Prisma Construction & Development Corporation and Rogelio S. Pantaleon Vs Arthur F. Menchavez G.R. No. 160545 March 9, 2010 Facts
Prisma Construction & Development Corporation and Rogelio S. Pantaleon Vs Arthur F. Menchavez G.R. No. 160545 March 9, 2010 Facts
Prisma Construction & Development Corporation and Rogelio S. Pantaleon Vs Arthur F. Menchavez G.R. No. 160545 March 9, 2010 Facts
On August 28, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for sum of money to enforce
the unpaid balance, plus 4% monthly interest. In their Answer, the petitioners
admitted the loan of P1,240,000.00, but denied the stipulation on the 4%
monthly interest, arguing that the interest was not provided in the promissory
note. Pantaleon also denied that he made himself personally liable and that he
made representations that the loan would be repaid within six (6) months.
RTC found that the respondent issued a check for P1M in favor of the
petitioners for a loan that would earn an interest of 4% or P40,000.00 per
month, or a total of P240,000.00 for a 6-month period. RTC ordered the
petitioners to jointly and severally pay the respondent the amount of
P3,526,117.00 plus 4% per month interest from February 11, 1999 until fully
paid.
ISSUE:
Whether the parties agreed to the 4% monthly interest on the loan. If so, does
the rate of interest apply to the 6-month payment period only or until full
payment of the loan?
RULING:
Petition is meritorious. Interest due should be stipulated in writing; otherwise,
12% per annum
Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. When the
terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations governs. Courts have
no authority to alter the contract by construction or to make a new contract for
the parties; a court’s duty is confined to the interpretation of the contract the
parties made for themselves without regard to its wisdom or folly, as the court
cannot supply material stipulations or read into the contract words the
contract does not contain. It is only when the contract is vague and ambiguous
that courts are permitted to resort to the interpretation of its terms to
determine the parties’ intent.
In the present case, the respondent issued a check for P1M. In turn, Pantaleon,
in his personal capacity and as authorized by the Board, executed the
promissory note. Thus, the P1M loan shall be payable within 6 months. The
loan shall earn an interest of P40,000.00 per month, for a total obligation of
P1,240,000.00 for the six-month period. We note that this agreed sum can be
computed at 4% interest per month, but no such rate of interest was stipulated
in the promissory note; rather a fixed sum equivalent to this rate was agreed
upon.
Article 1956 of the Civil Code specifically mandates that “no interest shall be
due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.” The payment of interest
in loans or forbearance of money is allowed only if: (1) there was an express
stipulation for the payment of interest; and (2) the agreement for the payment
of interest was reduced in writing. The concurrence of the two conditions is
required for the payment of interest at a stipulated rate. The collection of
interest without any stipulation in writing is prohibited by law.
The facts show that the parties agreed to the payment of a specific sum of
money of P40,000.00 per month for six months, not to a 4% rate of interest
payable within a 6-month period.
It is a familiar doctrine in obligations and contracts that the parties are bound
by the stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions they have agreed to, which is
the law between them, the only limitation being that these stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions are not contrary to law, morals, public order or
public policy. The payment of the specific sum of money of P40,000.00 per
month was voluntarily agreed upon by the petitioners and the respondent.
There is nothing from the records and, in fact, there is no allegation showing
that petitioners were victims of fraud when they entered into the agreement
with the respondent.
Therefore, as agreed by the parties, the loan of P1M shall earn P40,000.00 per
month for a period of 6 months, for a total principal and interest amount of
P1,240,000.00. Thereafter, interest at the rate of 12% per annum shall apply.
The amounts already paid by the petitioners during the pendency of the suit,
amounting toP1,228,772.00 as of February 12, 1999, should be deducted from
the total amount due, computed as indicated above. We remand the case to
the trial court for the actual computation of the total amount due.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it was warranted for the lower courts to pierce the corporate veil of PRISMA
RULING:
We find it unfounded and unwarranted for the lower courts to pierce the corporate veil of PRISMA.
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only in three (3) basic instances, namely: a) when
the separate and distinct corporate personality defeats public convenience, as when the corporate
fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation; b) in fraud cases, or when the
corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect a fraud, or defend a crime; or c) is used in alter
ego cases, i.e., where a corporation is essentially a farce, since it is a mere alter ego or business
conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs so
conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another
corporation. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of law making a corporate
officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities.
In the present case, we see no competent and convincing evidence of any wrongful, fraudulent or
unlawful act on the part of PRISMA to justify piercing its corporate veil. While Pantaleon denied
personal liability in his Answer, he made himself accountable in the promissory note "in his personal
capacity and as authorized by the Board Resolution" of PRISMA. With this statement of personal
liability and in the absence of any representation on the part of PRISMA that the obligation is all its
own because of its separate corporate identity, we see no occasion to consider piercing the
corporate veil as material to the case.