ATLAS FARMS, INC., petitioner, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ISSUE: Whether the LA and the NLRC had jurisdiction to decide complaints for illegal dismissal.
JAIME O. DELA PEA and MARCIAL I. ABION, respondents.
RULING: Article 217 of the Labor Code provides that labor arbiters have original and exclusive
FACTS: Private respondent Jaime O. dela Pea was employed as a veterinary aide by petitioner. jurisdiction over termination disputes. A possible exception is provided in Article 261 of the Labor
He was re-hired by petitioner and given the additional job of feedmill operator. On 1993, Pea was Code, which provides that- The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall have
allegedly caught urinating and defecating on company premises not intended for the purpose. The original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the
farm manager of petitioner issued a formal notice directing him to explain within 24 hours why interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for violating company rules and the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Accordingly, violations of a
regulations. Pea refused, however, to receive the formal notice. He never bothered to explain, Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be
either verbally or in writing, according to petitioner. Thus, a notice of termination with payment of treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective
his monetary benefits was sent to him. Bargaining Agreement.

Co-respondent Marcial I. Abion was a carpenter/mason and a maintenance man whose Under Policy Instruction No. 56 of the Secretary of Labor, termination cases arising in or resulting
employment by petitioner commenced on October 8, 1990. Allegedly, he caused the clogging of from the interpretation and implementation of collective bargaining agreements and interpretation
the fishpond drainage resulting in damages worth several hundred thousand pesos. Petitioner sent and enforcement of company personnel policies fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction
a written notice to Abion, requiring him to explain what happened, otherwise, disciplinary action of the voluntary arbitrator; and, if filed before the Labor Arbiter, these cases shall be dismissed by
would be taken against him. He refused to receive the notice and give an explanation, according to the Labor Arbiter for lack of jurisdiction.
petitioner. Consequently, the company terminated his services on 1992. Pea and Abion filed
separate complaints for illegal dismissal that were later consolidated. Both claimed that their The instant case is a termination dispute falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
termination from service was due to petitioner’s suspicion that they were the leaders in a plan to Labor Arbiter, and does not specifically involve the application, implementation or enforcement of
form a union to compete and replace the existing management-dominated union. company personnel policies contemplated in Policy Instruction No. 56. Consequently, Policy
Instruction No. 56 does not apply in the case at bar.
LA: The labor arbiter dismissed their complaints on the ground that the grievance machinery in
the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) had not yet been exhausted. Private respondents It was held that the dismissal case does not fall within the phrase grievances arising from the
availed of the grievance process, but later on refiled the case before the NLRC in Region IV. They interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the
alleged lack of sympathy on petitioner’s part to engage in conciliation proceedings. Their cases interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Since the real issue then was
were consolidated in the NLRC. whether there was a valid termination, there was no reason to invoke the need to interpret nor
question an implementation of any CBA provision.
Jurisdiction: Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging
private respondents themselves admitted that they were members of the employees union with Furthermore, pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or
which petitioner had an existing CBA. This being the case, according to petitioner, jurisdiction designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is
over the case belonged to the grievance machinery and thereafter the voluntary arbitrator, as unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in
provided in the CBA. The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, finding that the case was advance by the parties to a CBA. Consequently only disputes involving the union and the company
one of illegal dismissal and did not involve the interpretation or implementation of any CBA shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. In these termination cases
provision. Thus, private respondents brought the case to the NLRC, which reversed the labor of private respondents, the union had no participation, it having failed to object to the dismissal of
arbiter’s decision. Dissatisfied with the NLRC ruling, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals by the employees concerned by the petitioner.
way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, seeking reinstatement of the labor
arbiter’s decision. The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC resolution. In sum, the Court conclude that the labor arbiter and then the NLRC had jurisdiction over the
Petitioner forthwith filed its motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this petition. cases involving private respondents dismissal, and no error was committed by the appellate court
in upholding their assumption of jurisdiction.
BEBIANO M. BAEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. DOWNEY C. VALDEVILLA and ORO By the designating clause “arising from the employer-employee relations”, Art. 217 should also
MARKETING, INC., respondents. apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages against its dismissed
employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily connected with the fact of
FACTS: Baez was the sales operations manager of Oro Marketing Inc. In 1993, Oro Marketing termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal case.
indefinitely suspended Baez, prompting Baez to file for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter ruled in
favor of Baez. Since Oro Marketing failed to timely file the appeal, both NLRC and SC dismissed In this case, Oro Marketing’s claim against Baez for actual damages arose from a prior employer-
the same. Oro Marketing filed a complaint for damages before the RTC for loss of profit, cost of employee relationship. In the first place, Oro Marketing’s would not have taken issue with Baez’s
supplies, litigation expenses, and attorney’s fees. “doing business of his own” had the latter not been concurrently its employee. Thus, the damages
alleged in the complaint were: first, those amounting to lost profits and earnings due to Baez’s
It alleged that due to Baez’ modus operandi, its sales decreased and reduced its profits. Baez filed abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager, having been otherwise preoccupied by his
a motion to dismiss, interposing that the action for damages, having arisen from employer- unauthorized installment sale scheme; and second, those equivalent to the value of Oro
employee relationship, was squarely under the exclusive original jurisdiction of NLRC under Art. Marketing’s property and supplies which Baez used in conducting his “business”. In other words,
217(a) par. 4 of Labor Code, and is barred by reason of the final judgment in labor case. As such, the issue of actual damages has been settled in the labor case, which is now final and executory.
he accused Oro Marketing of splitting causes of action, and that the latter should have included the
claim in its counterclaim before the Labor Arbiter. The respondent RTC Judge Valdevilla ruled When regular court has jurisdiction: This is, of course, to distinguish from cases of actions for
that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, since the complaint did not ask for any relief under damages where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action
the Labor Code, but rather to recover damages as redress for Baez’s nefarious activities, causing proceeds from a different source of obligation. Thus, the jurisdiction of regular courts was
damage and prejudice to Oro Marketing. Since this there was a breach of contractual obligation, upheld where the damages, claimed for were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of
which is within the realm of civil law, the jurisdiction belongs to the regular courts. contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee or seeks liquidated
damages in enforcement of a prior employment contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the claim for damages filed by Oro Marketing
against Baez.
G.R. Nos. 191288 & 191304 March 7, 2012
RULING: No. RTC had no jurisdiction over Oro Marketing’s complaint for damages. RTC was MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. JAN CARLO GALA, Respondent.
incorrect in saying that the resolution of the issues presented by the complaint did not entail
application of the Labor Code or other labor laws; the dispute was intrinsically civil. Article FACTS: Respondent Jan Carlo Gala commenced employment with the petitioner Meralco
217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and Electric Company (Meralco) as a probationary lineman. He initially served as member of the crew
exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations —in of Meralco’s Truck No. 1823. After one month, he joined the crew of Truck No. 1837. Barely four
other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by months on the job, Gala was dismissed for alleged complicity in pilferages of Meralco’s electrical
labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code. supplies. Despite Gala’s explanation, Meralco proceeded with the investigation and eventually
terminated his employment. Gala responded by filing an illegal dismissal complaint.
On May 1, 1979, however, Presidential Decree (“P.D.”) No. 1367 amended said Article 217 to the
effect that “Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings: The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of
moral or other forms of damages.” This limitation in jurisdiction, however, lasted only briefly merit. She held that Gala’s participation in the pilferage of Meralco’s property rendered him
since on May 1, 1980, P.D. No. 1691 nullified P.D. No. 1367 and restored Article 217 of the unqualified to become a regular employee. Gala appealed to the NLRC which reversed the LA’s
Labor Code almost to its original form. Presently, and as amended by R.A. 6715, the jurisdiction ruling. It found that Gala had been illegally dismissed, since there was “no concrete showing of
of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC in Article 217 is comprehensive enough to include claims for all complicity with the alleged misconduct/dishonesty.” The NLRC, however, ruled out Gala’s
forms of damages “arising from the employer-employee relations”. reinstatement, stating that his tenure lasted only up to the end of his probationary period. It
awarded him backwages and attorney’s fees.
Both parties moved for partial reconsideration; Gala, on the ground that he should have been We consider, too, and we find credible the company submission that the Meralco crew who
reinstated with full backwages, damages and interests; and Meralco, on the ground that the NLRC worked at the Pacheco Subdivision in Valenzuela City on May 25, 2006 had not been returning
erred in finding that Gala had been illegally dismissed. The NLRC denied the motions. Relying on unused supplies and materials, to the prejudice of the company. From all these, the allegedly
the same grounds, Gala and Meralco elevated the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari hearsay evidence that is not competent in judicial proceedings (as noted above), takes on special
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. meaning and relevance. With respect to the video footage of the May 25, 2006 incident, Gala
himself admitted that he viewed the tape during the administrative investigation, particularly in
CA: The CA denied Meralco’s petition for lack of merit and partially granted Gala’s petition. It connection with the accusation against him that he allowed Llanes (binatilyong may kapansanan
concurred with the NLRC that Gala had been illegally dismissed, a ruling that was supported by sa bibig) to board the Meralco trucks.26 The choice of evidence belongs to a party and the mere
the evidence. It opined that nothing in the records show Gala’s knowledge of or complicity in the fact that the video was shown to Gala indicates that the video was not an evidence that Meralco
pilferage. It found insufficient the joint affidavit of the members of Meralco’s task force testifying was trying to suppress. Gala could have, if he had wanted to, served a subpoena for the production
that Gala and two other linemen knew Llanes. The CA modified the NLRC decision and ordered of the video footage as evidence. The fact that he did not does not strengthen his case nor weaken
Gala’s reinstatement with full backwages and other benefits. The CA also denied Meralco’s the case of Meralco.
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
On the whole, the totality of the circumstances obtaining in the case convinces us that Gala could
ISSUE: Whether Gala’s reinstatement despite his probationary status is proper. not but have knowledge of the pilferage of company electrical supplies on May 25, 2006; he was
complicit in its commission, if not by direct participation, certainly, by his inaction while it was
RULING: We find merit in the petition. The Court stress at this point that it is the spirit and being perpetrated and by not reporting the incident to company authorities. Thus, we find
intention of labor legislation that the NLRC and the labor arbiters shall use every reasonable substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Gala does not deserve to remain in Meralco’s
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities employ as a regular employee. He violated his probationary employment agreement, especially the
of law or procedure, provided due process is duly observed. In keeping with this policy and in the requirement for him “to observe at all times the highest degree of transparency, selflessness and
interest of substantial justice, we deem it proper to give due course to the petition, especially in integrity in the performance of their duties and responsibilities.” He failed to qualify as a regular
view of the conflict between the findings of the labor arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and employee. For ignoring the evidence in this case, the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
the CA, on the other. and, in sustaining the NLRC, the CA committed a reversible error.

Contrary to the conclusions of the CA and the NLRC, there is substantial evidence supporting McBurnie vs. Ganzon, G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117, October 17, 2013
Meralco’s position that Gala had become unfit to continue his employment with the company.
Gala was found, after an administrative investigation, to have failed to meet the standards FACTS: On October 4, 2002, McBurnie, an Australian national, instituted a complaint for illegal
expected of him to become a regular employee and this failure was mainly due to his “undeniable dismissal and other monetary claims against the respondents. McBurnie claimed that on May 11,
knowledge, if not participation, in the pilferage activities done by their group, all to the prejudice 1999, he signed a five-year employment agreement with the company EGI as an Executive Vice-
of the Company’s interests.” President who shall oversee the management of the company’s hotels and resorts within the
Philippines. He performed work for the company until sometime in November 1999, when he
Evidence: The evidence on record established Gala’s presence in the worksite where the pilferage figured in an accident that compelled him to go back to Australia while recuperating from his
of company property happened. It also established that it was not only on May 25, 2006 that injuries. While in Australia, he was informed by respondent Ganzon that his services were no
Llanes, the pilferer, had been seen during a Meralco operation. He had been previously noticed by longer needed because their intended project would no longer push through. The respondents
Meralco employees, including Gala (based on his admission), in past operations. If Gala had seen opposed the complaint, contending that their agreement with McBurnie was to jointly invest in
Llanes in earlier projects or operations of the company, it is incredulous for him to say that he did and establish a company for the management of hotels. They did not intend to create an employer-
not know why Llanes was there or what Zuñiga and Llanes were talking about. To our mind, the employee relationship, and the execution of the employment contract that was being invoked by
Meralco crew (the foremen and the linemen) allowed or could have even asked Llanes to be there McBurnie was solely for the purpose of allowing McBurnie to obtain an alien work permit in the
during their operations for one and only purpose — to serve as their conduit for pilfered company Philippines. At the time McBurnie left for Australia for his medical treatment, he had not yet
supplies to be sold to ready buyers outside Meralco worksites. obtained a work permit.
Labor Arbiter: The LA declared McBurnie as having been illegally dismissed from employment, ISSUE: Whether the CA committed reversible error in finding that the NLRC committed grave
and thus entitled to receive: (a) US$985,162.00 as salary and benefits for the unexpired term of abuse of discretion when it implemented the provision of the Labor Code, Art. 223 and Sec. 6,
their employment contract, (b) ₱2,000,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and (c) attorney’s Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. YES.
fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed the appeal
and motion to reduce the bond of approximately P60M. RULING: The petition is granted. The decision and resolution of the CA are reversed and set
aside. The resolutions of the NLRC are reinstated and affirmed.
On one of the many appeals to CA, it granted the motion to reduce appeal bond and directed
NLRC to give due course to their appeal. Meanwhile, the CA rendered the assailed decision Under Art. 223 of the Labor Code, the posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an
granting respondents motion to reduce appeal bond and directing them to post an appeal bond of appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Moreover, the
P10 million with the NLRC, which was likewise ordered to give due course to the appeal and to filing of the bond is not only mandatory but a jurisdictional requirement as well, that must be
conduct further proceedings. complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC.
NLRC then reversed and set aside the ruling of LA above. The NLRC rule that: (1) McBurnie was Although the general rule provides that an appeal in labor cases from a decision involving a
never an employee of the respondents and (2) he failed to obtain work permit that would have monetary award may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond, the Court has
allowed him to work for the respondents. The third division of SC however reversed the decision relaxed this requirement under certain exceptional circumstances in order to resolve controversies
of CA granting the motion to reduce the bond and it directive for The NLRC to give course to the on their merits. These circumstances include: (1) the fundamental consideration of substantial
appeal. The earlier ruling of LA thus became final. This is deemed a third MR. (Note: The court justice; (2) the prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3) special
held that even if it is procedurally defective since it’s already a third MR, it does not preclude the circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved.
court from ruling for the sake of substantial justice.)
The jurisdictional principle and the mandatory nature of the appeal bond posted within the 10-day
ISSUE: Whether McBurnie, an Australian national can be considered as an employee of Ganzon? reglementary period are reaffirmed by the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. While the bond
may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion
RULING: The court basically adopted the ruling of NLRC. The Court held that before McBurnie to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation
can allege illegal dismissal, it was necessary for him to establish, first and foremost, that he was to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond
qualified and duly authorize to obtain employment w/in our jurisdiction. This requirement for shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
foreigners who intend to work within the country to obtain employment permit is laid down in Art.
40 Title II of the Labor Code. Records show that respondents filed their memorandum of appeal and motion to reduce appeal
bond on the 10th or last day of the reglementary period. Although they posted an initial appeal
Failure to do so poses serious problem in obtaining relief from the Court. Hence, by the very fact bond, the same was grossly inadequate. Further, there is no basis in respondent’s contention that
that McBurnie failed to obtain employment permit necessitates the dismissal of his labor the awards of the Labor Arbiter were null and excessive, and with premeditated intention to render
complaint. The court also noted that McBurnie failed to establish employer –employee respondents incapable of posting an appeal bond and deprive them of the right to appeal. It also
relationship. The records disclose that employment of McBurnie is conditional on the successful does not escape judicial notice that the cash/surety bond requirement does not necessitate the
completion of the project financing for the hotel project in Baguio City and his acquisition of employer to physically surrender the entire amount of the monetary judgment.
Alien Employment Permit. It must be noted that the project did not push through. McBurnie
likewise failed to prove employer-employee relationship in accordance w/ the four-fold test: (1) The usual procedure is for the employer to obtain the services of a bonding company, which will
selection & engagement (2) payment of wages (3) power of dismissal and (4) control. McBurnie then require the employer to pay a percentage of the award in exchange for a bond securing the
also failed to show any document such as payslips or vouchers of his salaries during the time that full amount.
he allegedly worked for the respondent.
ALEJANDRO ROQUERO, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondent. These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the
workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic
FACTS: Roquero, along with Rene Pabayo, were ground equipment mechanics of respondent force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms with equal intensity. Labor is an indispensable
PAL. From the evidence on record, it appears that Roquero and Pabayo were caught red-handed partner for the nation’s progress and stability. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating
possessing and using Methampethamine Hydrochloride or shabu in a raid conducted by PAL employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution
security officers and NARCOM personnel. Roquero and Pabayo received a “notice of pending appeal.
administrative charge” for violating the PAL Code of Discipline. They were required to answer
the charges and were placed under preventive suspension. Roquero and company alleged that they Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may authorize an immediate
were set up by PAL to take the drugs through a certain trainee. In a Memorandum dated July 14, implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since
1994, Roquero and Pabayo were dismissed by PAL. Thus, they filed a case for illegal dismissal. that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor
of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or
The Labor Arbiter ruled against Roquero and upheld the validity of their dismissal, but awarded separated employee and his family.
separation pay. While the case was on appeal with the NLRC, the complainants were acquitted by
the RTC, in the criminal case which charged them with “conspiracy for possession and use of a The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to
regulated drug in violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act 6425,” on the ground of reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the
instigation. The NLRC ruled in favor of complainants as it likewise found PAL guilty of employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a
instigation. It ordered reinstatement to their former positions but without backwages. restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of
Complainants did not appeal from the decision but filed a motion for a writ of execution of the reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory on
order of reinstatement. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion but PAL refused to execute the said PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL
order on the ground that they have filed a Petition for Review before this Court. In accordance must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from the time of the decision
with the case of St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC and Bienvenido Aricayos, PAL’s petition was of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of this Court.
referred to the Court of Appeals.
We reiterate the rule that technicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court are
The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and held that petitioner’s dismissal was valid, but it applied only in a suppletory manner and only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and
denied the award of separation pay. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review under Rule 45. not to defeat them. Hence, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed
ISSUE: Whether or not PAL can validly refuse to execute an order for reinstatement on the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the
ground that the case is still on appeal. employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed
with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is
RULING: The SC held that PAL cannot refuse to execute an order for reinstatement on the entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period.
ground that the case is still on appeal.
Dismissal of Petitioner is affirmed, but respondent PAL is ordered to pay the wages to which
Article 223(3) of the Labor Code (as amended by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, and Roquero is entitled from the time the reinstatement order was issued until the finality of this
Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under RA No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code) decision.
provide that an order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even pending
appeal. In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the
Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a
compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987
Constitution on labor and the working man.
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the
AND FACULTY OF LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS, respondents. suspension of negotiation by the employer.

FACTS: During the renegotiation of the respondent unions Collective Bargaining Agreement with 2. The factual backdrop of the termination of Ambas led the Court to no other conclusion that
the petitioner, Eleonor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President of the union. Ambas wanted she was dismissed in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of her
to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the co-workers in the bargaining table. While the Court recognizes the right of the employer to
CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. However, the union members rejected the terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, nevertheless, the
said CBA. Thereafter, petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of aw and pursuant to the tenets
NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the petitioner. This decision was reversed on appeal of equity and fair play. Even assuming arguendo that Ambas was guilty of insubordination,
with the NLRC. such disobedience was not a valid ground to terminate her employment. When the exercise of
the management to discipline its employees tends to interfere with the employees’ right to
The parties later agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on new five-year self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act.
CBA. During the pendency of approval of proposals, Ambas was informed that her work schedule
was being changed. Ambas protested and requested management to submit the issue to a Certification Elections; In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process
grievance machinery under the old CBA. After the petitioner’s inaction on the CBA, the union there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. In
filed a notice to strike. After meeting with the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process there must be a valid
renegotiation, Ambas received a letter dismissing her for alleged insubordination. The petitioner petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of
then ceased negotiations when it received news that another labor organization had filed a petition a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the
for certification. The union finally struck, but the Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered employer. The petition must first comply with the provisions of the Labor Code and its
them to return to work and for petitioner to accept them back. The Secretary of Labor and Implementing Rules. Foremost is that a petition for certification election must be filed during the
Employment later rendered judgement that the petitioner had been guilty of unfair labor practice. sixty-day freedom period.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the former.
Contract Bar Rule; Under the “Contract Bar Rule,” if a collective bargaining agreement has been
ISSUES: duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Labor Code, a petition for certification
1. Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the
when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new CBA; and expiry date of such agreement; The rule is that despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the
2. Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees’ CBA the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have
right to self-organization. been validly executed.

RULING: The Supreme Court found the petition unmeritorious.

1. The petitioner’s failure to act upon the submitted CBA proposal within the ten-day period
exemplified in Article 250 of the Labor Code is a clear violation of the governing procedure
of collective bargaining. As the Court has held in Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, the company’s refusal
to make counter-proposal to the union’s proposed CBA is an indication of bad
faith. Moreover, the succeeding events are obvious signs that the petitioner had merely been
employing delaying tactics to the passage of the proposed CBA. Moreover, in order to allow
the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process, there must be a valid petition for
certification election raising a legitimate representation issue.