256. GR No.

128024  May 9, 2000 Banez v. Valdevilla and Oro Marketing, Inc

Facts:
Baez was the sales operations manager of Oro Marketing Inc. In 1993, Oro Marketing
indefinitely suspended Baez, prompting Baez to file for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter ruled in
favor of Baez. Since Oro Marketing failed to timely file the appeal, both NLRC and SC dismissed
the same.
Oro Marketing filed a complaint for damages before the RTC for loss of profit, cost of supplies,
litigation expenses, and attorney’s fees. It alleged that due to Baez’ modus operandi, its sales
decreased and reduced its profits.

Baez filed a motion to dismiss, interposing that the action for damages, having arisen from
employer-employee relationship, was squarely under the exclusive original jurisdiction of NLRC
under Art. 217(a) par. 4 of Labor Code, and is barred by reason of the final judgment in labor
case. As such, he accused Oro Marketing of splitting causes of action, and that the latter should
have included the claim in its counterclaim before the Labor Arbiter.

The respondent RTC Judge Valdevilla ruled that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, since
the complaint did not ask for any relief under the Labor Code, but rather to recover damages as
redress for Baez’s nefarious activities, causing damage and prejudice to Oro Marketing. Since
this there was a breach of contractual obligation, which is within the realm of civil law, the
jurisdiction belongs to the regular courts.

Issue:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the claim for damages filed by Oro Marketing against
Baez.
Held:
No. RTC had no jurisdiction over Oro Marketing’s complaint for damages.
RTC was incorrect in saying that the resolution of the issues presented by the complaint did not
entail application of the Labor Code or other labor laws; the dispute was intrinsically civil.
Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original
and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations —
in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor
laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.

It is clear that under Art. 217(a) par. 4 of Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter and NLRC have original
and exclusive jurisdiction claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from the employer-employee relations. This provision is the result of the amendment by
Section 9 of Republic Act (“R.A.”) No. 6715, which took effect on March 21, 1989, and which put
to rest the earlier confusion as to who between Labor Arbiters and regular courts had
jurisdiction over claims for damages as between employers and employees.

It will be recalled that years prior to R.A. 6715, jurisdiction over all money claims of workers,
including claims for damages, was originally lodged with the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC by
Article 217 of the Labor Code. On May 1, 1979, however, Presidential Decree (“P.D.”) No. 1367
amended said Article 217 to the effect that “Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor
Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages.” This limitation in
jurisdiction, however, lasted only briefly since on May 1, 1980, P.D. No. 1691 nullified P.D. No.
1367 and restored Article 217 of the Labor Code almost to its original form. Presently, and as
amended by R.A. 6715, the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC in Article 217 is
comprehensive enough to include claims for all forms of damages “arising from the employer-
employee relations”.
By the designating clause “arising from the employer-employee relations”, Art. 217 should also
apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages against its dismissed
employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily connected with the fact of
termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal case.

In this case, Oro Marketing’s claim against Baez for actual damages arose from a prior
employer-employee relationship. In the first place, Oro Marketing’s would not have taken issue
with Baez’s “doing business of his own” had the latter not been concurrently its employee.
Thus, the damages alleged in the complaint were: first, those amounting to lost profits and
earnings due to Baez’s abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager, having been
otherwise preoccupied by his unauthorized installment sale scheme; and second, those
equivalent to the value of Oro Marketing’s property and supplies which Baez used in
conducting his “business”.

Second, contrary to Oro Marketing’s allegations, no business losses may be attributed to Baez
as in fact, it was by reason of Baez’s sales operations that the sales reached its highest record
level, and that the installment scheme was in fact with the knowledge of the management of
Oro Marketing. In other words, the issue of actual damages has been settled in the labor case,
which is now final and executory.
This is, of course, to distinguish from cases of actions for damages where the employer-
employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different
source of obligation. Thus, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld where the damages,
claimed for were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of contract, as when the
claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee or seeks liquidated damages in
enforcement of a prior employment contract.

257. Soliman Security Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 384 SCRA 514/ G.R. No. 143215. July
11, 2002

Labor Law; Dismissals; Temporary “off-detail” of respondent Valenzuela not a constructive

dismissal.—Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain, on the part of an employer has become so unbearable as to leave an employee with no
choice but to forego continued employment. The temporary “off-detail” of respondent
Valenzuela is not such a case.

FACTS
 Respondent Eduardo Valenzuela, a security guard, was a regular employee of petitioner
Soliman Security Services assigned at the BPI-Family Bank, Pasay City. On 09 March 1995, he
received a memorandum from petitioners relieving him from his post at the bank, said to be
upon the latter's request, and requiring him to report to the security agency for reassignment.
The following month, or on 07 April 1995, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on
the ground that his services were terminated without a valid cause and that, during his tenure
at the bank, he was not paid his overtime pay, 13th month pay, and premium pay for services
rendered during holidays and rest days. He averred that, after receiving the memorandum of 09
March 1995, he kept on reporting to the office of petitioners for reassignment but, except for a
brief stint in another post lasting for no more than a week, he was put on a “floating” status.
Petitioners contended that the relief of respondent from his post, made upon request of
the client, was merely temporary and that respondent had been offered a new post but the
latter refused to accept it. Petitioners argued that respondent’s floating status for barely 29
days did not constitute constructive dismissal. On 31 July 1995, the Labor Arbiter, Ariel
Cadiente Santos, arrived at a decision holding petitioners guilty of constructive dismissal and
ordering the reinstatement of the complainant to his former position with full backwages from
the date of his “dismissal” until his actual reinstatement; directing the Research and
Information Unit to compute the various monetary benefits awarded to the complainant; and
adjudging the payment, by way of attorney’s fees, of ten percent (10%) of all sums owing to the
complainant.
On 16 October 1998, petitioners filed an appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). On 11 November 1998, the NLRC issued an order directing petitioners to submit an
affidavit to the effect that their appeal bond was genuine and that it would be in force and
effect until the final disposition of the case. In his reply memorandum, dated 28 November
1998, respondent, asseverating that petitioners failed to deposit the required bond for the
appeal, sought the appeal to be declared as not having been validly perfected.
The NLRC, on 30 April 1999, gave due course to the appeal and rendered the presently
assailed decision, reversing that of the Labor Arbiter, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE. However, respondent [before
the NLRC] is hereby ordered to pay complainant separation pay computed at one-half (1/2)
month for every year of service, reckoned from date of employment on October 9, 1990 up to
September 9, 1995, the date the complainant should have been redeployed.”A motion for
reconsideration, filed by herein private respondent Valenzuela, was denied by the NLRC.
Valenzuela forthwith brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE
Whether or not private respondent should be deemed constructively dismissed by
petitioner for having been placed on “floating status,” i.e., with no reassignment, for a period
of 29 days?

HELD
NO. Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain, on the part of an employer has become so unbearable as to leave an employee with no
choice but to forego continued employment. The temporary “off-detail” of respondent
Valenzuela is not such a case.

RULING
The instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals are SET ASIDE and the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NCR CN.
04-02620-95 is REINSTATED. No costs. [Soliman Security Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 384
SCRA 514(2002)]

258. Navarro v. NLRC [G.R. No. 116464, March 1, 2000]

FACTS: Petitioners were jeepney driver of private respondent Comejo on
the boundary system. Due to a change in schedule, they did not report to work
as protest. They were then replaced. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal asking for separation pay and other benefits. On November 26, 1991,
the labor arbiter rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Private respondents
were served a cop of the decision on April 3, 1992. They filed
their memorandum on appeal on April 13, 1992; however the appeal bond was
only filed on April 30, 1992. Also, such bond was found to be spurious. It was
only on July 20, 1993 that a substitute bond was issued by another company.

ISSUE: W/N the NLRC has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

HELD: No. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period

and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with
such legal requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment
final and executory. Perfection of an appeal includes the filing, within the
prescribed period of the memorandum of appeal and posting of the appeal
bond. In cases where the judgment involves a monetary award, as in this case,
the appeal may be perfected only upon posting of a cash or surety bond to the
NLRC. Since the private respondents received the LA’s decision on April 3, they
had only until April 13 to file their appeal. The bond was posted only on April
30; beyond the reglementary period. The requirement of posting the bond has
only been relaxed on grounds of substantial justice and special circumstances
which are not attendant in this case. Furthermore, the bond posted was not
genuine. The decision can no longer be amended nor altered by the labor
tribunal.
259. STAR ANGEL HANDICRAFTS VS NLRC-NO DIGEST FOUND

260.
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261. Diamonon v DOLE, Laguesma [G.R. No. 108951, March 7,
2000]
FACTS: Petitioner was National Executive VP of the NACUSIP and VP for
Luzon of the PACIWU. He later learned of his removal from the positions he held
in both union in a resolution approved during a meeting of the National
Executive Boards of both unions. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the
resolution on his removal; at the same time, he initiated a complaint before the
DOLE against the National President of NACUSIP and PACIWU questioning the
validity of his removal. He filed a second complaint accusing officers of the
NACUSIP and PACIWU of violation of the C/BL, illegal disbursement of union
funds and abuse of authority. The first case was decided declaring his removal
null and void. The Med-arbiter dismissed the second complaint for lack of
personality. Petitioner appealed the dismissal of the second complaint to public
respondent DOLE who issued the order holding that petitioner’s failure to show
that the administrative remedies have been exhausted was fatal to his cause.
Petitioner alleges that public respondents “switched” the ground for dismissal
from that of “lack of personality to file the complaint to “non exhaustion of
administrative remedies.” Thereby by going outside the issued and purporting
to adjudicate on something upon which the parties were not heard.

ISSUE: W/N public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing the appeal.

HELD: No. An appellate court may only pass upon errors assigned, but

such without exceptions. An appellate court, as well as those in administrative
bodies, are given broad discretionary powers to waive the lack of assignment of
errors and consider errors not assigned. In this case, not only did petitioner fail
to comply with the IRR of the Labor Code, but he also did not exhaust the
remedies set forth by the C/BL of both unions. A party with an administrative
remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to
obtain relief, but also to pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking
judicial intervention to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to said
bodies.

262.