh, Timothy, 37, 56
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 80 money laundering, 68, 74, 81, 217, 218,
International Criminal Court (ICC), 192 223, 224, 228, 229, 230, 240
interrogation, 35, 135, 139, 168, 169, 218 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 186,
Irish Republican Army. See Provisional Irish 192, 261
Republican Army (PIRA) motivation for violent extremism and
Islamic State, 18, 28, 34, 38, 41, 44, 49, 52, terrorism
62, 69, 73, 75, 76, 86, 94, 100, 109, 115, deprivation, 22
118, 119, 123, 132, 133, 141, 192, 193, environmental factors, 17, 22, 26, 29
202, 221, 225, 228, 253 family, 24, 27, 36
identity, 21, 22, 24, 26, 52, 72, 90, 218
J ideology, 21, 23, 24, 28, 52, 57, 60, 62,
94, 111, 121, 128, 158, 200, 202, 207
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), 236, individual factors, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
239, 243, 244, 246, 248 25, 26, 29, 57, 76
injustice, 9, 20, 21, 23, 39
K leadership, 18, 25
prison, 26, 28, 29, 70, 119, 127, 205
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 25
victimization, 13, 21, 24
L mutually hurting stalemate, 189, 190
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), 42, 132 N

law
Narodnaya Volya. See People’s Will
Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism, 173 National Interdiction Unit (NIU,
Convention on Torture, 170 Afghanistan), 80
National Movement for the Liberation of highly enriched uranium, 104, 105, 106,
Azawad (MNLA), 220 108, 111
NATO Intelligence Fusion Center, 142 plutonium, 105, 106, 111
negotiations, 152, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, radiological isotopes, 105, 106
187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 259 Red Army Faction (RAF), 54, 55, 59
nerve gas. See chemical weapons Red Brigades, 37, 72, 185
networks rendition. See law
organization, 73, 152, 193, 238, 249 resilience, 202, 212, 256, 257
social, 121 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
transnational, 14, 144 (FARC), 54, 70, 73, 75, 76, 165, 184, 185,
Nigeria, 88, 133 187, 189, 219, 221
Norway, 236, 237 ricin. See biological weapons
November 17th, 50, 59 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), 137, 141
O S
organized crime, 1, 14, 67, 69, 71, 74, 77, salmonella. See biological weapons
223 sarin gas. See chemical weapons
Sendero Luminoso, 34, 54, 220
P Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), 80
Pakistan, 42, 43, 56, 107, 108, 116, 134, Sharia4, 27
135, 142, 143, 159, 171, 186, 188, 204, Shining. See Sendero Luminoso
211 Sicarii, 43, 253
Palestine Liberation Organization, 37, 43, special operations
90 Special Air Service (SAS), 136
Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP), 73 Special Operations Command (SOCOM),
People’s Will, 5, 56 135
Popular Front for the Liberation of Special Operations Forces (SOF), 133,
Palestine – General Command (PFLP- 135, 137, 139
GC), 50, 54, 59 special police units
Popular Front for the Liberation of Grenzshutzgruppe 9 (GSG-9), 137, 142
Palestine (PFLP), 20 Groupe d’Intervention de la
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN), 136
25, 39, 43, 54, 55, 70, 73, 74, 78, 137, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT),
152, 154, 190, 192, 201 136, 139
Yamam (Israel), 136
R state terrorism, 12, 13, 14, 58, 68, 77, 107,
187, 219, 259
radicalization, 17, 21, 24, 26, 28, 60, 70, 76, strategy, 14, 33
94, 120, 121, 207, 241, 262, 266 CT strategy, 131, 155, 161, 182, 195,
radiological dispersal device. See 199, 203, 205, 207, 213, 237, 254,
radiological weapons 255, 256, 257, 259, 261, 263, 266, 268
radiological weapons terrorist strategy, 19, 21, 33, 36, 46, 51,
cesium 137, 105, 106 64, 86, 93, 132, 153
dirty bomb, 103, 104, 105
Index 277
T Munich Olympics (1972), 37, 90, 137

Norway (2011), 40
Taliban, 36, 45, 75, 142, 164, 173, 186, 187, Oklahoma City bombing (1995), 37, 56
188, 221, 223 Omagh (1998), 153
Tamil Tigers, 34, 54, 70, 184, 185, 220 Paris (2015), 38, 39, 42, 62, 115
Tehreek-e-Taliban, Pakistan, 36, 212 Sofia (1925), 6
terrorism Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
definition, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, (MRTA), 44
17, 69, 75, 86, 173, 200, 218
financing, 58, 68, 76, 140, 151, 173, 176, U
217, 218, 220, 221, 223, 225, 227,
229, 230, 240, 264 ummah, 20, 24, 94
international, 6, 7, 94, 131, 166, 171, United Kingdom (UK), 2, 109, 117, 141,
173, 225, 245 149, 256
legislation, 4, 39, 68, 69, 81, 164, 172, United Nations (UN), 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 80,
175, 226, 229, 238 170, 173, 258
tactics, 9, 21, 33, 40, 44, 45, 49, 50, 54, United States (US), 7, 11, 34, 94, 103, 108,
56, 62, 72, 74, 118, 258 159
terrorist media Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), 21, 26,
al Hayat, 94 134, 135, 140, 171, 178
al-Kataib News Channel, 93
as-Sahab (“The Cloud”), 91 V
Azzam Publications, 173
Dabiq, 34, 94 vigilantism, 12, 69
Inspire, 34, 92, 94, 118 violent extremism. See Countering Violent
Mujatweets, 94 Extremism (CVE)
Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of the Jihad), 91
terrorist plots and attacks W
Beslan school siege (2004), 36, 44, 136
Weather Underground, 23
Charlie Hebdo attack (2015), 39, 41, 88,
119, 136 Whole of Government (approach to CT),
Liquid Bomb Plot (2006), 117, 159, 176 131
Mumbai (2008), 41, 42, 46, 50, 76, 132,
136
List of Abbreviations
17N November 17th
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFP-IPSP Armed Forces of the Philippines Internal Peace and Security Plan
AML Anti-Money Laundering
ANC African National Congress
AQ al-Qaeda
AQAP al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQI al-Qaeda in Iraq
AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ARS Alternative Remittance System
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
AU African Union
BfV Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Germany’s domestic intelligence
service)
BKA Bundeskriminalamt (Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office)
BND Bundesnachrichtendienst (German Foreign Intelligence Service)
BR Brigate Rossa or Red Brigades
BW Biological weapon
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear
CFT Combating the Financing of Terrorism, or Counter-Terrorist Financing
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CNP-A Counternarcotics Police Afghanistan
CNS James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
CT counter-terrorism
CTIF-CFI Belgian Financial Intelligence Unit
CTR Cash Transaction Report
CVE Countering Violent Extremism
CW Chemical Weapon
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration (US)
DHS Department of Homeland Security (US)
EDL English Defence League
ELG Executive Liaison Group
ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, Colombia)
EPP Paraguayan People’s Army
ETA Euskadi ta Askatasuna
F3EAD Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
279
FAST Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Team

FATF Financial Action Task Force
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (US)
FIU Financial Intelligence Unit
FLN Front de Libération Nationale
FSEC Force Strategic Engagement Cell
FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization
GAL Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (Spain)
GAM Free Aceh Movement
GCERF Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (UK)
GCMC George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
GIA Armed Islamic Group
GICNT Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
GIGN Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (France)
GSG-9 Grenzshutzgruppe 9 (Germany)
GTI Global Terrorism Index
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
HRL Human Rights Law
HRT Hostage Rescue Team (of FBI)
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC International Criminal Court
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IHL International Humanitarian Law
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
IPSP Internal Peace and Security Plan (Philipines)
IRA Irish Republican Army
IS Islamic State
ISI Interservices Intelligence (Pakistan)
ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, or ‘Islamic State’
ITFC Iraq Threat Finance Cell
JI Jemaah Islamiyah
JN Jabhat al-Nusra
JSOC Joint Special Operations Command (US)
JTF Joint Task Force
JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force
KDF Kenyan Defense Forces
KFR kidnap-for-ransom
LE Law Enforcement
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba
Abbreviations 281
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or “Tamil Tigers”
MHS Mutually Hurting Stalemate
MI5 British Security Service
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
ML Money Laundering
MLAT Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mali)
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
MRTA Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
NCTC National Counter Terrorism Center (US)
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NIU National Interdiction Unit (Afghanistan)
NPA (Communist) New People’s Army (Philipines)
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSA National Security Agency (US)
NSG National Security Guard (India’s elite CT unit)
OC Organized Crime
OCG Organized Crime Group
OSINT Open-Source Intelligence
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command
PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
POW Prisoner Of War
PRAC Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare
PSI Proliferation Security Initiative
PTSS Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (at GCMC)
RAF Red Army Faction
RAN Radicalisation Awareness Network (EU)
RAS Riyadus Shaliheen Suicide Battalion
RB Red Brigades, also Brigate Rossa (BR)
RDD Radiological Dispersal Device
RIIA Royal Institute of International Affairs (UK), known also as Chatham
House
RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary (UK)
RW Radiological weapon
SAR Suspicious Activity Report
SAS Special Air Service (UK)
SCR (UN) Security Council Resolution
SEPP State Establishment for Pesticide Production (Iraq)

SIGINT signals intelligence
SISMI Italian Military Intelligence and Security Service
SIU Sensitive Investigative Unit (Afghanistan)
SL Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)
SOCOM Special Operations Command (US)
SOD Special Operations Division (of US DEA)
SOF Special Operations Forces
SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics
TFI (Office of) Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
TSCTP Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNODC The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USIP United States Institute of Peace
VBIED Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VPN Virtual Private Network
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
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James K. Wither and Sam Mullins, eds., Combating Transnational Terrorism

(Sofia: Procon, 2016).
Original version: English, 2016
Procon Ltd.
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Combating Transnational

This electronic publication cannot be published online. It

Original version: English, 2016

Publisher: Procon Ltd., www.procon.bg

Cover photo courtesy of Karlheinz Wedhorn

ISBN 978-954-92521-9-4 (PDF edition)

Semper Fi, Nick.

Keith W. Dayton, Lt. Gen., U.S. Army (ret.)

issue. Chapter 2 deals with terrorist motivations. Egyptian scholar Dina al

logical developments as well as the continuing challenges and limitations of

how they can be incorporated into the framework of a comprehensive CT

James K. Wither and Sam Mullins

forcement Administration (DEA) and as a regional law enforcement adviser for

2. Terrorist Motivations .................................................................................................17

3. The Strategy and Tactics of Terrorism ................................................................33

5. Terrorism and Crime ..................................................................................................67

6. Terrorism, Media, and the Rise of the Internet ................................................85

7. Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction..................................................99

8. Jihadist Foreign Fighters and ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorism ................................. 115

9. The Role of the Security Forces in Combating Terrorism ........................ 131

10. Intelligence-led Policing in Counter-Terrorism: A Perspective

11. Legal Issues in Combating Terrorism ............................................................ 163

12. Talking to Terrorists.............................................................................................. 181

13. Countering Violent Extremism .......................................................................... 199

14. Counter-Terrorist Financing .............................................................................. 217

15. Interagency Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism ....................................... 235

16. A Comprehensive Strategy for Combating Terrorism ............................. 253

Acknowledgements and Credits............................................................................... 271

Terrorism and Political Violence

ever, if we simply equate terrorism with political violence, we end up with an

Table 1.1. Forms of Political Violence other than Terrorism.9

x Hunger strike/ self-burning (political suicide)

In terrorism studies, there is a certain ‘definition fatigue.’ Do we need a legal

The Need for a Social Science Definition

10 The Definition of Terrorism. A Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Independent

Historical Origins of the Terms Terror and Terrorism

Andrei Ivanovich Zhelaybov, another strategist of the People’s Will con-

16 Nicholas Morozov, Terroristicheskaya Borba [Terrorist Struggle] (Geneva, 1880),

Maximilien Robespierre, who in 1793 had advocated for making “terror”

The Definitional Debate in the United Nations

19 Schmid, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 2-3.

Terrorists as Freedom Fighters?

Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of December 17,

Case Study 1.1. The Euro-Mediterranean (Euromed) Anti-Terror Code of

Given such politicization of the term terrorism, it is tempting to conclude

Comparing Academic Definitions

36 Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism, Final Text, accessed

In 1987, Wilkinson described terrorism in these terms:

Notably, Wilkinson’s latter definition gives more prominence to the com-

41 Appendix 2.1: 250-plus Academic, Governmental and Intergovernmental Definitions

In particular, Hoffman’s definition stresses the terrorist’s pursuit of political

The Revised Academic Consensus Definition

45 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 40, emphasis added.

complexity within a brief description. The “Academic Consensus Definition” is

50 Schmid, ed., Handbook of Terrorism Research, 86-87.

Terrorist Motivation Myths

are driven by psychological disorder. For example, early researchers, such as

2 See respectively Phillip W. Johnson and Theodore B. Feldmann, “Personality types

7 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century

The Individual Level of Terrorist Motivation