An analysis of changing trends in philosophies of science on nursing theory development and testing ‘The effects of changing trends in philosophies of sclence on nursing theory development and testing se analyzed. Two philosophies of scencelogicalempiiism and historcism—ate compared fot four variables (1) components of Science, (2) conception of science, (3) assessment of scientific progres, and (8) goal of philosophy of scence. These factors serve asthe bass for asesing ends inthe development and testing of nursing theory from 1964 othe present. “The analyse shows beginning philosophic shife within nursing theory from logical empiricism to historiciem and Addresses implications and recommendations for faute nursing theory development and texting Mary Cipriano Silva, RN, PhD, FAAN Professor Department of Nursing George Mason University Fairfax, Virginia Kennedy Fellow in Medical Ethics for Nursing Faculty Georgetown University Washington, DC Daniel Rothbart, PD Assistant Professor Department of Philosophy and Religion George Mason University Fairfax, Virginia OTH PHILOSOPHY of science and nursing theory are in a state of transi- tion, At times this transition is character ized by contradictory, divergent, and con- fusing points of view that lead to probing questions about the nature of science in general and nursing theory and science in particular. What are the goals and compo- nents of science? How should science be conceptualized and scientific knowledge assessed? Have nursing theory develop- ment and testing kept pace with changing trends in philosophies of science? The goal of this analysis is to show the influences of changing trends in philoso- phies of science on nursing theory devel- opment and testing and to encourage dialogue among nurses about the future directions of nursing theory. This article is adapted from a presentation given at the Virginia Carolinas" Doctoral Consortium in Nursing, Wile liarsburg, Virginia, April 18, 1983, as pat ofthe sympo- sium Nursing Research; The State of the Art. M. Silva thanks The Jouph P. Kennedy, Je. Foendation for support of ber Kennedy Fellowship in Medical Ethies daring 1983- 1984. (© 1085 Aspen Systems ComporationADVANCES IN NURSING SCIENCE /JANUARY 1984 PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE Since the 1940s, two major schools of philosophical thought have influenced phi- losophy of science: logical empiricism (1940s-1960s) and historicism (1960s to the present). The most influential proponents of logical empiricism (the orthodox view) included Braithwaite,' Ayer,’ Nagel,” Scheffler," Hempel,"* and Rudner.’ These proponents understood the nature of scientific knowledge as an application of logical principles of reasoning. Although the logical empiricist view dominated the study of philosophy of science for more than two decades, a wave of criticism began in the early 1960s. Logi- cal empiricism was subjected to intense philosophical scrutiny, revolving around the general contention that the orthodox view became too purified in its idealisti- cally formal approach to science. In pro- viding logical rigor and formalization to the nature of scientific knowledge, logical empiricism removed itself from the actual practice of working scientists; the ortho- dox view approached logic more closely than it did science, according to critics These critics began to re-examine the actual practices of scientists, the patterns of reasoning, and the sociological influences during a historical era. The his- tory of science became an essential ele- ment of any adequate philosophical analy- sis, prompting a new philosophy of science known as historicism. Major historicists include Hanson,’ Kahn,” Lakatos," Toulmin, Laudan,” and Feyerabend." Although Kuhn is the best known of these historicists, based on the influential work The Structure of Scien- tific Revolutions," his philosophical pro- posals have been widely criticized by other historicists, and Kuhn himself has had second thoughts about certain aspects of this work. Therefore, to draw the distinctions between logical empiricism and histori- cism, itis desirable to focus on the work of Laudan rather than Kuhn. The reasons are threefold: (1) Laudan’s works represent the forefront of philosophy of science today; (2) his views are largely shared by other historicists; and (3) his works have gone almost unnoticed by nurse theorists and researchers. To show fundamental differences re- garding theory development, testing, and assessment between logical empiricism and Laudan’s version of historicism, these two philosophies are compared for four signifi- cant variables: (1) the components of science, (2) the conception of science, (3) the assessment of scientific progress, and (4) the goal of philosophy of science. Table 1 summarizes the basic differences between logical empiricism and_histori- cism. These comparisons show the shifting trends within philosophy of science. From this table one can also surmise implications for the emergent development of new nursing theory. Components of science The components of science, as defined by logical empiricists, are well documented in both the philosophical literature and the nursing literature. Logical empiricists attempt to understand science in terms of theories and the relationships among the components of a theory. A scientific the- ory is intended to systematically unify all the diverse phenomena of a particularNURSING THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING ‘Table 1. A comparison of logical empiricism and historicism on four parameters of science Parameters Logical empiricism Historicism Components of science Conception of science Assessment of scientific progeess Goal of philosophy of Science as product Concepts, theoretical assumptions, ‘empitical generalizations ‘Accept theories as probably true Reject theories as probably false Logical explanation of nacure of Scientific knowledge Concepts, scientific theories, re- search traditions Science as process Number of solved problems within a discipline Historical explanation of the n ture of scientific knowledge [Note: Although this table highligh the major diferences between these two philosophies of scence there ate some stared views. For example, histriits pimarly define science asa hutnan process, bu they also examine the product of solved scenic problems. discipline. This unification is achieved by encompassing descriptions of phenomena within an abstract set of statements known as a deductive system. ‘A deductive system is composed of three major components that are arranged in descending order of abstractness. First, the system’s most abstract statements are its assumptions, which introduce the theo ry’s basic concepts through the use of theoretical terms. Secondly, from these theoretical assumptions, propositions are deduced as part of the second level of abstraction. Together these assumptions and propositions systematically organize the entities and processes that presumably “ie behind” the observable phenomena. To complete the theory it is necessary to bridge these principles to empirical gener- alizations, Toward this goal, bridge princi- ples, still within the second level of abstraction, indicate how the theoretical entities and processes relate to empirical phenomena, Without these bridge princi- ples no empirical explanations or predic- tion would be possible and the system would be immune to empirical testing. Thirdly, these bridge principles in turn produce empirical generalizations within the lowest level of abstraction. In summa- ry, the components of a scientific system, according to logical empiricists, are a set of statements that are systematically unified within a deductive system and that link theoretical concepts to empirically observ- able properties through the use of bridge principles." In contrast to the logical empiricists who attempt to understand science in terms of theories, historicists like Laudan” attempt to understand science in terms of research traditions, each of which includes many theories. Although theories are seen by logical empiricists to be specific, short- lived, stable in formulation, and testable, historicists believe research traditions to be global, long-lived, and changeable within the boundaries of an acceptable ontologi cal commitment. By definition, a research tradition is a broadly based foundation of many theories and is an accepted way of viewing the fundamental phenomena within a di pline. It provides a global backdrop from which theories are constructed and evalu- ated through a set of guidelines for iden- tifying the fundamental objects of a par- ticular research tradition. Laudan doesADVANCES IN NURSING SCIENCE /JANUARY 1984 recognize, however, that the domains of science are not always clear; thus, classifi cation of knowledge into a particular research tradition may be ambiguous. Every discipline has several research tradi tions, as illustrated by the nursing research traditions of holism and particularism. According to Laudan,” three specific components make up a research tradition: (i) specific theories, (2) ontological com- mitments, and (3) methodological commit- ments. Some of the specific theories within a given research tradition are new and others are modified versions of older theo- ries that “fit” within the tradition. The function of any theory is to solve scientific problems within the discipline, from the perspective of the research tradition’s ontological commitments. If, for example, one ontological commitment of a research tradition is holism, various theories within this research tradition might address the problem of how to view the person as a holistic being without looking at parts. In addition to specific theories and onto- logical commitments, the third compo- nent, methodological commitments, is also essential for a research tradition. Methodological commitments define the legitimate methods of inquiry and experi- mental procedures that are inseparably linked to a research tradition’s ontology. To follow the logic of the above example, would not the case study method of inquiry better preserve the ontological commitment to holism than the experi- mental design method of inquiry with built-in reductionism? The components of a scientific system, according to historicists like Laudan, are multiple research traditions, each contain- ig theories that produce a set of ontologi- cal viewpoints and methods of inquiry that are not only essentially compatible with the research tradition but also capable of solving problems within it. Conception of science Based on this comparison of the compo- nents of science for logical empiricism and historicism, it is apparent that the two schools assume very different views about what science means. Logical empiricists do not understand science in terms of the human activities of working scientists (eg, experimenting and compiling data). In- stead, they conceive of science only in terms of the results of these activities. The term science refers only to a product, ie, a set of statements that purportedly consti- tute the body of scientific knowledge. The product includes scientific terminology and definitions, propositions, hypotheses, theories, and laws. This conception of science as product rests on the philosophi- cal goal of articulating the logical founda- tions of scientific knowledge.’ Within this viewpoint, it is important to recognize that logical empiricists are not interested in how scientific hypotheses are conceived but rather in how they can be sufficiently supported by empirical evidence. Theit emphasis is one of theory validation, not theory discovery’ In contrast, historicists understand science as a process of human behavior and thought exhibited by practicing scien- tists. Historicists would be interested in . different questions. What reasoning pat- terns do practicing scientists use to accept or reject a theory? To what extent are scientists influenced by the theory's empirical findings in contrast to the theo-Historicists understand science as a process of human behavior and thought exhibited by practicing scientists; logical empiricists understand science only in terms of the linguistic results of these activities. 1y's logical elegance in such a decision? How do external factors such as religious convictions influence the scientist's deci- sion-making judgments? To the historicist, every facet of the scientific process is subject to philosophi- cal examination, including the process of explaining how fruitful theosies are con- ceived by practicing scientists. With greater understanding of this process, his- toricists hope to develop models for future theory construction. Within this scientific viewpoint, valid data for theory construc- tion include: * the psychological factors of in scientists; * the social forces on the community of scientists at a particular time; and the overall historical environment, especially the “nonscientific” in- fluences on scientists. jidual Assessment of scientific progress The assessment of scientific progress within the logical empiricist tradition rests on the ability to justify a scientific theory by examining the requirements for the theory's truth and the conditions of its falsehood. If a scientist can demonstrate the truth of a theory, the scientist has acquired scientific knowledge. Certain criteria identify theory as false or NURSING THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING true. Generally, if a theory's predictions are repeatedly disconfirmed, the logic of test ing requires a rejection of the problematic dimensions of the theory, assuming that the observations are correct.° But logical empiricists have more difficulty explaining the method of proving that a theory is true. According to the logic of theory testing, no finite number of experiments can con- clusively prove that a theory is true. If a theory passes many severe tests, it is only empirically confirmed; that is, the theory's probability of truth has increased. There- fore, to logical empiricists, scientific pro- gress is assessed by the degree of probabil- ity that the theory is true, based on the number and severity of empirical tests it passes. In addition, logical empiricists consider theoretical reduction an important scien tific goal. In theoretical reduction, one theory can be absorbed by or reduced to some other inclusive theory. The philo- sophical advantage of reduction lies not only with the simplicity of fewer theoreti- cal concepts and laws but also with the insight inco the ultimate character of real ity. For historicists, the question of whether philosophy of science should try to explain when, if ever, a theory is true or false is the subject of considerable debate. Many agree with Laudan,” who argues that phi- losophy should not search for distinguish ing characteristics of true theories, pri- marily because practicing scientists rarely evaluate theories in terms of truth or falsi- ty. The history of science includes many instances in which a theory was accepted even though it contained scientific anoma- lies or produced false experimental predic tions. Conversely, some theories have beenADVANCES IN NURSING SCIENCE / JANUARY 1984 rejected even though they received the most empirical confirmation, Thus, Lau- dan argues that questions about truth are essentially irrelevant to scientific progress. The relevant element is the theory's prob- lem-solving effectiveness; a theory's prog: ress is defined by the degree to which it solves more scientific problems than its rivals, As stated by Laudan, “the solved problem—empitical or conceptual—is the basic unit of scientific progress." Historicists such as Laudan find reduc- tionism counterproductive to the goal of solving scientific problems. Research tradi- tions should not be seen as competitors trying to mutually undermine each other but rather as collaborators toward the goal of solving scientific problems. This process of synthesizing research traditions, thus expanding them, is called the “integration of research traditions,” according to Lau- dan." Two ways in which this integration may occur are described. 1. One research tradition can be grafted onto another without any major mod- ifications in the components of eith er. 2. Two or more research traditions may each sacrifice fundamental elements that have been refuted while com- bining their remaining elements in a new way, ‘An important scientific motivation for integrating research traditions is the goal of explaining different dimensions of the same phenomena under study. For exam- ple, in nursing, the integration of divergent research traditions from biology, psycholo- gy, and sociology can account for the ontological perspective that individuals are biopsychosocial beings, which is common in nursing, This pattern of conjoining fundamental perspectives from Research tradition 1 (RT t) Research ‘radition 2 (RT 2) ‘Theories from ara trom the integration of RT tend RT2 Fig 1. A conceptualization of the integration of research traditions and corresponding theories within historicism, traditions is common when scientists develop new interdisciplinary fields of study to account for previously unex- plained scientific problems. The integra~ tion of research traditions and correspond- ing theories is shown in Figure 1. Laudan’s analysis of integration departs significantly from the logical empiricist contention that science progresses through the elimination of theories by reduction. But the process of integration does not involve elimination by reducing one tradi tion to another, because both traditions retain their identity. Integration aims at extracting the progressive components of each tradition in a way that produces solutions to previously unsolved prob- lems. Goal of philosophy of science According to logical empiricists, the ultimate goal of philosophy of science is to present a formalized account of the nature of scientific knowledge. This includes an application of logical principles to ques- tions about the nature of science, since logic provides the eternal principles for relationships between scientific statements. By examining these relationships, the foun-dation of science is intended to systemati- cally reveal the logical requirements for all scientific knowledge. Historicists share with logical empiricists the belief that the philosopher's task is to construct a general account of the nature of scientific knowledge. But for historicists like Laudan, such a task must conform to the human elements of scientific evolution and growth. To meet this goal, histori engage in studies of the actual activities, behavior patterns, and reasoning processes of working scientists. The belief is that philosophy of science must show how science, as itis actually practiced, can yield knowledge about the world. Such exam nation of the actual practice of scientists is used by historicists as evidence against logical empiricism, because the growth of scientific knowledge seems at times to be aided by illogical and nonrational decision making. Ie is believed that illogical pro- cesses can contribute to creative growth of knowledge within a discipline. NURSING THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING Since 1964, nurse scholars have become more aware of the influences of philoso- phy—in particular philosophy of science— on the development of nursing theory. A review of significant and representative nursing theory literature within three time periods shows the status of nursing theory in regard to logical empiricist and histori- cist trends in philosophy of science. 1964-1969 ‘An important influence on nursing the- ory development during the 1960s was support given by the Division of Nursing NURSING THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING. of the U.S. Department of Health, Educa- tion, and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services) to nursing schools to sponsor programs on the nature and development of nursing science. An analysis of metatheoretical papers from the proceedings of two such conferences—the Symposium on Theory Development in Nursing" held at Case Western Reserve University in 1968 and the Conference on the Nature of Science in Nursing" held at the University of Colorado in 1969—gives insight into how nurse scholars and others during the late 1960s conceptualized the derivation of nursing knowledge. In 1968, Dickoff and James" presented a version of their position paper on a theory of theories, introducing the idea that sig- nificant nursing theory must be situation producing. Although they modified the orthodox view about the purpose of theo- ry—that is, they postulated that theory could be capable of both more than and less than prediction—they, nevertheless, explicitly stated their faithfulness to the logical empiricist tradition. They forth- rightly spoke of their work as a broader interpretation of the writings of such phi- losophers as Nagel’ and Hempel.» The language they used to describe theory supports logical empiricism. They spoke of concepts, propositions, set; they assessed scientific progress in terms of truth; and they insisted on a product orientation to science (ie, production of desired situa- tions). In 1969, Abdellah” discussed the nature of nursing science. Although no mention was made per se of the writings of pl phers who supported logical empiricism, Abdellah’'s views of what constitutes a scientific theory were nevertheless consis- tent with their writings; that is, terms mustADVANCES IN NURSING SCIENCE /JANUARY 1984 be operationally defined and preferably observable and quantifiable. Postulates are validated by testing deductions, which either helps to confirm the theory or leads to modifications of the postulates. Abdel- lah concludes that the reward of nurse scientists for their efforts is the discovery and affirmation of truth. Thus, as with Dickoff and James," the criterion for the assessment Of scientific progress is an increase in scientific truths. Other writings™” related to nursing the- ory development and testing during the late 1960s all tended to have a logical empiricist perspective, with the exception of Leininger's” introductory comments to the Conference on the Nature of Science in Nursing, which offered an ethnoscience research methodology to the discovery of scientific knowledge. This approach stresses the viewing of behavior from the subject's perspective rather than the researcher's. This accommodation to sub- jectivism is more compatible with histori- cism than with the objectivism of logical empiricism. 1970-1975 In the first half of the 1970s, two major trends in nursing theory occurred. 1. Metatheoretical formulations relevant to nursing theory and testing within the logical empiricist tradition were developed to a high degree by such investigators as Jacox” and Hardy.™ 2. A number of conceptual frameworks for nursing were published; for exam- ple, the work of Rogers,” King,” Orem,” and Roy. According to Jacox,” the goal of science is the discovery of truths, and the purpose of scientific theory is description, explana- tion, and prediction of part of our empirical world. In discussing theory con- struction, Jacox uses the language of the logical empiricists, including concepts, propositions, axioms, and theorems. Har- dy is even more oriented to the formal logic underlying logical empiricism, dis- cussing nine possible relationships that can exist between concepts and presenting a diagrammatic and matrix presentation of a situation that shows (1) the concepts, (2) the sign of the relationship between con- cepts, and (3) the nature of the relation- ships between concepts. These two articles represented a culmi- nation of the metatheoretical notions about logical empiricism in nursing theory. The irony, of course, is that at the time these and similar reports were making a profound impact on the derivation of the- ory in nursing, the logical empiricist view- points espoused in them were being strongly repudiated by a growing number of philosophers of science. In other words, nursing’s theoretical link to philosophy of science was, from the historicist perspec- tive, about a decade behind the times. The irony continues in regard to the second trend—the publication of a number of important conceptual frameworks for nursing. Several conceptual frameworks published in the early 1970s were essen- tially devoid of any explicit linkage to philosophy of science.” This is in no way meant to diminish the quality or signifi- cance of these seminal works but only to point out that a situation existed in which the most influential nursing literature on theory construction and testing followed rather than preceded the derivation of the conceptual frameworks, apparently be-Since 1976, new trends have been a beginning movement away from logical empiricism and toward historicism; revision as well as introduction of conceptual frameworks for nursing; and a beginning shift from quantitative to qualitative research to test nursing theory deductions. cause the metatheoretical movement in nursing was, for the most part, a separate movement from the conceptual framework movement. 1976 to present Since 1976, the following trends have occurred * a continued and relatively stable com- mitment to logical empiricism, al- though a beginning trend toward his- toricism is apparent; * a revision of several conceptual frame- works for nursing and the introduction of some new frameworks; and * a questioning of the adequacy of strictly quantitative research methods to test nursing theory deductions. The relatively stable commitment to log- ical empiricism is reflected in the current writings of several nurse authors.°"* How- ever, there are some new trends. For exam: ple, in 1979 when Newman” introduced a new theory of health, the viewpoint was one of logical empiricism. However, in a recent work, a shift in her thinking is evident. Reflecting the thoughts of Kuhn (a historicist), Newman defines science as “a process of knowing, a process of chal- lenging, and a continuing revolution.”*“?*” NURSING THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING This emphasis on process (not product) and revolution (not logic) is a noticeable shift in viewpoint from logical empiricism to historicism. In a recent publication, Hardy” also extensively cited Kuhn in discussing nurs- ing theory. The primary emphasis is on metaparadigms; however, Hardy also seems to agree, at least implicitly, with Kuhn's definition of the development of scientific knowledge as both nonrational and noncumulative, This represents a marked shift in viewpoint from the 1974 article," which, of all the metatheoretical articles, represented the most rigorous and logically structured formulations in sup- port of logical empiricism. These contra- dictions in the works of Hardy and other metatheorists ate indicative of the pull between orthodox and new ideas in philos- ophy of science and in nursing theory development and testing. Although several other nurse authors" » briefly address Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,” with the exception of Meleis,¥ they do not discuss Kuhn's more recent writings or mention Laudan’s work, which represents the forefront of philosophy of science today. However, Laudan’s work is briefly mentioned in an article by Watson and cited in the bibli- ‘ographies of books by Parse and Chinn and Jacobs.” Although this attention to the work of Laudan is scant, it is encourag- ing because it begins to bring the develop- ment of nursing theory knowledge in line with current trends in philosophy of science. The second trend occurring between 1976 and the present is the expansion and revision of the works of those nurse authors who in the early 1970s had devel-10 ADVANCES IN NURSING SCIENCE /JANUARY 1984 oped conceptual frameworks for nursing. For example, first editions of books and other publications were rewritten, expand- ed, or revised by Orem,” King,” Roy,“ Roy and Roberts,” and Rogers. Several of these nurse theorists, in an attempt to bring their works more in line with what the nurse metatheorists of the mid-1970s were espousing (logical empiricism), re- vised their works to explicitly identify such elements as concepts and propositions that are inherent in the orthodox viewpoint. Thus, an interesting situation has been created: While these nurse theorists have been updating trends in philosophy of science as espoused in the nursing litera- ture of the mid-1970s, those who espoused these views have begun to question them and some no longer espouse them. This is not to say that individuals should not alter their viewpoints but to point out again the seeming separateness of the metatheoreti- cal and conceptual framework movement in nursing and the effect of this separate- ness on perpetuating traditional or singular viewpoints about philosophy of science. Two other conceptual frameworks were developed in books published in 1976 by Paterson and Zderad” and in 1981 by Parse." Neither book has received much attention in the nursing literature, although there is some evidence that this is chang- ing.” Could it be that both of these books have a strong existential-phenome- nological perspective that, until recently, was out of the mainstream of the thinking of orthodox nurse scientists about philoso- phy of science? The underlying assump- tions these three authors hold about the nature of science are much more in keep- ing with nontraditional views about philos- ophy of science than with traditional views. In particular, they see science as process; they envision a strong link between the theory's ontological commitment and its methodological commitment; and they place little emphasis on precise, logical formulations. The third trend is a shift in emphasis from quantitative to qualitative research methods to test nursing theory deductions. In the late 1970s, nurse scholars began to question the limits of quantitative research methods because they too often sacrificed meaningfulness for rigor.” Out of this questioning, articles suggesting alternative approaches to logical empiricism began to appear in the nursing literature." ‘These approaches were sought because of the inadequacy of logical empiricism co deal with certain phenomena in nursing, in particular, those phenomena dealing with humanism and holism. By exploring alter- native philosophies of science and research methodologies that are compatible, it seems possible to study these phenomena ina more meaningful and creative way and, in so doing, to help bridge the gaps among philosophies of science, nursing theory, and nursing research, Historicism is one of the alternative philosophies that holds promise in helping to bridge these gaps. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE Since every scientific theory is tied ro some philosophical framework as the basis for understanding and assessing theory, it is important for the theorists within a given discipline to be aware of the discipline's philosophical orientation. Therefore, nurs- ing theorists should continue to explorethe philosophical underpinnings of their discipline in order to integeate the latest advances in nursing theory development and testing with a coherent philosophical foundation. This review of the trends in nursing theory from 1964 to the present shows not only that nursing theory is presently in a state of transition, but also that many of the changes in nursing theory reflect a reorientation of the underlying philosophy of the discipline. This is evident in the beginning metatheoretical shift away from a strongly empirical and logical orientation to theory construction reminiscent of logi- cal empiricism and toward a more holistic and humanist approach more in line with historicism, There are several implications for nursing theory development and test- ing. * Laudan dismisses as counterproduc- tive the logical empirical goal of reducing one theory to another. Rather than trying to restrict the range of possible theories, Laudan encourages theory expansion through a process of integrating components from different research traditions, which results in a multidimensional understanding of the phenomena. Based on this historicist orientation, there should not be a sin- gle, conceptual framework for nursing. This orientation suggests, rather, the expansion of nursing theory through the integration of progressive compo- nents of che various existing nursing conceptual frameworks, which results in multiple frameworks. This process should be a cooperative endeavor and, if adhered to, should encourage a cooperative rather than a competitive attitude among nurse scholars. In the NURSING THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING future some of the conceptual frame- works for nursing may be integrated so that the unimportant elements are sac- rificed and the important elements are combined in a new way. The historicist's conception of science as a human process, rather than a product of some endeavor, suggests that nursing theory should always be understood as a stage in its evolution and growth. Although nursing theory is experiencing shifts in its evolution, the result of the transition will not be some final and static body of know!- edge. Like any scientific discipline, nursing theory construction will never culminate in some static set of eternal truths but will represent one episode in its evolving history. Historicism strongly encourages a careful study of the actual practices, belief systems, and external factors influencing a community of scientists within a given discipline. This has a direct bearing on the type of data relevant for any theory construction. Thus, data for nursing theory develop- ment and testing will include the com- mon practices of nurse clinicians, the social and psychological factors affect- ing the profession of nursing, the widely held beliefs of the community of nurses, and the reasoning patterns of individual nurse theorists. A result of integrating these data will be a nursing theory that more explicitly addresses the human dimensions of nursing and the practitioners of nurs- ing. Scientific progress for Laudan reduces to the number of solved problems within a discipline. Therefore, the u12 ADVANCES IN NURSING SCIENCE /JANUARY 1984 assessment of progress in nursing the- ory development and testing will be less rigid and more practical than sug- gested by a logical empiricist orienta~ tion, That is, there will be less empha- sis on truth and error as the criteria for assessing scientific progress and more emphasis on the actual solution to nursing care problems. This shift should help to bridge the gap between those persons who are primarily nurse scholars and those who are primarily nurse clinicians. The clinician, of course, is in an ideal position to both understand and assess whether, and to what degree, a nursing care problem has been solved. Within this frame- work, the nurse clinician should be highly valued as an integral part of the process of nursing theory development and testing. Based on the changing trends in philoso- phies of science and nursing theory, four recommendations are made: 1. creation of liaisons between depart- REFERENCES: ments of nursing and departments of philosophy to help nurse scholars, theoreticians, researchers, and clini cians stay abreast of changes in phi- losophy of science; 2. establishment of closer, cooperative working relationships among nurse metatheorists, theoreticians, research- ers, and clinicians with a common goal of solving problems of signifi- cance in nursing; 3. exploration of innovative, qualitative methods for testing nursing theory that are in keeping with the historicist tradition; and 4. continued and explicit emphasis in nursing theory courses on the interre- lationships among philosophies of science, nursing theory, and nursing research. 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