Kwame Arhin A Profile of Brong Kyempim

ESSAYS ON THE SOCIETY,
HISTORY AND POLITICS OF

THE BRONG PEOPLE
Edited with introduction by

Kwame Arhin
(ij vut venu ry
ciiM . ^J~y*sdu~-^
A PROFILE OF
BRONG KYEMPIM
(Essays on the Archaeology, History, Language and Politics of the
Brong Peoples of Ghana)
Edited with Introduction
By
KW AME A R H IN
Senior Research Fellow, Institute o f African Studies, University o f

Ghana, Legon
Published by
A FRAM PUBLICATIONS (GHANA) LIMITED
P. O. BOX M. 18, ACCRA. GHANA
in co-operation with
INSTITUTE OF A FR IC A N STUDIES,
UNIVERSITY OF GHANA. LEGON
(f) Institute o f A frican Studies

University o f Ghana, Legon 1979
Printed at New Times Corporation, Accra

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface ............................................................................. 5
Contributors ................................................................. 7
M ap of Brong Ahafo ..................................................... 8
Introduction: The B r o n g ..................................................... 9
Chapter p age
M. POSNANSKY
i Archaeological Aspects of the Brong-Ahafo Region 22
K. O. ODOOM
ii A N ote on the History of Islam in Brong-Ahafo ... 36
NANA KW AKYE AMEYAW & KWAME A R H IN

iii Bono Manso and T ech im an ..............................................49
KW AME A R H IN
iv Asante Security Posts in the Northwest ................. 56
K. A. BRITWUM
Kwadwo Adinkra of Gyaman: A study of the
Relations between the Brong Kingdom o f Gya-
v man and Asante c. 1800-1818 68
K. Y. DAAKU
vi Politics Among the Eastern B r o n g ................................. 80
FLORENCE DOLPHYNE
vii The Brong (Bono) Dialect of Akan ................ 88
F. K. DRAH
viii The Brong Political Movement ............................... 119
PREFACE
W ith the exception of chapter viii, all the papers in this volume
were read and discussed at an inter-disciplinary seminar on the
Brong district of the Brong-Ahafo Region held at the Institute of
African Studies, University o f Ghana, Legon from 16th to 18th
M arch, 1973.
The authors are grateful to the Institute of African Studies for
the facilities offered for the seminar and for getting the papers into
shape for publication; to Nana Agyeman Badu, Omanhene of
Dormaa, for his active interest in the seminar; to Nana Kwakye
Ameyaw, Omanhene of Techiman, for joining us at the seminar;
and to Professors Adu Boahen and John Hunwick and M r Isaac
Tuffuor, Senior Lecturer, o f the History Departm ent and Dr
George Benneh, Senior Lecturer, Department of Geography for
their contributions to the discussions at the seminar.
Dr Paul Baxter o f the University of M anchester and Professor
K. Wiredu, University of G hana, read drafts of the papers and
made invaluable suggestions. But they are in no way responsible
for the faults in the book.
D r Kwame Yeboah-Daaku, a beloved colleague and contributor,
died before we went to press. This volume is dedicated to his memory.
Legon. Kwame Arhin
July, 1974
Contributors
M. Posnansky ... Professor in Archaeology and

Head of Departm ent of Arch
aeology, University of Ghana,
Legon.
K. O. O d o o m ............... ... Research Fellow in Islamic Studies

at the Institute o f African
Studies, University of Ghana,
Legon.
Kwakye Arneyaw II ... ... Omanhene of Techiman in the

Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana.
Kwame Arhin ... Senior Research Fellow in Social

Anthropology at the Institute of
African Studies, University of
Ghana, Legon.
K. A. Britwutn............... ... Senior Lecturer in History, D epart

ment of History of the Universi
ty of Cape Coast, Cape Coast.
K. Y. Daaku ... Senior Lecturer in History at the

Institute of African Studies,
University of Ghana, Legon.
Florence Dolphyne ... Senior Lecturer in Linguistics at

the Departm ent of Linguistics
of the University of Ghana,
Legon.
F. K. Draft ............. ... Senior Lecturer, Departm ent of

Political Science, University of
Ghana, Legon.
B RONG A H A F O REGION
INTRODUCTION*
THE BRONG
Kwame Arhin
As noted in the Preface, eight of the nine papers in this volum e1

were read at an inter-disciplinary seminar held at the Inslitute of
African Studies, Legon, in M arch 1973. The original aim of the
Seminar had been to produce data on the basis of which cne could
demarcate the Brong people as a distinctive Akan sub-group. It
turned out that only four of the papers provide some useful evidence
for that task.
Firstly, Dolphyne shows that Brong dialects constitute a group
within the Akan or Twi language which is quite distinct from
Asante, south and west of the Brong language area. These dialects
are localized in that section of the Brong-Ahafo Region which is
distinguished as ‘Brong’ from the ‘Ahafo’ section. The people of
the Ahafo section speak Asante-Twi and regard themselves as
Asante and not Brong.
But in the area of the Volta Bend, the northwestern corner of
the Brong area, there are Gur-speaking peoples (for example, the
Nafana of Sampa, the Koulango of Seikwa and Badu and the
Mo/Degha of New Longoro) as well as Mande-speaking peoples
(such as the Ligby of Banda and Kintampo, the Hwela and Numu
of Namasa and Nsoko) who may speak a Brong dialect only as a
second language (Goody 1963: 178; 181; 1964: 193-204) just as
most speakers of Brong dialects may speak Asante as a second
language.2
If, then, the ‘Brong’ are defined as those peoples who speak
Brong dialects as their first language, one must exclude from the
Brong peoples the Gur and Mande-speaking peoples.
Secondly, Nana Kwakye Ameyaw distinguishes between the
Brong and the Asante on the basis of the days of occurrence of their
main periodic festivals. The Brong have abono nne which fall on
week-days, e.g. Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. The Asante
have the Akwasidae which falls on Sundays. It is not only the days
of occurrence of the main festivals which differentiates the two
groups. As Nana stated in an unpublished part of my interview
♦Unless otherwise indicated, the use of names in the text refers to contributions
in this volume.
Kwame Arhin
with him, for the ‘true’ Brong, who, to him are the people of Techi-
man (the successor state to Bono Manso), the foci of the abono m e
rites are the state deities. For the Asante, the foci of the rites are
the stools, or rather their deceased occupants. One might speculate
further: it appears that it would be found on deeper enquiry that,
for the Brong, communion with their numerous state and family
deities through their priests is the main element of their religion.
In contrast, for the Asante, it is communion with the ancestors.3
Again the use of this criterion for the definition of ‘Brong’ would
mean the exclusion of the non-Akan peoples, the Koulango, the
Ligby, the Nafana and the Degha.
Thirdly, Nana Ameyaw says that the true ‘Brong’ are citizens of
Techiman and that the term ‘Brong’ is derived from ‘Bono’ the
name of the first northern Akan state. Nana Ameyaw is probably
right. Abronfo (pi. of Bronni sing = men or man of Bono) m ust
certainly refer to the citizens of the kingdom of Bono, a pre-Asante
state recorded on the old European maps and described by Dapper
as bordering on “ Wankyi” or Wenchi. Bowdich (1819:233) was
informed that Osei Tulu (d. 1712/1716) conquered ‘Boorom’ soon
after the conquest of Denkyera. The major Asante conquest in
the north after the conquest of Denkyera was that of Bono-Manso,
which is dated 1722/23 and occurred in the reign of Opoku Ware
(1720-1750). Dupuis (1824:233) indeed places ‘the subjugation of
Bouromy' in the reign of Opoku Ware. Dupuis also (op. c/7., appen
dix iv, xxxiv) described ‘Bouromy’ as a district bordering on the
Volta. Rattray (1923:104) identified the true Brong as citizens of
Techiman.
It does appear, then, th at by the nineteenth century, the whole
area between Asante-Mampong and the Volf a was known both to
the peoples in that area and to outsiders as ‘Brong’ signifying an
area that but for the Asante conquest, would be the domain, ‘Bono-
man’, of the king of Bono-Manso.4
If this is the case it follows that incoming groups were called
‘Brong’ by virtue of their relative nearness to the Bcno M anso
state; or th at the term ‘Brong’ was imposed upon such peoples
as those of Gyaman, Dorm aa, Atebubu, Nkoranza and the sub-
chiefdoms in the district by their northern (ihe Gonja) and southern
neighbours (the Asante) as a reference name. This would account
for the designation of the aboriginal inhabitants in the Begho area
as Brong by their Mande speaking co-settlers (Posnansky). It appears,
also from information gathered at Bcrekum, that the aboriginal
inhabitants in the districts occupied in the area of modern Sunyani-
Odumasi, Nsoatre, Berekum and Dorm aa were all called ‘Brong’
by the southern immigrants, the ruling groups and their adherents.
The immigrant rulers and their aboriginal subjects occupied
politically discrete territories, preserved and transm itted separate
10
The Brong
traditions of origin or ‘histories’, observed separate rituals of

chiefship and thus maintained separate political identities under
their own names. The bonds between them were geographical
contiguity, related dialects and most important of all, the Asante
connection. Paradoxically it was the Asante connection that nur
tured Brong consciousness and Brong self-identification by the
various peoples and that thereby became the basis of the twentieth
century struggle for a separate Brong Chiefs’ Council and adminis
trative region.
The peoples of these states have accepted the designation ‘Brong’,
particularly in situations of political conflict with Asante. In its
modern sense — since the last quarter of the nineteenth century—
‘Brong’ has acquired a distinctively political meaning. It has become
a protest word adopted by those living northeast, north and north
west of Asante who deny political allegiance to the Asantehene.
So used, ‘Brong’ covers such non-Akan peoples as the Nafana and
Koulango peoples of Sampa and Seikwa, all Gur-speaking, who
on linguistic or other cultural grounds5 would deny that they are
Brong. The people of Berekum, for example, say that they are-
culturally Asante, but in most political situations identify them
selves as Brong. That kind of political identification also has certain
cultural consequences. A Brong who insists on his non-Asantenes,
i.e. denies th at he owes allegiance to the Asantehene, would nor
mally speak his Brong dialect particularly in situations of vehement
political protest. This has had the effect of reviving interest in
Brong dialects among groups who before the movement for Brong
seccession from Asante had considered it convenient and advanta
geous to speak Asante (Dolphyne).
While the papers do not deal at all exhaustively with the original
question of investigating the Brong people as a separate sub-Akan
grouping, they draw attention to the place of the Brong area in the
commercial, cultural and political history of the constituent peoples
of modern Ghana.
As Posnansky points out, the Brong district lay in ‘contrasting
ecological zones’ in a zone separating the northern savannah from
the southern forest. The zone favoured the entry of the beasts of
burden of Mande-speaking traders, was auriferous, and in these
conditions, ideally situated for market establishments mediating
between the gold and kola forest areas and the old-established m ar
kets of the middle Niger. Commerce with the north involved not
only the aboriginal people of the Begho area, the Brong of Bono-
Manso but also the Nchumuru east, and the other Akan south, of
the Begho area.
W ith trade came cultural influences: Akan craftworks were
influenced by the Mande-speaking establishments. It is highly
11
Kwame Ar/iin
probable that the initial stimulus to the evolution of the Akan gold
currency and weight systems was trade with the market establish
ments of the Begho complex (Posnansky). Cloth-making, black-
smithery, gold-smithery, tannery and weaving among the Brong of
Bono-Manso and through their mediation, among the southern
Akan, were also influenced through contact with the sedentary and
itinerant traders of Begho.
Islam has not done very well among the Akan. But whatever early
progress it made was partly from the direction of the early settle
ments of Begho (Odoom).
The political history of the Brong peoples is the history of their
struggles with the Asante. The Brong district today has ten para
mount chiefdoms in an area of 13,680 square miles. These are
Abease, Atebubu, Banda, Berekum, Dormaa, Nkoranza, New Drobo
Mo, Techiman and Wenchi. Of these only four—Banda, Dormaa*
Nkoranza and Techiman—had what the Asante regarded as para
mount, obrempon, status before the colonial period. Abease, Atebu
bu, Berekum, Mo, New Drobo (half of the old Gyaman (Abron) chief-
dom in British territory) and Wenchi were British-created para
mount cies. But paramount or obrenipon status in the days of Asante
hegemony meant not independence but subjection to the Asantehene.
Struggles between the peoples who later came to be identified as
Asante and as Brong started in the seventeenth century and was
certainly the major factor in preventing the consolidation of a Brong
kingdom comparable in cohesion and size w ith the united Asante
kingdom. The Oyoko dynasty under Obiri Yeboah started fighting
with Dormaa, (the later Abron), in the Kwaman, modern Kumasi
area, in the first hall ot the seventeenth cenlury. The fighting con
tinued through the reigns of Osei Tutu and Opoku Ware and ended
aV e^cal, Gyaman in 1746/47. Asante defeated and destroyed
Ahwene Koko, the capital of old Wenchi, in 1711 or 1712.6 Asante
also conquered Bono-Manso in 1722/23. Nkoranza (to which M o/
Degha later became an appendage) which was firmly established
alter the Asante-Bono-Manso War, was really a northern extension
ot A sante.7 Banda became an Asante ‘ally’ early in the eighteenth
century. Atebubu, Abease and neighbouring communities were
brought under Asante rule in about 1744/45. The nature of A sante’s
historic relations with Dorm aa is obscure and requires investigation.
It appears that Dormaa, a part of the Gyaman kingdom, reached its
own accommodation with Asante early in the eighteenth century
and was thereafter treated distinctly from the main Gyaman chief-
dom established in the area of modern Bonduku.
Asante statecraft bore heavily on the Brong territories. N ot only
did the Brong make substantia] contributions to the At ante eccncrr v
and manpower requirements in the domestic economy and Asante
12
The Brong
warfare8 but it is also in this area that the Asante tried their major
methods of incorporation. Bono-Manso was dismembered; nine of
its villages, including Tuobodom, 4 miles north of the new capital of
Techiman, became administrative units of Kumasi. Sunyani-
Odumasi, Nsoatre and Berekum were also directly subjected to the
Kumasi (Bantama) stool, resulting in the separation of Dormaa
territories of Boma, Abessim and Chiraa from the main territorial
block of Warn. Seikwa was directly administered by the Akyempim-
hene, Nsawkaw and Badu by the Adumhene of Kumasi. Odumasi
and Berekum in particular served as Asante security posts.
A major reason for the Asante interest in the Brong districts was
undoubtedly economic. The northwest was rich in gold and in such
raw material as cotton. It remained an area of trade establishments—
including Bonduku and Wenchi—even after the break-up of Begho;
and it was the source of craftsmen’s skills which the Asanlc showed
considerable ingenuity in organizing and adapting to their socio
political needs.9 Similarly the ‘Brong’ of the northeast, though w ith
out gold, intervened between Asante-Mampong and the kola
markets in Dagomba (Yendi) whence the Asante derived savannah
craft w'orks, luxury and consumer goods, and natural products,
including livestock, salt (from Daboya) and smelled iron in exchange
for kola nuts.
‘Brong’ opposition to Asante rule was led by Gyaman which
throughout the eighteenth century took opportunities offered by a
new succession to the Asante stool and therefore the untested
generalship of a new ruler to launch a secessionist revolt. The last
in the series of Gyaman violent revolts against Asante was in 1818-—
1819 (Britwum). Thereafter the Brong both in the northwest and in
the northeast had to wait till 1874.
The British invasion of Kumasi in that year was followed by a
civil war between Kumasi and Dwaben, by the deposit ion of Karikari
and over a decade of succession wars in Asante. The Brong of both
the northeast and the northwest saw their opportunities in the trou
bles in Asante. In the east the Brong of Atebubu, Abease, Wiase and
the Guang of Krachi—later to be joined by N koranza—established
an anti-Asante confederation and requested the British for protection
against a possible Asante attem pt at another take-over. The Govern
ment of the Gold Coast sustained the independence of the eastern
Brong because of their interest in trade in the northeast; also while
not ready, owing to restraints from London, to extend the territory
under its rule, the Government of the Gold Coast wanted to keep
Asante divided and weakened in the event of a future possible
take-over of Asante. A ‘forward-looking’ policy required that
Asante be stripped of her former territories in the north whose
populations increased her fighting power and whose resources made
her rich; or at least that the secessionist territories be sustained in
their independence (Daaku).
13
Kwame Arhin
In the northwest, Gyaman was also at the head of a confederation

that included Techiman and which also sought protection from the
Government of the Gold C oast.10 A consequence of the anti-Asante
movement was the attack on Berekum and Nsoatre in 1883-84
that tor a period made Berekum and Nsoatre subject to the Gyaman
kingdom (Arhin).
The seeds of Brong consciousness, then, were sown in the period
of the anti-Asante movements following 1874. However, there is no
evidence that there was a political conjunction between the eastern
and western Brong. Also the movement which in the west included
such non-Brong as a section of the Sefwi people, were purely defen
sive alliances against possible future Asante attacks. This passive
characteristic and the intervention of European rule, (for Gyaman,
European rule meant a division of its territory into French and
British Gyaman) prevented Brong consciousness from crystallizing
into a movement towards an all-Brong political unification.
The Brong states became severally parts of the Asante ‘protectora
te ’ between 1896 and 1901 and were independently administered by
the Ashanti Resident and his subordinate officers. With the Asante-
hene exiled and the Native Committee of Administration restricted
in its operations to the Kumasi division, the Brong states won the
independence ot Kumasi to which they had apparently always
aspired. The Techimanhene in particular had the satisfaction of
getting restored to him the Tano-Subin valley villages which had
been taken from him in the reign of Opoku Ware. And the chiefs of
Atebubu, Abease, Berekum, New Drobo and Wenchi became newly
independent states under colonial rule; in the case of Berekum with
additions of territory.
On the annexation of Asante to the British Crown by an order in
Council (1 January 1901) and the passage of the Ashanti Admini
stration Ordinance of 1902, A shanti was divided into four admini
strative districts, the Brong states forming the north-western and
north-eastern districts of Ashanti.
There were further administrative reorganizations in 1906, 1907
and 1913 and also in 1920. The order No. 4 of 1920 divided Asante
into two provinces, eastern and western; most of the Brong states
were included in the western provinces.11
It does appear th at the habit of nearly two centuries of relations
with Kumasi chiefs had stuck. It has been reported, rather curiously,
th at contrary to the expectations and orders of the colonial adm ini
stration, certain Brong chiefs—Techiman, Dormaa and Berekum —
continued to recognize the Kumasi chiefs as their ‘head chiefs’ to
whom they preferred to refer major oath and land cases rather than
to the officers of the colonial adm inistration.12
14
The Brong
It was probably the same habit of centuries (enforced by common

inclusion within one colonial adm inistration and a certain amount
of pressure from officers of the colonial adm inistration) which was
responsible for the ultim ate decision of all but one (Atebubu) of
the Brong states to join the Asante Confederacy Council of chiefs.
At the start of the enquiry to determine which of the Brong chiefs
favoured the restoration of the Confederacy, the chiefs of Banda
and Mo favoured restoration; Wenchi and Nkoranza were silent.
Atebubu, Abease, Berekum, Dormaa, Gyaman and Techiman said
they were opposed. Yet ultimately only Atebubu refused to join.
When the Confederacy was inaugurated on 31st of January 1935, it
included the ‘Brong’ divisions of Banda, Mo and Wenchi. Nkoranza,
Gyaman, Dormaa and Berekum joined in May 1935, Techiman in
April 1936, and Abease in October 1938.13 The restoration meant in
essence subordination to the Asantehene—though this time under
the supervision of the British colonial adm inistration—which they
had appeared to dislike in the days before British rule.
In view of the subsequent outbreak of the movement for a se
parate Brong Council of chiefs and adm inistrative region, the willing
ness of the Brong chiefs to join the Confederacy in 1935/36 requires
explanation. In addition to the force of habit and pressure by colonial
officials noted above, there were other possible reasons. Firstly, it is
probable that a chief like the Techimanhene hoped to have his grie
vances over the Tano-Subin villages attended to if he were within
the Confederacy rather than outside i t .14 Secondly, individual
Brong chiefs, who in this period had apparently not thought of
uniting and asking for a separate Council of chiefs, were probably
impressed by the prospect of advantages that might be derived from
inclusion within a large adm inistration area and chiefs’ council.
Drah deals at length with the reasons for the Brong movement
which ended in the creation of the Brong-Ahafo Region and a Brong
Ahafo House of Chiefs in 1959. The reasons may be sought in three
main areas. These are: (/') The expectation of the Techimanbene that
his voluntary adherence to the Confederacy would induce the Asan
tehene to return the nine Tano-Subin villages to him turned out to be
false, (ii) The composition and working of the Confederacy, with its
institutions like the Asantehene’s court A, and welfare scheme like
the ‘Ashanti National Fund’, from which scholarships were expected
to be awarded to the subjects of all the Confederacy states, appeared
to be unfavourable to and discriminatory against the B ro n g . 13
(Hi) The Asante and Brong states held different views about the
political significance of the Confederacy, and in particular about the
position of the Asantehene. For the Asante, the Confederacy meant
a revival of the A sante‘C onstitution’ before colonial rule. Then the
Asantehene had been the undisputed head of •— as the Asante
thought—nine districts of Asante: namely, Adansi, Asante-Akyem,
15
Kwame Arhin
Atwima, Amansie, Ahafo, Brong, Kwabre, Manso and Sekyere.

They therefore insisted upon the old tokens of acceptance of the
Asantehene as overlord, such as that a newly installed omanhene
should take an oath of allegiance to the Asantehene in the course of
which the latter should place his right foot on the neck of the latter;
or that no omanhene should have gold or any other ornaments
similar to those of the A santehene.16
The Brong, on the other hand, thought that the confederacy was a
voluntary association of “ free” states in which at best only deference
might be paid to the Asantehene. They in turn objected to these
tokens of subjection to the Asantehene and the indignities to which
they claimed that chiefs were subjected in Kumasi for what the
Asante chiefs considered as evidence of insubordination.17
The consequence of all this was the birth of modern ‘Brong’ con
sciousness and separatism followed by the adoption of what may be
called Brong ‘nationality’ even by those stales that had before then
not considered themselves as Brong. The states of Techiman,
Dormaa, Drobo, Abease, Suma and Antepim-Domase declared their
secession from the Confederacy in 1952.18 The Brong-Asante issue
became merged in the struggle for power between the Convention
Peoples’ Party, the ruling party, and the Opposition Parties inclu
ding the short-lived National Liberation M ovem ent.19
I suggest three reasons for the success of the Brong in winning a
separate region together with Ahafo. The first is the sheer determi
nation of the leaders o f the movement who were successful in exploit
ing the political differences between the leaders of the ruling party
and the Kumasi chiefs, all strong adherents of the N ational Libera
tion Movement. The second reason arose from the first. It was the
desire o f the leaders of the ruling party to break the Asante Region
into politically manageable units. The third reason was that a
separate region for Brong-Ahafo was administratively viable and,
perhaps, desirable. The table following shows the position o f the
Brong-Ahafo Region in term s of size, population and urban
centres in relation to the other regions of G hana:
But the political struggles between some o the Brong and Kumasi
chiefs did not end with the creation of the Brong-Ahafo Region.
Neither the Brong-Ahafo Region Act (1959) nor the G hana Consti
tution (1960) specifically mentioned inter-regional traditional
political allegiance. The chiefs in the Brong area who were recog
nized amanhene became members o f the Brong-Ahafo Regional
House of Chiefs.21 Brong chiefs traditionally subordinate to
Kumasi chiefs remained in that position. In spite of their situation
in another region, their sub-chiefdoms still legally formed parts of
the Kumasi traditional division or area (that is, they were subject
to the omanhene of Kumasi who is also the Asantehene) in m atters
concerning chiefs. Even of greater im portance to the chiefs con
cerned, revenues from their ‘stool’ lands were paid by officials of
16
Number of Number of
Size in centres centres
relation with po- with popu
Region Size V that of Population r ulation lation
G hana 5,000 10 above
10,0 0 10,000
N orth rn ............................ 27,175 30% 727,618 6 2

Brong Ahafo ............................ 15,273 17% 766,5 9 14 4
U oper ........................................ 10,548 11% 862.793 — 4
Ashanti ........................................ 9,417 10% 1,481,698 7 4
Western ........................................ 9,236 10% 770,087 8 8
Volta ........................................ 7,943 9% 947,268 8 6
Eastern ........................................ 7,698 8% 1,2 1, 61 18 9
Central ........................................ 3,815 4% 8' 0,135 15 7
G reater Accra ............................ 995 1% 851,t>14 2 6
Sources: (1) G hana Fopulation Census 1970.
(2) Socio-Economic Survey 1969, Departm ent of Rural Planning, Accra.
The Brong
Kwame Arhin
the central government into the Kumasi stool or chiefs’ treasury

out o f which the Brong chiefs were expected to receive their share.
Between 1960 and 1966, the government of Kwame Nkrumah
tried to resolve the question of inter-regional traditional political
allegiance by creating, and recognising, as amanhene some of the
subordinate chiefs in the Brong-Ahafo Region who traditionally
owed allegiance to Kumasi chiefs and through them to the Asante
hene. A chief created and recognized as omanhene became autono
mous in traditional political terms and a member of his Regional
House o f chiefs. He was thus enabled to sever his traditional politi
cal ties with his erstwhile Kumasi ‘overlord’. The chiefs o f Nsoatre,
Sunyani and Odumase No. 1, Seikwa and Nsawkaw, among others,
were recognized amanhene.
The National Liberation Council, the military government, which
succeeded Nkrumah after the latter’s overthrow by a coup d'etat on
February 24th, 1966 passed a Decree [112 of 1966], the effect o f which
was that the government of Ghana had ceased to recognize the
param ount status and the traditional councils of subordinate chiefs
elevated by the Nkrum ah government: and that the chiefs men
tioned would, on the coming into force of the Decree, be considered
by the government as subordinate to their superordinate chiefs
before their elevation by the Nkrum ah government.
It appears, however, that the Decree was at variance with political
realities. Successive governments, civil and military, have had to
find political rather than legal solutions to the problem. At the
time of writing a Committee appointed by the military govern
ment — the National Redemption Council*— is enquiring into
the problem. Clearly the heart o f the m atter is how to reconcile
historical or pseudo-historical tradition with contemporary social
and political realities.
Summary
Used linguistically, ‘Brong’ refers to the speakers of Twi-Brong
dialects. Ethnographically, it is best used to refer to the people of
the Techiman chiefdom. Lastly, in its political and widest usage it
means the peoples o f the chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms of the
Brong section of the Brong-Ahafo Region who do not, or refuse to,
acknowledge traditional political allegiance to the Asantehene. This
wider use of the term originated in the extension of ‘Bono’ to cover
the actual and presumed territorial domain (Bononum) of the erst
while King of Bono-Manso, whose successor was the Techiman-
hene. ‘Brong’, as the collective name of a congeries of peoples, has
attained reality and permanence through the political and adminis
trative act of the Governm ent of Ghana in making it the joint
name of the Brong-Ahafo Region.
* The National Redemption Council succeeded the Civil regime of Dr K. A.
Busia (1969-72) after a coup d'etat of January 13th, 1972.
8
The Brong
Notes on Introduction
1 The exception is chapter ix by F.K. D rah on The Brong M ove
ment.
2 J. Goody ‘Ethnographic Notes on the D istribution of Guang
Languages’ Journal o f African Languages, Vol. 2, Part 3, 1963;
‘The Mande and the Akan Hinterland’ in J. Vansina, R. Mauny,
and L.V. Thomas eds. The Historian in Tropical Africa, O.U.P.
1964.
3 See R.S. R attray’s accounts of these festivals in Ashanti O.U.P.,
1923 chs. v, ix and xv. and also Religion and Art in Ashanti
O.U.P. 1927; also K.A. Busia ‘A shanti’ in African Worlds,zd .D
Forde, O.U.P. 1954, pp. 2 0 3 - 204.
4 See J. Goody, 1963, op. cit. and ‘The Akan and the N o rth ’ in
Ghana Notes and Querries No. 9, November 1966;
K.Y. Daaku ‘Pre-Ashanti S tates’ in Ghana Notes and Querries
op. cit. pp. 10— 13;
K.Y. Daaku and A. Van Danzig: ‘The Akan Forest
States’. A Provisional translation of an extract from
O. Dapper Beschreidurg von Africa (German edition)
Amsterdam, 1970 in Ghana Notes and Querries, No. 9,
November 1966, pp. 15— 17;
also A.A. Boahen: ‘The Origins of the Akan’ in Ghana Notes
and Querries, No. 9 November 1966, pp. 3— 10;
T.E. Bowdich: Mission from Cape Coast to Ashantee, London,
1819;
J. Dupuis: Journal o f A Residence in Ashantee, London, 1824.
5 For example, unlike the Brong-Akan, they have a patrilineal
descent system.
6. See Paul Ozanne ‘Ahwene Koko: Seventeenth Century Wenchi’
Ghana Notes and Querries, No. 8 5 Jan. 1966, p. 18;
K.Y. Daaku ‘A N ote on the Fall of Ahwene Koko and Its
Significance in Asante History’ Ghana Notes and Querries
No. 10 December 1968, pp. 40—44; also inform ation from
Opanyin D abanka (an elder of Wenchi), who was unable
to say in which Asantehene’s reign the attack on Wenchi
took place.
7 See J. Goody ‘Introduction’, J. Goody and K. Arhin, eds.
Ashanti and the Northwest, mimeographed, Institute of African
Studies, 1965.
8 See Chapter m.
9 See Goody, ‘The Akan and the N o rth ’ in Ghana Notes and
Querries, No. 9, November 1966, pp. 18-24.
19
Kwame Arhin
10 The Confederation, first mentioned in the records of the govern

ment of the Gold Coast on October 28th, 1881, included Techi
man, Sequa (Scikwa), Suma, Drobo, Kwatwoma, Fiassi (Fiase-
Wassaw?) Bini? Barabo? Nisia? Supre? Wrochey (name of a
chief) Quasi Doh (name of a chief) Cheryor (name of a chief)
K ro sah (n an u of a chief) and Sehwi. Its main principle of orga
nization was interestingly, as follows:
The kings on the thrones of the sub-chiefdoms pay no tribute to
King Agyeman (Agyeman of Gyaman) and do not submit
m atters to him for consideration or instruction unless such
m atters be of great importance, but, if called upon, they are
bound to take part in Agyeman’s wars, by supplying warriors
in numbers according to size and population of the districts,
and at this time they are under (joint) control.
Notes on Gaman taken October 28//;. 1881, Enclosure in No. 30
in Parliamentary Papers (C—■) 3386 Seikwa, Suma and Drobo
were all units of Gyaman.
11 W. Tordoff, Ashanti Under The Prernpehs 1888— 1935, Oxford,
1965, pp. 112-128.
12 Tordoff, op. cit., 89
15 See K.A. Busia, The Position o f the Chief in the Modern Political
System o f Ashanti, O.U.P. 1951, 188— 193; Report o f the Mate
Kole Committee on the Asanteman-Brong Dispute Government
Printer, Accra, 1955.
16 Report op. cit., See also A. Triuli ‘The Asantehene-in-Ccuncil:
A shanti Policies Under Colonial Rule, 1935— 1950’. Africa,
XLII, No. 2 April, 1972, pp. 8 9 -111.
17 Report of the M ate Kole Committee, op. cit.
18 Report of the M ate Kole Committee, op. cit. Domasc consisted
of two towns known as Antepim and Awua-Domase. The ruling
lineage of A ntepim —Domase says it originated in Denkyera in
the central region of G hana; that of Awua-Domase traces its
connection with the Bantama (Kumasi-Kuronti) Stool. The
dispute between the two stools over precedence went on in the
D istrict Commissioner’s courts from early in the colonial
period to the 1930s. See for example letters from the Provincial
Commissioner, Sunyani to District Commissioner 16th M arch,
1928, File No. 403/W.P.8/23, in Ghana National Archives,
G.N.A. Sunyani. It still goes on.
20
The Brong
19 See D. Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946— 1960 O.U.P. 1964, pp

293—297; on the Ahafo side of there political disputes, see A.F.
Robertson ‘Histories and Political Opposition in Ahafo,
G hana’, in Africa Vol. XLIII, No. 1 January, 1973, pp. 41—58.
20 In his final reply to the debate on the Brong Ahafo Region Bill,
20th March 1959, in the National Assembly, M r A.E.A. Ofori
A tta, the M inister of Justice and Local Government, said on
behalf of the Government.
The Bill before this House this morning is a fulfilment of the
solemn promise of 1956 based on the conviction of the Govern
ment and the C.P.P. and made to the people of Brong Ahafo.
I need not remind hon. Members that the battle for indepen
dence was nearly lost on this issue.
The Government were convinced that culturally, adm inistra
tively, and socially, there must be a region for the Brong-Ahafos
apart from the Ashanti Region. The Government insisted that
the Constitution of Ghana must make provisicn k r a Brcng-
Ahafo Region.
Col. 456: Parliamentary Debates ‘Official Report— First Scries
Vol. 14; 19//z February— 20th March, 1959. ‘The battle for inde
pendence’ is a reference to the apparent attempt by the National
Liberation Movement to delay independence pending the grant
of a federal C onstitution to G hana by the B ritish Government
See Austin, op. cit.
21 All the present seven adm inistrative regions o f C har? have
Houses of Chiefs, and there is also a National House of Chiifs
which together are expected to deal with chieftaincy disputes
and to assist governments of Ghana in re-examining and codify
ing customary law.
21
CHAPTER I
ARCHAEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE BRONG-AHAFO
REGION
Merrick Posnansky
Brong Ahafo has not witnessed a great amount of archaeological
activity although more work has been conducted in the Gonja area
because of the recent activities of the Volta Basin Research Project
(1963-70). In 1970 however the Departm ent of Archaeology ini
tiated a new project, The West African Trade Project, the object of
which is to find out more about the archaelogical aspects of the
beginnings of long distance trade between the middle Niger and the
Ghana a re a .1 A research centre has been established at Hani with
the immediate object of undertaking an extensive excavation of
Begho and with the long term aim of providing a base for research
over a much wider area. The western part of Brong Ahafo was inten
tionally chosen as it represents an area of contrasting ecological
zones, a linguistic contact area, and a region where the archaeolo
gical potential has been clearly indicated by Oliver Davies? and in
which a substantial amount of first rate anthropological investiga
tion and publication by Jack G oody3 and o f historical research by
Ivor W ilks4 had laid a useful foundation for future work. The
bulk of this paper describes the preliminary results of the research
undertaken at Begho*.
Past Research
As early as 1912 curious flat, often oval or elliptical section pieces
o f soft stone, or even terracotta, up to eleven inches long and two
inches wide with criss cross striations on both faces had been found
at Kintam po by members of the Geological Survey*. They are a
class o f artefact so far unique to Ghana and are now known as
‘stone rasps’ and are a characteristic feature of the Kintam po culture
first defined by Oliver Davies 5 m 1959 and later elab o rated by
Flight 6 who conducted several excavations at Kintampo. In 1972
a further site of the Kintam po cultural tradition was found at
M umute, half a kilometre from the Brong quarter of Begho which
is the subject of a separate paper by M r E.K. Agorsah. +
The writer acknowledges with appreciation the permission given by the editors
of the Ghana Social Science Journal to quote in extenso parts o f the section on
Begho which will appear in an article Volume 2, Part 2 under the title “The
early development of Trade in West Africa — Some Archaeological Considera
tions . See also the author’s, ‘Aspects o f early West African trade’ World
Archaeology Vol. 5. No. 2 October, 1973. ed.
* A Department of the Government o f the Gold Coast, ed.
+ Unfortunately omitted from this publication, for reasons of space: copy in
Institute of African Studies, Legon, Library.
Archaeological Aspects o f the Brong Ahafo Region
The Kintampo tradition, objects of which have been found in

various parts of Brong Ahafo, dales to the latter half of the second
millennium B.C. and has been ihought of as “ ncolilhic” because of
the association of polished stone axes and other tools characteristic
of the better known Saharan “ neolihic” . Domestic mammalian
remains at Kintam po and also at the site of Ntcrcso, as well as grind
stones, indicate the strong likelihood 1hat the Kintam po cultural
tradition provides the first evidence for agricultural societies in
G hana.7
Though many objects clearly postdating the K intam po period are
described in the Field Notes on Ashanti by Oliver Davies, none of
them have been placed in an historical context. In 1965 Mr James
A nquandah8made an archaeological survey of the Tcchirran-Wcnchi
area which drew attention to discoveries at Teel man, T arcbcasi,
Manso, sites in the area of Nkoranza, Wenchi and around Hani
where the former town of Begho was located. This survey put on
record discoveries by previous visitors to ihc area. In 1966 O zanne9
published a description of Ahwene Koko, seventeenth century
Wenchi, whilst R. Duncan Maihcwson, a Research Fellow of the
Volta Basin Research Project of the Universily of Ghana, conducted
a survey in the northern Tain basin as part of a broader scheme to
put the research then being undertaken in the area to be flooded by
the Volta lake around the confluence of the Black and White Volt as
into a wider perspective.10 Additions to the survey excavations
were carried out at a site north-east of N arrasa which had previously
been referred to as the Dumpo quarter of Begho.
The area east of a line running between Kintam po and Nkoranza
and south of Techiman is largely unexplored archaeologically
except for a few sites along the Volta investigated as part of the res
cue operations of the Volta Basin Research P roject.11
Begho
Begho has rightly been considered one of the most im portant
historical sites in Ghana. Its existence was indirectly known to
European merchants on the coast by the early seventeenth century.12
Its importance was due to the trade that Begho was said to have
participated in between the Niger, particularly the streich around
Jenne, the Forest belt and ultim ately the coast. Both Wilks and
G oody13 have in recent years written in detail about the historical
sources, the oral traditions and the cultural anthropological evi
dence, and both see the foundation of Begho and the development
of the long distance trade in gold as due to the expansion of Mande-
speaking people whilst the present writer has related ihe exploration
of the gold resources to the general world-wide expansion of trade
and consequent insatiable demand for g old.14
23
Merrick Posnansky
Begho IS said by various authorities to have been founded as

early as the eleventh cen’ury (Meyerowhz) >5 or as fate as the sixteen
th ce n tu ry -6 and to have been abandoned or destroyed anytime
between he fourteenth (D elafosse)n and the eighteenth centuries
(O zan n ej's There is also some controversy as 'o its loca ion Early
tw entieth century French scholars placed Begho in the vicinity of
u r n i n ^ U 19 'n ^vory Coast. This view now has few followers.
Wilks situated 'he town 'o the north-east and south-east c f the
present village of Namasa (also called ‘Demisa’ in various historical
texts) whilst to Mcyerowitz, Shinnie, Anquandah, Ozanne and
r°£r • ,l would n.l ore clearly seem to be near the modern village
of Ham some 6§ kilometres to the south of Namasa and 51 kilo
metres west north-west o f Wenchi. The most recent article bv Brav-
mann and Mathcwson in African Historical Studies for 197022
manages to combine both locations and calls the whole area, of
perhaps some forty to fifty square kilometres in the Hani-Namasa
area, Bicu, their orthographical rendering of Begho.
The oral history of Hani and of Nsawkaw,23 sixteen kilometres
to the east of Hani, is quite definite in placing Begho, pronounced
by them as Beew, a kilometre to the east of Hani at a place known
to them as Amanfokeseeso. The oral traditions relate how the
original ancestors came from a hole in the ground (Bonkeseso)
situated in a grassy plain (Nserekeseso) four to five kilometres
to the west of Hani. The oral traditions further describe the town
of Begho as consisting of three major geographically distinct
quarters of the Brong; the Kramo or Muslim trading com m unity
and of the Numu blacksmiths (Tonfo or Tumfuo) The Numu
and Muslims, according to the linguistic evidence discussed by
Goody, were proto-Dyula and Dyula speakers respectively.2**
A rather less distinct quarter, the Nyaho, is situated a little under half
a kilometre north-west of Hani where the population is said to have
consisted of both Brong and Tonfo elements. At the present day,
the village of Namasa has a predominantly Muslim population
speaking a Dyula dialect. Various versions account for the abandon
ment of Begho: the most common refer to internal dissension whilst
others bring in directly or indirectly relations with the Ashanti
around 1722/23 who eventually gained political control o f the area
and diverted the trade to Kintampo, Salaga and Kumasi.
The people of Hani are able to guide visitors to all the Begho
quarters. Each quarter consists of an area of mounds, each mound
being between one and two metres high and up to 30 metres across,
presumably representing former homesteads, the largest of which,'
that of the Brong, is nearly a kilometre across. Between the quarters^
which are around a kilometre from each other, there is an
exposure of laterite and a large Iaterite block which indicates the
site o f the market (Gyetunidi) where the Brong and the traders are
24
said to have met. The blacksmiths quarter is the smallest in area.

On and around all the mounds there are considerable quantities
of surface pottery largely thrown up by the burrowing activities
such creatures as porcupines and aardvarks.
Various archaeologists have visited the vicinity of Begho and
collections have been made o f surface finds. In 1967 Mr Duncan
M athewson25 conducted a test excavation at a site two-and-a
half kilometres north-east of Namasa which he called the Dumpo
quarter of Bicu and presumed was the Guang quarter of Begho.
Oral traditions in Namasa however refer to this site as Nyamaga
Gboo and our informants, including the Namasahene’s linguist,
were quite definite that Nyamaga was a separate ancient settlement
and not part of Begho which they affirmed was near Hani. Even by
bush track Nyamaga is nearly ten kilometres from the Brong and
Kramo quarters and the absence of continuous settlement between
the two sites would suggest that Nyamaga cannot be considered
as a quarter of Begho, though it could well be older as Mathewson
obtained a radiocarbon date of 1019 + 158 A.D. (Birm-71) for one
of his lower levels. Unfortunately this latter date is not a secure
one as there was an inversion in the C.14 sequence with some more
recently dated samples being found in stratigraphically earlier
contexts.26 Also it is not known exactly what the sample dates as
the excavation consisted of a test pit with very little attem pt to work
out the structural implications of the samples. Settlement there
certainly had been in the area from stone age times onwards but
what we need to know is the date of the beginnings of organized
trade based on large market centres and on this point the samples
do not help.
Without inscriptions or continuity of settlement name it is impos
sible to be certain that the site of Begho has been positively identi
fied. Nevertheless the testimony of the oral traditions, the existence
of four distinct areas of settlement with abundant surface finds and
the absence of other sites with a better claim to be Begho would
suggest th at the mound ‘fields’ east of Hani are the most likely site
of Begho. It is possible of course that Begho referred to a wide
area south of the Black Volta rather than to a specific town. There
is certainly evidence from Mathewson’s work that a whole cluster
of towns like Bima and Bofe, as well as Begho itself, were contem
porary with Begho and presumably shared in the trade.
Many very good reasons have been advanced for the location of
Begho where it is, such as the proximity to gold resources; kola
to the south; perhaps the local presence of elephants; good iron
working potential in the existence of iron rich laterite outcrops and
abundant fuel; and most im portant of all the proximity to a natural
route through the Banda hills to the south of the Black V olta—a
25
Merrick Posttansky
route which did not involve the crossing of any large rivers. The
natural ecology was favourable for the growth o f large settlem ents
with an adequate rainfall and fertile soils. This area of ‘derived
uWaSi he ,u r,h fj.t extent to which pack animals from Mali
could reach without rapidly succumbing to tsetse borne diseases.
So far four excavations have been conducted at Begho which
have been described elsewhere in greater d etail2 7 _ lwo ]n lhe
Brong quarter (1970 and 1972) and one each in the Tm m four (1972)
and Kramo (1971) quarters. Interpretation of the excavations in
terms of the history of the area will depend on the analysis of the
finds which is still being undertaken. Each house so far excavated
has exhibited significant difierences from the ones previously exca
vated and broad generalizations may only be possible when further
sites have been excavated which should indicate the typical fea
tures of each quarter rather than merely highlighting the specific
differences which are likely to exist between the houses of indivi
duals in any large settlement.
Certain general conclusions can however be suggested. Though
there were differences in detail between the pottery assemblages
of each quarter there was a broad similarity in basic forms, decora
tion and paste which suggests that the Kramo, if it was ihe trading
community, was not all that ethnologically distinct from the Brong*
Similarities between the pottery found in the Brong quarter and
that made at Bondakile, the main present day potting centre of the
area some seventeen kilometres to the north-west of Begho indi
cates a cultural continuity between Begho and the present day
peoples of the area. The people of Bondakile are Mo, called Degha
by Goody and are thought to be remnants of the pre-Akan
indigenous inhabitants which could indicate that their ceramic
traditions predate the foundation of Begho. There is little relation-
s ip with the pottery from the Volta confluence area where one of
e most distinctive types of pottery is decorated with red painted
designs.2 9 At Begho this design-painted ware numbered less than
r ° lal pottery assemblage at all four sites of
n lrfu r S' sh?rds/ ^ ursory examination of pottery from sites
north of Kumasi like Mampongtin,30 whjch might be contempo
rary with Begho also indicates lit lie direct similarity. It would thus
appear that the population of Begho cannot be identified with
groups to the south and east and from the point of view o f its
ceramics, the Begho people are probably the ancestors of the present
day Brong people in the area. A detailed quantitative and qualitative
assessment o f the ceramics is being undertaken by M r L. B. Cross-
!ff7n Jt IS h° ? ed t0 comPare the pottery with that from sites
ot the same age from the Sudamc zone to see if any ‘immigrant’
e x i s t e n t bC t ntlfie, d * * * Provide a cI^e as "o the actual
stence, num ber and relative im portance o f the M ande traders in
26
the towns reputedly important for trade located north of the forest
and south of the bend of the Black Volta.
The prevalence o f red slipped wares at Begho and in the Volta
basin has been cited by Davies31 and others as an indication of
immigrants from the n o rth.32 Fine red slipping is certainly a feature
of sites associated with the early Sudanic states and is found on
such sites as Kumbi Saleh, the presumed capital of the Ghana
empire, but it is also found on pottery of the Kintam po ‘neolithic’
tradition. That, it was a northern trait is likely tu t so fcr that matter
is all pottery ultimately. Slipping is not a highly localized element
and the red colouring m atter is obtained from the iron rich lateritic
deposits developed on the Basement Complex rocks of Africa.
Features which are perhaps more culturally significant are the red
painted designs of such Volta confluence assemblages as that of
New Buipe and certain of the actual pottery forms such as the
pedestals and pot-stands which do not seem to form part of the
indigenous ceramic tradition of the region and which could quite
easily be derived from the middle Niger. Seme of the pots clearly
imitate copper vessels and indicate that this was a period when
vessels of copper and its alloys, particularly small tasins, were of
significance and presumably brought by the traders. Ozanne33
similarly noted from the Accra Plains the effect that the arrival of
brassware might have had on coastal ceramics resulting in polished
finishes and angled forms such as the carination also common at
Begho. Copper vessels cannot however normally be expected from
excavated house sites since when a ccpper pot or basin is worn or
broken it would still retain a high value for remelting and manufac
ture into other objects unlike its ceramic counterpart. It is of interest
to note that three small basins now in the Archaeology Department
Museum, were dug from graves near Techiman Secondary School
though there is no means o f dating them .34
Architecturally the evidence so far obtained is of buildings without
foundations largely built of swish on a rectilinear pattern with
rooms some 2 - 3 metres wide and up to 4 - 5 metres long. A
recurrent feature is the presence o f platforms up to 40cm. above
floor level around the edge of the rooms or facing into the courtyard.
These are still features of Brong architecture. In the Brong quarter,
one house with earthenware cylindrical drain pipes was excavated
in 1972 which indicates that the flat roofed Sudanic house was
perhaps tried in the seventeenth century but did not succeed. Similar
drain pipes are found in the New Buipe35 sequence appearing in
the sixteenth or seventeenth century and presumably also represent
a northern influence.
Burials have been found on both the Brong and Kramo quarters.
Those on the Brong quarter have no consistent pattern of orienta
27
Merrick Posnattsky
tion and are flexed, whilst the only two found on the Kramo quarter
are extended in a north-south orientation which may indicate that
they are those of Muslims, though the direction of Mecca is east
north-east rather than north-south. Other signs of Islamization
which one might expect to accompany the arrival of Mande traders,
such as pilgrimage water flashs of north African origin or actual
mosques have not been found, though a small flat rectangular piece
o f glass may have come from an amulet of the type stitched into
jackets and which was still very popular at the time Dupuis visited
Ashanti. 36
Evidence of trade can only satisfactorily be obtained from the
number and size o f the settlements in the area and frcm the presence
o f trade goods. The oral traditions, the six radio-carbon dates
from the 1970 and 1972 excavations which ranged frcm A.D.
1430 + 100 to 1710 -f 100, and archaeological material such as
tobacco pipes, indicate a date for Begho between A.D. 1350 and
probably not later than A.D. 1725. From the work at present in
progress the town w'as at its peak in the seventeenth century. It
would appear that a town with several thousand inhabitants deve
loped during that period and that the population dispersed with the
decline of the trade consequent upon the rise of Ashanti and the
growth of Kumasi as a major market centre. Market towns rarely
reveal the products for which they were famed. Gold was too
precious to be lost and the fact that the people of Begho did not
bury grave goods militates against finding gold ornaments. Kola
which must also have been an im portant trade staple does not
survive. However there is evidence of varous industries which may
have contributed to trade. Iron slag is very abundant on all the
sites and indicates a widely dispersed smelting of iron which was
not confined to the Tumfuo quarter. D r Van Landewijk37 has
strongly argued that many o f the blue, often rather poorly made,
beads at Begho may have been made locally from the siliceous
slag which is a by-product of iron smelting. He thinks that the local
m anufacture of blue beads in West Africa may explain the legends
about the Aggrey beads. Beads were certainly made since the waste
products from their manufacture are found. Other industries could
have included the carving o f ivory ornaments for trade and local
use. Bracelets, the ends o f two decorated ivory side blown trum pets
and pieces o f unworked ivory have been found on the two Brong
sites. By the time Portuguese arrived on the Ghana coast there was
certainly trade there. Mande traders, some of whose words have
remained as loan words in the Akan languages,38 were bringing
down striped blue cloth whilst the coastal peoples were trading in
dried fish and salt.39 in a 1629 coastal account40 mention is made
o f Tnsoco’, which might refer to Begho, and of the importance of
weaving in the area. Spindle whorls have been found on each exca
vation and on the Kramo quarter a metre deep hole associated with
28
a cistern may be a dye hole for the blue cloth that was in demand
further to the south. The townspeople were certainly more pros
perous than the present day communities in the area. Cattle were
more commonly eaten and hunting undertaken for relatively larger
game than the grasscutters and small antelopes of the present day.
Cursory examination of the teeth indicates the presence of horse
amongst the bones which could indicate its use for trade, or its
presence at Begho may indicate the prestige and/or northern origins
of its rulers.
Actual imports have varied considerably in number from site to
site in Begho. On the B1 site 372 isolated (as opposed to being in
strings) beads, many of which were clearly imports and some reco
gnizably of D utch or Venetian manufacture, were found whereas
there were only 21 from the B2 site. Again on the B1 site there were
more than 40 objects o f copper or its alloys compared to 14 from
the B2 site for the levels o f the same age. It is obvious that there
were contrasts in personal wealth between different houses of the
same quarter at Begho though it m aybe that certain areas of a house
may prove to be more rewarding than others. In archaeology there
is a very strong element of chance which even extensive sampling
cannot entirely eliminate. On the B1 site a piece of late sixteenth
(or possibly seventeenth) century Chinese blue and white porcelain
was found which provides a tantalizing insight into the luxury goods
which may have been imported and still await discovery. Cowries,
which were certainly imported, would appear to have had little im
portance as less than half a dozen have been found and those only
on two of the sites. This could mean that gold dust was more im por
tant as even a local medium of exchange.
The most interesting artefact yet found, a brass bracelet, was not
discovered during excavation but as so often happened was an
accidental find. Dug up in the area traditionally reputed to be the
original market located between the Kram o and Brong quarters, by
a local cultivator it is impossible to date precisely, though it is most
likely to date from the main period of Begho. Triangular in section
and weighing 356 grams it is decorated with a plaited design around
the inner edge, beaded along the outer apex and with alternating
raised cowrie shell designs and segment shaped designs covered
w ith ridges parallel to the arc of the segment alongthe twofiat faces.
The designs are reminiscent of those found on Ashanti brass ware
and the bracelet probably belongs to the same cultural and techno
logical tradition. At Nsawkaw nineteen kilometres east of Begho
can be seen a large collection of brass ware in three locations, each
regarded as a shrine in its own right. The largest is a brass basin in
the open air, over a metre across, with an ornate design around the
sides consisting of an Arabic inscription in Kufie script which is
clearly of N orth African manufacture and of possible fourteenth
29
Merriek Posnansky
century date. The bowl is reputed to have come from heavem

The most venerated item is a two headed female Janus hgure
in polished brass evidently made in West Africa The figure is
said to have been brought from the s a c r e d hole from wh ch he
people of Hani and Nsawkaw came. In another house a collection
of eighteen major items and several minor ones includes two bowls
with Arabic inscriptions in panels around the outside A jug, a
calabash ladle and bells exhibit workmanship not dissimilar to that
found on certain pieces of Ashanti brassware. The designs of the
non-imported items like those with the arabic scripts often consist
of all-over designs or include continuous rows of chevron des gn
but there are no naturalistic designs Other isolatedI bowls_f>r col e -
tions of brassware, which appear to have a north o rig in h a e
come from Atebubu, Ahwene Koko,4i Manso north of Nkoranza
and Amoaman and Ejisu in Ashanti. bowls ar P
from Kranka, Nkoranza (which may now be lost) and Adoi in Brong
Ahafo and N suta near M am pong in Ashanti, th ^ esc" ^ 101JSwi^
which do not allow one to postulate an origin. Mrs. Meyerowitz
thinks the Ejisu bowl may have been brought from Bono Manso.
The existence of these bowls in the Brong Ahafo area indicates the
past importance of trade whilst the fourteenth century date of a
bronze ewer of Richard II of England, found m one o he Asante-
hene’s enclosures in 1896 in Kumasi, could, after dating, provide
an indication of when the foreign brassware may have been reaching
the Brong area.
The imported brassware may have been one of the stim ulants for
the later growth of the A shanti brass working traditions. Though
many of the brass gold weights show a great individuality ° f design
there are certain features which indicate a northern influence. Th
all-over designs, the shape of many of the brass containers
and the treatm ent of the decoration, and the patterns of some of th
geometric gold weights are somewhat reminiscent of Islamic brass-
ware whilst many belong to the Islamic weighting system It
could be postulated that brass items were constantly imPort^dI into
the towns of the Sudanic belt. A crocodile from a mound at Killi in
M ali45 is not dissimilar to the later Ashanti gold sfJ
bracelets from some of the Mali mounds parallel some of the mot its
of the Begho bracelet. The Mande traders would have b o u g h t
down brass objects as items of trade and it is probable that some of
the presumed indigenous Brong brassware owes its ^ Ig in to mspira-
tion from Malian and N orth African prototypes. With the rise of
Ashanti many of the objects, as well as the necessary technology and
designs, would have been brought south where they flouns^ d>
particularly from the early eighteenth century in the suitable econo
mic and social climate provided by the effervescent rise ot the
A shanti. This is of course speculation but gives an indication of how
30
finds once fitted into their historical context may throw new light
on im portant problems of culture contact.
Begho And The Gonja

It is of interest to note the contrasts that have so far been observed
between the Begho area and the Gonja area. Both are credited with
having witnessed movements from the north-west of Mande people,
though in the case of Gonja it was a sudden movement of Ngbanya
horsemen whilst the movement into the Begho area was the gradual
movement of traders, who presumably to avoid upsetting the mecha
nics of the trade would have avoided altering the status quo as much
as possible. The Gonja area presented a relatively sparsely inhabited
area containing a dispersed settlement of cultivators with different
linguistic origins. The Ngbanya created a conquest state with
a definite immigrant hierarchy. Islam was the religion of its
rulers. In Begho the ecological attractiveness of the area would
suggest a rather more densely settled area, perhaps with some nu
cleated villages existing even before the arrival of the Mande. Except
in certain areas the actual rulers were probably not Muslims and the
archaeological evidence suggests that the local rituals prevailed. The
absence of much detail about the rulers of Begho is in contrast to
the detailed stories of Jakpa and his successors and suggests that
the Begho rulers presented what would now be termed a rather low
profile. No chiefs’ graves are remembered at Begho, and none which
can clearly be indicated as chiefs’ burials have been excavated in
contrast to the more prominent chiefs’ burial-places of Gonja.
Mathewson has argued that the red slipped carinated wares of the
area “represents autochthonous Dumpo occupation which antedates
the arrival ofthe Mande and the commercial development of Bicu” 46
He associates the red design-painted sherds with the Mande who he
sees as suddenly arriving in the area in the sixteenth century. The
evidence from Begho does not support this contention as the red
slipped wares, if anything, increase in quantity in the sequence and
are not so abundant in the earliesl levels (? fifteenth century). The
red design-painted wares are insignificant in quantity and if associa
ted with the Mande then they are associated wilh the Ngbanya only,
who were only one minority Mande group. But because of the nature
of their impact as discussed above, their effect in the Gonja area
was probably greater. They came as conquerors. The double-storied
houses, like that at Jakpawuase near Salaga, their flat roofs drained
by earthenware drainpipes, their horses as evidenced by iron horse-
trappings, all left a material mark. As a conquering group it pro
bably included women folk47 who could have included the makers
of the design painted-ware, whereas the Mande traders at Begho
were probably content with local women, local pottery and only
marginally influenced the material culture perhaps by having the
31
Merrick Posnansky
Mo potters make certain pot forms with which they were familiar
in their area of origin. One feature common to both areas is the use
o f the thick swish walls built up in layers of wet clay rather than
plastered onto a framework of poles and woven horizontal slicks.
As a male activity, this building technique may have been one of the
definite cultural traits brought down by the early Mande traders to
Brong Ahafo.
It is pertinent to ask, why did not Jakpa and his militant pre
decessors stay in the richer Begho area but moved to the more
barren Gonja area? Human factors are always difficult to assess but
it may have been because of the rather closed Begho environment
and the inability to use horses there and probably because it was
already well settled. Contact was certainly maintained with the
Begho area according to W ilks48 who has indicated how the Mallams
who did the conversions for the Ngbanya came from Begho. The
Ngbanya certainly passed through the Begho area where some of
their graves at Njau are still remembered, whilst Goody49 records
that this settlement is still known as Kponkowuura in Brong (Gban-
gawuura in Gonja) which means the horseman’s village.
Priorities For Future Research

Though we are getting to know a little about the earliest agricul
tural societies within the area (the Kintam po cultural tradition) and
rather more about the period AD 1400— 1750 from archaeology,
the period in between is still a blank. The oral traditions of the area
jum p straight from holes in the ground*, which archaeologically
may refer to rock shelters and water holes, to the existing societies
o f the area. Unfortunately the intermediate sites we seek may be
difficult to find. Small settlements of cultivators, particularly if they
lived in relatively flimsy houses and had little in the way of material
goods, are notoriously difficult to find except by accident. We
certainly need to know if the Begho ceramics go back in time within
the same area before we can postulate Brong origins. In the next
few years it is hoped to excavate one of the settlement sites north-east
o f Namasa which may predate Begho. The connections with the
area to the east will be explored and one of the Department of
Archaeology’s M.A. students, M r E. Effah-Gyamfi, hopes to under
take trial excavations on sites associated with the Bcno Manso state
in the long vacation of 1973. Other trading sites like those of Bima
and Bofe will similarly be sampled and eventually, we hope, so will
several sites en route to Jenne in the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta.
In September, (1973) I shall visit Museums in Dakar and Bamako
to see whether there are any direct correspondences between the
ceramics of the Begho area and those of the Mali empire. Unfortuna-
* See Interview with Nana Kwakye Ameyaw, Ch. Hi ed.
32
tely, however, very few firmly dated sites of the period from A.D.
1300— 1400 have been found or excavated in the middle Niger area.
Though many sets of oral traditions were collected from western
Brong Ahafo in the early days of the Ashanl i Research Project more
collecting should be undertaken particularly from smaller centres
to the west of Begho. Place name studies may reveal more about the
autochthonous inhabitants than furlher speculations based on
traditions. The work being undertaken by M r Crossland on the
Begho ceramics and links with modern polling tradi ions highlight
the need for renewed investigation of the m aerial culture of the
wider area. The modern ‘trade’ zones of the present day potters may
indicate more than just the realities of economics. An analysis of
the traditional material culture should go a long way to isolating and
estimating the scale and nature of elements o f both cultural conti
nuity and intrusion. It can thus be seen that for a more comprehen
sive picture to emerge about the area we need the active collaboration
of historians, linguists and anthropologists and we hope that scho
lars in these disciplines will make use of the facilities of the Begho
Archaeological Research Centre to undertake such collaborative
research.
NOTES
1. M. Posnansky, ‘Ghana and the Origins o f West African Trade’, Africa

Quarterly, (New Delhi), 1971, XI, pp. 110-25.
2. O. Davies, Ghana Field Motes Pt. Ill, Ashanti, Department o f Archaeology

(Legon)1972.
3. J. Goody, Introduction to Ashanti and the Northwest ed. J. Goody and K .

Arhin, Institute of African Studies, (Legon 1965), pp. 1-110 and
The Minde and the Akan hinterland’, in The Historian in Tropical
Africa ed. J. Vansina, R. Mauny and L. V. Thomas, (London 1964), pp.
4. I. Wilks, The Northern Factor in Ashanti History, Institute of African

Studies, (Legon 1961).
5. O. Davies, Neolithic cultures in Ghana’ Proc. 4th Pan African Congress o f

Prehistory, (Leopoldville), Vol. 2, ed. J. Nenquin, pp. 291-302.
6. West African Archaeological Newsletter, 8, (1963), pp. 15-20.
33
Kfr-.'ic’c Posnansky
7. P. L. Carter and C. Flight, ‘A report on the fauna from the sites of Ntereso
and Kintampo rock shelter in Ghana,’ Man (1972) 7, pp. 277-82.
8. J. R. Anquandah in Goody and Arhin, 1965, op. cit. (note 3), pp. 111-34.
9. P. Ozanne, Ghana Notes and Queries, 8, (Legon, 1966) p. 18.
10. R. A. Bravmann and R. D. Mathewson, ‘A note on the History and Archaeo

logy of “Old Buna,’” African Historical Studies, (Boston 1970) III,
p p .139-49.
11. R. N. York, R. D. Mathewson, D. Calvocoressi and C. Flight, Archaeology

in the Volta Basin, 1963-66, Department o f Archaeology (Legon 1967),
mimeographed.
12. K. Y. Daaku and A van Dantzig, ‘Map of the Regions of Gold Coast in
Guinea, An Annotated Djtch Map of 1629’, Ghana Notes and Queries,
(Legon 1966), pp. 14-17 and map.
13. op. cit. notes 3 and 4.

14. M. Posnansky, ‘The early development of Trade in West Africa — some
arehieologieal considerations’, Ghana Social Science Journal, (Legon
1973) 2.
15. E. R. L. Meyerowitz, Akan Traditions o f Origin, (London 1952).
16. Y. Person, ‘Les Kissi et leurs statuettes de pierre dans le cadre de l’histoire
ouest-africaine’, Bull. IFAN (Dakar 1961), 23, pp. 1-59.
17. M. Delafosse, Vocabulaires comparatifs, (Paris 1904).
18. P. Ozanne 1965 quoted in Bravmann and Mathewson 1970, op cit., notes 2
and 29.
19. L. Tauxier, Le Noir de Bondoukou, (Paris 1921).
20. I. Wilks, op. cit. p.
21. Goody 1964, op. cit., p. 194.
22. Bravmann and Mathewson, op. cit. note 10.
23. The Hani and Nsawkaw Tradition, collected by K. Ameyaw (I.A.S. B.A./2
1965).
24. J. Goody 1964, op. cit. pp. 195-6.

25. op. cit. note 10.
26. F. Willet, ‘A Survey of Recent Results in the Radiocarbon chronology of
Western and Northern Africa’, Journal o f African History (1972),
XIII, p. 364.
27. In Posnansky 1971 op. cit., and West African Trade Project. Report on
Research 1972, mimeographed report of Department of Archaeology
(Legon 1972).
28. J. Goody 1965, op. cit. p. 2.
34
29. O. Davies, ‘Gonja Painted Pottery’, Transactions o f the Historical Society

o f Ghana, Vll (Legon) 1964, pp. 4-11.
30. O. Davies, Excavations at Mampongtin, 1955, privately xeroxed and circu

lated 1971.
31. O. Davies, 1964, op. cit.
32. R. D. Mathewson, ‘The Painted Pottery Sequence in the Volta Basin’,

West African Archaeological Newsletter, (Ibadan 1968) 8, pp. 24-32.
33. P. Ozanne, ‘Early Historic Archaeology of Accra’, Transactions o f the

Historical Society o f Ghana (1962) VI, pp. 65-66.
34. J. R. Anquandah, 1965 op. cit., p. 128.
35. R. N. York, Volta Basin Research Project Excavations at New Buipe;

Preliminary Report, Ghana Notes and Queries, 10, (Legon 1968),
pp. 33-35, and appearing since this paper was written, ‘Excavations
at New Buipe’, West African Archaeological Journal (Ibadan) 3, (1973)
pp. 1-189.
36. J. Dupuis, Journal o f Residence in Ashantee, (London 1824), p. 244.
37. J. E. J. M. van Landewijk, ‘What was the original Aggrey bead’, Ghana
Journal o f Sociology (Legon) 6-7, (1970-71). pp. 89-99.
38. I. Wilks, ‘The Mande loan element in Twi’, Ghana Notes and Queries,
(Legon), 4, pp. 26-28.
39. J. D. Fage, ‘Some remarks on Beads and Trade in Lower Guinea in the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries’, J.A.H., III (1962), pp. 343-47.
40. I. Wilks, The Northern Factor in Ashanti History, (Legon, 1961) p. 4, note 6.
41. P. Ozanne, 1966 op. cit. p. 18
42. Information gathered by Mr E. Effah-Gyamfi.
43. Personal communication from Mrs Meyerowitz.
44. Personal communication from Mr T. Garrard who has also noted that
pottery discs from Begho fall within the same weight system and are
presumably also gold weights.
45. L. Desplagnes, ‘Etude sur les tumuli du Killi dans la region de Goundam’,
L'Anthropologie (Paris) 14, pp. 151-72.
46. Bravmann and Mathewson 1970, op. cit. p. 139.
47. D . H. Jones, ‘Jakpa and the Foundation of Gonja’, Trans. Hist. Soc. o f
Ghana (1962) VI, p. 16.
48. I. Wilks, paper on the Khitab Ghunja given in Gonja seminar, Legon, 1968.
49. J. Goody, 1964, op. cit., p. 199.
35
CHAPTER II
A NOTE ON THE HISTORY OF ISLAM IN BRONG AHAFO
K. O . O doom
The Mande and The Saharan Trade

The history of Islam in the area covered by what is today the
Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana forms part of the story of the spread
of those islamised African peoples whose main interest was to
participate in the great trans-Saharan trade system, in which gold
from the Western Sudan featured prominently for a number of
centuries.* This interest in trade in turn fostered the establishment
of communities of Muslims along the great trade route which
stretched from the shores of N orth Africa to the fringes of the
forest in the South, from the Atlantic Ocean in the West to Hausa-
land in the east. The point must be emphasized that the establish
ment of these communities of traders must be seen as one aspect
of the process of islamisation which took the form of what Levtzion
has termed “ the dispersion of Muslims rather than the spread of
Islam ” , 1 for it involved the movement of islamised peoples from
one area into another and, as already noted, their main interest lay
in trade rather than in converting the indigenous people among
whom they settled to carry on business. However, these traders,
being Muslim, carried Islam over a wide area as they extended the
trade routes in search of newer and richer sources of gold.
Four main centres in the Western Sudan have been identified
with the production of gold, which occupied the pride of place
among the articles of trade in the area. The first to be exploited by
Muslim traders were those of Bambuk in the area where the Senegal
and Faleme rivers meet. It has been suggested that it was gold
produced in this region which came under the control of the rulers
of ancient Ghana and to which that Empire owed its prosperity
and fame.2 The second gold fields were those of Bure located on
the Upper Niger, and these became accessible to Muslim traders in
the period between the 11th and 12th centuries. The growth of
several Malinke chiefdoms which eventually culminated in the
creation of the Mali Empire is attributed to the exploitation of these
gold fields.3 The third and fourth — and perhaps the most im port
ant — of these gold fields as far as our region is concerned, were the
so-called “ Lobi gold fields” located along the Black Volta River
in north-eastern Ivory Coast and north-western areas of Ghana
* See Posnansky, ch. i, in this volume, ed.

History o f Islam in Brong Ahafo
and the northern Akan forests. I say the most im portant because,
firstly, it was gold from the Lobi and Akan goldfields that reached
Europe through the coast. Secondly, the centre for the distribution
of gold from the Lobi and Akan gold fields was the town of Begho
in the modern Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana.
Needless to say, all these gold fields were worked by local people
but the net-work for distributing the metal extracted was established
by Muslim traders who also enjoyed exclusive monopoly in dis
tributing it along the trade routes to N orth Africa, from where it
found, its way to European markets. It has in fact been claimed
that the Western Sudan provided Europe with most of her gold
requirement throughout the Middle Ages until the discovery of
America.4 It also appears that it was the attem pt by Europeans
to break this Muslim monopoly over the gold trade which led to the
exploration of, and the establishment of forts and castles, especially
by the Portuguese, along the West African coast beginning in the
15th century. The best known of these Muslim traders in gold were
indeed members of that great family of Mande tribes known to the
peoples of modern Ghana as the Wangara, a term made current in
West Africa by the Hausa who in turn derived it from Arabic
sources.5 Hence the history of the spread of Islam into the Brong
region cannot be properly understood, without taking account of
the ancient continental trade system and the part the Wangara
played in that system.
Before moving on to another aspect of our subject, I wish to
emphasise that the role of the Mande in trade in the Western Sudan
was not a one-way affair. Apart from gold which they carried
northwards along the trade routes, the Wangara or Dyula traders,
as they are usually called, brought with them to the gold producing
areas in the South one im portant item — salt. This commodity,
produced in salt-mines in the Saharan oases, was either in bars or
broken into pieces and then carried on camels across the Sahara
by Sudanese traders to be distributed along the trade routes that
led ultimately to the gold mines. The distribution was again in the
hands of the Wangara who had become islamised as a result of
contact with Arab and Berber merchants with whom they exchanged
itinerant traders and, as they extended the trade routes, there grew
up along them colonies of Muslim traders among whom these
Dyula found hospitality. Trade and Islam thus came to be closely
associated with the Dyula branch of the Mande.
The extent of Mande involvement in the trans-Saharan trade
and thus in the spread of Islam in the area of which Brong forms a
part may be gauged from the wide distribution of languages of the
M ande family along the trade routes. Jack Goody, for instance, has
summarised it this way:
37
K. O. Odoom
As can be seen from the map in The Languages o f West Africa,

languages of the Mande family are distributed right along the
great trade routes which led from the Niger bend to the Begho
—Bouduku area. The economic basis for the achievements of
the great empires of the Niger bend lay in the trade in gold
ivory and slaves across the Sahara to the Barbary Coast and
then to Europe, a trade largely carried on by Moorish mer
chants. The gold mines of Wangara (Mande) were the goal of
European exploration. The source of these supplies of gold and
slaves lay to the West and South of the famous Sudanese cities,
and trade to those areas was largely in the hands of the Mande-
speaking Dyulas, whose name is itself derived from the Mande
word ‘to trade’, and has taken on the generalized meaning
of trader throughout the region. Salt from the mines of the
Sahara was exchanged for gold, ivory, slaves and kola nuts.
Cloth and cattle also went South from the regions between the
forest and the entrepots on the Niger.6
Begho and Bono Manso
By far the most im portant commercial centre and outpost for

Islam in the Brong country was the ancient town of Begho which
owed its prosperity and fame to the settlement there of Dyula
traders. Jack Goody has already drawn attention to the role of
thsee Dyula traders in the spread of Islam southwards along the
trade route from the Niger down to Begho.7 Suffice it to note here,
that prior to the rise of Ashanti in the latter part of seventeenth
century, Begho, to all intents and purposes, marked the southerly
limit of Dyula commercial activity. The choice of this town, its
colonisation and development into a commercial centre by the
Muslim Dyula for the distribution of gold from its production
centres in the Akan forest was all dictated by natural factors. For,
as Wilks has pointed out, a more northerly route over the Banda
Hills was obstructed by the Black Volta, while further south,
though scarcely more than a day’s journey from Begho itself, the
high forest made penetration impossible.8
According to local tradition from Nsawkaw, the inhabitants of
Begho were composed of three groups: the Muslims (‘Karam oko’)
the Brong (the Abronfo) and the Blacksmiths (the tonfo or Numu).*
At Hani itself, which was built as successor to Begho, the tradition
is th at the components of the Begho population were the Muslims,
the Brong and the Nafana. The town is said to have consisted of
two quarters, one for Muslims and another for non-Muslims.9
It may be assumed th at the Muslim quarter was developed as a
m arket for the itinerant Dyula traders. It is said that the Muslim
• See Posnansky, ch. /, ed.
38
History o f Islamic in Brong Ahafo
section of the town was known to the Akan as ‘Nsoko’ and it is

probably by this name that Begho became known to Europeans
on the coast. The name Nsoko itself appears in nineteenth century
European records and, according to Dupuis, it stood for the whole
region around Begho while Namasa, located on the edge of the
ruined township, was considered its capital.10
It is not certain when the Muslim Dyula first began settling at
Begho.* The event, however, must have taken place before the rise
of Ashanti as the effective power in the region south of Eegho
during the latter part of the 17th century. It also antedates the found
ing of the Gonja state to the north probably in the middle of the
16th century, for traditions of Namasa speak of a battle between
the Mande invaders who founded Gonja and the “ cave people”,
namely the Brong. The “ invading horsemen” were driven away
by the combined forces of the people o f Begho and the Brongs,
who, at that time, were subjects of the Begho chief.11
Although the date for the first M ande settlement at Begho is a
matter of some controversy, it is generally agreed that the f rst
Mande groups to arrive there are those defined by linguists as
Proto-Dyula. Following Tauxier (1921) and Goody (1964) Levtzion
identifies them as the Ligby and the Numu, the former having
“ migrated from the Upper Niger to the fringes of the forest, towards
the region where the frontiers of the Ivory Coast, Guinea and
Liberia meet.” 12 “ Attracted by the prospects of gold, probably
that of the region of Banda,” the Ligby accompanied by the Numu,
arrived at Begho where they were joined later by the D yula.13
The opening up of the Akan gold fields, the rise of Jenne and the
development of Begho both as commercial centres within the
Sudanese trade system must all be seen as related events. An early
16th century account of trade to Jenne is given by Valentim Fer
nandes who wrote:
To Jenne the merchants came who go to the gold mines. These
traders belong to a certain race called the Ungaros: these are
red or brownish. In fact no one is allowed to approach these
mines but those o f this race, to the exclusion of others, because
they are regarded with a great deal of trust . . . When these
Ungaros arrive at Jenne each merchant brings with him a
hundred negro slaves, or more to carry the salt on their heads
from Jenne as far as the mines, and from there to bring back
the gold. The merchants who make trade with the gold mines
do considerable business. Certain of them have trade that can
rise to 60,000 m ithqals; even those who are content to bring
the salt to Jenne make 10,000 m ithqals’ business.14
•See Posnansky, ch. i, ed.
39
K. O. Odoom
This description o f the trade in salt and gold to and from Jenne,
respectively, which was in the charge of the Mande Dyula, confirms
a statem ent by the Tim buktu author of Ta'rikh al — Sudan, al-Sa’di,
who spoke of the trade pattern in the area in the following terms:
Jenne is one o f the greatest Muslim markets, where traders
with salt from the mine o f Teghaza meet traders with the gold
o f Bitu . . . It is because of this blessed town [of Jenne] that
caravans come to Tim buktu from all points o f the horizon:
east and west, south and n o rth .15
If the Bitu o f al-Sa’di refers to Begho — and there seems to be
no reason to doubt the identification16 — then Begho was certainly
one o f the earliest centres for the diffusion of Mande Muslim
influence not only in the Brong region but also in neighbouring
areas. The trade route from Jenne to Begho passed, for instance,
through the predominantly Muslim towns of Kong and Bobo-
Dioulasso and it is most likely that these two were developed by
Muslim traders as caravan towns. Ivor Wilks has also stressed the
rise o f warrior groups along this trade route. Some of these groups,
accompanied by Muslim Dyula, were responsible for the creation
o f the Gonja state to the north of Begho, while others, he claims,
moved southwards to found the royal house of Akwam u.17
As has already been noted, Begho owed its prosperity and fame
to the settlement there of Mande groups among whom were the
Muslim Dyula whose role in the salt and gold trade made Begho
into a prosperous commercial centre. Their dispersion from Begho
followed the ruin o f the town. The collapse of Begho which seems
to have occurred in the early eighteenth century18 is attributed to a
quarrel which arose among the various components of its inhabi
tants — a quarrel which “ involved not only Muslim Dyula and non-
Muslim Brong, but also one Dyula group and another.” 19 The
‘urban warfare’, (as Wilks describes it) which followed the quarrel
scattered Begho’s inhabitants. One may also see in the collapse of
Begho the result o f change in the trade patterns in the area due to
the chaotic conditions in the Western Sudan follow ing the Moroccan
invasion, the rise o f Ashanti and the extension of the trade route
from the Akan forest to the coast.20
The rise of Begho itself as a commercial centre, was, of course,
due to its proximity to the gold fields of the Akan forest. The first
Akan state from which gold reached Jenne and beyond from the
distributing centre at Begho was that of Bono-Manso. Indeed, it
would seem that the creation of this state was due in no small
measure to the trade in gold and kola, some of which, at any rate,
m ust have come from further south and which she must have con
trolled. This is confirmed by some of the traditions recorded by Mrs.
Meyerowitz, according to which the “prosperity and advanced
40
civilization” attained by the state o f Bono M anso were due to this

Muslim trade in gold and kola.21
Traditions also record the presence of Muslim traders in the
capital of the state, some of whom are on record to have established
social relations with the ruling classes, especially with royal prince-
ssess.22 The dispersion of the Muslims frcm Bono Manso is said to
have occurred at the time of the Ashanti invasion in 1723. This
point receives some confirmation from the fact that all the Muslims
living at the present time in the area of the old state claim to have
arrived there since “ the second quarter of the 19th century.” 23
This claim, based as it was on Goody’s enquiries in the area, is,
however, contradicted by information given to Dupuis in 1819 in
Kumasi concerning the existence of Muslim communities in both
the northwestern and northeastern provinces of what was then the
Ashanti empire. Within the former, Dupuis was told by the Kumasi
Muslims, were “ the provinces of Soko (Nsawkaw) and Takim a”
(Takyiman) where Muslims had established themselves in large
towns and lived “ in distinct societies under the jurisdiction of their
own laws, but in subordination to the caboceers, appointed by the
king of A sh an ti. . .” 24 In the same area Namasa, which formed part
of the Begho complex and was described as the “ metropolis of
Soko,” was estimated as containing about one thousand Muslims.
Waraki (? Wenchi) and Kherabi (unidentified) also are mentioned
as among the towns where Muslims were known to form part of
the population. O f great significance in this connection, perhaps, was
the district of Kherabi where the Muslims were said to live “ entirely
by themselves in a city” of some size. Though no name of a ‘city’
is mentioned, such a ‘city’ was reported to Dupuis to have been
the residence of the head of the Muslims who, from there, ruled all
the believers in A shanti’s northwestern provinces on behalf of the
Ashanti m onarch.25
W ith regard to the provinces in the northeast, N kcranza (Coran-
sah) and Banda (the kingdom of Banna) were known among the
areas which had Muslim residents among their populations.26
Furthermore, when it is considered that the information given to
Dupuis led him to estimate the number of Muslims in A shanti’s
Northwestern provinces alone to be 80,000 souls, and that this
figure, according to his reckoning, was smaller than that of the
provinces of the northeast,27 it becomes obviously difficult to re
concile the position of Islam in the time of Dupuis w ith the informa
tion given to Goody in 1965.
While it can be conceded that the Kumasi Muslims probably
exaggerated the importance of Islam in A shanti’s provinces, one
would still have to explain where all the Muslims in the Begho area
as well as those within the Bono M anso state dispersed after the
41
K. O. Odoom
collapse of the former and the defeat of the latter by Ashanti. It

could be suggested that while some of the Muslims from the Begho
complex migrated to Kong and Banda (see below) others—-including
some of those within Bono Manso —went to establish themselves
in the towns and districts enumerated to Dupuis by the Kumasi
Muslims.
If this suggestion is accepted one or two comments may be made
here in connection with the information given to Goody. Firstly, it
appears certain th at Goody's information came from Muslims
who could recall only the events in the area which just about coin
cided with the British defeat of Ashanti in 1874. It should also be
noted that this was a period characterised by intense activity in the
kola trade with the Akan fo re st-tra d e which was mainly controlled
by the Muslim Hausa. May it not be assumed that the Hausa near
monopoly of the kola trade at this time was accompanied by and led
to large scale Hausa m igration into the area?
Secondly it is probable that, as Levtzion has shown in the case ot
D agom ba,the earlier Muslim residents in the northwest of Ashanti
were superceded by the more recent arrivals by virtue of their
numerical strength. Unlike the case of Dagomba, however, where
Muslims held offices at the Ya N a’s (the king of Dagomba s) court
and where it is therefore possible to distinguish the earlier trom the
more recent arrivals by virtue of the offices held by their descendants
today, Muslims did not become, or perhaps, were not allowed to
become welded into the socio-political structure of the Brong, or
indeed of any Akan state.28
In addition to the above references to Muslim groups in the old
Bono M anso area, there is record of Muslims within the Bole
division of the Gonja state who claim descent from Muslims who
lived in the area between Nkoranza and Takyiman. These are iden
tified by Goody as the Gberi, but they are known among the Gonja
as ‘M botisua’, a word which is generally interpreted as ‘Akan
Muslims’ or ‘Muslims of the Akan’. “ They are traditionally connect
ed with gold and kola trade and appear to be descended from a group
of Dyula who settled in ‘Brong’ country and adopted ihe local cul
ture, or else indigenes who were converted to Islam.” 29
The speculation about the Akan Muslims in Gonja (M botisua)
points to the success Muslims seem to have had among some sections
of Brong society at least in the field of proselytisation. But what
about the impact of Islam and Muslim cultural tradition on Brong
culture as a whole, especially since Muslims are said to have had
close social relations w ith members of the Bono royal household
It is impossible in this short paper to examine this whole question
but one or two observations may be made.
42
In the first place it is clear that this first Akan Kingdom of Bono
Manso was closely linked with the economy o f the Western Sudan
and, as a result it came to acquire “ some markedly northern cultural
traits in, for example, the importance of the horse in both ritual and
everyday life” 30 This statement is probably based on Mrs Meyero-
witz’ remark that in the Bono kingdom “ the horse was used for
general transport; the whole nation rode.” 31 There is reference also
to two other cultural traditions of the Brongs which have northern
origin, both of them in the field of chiefship ritual. Bono tradition,
according to Mrs Meyerowitz, claims that in former times their
chiefs sat on cushions and not on stools.32 The same writer makes
reference to another northern influence on Brong chiefship rituals.
This is the use of the hooded gown33 by Brong chiefs which, though
originally not Muslim, is certainly of Middle Eastern origin and was
brought to the Brong region by Muslims from further north.
In the second place it is worth recalling some of R attray’s accounts
of ‘Brong’ ceremonies which indicate strong Muslim influence.
There is, for instance, reference to the use o f the fez34 and to the
Muslim Holy City o f Mecca described as a place “ well known to
the Ashanti.’’35*
But perhaps by far the most im portant Muslim cultural influence
on the Brong is to be seen in the forty-day calendar o f the Akan
(Adaduanan) according to which a period o f 42 days is calculated
by running a seven day week against a six day one.36 The seven day
week which has its probable origin in Middle Eastern society occurs
in the Hebrew, Christian and Muslim religions while traditionally
in West Africa weekly cycles of three, four, five or six days are
common and are linked with the rotation of market days. The
significance of Friday to the Akan should be noted in this connec
tion. It is probable that the ‘Adaduanan’ and its mode o f calculation
are the result of the influence o f the Muslim calendar on local
methods of calculating the week and ‘represents the conjunction of
the Moslem (based on a seven day week) and the indigenous (based
on a six day week) cycles that reflect the economic interests that
were the feature o f these savanna towns.” 37 The Brongs’ special
role in purveying the ‘adaduanan’ to the Akan seems to be confirmed
by Rattray’s information that the Brongs were the ‘keepers of the
King’s calendar’ and that the king always referred to them when
ever he was in doubt as to the date o f a festival.3 8
It may be concluded from the above summary o f the evidence
that Islam and Muslims did have a considerable degree o f influence
*One may also note the practice of the Asantehene of giving Sadaka, alms, at
palace every Friday. The Asantehene then distributes cakes or doughnuts to the
children in the presence of the Nsumankwahene, chief of the Asantehene’s
physicians, and the Kumasi Chief Imam, ed.
43
K . O. Odoom
on the Brongs both religiously and culturally and as Goody obser

vers “ Muslim influence in Bono was strong and there was, it is
said’, the same kind of bipolarity between chiefs (i.e. ruling estates)
and Muslims (i.e. traditional Muslim groups) as that found in the
Voltaic area’’.39 One may finally point out that in spite of this
strong Muslim influence in Bono, there was one office that no
Muslim nor indeed, any circumcised person could hold — and this
was the office of chief. Circumcision thus stood as a barrier between
the Muslim and chiefly office in the Bono kingdom and this may
have accounted for the absence of converts among chiefly estates
in Bono.
The kingdom of Bono-Manso was of course broken up in 1722/23
by Ashanti forces who were also responsible for dealing the last
blow to Begho, already in decline before the advent o f the Ashanti
forces. W ith the break up of the two Muslim centres of trade in the
Brong region — Begho was rebuilt as H ani40 — other Muslim
market centres were developed in consequence o f the extension 01
Ashanti dominion over areas where they did not formerly wield
authority, or if they did, only on a small scale.
The rise of Ashanti and her wars of conquest and expansion
with which we are only indirectly concerned, may both be seen as
closely related to the opening up of the Niger — Begho trade route
to the coast at Elmina. Wilks has commented.
N ot only did the early expansion of Ashanti occur along the
line of the route, into and beyond the Begho region until it
was arrested on the frontiers of the Dyula kingdom of Kong
but even earlier the extended trade route had determined the
line of advance of the groups who only later were to constitute
themselves the nucleus of the new Ashanti state.4
It appears, therefore, that Ashanti expansionist activities in the
18th century were, in effect, an attem pt to gain control over the
Akan gold fields as well as over the trade route to the north and
south.
The aftermath of the Ashanti conquest
The Ashanti conquest of Bono Manso led to the break up of this
first Akan forest kingdom; its rulers became the subjects of Ashanti
kings. This, together with the dispersion of the Muslims from the
Bono kingdom and their subsequent resettling in other areas, was
the first direct consequence of Ashanti’s emergence as the most
effective power in the forest region bordering the savannah.4? lfie
second consequence of some importance to this paper was the
creation of new trading and market centres in what is today the
northwest of Ashanti within the present Brong Ahafo as well as at
44
Salaga and later at Krachi. With the decline of Begho as a trading

centre the Muslim Dyula and, in particular, the Ligby, migrated
to what is today Banda where they are said to have engaged in the
kola and, to a lesser extent, the slave trade. In the course of their
commercial activities some of them came to settle in other trading
centres such as Yendi, Sansanne-Mango and Salaga — all within
the Middle Volta Basin. After the destruction of their settlements
within Banda by the Abron of Gyaman, the Banda Muslims migra
ted to Wenchi and Kintam po in the early 1880’s. In all these areas
the descendants of these Dyula groups are known by the common
patronymic Banda.
It appears that the trade in gold to the north ceased, due princi
pally to Ashanti control over the Akan gold fields as well as to their
diversion of the metal to the coast because of increased demand
for it by Europeans. The Ashanti needed European goods, espe
cially guns and gun powder some of which they paid for in gold.
What, however, is certain is, that the nineteenth century saw a
change in the articles of trade from the Akan forests to the north.
Kola nuts instead of gold became the most im portant commodity
in the north-bound trade. The same century saw the take-over by
the Hausa of Northern Nigeria of the distribution of the new
commodity. It was the Hausa therefore who are credited with the
creation of new market centres like those of Kintam po and Atebubu.
Thus, it was Hausaland rather than Jenne and Timbuktu which
became the final destination of the kola from the Akan forest.
By far the most im portant Muslim trading centre in Brong

Ahafo in the late nineteenth century was that of Kintampo. The
development and growth of this market was a direct result of the
British conquest of Ashanti in 1874 which greatly upset the trade
pattern and resulted in the closure of the main route to Salaga. In
the early 19th century and before the confusion following Ashanti
defeat, Kintampo had been known only as a rest stop on the Hausa
route from Kumasi to Buipe and Daboya and it was not until
about 1882 that the market there became known. It was then, as
Lonsdale described it, “ the headquarters of the kola trade’’.43 In
1884 the first European visited Kint£ir.po and described the town
in his report as “ the largest market in this part of Africa” . 44 Accord
ing to Levtzion, the Kinjam po market grew in importance “ at the
expense of Salaga, as a considerable part of the latter’s floating
i population moved there”. 45 During the reign of the Asantehene
: Mensa Bonsu (1874-83) the K intam po market suffered considerably
! due to the closure by the Nkoranza chief of the Ashanti trade route
; to the north which passed through his territory. As a result, Kin-
j tam po had no direct access to the coast and goods brought there
t came from Bonduku.
45
K. O. Odoom
The im portance of the Salaga market and of Kintam po as heir

to the former may be inferred from Lonsdale’s report which asserts
th at “ the leading traders, the organizers of the caravans, invariably
expressed their hope that kola may once again be plentiful in the
Salaga market as during the time the Ashanti controlled it, primarily
because o f the increased distance for them to travel to Kintampo,
and particularly on account of the loss they suffer on that extended
portion of their journey through sickness and death among their
horses, mules and donkeys . . ,’’4^ But of course the Salaga market
was never to return to the fame and glory of its former days. By
1892 the ‘spirit of trade and enterprise’ at Salaga had declii ed so
considerably th at Binger heard of people leaving for Kintam po
and Kete K rachi.47 The decline of the Salaga market was the
result of British efforts to divert the bulk of the former north
bound trade to southern markets. The final blow to Salaga as a
market town came with the civil war which occurred in 1892,
during which most of the alien trading population dispersed.
Conclusion
In this paper I have attem pted to set in outline the story of the
Muslims who moved into the area now covered by the Brong-Ahafo
region. Their story is one of participation in trade rather than one
o f carrying Islam to the people with whom they traded. This trade
was first in gold and to some extent in slaves to which kola was
added in due course. By the time kola took the pride of place in the
north-bound trade, gold had probably ceased to have any signifi
cant place as an item of trade.
In the period in which gold was the main product from the Akan
forest, some of it m ust have come from the Takyiman and Banda
areas, whence it was sent to Begho, some forty miles from the
capital of the first Akan kingdom of Bono Manso, and then north
wards to western Sudan. It was Muslims, particularly the Muslim
Dyula, who were in charge of this trade between Bono Manso and
the n o rth and it is they who are credited with having made both
Begho and the Akan kingdom prosperous.
W ith the rise of Ashanti the trade pattern changed. The new
state took control over the gold producing centres in the forest and
diverted the gold trade to Europeans on the coast. The Muslim
Dyula scattered and in the 19th century the Hausa trade in kola
took the place of the Dyula gold trade. Though Islam seems to have
left no impression on the local people in the region, we must credit
Muslim groups with helping to make the Brong region known to
the outside world. The m arket centres, which they established
became centres of civilization and its indigenous people certainly
participated in the concomitant prosperity until Europeans took
over the trade in the nineteenth century.
46
NOTES
1. N. Levtzion, 1968, p. xxv.
2. N . Levtzion, op. cit. p.3
3. N. Levtzion, 1971, p. 132
4. R. Mauny, 1961, p.301
5. Ibn Battuta, 1922, iv. 394
6. Quoted from Kwame Arhin, 1965, p.135
7. Jack Goody, 1953 pp. 45-46
8. Ivor Wilks, 1961, p. 3
9. Goody, 1964, pp. 194-5. It is to be presumed that the Numu who were
also a branch of the Dyula but pagan lived in the same quarter with the
pagan Brongs.
10. J. Dupuis, 1824, p.Lviii. Wilks 1961 was the first to identify ‘Insoco’ in
a 17th century Dutch document with the ‘Nsoko’ that was supposed to
have been the name of the Muslim quarter of Begho. Goody 1964 how
ever argues against this identification, although he agrees with Wilks that
‘Nsoko’ was a common name by which settlements of Mande peoples
were known to Akan speakers. Be that as it may, the fact remains that
the Muslims at Begho maintained themselves in a different quarter of
the town just as the Hausa were to do later in other parts of Ghana.
11. See History o f Namasa as recorded in Arabic (IASAR) 340 (ii), and also
The History o f Namasa by Namasahene Sumayila II at Institute of African
Studies.
12. Levtzion, 1968, p.8. I have followed Levtzion’s position in speaking of
the first “ Mande group” rather than of “ the earliest Muslim element”
of Goody (1964, p.195). Goody’s statement gives the impression that
members of these proto-Dyula groups were all Muslim whereas he him
self later on speaks of the “Ligby as Muslims, the Numu Pagan and the
Hwela now evenly divided.”
13. Ibid.
14. Quoted from Wilks, 1971, p.356
15. Al-Sa’di, 1900, p.11-12; trans. pp.22-23
16. See Mauny, op. cit., 359-60; Goody, 1964, p.211; Levtzion, 1968, p. 4.
17. Wilks 1961, p. 9. This point has received more emphasis in his latest
article, (1971) on T he Mossi and Akan States.’ In J. F. A. Ajayi and
M. Crowder eds. History o f West Africa, vol. I, 1971, especially pp.364 ff.
18. Wilks, 1971, p.355.
19. Ibid.
20. Levtzion, 1968, p .ll; Wilks, 1961, p.12. See below for the case of Salaga
in the late 19th century.
21. Meyerowitz, 1951, p.198.
22. Meyerowitz, 1958, pp. 106-122.
23. Goody, 1965, p.49.
24. Dupuis 1824, p.Lviii.
25. Ibid.
26. Among the various Muslim groups resident at Nkoranza at the time of
Dupuis were descendants of “Moslem Mandings” known to the Kumasi
Muslims as “Salkoh” (Dupuis, p. 124).
47
K . O. Odoom
27. Dupuis, op. cit. Lviii.

28. See Levtzion, 1968, pp.91 ff.
29. Goody, 1964, p.198; Levtzion, 1968, p.7.
30. Wilks, 1971, p.360.
31. Meyerowitz, 1962, p. 81.
32. Meyerowitz, 1958, p.117
33. Meyerowitz, 1962, p.154
34. Rattray, 1923, p. 164.
35. Ibid. p.179
36- Goody 1965, p.20. both of which were
37. Ibid. Goody also points to Gonja g • Jn Gonja) there is a
influenced by Islam, as J * j c caiendar but there is also a tradi-
seven-day week based on the Islamic caien market day. It is sigm-
tional six-day cycle revolving ar.°'|ni ^ h(S^ r d a y ) and the Kulupi market
ficant that when the Salaga ^ ar^ yething of special significance, while
S S S Z S h * S s e and general lub,-
lation.
38. Op. cit. p. 144.
39. Goody, op. cit., p.19.
40. Goody, 1965, p. 37.
41. Wilks, 1961, p. 12. reference to Muslims in Ashanti’s
42. Of ‘Mbotisua’ above and also Dupuis
provinces.
43. Levtzion, op. cit., p. 39.
44. Ibid. See also Arhin, 1965, p. 138.
45. Levtzion, ibid.
46. Ibid. p. 40.
47. Ibid.
48
CHAPTER III
BONO-MANSO AND TECHIMAN

Interview with Nana Kwakye Ameyaw Omanhene o f
Techi/nan — Successor to the Bono-Manso State
[This interview with Nana Kwakye Ameyaw the Techimanhenc
was conducted by Kwame Arhin, editor of the present volume,
in the presence of the Kurontihene and Akyeamehene of Tcchiman
who put in a word now and then. It was transcribed and translated
by C. E. Agyenim-Boateng, Graduate Research Assistant, Institute
of African Studies. Nana Amcyaw, who was present at our seminar
on the Brong peoples, answered questions on the points raised.
We publish it both for the information it affords and also for an
illustration of the interest that some modern educated chiefs of
Ghana take in oral traditions.]
Q: What is the meaning of Bono or Brong?

A: “Bono” as has been explained by my forefathers means a
“pioneer” — something that comes first. Among the Akan
if a woman gives birth for the first time this is referred to as
her abonowoo. It therefore appears to me that we were called
Bonofoo, because we were the first to settle; we were the pioneer
settlers in this area.
Q: Where did you come from to settle here?
A: I was informed by my elders that we came out of a hole (yefri
ebone mu) called Amoowi at Pinihi near N koranza.1
Q : Nana, you have made mention of a hole (bone). Could it not
be that the “Bono” used in reference to your tribe was derived
from the traditional belief in your eggress from the stone
cave (compare boo and bono)2
A: No.
Q : Where did you [i.e. your ancestors] first settle before moving
to your present site?
A: The tradition is th at we first settled at Pinihi — which was
discovered to be an unfavourable site so we moved to Yefri.
While at this site the king sent m ssengers to look for a more
favourable site. Manso was recommended to the King so
we moved to settle at Manso. The Kurontihene was not
allowed to come to Manso w ith the group. He was made to
stay at Yefri. The families that came along were encouraged
to live apart from each other, in different parts of the then
acquired territory. This led to the expansion of the territory.
Interview with Nana Kwakye Ameyaw
Q : How were the people grouped as they started settling in the

new territory. Were they grouped by nton, clans?
A: Perhaps each group of people settled its area under a leader.
As regards grouping by clan it is difficult to say whether the
different clans now in existence date back to that period ot
time. We have the Ayokoo as the royal clan at Tekyiman,
Aduana, Bretuo, Asakyiri and some others can also be found
here.3
O : You imply th at when your people first settled here the^arca
was then uninhabited. How came it that the Brong Manso
state expanded over its actual and suspected extent?
A: W hat I can say for sure is that when my peoples settled here
there was no inter-tribal warfare to stim ulate dispersal over
the land. W hat happened was that as our number increased
segments of families left to build their own settlements. This
led to the increase in number of towns and villages that formed
the state. Expansion of the territory was also by conquest,
for example, my people fought a war against the Yagbumwura
(Gonjas) and drove them across the V olta.4 We occupied
their territory and the Volta became the boundary as the
Yagbumwura and his people lived on its other bank.
O : Where did the Yagbumwura live before crossing the Volta?
Can you give us any guide so as to help us locate the place
on a map?
A: The only guide that I can give is th at he lived across the Volta,
but I cannot tell whether it was at Buipe or Kabere.
Q : W hat were the boundaries of the Bono-Manso state?
A: We had borders with Yagbumwura, Krachi, Ejura (that is
to say Mampong) Offinso, Gyaaman and Banda.
Q : W hat marked your boundary w ith Offinso?
A* A place called “ Mfutudwaneemu” — this is a stretch ot
marshy land th at lies near a stream which one crosses alter
passing Asuosu on the Techiman-Kumasi road. This stretch
of marsh land turned dusty during periods of drought —
which could be the mfutudwaneemu that was said to be the
boundary w ith Offinso.
Q : Were there people living on the lands of the Bono Manso
state who were not ‘Brong’ by tribe?
A: Yes, there were such groups of people. One can name people
of Domase near Sunyani as an example. They were Oen-
kyira who came to ask for land for settlem ent from the Techi-
manhene. People of Seikwa and Badu are believed to have
come from Bona in Ivory Coast.
50
Bono-Manso and Tekyiman
Q: What marked your boundary with the Gyaman state?

A: I cannot be specific on this. I know boundaries were marked
by rivers and streams, but I cannot say for sure whether it
was River Tain or River Yentumi. Techiman is referred to
as “ Bono Kyempim Duaduakwa hene mu hene,” i.e. Dua-
duakwa the giver of thousands, king of kings. This is an
appellation of the Omanhene of the state played on atumpan
drums. It informs us of how the state was organised. It is
said that as our ancestors increased in number when they
settled at Bono Manso, the Omanhene (paramount chief)
made different families settle under an elder in different parts
of the territory. This was a security m easure:5 by settling
people in different parts of the state he could be informed of
any invasion of his territory by any group of warriors. Certain
posts were therefore created — oduadua nnipa no poso, poso,
poso, literaly he settles people at strategic points. Akomadan
was one such security post; Ankama, a hunter was posted
there to report attacks from the south. He built a house and
lived there and this was referred to as Ankama nnaso, i.e.
Ankama’s hunting lodge (now turned into Akomadan).
Nyafoman (now called Akumasa Domase) which is near
Nkoranza was another security post. The Adontenhcne was
stationed there to inform the king of enemy attacks from
that direction. It is even said that when the Asante first heard
of the Bono Manso state an army was sent to attack it. The
Asante attack was repelled by the powerful Adontcnhene
and his men. The Asante went back and informed their king
that the Bono Manso state was no little state to overpower —
enye fo man — hence the origin of Nyafoman.
Yefiri, an earlier settlem ent before the movement to Bono
Manso, was left in the charge of the Kurontihene.
Q: Could you tell us something about the wars fought by the
Brong while at Bono Manso
A: I can only tell of the few wars that I know of. We first fought
the Gonja (Yagbumwura) and drove them from their settle
ments across the Volta. I do not know of the wars that followed
till our encounter with Opoku Ware. We were defeated by the
Asante in this war. We thereafter fought on the side of the
Asante in the wars against the Gonja in the Bote war against
the Banda and against the Gyaman. We took our Taakora
and Tanmensa deities to these wars to help the Asante win. We
also joined them in their wars with the Fanti and the Ewe.6
After the Asante conquest of Bono Manso and our participa
tion in the wars against Gyaman we rebelled, drove the Ashanti
residents out of our lands and occupied them.
51
Q : You state that Bono Manso’s boundaries were with the Gonja,
the Gyaman, with Krachi and with Asante. Did it have any
boundary w ith Atebubu?
A: It could not have shared a boundary with Atebubu for the
Atebubu state was then not in existence.7 The only chiel who
was known to be in the area was the Wiasehene with whom we
never fought. We had settled before the people of Atebubu
came.
Q : Mrs Meyerowitz wrote of the existence of a powerful state
th at was in the neighbourhood of Techiman and was under
A taara Finam.8 What do you know about this ?
A: I do not know much about Ataara Finam. I do not know
whether or not he was a brother to the ruler of Krachi an
lived with him. All that I know is that his territory was at first
on the other side of the Volta but he and his people later moved
to stay somewhere in Kwahu.
Q : W hat were Bono-Manso’s marketing centres? Where did your
people trade?
A: There used to be a trading centre, dwabirem, at Bono Manso.
Goods sold included food items and kolanuts Traders irom
outside the area brought blankets, beads, gold, slaves and
exchanged them for kola. Some traders brought gold and
exchanged it for cowrie shells. Salaga was also another trading
centre. Our people went there to trade while people from
Salaga also came down to trade. Bew (Begho) near Nsawkaw
was also a known trading centre. Traders who came to our
m arkets moved in a convoy (caravans). Bew (Begho) was
both a market centre and a resting-place for those who came
to our markets. They spent the night there on their way down
and when going back slept there to work on the goods bought,
especially kola. The kola was usually wrapped with leaves on
reaching Begho. The Begho trading post was not controlled
by Bono Manso (Techiman).9
Q : How did the chief acquire wealth?
A: In our state, gold was dug for the chief at P r a b o r a (Prabom
Obuasi) across the Tam towards Banda. Individuals who
found gold nuggets took them to the chief who took the greater
part The chief also took a greater part of what was plundered
in wars. He could also ask his subjects to farm for him. Besides
he sent people to trade for him.
Q : Were there any subjects specially appointed as traders for the
chief?
A: There was no select group of persons as traders for the chief.
Whenever the chief needed any goods, like drinks and blankets
52
from M poano (Gold Coast), he could send any of his sub

jects to go on the errand.10
Q: W hat currency was used in the state?
A: Gold was the currency in use. Trading was done in gold. Gold
weights were used to determine what quantity of gold should
be exchanged for a commodity.
Q: Was it the chief who fixed the units of the currency?
A: The chiefs and elders determined the units of the currency.
This can be borne out by the way in which gold was measured
at the chief’s court when a man fell into debt and had to pay
with gold. The akyeame (spokesmen) usually held one side
of the balance to make the gold weight heavier. M ore gold had
to be put on the sack till it came to a position of equilibrium.
Any gold dust that overflowed was never returned to the
debtor. The akyeame took the extra. The chiefs fixed the
quantity of gold that should make a peredwan, a doma, dwoa,
e tc .11
Q: Would you say it was your ancestors who introduced the idea
of state treasury, i.e. introduced gold weights, scales, etc.
A: Meyerowitz (reference had been made to Meyerowitz) may be
right in saying this because 1 hear that when Asante conquered
Techiman (Bono Manso) and took Nana Ameyaw Kwakye
captive to Kumasi, the Asantchene invited him to play the
oware game with him .12 While playing, the captive discovered
that the players used in playing were in copper. Unlike his
which had been in gold, they made the fingers dirty which
smelt badly after playing. He commented on this and said his
had been better for use. The Asantehene made him send
messengers to Bono-Manso to bring his Oware with the players.
The Oware had before then been hidden with his Sanaa at the
time of the wars, so they were taken together to Kumasi.
It was there that the Asantehene saw the nsenea, scales, and
abrammoo, weights. He took them for his use and never returned
them to Techiman.
Q: Do you believe there are some other handicrafts, adwini die,
that the Asante borrowed from Brong?
A: Yes, I believe certain Brong crafts were introduced to Kumasi.
In one of Dr Kyerematen’s books,13 he could not name some
of the regalia and explained this was because they were brought
from outside Asante. I believe some of the items were taken
away from us after the conquest.
Cloth weaving could also be said to have been borrowed
from us. Only the Banda, beside ourselves, engaged in cloth
weaving — we wove the kyekye. There was also an old tradi
53
tional cloth known as gagawuga14 which, I believe, was first

designed and woven here. Stool carving too originated from
here.
Q: Who is a “ Brong” ?
A: A real “ Brong” is one who comes from Techiman.
Q: How comes it that “ Brong” now applies to all the people who
live in the Brong district of the Brong Ahafo Region, including
those from outside Techiman, e.g. A tebubu?
A: I think they call themselves Brong because the name has been
extended to cover them. This has been possible because they
came to join us in the area after we had settled as pioneers and
had been called Bonofoo.
Q: W hat distinguishes the Brong from the other Akan tribes?
A: (/) Our dialect — we Brong do not use long sentences when
speaking. We make much use of breaks in speech — short
sentences.
(h) Our festivals are also different from those of A sante.15
The Kwasidae festival is known and celebrated over the
whole Asante territory; we Brong do not celebrate it.
Instead we have abono nne. Here in Techiman Wednesday
is our abonoda. In other Brong traditional areas, Friday
is their abonoda. The Asante celebrate their annual festi
vals on Sunday (Akwasidae) while in Brong it differs
within the traditional areas. Techiman celebrates hers
on Fofie, Friday, Berekum and Dormaa on Kwafie,
Friday, and Atebubu and some others on Kurufie, Thurs
day. Other such days as Monofie, Kurufie and N kyifie,
used for yam festivals, are not known among the A sante.16
EDITOR’S NOTES ON CHAPTER IV
1. E. Meyerowitz (1952:33) places the foundation of the Bono Manso king

dom in 1295-1325. She says she was told that the founders of the Bono
Manso state came originally from a place in the ‘Great White Desert’ to
Diala or ‘Diula’ which was close to a big river. Then they settled among the
Mo, the aboriginal Mossi. Here they fought and lost a war and fled under
the leadership of three, one of whom brought a section of the refugees to
the neighbourhood of the Black Volta. They settled on the fringes o f the
forest in a cave at Amowi. The cave afterwards collapsed and they came
to Yefri whence they migrated to Bono-Manso. It has been shown that
54
Miss Meyerowitz’ chronology o f the Bono Manso state is inaccurate; she

thought Asante’s defeat of Bono Manso, in 1722-23, took place in 1740
(J. Goody, 1954: appendix iv). C. Flight: Journal o f African History IX, 2,
1970:268 has recently concluded that the period of the formation of the
Bono-Manso kingdom probably began in the fourteenth century.
2. See M. Posnanskv, supra ch. I.
3. For comparative lists of Akan clans, see Rattray (1929:63).
4. The Yagbumwura, according to Goody (1967:188) was the paramount

chief of all Gonja. Goody (ibid: 185) also says that Bono-Manso was one
of the ‘enemies’ o f the Gonja state, founded sometime in the sixteenth or
seventeenth century. While Bono-Manso may not have defeated the whole
of the Gonja state, it possibly expelled scattered Gonja migrants who Goody
(1967:v) appear to have first established themselves north of the forest
borders.
5. See Arhin, infra., ch. 4.

6. In 1868-69. See Ellis, (1893:262:262).
7. The Atebubu state was probably established in the late seventeenth century.
See Arhin, ‘Introduction’ Ashanti and the Northeast, Research Review
Supplement No. 2, Institute of Afiican Studies, Legon, 1970, also Daaku,
infra.
8. Ataara Finam or ‘Atele Firempong’ as Meyerowitz (1952:78) calls him.
She wrote ‘The capital of the great Guan state was once at Kokofu near
Atebubu; its most famous king was Atele Firempong, who lived in the
traditions of Kwaman, Kumawu, Agogo and Kwahu’. See also Arhin 1970,
op. cit., and Daaku, infra., ch. 6.
9. See Wilks (1961).
10. Compare with Rattray’s (1929:107-119) account o f the finances o f an
Asante chiefdom, also Arhin, (19676).
11. For lists of the units of the Akan gold currency see Sarbah (1960:70). Also
Ramseyer and Kuhne (1875 appendix 11, pp. 303-304).
12. Meyerowitz {op. cit. 35-36). See also Reindorf, (1895, 2nd edition 1950:72)
who says on the defeat of Bono-Manso ‘the whole treasure of the kingdom
was taken by Asantes, whose power was greatly increased by this victory.
Several imorovements were, by Amo Yaw’s (the king of Bono-Manso)
advice, made in the government and social conditions o f Asante. He taught
Opoku to make gold and silver weights, to claim the estate of a deceased
chief or general, also to enact laws fining offenders in order to add to his
power and reduce that of his subjects’.
13. The reference is probably to A. A. Y. Kyerematen, Panobly o f Ghana,
Longmans, 1964.
14. They say in Asante, ‘wo fira gagawuga koraa a, menye no den?’ lit. ‘even
if you wear gagawuga so what?’ Gagawuga is said to have been the cloth
of kings or chiefs.
15. On Brong dialects see Dolphyne infra, ch. 8.
16. For the purposes of comparing the reckoning o f the festival days and the
rites of the festivals see Rattray (1923:chs. v-ix). Rattray (ibid: 114) signifi
cantly states: ‘One day I overheard one of my men saying that in olden times,
when the king of Ashanti was in doubt as to any date for a festival, he
always referred to the Brong, who were the keepers of the king's calender,
so to speak’.
55
CHAPTER IV
ASANTE SECURITY POSTS IN THE NORTHWEST*
Kwame Arhin
Introduction
M ost writers on the Asante wars have stated that Asante could
conquer but not govern,1 and have given this as a reason for
what I have elsewhere (Arhin, 1967a) called the ‘cycle of rebellion
among A sante’s conquered territories and the consequent instability
of the Asante empire. Asante’s early mode of administering
her conquered territories was to appoint a chief (normally the
leader of the conquering army) as the overseer of the territory
who also annually went himself or sent a messenger to collect
tribute and to settle internal disputes (Bowdich, 1819:235). Later,
as Wilks (1969) has pointed out, a system of regional commissioners
was developed mainly for political purposes: to report incipient
rebellion in the subject state, and to ensure that the king’s writ
operating through the system of Asante’s Great O ath, ran in
the regional territories (Goody, 1965:8, Arhin, 1967a).
I wish to suggest in this paper that, in so far as ensuring the
military and political subordination of the territories in the north
west was concerned, the Asante early resorted to another practice.
This was the establishment of security posts in the west and north
west. These security posts included M anso-Nkwanta on the
border with Denkyira in the southw est,2 Ahafo settlem ents in
the virgin forests between Asante and the Sefwi chiefdoms,
certain villages in Techiman, the successor state to the Bono-
M anso chiefdom after the conquest of the latter in 1722-23; and
also the sub-chiefdom of Odumase between the Dorma and the
Gyaman states.5
There were, as far as I can see, two ways in which these security
posts were established. Firstly, as in the case of M anso-Nkwanta
and Ahafo, new villages were founded and placed under a hunter
who went on amantuo, travelled with a group of other hunters
and their close kin. The second method was to send a group ot
rulers with close kin to rule existing villages. In such cases, illust
rated by Odumase, Sunyani, and Tuobodom, four miles south
of Techiman town, one finds either twin villages with their chiefs
* Part of the material for this paper was collected by C. E. Agyenim-Boateng,
B A now a Graduate Research Assistant at the Institute of African Studies
and Mi B.J. Aidoo, B.A. Mastei at Sunyani Secondary School. Messrs Agyenim-
Boateng and Aidoo and myself are giateful to Mr P. K. Yeboah, Secretary of
the Berekum Traditional Council for his help during fieldwoik in Berekum.
Asante Security Post in the Northwest
competing for supremacy, or what am ounts to ‘circulating succes*

sion’ to the chiefship by two dynasties.
It appears to me from (/) the oral version of the story of the
establishment of the first settlem ent of Berekum th at it was one
of these scout or security posts. The impression is strengthened
when one examines («) the political organisation of Berekum;
(m) Berekum’s relations with Asante, and (iv) with her neighbours,
including Dorm aa and Gyaman. I intend to examine / - iv and
(v) attem pt to set out the characteristics of Berekum as a model
Asante scouting or security post.
(/) Berekum Tradition of Origin
Modern Berekum lies a hundred miles northwest of Kumasi at

a junction. From this junction roads, (formerly footpaths)
lead to Seikwa in the north, Bonduku (a 19th century trading
town in Gyaman) in the northwest and to Dormaa (formerly
Warn) in the south-west. Its immediate eastern neighbour is
Nsoatre.
The main tradition of the foundation of Berekum, that of the
present chief and his elders, says th at on the return of an Asante
army from a war with Abo Kofi (the Gyamanhene), the A sante
hene, Opoku Ware (1720-50) (who had himself led the A sante
army) placed a number of warriors under Kwaku Tia from Asante
Asokore at Awaasu north of B jrekum .6 They were to spy upon the
Gyaman (Abron) people and report plots of rebellion to Kumasi.
Tia and his contingent were also given a number of Abron war-
captives. L ater a group from Adanse (north of Kumasi) were
added to the Asokore contingent. Much later another group of
Denkyira people were also planted in Berekum.
The chief and his elders say that the people of Berekum have
thrice moved site. The Awaasu settlem ent was found to lie in a
marshy area, so Pepease (also north of Berekum) was chosen. A
number of chiefs were buried at Pepease which became their
banmu, the burial-place of chiefs, and their sacred grove. From
Pepease they moved to Akurofo, the abandoned settlem ent,
where they came to the site of modern Berekum.
The “ m ilitary” origin of Berekum was retained in the old name
of Berekum, “Asokore-Berekum D om tene” : dom (Akan) means,
a crowd, an assembly, a fighting group, or unit ot it; tene means
a file; so th at the phrase means the file of warriors from Asokore
at Berekum and “ Berekum” itself is said to mean the place where
the hunter got game but with difficulty; “ Bere na w’akum” : ‘one
gets game with difficulty’.
57
Kwame Arhin
The royal lineage is said to be composite; it consists of chiefs

of the m other’s line (the Asokore group), and chiefs of the line of
sons (the Adansi group). The chief of the m other’s line are those
matrilineally connected with Amankona Diawuo, a maternal
relative of Kwaku Tia, the warrior from Asokore; chiefs of the line
of sons are those descended from a full sister of the third chief
whose m other, from the Adansi group of settlers, was married to
the first chief of Bcrekum. A similar change in the succession
from m other’s people to sons occurred at M anso-Nkwanta which
was also a security post. This change shows the fragile traditional
foundation of the succession owing, first to the shortness of the
life of the settlem ent and, second to the functionary character
of the settlem ent which requires more attention to ability in a
chief than to strict legitimacy.
The chief and his elders explain that the succession of sons
started when there were no suitable male successors in the Asokore
group, and Kwaku Diawuo, a son of Amankona Diawuo, the
first Berekumhene, succeeded. Diawuo’s maternal descendants
have since occupied the Berekum stool. The stool list of Berekum
chiefs is as follows:
Asokore ( Maternal line) Adanse (sons’ line)
Amankom Diawuo Kwaku Diawuo
Kyere Diaboa Kyere Yaw
Boateng Akuamoa
Nana Tabiri
Pampraw7
Kwasi Diawuo
Kofi Date
Kwabena Owusu
Kojo Barnie
Kwame Boateng
Yiadom Boakye
Akuamoa Boateng
Yiadom Boakye8
Early w ritten Asante traditions mention the Asante wars with
Gyaman but are unfortunately silent on the details of security
arrangements the Asante made after her conquest of the latter.
Bowdich (1819:233) was told th at Osei Poku, i.e. Opoku Ware
invaded Gyaman, and th at Abo, the Gyamanhene, ‘purchased a
peace by presenting large sums of gold to the warrior chiefs, and
consenting to an annual tribute’. But he fails to mention (p.238)
Gyaman in his list of conquered territories and the Kumasi chiefs
under whose immediate care it was placed.
Dupuis says (1824:230) th at Osei T utu invaded Gyaman with
a ‘powerful army with which he vanquished those tribes, and
58
Asante Security Posts in the Northwest
reduced their monarch to the condition of a tributary*; that (p.233)

Opoku Ware had to fight once again the wars of the previous
reign, and achieved ‘the entire reduction of Assin, Akim, the
re-occupation of Dinkira (Denkyera) the perfect conquest of Gaman,
and its annexation to the empire as unconditional tributary*.9
For the purpose of determining the period (if not the exact
date) in which Berekum was established it is necessary to show
which of the Asante attacks on Gyaman or Abron immediately
preceded its establishment. Goody (1965:16) has gone to some
lengths to show that contrary to Dupuis’s information, Osei Tutu
himself only pursued the Abron when they were known as the
‘Dormaa’ as far as Abesim, before the Asante-Dmkyira war
1699-1700; th at {op. cit. 18) it was Opoku Ware who first des
patched the Dadiesoabahene, N ti Panyin, to invade Abron, in
continuation of the wars of the previous reigns (Obiri Yeboah
and Osei Tutu); and that ‘the perfect conquest’ of Gyaman or
Abron mentioned by Dupuis most probably took place in 1746-47.
It is certain that the security post of Berekum was established
after the ‘perfect conquest’ of Abron. Opoku Ware is normally
credited with the establislm ent of scouling posts, for exrrrple,
in Ahafo on the borders with Sefwi-Wiawso after conquest o f the
latter (Fuller 1921, 2nd ed. 1968 p.26; Arhin, 1970; Fynn 1971:61)
and within the Takyiman chiefdcm .10 The need for thest scouting
or security posts would suggest itself after a series of experiences
of relations with defeated peoples and particularly during the
efforts of consolidation with which Opoku Ware is credited (Dupuis,
op. cit)
Berekum could have been established only after the ‘perfect
conquest’ of Gyaman when the land between the Tano river and
the modern Berekum borders with the Drobo, a sub-chiefdom of
Gyaman, was seized and became available for settlement. Also
for the purpose of maintaining effective occupation of the land,
it was necessary to establish occupation posts. The settlement of
Berekum must be seen as part of a consolidation effort which
included the creation of the Bechem settlement and the Bantama-
Awua-Dumase connexion11 and also the political subjecticn of
neighbouring Nsoatre. Already Seikwa, Badu, Nsawkaw and
Banda had been brought within the Asante political system and
Opoku Ware had achieved Asante dominance in the whole of the
northwest (Dupuis op. cit. 234; Goody, 1965; 16, 17).
(«) The Political Organisation of Berekum
Until the Yaa Asantewa War (1900-01) when the British elevated
the Berekum chiefdom to a param ountcy12 (Tordoff, 1965:137,
Berekum fieldnotes) Berekum remained a sub-chiefdcm and a sub
59
Kwame Arhin
unit of the Kuronti (Bantama) division of the Kumasi state. The

present Berekumhene himself stated that it was a deliberate policy
of Kumasi not to raise any of the chiefs in the security border
areas to paramount status; a paramount chief would have more
initiative for intrigue than a subordinate one who formally, at any
rate, could not have any pretensions to pursuing an independent
external policy.
Before 1900, the Berekum sub-chiefdom consisted of adanpan-
k ro n 13 (also used as titles for the chiefs) nine villages with ‘town
halls’, whose chiefs were the principal councillors of the Berekum
hene. These chiefs were known as mpanyinfo, (elders) heads of
localized lineages. None of them was an obirenipon, a major sub
chief such as one finds within an Asante paramountcy (R attray
1929:79, 94).
The adanpankron claim different place - origins and have
different traditions of migration into Berekum. None of them
claims that his earliest ancestors were companions of Kwaku Tia,
the head of the scouting groups. Their stories suggest spasmodic
additions to the population of Berekum rather than the gradual
spread of a settled population from a cenlral point such as was
normal with the central Asante chiefdoms (Rattray 1929.72).
The following are the adanpankron, their village seats (italicized)
and the villages under their authority.
K urontire Senose, Jamdede, K utre No. 1 Abi.
Akwamu Biadan
Benkum Nsapor, Nanasuano, Amomaso.
Nifa Domfete, Benkasa
Adonten Kotoa, Asaapuu
Ankobea Abisase, Akroforo
Twafo Adorn, Tewbaabi, Amankokwaa
Kyidom Fetentaa, Kato, Anyinasu, Nkyenkyemamu,
Mpasem, Botokrom.
Gyase Jinijini, M patasie, Koraso, Nkwantanka, Pe-
paase, Ampenkuro, Domiabra, Kutre No. 1,
Namasua, Kankam ano, Antokrom, Ya-
kwan.
Two observations must be made here. Firstly, the designations
‘K urontire’, ‘Akwamu’, etc., date from the elevation of th e Berckum-
hene to paramount status which meant a corresponding increase
in the status of his sub-chiefs by the colonial authorities. Bofore
then the sub-chiefs had all been known as the adanpankron, elders.
Secondly, it is said at Berekum that the villages under the various
chiefs had all been established by members of what may be called
the ‘dom inant’ villages, the village-seats of the chiefs, (Schapiera;
1940:57) with which they had kinship, affinal and ritual relations.
60
Of the adanpankron interviewed, the Gyasehene, chief of the

household division, which includes the sons and grandsons of
successive chiefs of Berekum, and the Asokore group of royals,
said his maternal ancestress had migralcd frcm Adame Forrena
in pursuit of a cure for barrenness. She had married Amankona
Diawuo, the then Berekumhene, who made their eldest son, Kwasi
Date, the first Gyasehene. The Akwamuhcne, head of the Akwamu
division, claims that his ancestors migrated from Adanse to
Bantama to Awaasu, the first Berekum site .14 The Kurontihene,
next to the Berekumhene in authority in Berekum and head of the
adanpankron, claims that his ancestress came to Berekum from
Techiman to marry. The Benkumhene, head of the left wing, said
his ancestress migrated frcm Anwanweneso in Akwamu, also
in search of cure for barrenness; that they first settled at Koraso
near Drobo (i.e. they were subjects of the Gyamanhene) and moved
to Berekum when they heard that Tankwasi, a deity of Berekum,
could cure barrenness. The Nifahene, chief of the right wing,
claims Akwamu as the place —origin of his ancestors and that
the latter were part of the Dorm aa group who left Akwamu and
after passing through Amakom/Sunlreso (all modern Kumasi
suburbs) Abampiredase (Boma), Abesim and Chiraa settled in the
Bonduku and Wamfie areas (Goody, 1965 ;66). The Twafohene,
chief of the advance guard, asserts Adansi as the home of his
ancestors.
The reasons given by some of the chiefs for the emigration of
their ancestresses/ancestcrs may be true or fake. It is respectable
to claim Adanse or Akwamu as a place-origin. Adanse is said to
be the original home of many of the Asante chiefdcms (Rattray,
1929). The Akwamu empire preceded Asante, was its military
‘tutor’ (Wilks, 1961:31) and became Asante’s protectorate and
not its subject state.
It is pertinent to point out that Berekum may have been a bene
ficiary of Asante’s attempts to dispe- se and control the population
of her more troublesome provinces. Dupuis was informed
(1824:241-242) that after a war with Wassaw, Osei Kwadwo
(1764-1777) removed ‘two powerful tribes’ to ‘Bouromy’ (Brong)
and ‘Quahou’ (Kwahu) ‘either to supply a deficiency of the popula
tion of those parts, or to secure their future allegiance’. Whether
the causes o f the emigration of the various groups were as stated
or not, it is certain that the early populations of Berekum arrived
in successive groups among ‘Brong’ scattered settlements and,
hence their Brong ‘tongue’. 15
A characteristic of the Asante scouting or security out posts
then, was that their earlier populations were heterogeneous in
ethnic and place-origins. Such a state could hardly have the cohe
61
Kwame Arhin
sion and the strength deriving therefrom to contemplate secession

or intrigue with potential enemy-states. This lack of cohesion16
would also prevent such early consolidation as would induce
Kumasi to raise the status o f the chief. So that either through
internal weakness or deliberate policy of Kumasi, Berekum was
kept a subordinate o f the Bantam ahene.
(iii) Relations with Asante
I have already noted that Berekum was sub-unit of the Kuronti

(Bantama) division of Kumasi till the colonial period. The Btrekum-
hene and his elders say that na yekobo Bantamahene so som Osan-
tehene ‘we served the Asantehene through the Bantair.ahene’. For a
chief to say that me bo ohene bi so is different from saying that obi
ye m'adamfo. The former means ‘I am a subordinate of another
chief’, the latter that ‘chief so-and-so is my friend at court’ which
as R attray says (1929: 95), meant a patron or ‘representative* at
the Asantehene’s court, and implied a relationship of equality,
though the Kumasi chiefs tended to behave as if they were the
superiors, of their nnamfo, (Rattray, ibid).
The Berekumhene and his sub-chiefs meant by ‘som’ ‘serve’,
above all military service, participation in Asante wars. When
discussing their relations with Asanle before the twentieth century,
the chiefs usually recall the part their predecessors played in various
Asante wars, and the trophies acquired in those wars; they are rela
tively silent on other implications of 'som'.
To illustrate: The Gyasehene recalls the part his ancestors played
in the Fanti sa, the first Asante invasion ot the Fanti area in 1806—
1807 (Fynn op. cit. 142-143) in which he claims his ancestors seized
the apesemaka drums from the Fanti. The Akwamuhene says that
Berekum fought on the side of the Asante during the ‘Korm antine’
(Kormantze)’ wars i.e., in 1806-1807. The Benkumhene claims that
his ancestors distinguished themselves during the same Fanti war.
The Nifahene recalls the participation of Berekum in th e ‘K rom anti’
war. The 1 wafohene says that his ancestors helped the Berekumhene
in many wars. Berekum, however, is said to have fought only one
war of her own, the Nkyibena tuotu (see below) so that the ‘many
wars’ were those of Asante.
Also during the negotiations preceding the restoration of the
Asante Confederacy, the Berekumhene, Kwame Boateng, and his
councillors recalled in a letter that their chief ‘P rrn p a w went to
F anti War (Fanti Sa) with Kumasihene. When the war was over
the cost o f gunpowder shot (sic) was charged from us. Three hundred
(300) o f our men died, we received no thanks’. 17
62
Participation in Asante wars, particularly for a people who

regarded themselves as Asante, was really only the prom inent
feature of 'som', service. Those who participated in Asante wars
also paid flpco/00, war tax (Arhin 1967/) :283-291) and o th e r‘imposts
(e.g. aseda), (thanksgiving fee on enstoolment) muhcma (a fee for
waist-band) ayibuadie (aid for funeral rites) omontoo (national tax)
etc.’ (Rattray, 1929:105). These were collectively known as ka , levy
or debt and it was accepted in the course of the proceedings of the
Committee of Privileges (1936:39) that Berekum paid ka as a
separate unit of the Kumasi Kuronti division.
Berekum also used the Asante Great Oath, Ntamkese. The chief
and his elders do not recall any other oath before the Nkyibena
which was instituted after the Nkyibena tuoto. This was a one-day
pitched battle with Dormaa, helped by a Gyaman contigent, appro
ximately in the reign of the Asantehene Mensah-Eonsu (1874-83).
Taken together, participalicn in Asante wars, the payment of
the various levies and the use of the Great Oath as the sole oath —
signifying the undisputed acceplarce of juridicial obedience to the
Asantehene and ritual guidance of his ancestors (Rattray 1929:102,
106, Busia 1954: pp. 203-204) ■— meant that, though distant,
Berekum lands were formally and substantively part o f central
Asante in a way that conquered territories, like Takyiman or
Gyaman, were not (Arhin 1967a).
(iv) Berekum s Relations with Her Neighbours
As noted, Berekum’s immediate neighbours were Nsoatre in the

east, Seikwa in the north, Gyaman in the west and northwest, and
Dormaa in the south and southwest.
Berekum’s relations with Nsoatre and Seikwa were relations of
‘peace’ which was emphasized and institutionalized in practices
indicating privileged relations. Berekum citizens had the right to
‘loot’ Nsoatre when the death of an Nsoatrehene was announced
and a similar right was accorded to Nsoatre citizens on the death
of a Berekumhene. A Berekum man who committed adultery in
Seikwa was not subject to the normal payments and a similar exemp
tion was granted to a Seikwa adulterer in Berekum.
The elders of Berekum explain the practice of reciprocal looting
between Berekum and N soatre on the ground that they shared
common institutions. The two towns have as their tribal deities
Tain Kwasi (brought from the headwaters o f the river Tano near
the town of Techiman) which impelled religious collaboration and
the observance of common rules and avoidance. They celebrate
the Kwafie, a first fruits festival similar to the Asante Odwira
(Rattray 1927:122-136) on the same day. No explanation has so far
been offered for the mutual exemption from adultery payments
between Berekum and Seikwa...
63
Kwame Arhin
It seems to me to be significant that, in contrast, Berekum had

no such ‘pact’ of peace with either Dorm aa or Gyaman; or with
any of the towns that were effectively parts of the two states. Rela
tions with Dormaa and Gyaman might be described as those of
latent hostility.
T h e ‘hostility’ became open and violent in the reign ofM ensah-
Bonsu when Dormaa and Gyaman attacked Berekum and Nsoatre
on a Tuesday, routed the Berekum army and carried away a number
of captives, including members of the Berekum royal family to
Dorm aa and Bonduku. This war, as already noted, was the origin
of the Nkyibena oath with which both Berekum and N soatre
com m em orate an event they regard as calam itous.
The chief and elders of Berekum are vague on the reason or rea
sons for the attack. But there are a number of pointers to the pro
bable reasons. The reign of the Asantehene Mensah-Bonsu (1874—
1883) followed upon that of Karikari (1867-1874) the end of whose
reign saw the first British invasion of Kumasi. The invasion became
a signal for the revolt of the Asante subject states in the north and
northwest. Among the Brong peoples, Atebubu in the east and
Techiman and Gyaman in the west threw off the Asante ‘yoke’.
Anti-Asante defensive alliances were formed in the east and west.
In this context, it is reasonable to see Berekum, an Asante enclave
between Dormaa and Gyaman territories, as a special target of
Dormaa and Gyaman hostility. It is suggestive that during the attack
Berekum asked Kumasi (albeit in vain) for help. Dormaa and Gya
man aim was to cut the Berekum and Kumasi connexion and restore
Dormaa and Gyaman rule over the whole of the territory on the
Gyaman side of the Tano river.18
That aim was achieved for a period. During the negotiations pre
ceding the restoration of the Asante Confederacy Kwame Boateng,
the Berekumhene, and his elders stated that ‘we are Brongsand have
nothing to do with Asante am algam ation. . . We do not share in
the opinion that Asante should once revert to the old dynastic
regime of centralized G overnm ent.’ Explaining themselves, they
said that if the British were‘no longer willing to hold their trust with
us, then because we are left unprotected, we shall return to serve
French Agyeman, our former overlord’; that ‘From the time of
Bonsu, Kwesi Diawuo our Omanhene broke his allegiance with the
Asante yoke’; that ‘we did not serve Bonsu, Kweku Duah and
Prem pehl, so we are not serving Kumasi now’; that ‘The Jamans
and Warns [Dormaa] once waged war against us. We called for aid
from K u m a s i , but Kumasi turned deaf ears to us. We do not want
any amalgamation. Brongs and Asantes have nothing in common’
and th at ‘when we left our allegiance to Bonsu, we served Agyeman
of Jam an.’19
64
Asante Secrity Posts in the Northwest
Berekum had one great reason for not wishing to join the con
federacy. This was their fear that Berekum would lose her para-
mountcy if ‘Asante should once revert to the old dynastic regime
of centralized Governm ent.’ But the Berekumhene and his elders
were also clearly saying that Kumasi’s failure to help them during
the Nkyibena war had induced them to identify themselves politically
with the ‘Brong’.
It ought to be stated th at today the chiefs and his elders identify
themselves as ethnically and culturally ‘A sante’ but state that they
are Brong by virtue of their geographical situation and also by virtue
of the 1960 Republican C onstitution which created the Brong-Ahafo
Region.20 They point out that they are obliged by social nearness
to their neighbours to speak ‘Brong’, which indeed they do when
they wish to emphasize their political separateness from Asante.
They identify ‘Brong’ as Gyaman. But they have preserved their
Asante dialect which they speak when they wish to recall their
Asante origin and also when they wish to emphasize solidarity with
an Asante friend. They also point out that their court etiquette,
political institutions21 their drumming and dancing are all Asante.
v. Conclusions: Characteristics of Asante Scouting or Security

Posts
From the Berekum, example, then one would expect Asante
scouting or security posts in the northwest to have the following
characteristics:
(a) establishment in the reign o f Opoku Ware, 1720-1750;
(b) diverse ethnic and place origins of the early population;
(c) a composite royal lineage;
(d) subordinate political statu s to a Kumasi chief, and
(e) persistent cultural identification with Asante.
Odumase and Tuobodom, in fact, do have these characteristics.
Security posts as a mode of controlling subject-states was in the
early days more acceptable to the Asante than placing Asante rulers
over these states. Replacing local, with Asante, rukrs wculd have
contravened the prevalent Akan ideology, th at one could ‘rule’ an
area effectively only if one were descended from the dead founder of
the oman. The dead founder was the supreme spiritual guardian of
the oman and would communicate only with his own m aternal des
cendants. He was unlikely to heed the prayers and accept the sa
crifices of an usurper.22
This paper has also indicated a certain connection between the
‘history’ of Berekum as the people know it and their political orga
nisation (Tait 1955:19).
65
Kwame Arhin
1. B. Cruickshank (Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast, London, 1852 Frank

Cass 2nd ed. 1966 Vol. II pp. 58-59) speaking of the Asante conquests
says ‘They had for their sole object the maintenance of Ashantee superio
rity, without any attempt to assimilate the conquered tribes with them,
which they knew would have met with strong opposition, and rendered
necessary the continual piesence of such a military force as must have
greatly interfered with their career o f conquest’. A. B. Ellis (A History o f
the Gold Coast, 1971 edition, Curson Press Ltd., London and Dublin
p.106) says that'But though the Ashantis could conquer they could not
govern and their authority over the tributary states was more nominal
than real’, and W. E. Ward, (A History o f Ghana, Allen and Unwin, Ltd.,
1958 ed. p.141) reviewing Asante’s relations with her conquered territories
says ‘Ashanti Statecraft, however, was unprogressive’; for ‘The native
chief was left in authority, the Ashanti governor usually continuing to
reside in Ashanti except for occasional visits’.
2. See Kwame Arhin ‘Succession and Goldmining at Manso-Nkwanta’ in
Research Review, Vol. 6. No. 3 1970, pp. 101-109.
3. See Kwame Arhin Collected Papers on Ahafo Landholding Supplement
No. 3, Research Review June, 1970.
4. See Proceedings o f the Meetings o f the Committee o f Privileges Held at
Kumasi from 18th June, 1935 to 3rd January 1939, pp. 216-248. The
Committee, consisting o f the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti, the Asante
hene and other chiefs, was appointed to enquire into questions of territorial
jurisdiction arising from the establishment of the Confederacy.
5. See Arhin ‘Aspects o f Colonial District Administration: The Case of
the Northwestern District of Ashanti 1904-1911’ in Research Review
Vol. 8, No. 1, 1971 pp. 1-30.
6. The present Akwamuhene, the chief of Biadan, has another version of
the early story of Berekum. He says that the Asokore group was descend
ed from a woman who came to Berekum to seek a cure for barrenness
and that the woman met his ancestors, some of the Dormaa (Abron)
migrants in the area. The Dormaa or Abron migrants certainly preceded
the Asante group — witness the Asante attack on Abron — but it is by
no means clear the Akwamu group were among the Gyaman migrants.
Also nobody else in Berekum believes it.
7. It is said at Berekum that Prampraw was a son of a woman from the Den-
kyira migrant group. It was apparently an integrative device o f the early
chiefs to marrv from all the migrant groups.
8. I tried obtaining the genealogy of the Berekum chiefs. But the chief and
ciders were so vague that drawing a diagram was impossible. The Asokore
group have recently sought the intervention o f the Asante-Asokorehene
and of the Asantehene by swearing the Great Oath — that they ‘own’
the Berekum chiefship — over what appeared to be their permanent
exclusion from the stool. The case was finally settled through arbitration
by Berekum elders. It is alleged that the exclusion originated in a misdeed
o f an ancestress which resulted in her group being cursed, which meant
some sort of political excommunication from the nkonwafieso, stool-house.
Sheep were slaughtered after the settlement to remove the curse to permit
the restoration of the group’s rights to the stool.
9. ‘Proceedings of the Meetings. . . ’ op. cit.
10. See E. A. Agyeman, Gyaman — Its Relations with Ashanti, 1720-1820.
Unpublished M. A. Thesis, Legon, 1965, p. 48.
11. ‘Proceedings . . .’ p.43.
12. On first July, 1901, C. H. Armitage, a Travelling Commissioner o f the
Government of the Gold Coast signed an agreement with the chiefs o f
Bechem, a section o f Ahafo and Borumfo — Nkwanta/Odumase and
Nsoatre in which the latter agreed to ‘recognize’ and serve the Berekum-
hene, Kobina Owusu, his heirs and successors as head and ‘king’ o f the
districts of Bechem, Ahafo and ‘Borumfu’ in Northern Ashanti. Up to
66
the restoration o f the Asante Confederacy in 1935, the chiefs concerned

paid ‘judicial obedience’ to the Berekumhene (accepting the Berekum
Nkyibena as their final oath) and served as members of the Berekum Tradi
tional Council. Berekum was so favoured for alleged loyalty to the Govern
ment of the Gold Coast during the Yaa Asantewa War. The present Bere
kumhene and his elders say that they refused to help Asante out o f the
conviction that she would be beaten.
See Kwame Arhin ‘Aspects of Colonial District Administration’ . . .
op. cit.
13. Mr A. C. Denteh, o f the Language Centre, Legon, explains that adanpan
meant a ‘hall’; that a chief could give a village a right to build a ‘hall’ which
was equivalent to according it a ‘municipal’ status and also upgrading the
status of the chief.
14. As noted (Note 6) the Akuamuhene claims that groups of Dorma migrants
were in the area before the Asokore group got theie.
15. The Nifahene of Berekum says that there was a village, Abi, a small hunting
village, scantily populated before the Asokore group settled at Berekum
to ‘spy’ on the Gyaman. ‘Brong’ means ‘aborigines’ in this context as
also from the interpretation given by Nana Takyimanhene.
16. For instance — in 1905, the Commissioner of the Western Province of
Ashanti reported that the Berekum sub-chief Tarbil (Tabi) of Nsapor
had committed a breach o f native custom bv contracting a debt in Dormaa
without telling the Berekumhene and without a Berekum security and
wrote:
In accordance with the King’s [Berekumhene’s] wishes, who was
afraid this chief would in consequence try to secede to Warn, I ordered
him to remain in Berekum and told the King secession from one
tribe to another on account o f debt would not be allowed.
17. Papers Relating to the Restoration o f the Ashanti Confederacy, Gold Coast
1935, Appendix 60, pp. 101-102.
18. Captain R. La T. Lonsdale. Special Commissioner o f the Government
o f the Gold Coast reported in his Report on his Mission to Ashanti and
Gyaman, April to July 1882, that Gyaman had threatened to invade
Kumasi ‘but for the Whiteman.’ His visit to Kumasi and Bonduku was to
settle counterclaims between Asante and Gyaman which had led to the
closure o f the trade passages and apparently to the Gyaman invasion o f
Asante territories. The Asantehene claimed inter alia that ‘the people o f
Warn, Berekum and Abesim, now in Gyaman be handed over to him’.
Lonsdale also reported that ‘Warn, Berekum and Abessim wish to return
but independent of Ashanti’. It is just possible that in spite of their joint
attack on Berekum, Dormaa (Warn) and Gyaman fell out over counter
claims to Abessim land which is said to be part o f Dormaa. Lonsdale’s
Report in Enclosure No. 56 PROCO 879/19.
19. Papers Relating to Restoration . . . op. cit. also Davidson-Houston
reported {Confidential 2nd July, 1896) that the ‘Borumfo’ feared a possible
attack by Gyaman, to whom they had been tributary for the past twelve
years which places the Gyaman attack on Berekum in 1884 and also that
a Gyaman attack on Berekum had driven ‘the Berekums into the bushes’
in PROCO 96/275.
20. See Article 6 of the 1960 Constitution o f the Republic o f Ghana.
21. It ought to be noted though that the composition of the Berekum Gyase,
which appears to be similar to that of neighbouring Dormaa differs from
that of Kumasi Gyase. The Berekum or Dormaa Gyase consists of ahen-
emma and ahenenana, children and grandchildren o f successive chiefs,
who are also the ‘service’ people, asomfo, stool-carriers, etc. The Asante
Gyase consists of functionaries who are unrelated to the chief. It also
ought to be said that Dormaa celebrates Kwafie and not the Akwasidae.
22. See K. A. Busia ‘The Ashanti’ in African Worlds ed. D. Forde, O.U.P.
1954, pp. 203-204.
67
CHAPTER V
KWADWO ADINKRA OF GYAMAN: A STUDY
OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BRONG KINGDOM
OF GYAMAN AND ASANTE FROM C. 1800— 1818
K. A. Britwum
In 1817 after a protracted war between Asante and the Fante
states, the British Government sent a mission to Kumasi, the Asante
capital, to negotiate peace.1 T.E. Bowdich, who was a member and
ultim ately the spokesman of the mission, referred, in his work, to a
growing disturbance in 1817 in the relations between Osei Tutu
Kwame Asibey Bonsufc. 1800— 1824), the Asantehene, andK wadwo
Adinkra, King of Gyaman.
The kingdom of Gyaman, lying to the north-west of Asante, was
probably founded about the first half of the seventeenth century by
a Dormaa chief called Adu Ben. But Gyaman did not become a
powerful state until towards the end of the seventeenth or the begin
ning o f the eighteenth century, when its successive kings succeeded
in establishing a highly efficient centralised administration over the
indigenous peoples whom they conquered and incorporated into
the newly founded state.2 Its territory was fairly large and it had
a well disciplined army. Above all Gyaman was rich in minerals and
natural resources which gave the kings much economic power and
drive, and made the kingdom a great force to reckon with in the
north-west o f Asante. From about 1740, when the “ perfect” conquest
o f Gyaman is said to have been accomplished by Asante under
Opoku W are,3 relations between the rulers o f Gyaman and of
Asante came under constant strain and stress. The Gyaman rulers
were dissatisfied with the subordinate role they came to play under
Asante. Subsequently Gyaman ‘national consciousness’ was
expressed in recurrent rebellion against Asante — a main aspect of
the relations between the rulers of Gyaman and Asante until 1874
when Gyaman partially seceded from the Asante Empire, following
the invasion o f Kumasi by British troops in the same year.
This paper is an attem pt to examine one o f the im portant episodes
in the history o f the relations between Gyaman and Asante during
the period 1800— 1818. In particular, it is a study o f the relations
between the Gyamanhene, Kwadwo Adinkra and the Asantehene,
Osie Tutu Kwamina Asibey Bonsu. Asante re-defeated Gyaman in
this period and is said to have tightened its control over the chiefdom
by making it “ a province in lieu of the tributary rank it enjoyed
before.” 4
Little so far is known about the early life of Kwadwo Adinkra.
There is a suggestion, which is not altogether slight, that in his youth
Kwadwo Adinkra o f Gyaman
Adinkra served at the court o f Asante in Kumasi where (as Osei

Tutu, the first king of united Asante had done in Denkyira
and Akwamu before he became king) Adinkra probably had the
opportunity to study Asante court politics and diplomacy. It is,
however, fairly certain that Adinkra and Osei Tutu Kwamina Asibey
Bonsu were contemporary rulers. From the work of Abu Bak’r-as
Sadik, the son of a Moslem magnate of Tim buktu, it is known that
Adinkra was king of Gyaman in about 1800.5 A dinkra’s reign, there
fore, was from about 1800 to 1818 when he died in the Asante-
Gyaman war.
The events preceding the election of Adinkra to the Gyaman
throne raise an interesting but intriguing problem. The story is told
that in the last years of Ben Kompi Kwadwo II’s reign (1790-1800),
the people of Gyaman rebelled against Asante rule. In the cam
paign that ensued Ben Kompi Kwadwo II, the Gyamanhene, is said
to have died and Adinkra, presumed to have been supported by the
Asante authorities, was elected to succeed him.
The intriguing problem is: who was A dinkra? Was he a Gyaman
or an Asante? References in the works of Joseph Dupuis and
Robertson, to Adinkra as “a tool of the court of Coomassy” 6 and
a relative of the King o f A sante7 seem to indicate that Adinkra was
not a native of Gyaman but that he was an Asante citizen, a relation
of the Asantehene, who was imposed on the people of Gyaman by
the Kumasi authorities. Indeed, the circumstances, surrounding
Adinkra’s election to the Gyaman stool, then under Asante patro
nage and influence, tend to support the view. But recent investiga
tions have clearly revealed that Adinkra was a member of the Gya
man royal family, and that he descended from the Yakaase ruling
line, which was alternate to the Zanzan dynasty from which the late
King of Gyaman, Ben Kompi Kwadwo II, came. The two dynasties—
Yakaase and Zanzan—were established by the founding fathers of
the kingdom of Gyaman. It was from among the two dynasties that
the kings of Gyaman were alternately chosen to rule the kingdom.8
It may, thus, be restated that Adinkra was a native of Gyaman.
Perhaps, he was only “a tool o f the court o f Coomassy”, and also
literally related to the King o f Asante in the sense, as will shortly
be shown, that for a greater part of his reign until he turned a rebel
against the Asante authority, Adinkra allowed himself to be used
by the Asante Government far more in the interest of Asante than
in th at o f Gyaman.
Adinkra is generally represented in traditional Asante history as
a powerful and proud ruler who always flouted the authority o f the
King of Asante. That A dinkra was powerful cannot be doubted,
but that he was always proud and defied the authority of the Asante
hene is certainly not borne out by the facts. His pride and defiance
69
K. A. Britwum
o f Asante authority seem to have manifested themselves only in the

last years of his reign. But for a greater part of the period when he
was king o f Gyaman, Adinkra remained a loyal, if not a subservient,
vassal to the Asante court.
Brong traditions maintain that for a considerable period before he
revolted against Asante rule, Adinkra loyally served his Asante
overlord and paid regularly to Kumasi the stipulated annual tributes
and contributions he collected from Gyaman.9 W riting in 1819,
Robertson referred to Adinkra and Mansa as people who “ receive
consular direction and transm it the revenues to Akomassey (Kumasi)
as they are received by them from those states which are under their
control”. 10 Robertson was obviously referring to the period in
A dinkra’s reign when the latter mutually co-operated with the Asante
government in Kumasi, which must have made him appear “a tool
o f the court of Kumasi”.
Furthermore, it is known from other sources that in the earlier
period o f Adinkra’s reign, there was close co-operation between
him and Osei Tutu Kwamina Asibey Bonsu, the Asantehene. In
or about 1801, Asante was at War with Gonja and Bouna, two of
the Asante tributary states in the north-w est o f the Asante Empire.
The revolt of Gonja and Bouna was part o f a general Moslem drive
in the north-west to restore to the Asante throne the deposed King
called Osei Kwame (1777-1800), who was believed to have Moslem
sympathies, and to be inclined “ to establish the Koranic law for
the civil code o f the empire”. 11 In the campaign against Bouna in
particular, Abu Bak’r-as-Sadik, who was an eye-witness, reported
A dinkra’s remarkable role in the war which culminated in the
defeat o f Bouna, and the author’s own capture to Bonduku, the
Gyaman commercial capital, from where he was sent to Kumasi
and thence subsequently sold into slavery.12
The significance of the Asante-Bouna campaign, as far as the
relations between Gyaman and Asante were concerned, may be
seen in the fact that Adinkra distinguished himself as a courageous
and brilliant fighter on the side o f Asante. The support he gave to
Asante later brought him into open conflict with a section of his own
people who, taking advantage o f Adinkra’s absence from Gyaman
while fighting in Bouna, attem pted to stage “a partial revolt” to
destool h im .13 The case of this section of the Gyaman people was
perhaps, that, by supporting the Asante whom their late ruler
from the Zanzan line, had resisted, Adinkra appeared to have
betrayed the cause of Gyaman independence and ‘national con
sciousness’. It was for this reason that, while Adinkra was away
from Gyaman fighting for Asante, his opponents invited to the
throne the nephew o f the late King, Ben Kompi Kwadwo II who
was living in exile in K ong.14 This partial revolt by the Gyaman
people against A dinkra was immediately crushed by him w ith a
large contingent of troops from Kumasi.
70
The fact that the Asantehene sent m ilitary aid to Adinkra to

enable him to suppress an internal rebellion in Gyaman indicates
that reciprocal co-operation existed between him and the Gyaman-
hene. Osei Tutu Kwamina needed the services o f Adinkra to re
assert his authority in the north-west o f his Empire which had been
considerably undermined by the Moslem revolt during this period
much in the same way as Adinkra required the co-operation of the
Asantehene to maintain his own position on the Gyaman throne.
It is even possible, and this is purely conjectural, that in the wars
against the Fanti states (1807-1817), which also coincided with the
outbreak o f revolts in Akyem and Akuapem in the southeast of the
Asante Empire, Adinkra was loyal to Asante. If he did not actively
take part in person, he must have sent Gyaman auxiliaries to join
the Asante army in the field of battle. The most that can be esta
blished from the above is that, although a powerful ruler, Adinkra
was not always proud and defiant. On the contrary, the facts
support the view that for a greater part o f his reign A dinkra re
mained a loyal vassal o f the king of Asante.
Nevertheless the long period of close and reciprocal co-operation

came to a sudden end. From about September 1817, Bowdich
reported that the relations between Adinkra and Osei Tutu Kwami
na Bonsu were cold; then they suddenly took a dramatic turn. No
single episode in Gyaman-Asante relations is as vividly remembered
in local traditions, and so well documented in contemporary Euro
pean records, as the Adinkra revolt, generally referred to as the
Adinkra war. Several explanations may be offered for the outbreak
of the war in the priod 1817 to 1818 but three of them are worthy
of note.
First, from the evidence o f local traditions Adinkra refused to

pay tribute to Kumasi as before.15 It is not known exactly when
this occurred, but most probably it happened immediately before
the campaigns in the south came to an end when Adinkra must
have thought that the Asante were too preoccupied to notice his
attem pt to become an independent ruler. That Adinkra did refuse
to pay tribute is supported by some evidence from Asante when
Dupuis arrived in Kumasi to take up his post as British consul.
In January 1820, Dupuis reported that an Asante ambassador was
sent to Cape Coast to settle the differences, which arose during the
Adinkra war, between the King o f Asante on one hand and the
people o f Cape Coast and the British authorities on the other.
This ambassador, in an interview, told Dupuis that the Asantehene
waged war on Gyaman because A dinkra had defied him and had
“refused to pay him gold as before” . 16 Again, some of the Moslems
who were resident in Kumasi at the time informed Dupuis that
Adinkra wanted to transfer allegiance and tribute from the King of
71
K . A. Britwum
Asante to the Sultan o f Kong, a neighbouring Mande-Dyula state,

and as a result, the Asantehene declared war on him .17
The second explanation for the outbreak of the war may be
found in the report which was received in Kumasi that not only had
Adinkra refused to pay tribute to Asante but that he had actually
offered some money to the ruler of Kong. The payment of money
to the Sultan o f Kong by Adinkra was an act which Osei Tutu
Kwamina Asibey Bonsu could not tolerate, and his anger is reflect
ed in his interview with Apau, the son of Adinkra, who was cap
tured in the war and later brought to Kumasi: “ Your father was a
rebel, he was full of pride, and wanted to be a great King; he forgot
when he was my slave. Is this not true? Then he wanted Sarem
(referring obviously to Kong and the vast grassland in the north
west) to help him, and sent gold to make friends. Is not that true
to o ? He forgot I was his master . . .” 18 The tribute which Adinkra
is said to have paid to Kong instead of Kumasi was certainly not
intended to bring Gyaman under the power of Kong, but obviously
to induce its ruler to support Gyaman against Asante. The intended
alliance was already under way because the foundation for it seems
to have been laid by the dynastic arrangement by which Adinkra
had married Nyankura, a Mande princess from K ong.19
Refusal to pay tribute, it must be pointed out, was generally the
first step taken by all vassal rulers in an attem pt to repudiate Asante
authority in their states. Thus when the signal was given by Adin
kra, it clearly showed to the Asante authorities in Kumasi the road
where the am bition of the Gyamanhene lay. Taken together with
A dinkra’s refusal to pay tribute to Kumasi, his alleged offer of
money to the Sultan of Kong had rather serious implications
for Gyaman-Asante relations because during this period, the
M ande state o f Kong, which lay about seven days’ journey from
Bonduku, was one of the greatest rival states to the power of Asante
in the north-w est.20
But what was, perhaps, the most serious factor of all was the
news, received almost simultaneously with the Gyaman refusal to
pay tribute, that Adinkra had made for himself a stool which,
according to Bowdich, was “ thickly plated and embossed with
gold”. 21 Its “splendour and value was stated as everyway superior
to that used by the Ashante chief which is represented as being
formed o f the common wood o f the country cased over with golden
plates”. 22 A dinkra’s gold stool seems to have had a far greater
meaning and significance to the Asante than its implied superiority
to the Golden Stool of the great potentate of Asante. The signifi
cance o f A dinkra’s ‘gold stool’ episode lies in the fact that it was
regarded in Asante both as an act of gross presumption on the part
o f the Gyamanhene and as an eloquent proof o f his am bition to
72
become as great and powerful as the Asantehene who, by the consti

tution of the Asante nation, was the only King permitted to possess
and ‘sit’ on a stool adorned with g o l d . 2 3 indeed, by carving the
golden stool, Adinkra had not only defied the authority of the King
of Asante but more im portantly had violated the Asante constitu
tion. It is no wonder then, that, on receiving the information, the
King o f Asante reacted immediately. A high-powered mission
under Kwame Butuakwa,24 who was, at the time, Asante resident
commissioner at Abura Dunkwa, was sent to Gyaman to demand
the stool which Adinkra was alleged to have carved. It is said that
Adinkra readily surrendered the stool to Butuakwa, who brought
it to Kumasi.
There is a suggestion in a British official report of 1824 that the
stool was “sought for and recovered by the queen of Buncatoo even
after its arrival at C o o m a s s i e ” . 2 5 But Bowdich, who was in Kumasi
at the intial stages of the crisis, reported that Adinkra’s sister was
away when the stool was surrendered. On her return, she became
so much annoyed at her brother’s apparent cowardice that she
reprimanded him and “ ordered a solid stool to be made to re
place”, 26 the one which had been surrendered to the Asantehene.
On this evidence alone, it is reasonable to reject the British official
report o f 1824, and assert that the stool, which was surrendered
was not recovered, but that a new one was made to replace the lost
one.
One point, however, needs clarification. Who was this woman
who ordered the replacement of the stool? Was she Adinkra’s
sister as Bowdich claims, or his wife, as Clozel, Delafosse, and
Reindorf, contend?27 Bowdich is most certainly right. In such a
Akan matrilineal society as Gyaman was, a wife of a king might
exercise influence over her husband at home but she could not be
directly involved in court or state politics. This was only possible
in the case of a queen, who might be the sister or the mother or the
aunt o f the reigning king, and who might sometimes even wield
as much power and influence as the king himself in the event of a
national crisis such as happened in Gyaman. Indeed, the role of
the queen-mothers and queens in the administration of Gyaman28
tends to tip the scale rather heavily in favour of the view that it was
the queen (a sister) and not the wife of Adinkra who ordered the
replacement of the stool that was surrendered to the Asantehene.
The news of the making of a new golden stool by Adinkra soon
reached Kumasi, and, as before, messengers from the Kumasi
court were sent to demand it together with an accummulated
tribute worth about 1,000 oz. of gold. On this occasion, Adinkra
gave the Asante messengers a point blank refusal and placed them
under arrest. He then summoned his council of elders whom he
73
K . A . Britwum
addressed in the presence of the Asante messengers in the following

words usually repeated by the Gyamanhene’s horn-blowers on
ceremonial occasions:
Akyekyedee wotwa nkontom po;
Akyekyedee, wotwa nyayiriya,
Wo baakofoo yi wosie basa, wosie sre,
W otua dua, woto kosua. Na wo mma yi bedi deeben?
Asante K otoko se wogye apem!
Yeene apem anaa yeeta apem ?
Yennya, nea ebeba m m ra.29
This means, ‘you tortoise, you are a liar and a cheat; you alone
you have limbs, you possess a tail and you lay eggs. What shall
your children eat? Asante K otoko say they are demanding a
thousand oz. o f gold. From where shall we get it? We cannot afford
it. Come, what may!.’
These words throw considerable light on the feelings of Adinkra
and his people towards the Asante. The symbolising of the Asante
as the tortoise is quite revealing. Like the tortoise which has the
features of both a mammal and a bird the Asante appeared double-
faced to the people o f Gyaman. W ith one face the Asante, who
wanted everything for themselves, demanded a stool, and with the
other, they wanted an amount o f gold, which was too heavy to
bear. Indeed, the words dem onstrate the courage and determ ination
o f the Gyamanhene, and represent him as a ruler prepared to fight
in order to free his kingdom from Asante domination. Subse
quently, Adinkra ordered that the ears o f the Asante messengers
be cut off and that all Asante residents in Gyaman be throw n into
the gold pits o f the kingdom .30 These steps are evidently what
Osei T utu Kwamina Asibey Bonsu is reported by Dupuis to have
referred to as Adinkra killing his sword bearers and sending him
an insulting message.31
It is evident that the various acts committed by Adinkra over a
period — the refusal to pay the annual tributes, the alliance with
the Sultan o f Kong to whom an offer o f gold was made, the carving
o f a golden stool and finally the insult alleged to have been heaped
on the King o f Asante whose messengers were disgraced and multi-
lated — all these acts put together, am ounted to extreme pro
vocation to the Asantehene which made war inevitable in about
February, 1818.
Elaborate preparations for war w'ere made by both sides. Between
November 1817 and January 1818, it is on record that Osei Tutu
Kwamina Asibey Bonsu placed orders for several articles of clothing
which included military uniforms for himself and his captains.
Guns and gun-powder were also requested from the English, the
74
Dutch and the Danes, the principal European merchants with whom
Asante had trading contacts. The Moslems in Kumasi were asked to
say prayers for the King’s success in the impending campaign.32
Sacrifices to the national gods and prayers said by the King’s Moslem
friends were a common practice in Asante when the King was going
to war. The religious ceremonies were deemed necessary for the
intercession of the war gods of Asante and of the God of the Mos
lems for the success of the King in his impending campaign against
the people of Gyaman.
Similarly, Adinkra made some preparations for the war. A Dutch
journal o f December 6, 1812 records that Adinkra bought goods
from Elmina which had previously been ordered by the King of
Asante. This incurred the displeasure of the Asantehene who launch
ed a formal protest, particularly against the supply o f arms by the
Dutch to the people o f Gyaman who were his enemies.33 It is
possible that further attem pts by Adinkra to obtain large supplies of
arms from the other merchants on the coast failed, largely due to
the persistent difficulties put in his way by the King o f Asante whose
influence on the European merchants was considerable. This failure
probably accounts for A dinkra’s last minute attem pt at negotiations
for peaceful settlement o f his differences with the Asantehene who,
under the influence of a strong war party in his council, turned
down the Gyamanhene’s offer o f four hundred bendas (about
£3,200).34
Nevertheless, Adinkra in the end succeeded in recruiting a large
force. Dupuis was informed by Baba, the spiritual head o f the
Kumasi Moslems at the time, that A dinkra’s force, consisting of
contingents from his neighbouring pagan and Moslem allies, totalled
140,000.35 This evidence is corroborated by the linguist of the
present New Juabenhene who, even though he does not give figures,
throws much light on the strength o f A dinkra’s army. According
to this chief, apart from a large reserve of several armed units,
Adinkra’s army was larger than that of the King of Asante and when
this was brought to the notice o f the King and court by the Asante
scouts, the whole Asante force in camp became panic-striken.36
On the other hand, besides several thousands o f Moslems under
Baba, who formed one wing o f the army, the King o f Asante had a
force said to have totalled 80,000, as large as half o f this number
being equipped with firearms.37 The entire force o f Asante was
recruited from the m etropolitan states as well as from such provincial
states as Akyem Kotoku, Akyem Bosome, Akwamu and Akuapim
and most o f the tributary states except, as R eindorf maintains, the
Fanti states which did not take part in the war on behalf of A sante.38
From Hutchinson’s last despatch, it is clear that in the early part
of February 1818, the Asante army were on the Gyaman frontier39
75
K. A. Britwum
where they met the formidable army of Adinkra. About this time
the first of the series of battles was fought on the banks of the river
Tain, and it was here that the Gyamans distinguished themselves
as skilled and courageous fighters.40 For several days, they attacked
the Asante forces, killed several o f the men and succeeded in pushing
the rest back. Great confusion set in the Asante camp, and it looked
as if the Gyaman forces were winning the day. But the Bantamahene,
Amankwatia, who was the spearhead of the Asante army together
with the Kokofuhene, the Juabenhene and the chief of Akyem
Bosome called Koragye Ampaw, put great morale into the Asante
army. Rallying behind these chiefs and captains, the Asante army
moved forward, crossed the river Tain, broke through the mighty
forces of Gyaman and attacked and defeated one wing after another.
Several of the Gyaman men were killed. Several others were cap
tured, and some succeeded in escaping in utter confusion to Kong.
The Asante won a great victory over Gyaman.
The fate of Adinkra is variously rendered. The Asantehene,
in conversation with Dupuis, is reported to have said that he killed
Adinkra, and took his gold, adding that A dinkra’s skull “ was
broken but I would not use the trophy and now I made a similar
skull o f gold. This is for my great customs, that all my people
may know I am the K ing”. 41 This is the general view of the Asante
to this day. This view is also shared by the people of Kotei and
Seketia, in the present day Brong region, who maintain that Adinkra
was captured in the war and was beheaded; his stool was captured,
and th at Gyaman was completely defeated.42
On the other hand, the people of Suma, also in the Brong
region, have a different story to tell. While admitting that Adinkra
was defeated, they maintain that the Gyaman stool was not cap
tured nor was Adinkra killed by the Asante. According to this
same source, when Adinkra realised that things looked grim for
him and his state, he summoned before him his wife called Kra
Adwoa and the surviving members of his council. He asked the
latter to hide all the stool regalia, and then committed suicide.43
According to a recent writer whose evidence is corroborated by
traditions o f Suma, Adinkra’s body was buried with the bodies
o f several Gyaman people who had been killed in the war to
make it difficult for the Asante to discover the body of Adinkra.
But his son Apau was captured, and, under severe torture, he
showed where his father had been buried. The A sante discovered
w hat they believed to be A dinkra’s body with his head almost
battered. His body was thus removed and brought to K um asi.44
From the circumstance under which Adinkra’s body was dis
covered, it is probable that Apau showed the Asante the body of
a different person than, not as that of his father’s. But Adinkra was
well known in Asante, particularly in Kumasi, so that the Asante
76
would have no difficulty in identifying A dinkra’s battered body.45

In any case, an effigy o f A dinkra’s head is part of the Asante-
hene’s stool regalia.
The death o f Kwadwo Adinkra by no means ended the war.
The rest of the Gyaman army and people who had taken refuge
in Kong returned to the field with auxiliary troops from Kong
and renewed the attack on the Asante. This renewed fighting
compelled the Asantehene to remain in Gyaman for over a year
after A dinkra’s death, and it was not until August 1819, when
the situation had returned to normal in Gyaman, that the Asante
hene returned to K um asi.46 In 1820 when Dupuis was in Kumasi
there was virtually no more trouble in Gyaman.
At the end o f the war, Asante tightened its control over Gyaman
by making it “ a province in lieu of the tributary rank it enjoyed
before.” 47 This is made more evident from the first article o f
the Supplementary Treaty signed between Osei Tutu Kwamina
Asibey Bonsu and Dupuis, acting on behalf of the British author
ities. It is stated that after the war the King of Asante assumed
full and undisputed sovereignty over Gyaman and that, for political
reasons, he maintained troops in Am anaha on the banks of the
Assin river and in other parts o f Gyaman so as to prevent the
inhabitants from trading or having direct communications with
the coast.48 It is also evident from a D utch report that the King
of Asante “ appointed one of his caboceers King of Bontooko” 49
but this ‘Caboceer’ o f the Asantehene was, probably, a personal
representative of the King who, from this time, jointly ruled Gya
man with the successor of Adinkra, chosen, according to custom,
from the Zanzan ruling house.
The maintenance of an army o f occupation in Gyaman and
its neighbourhood and of an Asante resident official, after the
cessation of hostilities, shows the extent to which Asante rule
came to be more effectively established in Gyaman; it further
indicates that the government o f Asante was not satisfied with
its previous administrative arrangement in Gyaman which allowed
too much power and freedom in the hands of local rulers.
REFERENCES AND NOTES
1. British merchants trading in Cape Coast and Anomabo were interested

in peace between the Fanti and the Ashanti who were the main source ot
gold dust and ivory, the trade articles.
2. E. A. Agyeman: ‘A note on the foundation of the Kingdom of Gyaman
in Ghana Notes And Queries, No. 9, November, 1966, pp. 36-39.
77
K. A. Britwum
3. J. Dupuis: Journal o f A Residence in Ashantee, 1824, p. 233. Also see

Arhin, Supra ed.
4. J. Dupuis: op. cit., p. 104.
5. Abu Bak’r-as-Sadik, pp. 19-21, quoted by E. A. Agyeman op. cit. 1965.
6. J. Dupuis: op. cit., p. 249.
7. G. A. Robertson: Notes On Africa, 1819, p. 182.
8. E. A. Agyeman 1965, pp. 15 & 49.
9. Suma Traditions collected by E. A. Agyeman, 1965 Appendix II. See also
Robertson op. cit., p. 182; Bowdich: Mission from Cape Coast to Ashantee,
1819, pp. 320-321; Wilks: ‘Ashanti Government in the 19th Century’,
unpublished manuscript, Legon, 1964, p. 21 and Footnote p. 73. Wilks
estimates the tribute paid by Gyaman to Asante at 18,000 oz. of gold
per annum.
10. G. A. Robertson: op. cit., p. 182.
11. For more about this revolt see Dupuis, op. cit., p. 245 and also E. A.
Agyeman, 1965: pp. 67-71.
12. See Abu Bak’r-as-Sadik: op cit., p p .5 ,19-21 and Wilks: The Northern Factor
in Ashanti History, 1961, p. 23.
13. Dupuis: op. cit., p. 249, that section of the people of Gyaman were presum
ably supporters of the Zanzan ruling family.
14. Dupuis: op. cit., p. 259.
15. Suma and Seketia Traditions collected in 1964 in E. A. Agyeman, 1964
Appendix II.
16. Dupuis: op. cit., ‘ introduction’ p. xxxiii.
19. Delafosse: Frontiers de la Cote d'Ivoire, etc. 1908, p. 231. See also Reindorf:
A History o f the Gold Coast and Asante, 1895, 2nd eddition, p. 163.
20. Bowdich: op. cit., 1819, p. 169.
21. Bowdich: op. cit., 1819, p. 244.
22. Reports o f Commodore Sir G. Collier and Sir Charles McCarthy and other
official sources, 1824, in West African Sketches, I.A.S. 1963, p. 230.
23. Busia, K. A.: The Position o f the Chief in the Modern Political System o f
Ashanti, Oxford, 1951 p. 56.
24. Reindorf: op. cit., p. 164 — also Suma Traditions', The people of Suma,
in the Brong region, said that when the King o f Asante demanded the stool
it was refused. This is probably confused with the second stool said to
have been made, which was not surrendered on demand.
25. Reports of Commodore G. Collier and Sir McCarthy and other official
sources in West African Sketches, op. cit., p. 231.
26. Bowdich op. cit., p. 244.
27. Bowdich: op. cit., p 244. Clozel: ‘Introduction’ to Clozela and Villamur,
Les coutumes indigenes de la cote d'Ivoire, Paris, 1902, p. 17, Delafosse:
Frontiers de la Cote d'Ivoire’, etc. Paris 1908 p. 231; Reindorf, op. cit., p.
164. Adinkra’s sister was called Tamia, ibid., p. 165.
28. E. A. Agyeman; 1965, p. 17.
29. The Traditions o f Suma in E. A. Agyeman, Appendix II. The words were
sung by Nana Kwame Fori o f Asiri, Adumhene of Suma Brong. Accord
ing to Mr A. C. Denteh o f the Institute o f African Studies, Legon, the
sword of the sword-bearers sent to collect the gold stool o f Gyaman and
arrears of tribute was cast in the make of a crocodile head.
30. The Traditions o f Suma in E. A. Agyeman: op. cit., Appendix II. It was
the Sumahene called Kwaku Gyabaa Kokroko who cut the ears o f the
Anantahene of Kumasi, one o f the messengers sent to collect the Gyaman
stool and the tribute. See also Reindorf: pp. c/r., pp. 163-164; Claridge:
A History o f the Gold Coast and Ashanti Vol. I, 1915, p. 300.
31. Dupuis, op. cit., p. 165.
32. ‘Hutchinson’s Diary’ in Bowdich, 1819, pp. 381-446.
78
33. Dutch Diaries and Correspondence (1815-1823) See Journal o f 6 December

1817 (Balme Library, Africana section, University o f Ghana)
34. Bowdich, 1819, op. cit., p. 245: See also Reindorf: op. cit., p. 165. Reindorf
asserts that Adinkra sued for peace because the army from Kong did not
arrive, as expected.
35. Dupuis: 1824, Appendix p. cxxx.
36. Information was given by Okyeame Adjepong, linguist o f the Omanhene
of New Juaben. He was at the time employed by the Institute o f African
Studies, Legon, on the collection o f oral traditions.
37. Dupuis, 1824, op. cit., Appendix, p. cxxx.
38. Reindorf: op. cit., p. 165.
39. Hutchinson’s last despatch o f February, 1818.
40. The Traditions o f Suma op cit-, and information from Okyeame Adjepong.
See E. A. Agyeman, op. cit., Appendix II; see also Ashanti Heroes by
Bonsu Kyeretwie, 1964, p. 23.
41. Dupuis: op. cit., pp. 164-165.
42. The Traditions o f Koti and Seketia in E. A. Agyeman: op. cit., Appendix II.
43. Suma Traditions in E. A. Agyeman: op. cit., Appendix II: Adinkra is
said to have told his wife, Kra Adwoa, “ Mihyira m’ano twesee”. this
probably meant that he intended to save himself from disgrace and
torture at the hands of the Asante and thus killed himself.
44. Bonsu Kyeretwie, 1964; op. cit., p. 27; see also Suma Traditions in E. A.
Agyeman: op. cit., Appendix III.
45. I am grateful to Mr A. C. Denteh for this information.
46. Dutch Diaries and Correspondence 1815 to 1823; Journal of 28th August,
1818 to 31st August, 1819, op. cit.
47. Dupuis op. cit., p. 263.
48. Dupuis op. cit., Appendix, cxxii.
49. Dutch Diaries and Correspondence, 1815-1823; See Journal o f 28th August,
1818, op. cit.
Appendix; Gyaman Stool List.
Adu Ben
Obiri Yeboah
Yeboah Afari
(Sakuriye — from Delafosse’s list but does not appear in Oral tradition)
Boadu (Badu) Ben
Tan Date I
Adinkra Panyin (1654-688)
Ben Kompi Panyin (or Ben Kompi I 1688-1720)
Abo Mire or Abo Kofi (1720-1746)
Kofi Sono Ampem Osagyefo (1746-1760)
Kofi Agyeman (1760-1790)
Ben Kompi Kwadwo II (1790-1800)
Kwadwo Adinkra Kakyire (Kwadwo Adinkra II) 1801-1818
Fofie (1815-1830)
Kwasi Yeboah I (1830-1850)
Kwadwo Agyeman 1850-1899 (also called Kwcku Agyeman by people of
Seketia)
Kwadwo Yeboah II (1899)
Amakyina
Tan Date II
Kwadwo Agyeman
Kwame Adinkra (not a royal by native custom)
Kofi Yeboah III (present chief, now resident at Sherebo in Ivory Coast.)
79
C H ARPTER VI
POLITICS AMONG THE EASTERN BRONG 1700—1960
K. Y. Daaku
Eastern Brong here includes the stretch of territory from the

Volta in the N orth to the borders of Ejura in the South and from
Nkoranza in the west to Kete Krachi in the east. The area is peopled
by a mixture of groups, comprising the original Nchumuru,(Dwane)
and immigrants from the Twi-speaking people from the south,
as well as people from N orthern Ghana.
The early history of the area has been one of struggle between
the immigrants from the south and the original Guan speakers under
their almost legendary leader A tara Finam (Atere Firaw). An
unknown factor in Ghanaian history is the extent of the power and
territoiy, as well as the nature of the government of Atara Finam.
At one time or the other his writ appears to have run thorugh Kwahu
in the south to the borders of N koranza1 that is, the area washed by
the Sene and Afram Rivers. W ith his capital at Gyaneboafo, Atara-
manso controlled the north-eastern trade routes leading to the
north.
Traditions of the states of Atebubu, Kumawu, Beposo, Agogo and
Kwahu assert that they fought either jointly or indiviually against
Atara Finam, and drove him across the Volta, and hence, the saying
“Atara Finam ode amemenenfe twi faa mpempemso” i.e. “Atara
Finam under great pressure crossed the Volta with his thousands.” 2
For the emergent states in the forest area to the south and west of
Ataramanso there was the need for a free and uninterrupted access
to the northern markets where they could sell their kola nuts and
other forest produce for livestock and other manufactured goods
from the north. It was therefore imperative that Atara Finam, who
was said to be “obstructing them from the rays of the sun”, should
be eliminated, to accord them uninhibited growth. From about the
middle of the seventeenth century A tara Finam ’s territories were
attacked on several fronts. By the 1680s it appears that his power
had been completely broken and his territories parcelled out among
the victors.
After the fall o f Atramanso, people from far and near came to
found settlements in the area. Traditions of origins of towns like
Abease, Atebubu, Wiase, Bassa, Kete-Krakye, Prang and Yeji,
indicate that their founding fathers came from places like Saman,
near Kwaman, the site o f modern Kumasi, Takyiman, Jukwa,
Kwabre, Wassa, L arteh and Anum-Boso.3
Politics Among the Eastern Brong 1700—1960
One of the factors which led to the movements o f peoples from

the south to eastern Brong was the centralising policies of the emi
grants from Asantemanso and Adanse, who later founded the Asante
nation. A part from those escaping the power o f emergent Asante,
there were the pre-Asante settlers who had moved to settle on the
trade routes so as to exploit their economic potentialities. Indeed
the struggle for the control of the trade paths has always loomed
large in the relations between the neighbouring towns.
By the middle of the eighteenth century two main centres of
power had emerged in the area. Atebubu, which had moved from
the old site at Saaman to settle along the main trade route, the
“ Amaniampong highway” passing through Mampong and Ejura
to the north, increased its political and economic status and began
to over-shadow Abease, a once powerful religious centre. In the
extreme east was Krakye, the home of the famous Denteh Oracle
which attracted devotees and supplicants from far and near. It
was also the most convenient port on the Volta to which Ada
canoemen brought the valuable salt from the south.
The traditions of Bassa for instance say that they voluntarily
chose to come under Krakye because of the protection afforded
them by D enteh.4 Since no chief in the area would undertake any
serious political venture without first consulting Denteh, Krakye
now vied with Atebubu as the leading town in eastern Brong.
Whatever the internal rivalries among the states, it was the emer
gence of Asante which profoundly affected the area. From the time
of Opoku Ware I (1720-1750) to that of Prempeh I (1888-1896) the
brunt of Asante power was strongly felt in the area. Although tra
ditions of many of the states like Atebubu, Prang and Abease deny
ever being conquered by Asante, there is no doubt that eastern
Brong was brought under Asante power by force of arms. Bowdich,
Dupuis and writers after them refer to the subjugation of the
“ Boorom” and the ‘Yobaty* tribes. Reindorf explicitly details the
exploits of the Asante armies in the area, especially the forces of
Dwaben, M ampong and Nsuta which came to exercise a supervi
sory role in the area on behalf of the Asantehene. By 1748, the
Asante forces had crossed the Volta at Krakye to subdue the tribes
in the Buem area.5
In apportioning the eastern Brong states among the various
victorious Asante chiefs, Dwabenhene Akrasi, under whose control
Krakye was placed, won the most lucrative prize since the prestige
of Denteh came to be shared by the D w atens. As subjects o f the
Dwabenhene, the Krakyes not only paid annual tributes but they
placed the services of the famous Oracle under Dwaben. The control
of Denteh was to feature largely in the struggles between Kum asi
and Dwaben in the nineteenth century.
81
K. Y. Daaku
Between 1750 and 1850, eastern Brong remained under uneasy

subjection to Asante. They provided contingents for Asante cam
paigns and paid annual tributes to their overlords. At times, how
ever, some states made unsuccessful attem pts to rid themselves o f
Asante rule, but their efforts were thwarted by lack of unity among
the peoples of eastern Brong. This enabled Asante to exploit the
internal rivalries among them to her own advantage. It was not
unusual, for instance, for Asante to detail one of the states to put
down rebellions by its neighbours. They were also drawn into inter
nal Asante political struggles. During the first Asante-Dwaben strug
gles in the 1840s, Krakye was attacked by Atebubu and other
Asante forces for its loyalty to Dwaben.6
In the course of the nineteenth century, however, the Brong
states began to feel the pinch of the Asante yoke and sought to unite
in opposition to their overlord. One common denominator was
their position in the Asante military organisation. They were said
to have been placed in the Adonten division of the army and suffered
heavy casualties for which they never reaped adequate compensa
tion. But as long as the Asante military and political strength
remained intact, they saw little hope in freeing themselves through
m ilitary action. However, some o f them realised that their salvation
lay in strengthening and exploiting the advantageous position which
the presence o f the Denteh Oracle gave them. Whereas in the early
1850s, A tebubu, for instance, had been willing to subdue Krakye
on behalf o f Asante, ten vears later it was ready to bring itself under
the rule o f Krakye-Denteh. After the Krepi war of 1869, Kwame
Gyane, the Atebubuhene sought protection from Krakye. It may
be* said th at from about the 1860s, the basis of what is often referred
to as the Eastern Brong or Denteh confederation was laid. But it
was the British defeat of Asante in 1874, and the subsequent confu
sion which gripped that empire, that enabled Atebubu and the
other Brong states (except Nkoranza) to declare their indepen
dence. 7 Atebubu now defiantly closed the northern trade route to
Asante traders.
Fortunately for the newly established Brong confederation
troubles in M etropolitan Asante enabled them to nurture their
independence. Between 1874 and 1888 the Asante forces were so
completely taken up with settling internal disputes or engaged in
civil strifes as to have no time to pursue any recalcitrant tributary
state. It may be recalled that not only Dwaben but states like
Bekwai, Kokofu and Adanse refused to accept the authority ofi
K um asi.8
After the deposition o f Kofi K arikari, however, his successor,
M ensah Bonsu, 1874-1883, determined to restore Asante to its
former position. He proved an able and determined leader, but his
high-handedness led to his eventual deposition. This event, his
82i
Politics Among the Eastern Brong 1700— 1960
deposition, was to throw Asante into more confusion which was

again exploited by the Brong. The choice o f Prempeh was opposed
by supporters o f Atwereboanda. States like Mampong, Kokofu
and N suta supported the latter claimant. After his enstoolment,
Prempeh ably set out to rebuild the Asante empire. One by one
his forces over-ran Nsuta, M ampong and other states. The struggles
enhanced the position o f the members of the Brong confederacy.
Atebubu for instance, became the refuge centre for the fugitive
kings o f Mampong and Nsuta. Again in 1893, the king of Nkronza
took refuge in eastern Brong, where he had obtained both moral
and material support from both Atebubu and Krakye in his struggle
against K um asi.9
The members of the Brong Confederacy knew that having assu
med a defiant attitude it would not be long before they faced
Prempeh’s armies. W hat saved them was their advantageous posi
tion on the all-im portant Amaniampong Highway to the north,
which became the target of the European traders. The confusion
had led to trade stagnation which greatly disturbed the administra
tion on the coast. It was therefore considered imperative for the
adm inistration to find alternative routes. Their attention was turned
first to eastern Brong, where the Atebubu market had been established
after 1874, and to Krakye which was the navigable port by canoes
from the coast. W ith trade in view, the administration dispatched
Captain Lonsdale in 1881 to Kumasi and charged him to open
the trade route to Salaga and other places (Ward 292).10
Both the British on the coast and the members o f the Brong
Confederation exploited the Asante defeat to their own advantage.
The confederate states, especially Atetufcu and Krakye, sought
to translate their open rebellion into genuine independence o f
Asante by appealing to the British to grant them protection in
1874. The British adm inistration, on the other hand, viewed the
Brong states from both commercial and diplomatic points. In
addition to them, their place being regarded as stepping stones to
the m arket o f Salaga, it was essential to prevent the Germans, who
were advancing westwards from Togo, from gaining control over
the area. The interests of the British in the area is evident in the
number o f officials like Capt. Lang, Capt. Lonsdale, Ferguson and
others who were sent between 1881 and 1894 to reconnoitre, sign
treaties and to protect the eastern Brong from possible Asante
attack s.11
In 1890, Atebubu formally entered into a treaty of protection
with the British. It was on the strength of the treaty that the British
despatched troops and officials to Atebubu in 1893 during the
Asante-Nkoranza war, a gesture which dissuaded the Asantes
from attacking and reincorporating the eastern Brong into the
S3
K. Y. Daaku
Empire. Whatever might have been Prempeh’s intentions towards

the Brongs, his capture and exile in 1896 “ uprooted the Asante
Confederacy and secured the complete independence o f Brong
tribes of Kumasi control” . 12
In 1900 when Asante was formally annexed by the British, they
came under the same adm inistration with their former Brong
subjects. Unfortunately, eastern Brong was divided into separate
administrative districts: some were placed within the Atebubu
and others within the Mampong districts. Although the imposi
tion o f British rule relieved them from Asante dom ination, it
spelt the demise o f the Brong Confederation. With the hated
Asante rule removed the bond of unity, that is “ the century of
W rongs” was gone. T he rivalries between Wiase and Atebubu
were revived, the former refusing to acknowledge the rule of the
latter over him .13
In the negotiations leading to the restoration of the Asante
Confederacy in 1935, the British adm inistration agreed that any
Brong state which wanted to join the Asante Confederacy should
be allowed to do so, but it insisted that there should be no coercion.
It is interesting to note that not even the fact that the Brong and
the Asante had come under the British administration would
induce many o f the Brongs to consider themselves as having
something in common with Asante. Whilst states like Abease and
Wiase eventually agreed to join the Confederacy, after it had been
set up, Atebubu, which had all the time maintained its posture of
defiance, resolutely refused to be drawn into any connections with
Asante. It remained independent.14
Since the seventeenth century eastern Brong has been the scene
of struggles. This started with the Akan emigrants from the
south who set out to wrest control of the area from the Guan
King, A tara Finam. But scarcely had these people settled down
to consolidate their newly won lands than the burgeoning Asante
power moved into the area. From the time of Opoku Ware, a
series o f campaigns was launched in eastern Brong which eventually
brought the whole of the area from Abease to Krakye and north
wards to the Volta, under Asante control. Asante institutions,
especially political practices, were imposed on the people. Al
though they hated being forced to pay taxes and being constantly
drawn into the Asante wars, they were unable to do much to
reassert their independence. It must be pointed out that to the
Asantes eastern Brong was of great political and economic value.
Politically they could exploit the power and prestige of the Denteh
Oracle at Krakye, whose protection was solicited by rulers through
out the forest area. It was also on the all-im portant trade route
leading to the m arket at Salaga. In the latter part o f the nineteenth
$4
Politics Among the Eastern Brong 1700—1960
century the eastern Brong states united under the leadership of

the Priest of Denteh, who became the spokesman of a confe
deracy of states in which Atebubu provided the military leadership.
The confederate states benefited from the dynastic and civil strug
gles which plagued Asante after 1874. After 1888, however, the
dynamic leadership of Prempeh I could have led to their eventual
defeat and incorporation into the Asante empire. But the eastern
Brongs were saved by the determination of the British not to allow
Asante to regain its former status. In the scramble for possessions
in West Africa, Britain was determined that neither Germany
advancing from the east, nor France from the west, would gain
control of the hinterland of modern Ghana. It was with these
two aims in view that the administration decided to annex the
eastern Brong states. The imposition of British rule enabled them
to achieve their ambition to be independent of Asante. Not even
the fact that they and the Asante came under British rule for
over thirty years would induce many of the former Brong confe
derate states to agree to come together when the Asante Confe
deracy was restored in 1935.
The Brong ambition to be completely independent of Asante
manifested itself during the struggle for Independence. Their
efforts were rewarded with the establishment of a separate Brong-
Ahafo region after independence which may be described as a
penultimate achievement of two centuries of struggle.
REFERENCES
1. E. Efah: Forosie (Scottish Mission Book Depot, Accra).
2. Ansa Yamoah: “Myths and Traditions o f Atebubu” in K. Arhin (ed.)

Ashanti and the Northeast (I.A.S., 1970).
3. K. Ameyaw: A History o f the Kwahus, Vol. II (unpublished manu
script). The Stool History o f Agogo (I.A.S.).
4. E. Meyerowitz: Akan Traditions o f Origin. (London 1950; pp. 50-75)
K. Arhin (ed.) Ashanti and the Northeast
J. Kumah: Kete Krachi Traditions (I.AS. 19).
5. T. E. Bowdich: Mission from Cape Coast to Asantee, London (1819,

p. 231).
J. Dupuis: Journal o f A Residence in Ashantee, London (1824, pp.

233-237).
C. C. Reindorf: History o f the Gold Coast and Asante, Basel (1898,

pp. 84-85).
K . Y . Daaku
I. Wilks: Akan and the Mossi States Ajayi (ed.). A History o f

West Africa, Vol. I, p. 377.
6. Reindorf: op. cit. p. 285.
7. R. E. Walker and “A short History o f the Atebubu" “ Comments on the
J. R. Dickinson: History o f Atebubu in K. Arhin (ed.) Ashanti and the
Northeast" I.A.S. 1970.
8. W. W. Claridge: A History o f the Gold Coast, and Ashanti London, 1915
W. E. F. Ward: A History o f Ghana (London, 1958, p. 284).
9. G. E. Ferguson: Ashanti and the Brong Tribes in K. Arhin (ed.) Ashanti
and the Northeast.
10. W. E. F. Ward: op. cit., p. 292.
11. G .E . Ferguson: op. cit.

J. R. Dickinson: op. cit.
12. W.Tordoff: “The Brong-Ahafo Region” Economic Bulletin, Vol. 3,
N o. 5, 1959.
Ashanti Under the Prempehs 1888-1935, Oxford, 1965.
13. J. R. Dickinson: op. cit.
14. W. Tordoff, op. cit.
86
i.. J
87
CHAPTER VII
THE BRONG (BONO) DIALECT OF AKAN
F l o r e n c e A rena D o l p h y n e
INTRODUCTION
0.1 Brong (or Bono) is one of the major dialects of the Akan
Language. It is mutually intelligible with the other dialects of
Akan-Asante, Akuapem, Fante, Akyem, etc. — although the
degree o f intelligibility is related, to a large extent, to how near
or how far away the speakers o f the other dialects are, geographi
cally, from the Brong-speaking area. In other words speakers of
Asante, who are closest, geographically, to the Brong people, can
understand Brong speakers more easily than can speakers of Fante,
for example.
. Brong is spoken by about 320,000 people (1960 census figures)
in an area in the Brong-Ahafo Region o f Ghana that extends from
the border between the Ivory Coast and G hana in the West to
Atebubu in the East and between Kintam po in the North and
Dormaa-Ahenkro and Nkoranza in the South (see map).
The Brong-speaking area is surrounded by the following lan
guages: Ligbi (a Mande language), Nafana (a Senufo language),
and Mo (a Grusi language) to the North-west; Gonja to the N orth
and Nchumuru to the East (both Guan languages) and the Asante
dialect o f the Akan language to the South.
From the point o f view of number o f speakers Brong comes
third after Asante and Fante but the prestige o f the Asante dialect
in the Brong-speaking area is so great that there has been a ten
dency especially among educated Brong peoples and those living
in towns, to adopt the Asante dialect, and, even though they very
often speak Brong as well, they reserve it for much older people
and speak Asante to other Brong speakers o f their age group. It
seems, however, that this trend has changed to some extent since
the creation o f the Brong-Ahafo Region.
In spite o f the relatively large num ber o f speakers, the Brong
dialects have not been studied in any detail, except for a brief
reference to it in Ida W ard’s Report o f an investigation o f some
Gold Coast Language Problems, London 1945 and B. J. A idoo’s
paper The Linguistic differences between Asante and Bono o f the
Sunyani Area (unpublished).
0.2. There are certain linguistic features that are peculiar to
the variety o f the Akan Language spoken within the geographical
area described above, which help to distinguish Brong from other
dialects o f Akan. At the same time there are marked differences
The Brong (Bono) Dialect o f Akan
between the spoken language that is used in different parts o f the

Brong-speaking area, and it is sometimes not very easy for speakers
from one town or village to understand speakers from a town or
village some 30 miles away, so that what is spoken in the Brong
area might be better described as a dialect cluster rather than as
one dialect. For example it will be obvious from this paper, espe
cially to those who are familiar with the other dialects o f Akan,
that the differences between what is spoken in different parts of the
Brong area are more marked than the differences between the
Asante, Akyem and Kwahu dialects, for example. This paper sets
out some of the characteristic features o f the Brong dialect cluster
as a whole, as compared with the major Akan dialects: Asante,
Akuapem and Fante; and discusses some of the differences between
the types o f Brong spoken in different parts of the Brong-speaking
area.1
The description is based on stories and conversations recorded
by native speakers in Japekrom, Adamso, Berekum, Dormaa-
Ahenkro, Sunyani, Fiapre, Odumase, Abesim, Wamfie, Wenchi,
Techiman, Nkoranza, K intam po and Atebubu. The m aterial was
collected by M r B. J. Aidoo, a former student o f the Department
of Linguistics, Legon.
0.3. Transcriptions
The Brong dialect has not been written, and the examples cited
in this paper are written w ith the symbols of the Akan orthography,
with the following additional convention for the vowel symbols:
Nasalised vowels are written with the symbol /-/ over the
vowel letter, where the vowel is not preceded or followed by a nasal
consonant.
e.g. kO (to fight)
fl (dirt)
but hono (to dissolve)
nkyene (salt)
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BRONG DIALECT

CLUSTER
1.0. Sound Correspondences between Brong and the other Dialects

o f Akan
1.1 Correspondence between Brong //*/ and Akan /hy/ and /hw/
Most Brong speakers have a glottal fricative /h/ where other
Akan speakers have a labialised or a non-labialised alveolo-palatal
fricative /hw/ or /hy/.
89
Florence Dolphyne
&g. Brong other Akan

he hye (to wear)
he hwe (to look at)
hire hyire (white clay)
hia hyia (to meet)
afahe afahye (festival).
In other Akan dialects the palatal fricatives occur only before oral
front vowels and the glottal fricative before other vowels and
nasalised front vowels.
e.g. hye (to wear) horo (to wash)
hyia ( to meet) eho (there)
hwie (to pour out) ha (re) (to be light — o f weight)
but hid (to need)
hem (to blow one’s nose)
In Akan palatal consonants occur before front vowels and the
open vowel /a/, while velar and glottal consonants occur before
back vowels and the open vowel.
e.g. Palatal consonants Velar and glottal consonants
kye (to share out) k o (to g o )
twe (to pull) kd (to fight)
twa (to cut) ka (to bite)
gya (to leave behind) kwa (to smear)
gye (to receive) gu (to scatter — e.g. seeds)
adwini (pattern) gwa (to split open)
hye (to wear) gow (to soften)
hwie (to pour out) e ha (there)
1.11. There is historical evidence from early written texts2 to
show th at the palatal consonants are a recent development, and
th at they are a result of a systematic palatalisation of the velar and
glottal consonants in the environment of a following front vowel.
(Some older speakers of the Asante dialect still say ‘hire’ for ‘hyire’
(white clay) and ‘okena’ for ‘okyena’ (tomorrow)). Since the Brong
/h/ pronunciation for other Akan /hy/ is widespread throughout the
whole of the Brong-speaking area (see chart section 9.0), it is not
likely, (as was suggested by some participants at the Brong Seminar)
that the Brong pronunciation could have been borrowed from one
or more of the neighbouring languages. The conclusion that may
be drawn is that since palatal consonants are a recent development
in A kan2, it appears that in the Brong dialects the glottal fricative
did not get palatalised along with the velar consonants, and that
the forms ‘he’ instead of ‘hwe’ and ‘hia’ instead of ‘hyia’ represent
a much older pronunciation, that is, as far as /h/ in these examples
is; concerned the Brong dialects have retained an older form of the
Akan language.
90
The Brong {Bono) Dialect o f Akan
1. CVnV Stems
In the Akuapem and Asante dialects there is a large number
of CVnV verb stems (i.e. where the second consonant is /n/) most
of which have CVn variants, the CVnV forms being used in
more emphatic speech.
e.g. kyene/kyen (to surpass)
dane/dan (to turn over)
sane/son (to strain)
Apart from a few exceptions, nominal stems with similar structure
are only CVn.
e.g. odan (house)
ekon (neck)
but efunu/efun (corpse)
In the Brong dialects such stems have
1. CVnV Structure
e.g. dane (to turn over; house)
bone (to smell)
kwane (path)
2. CVrV Structure
e.g. dare (to turn over; house)
hyere (ship; vehicle)
kware (path)
3. CV/CV Structure
e.g. dl (name) da (to turn over; house)
bd se (how much?)
1.21 CVnV Stems

The CVnV form is the most common, but most of such words
also have a CVrV pronunciation, and the same speaker may use the
two forms as free variants.
It is quite common for polysyllabic words that end in vowels
to lose the final vowels over the years unless there is some special
reason for their being retained (such as stress on the final syllable).
This loss of final vowel affected a large number of CVnV words in
the Akuapem and Asante dialects, but in the Fante dialect the
process was complete and all such words have CVn structure. It
seems therefore th at in the Brong dialects these CVnV forms have
not undergone the change that has taken place in the other dialects.
1.22 CVrV Stems

The CVrV pronunciation for Akan CVnV stems is peculiar to
the Brong dialects, and seems to be an exclusive Brong innovation.
91
Florence Dolphyne
In Akan /n / is in complementary distribution with /d/ and h i— Ini

can occur in stem-initial position and inter-vocalically but always
M Syl %c/ except where il is an assimilated /d/ e.g.
in /^ v u °tCCurs on,y in stem initial position and /r/
mtervocalically and both occur in oral syllables only. TheCVnV
•thef lfore/ nasal and the CVrV ones oral. Nasality is
phonemic in Akan (e.g. ka (to be left behind) ka (to say)) and
there are pairs of disyllabic words in the language that are distin-
nan( y y 6 OC(:urrence of / n/ or /r/ as the second conso
nant, and the corresponding vowel nasality or its absence.
e.g. sone (to strain) sore (to get up)
kyene (to surpass) kyere (to stay long)
hono (to dissolve) horo (to wash)
pene (agree) pere (to be restless)
„ , ^ i Br0nginrl0VJat,i0n is one of rePlacing the marked (4-nasal)

with the unmarked (—nasal) feature value, thus neutralising the
distinction between such pairs of stems.
1.23 CV/CV Stems

3^hf ser are n° \ as common as the CVnV and CVrV forms. The
quality0 1S ° ° r nasalised depending on the vowel
e.g. dl (name) dij (house)

ko (neck) se (now much?)
The vowel quality o f the CV form is not always the same a
the vowel quality of the initial syllable of the CVnV stem.
(!) Where the V of the initial syllable of the CVnV stem is the
vowel h i the vowel of the CV form is /5/. The usual Akan pro
nunciation is put in brackets, in the following examples,
e.g. ko (kon) neck
bo (bon) to smell
(2) Where the V of the initial syllable of the CVnV stem is the
v ow el/e/the V o fth e C V form may be
(1) a nasalised /e/
e.g. twe (twen) to wait
s£ (sen) to be perched
or (li) an oral /e/, (sometimes followed by a glottal stop when the
word occurs before pause).
e.g. se (sen) how much?
pe (pen) sometime ago, once.
phSolo^cafrulIsf 0™ 5 deriVed by aPP'ying ,he followin®

92
Brong Asante Akuapem

(1) Delete final vowel dan/bon/ dan/bon/ dan/bon/
of the CVnV stem twen twen twen
(2) In Brong replace /a, e/ with dan/bon/ dan/bon/ dan/bon
a higher vowel quality twen twen twen
(3) In Brong and Asante nasa dan/bon/ dan/bon dan/bon
lise vowels before final /n / twen tw§n twen
(4) In Brong and A sante re dde boo/ dae/bo& dan/bon
place final /n / with o/u after twee twee twen
back vowels and with e/I
after non-back vowels.3
(5) In Brong delete final vowel da/bo dae/boo dan/bon/

twe twee tw en4
1.24 In the Brong dialects then there is a large number of (1)

CVnV stems that have retained their original form; as well as a
number that have been affected by the two Brong innovations
resulting in (2) oral CVrV stems and (3) monosyllabic CV stems.
The following are examples of the different pronunciations
associated with CVnV stems:
kwane/kware (path)
dane/dare/dS (to turn over; house)
kono/ka (neck)
dini/dl (name)
twene/twg (wait)
hyene/hyere (ship/vehicle)
Examples of other words with similar structure:

kram ane/kram are (dog)
apakane/apakare (chief’s palanquin)
sekane/sekare/seka (knife)
1.3 Assimilation of voiced plosives and affricates into nasals
In some dialects of Akan, e.g. Akuapem, Asante, Akyem, Kwahu,

a voiced plosive or a voiced affricate is assimilated into a nasal in
the environment of a preceding nasal consonant within the same
word.
This happens in
(a) Negative verbal forms and in Optative Tense forms where the
nasal Negative prefix or Optative prefix occurs immediately before
a voiced plosive or a voiced affricate.
93
Florence Dolphyne
e.g. mma (don’t come) stem: ba

onnye (he won’t take it) „ gye
onnwa (let him cut it up) „ dwa
ommefa (let him come and take it) Ingressive Prefix: be
(b) Nominal forms where a nasal nominal prefix occurs imme

diately before a voiced plosive or a voiced affricate,
e.g. nnwom (song) s t e m : dwom
nnua (trees) tt dua
mmofra (children) ” abofra
This phonological process is absent in Fante, and in Brong it is
not regular so that both assimilated and unassimilated forms occur.
(i) The assimilated forms occur in Nominal forms, Negative
verbal forms and Optative Tense forms where the nasal
prefix occurs before a voiced plosive.
e.g. nnua (trees) stem: dua
mmaayaa (young girls) „ abaayaa
onni (he won’t eat) tt di
ommra (let him come) ” bra
(ii) The unassimilated forms occur in

(a) Nominal forms, Negative verbal forms and Optative
forms where the nasal prefix occurs before a voiced
affricate.
Brong Other Akan

e.g. ndwom (song) cf. nnwom
akyingye (debate) „ akyinnye
bengyae (let them stop it) „ wonnyae
ma mi n dwa (let me cut it up) „ ma minnwa
ongye (he won’t take it) „ onnye
(b) 1st person singular verbal forms where the 1st person singular
pronoun’ is reduced to a homorganic syllabic nasal, (see Section
4.1) e.g.
nda (I sleep) cf. meda
mbee (I came) „ mebae
ndidi (I eat) mididi
(c) possessed forms of the noun where the 1st person possessive
pronoun is reduced to a homorganic syllabic nasal that occur
before the noun.
mba (my child) cf. me ba
ndee (my thing) „ me dee
(i.e. mine)
ndane (my house) „ me dan
1.31 It seems from these examples that
(1) In the Brong dialects, the assimilation of voiced plosives and

voiced affricates into nasals in the environment of a preceding nasal
which occurs in some Akan dialects effected only voiced plosives
but nb.t voiced affricates. r
(2) The reduction of 1st person pronoun to a syllabic rtasal in
the Brong dialects took place after the assimilation of Voiced plosives
to nasals referred to in (1) above, hence the forms “ nda” (I sleep)
“mbee” (I came) “m ba” (my child) as compared with “ nnua”
(trees) “mm a” (don’t come).
1.4 Correspondence Between Brong 1/r and /r/ in the other Akan
dialects
In the Brong dialect cluster, /l/ and /r/ are in free variation, and
they occur intervocalically in words where the other Akan dialects
have /r/.
e.g. Brong Other Akan Dialects

bolodee/borodee (plantain) borode
abelebe/aberebs (pineapple) aborobe
akolaa/akaraa (child) akodaa/akoraa
In Akan /d/ is in complementary distribution with /r/, /d/ occur
ring in stem-initial position, and /r/ intervocalically, so that /r/ is.
described in the phonology of Akan as intervocalic /d/. /!/, which is
in free variation with /r/ in the Brong dialects (and in some parts
of the Asante-speaking and Fante-speaking areas as well as in the
Kwahu dialect), can also be described as an intervocalic/d/. There
are, however, some few words in which all three sounds /d/, /!/
and /r/ are in free variation, so that in such words the distinction
between stem initial /d /: [d] and intervocalic /d/: [r, 1] does n o r
apply,
e.g. Brong
de/re/le (to say) as in: ode/ore/ole (he says) fieda/fiera/fiela
(Friday).
c.f. Some Types o f Asante
akodaa/akoraa/akolaa (child)
ahodoo/ahoroo (several)
2.0 Tone
(Tone marks: (') high tone 0) low tone (1) downstep. e.g. K 6fi;
A!m£).
95 .
Florence Dolphyne
It has not been possible in this study to do a detailed tonal analysis

of Brong. Moreover there are marked differences in the tonal
patterns used m different parts o f the Brong-speaking areas, and
what follows is therefore a brief statement o f some o f the ways in
wluch the Brong dialect cluster as a whole differs tonally from the
Akuapem, Asante and Fante dialects.
2.1 The Emphatic Particle ne
The emphatic particle nd is always said on a high tone. In the other

Akan dialects it is a low tone nd.
e.g. Brong cf. Akuapem and Fante
m£ nd mbdd md/dmi nd mdbde
(it is I who came) Asante: md nd mdbdde
nyd dndnsd nd! yd ho Akuapem, Asante and Fante
(there lived (was) Ananse) nye dndnsd nd 5w6 ho
B6n6 nd g !kd Akuapem, Asante and Fante
(it is Brong I speak) B6n6 nd md!kd.
2.2 Possessive Noun Phrase with the Possessive ‘Pronoun’( 5)
, . , In. ^ following examples the possessive ‘pronoun’ in Brong

like in Fante, is said on a high tone, while it is said on a low tone
in Akuapem and Asante.
Brong Fante c.f. Akuapem I Asante

mdkond/r)k6 mo k6n „ me k5n (my neck)
w6 kdnd/kd wo k6n „ w6 kon (your neck)
nd ! ydrd nd ydr nd ydrd (his wife)
n’dsd !dsl n ’d sod! dsiw n’dsd dlsf (lit. his ear is
blocked) (he is deaf)
n ’dnild furd n ’dnyf! dfura n’dni dlffrd (his eyes are
blind).
2.3 Verbal Forms
In the following examples, the Brong verbal forms differ tonally

from one or more o f the other Akan dialects. (Verb stems - fa (take)
bisa (ask). v 7
Tense Brong Fante Akuapem Asante

Habitual 6fd 6fd 6fd ofd
dbisd obisd 6blsa dblsa
Progressive 56fd drdfd drdfd ddfd
bdbfsd drebisd drdbisd 56bisd
96
Past df6e(«) ofae ofa& b fte t

dbis&> 6blsa& 6bisa& dbisae£
Perfect w&af& waafa wafa
&£bis& we6bis& w&bls& w&bis&
In these examples the Brong forms are tonally more like the
Fante forms than the Akuapem or Asante. It may be noted in
passing th at as far as tone is concerned, Brong ‘sounds’ more like
some dialects of Fante than Akuapem or Asante.
3.0 Nominal Affixes
3.1 Prefixes
M ost nouns in Akan either have an initial vowel or an initial

syllabic nasal consonant which is homorganic with the following
consonant:
ohene (chief)
eti/etire (head)
aba (seed)
mpa (bed)
nsu (water)
gkoa (slaves)
In the Brong dialects nouns either have an initial syllabic, homor

ganic nasal or an initial /a/. Nouns which begin with /e, e, o, 0/ in
the other Akan dialects are consonant-initial in Brong.
Brong Other Akan Dialects
ponko oponko (horse)
be ebe (proverb)
wuo owuo (death)
kramane okraman (dog)
du edu/idu (ten)
The Brong consonant-initial nouns are a development away from

the more common structure for nouns in the ‘Kwa’ group o f lang
uages where most nouns have vowel prefixes.
3.2 Suffixes
The vowel suffix which occurs in nouns in the Asante dialect,
but which has been lost in the Akuapem and Fante dialects, is
retained in the Brong dialects. This nominal suffix is usually an
open vowel which agrees w ith the vowel o f the stem in two dimen
sions of vowel Harmony — advanced/unadvanced; rounded/un
rounded.
97
Florence Dolphyne
eg- Brong Asante Akuapem/Fante

tire (head) etire eti/i tsir
boa (stone) eboa obo/ebo
nsuo (water) nsuo nsu
adee (thing) adee ade/adze
wuo (death) owuo owu
These examples show that while nouns in the Brong dialects

lost the /e, 8, a, o/ vowel prefixes and retained the suffixes, Akuapem
and Fante lost the nominal suffixes and retained the prefixes. Asante
nouns however retained both the vowel prefixes and suffixes.
It is worth pointing out here that nouns in related languages
such as Nzema, Anyi/Baoule also have nominal suffixes that are
comparable to those in Asante and Brong.
Nzema Anyi c.f. Asante Brong

e.g. water: nzule nzuo/nzue nsuo nsuo
head: etile — — etire tire
From such evidence one may conclude that nominal suffixes
occurred in the ‘parent’ Akan language, so that as far as nominal
suffixes are concerned the Brong and Asante forms represent what
used to occur in an older form of the Akan language.
4 0 Personal Pronouns
The description below follows Schachter and Froinkin’s treatm ent
of traditional ‘subject pronouns’ as Subject-Concord (SC) prefixes.7
For reasons set out in section 5.2 under Possessive Noun Phrase,
traditional possessive pronouns are also described as Possessive
Concord (PC) markers. Below are the Brong personal pronouns
and the concord markers associated with them.
Independent SC Prefix PC marker Pronoun
Pronoun Object
1st pers. sing me N-/m e-8 N-/me- m

2nd „ „ wo wo- wo w
3rd ,, ,, ono wo-/o- o-; ne no
1st „ plural ye ye- ye ye
2nd „ ,, hg hg- hg hg
3rd „ bs be- be be
unspecified subject prefix. 8-
The ways in which Brong personal pronouns and the concord
markers associated with them differ from those of the other Akan
dialects are discussed below for each personal pronoun.
98
4.1 1st Person Singular Pronoun: me.

(a) Subject Concord prefix: This is a syllabic nasal when it
occurs immediately before a consonant. The nasal is homor
ganic with the following consonant: e.g. m occurs before
p, b, f; n before t, d, s; q before k, g, h.
e.g. mbee (I came)
nde too ho (I put it there)
Dorm aa ne qka (I speak the Dormaa dialect)
nte ha (I live here)
but mefa (I shall take it)
meeko (I am going)
In the other Akan dialects the subject concord prefix is me—
e.g. mebae ( I came)
mede too ho (I put it there)
(b) Possessive Concord Marker
This is also a syllabic nasal when the possessed noun is conso
nant-initial. The nasal is homorganic with the following consonant;
e.g. mba (my child)
nse (my father)
gk (3 (my neck)
but mafuo (my farm)
madwane (my sheep)
In the other Akan dialects the possessive concord marker is ‘me’,
e.g. me ba (my child)
me se (my father)
(c) Pronoun Object
This is a syllabic bilabial nasal m, as in the Fante dialect.
In Asante and Akuapem it is usually ‘me’ and sometimes ‘m’.
e.g. beehwe m (they are looking at me)
ode maa m (he gave it to me)
4.2 2nd Person Singular Pronoun: wo
Same as in the other Akan dialects.
(a) Subject-Concord Prefix
e.g. wokoe (you went)
wobeda ha (you will sleep here)
e.g. wo dane, (your house)
wo nua (your brother)
(c) Object Pronoun
e.g. oofre w (he is calling you)
ode maa w (he gave it to you)
4.3 3rd Person Singular Pronoun: ono
(a) Subject-Concord prefix
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Florence Dolphyne
Unlike the Akuapem and Asante dialects which have two 3rd
person singular subjeet-concord prefixes—one for animate referen
ce and another for non-anim ate reference—Brong, like Fante, has
o- for bath anim ate and non-animate reference. It is sometimes
pronounced wo- in Brong, especially in the Atebubu area.
e.g. Brong cf. Akuapem and Asante
oko (he/she/it has gone) oko (he/she has gone)
eko (it has gone)
obeko (he/she/it will go) obeko (he/she/will go)
ebeko (it will go)
se woode o (if it is sweet) se eede o (if it is sweet)
woroko (he is going) oreko (he is going)
In Akan there are two possessive concord markers associated
with the 3rd person singular pronoun; o- and ne. (The o- form
does not occur in Fante).
e.g. ne dan (his house) ne nua (his brother/sister)
owofa (his uncle) onua (his brother/sister)
The form ‘ne’ can occur with all nouns. The o- form has a limited
distribution, occurring only with a subclassification of nouns with
the feature “hum an” which Boadi9 refers to as the ‘Kinship’ group.
In the Brong dialects the o- form occurs with a larger number of
nouns than in the other dialects of Akan.
Brong cf. Akuapem and Asante
ne wofa/owofa (his uncle) ne wofa/owofa (his uncle)
ne kunu/okunu (her hus
band) ne kunu/okunu (her husband)
ne nua/onua (his brother/ ne nua/onua (his brother/sister)
sister)
ne ba/oba (his child) ne ba (his child)
ne yere/oyere (his wife) ne yere (his wife)
In the Brong dialects therefore the o- possessive concord marker
has a much wider distribution than in the other Akan dialects in
which it occurs. A similar distribution in related languages such as
Nzema and Sefwi indicates that this wider distribution in Brong
represents what used to occur in the ‘parent’ Akan language. In the
Akuapem and Asante dialects the number of nouns wiih which the
o- possessive form can occur has become considerably reduced,
while in the Fante dialect this possessive form has been lost. Here
again it seems Brong has retained an older Akan form.
(c) Pronoun Object
The third person singular pronoun object for anim ate refe
rence in Brong and in the other dialects of Akan is ‘no’. Where
100
the pronominalised noun object is inanimate the object is covert,

that is, it is not expressed, in all the dialects of Akan.
e.g. fre no (call him)
Kofi huu no (Kofi saw him)
ode maa no (he gave it to him)
but Kofi hui (Kofi saw it)
4.4 1st Person Plural Pronoun: ye
All the dialects of Akan including Brong, have the form ‘ye’
for the subject-concord prefix, but the possessive concord marker
and the object pronoun is ‘yen’ in Akuapem and Asante and ‘hen’
in Fante. Brong has ‘ye’ for both the possessive concord marker
and the pronoun object. Like some other CVnV/Cvn words in
Brong, this pronoun lias lost its final nasal. (See section 1.2).
yeko (we go)
yebefa (we shall take it)
ye dan (our house)
ye nua (our brother/sister)
(c) Pronoun Object:

ofree ye (he called us)
bede maa ye (they gave it to us)
4.5 2nd Person Plural Pronoun: h$
In the Akuapem and A sante dialects this pronoun is mo and in

the Fante dialect horn. The Brong form bears a close resemblance
to the Fante one.
(a) Subject Concord Prefix

hadidi (you eat)
habeda (you will sleep)

ha kasaa (your language)
ha nua (your brother/sister)
(c) Pronoun Object
maahu h3 (I have seen you)
oofre ha (he is calling you)
101
Florence Dolphyne
4.6 3rd Person Plural Pronoun: be

The third person plural pronoun ‘be’ more than anything else
llh A t 008 dliJ,ects has been the one linguistic item by which
other Akan-speakers have identified Brong-speakers. It does not
occur in any of the major Akan dialects — Asante has both ‘yen’
and Von/wDonom'; Akuapem V on', and Fante W . ‘Be"is an
old 3rd person plural pronoun of the Benue-Congo language
F n H ^’u / U 10 Nzema and in Anyi-Baoule. It also occurs
in the Wassaw dialect o f Akan. ‘Be’ is used throughout the Brong-
t o T h p ^ n 3 and ?VCn, th ° Ugh lt does not bear any ^sem blance
to the 3rd person plural pronouns of the Akan dialects nearest to
the Brong area, it cannot be regarded as borrowed from the neigh
bouring languages in the Ivory Coast, in which it occurs. It seems
Brong has retained, tins Benue-Congo form which has been lost in
most of the other dialects of Akan.

beko (they have gone)
bele (they say)

be kasaa (their language)
be dane (their house)
(c) Pronoun Object
fre be (call them)
kobisa be (go and ask them)
4.7 Unspecified Subject Prefix: e-

Sometimes in emphatic constructions, an unspecified subject
prefix occurs with the verb after the ‘ne’ emphatic particle,
e.g. onua ne ebee (it is his brother who came)
ne wofa ne eyooe (it is his uncle who did it)
The use of this prefix in emphatic sentences is however optional
so that the following sentences also occur:
onua ne bee (it is his brother who came)
ne wofa ne yooe (it is his uncle who did it)
Note: The unspecified subject prefix also occurs in the Asante
dialect after the emphatic particle ‘n a’. It does not occur in Akua
pem or in Fante.
e.g. ono na ebaee (it is he who came)
woonom na ekoee (it is they who went)
(the na e’ sequence in Asante is pronounced /ne/).
5.0 Noun-PIus-Concord Marker Noun Phrase
102
5.1 Noun Phrase as subject of a Sentence

In most Akan dialects the subject of a sentence is expressed by
a noun or by a subject-concord (SC) prefix.
e.g. Kofi kae (Kofi went)
or okoe (he went)
Kofi fa bae (Kofi took it and brought it)
or ofa bae (he took it and brought it)
It is only in emphatic sentences that both a noun and an SC
prefix may be used,
e.g. (Akuapem and F ante) Kofi na okoe (it is Kofi who went)
(Asante) Kofi na ekoee10 (it is Kofi who went)
In the Brong dialect however when a noun subject is used it
almost always requires a concord marker whether the sentence is
emphatic or not. e.g.
(1) Unemphatic Sentences

maame no ole (lit. the woman she said)
akodaa no omaa dwom so (lit. the child he started a song)
Kofi ne Ama bekoe (lit. Kofi and Ama they went)
mpanimfoo bekae se . . . (lit. grown-ups they said that)
me ne wo yebeko (lit. I and you we shall go)
nsuo eeto11 (lit. the rain it is falling)
hene he eeba11 (lit. the chief he is coming)
(Serial Verb Construction)

rjkodaa no baako baabi (lit. the children they have
gone they have come back)
ode okye no (lit. he takes it he gives it (as
a present) to him),
ode eema11 no (lit. he takes it he is giving it
to him)
bepagya bekoe (lit. they lifted it, they went
away).
(Note: sometimes the SC prefix is not repeated in the serial verb
construction, e.g. nde maa no (I took it, gave it to him)).
(2) Emphatic Sentences (with the emphatic particle ‘ne’)

me ne gkee (it is I who said it)
wo ne woyooe (it is you who did it)
onua ne ebee (it is his brother who came)
ne wofa ne eyooe (it is his uncle who did it)
Sometimes however when the subject requires a 3rd person
singular pronoun, the pronoun does not occur with the verb after
the emphatic particle.
103
Florence Dolphyne
e.g. onua ne bee (it is his brother who came)

nye baa bi ne ya ha (there was (lived) a certain
woman)
ananse ne yaoe (it is Ananse who did it).
It may be pointed out here that in the Fante dialect the noun
plus S-C prefix Noun phrase is sometimes used although this is
not very common.
e.g. abofra no aye adze (lit. the child he does well)
hon nyinaa woguanee (lit. they all they ran away)
The noun plus concord marker construction in Brong gives
support to Schachter and Fromkin’s treatm ent of Akan ‘pronoun’
subjects as subject-concord prefixes which agree with the noun
subject in number and person. It seems as if this type of construc
tion was more widespread in the Akan language than the present
structure o f the language would lead one to conclude. For un-
emphatic sentences the Akuapem and Asante dialects have lost
this type of noun phrase completely; F ante still uses it to some
extent, but in Brong it is regularly used, except for a few examples
o f serial verb construction. Here too Brong has retained an older
form of the Akan language which has almost disappeared from
the other Akan dialects.
For emphatic sentences with the ‘ne’ emphatic particle however,
Akuapem, Asante and Fante dialects regularly use the noun plus
concord m arker construction, but in Brong the use of the subject
concord marker is optional.
5.2 Possessive Noun Phrase
In general a possessed noun in Akan may be preceded either
by a noun which is the possessor or by a possessive ‘pronoun’.
e.g. Kofi dan (Kofi’s house) or ne dan (his house)
Kofi ne Ama sukuu (Kofi and Ama’s school) or won sukuu
(their school).
In the Brong dialects however when the noun which is the posses
sor is expressed, it obligatorily requires a possessive ‘pronoun’.
e.g. Kofi ne dan (lit. Kofi his house)
Onyankopon n ’anim (before God. lit. before God
his face.)
Kofi ne Ama bz sukuu (lit. Kofi and Ama their school)
sbe aboa bs tire n i? (lit. which animals their heads
are these ?)
Sometimes when the possessor referred to is a plural noun, two
‘pronouns’ are required.
e.g. bs bs kasaa (lit. they their language).
This type o f possessive noun phrase does not occur in the Asante
dialect but it does in the Fante and Akuapem dialects.
104
e.g. (Fante) erai na owo hen ndzeraba (lit. I and you our things)
Kofi ne sika (lit. Kofi his money)
mbofra no hon ntar (lit. the children their
dresses).
(Akuapem) m’agya ne nua bea (lit. m> father his sister)
This type of possessive noun phrase shews that what has been
traditionally referred to as ‘possessive pronouns’ in Akan are in
fact concord markers which agree with their nouns in number and
person. Like the noun plus subject-concord marker noun phrase
discussed above the noun plus possessive concord marker noun
phrase seems to have been widespread in the Akan language at some
earlier stage in the history of the language. While it has been retained
in the Brong and Fante dialects, its use has become restricted in
the Akuapem dialect to singular nouns requiring the third person
singular concord marker, but it has been lost in the Asante dialect.
6.0 Vocabulary
Like all other dialects of Akan, Brong has a number of vocabu
lary items that do not occur in any of the other dialects.
e.g. awehoma —• monkey
ahundede — bat
anansoa — ananse story
kom — farm
In this section however, only a few vocabulary items with a high
frequency o f occurrence, that are strikingly different from what
occur in the other Akan dialects are discussed.
6.1 ke/he
‘ke’ in the Japekrom/Adamso subdialects and ‘he’ in the other
subdialects are used for the (a) demonstrative pronouns, ‘this’,
‘that’ (b) the definite article and (c) the subordinate clause marker.
Other Akan dialects have ‘yi’ for the demonstrative pronoun m ean
ing ‘this’; ‘no ’ for the demonstrative pronoun meaning ‘that’ and
for the definite article, as well as for the subordinate clause marker.
e.g. (a) Demonstrative Pronouns (this/that)

wiase kg (this world)
one oba ke bscko m voum 12 (she and this/that her
child were going to
the farm).
mmere bi baa he koo nsuom (once this/that woman
went to the river).
anadwo he a hene he eeba . . (that night when this
chief was coming)
moko13 bre mba he ya (I shall go where this my
child is).
105
Florence Dolphyne
cf. other Akan: wiase yi (this world)

(b) The definite article (the)
akolaa k£ ohuu anom aa bi (the child saw a bird)
ne sie ke so le (and the an t hill also said)
akolaa he buee pono he (the child opened the
door).
ne baa he le yoo (and the woman said
‘yes’).
opegyaa tuo he (he raised the gun)
cf. other Akan:
abofra no buee pono no (the/that child opened)
the door.
(c) Subordinate Clause Marker
na beeko mvuom ke na beko too (and when they were
dwo going to the farm they
found yam).
nipa dee yeebre ne h5 ke (the person over whom
we are toiling).
na oforoe he (and when he climbed it)
bewoo no he bede no kohee bon- (when he was born they
glo put him in a bunga
low).
asem dee oka kyeree wo he (lit. the case which he
told you).
c.f. Other Akan:
asem a oka kyeree wo no (lit. the case which he
told you).
wowoo no no . . . (when he was born .)
6.2 The Verb ‘to say’
The verb meaning ‘to say’ is se/le/re/de and occasionally ‘se’
which is the form used in the Asante dialect.
The pronunciation ‘se’ is mainly used in the Atebubu area,
in the rest of the Brong-speaking area the pronunciation Me’, re, de’
or a reduced form ‘e’ is used. All four pronunciations may occur
in the speech of one person. (For relationship between d/l/r see
section 1.4)
e.g. baa he le yoo (the woman said ‘yes’)
are ooko (he says he is going)
hene he de oobeku no (the chief said he was
. , , going to kill him),
bee beeko (they say they are going)
Note: Some dialects of Fante also have de/Ie/re for the verb (‘to
say’). v
106
6.3 The Verb ‘ya’

The verb ‘ya’ is used in Brong where the other Akan dialects use
‘wo’ (to be) or ‘te ’ (to live in a place),
e.g. dwe ya ne tira (there are lice in his hair)
anom aa bi ya kurom ha (there is a certain bird in this town)
K w ak u an an sen ey ah o (there was/lived Kwaku Ananse)
meko bre mba he ya (I shall go where this my child
is/lives).
6.4 The Verb yo/o
One of the renderings for the verb ‘to be’ in most dialects of Akan
is ‘ye’ which is often reduced to ‘e’
e.g. eye de/eede (it is sweet)
In the Brong dialects the Present Tense Affirmative form has ‘yo’
or ‘o’, although the Negative form has ‘ye’
e.g. adwuma ke ne sika yo pono aduonu (lit. this job, its money
is twenty pounds),
oyo m fe (lit. it is beautiful for me)
oode ( it is sweet)
but onye de ( it is not sweet)
e.g. m’anansoa ntooe se oode o se onye de o. . .
(lit. my story that I have told whether it is sweet or it is
not sw eet. . . )
6.5 The Verb ‘de/di’
Another rendering for the verb ’to be’ in most Akan dialects is
‘ne’ or ‘n i’, which is a contracted form for ‘ne oyi’ (it is this
one). In the Brong dialects this verb is very often ‘de’ or
‘di’
e.g. mba di (this is my child)
n ey e red e m ( I am his wife. lit. his wife is me)
cf. Other Akan:
me ba ni ( this is my child)
ne yere ne me ( I am his wife)
(see section 1.22 for relationship between /d/,/r/and/n/)
6.6 The Verb ‘bra’
In most Akan dialects the verb ‘bra’ means ‘to come’ and ‘bre’
means ‘to bring’. In Brong however the verb ‘bra’ means ‘to come’
and ‘to bring’,
e.g. bra ha ( come here)
fa bra me ( bring it to me)
cf. Other A kan:
bra ba ( come here)
fa bre me ( bring it to me)
6.7 The Verb‘ho’
The verb for ‘to be dry’ is ‘ho’ in Brong and ‘wo’ in other Akan
dialects.
107
Florence Dolphyne
e-g- aho ( it is dry)

seo h o a ( when it is dry)
cf. Other Akan:
awo ( It is dry)
S6 ew o a ( w hen it is dry)
It is only in this word that a Brong /h/ corresponds to other
Akan /w/.
7.0 Subdialects of Brong.
A part from the general characteristics described above which
distinguish Brong from other dialects of Akan, there are marked
differences between the type of Brong spoken in different parts of
the Brong-speaking area which sometimes make it difficult for a
person from the western section of the area to be understood by
another from the eastern section. The Brong speakers are themselves
aware of these differences and can very often tell the town a speaker
comes from.
This section describes some of the linguistic characteristics of the
subdialects. Each subdialect is identified by the town(s) or village(s)
in which it is spoken.
The subdialects seem to fall into five main groups, each of which
has certain characteristics peculiar to it.
1. Japekrom/Adamso
2. Berekum/Sunyani/Dormaa/Wamfie
3. Wenchi
4. N koranza/K intam po
5. Atebubu
7.1 Japekrom/Adamso Subdialect
The following description is based on recordings made in Jape-
krom and Adamso, in the north-western section o f the Brong
speaking area. 6
7.11 Consonant Mutation
W hat is most striking about this subdialect is the phonological
feature of consonant m utation, whereby voiceless consonants become
voiced m the environm ent of a preceding nasal consonant
e.g. akoraa/ngoraa ( child/children)
fie/ahemvie ( house/palace)
si mu/ma nzi mu ( start off/don’t start off)
tie/ma ndie (listen /d o n ’t listen)
ope/ombe ( he likes it/he does not like it)
twa/ma ndwa ( cut it/don’t cut it)
C onsonant m utation is very characteristic of the Bia group of
languages—Nzema, Anyi, Baoule—which are spoken across the
border in the Ivory Coast. None of the Akan dialects has this pho
108
nological feature and since it occurs in the area closest to the Bia
languages it is very likely that it is borrowed from the Ivory Coast
languages.
On the other hand since the Bia languages are, genetically, closely
related to Akan, it is possible to consider consonant mutation as
something that was once common to all the Akan dialects, but which
has been retained in this section of the Brong area because of its
proximity to related languages in which the same phonological
process occurs.
7.12 Negative Imperative forms
The second person singular Imperative form in Akan is the simple
verb stem.
e.g. ko ( go) fa ( take it)
kasa ( speak) tie ( listen)
In the Akuapem and Asante dialects the Negative of this Impe
rative form has the Negative morpheme, which is a homorganic
nasal, prefixed to the stem.
e.g. r)ko (don’t go) mfa (don’t take it)
rjkasa (don’t speak) ntie (don’t listen)
In the Japekrom /A dam so subdialect o f Brong, as well as in
Fante, the Negative form has the nasal prefix as well as ‘m a’ which
occurs before the negative form.
e.g. ma mva (don’t take it (stem — ‘fa’)
m a nyo (don’t do it)
m a ngo (don’t go (stem — ‘ko’)
This form o f the Negative Im perative also occurs in Nzema, a
related language, except that there is no homorganic nasal before
the verb stem.
e.g. m a ye (don’t do it)
m a fa (don’t take it)
7.13 Demonstrative Pronouns, Definite Article, etc.

The Japekrom /A dam so subdialect has ‘ke’ where the other
subdialects have ‘he’ for
(a) The demonstrative pronoun
e.g. wiase ke (this world)
fa ke to ke so (put this one on that one)
one oba ke beeko m vuom (lit. she and this her child were
going to the farm)
saa abayaa ke ne h6 ofe (this girl is beautiful)
(b) The definite article

akolaa ke ohuu anom aa bi (the child saw a bird)
109
Florence Dolphyne
na sie ke so le . . . (and the ant-hill also said)

ofaa sika kokoo ke (he took the gold)
(c) The subordinate clause marker

na beeko mvuom ke na (and when they were going to
okotoo dwo the farm he found yam)
nnipa dee yeebre ne h5 ke (the person over whom we are
toiling)
nea obenya sika dodoo ke (the one who will have the
largest am ount o f money).
7.14 Adamso subdialect

In addition to consonant m utation and the Negative forms
described above which are characteristic of the Japekrcm /Adam so
subdialect as a whole, the subdialect spoken in Adamso has the
following characteristic:
Future Tense — 1st Person Singular

The first person singular of the simple Future Tense has the form
mbe — (cf. Akuapem, Asante, F ante: me—)
e.g. mbetoa so (I will continue)
m bepene (I will agree)
m beduru (I will reach)
The other subdialects o f Brong as well as the other dialects of
Akan have the form ‘me-’ e.g. meko’ (I will go)
As stated elsewhere (section 4.1) the 1st person singular subject—
concord prefix is a syllabic nasal in Brong when it occurs before a
consonant, but ‘me’ in the other Akan dialects. The Adamso 1st
person singular Future Tense form indicates that:
(i) the 1st person singular Future Tense form was ‘mebe-’ in
which the full forms o f both the subject-concord prefix and
the Future Tense prefix were represented.
(ii) the 1st person singular S-C prefix later got reduced to a
syllabic nasal: mbe — (as in the Adam so subdialect).
(iii) in the other Akan dialects the /b/ in the /m b/ sequence got
assimilated into a nasal consonant: mme-
(iv) the long nasal later got reduced to a single nasal consonant:
me-. Hence the other Akan form ‘meko’ (I shall go) ‘mefa’
(I shall take it).
110
The Brang (Bono) Dialect o f Akan
7.2 BEREKUM/SUNYANI/DORMAA/WAMFIE SUBDIALECT

7.21 Demonstrative Pronouns, etc.
This subdialect is different from all other Brong subdialects in
having ‘yi’ for the dem onstrative pronoun ‘this’ and ‘no’ for the
dem onstrative pronoun ‘that’, the definite article and the sub
ordinate clause m arker (as in the major Akan dialects) instead of
‘ke’ or ‘he’ that is used in all the other Brong subdialects. There are
however a few instances of ‘he’ in this area.
e.g. (a) Demonstrative Pronoun — ‘yi’
nka nsuo yi oofam (lit. the river it almost took
(drowned) me)
nkoraa yi (these children)
(b) Definite Article—‘no’
baakO akogyina nkw anta no so (one went and stood
at the junction),
betwee akondwa no (they removed the chair)
(c) Subordinate Clause Marker — ‘no’
na owaree no no . . . (and when she married him)
dini nea obeka se fafre (the name which he says you
no no should call him).
It is possible that this area has had the longest contact with
Asante speakers and the use of ‘yi’ and ‘no’ instead of ‘h6’ is a re
sult o f Asante influence. (In the other bigger towns such as W en
chi and Techiman some speakers use ‘yi’ and ‘no’ as well as ‘he’).
7.22 Progressive Tense Form — Berekum
In addition to the above, the subdialect spoken in Berekum has a

different pronunciation for the 2nd person singular Progressive
Tense form.
e.g. wo ne nka wooma nsuo yi (it is you who nearly made this
afa me yi river take me),
bere a wodii kane se wooko (when you set off to go to the
mfuom no farm).
In the other subdialects, the Progressive Tense prefix is a long
vowel of the same quality as the subject-concord prefix,
e.g. wooko (you are going)
7.3 THE WENCHI SUBDIALECT

7.31 The Future Tense Prefix
The Future Tense Prefix in the Wenchi subdialect is ‘bo’ instead
o f ‘be’ as in the other subdialects o f Brong and in the other dialects
of Akan.
Ill
Florence Dolphyne
e.g. mobo korono (I will become a thief)

obohye no nneema miensa (he will ask him to do three
things).
obowia (he will steal it)
woboku me (you will kill me)
7.32 1st Person Singular Subject-concord prefix
Unlike the other subdialects where the first person singular subject
concord prefix is a syllabic nasal when it occurs before a consonant,
the Wenchi subdialect has the full form o f the prefix 'm e-’ in these
verbal forms. (It is possible this is due to Asante influence).
e.g. mefae (I took it)
se m ete to ho (If I pluck it)
mepe (I like it)
7.4 NKORANZA/KENTAMPO SUBDIALECT
7.41 CVnV(CVn) Stems

Words with CVnV structure in which the first vowel is the half
open /e/ or /o/ vowel in the other Akan dialects have a CV pronun
ciation in which the vowel quality is e or o depending on whether
the usual Akan pronunciation has an /e/ or /o/ vowel respectively
(section 1.23). This phenom enon is more common in this subdialect
than in any of the other subdialects. The usual Akan pronunciation
is put in brackets.
e.g. anom aa se (sen) sere so (a bird perched on the grass)
me nkye (nkyen) (beside me)
twe (twen) me (wait for me)
kente (ken ten) (basket)
taase (taasen) (a type of smoking pipe)
ob5 (ebon) (it smells)
i)k5 (me kon) (my neck)
7.42 The Verb‘se’

The N koranza/K intam po subdialect is different from the other
subdialects in having ‘se’ instead o f de./le/re/e for ‘to say’,
ose yoo he says ‘yes’
baa he ose the woman says
7.5 ATEBUBU SUBDIALECT

7.51 Vowel Harmony
A kan, like some other West African languages, has Vowel H ar
mony in which only vowels which have the feature “advanced” or
“ unadvanced” can co-occur in any given word.
112
e.g. ‘advanced’ vowels ‘unadvanced’ vowels

obetu (he will dig) obeto (he will throw)
esie (ant-hill) asee (the base o f . . .)
In the Atebubu subdialect (as in Fante as well) there is another
dimension o f Vowel Harmony — that of rounding or unrounding
of the vowels. Verbal affixes in particular are advanced/unadvanced
as well as rounded/unrounded depending on which of these features
are present in the vowels of the verb stem. The verb stems are
shown in heavy type in the following examples.
e.g. Bemmedi (let them come and eat)
kesi se (until)
begye (come and take it)
moroka (I am going)
bommoda (let them come and weed)
oboya se (it will be a b o u t. . .)
boduruu ha (they arrived there)
This type of Vowel Harm ony also occurs in Possessive C on
cord Markers.
e.g. mu no (my mother)
mo qkodaa (my children)
me dane (my house)
bo no (their mother)
When one takes into consideration the fact that the dom inant
characteristic of Vowel Harmony in West African languages is the
contrast between “advanced” and “ unadvanced” vowels, one can
only conclude that the additional feature rounding/unrounding
which occurs in this subdialect is an innovation.
7.52 The Progressive Tense Prefix

In the other subdialects, as in Asante, the Progressive Tense
prefix is an extension of the vowel quality of the subject-concord
prefix.
e.g. meeko (I am going)
ooba (he is coming)
In the Atebubu subdialect, as in Fante, the Progressive Tense
prefix is ‘-re’- and the vowel quality of the prefix agrees in Vowel
Harmony (see Vowel Harmony above) with the verb stem.
e.g. moroko (I am going)
oroforo (he is climbing)
Very often however, the vowel of the prefix is a more open quality.
e.g. boroyo (they are doing it)
woreyi (he is removing it)
worsts bs (he is watching them)
113
Florence Dolphyne
7.53 Assimilation of Voiced Plosives and Affricates into nasals
In the other subdiakcts a voiced affricate does not get assimilated

into a nasal when preceded by a nasal consonant (see section 1.3)
In the Atebubu subdialcct, as in some dialects of A kan, (e.g. A kua
pem, A sante, Akyem) a voiced affricate like the voiced plosive,
also gets assimilated into a nasal in the environment of a preceding
nasal consonant.
e.g. bennyae no stem: gyae
(let them release him)
nnwom (song) : dwom
nnwane (sheep) : dwane
onna (he won’t sleep) : da
7.54 The Past Tense suffix -c
In Brong, as in Asante, Affirmative Past Tense and Negative

Perfect Tense forms of the verb have the suffix -e when they are
not immediately followed by an overt object. In other Akan dialects
the suffix is i/e.
e.g. Brong, Asante Akuapem, Fante

ohuuye (he saw it) ohui
ophuuye (he hasn’t seen orjhuie/ophui
it)
but ohuu Kofi (he saw Kofi) ohuu Kofi
orjhuu no (he hasn’t seen oqhuu no e/oqhuu no
him)
In the Atebubu subdialect when the Affirmative Past Tense or
the Negative Perfect Tense verb is followed by an object the suffix
occurs after the object.
bokoka kyeree bo no e (theywent and told their
mother).
ode kosua ta mienu braa (she brought two eggs to (River)
wurukye e Wurukye).
ohiaa pan ini bi e (he met a certain man)
oboduruu kwan so e (lit. he arrived on the road)
onnyaa no e (he hasn’t released him).
This phenomenon occurs in the Akuapem dialect with the Nega
tive Perfect Tense forms of the verb.
e.g. memfae e (I haven’t taken it)
oqhui e (he hasn’t seen it)
onyee adwuma no e (he hasn’t done the work)
oghuu no e (he hasn’t seen him).
114
This s suffix no longer occurs in the Fante dialect. In the Akuapem

dialect its use is restricted to the Negative Perfect Tense forms of the
verb. In the Asante dialect and in the other subdialects of Brong
the -s suffix occurs only when the Affirmative Past Tense or the
Negative Perfect Tense verb is not followed by an overt object.
In the Atebubu subdialect this Past Tense suffix occurs whether
the verb is followed by an object or not. This wider distribution in
the Atebubu subdialect seems to reflect what used to apply to the
whole of the Akan language, so that as far as the distribution of
the Past Tense suffix is concerned the Atebubu subJialect represents
an older form of the Akan language.
7.55 The Verb ‘se’

The Atebubu subdialect is different from the other subdial :cts
of Brong in having ‘se’ for the verb ‘to say’. Th? other subdialects
(except Nkoranza/ICintampo) have de/le/re/e.
e.g. ose ommfa mma no (he says he should give it to him)
ose moroba (he says ‘I am coming’)
bese boroyo (they say they are doing it).
8.0 CONCLUSION
8.1 Historical Inferences

As pointed out in the relevant sections, some of the linguistic
characteristics of Brong seem to represent what used to prevail
in the Akan language as a whole but which have either been lost
or become restricted in their distribution in the other dialects so
that in some ways the Brong dialect cluster represents an earlier
form of the Akan language. These Brong characteristics are:
1. The use of /h/ instead of /hy/ or /hw/ before oral front vowels
(section 1.1)
e.g. ‘h s’ instead of ‘hye’, or ‘hwe’ (to wear; to look at)
‘hia’ instead of ‘hyia’ (to meet)
2. The pronunciation of the final vowel of CVnV stems, which
in most of the other dialects is no longer pronounced (section
1.21).
e.g. kwane (path) kono (neck)
tono (sell) dane (house)
3. The wider distribution of the o- 3rd person singular possessive
concord marker (section 4.3 (b)).
e.g. oba (his child)
oyere (his wife)
4. The requirement of a concord marker that agrees with its
noun in number and person when the noun is (a) the subject
of a sentence or (b) the possessor of an object. (Section 5).
115
Florence Dolphyne
e.g. baa he ale (lit. the woman she says . . )

aboa be tire (lit. animals their heads)
5. The use of the Benue-Congo 3rd person plural pronoun ‘be’.
(Section 4).
e.g. beeko (they are going)
be kasaa (their language)
6. The fact that Brong nouns have nominal suffixes (section 3.2)
e.g. tire (head)
boo (stone)
nsuo (water)
7. The wider distribution of the -e Past tense suffix in the Atebubu
subdialect (section 7.54).
e.g. bakoka kyeree bo no e (they went and told their
mother).
ohunuu panini bi e (he saw a certain man).
8.2 Brong Innovations

In spite of the above “ old” traits there are certain innovations
that are exclusive to the Brong dialects as a whole and which are
im portant as a unifying factor for the dialect cluster.
1. The most im portant of these is the CVrV pronunciation for
Akan CVnV stems resulting in the loss of the oral/nasal contrast
in some CVCV stems (section 1.22).
e.g. kwane/kware path
hyene/hyere ship, vehicle
dane/dare house
2. The other exclusive Brong innovation is the loss of the vowel
prefix of some nouns (section 3.1)
e.g. biaa (everybody)
du (ten)
wo (snake)
be (proverb)
This study, it is hoped, has shown that although Brong sounds
‘strange’ to most speakers of other Akan dialects, Brong (pronoun
ced Bono by the speakers) is in fact a dialect of the Akan language
with its own distinctive characteristics which are summed up in the
table below. This study has also shown that the differences between
Brong and Akuapem, Asante, Fante or any of the better known
Akan dialects, are due, to a large extent, to the fact that Brong
unlike these other Akan dialects, has been rather conservative, and
has retained some of what used to be characteristic of the ‘parent’
Akan language.
116
Florence Dolphyne
FOOTNOTES
1. I am indebted to Dr J. M. Stewart o f the Institute o f African Studies for
his very useful comments on ?n earlier version of this paper.
2. See J. M. Stewart: Asante Twi in the Polyglotta Africana. Sierra Leone

Language Review, 5, 1966.
3. This rule affected only some of the items with the e vowel quality, hence
‘se1 (how much?).
4. The final nasal in these examples is pronounced/q/. This is an innovation

peculiar to the Akuapem dialect which is not relevant to the present dis
cussion.
5. Sec Possessive Noun Phrase, section 5.2).
6. The Brong forms have the final ‘-e’ suffix that occurs in Asante. If the final
vowel of the verb stem is a close vowel the verb has the same pronunciation
as in Asante e.g. /odiiye/ (he ate it) /ohuuye/ (he saw it). If the final vowel
of the verb stem is an open vowel the verb ispronounced with a long /ee/
which is preceded by a /w/- glide if the finalvowel of thestem is rounded.
e.g. stem: fa: ofee (he took it)

ko: okwee (he went)
7. See P. Schachter and V. Fromkin A Phonology of Akan: Akuapem, Asante

and Fante U.C.L.A. 1968.
8. N- stands for a homorganic nasal.
9. L. A. Boadi: ‘Akan Noun Phrase’ (fcrthcoming).
10. See unspecified subject prefix, section 4.7.
11. Where the verb is the Progressive Tense form, the unspecified subject prefix
/ e/ is used with the noun subject e.g. abofra he eeko (the child is going)
but ooko (he is gc ing).
12. For ‘mvuom’ See Japekrom/Adamso subdialect — Section 7.11: Consonant

Mutation.
13. See Atebubu subdialect — Vowel Harmony Section 7.51.
118
CHAPTER V III
THE BRONG POLITICAL MOVEMENT i
F. K . D r a h
Introduction
In June 1951 the newly elected government o f the Convention
People’s Party (C.P.P.) appointed a committee under the chairm an
ship of Nene Azzu M ate Kole, Konor of Manya Krobo, charged
with the following task:
“ In the interests o f unity and o f the importance, for future
constitutional development, o f preserving the historic
unity and significance of the Ashanti people, to examine
the situation presented by the differences between certain
Brong Chiefs and their brother Chiefs in Ashanti which
have come to public notice and to consider the steps
which should be taken to restore u n ity .” 2
As is generally known, the differences alluded to in the commit
tee’s terms of reference were deeply rooted in the long history of
the relations between the Asante and “ Brong.” The differences
came to a head in M arch 1951 with the inauguration of the Brong
political movement known as the Brong-Kyempem Federation
(BKF) by seven traditional states in north-western and north
eastern Asante. These were Techiman, Dormaa, Techiman, New
Drobo, Odumase, Abease, and Sum a.3 Explicitly, they demanded
a Brong traditional council separate from, ana independent of,
the Asanteman Council which was until 1950 known as the Ashanti
Confederacy Council.
In this essay an attem pt is made to (/) identify and explain the
origins of the Brong-Kyempem movement; (ii) delineate the course
of the movement; and (Hi) pinpoint one or two significant implica
tions of the movement for the consititutional and political develop
ments in G hana up to 1959 — the year of the establishm ent of the
Brong-Ahafo Region.
It is significant that, in the terms of reference already quoted,
the C.P.P. government talked of “ certain Brong Chiefs and their
brother Chiefs in A shanti;” in other words, both parties to the
dispute were considered as “ brothers” by the government. The
question, then, is whether the “ Brong Chiefs,” especially those
whom the government had in mind were, or even regarded them
selves as, Asante. This, o f course, is a very large question to which
various answers have been given.
t \ K. Dr ah
However, in the epilogue to the ‘Statement of Grievances”

(hereafter referred to as S.G.) issued on 2nd August, 1951, the
member-states o f the BKF were in no doubt whatever about the
existence o f a “ Brongland” which, to them, constituted a nation
distinct from the Asante nation. The latter they regarded as much
imperialistic in relation to the Brong as the British were regarded
in relation to colonial Ghana. Hence they found no difficulty in
drawing, with much rhetorical flourish, a striking parallel between
their struggle against ‘‘Asante dom ination” and the struggle of
colonial G hana against British imperialism. They thundered:
“ The hour of liberation has come and no nation can take
calmly the dom ination of her freedom by another nation.
Those who condemn the action of the federated Brong
states in breaking away from the Asanteman Council
should first condemn the action of the whole country for
the present struggle to be free from the dom ination of
British imperialism, for the one is just like the other only
(on) a minor scale or confined to a section of the coun
try . . . ” (SG, Epilogue, para.2).
And the point was stressed that the Brongs could manage or
adm inister their own affairs in order “ to bear their full share of the
country’s burden, economically, politically, socially, educationally
and in whatever aspect of life that goes to make the Gold Coast,
and G hana to become a happy and better place to live” (ibid.,
para. 3).
The assertion o f Brong independence of the Asanteman Council
in 1951, then, contained all the known ingredients of “ethnic
nationalism ” . 4 To the student of A santt history, Brong nationalist
historiography, as could be gleaned from both the general introduc
tion and the enumeration o f grievances by the individual member-
states, leaves much to be desired with respect to historical accuracy;
but that is the strategy of alm ost every nationalist historiography.
It is true that some Brong Chiefs seized the unique opportunity
offered by the British defeat of Asante in 1874 to repudiate their
allegiance to the Asantehene and, through him, to the Golden
Stool, by constituting themselves into a defensive alliance against
A santc; it is also true to say that in 1896 the Brong states, with the
deliberate support of the British, attained their complete indepen
dence ot Kumasi, the epicentre o f the Asante Confederacy.5 Thus
the assertion o f independence from the Asanteman Council in the
post-W orld War II period was not a political novelty.
In spite o f such historical evidence, it is equally true to observe
th at Brong nationalism did not possess any durable roots o f long
historical standing. In the “ SG” the member-states talked of the
120
The Brong Political Movement
“ natural boundary between the northern and southern parts of

(Asante), with the class of people called ‘A shantis’ occupying the
southern section and the ‘Brongs’ occupying the northern section”
(SG, Introduction, para. 1). This was an heroic attem pt to distin
guish “ Brongland” from “ true Asanteland.” However, “ Brong-
land,” like Ghana, was anything but a “ natural” entity. For it
encompassed many peoples in addition to the “ Aborono” or the
pure Brong. The Dormaas, Berekums, Bandas and Mos, for exam
ple, could not be regarded, nor did they regard themselves, as
Brongs. The only authochthonous Brongs were, indeed, the
people of Techiman.6
And this brings us to the consideration of the factors — general
and specific-— that generated the passion among these relatively
separate peoples to lose themselves in a single communal emotion
against the Asanteman Council in the post-war period.
i) The General Factors.— Undoubtedly, the first factor turned
on the common experience of w rongs1— real and imagined —
suffered by these diverse peoples at the hands of the Asante before
and after the forcible imposition of British colonial rule in 1901.
The second factor, linked to the first, consisted in the sharing o f
a common language and certain customs. Although these were
rather similar to those of the Asante, yet they were distinct
from them. And, thirdly, these various tribes increasingly came
to see the restored Asante Confederacy as the veritable expression
of a resuscitated Asante imperialism. All this is evident from the
SG (of which more below).
ii) The Specific Factors.— The specific event that triggered off
what was to become a strong expression of a Brong sense of
self-identity in contradistinction to the Asante in the immediate
post-war years arose in Techiman. In 1936 the Committee of
Privileges, which had been established to tackle the multifarious
stool and land disputes that were expected to result from the
restoration of the Asante Confederacy, returned some nine villages
in the Tano Subin valley (located in Techimanland) to various
Kumasi clan chiefs. The villages were Tuobodom, Buoyam,
Tanoboase, Nchiraa, Offuman I and 2, Branam, Nwoase and
Subenso.7 There was continued feeling of bitterness over the
loss of these villages; a feeling of bitterness which found expres
sion in the iron-bottomed refusal of Nana Akumfi Ameyaw III,
the Techimanhene, to accept the decision of the Committee of
Privileges. And this, despite the repeated failure to have the
decision rescinded through petitions to the Governor, not to
mention the abortive, costly court battles.
In 1951 the Techiman State berated the colonial government
for concurring in the original decision of the Committee; it also
bitterly criticised the very procedure whereby that decision was
121
F. K. Drah
reached on the ground that, since the Asantehene was an interested

party to the land dispute, he should not have been made a member
of the Committee by the government.
“ By this act, the Government deliberately made the A sante
hene a judge in his own case. Why was this undue privilege,
which was contrary to British justice and fair play, not extended
to Techiman also?” (SG, Techiman State, para. 5).
The loss of the nine villages, then, was a considerable source of
hostility of Techiman towards the Asante Confederacy Council.
And the appearance of a strong feeling of Brong nationalism in
Techiman in the immediate post-war years is explained largely
in terms of the issue of these villages. The underlying reason is
not far to seek. It was Lord Hailey who once noted the difficulty
of those who knew only the industrialized countries of the western
world in realizing the “ significance of the position occupied by
the land in the eyes of most peoples of Africa.’’8 But as an apolo
gist •— albeit an enlightened o n e — of colonial rule, Lord Hailey
failed to identify the core of the m atter: the fact that in most of
Africa land, apart from its economic value, was perceived as an
instrum ent of social power and control. And land rights went
in tandem with political and social obligations. With specific
regard to the n ire villages, there was no certainty that the various
Kumasi clan chiefs, who were given rights over those villages,
would discharge their corresponding political and social obliga
tions.9 Besides, the Techimanhene may have rightly considered
that the Kumasi clan chiefs in question would continue to have
social power and control over a significant portion of Techiman-
Iand. And that was intolerable. In fact, the loss of the nine
villages was seen as a portent of worse things to come; i.e. eventual
loss of all Techiman’s rights which would turn it into a “ vassal
state” of Asante (SG, Techiman State, para. 8).
Thus it was th at early in 1948 Techiman made certain moves
which led to what turned out eventually to be an effective secession
from the Asante Confederacy. First, N ana Ameyaw III succeeded
in persuading the chiefs of three of the villages in question, namely,
Tanoso, Offuman II and Tuobodom, to proclaim not only their
secession from Kum asi but also their desire to join the Techiman
state. Secondly, N ana Ameyaw himself ceased to attend meetings
of the A sante Confederacy Council. And, thirdly, he refused to
have Techiman’s contribution •— which was one-third of the total
levy collected in Techiman — paid to the “ Ashanti National
F und” which is discussed later. The colonial government brought
considerable, minatory pressures to bear upon Techiman in order
to bring it back into the Confederacy Council, but without success.
The government even went to the extent of suspending the Techi
man native authority (.SG, Techiman State, para. 10).
122
There is no question that Techiman’s secession had a “demon

stration effect” on Dormaa. The leader of the Dormaa secessionist
movement was, as it eventually turned out, Nana Agyeman Badu,
who was enstooled as Dormaahene in April 1950. But in his first
appearance at a meeting of the Confederacy Council in June
1950, he betrayed no signs of the effect of Techiman’s action in
1948 on him when he spoke in glowing terms of the Asantehene
and the Confederacy Council itself as follows:
“ Otumfuo and Nananom, on behalf of myself, elders and
people of Dormaa I express my sincere thanks and gratitude
to Otumfuo, the Asantehene. I am not unaware of the great
political unrest that occurred in the Dormaa state. This
affected the peace and prosperity of the State so much so
that the consequences would have been greater but for Otum
fuo. He with great tact, patience, wisdom and justice, was
able to settle all matters to the satisfaction of the greater
section of the people. I thank Otumfuo also for granting
me the privilege to be a member of this Council. During
the present session I have watched with great interest the
superb wisdom and tact that Nananom have shown in conduct
ing the proceedings of the Council and matters affecting
the welfare of this country. I have observed the genuine interest
they have in our people. I have indeed learnt very much from
the deliberations. I promise to co-operate with Otumfuo and
Nananom .” 10
The sincere tone of this statement cannot be doubted. But
whoever may have been the initiator of the Dormaa secessionist
movement,11 it is clear that by December 1950, Nana Agyeman
Badu had become convinced that the Asanteman Council no
longer had any “genuine interest” in the welfare of his people.
The immediate event th at touched off the split between Dormaa
and the Asanteman Council in December 1950 was the decision
of the latter to accept the Report on local government in Asante
issued by a Select Committee of the Legislative Council as a work
ing group-plan for future local government in Asante. Nana
Agyeman Badu and the Dormaa State Council took umbrage at
this decision, their reason being that they had little time to con
sider the Report in question (SG), Dormaa State, para. 22). The
decision itself was perhaps unexceptionable; but it served as a
convenient pretext for D orm aa’s break with the Asanteman Council.
The stark point is that D orm aa, like Techiman and some others
in Brongland, also nursed certain grievances, some of them of
long historical standing, against the Asante. Hence, as already
noted, the formation in March 1951 of the BFK (including D or
maa) as a body distinct from, and independent of, the Asanteman
Council; the BFK immediately approached the government for
recognition.
123
F. K. Drah
Although the Brong question was to be perceived as a political

resource which must be exploited fully to party political advantage
from 1954 onwards with the emergence of the National Liberation
Movement (N.L.M.), in 1951 the fledgling C.P.P. government
saw it essentially as a complex political issue. There was eveiy
reason for the C.P.P. government to tread warily with specific
regard to it. The C.P.P. itself, as a developing mass nationalist
party, boasted of many Asante among its staunchest rank-and-file
supporters as also within its leadership. (It is even doubtful th at
by 1951 the C.P.P. leadership as a whole had carefully considered
singling out the Asanteman Council as one of its political enemies
— despite Nkrum ah’s flesh-creeping warning to the chiefs that,
failing co-operation with his party, the time would come when
they would run away and leave their sandals behind.)12
T hat the C.P.P. government was in a very delicate political
position in 1951 is underlined by the opening words of the terms
of reference of the Committee it appointed to inquire into the
Brong-Asante dispute. The people of colonial Ghana, in other
words, must present a united front in the struggle for independence.
The country could hardly afford regional fragmentation. Hence
the imperative need for restoring the unity of Asante which was
threatened by the Brong secessionist movement.
In response to the appointm ent of the C om m ittee, the BKF
in August 1951 issued a comprehensive “ Statem ent of Grievances”
to which reference has already been made. For the sake of con
venience as also for analytical purposes, these grievances and the
findings of the Committee are discussed together.
The “ Statement of Grievances” falls into three parts: first, a
general introduction which is devoted to a consideration of those
historical, linguistic, and demographic factors, which, in combina
tion, separated the Brong from the Asante; secondly, the enum era
tion of grievances by each m em ber-state; and, finally, an epilogue.
These grievances are conveniently grouped under two broad
heads: 1) Political-Constitutional and 2) Socio-Economic.
/. POLITICAL-CONSTITUTIONAL
i) All the member-states, in varying degrees, made valiant

efforts to prove their contention that they enjoyed sovereign,
independent status within the restored Asante Confederacy.
Hence the resort to either oral or written history oi both. Such
efforts furnish an interesting example of the political uses of
history. The arguments put forward by Techiman and Dorm aa
will suffice as representative illustrations of this point.
124
Until the Techiman state, “ through persuasion” , became a

member of the restored Asante Confederacy, it “ had enjoyed
complete independence.” The “ British-Techiman Treaty signed
in 1897” was cited in confirmation of Techiman’s “ immemorial”
independence of the Golden Stool. On that score, then, Techiman
— “ a typical Brong state” — had “ never been a part of the Ash
anti states” , namely, the old Asante Confederacy; its joining
of the restored Asante Confederacy was very soon considered
as a mistake (SG, Techiman State, paras. 1-3).
Dormaa’s position on the “ immemorial” independence of the
Brong states was rather more subtle; and it provided an interest
ing interptreation of the constitutional structure of the restored
Confederacy. Dormaa, we are told, “ had been a sovereign state
long before the coming into power of the Ashantis, and had
enjoyed complete independence in spite of several wars waged
between the Ashantis and the Dormaa S tate.” However, through
the intervention of Major Jackson, the Chief Commissioner of
Asante, “ the Dormaa state reluctantly condescended (sic) to join
the Confederacy.” From such a position, it was only a short
step to the constitutional interpretation of the Asante Confederacy
as a conciliar organ of sovereign, independent states, with the
clear implication th at the Asantehene’s position was only that of
primus inter pares—'th e equals being the heads of the chiefdoms
comprising the Confederacy. As Dormaa put it, the restoration
of the Asante Confederacy became possible in the first place
precisely because of the willingness “ of the several states . . . to
come into a federation. Nowhere in the despatches ‘relating to
the R estoration’ is there a suggestion that the sovereign indepen
dence of a state adhering to the Confederacy was thereby lost
or forfeited.” Which, in effect, meant that all the states joined
the Confederacy w ithout prejudice to their long-cherished inde
pendent existence (SG, Dorm aa State, paras. 1-3 and 11).
It has been said that people do not laugh at those they fear or
hate. The member-states of the BKF, therefore, took very seriously
their own versions of the history of Asante-Brong relations. Be
that as it may, it is, perhaps, pointless here to attem pt any extended
critical discussion of those versions, beyond drawing attention to
the fact that the member-states considered it imperative to create
certain self-images based on historical interpretations which many
outsiders may regard as of doubtful validity.13 Certainly, those
interpretations constituted a powerful political weapon with which
to advance the cause of Brong separatism.
A concomitant of their alleged historical sovereign, independent
status was the member-states’ categorical denial that it was the
normal practice for a Brong chief to swear allegiance to the Asante-
125
F .K . Drah
hene as a necessary condition of government recognition of that

chief’s paramount status in his own chiefdom. The M ate Kole
Committee rightly noted that a decision on the issue was beyond its
competence, since the issue was of a customary and constitutional
kind. 14
(«) But the paramount chiefs of the Brong states could not, in
practice, avoid swearing the oath of allegiance to the Asantehene.
The BKF, however, bitterly resented how that oath was taken. The
Dormaa state cogently and graphically described the ritual thus:
“ .. . the mode o f the swearing of the O ath of
Allegiance (consisted in) the placing of the Asante-
hene’s foot on the head o f the Chief taking the oath.
The ritual, it was deeply felt, struck at the very dignity and self-
respect of the Brong chiefs; it wras, moreover, considered as the
“ principal cause” of the instability o f the institution o f chieftaincy
in the Dormaa state and, by extension, in the rest of Brongland. It
was argued th a t” . . . every Chief who swears this kind of oath
eventually becomes despised by his people and deposed” (SG,
Dormaa State, para. 4).
However much of an over-simplication this statem ent was, with
particular regard to the incidence of the destoolm ent of chiefs in
Brongland, there is no mistaking the feeling o f repugnance with
which the ritual was regarded. Significantly, the Committee of En
quiry was so impressed by the BKF’s fundamental objection to the
ritual as to suggest to the Asanteman Council the need for its modi
fication in line with “ modern political and social conceptions.15
A related source of grievance was the manner of government re
cognition of chiefs in the Brong states. Such recognition, it was
contended, took too long in forthcoming because it was subject
to the swearing o f the oath of allegiance to the Asantehene. This
procedure was criticised on the ground of its harmful effect on the
administration of the states in question (SG, Dorm aa State, e.g.,
para. 5).
(Hi) In 1950, as already noted, the “ Asanteman Council” was
adopted as the new name for the “Ashanti Confederacy Council.”
In view o f their standpoint that the restored Confederacy Council
comprised sovereign, independent states, the member-states o f the
BFK saw in the new name a further attem pt by the true Asante to
“ subjugate” the Brong. They argued that “ the change of name
(would) inevitably involve a change in the constitution o f the Council
itself” (SG, Dorm aa State, e.g. paras. 11— 14). This, although true,
was an under-statem ent, For, by 1950 when the new name was
adopted, the constitution ot the Confederacy Council had been
126
considerably transformed. For our purposes, the following aspects

of the transform ation are relevant.
The Confederacy Council in 193516 comprised about twenty-two
chiefly members. It is w orth noting that from 1935 onwards the
Asantehene used his prerogatives to invite a few more chiefs to
participate in the Council’s deliberations, albeit in an unofficial
capacity. In June 1935 five Extraordinary Members (the so-called
educated commoners or youngmen) were co-opted to serve on the
Council. These were not, that is to say, statutory members; their
duties, as the Asantehene put it, were to be “only of an advisory
nature.” By 1946 the number of such members had increased to
seven.
The Council was extensively reorganised in 1947. Its membership,
for example, was reviewed on the basis of population, thereby
increasing it to a total of about fifty-four. One more representative
was given to the Adansi, Dormaa, Juaben, Mampong, Nkoranza
and Offinso divisions; while four new divisional chiefs were added,
and the Asantehenemaa (the Queen-mother of Asante) became a
full member. The Kumasi division alone was given five more repre
sentatives. Besides, the Asantehene was empowered to nominate
“not more than ten persons of A shanti birth” (which in practice,
meant Extraordinary Members whose number was thus raised to
ten). The Asantehene’s nominations, however, had to be approved
by the Chief Commissioner. Now, if the Extraordinary Members,
as K.A. Busia has noted, were appointed “ to represent the views
of the educated commoners of Kumasi” . 17 then the 1947 reorganisa
tion exercise actually raised the Kumasi division’s representation
to twenty-four.
In that case, the increased membership of the Council as a whole
could not but benefit the Kumasi division vis-a-vis all the other
divisions of the Confederacy. Hence the understandable complaint
of the BKF that the membership of the Council heavily tilted “ the
voting power in the Confederacy Council to the advantage of the
Kumasi Division” . 18 Which meant that it was not the Brong
divisional chiefs only — as the BKF alleged — who constituted
ready objects of Kumasi intrigues whenever they became involved
in constitutional disputes brought before the Council; in fact, also
all the divisional chiefs of “ Ashanti proper” , who lived outside the
strategic command post that was Kumasi, more or less found
themselves in a similar situation. On the other hand, there was
some substance in the grievance that no Brong educated commone
had ever been appointed an Extraordinary Member. Even here,
the evidence seems to point to a tendency for only individuals from
a narrow circle of Kumasi citizens to be appointed as Extraordinary
Members.
127
F. K. Drah
(zv) A related source o f disaffection was what was perceived

as the paucity or even complete absence (in some cases) of Brong
representation on the various com m ittees or boards o f the Council,
notably the Scholarship Selection Board and the powerful Executive
Comm ittee. The issue was hardly as simple as the BKF would have
liked one to believe.
The Executive Committee was established in 1947 in place of the

Standing Committee. Originally meant to undertake such tasks
as the Confederacy Council would in its own discretion assign to
it “from time to time”, the Executive Committee rapidly developed
into the pillar of the Council: it served “as a sieve, passing through
the more important or contentious matters for the attention of the
full Council.” 19 And its membership appears to have been domi
nated by the Kumasi-based members (especially the Extraordinary
Members) o f the Council (although the Mamponghene, the Juaben-
hene and the Essumegyahene were almost invariably included).
An important reason for this development was the need for taking
quick decisions “ with an easily convenable Com m ittee” . It is
significant to note, though, that all the Brong divisions put together
had only a single representative on the Committee: the Dormaa-
hene from 1947 until he was replaced by the Berekumhene in
1950.20
But the BKF was on rather slippery grounds when it alleged

that no Brong chief or educated commoner had “ever served on
the Scholarship Board . . . The only Brong man who served was
Mr Buahin” , and then only in his “capacity as Education Officer
in charge o f the Sunyani D istrict” (SG, Dormaa State, e.g., para.
19). In refutation o f this allegation, the Asanteman Council under
scored the imperative necessity o f having on the Scholarship Selec
tion Board those “who by their academic background and general
experience” were sufficiently competent “ to interview candidates
for scholarship awards” . It was, indeed, desirable to “avoid the
representation o f sectional interests” on the Board. The M ate Kole
Committee wholeheartedly — and rightly — accepted this explana
tion .21
(v) The BKF complained also o f the lack o f freedom o f speech

during the deliberations o f the Asanteman Council. It did not seem,
it alleged, that the Council was considered as a “Parliament where
freedom o f speech exists but a place where courtiers go to shower
praises and eulogies (on) the Asantehene . . .” Hence, it was further
stated, members o f the Council as a whole found it almost impossible
to present their views adequately and effectively. What were con
sidered as the highly restrictive limits o f acceptable behaviour of
chiefs within the Council were spelled out thus:
128
In the Confederacy Council any statement made which

is not deemed appropriate or decent or pleasant to the
President makes the speaker liable to slaughter sheep or
to apologise.
And an episode involving the Dormaahcnc was cited as a case

in point. At a meeting of the Council held on the 27th November,
1950, we are told, Nana Agyeman Badu interrupted the reading
of the Report 011 local government on the ground that, since mem
bers had not read the Report, a discussion of it should bu deferred
to enable members ample time to study it. But “ some of the mem
bers said that the Dormaahene had disgraced the Council and should
therefore apologise or withdraw his suggestions” (SG, Dormaa
State, paras. 20 and 21).
There is no evidence that Nana Agyeman Badu was asked to
slaughter any sheep, but the experience, as was hinted w ry early
on, may have touched him on the raw. However that may have bet n
the allegation of lack of freedom of speech cannot be easily refu td .
It is true, as the Minutes of Council meetings amply testify, that ihe
Asantehene repeatedly instructed the members .0 feel free o state
their opinions on m atters under discussion. These repca ed admoni
tions were called for precisely because of the reluctance of the
chiefs to express views which might not chime in with the Asantc-
hene’s. Why this was so, is explained in terms of the long tradition
that “ no one may oppose the occupant of die Golden Stool who
is believed to speak with the wisdom and authority of the ancestors
whose place he fills” , as Busia has put it. Although the chiefs of the
Confederacy Council, Busia has suggested, expressed the ir opinions
more freely than in precolonial Asante, that ancient tradition still
inhibited free discussion.22 And ;he feeling still persisted that the
chiefs should not question the Asantehene’s ultim ate right to make
decisions in the Confederacy’s interest. Yet, this was the v*. ry right,
which they thought implied a severe limitation on their foedom
to make their own decisions, and which the membcr-statcs of the
BKF would no longer accept.
(v/) Finally, the member-states felt that the Confederacy courts,
especially the Asantehene’s “ A” Courts, operand to the disadvan
tage of the Brong divisions compared with the other divisions of the
Confederacy. For one thing, they said, these courts were so unwicld-
ly and centralized that the administration of justice was rendue d
expensive and slow. For another, since all such courts were Kumasi-
based, those Brong chiefs who had to be panel members, incurred
considerable expenditure on their travels, and during their slay in
Kumasi for as long as those courts sat. The Mate Kolc Committee
expressed sympathy with the Brong chiefs on this grievance; accord
ingly, it strongly recommended the decentralization of the Confc-
129
F. K. Drah
deracy courts to enable them to “ sit in different parts of Ashanti

with panels drawn from the best available persons within the
locality” .2 3
2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC
(/) The BKF bitterly resented the Kumasi clan chiefs’ ownership
of certain lands and villages which, it was believed, originally
belonged to some Brong states. Since the core o f the land question
has already been pointed out, it is unnecessary to repeat it here.
The only other point to be made in this connection is the fact that
the land issue has been intimately bound up with the issue of alle
giance to the Golden Stool. The two issues have constituted a
problem (especially in the Ahafo portion of present-day Brong
Ahafo Region) which is yet to be solved to the satisfaction of all
the parties concerned.
(i7) The issue of the prohibition of cocoa cultivation may also
be seen as another source—albeit of an indirect sort—of Brong
economic discontent. In 1938 the Confederacy Council, at the sug
gestion of the Asantehene, promulgated an order prohibiting the
planting of new cocoa trees. The reason for it was the admirable one
o f averting a possible food shortage by directing farmers' attention
to the cultivation ot foodcrops. The order affected all the divisions
o f the Confederacy.24
It soon became clear, however, that a number of chiefs were
not zealous in enforcing the order. Hence, at a meeting o f the Council
in 1946, the Asantehene was constrained to complain thus:
It is a m atter for regret that since the order was made many
Divisions have failed to see that it is obeyed by their people. The
Offinsohene, for instance, is reported to have said secretly in this
Hall that there were few cocoa farms in his Division and so he would
see that his people planted some more so th at they might be at par
with the other Divisions. Summons were once issued against certain
people at Techimantia for disobeying this order but the District
Commissioner, Sunyani, refused to countersign them because he
said he had been told by the Chief Commissioner that the law was
not being obeyed in Nkwanta, Berekum and Dormaa Divisions.
Then, the following exchanges took place.
Asantehene: The Chief Commissioner has told me that new cocoa
farms have been made in Dormaa, Berekum and Nkwanta Divisions.
1 should like to know what the Representatives of these Divisions
have to say .. .
Dormaa Representative: I would like to explain that between Dormaa
and Nkwant a there is a belt of forest which is said to have been cul
tivated by certain people.
130
Asantehene: According to what the Dormaa Representative has

said the Dormaa Native Authority is as much to blame as those who
have cultivated this forest because the offenders ought to and should
have been prosecuted for disobeying the Council’s order. Their
silence meant that they acquiesced in the action of those offenders.
Dormaa Representative: I agree with the views of Otumfuo, unless
cultivation is restricted there will be no forest left in the near future
and the result will be famine throughout the country. It is mostly
the people who do not attend meetings of the Council who contra
vene its orders.
Asantehene: Does the Dormaa Representative mean to tell us
that all the people in his Division have to attend the sessions of the
Council before laws made are obeyed?
Dormaa Representative: No, Sir, I know that gong-gong is beaten
after every session promulgating any orders that arc passed here;
but there are some people who secretly refuse to obey such orders.
In future we shall prosecute any offenders as suggested by Otumfuo.
Berekum Representative: Since Berekum was impeached at the last
session, I am glad to be able to say that there have been no fresh
cases. All offenders will rigidly be prosecuted.25
There is no evidence that the Brong representatives involved in
the above exchanges were opposed to the order. Nor was the issue,
raised by the order, mentioned by the BKF in the SG. But one may
make the reasonable conjecture that in the volatile circumstances
of the immediate post-World War II period the Brong chiefs in
particular may have felt that the continued enforcement of the order
would put their areas in an economically disadvantageous position
compared with the true Asante divisions in most of which cocoa had
been cultivated much earlier. Indeed, according to Busia, most of
the chiefs with whom he discussed the order in the early 1940’s came
from those divisions where the cultivation of cocoa “ had started
late” ; and when the order was promulgated their subjects had just
started to grow cocoa on a large scale. Those chiefs stated bluntly
that it was rather the divisions where cocoa had been cultivated
over a considerable period of time which ran a possible risk o f food
shortage. But inasmuch as the order affected all the divisions,
“ their subjects were kept poor, because they could not cultivate
cocoa .. .” 2<5 Although the identity of the divisions in question is
not disclosed, there is no reason to believe that they did not include
some Brong divisions.
(Hi) Formal education, it goes without saying, has been (and
continues to be) one of the few crucial determ inants of social change
in Africa as elsewhere. Accordingly, the Brong states must have
also whole-heartedly shared the m otivation behind the establishment
131
F .K . Drah
of the “ Ashanti National Fund” in 1942, in order to promote

“public and social services for the benefit of the whole Ashanti
people” . To this end, an annual levy of 2s. per man and Is. per
woman was ord red by the Confederacy Council. Of the total
am ount collected in each division, the division retained two-thirds
and paid one-third into the National Fund. A committee was
established to administer the Fund. Part of this fund was used to
provide scholarships to deserving candidates of Asante birth to
pursue further studies at home and abroad.27
The Brong states complained of discrimination against Brong
people in the operation o f the scholarship scheme. Since its institu
tion, it was alleged, “only one Brong man has been granted a
scholarship frcm the fund, namely, M r Busia of Wenchi; but even
t h i s . . . was withdrawn while the candidate was still pursuing his
studies in the United Kingdom” (SG, Dormaa Slate, para. 18). On
the latter allegation, Mr C.E. Osei, the Financial Secretary of the
Confederacy Council, slated what in all probability seems to be the
correct position: “ M r B.K. Busia, having failed to satisfy his exa
miners in the subjects for which he is undergoing training, has been
asked by the Council to return to the Gold Coast, thus meaning a
withdrawal of his scholarship” .28
Significantly, earlier in 1949, the Asantehcne had become so dis
turbed by the repeated allegation of discrimination in scholarship
awards th at he found it necessary to refute it. Scholarship awards,
he state d, far from being made unfairly, were actually based on “ the
results of the entrance examinations of the various colleges.” M ore
over, the scholarships for each year were “advertised in the local pa
pers for the information of every one” ; and those applicants, who
had met the requirements of their chosen higher institutions, were
called to an interview before the Scholarship Selection Board, which
we have already discussed. It was this Board, the Asantehene em
phasized, and not the Council’s Secretariat (which was the general
impression) th at selected and awarded candidates the scholarships.29
Unfortunately, the Asantehene’s explanation did not help, as he
had hoped, to “ remove every vestige of suspicion from the minds of
those” who, in any case, were not prepared to accept it as a state
ment of ihe whole tru th of the m atter. Thus it was that the Asante-
man Council was once more constrained to state its version of the
case before the M ate Kole Committee; a version which was similar
to th at given by the Asantehcne in 1949. The M ate Kole Committee
fully endorsed this version, and stressed the necessity of granting
the scholarships “ to only these persons with optimum capacity of
b enefiting from a scholarship regardless of sectional feelings. We
regard this to be a sound policy.” It, however, recommended the re
presentation of each of the nine territorial groups in Asante by at
132
least one member on the body charged with administering the F u n d ;

this, it hoped, would considerably assure all the contributing member
“ as to the fairness and efficiency of the adm inistration of the N atio
nal Fund” . 30
While the Committee rightly rejected “ ethnic arithmetic” as a
criterion for the award of scholarships, it would seem not to have
considered the m atter in the round. True, in the absence of sta- is: ics
showing the break-down of the beneficiaries of the scholarship sc
heme according to their areas of origin, it is difficult to make any
bold claims. But it is not impossible to make some intelligent gues
ses. The BKF’s version of the scholarships inssuc was no doubt
partial, in the sense that it saw only the Brong as victims of discri
mination. It hardly took into consideration the possibility oft here
being discrimination against a wider group of pccplc; that is, all
those people who found themselves ou'iide a rirg of a rrinorhy of
well-connected, rich and influence-peddling families and royal clans
in Kumasi and its immediate environs — in fine, the undcrprivih g< d.
Seen from this perspective, the possible occurrence of a measure of
discrimination in the award of scholarships could not be ruhd out;
in which case, it was not only the Brong, but also the majority of
true Asantes (who were as much underprivileged as the Brong as a
whole) th at fell victim to such discrimination. No wonder, even
many brilliant true A san'e-born school-lcavers failed to gain Con
federacy scholarship aw ards.31
(iv) There was, finally, the psychological syndrome. One need not
be highly imaginative in order to discern the feeling, runrn’rg like a
scarlet thread through the BKF’s SG, on the part of the Brong that
they were objects of contem pt and ridicule in the eyes of the true
Asante, especially the Kumasi-born. The Brong divisional chiefs,
for instance, complained that they were not infrequently subjectt d to
insults and social discrimination not only at Confederacy Council
meetings but also during social visits to Kumasi.
One such incident, it was alleged, was that involving Nana Yeboa
Afari, the Dormaahene, in 1935. On a visit to Kumasi, he attended
a durbar, “ the Asantehene ordered him to take off 1 is sandals and
fillet before saluting the Asantehene” . The Dormaali/me’s noncom
pliance with the order led to a quarrel between him and the other
chiefs, including the Juabenhene. In the evenJ, t he Dorm aalvnc did
not salute the Asantehene and returned to his house. But later, on
the intervention of the Chief Commissioner, the Dormaahcne a t
tended another social function at the Asantchcne’s palace where
the differences were settled, with the Asante he nc pacifying the D or
maahene “ with a case of gin” . But the whole episode was considered
as “a great disgrace to the Dormaa S ta te ” . A nother incident oc
curred in 1941, again involving a Dormaahene — Nana Asubon-
133
F. K. Drah
tcng II—when he attended a meeting in Kumasi. He took with him,

as he had done on several occasions, a stool with its sides orna-
m 'n tcd with gold. This ime, however, the stool was seized and the
Dormaahcne was compelled to “ stand in the glaring sun for many
hours, answering questions put to him in connection with the stool” ,
while the stool itself had been stored away in a cell. The Dormaa
state, we are told, incurred considerable expenditure before securing
the stool back (SG, Dormaa State, e.g., paras. 15 and 16).
To try to determine the historicity of these incidents cited by the

BKF may be a fruitless exercise of the historical imagination. At the
same time, however, the psychological and political purposes the li
beral citation of such incidents was meant to serve cannot be ignor
ed: to dramatise the deep psychological injury the BKF believed the
peoples of Brongland as a whole had sustained in their dealing with
the true Asante. The psychological injury involved a sense of inferi
ority which, it was believed, had been considerably fostered in the
Brong by h te tru e Asante to facilitate continued Asante domination.
Small wonder that one of the cardinal objectives of the BKF was “ to
fight relentlessly until the Brong are redeem ed... from tribal inferi
ority complex.” But there can also be no question about the reality
of the sort of feeling the Brong as a whole in turn harboured towards
the Confederacy Council in particular, and the true Asante in gene
ral. It was a feeling of fear and hostility. A typical expression of such
a feeling was that of the Abease Women in their resolution to the
BKF in July 1951. They resoved, inter alia, “ THAT we fear (the
Asante), because of their hideous atrocities. THAT we will never
find it easy to co-operate with them, because we feel that we shall only
be happier under Brong-Kyempem” (SG, Abease Women, paras.
2 and 3).
Such, then, were the grievances of the B.K.F. They am ounted,

in a nutshell, to a feeling of neglect, and discrimination at the
hands of the true Asante. But the B.K.F. declared th at it did
not seek the redress of those grievances within the structure of
the Asanleman Council. All the resolutions passed by the various
youth and women’s associations made great play with the idea
of non-co-oporation which meant opposition to any settlement of
the dispute that would lead to a restoration of Asante unity. W hat
they wanted was a federation of their own, the affairs of which
would be directed by a Brong traditional council.
The M ate Kole Committee accepted the idea of a “ Brong

Council” , since it saw nothing “ wrong with the idea of related
sta'es coming together to discuss m atters of common interest for
the common good.” The Asanteman Council was also, in some
measure, conciliatory. It stated:
134
“ The Council is in entire sympathy with the idea that states

having close teriitorial affinities should combine into adminis
trative units to plan and act together on m atters of local
government. This idea is embodied in the Coussey Report
on Local Government which has recommended the setting
up of Local and District Councils. The Council, however,
fails to see how such decentralisation should occasion the seces
sion o f member states from the Council.” 32
There was the rub! The point is that there was an unmistakable
collision o f purpose between the B.K.F. on the one hand, and the
Committee and the Asanteman Council on the other. The Com
mittee of Enquiry was not clear about tne constitutional structure
of the “ Brong Council” it envisaged: Was it to be a traditional
body on a par with the Asanteman Council; or an administrative
one, presumably a higher District Council for the whole of Brong-
land? On the other hand, the Asanteman Council was obviously
thinking of the “ Brong Council” as an administrative instead of
a traditional body at the local level. In this connection the Asante
man Council appear to have thought the issue through to its political
and constitutional implications better than the Mate Kolc Com
mittee. This much must be said for the Committee, though that
it was constrained by its terms of reference which emphasised
the imperative need for the restoration of Asante unity.
There is a sense in which one may correctly see the Brong-
Asante dispute as a purely traditional and constitutional one until
September 1954. The dispute would seem to have centred on
allegiance to the Golden Stool. But if the discussion of the Brong
grievances above is anything to go by, then the dispute was more
than a purely traditional and constitutional one: It was also a
political dispute. Truly enough, nowhere in the major individual
statem ents of grievances did each member-state of the B.K.F.
make an explicit demand for a separate and independent Brong
region. It is also noteworthy that such a demand was not among
the objectives of the B.K.F. as stated in its Constitution. These
were:
(z) To raise the social, economic and educational status of the
Brong peoples;
(z'z) To protect, encourage and foster the constitutional status of
the Brong states;
(iii) To maintain complete unity among the Chiefs and peoples
of the various Brong states;
(z'v) To serve as a strong political vanguard of the Brong peoples;
(v) To fight relentlessly until the Brong are redeemed from
want, ignorance and tribal inferiority complex;
(vz) To encourage and foster rural development in the Brong
states.33
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F. K. Draft
The nearest the B.K.F. came to making an explicit demand

for a separate, Brong constitutional and political existence is in
objectives (/'/') and (iv). Encouraging and fostering the constitu
tional status of the Brong states would logically imply constitutional
devolution, which, in turn, would mean the severance of all tradi
tional links with the Golden Stool; it was not for nothing that
the me mb' r-statcs of the B.K.F. spiritedly questioned the historical
basis of their allegiance to the occupant of the Golden Stool, as
we have already seen. Serving as a strong vanguard of the Brong
peoples implied that the B.K.F. was considered, and strongly
believed, to be the thin end of the wedge of a future Brong region.
These, admittedly, are hints, albeit strong ones. But a careful
scrutiny of the SG as a whole would, on balance, point to a separate
Brong existence, which would be politically and constitutionally
— and not merely adm inistratively— independent of the Asante
man, as the logical development of the very establishment of the
B.K.F. In fact, alone among the member-states, it was the Techi
man State Council, which, in its resolution of 6th August, 1951
sent to the B.K.F., spelled out this logical development:
Whereas the aims and objects of the Brong-Kyempem Federa
tion is (sic) to achieve for the Brongs a separate and complete
adm inistration entirely independent of the Ashanti Confede
racy or Asanteman Council . . . we urge that you make it
your aim to gain the Governm ent’s recognition for the Brong
Kycmpem Federa’ion and also ask the Government to set
up a Regional Administration for t he Brong area (SG, Appendix
II, Tcchiman State Council Resolution, para. 14.).
B ' th at as it may, in the sort of mood into which the Brong
nationalises as a whole had by 1951 worked themselves, the very
conception of a separaf e region was hardly considered as a practical,
much less a logical, impossibility. To say this is not to imply that
the possibility of reconciliation, despite the protestations of the
B.K.F. to the contrary, was non-existent; nor is it to gloss over
the considerable obstacles in the way of the establishment of a
separate Brong region.
As Tordoff has argued convincingly, a resolution of the Brong-
Asantc dispute, which would lead to the restoration of Asante
unity, was always on the cards — until September 1954.34 First,
had the Asanteman Council been more cautious and statesm an
like in its reaction to the Dorm aa stool dispute involving Kwasi
Ansu, the Dormaa state would probably have renewed its allegiance.
In December 1951 the Dormaa S tate Council destoolcd Kwasi
Ansu as chief of Wamfic and Krontihene of Dorm aa. But the
Asanteman Council continued to recognise Kwasi Ansu’s claims
as chief of the “ M ansen” state by inviting him to attend the m eet
136
ings of the Council.35 Secondly, it was most probable that Techiman

would also have renewed its allegiance, if the Asantehene had been
conciliatory in his stand on the Tano Subin valley villages — as
Mr J. H. Allasani argued in his minority Report attached to the
Mate Kole Report. Indeed, the Drobohene and the Sumahene,
two of the original signatories to the B.K.F.’s SG, did make their
peace with the Asanteman Council in September, 1952, as the
Mate Kole Committee stated in its Report. But, of course, some
of their subjects disapproved of their action, a situation which
led to domestic strife within each state.
There were certain factors in the period 1952 to 1954 which
combined to threaten the continued existence of the BKF as an
organised expression of Brong sentiments. First, it is a measure of
Nana Agyeman Badu’s influence within the Brong movement that
during his absence from the country in this period,36 it became
dormant. This development was possibly related to the fact that the
movement was, in its early stages, dominated by the chiefs and elders
of the member-states involved. As such, it was not the sort of
monolithic movement which linked all manner of its adherents
with a binding organisational force. A merely collective emotion
against an “ outgroup” was not alone sufficient as an enduring,
binding force; leadership and organisation were necessary to rein
force it.
The evidence of the number of youth and women’s associations
and groups37 which sent resolutions of solidarity to the BKF in
1951 and presented memoranda to the M ate Role Committee later
could give a facile impression of the extent of support of the youth
and commoners for the Brong movement. In the absence of any
reliable statistics, it is difficult to estim ate the strength or otherwise
of the membership of each association or group. However, there is
no mistaking the point that, since most, if not all the associations
or groups were hurriedly brought together to undertake the specific
task of expressing solidarity for the BKF, they may have lacked
strong grass-roots support themselves. So that it was possible for
most of these associations or groups to have comprised as many
members as the number of signatories to the resolutions sent to the
BKF.
Thirdly, the very existence of the BKF itself helped to open up a
pandora’s box; it spawned minor separatist movements of differing,
degrees of intensity within most of the member-states: for example
Dormaa, Suma, Drobo, and, when it joined up later, Berekum.
Such fissiparous forces hardly made for unity of purpose and organi
sation. Besides, in this period, some of the im portant states such as
Wenchi, Sunyani, Nkoranza, and Berekum still maintained their
aloofness from the BKF and continued to owe allegiance to the
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F. K. Drah
Golden Stool. Then there was, as already noted, the declared policy
of the C.P.P. government which aimed at achieving a peaceful reso
lution of the dispute within the context of a restored Asante unity;
not to mention the parallel argument that adm inistration would be
made more difficult in a divided A sante.38
The last but not the least im portant factor turned on the intransi
gent opposition of the Asanteman Council, especially the Asante
hene, to secession of any division of the Asanteman. The episode
involving the attem pted secession of the Bekwai division led by its
chief in 1945 was still fresh in the Asantehene’s mind when in the
following year he came heavily down on any talk of secession. He
warned those who were “ in the habit of threatening me with seces
sion from the Confederacy” . He was not the only beneficiary of
Asante unity.
“ Disunity and disintegration” would render all Asante “ vulnerable
to the shafts and arrows” of their enemies. Then he assured the
members of his determ ination to continue to play his alloted part
and to “ see to the preservation and maintenance of this Council”
until the end of his tenure of office.39 In 1952 he was surely not likely
to relent in the face of the Brong secessionist efforts.
Such, then, was the state of affairs in which the BKF found itself
until the return of Nana Agyeman Badu m 1954. He succeeded in
reviving the BKF, which meant the re-opening of the Brong-Asante
dispute. From September 1954 onwards, certain political events
were to play, to some extent, into the hands of the Dormaahene,
now the undisputable leader of the Brong movement. Just when the
hitherto, relatively peaceful struggle for independence was about to
turn the corner of success, a rather dark, sinister shadow fell across
it. The shadow was symbolised by the emergence of the National
Liberation Movement (N.L.M.). Backed up to the hilt by the Asante
m an Council as a whole, it soon gained strong footholds in Asante
and parts of Akim Abuakwa. It gave the achievement of a federal
independent Ghana with a liberal-democratic constitution as its
number one political objective. To this end, it teamed up with
splinter opposition groups, and did not hesitate to appeal to Asante
ethnic nationalist sensibilities; Asante was a nation; and a nation
it must largely remain within a federal independent G hana.40
Such a political platform could hardly be expected to appeal to
the founders of the Brong secessionist movement who sought to
escape from “ Asante dom ination” . Therefore, they redoubled their
efforts in the direction of their stated goals, and put their considera
ble weight behind the C.P.P. in Brongland; they naturally backed
the C.P.P.’s counter-political platform of a unitary, centralized
independent Ghana. The relatively localised Brong-Asante dispute
thus became inextricably conjoined to the wider country-wide party
138
political dispute between the C.P.P. centralists and the N.L.M.

dominated opposition federalists. To both parties to the Brong
Asante dispute, the side of the great party political divide on which
an individual in the Asanteman stood assumed a significance of
major proportions.
The Dormaahene, who had been opposed to the C.P.P. in 1951,4 1
now found himself firmly in the C.P.P. camp. Most of his subjects
in Dormaa did likewise. The BKF was changed into the Brong-
Kyempem Council (BKC), and two Brong sub-divisional states,
Sunyani and Bechem, became members. The BKC made no secret
of the motivation behind its support for the C.P.P. and its political
platform: the official recognition of the BKC (which would simply
mean public acknowledgment of its long-term objectives).
In the face of the N.L.M. onslaught, the C.P.P. began to view
the Brong question as a development which it could exploit to its
political advantage: on this re-appraisal the N.L.M. must be faced
head-on with what the C.P.P. believed was the very political weapon
it had resorted to, namely, “ethnic particularism” . But, even eaily
in 1955, the C.P.P. government was still reluctant to commit itself
totally to a separate Brong region. Such was the measure of the
C.P.P. government’s dilemma. Open and total commitment to the
Brong cause was fraught with the possible risk of unleashing a
rash of secessionist movements all over the country or encouraging
the revival of dorm ant ones. On the other hand, to be lukewarm
in its support of the Brong cause threatened to alienate the sizeable
Brong support for the party. And that would mean confronting the
federalists in Asante with a somewhat blunted weapon that was
the C.P.P.; for the party had emerged from the 1954 general elec
tions not inconsiderably weakened, organizationally and in terms
of membership, in Asante.
The C.P.P. government did not release the M ate Kole Report
until March 1955, and then only after a sustained campaign mounted
by the BKC both within and outside the chambers of the Legislative
Assembly. Earlier in March the C.P.P. member for Sunyani West,
Mr S. W. Yeboah, had tabled a m otion demanding the publication
of the M ate Kole Report’, the motion, seconded by Mr Krobo
Edusei, C.P.P. member for Sekyere East, was carried by the House.42
The C.P.P. government eventually yielded to the inevitable. On
25th March, 1955, the Prime Minister, D r Nkrumah, read a state
ment on the Brong-Asante dispute in the Legislative Assembly.
First, he informed the House o f his recommendation to the Gover
nor to publish the Report. Secondly, he told the House of the many
petitions the government had received in which the BKC directed
the government’s attention to the fact that nine states had seceded
from the Asanteman Council with which they no longer wished to
139
F. K. Drah
he associated. The government, then, would consider the petitions

demanding “ withdrawal from membership of the Asanfeman
Council” . Thirdly, the government would examine “ the possibility
of seating up a Brong-Kyempem Council” . Fourthly, it would
consider “ the desire of the Brongs for the establishment of a Devel
opment Committee for their area” . And, finally, the government
would “examine the case for the establishment of two administrative
regions for Ashanti” . He assured the members that these issues
were receiving the government’s “earnest and prompt attention” .43
The Prime Minister’s statement gave a fillip to Brong hopes.
But the C.P.P. government was still bogged down in inaction. Now
th at the Brong question had become entangled with the federal
issue, it did not want to take any precipitate action which would
endanger the settlement of the latter; so anxious was the C.P.P. to
achieve an early independence for Ghana. The pressures, however,
continued to mount from the Brong side for the early fulfilment
o f the promises of the March statem ent. The C.P.P. government
was constrained to take some action sooner than it had hoped,
and then only in a manner that compounded its own problems to
its great discomfiture.
The immediate problem centred on Bcchem stool affairs. In 1954
the Bechemhene was declared destooled by the Kumasi State Coun
cil. His destoolment had, however, not been published in the govern
ment gazzette on the ground that the action taken against him was
politically motivated, namely, as a reprisal for his refusal to join
the N.L.M. In what may be described as a mood of disappointment
and frustration the Bechem-Ahafo Youth Association and Bechem
elders resorted to one of the well-known strategies of a desperate but
potentially dangerous ally; political blackmail. In a petition of
October 1955, they “ warned” the C..P.P. government that they
might be compelled to “ betray their confidence in the government
and the Prime Minister, Dr. Nkrum ah” , if the government did not
take prom pt action on the twin issues of government’s recognition
o fth eB K C and the secession of Bechem from the Kumasi division.44
The government responded with the passage of the State Councils
(Ashanti) (Amendment) Ordinance on 17th Dec., 1955. Under the
State Councils (Ashanti) Ordinance, 1952, only paramount chiefs
could appeal from the decisions of the Asanteman Council or a
State Council direct to the Governor in constitutional cases. Under
the new Ordinance the right of appeal, which was made retro-active
to 1st January 1954, was extended to all manner of chiefs in Asante.
On this basis the Bechemhene could appeal direct to the Governor
which he did. The Ordinance met with strong opposition from the
Asanteman Council and the N.L.M. and its allies. They felt that the
Ordinance was a direct attack on the constitutional heritage and cul
140
ture of the Asante nation. 45 It was the passage of this Ordinance

which made it impossible for the N.L.M. and its allies to meet and
discuss the dragging constitutional issues with Sir Frederick Bourne
who had earlier in 1955 been appointed the government’s C onstitu
tional Adviser.
The irony in the C.P.P. government’s position was this, that, in
attem pting to make what can only be described as a partial conces
sion to Brong demands, the government only succeeded in under
mining considerably its efforts at resolving the larger, national cons
titutional dispute. Small wonder that, in a renewed effort to extricate
itself from this cul-de-sac. the C.P.P. government temporarily put
the Brong question into cold storage.
Apart from other difficulties (which are discussed below) in the
way of the creation of a separate Brong region, there was the consi
dered opinion of the C onstitutional Adviser to be reckoned with.
He said :
W hatever may be the result of the long standing difference
between the Brong States of Western Ashanti and the Asan
teman Council, I cannot see any administrative justifica
tion for a separate region of this comparatively small area
wherein local opinion on the subject is far from unani
mous 46
Such an argument did not, nor could it be expected to, cut much ice
with the Brong nationalists. Sir Frederick Bourne certainly approac
hed the issue with the apparent detachment of a clinical surgeon. If
a separate region for the Western Asante Province was ruled out,
even on administiative grounds, then obviously a separate Brong
region was out of the question, and one could only trust, that with
gooodwill, the Brongs could come to realize this. Unfortunately,
Bourne’s implied readiness to take th at line was unaffected by evi
dent proofs of its absence. The problem about “goodwill” , it has
been said, is simply that where it is present one need not make any
bother about it; but where it is absent, it is well-nigh impossible to
provide it overnight. This was especially so in the highly politically
charged atmosphere of Asante in the period September 1954 to 1956.
In the event, however, Sir Frederick Bourne’s verdict had the effect
of inducing the C.P.P. government to with-hold for close on two
years its open recognition of the BKC.
And from 1956 to the eve of independence the C.P.P. govern
ment largely directed its efforts at finding a solution to the larger
constitutional and political dispute. To that end, it convened the
Achimota Conference in February 1956. The Conference’s task
was to discuss the Report of the Constitutional Adviser and to reach
agreement on the salient features of regional devolution recommen
141
F. K. Drah
ded in that Report. The N.L.M. — dominated opposition declined

the invitation to attend the conference. On the other hand, the Brong
movement was ensured of a voice in the Conference’s deliberations
when the BKC was invited to send a delegation, led by Nana Agye
man Badu, to the Conference.
The invitation constituted a measure of victory for the Brong
movement. For it manifested the C.P.P. government’s tacit recogni
tion of the BKC. It is more than a manner of speaking to observe
th at, by early 1956, the Brong movement had become a strong poli
tical force to be reckoned with. For one thing, as already indicated,
the BKC’s membership had been reinforced by Bechem and Su
nyani. For another, not an inconsiderable number of people inclu
ding some chiefs in Ahafo Asunafo, had flung themselves into the
movement for a separate region which would encompass the whole
of the old Western Pronvince of Asante which included Ahafo Asu
nafo.47 The Bechem-Ahafo Y outh Association, which has already
been mentioned, was very active in that direction.
W ith specific regard to the Brong question, the Achimota Confe
rence, in its Report, made one cardinal concession to Brong nationa
list sentiments. Having “unanimously decided that the represen
tations made by the Brong/Kyempem Council delegation” were con
siderable “ in material and fact,” the Conference recommended that,
in the event of the establishment of Regional Assemblies through
out Ghana, “ the case for a separate Assembly for the Brong area
should be given careful consideration” . In this connection the con
ference noted that “ . . . the views of the S tate Councils and local
government councils concerned would have to be sought by Govern
ment before a final decision was reached” .48
Interestingly, the Conference stopped short of making an unam
biguous recommendation for a separate Brong region and House
of chiefs — the very issues which were o f disturbing significance to
the Asanteman Council and its allies. The Conference was of the
opinion th a t:
the A shanti Region is a compact area well served by roads
and railways radiating from Kumasi. Certain Brong Sta
tes and Brong elements in other States advocate that a
portion of the Ashanti Region should be made into a se
parate region which, it is averred, would be predominan
tly Brong. Nevertheless there is some controversy as to
which parts of the Brong area wish, or do not wish, to sever
their administrative connection with the Ashanti Region.49
Thus, the Conference was not clear in its mind whether a separate
Brong region was desirable and necessary. On the issue of a separate
House of Chiefs, the Conference applied a general principle it had
142
enunciated: “ wherever a Regional Assembly is established in a re

gion provision should be made for a House of Chiefs.” In view
however, of its rather cloudy stand on the question of a separate
Brong region, the Conference could only state blandly that the
issue of a separate Brong House of Chiefs should be considered
simultaneously with the othei issue.50
It is arguable that there is an apparent contradiction between
the Conference’s positive recommendation for a “ separate Assembly
for the Brong area” and its ambiguous position on a separate Biong
region. For the former would seem to imply the latter. But, on closer
scrutiny, such a contradiction disappears if it is recognised that the
“ separate Assembly” , as far as the conference was concerned, en
compassed considerable local administrative devolution within the
Asanteman—a position similar to that of the Asanteman Council,
as we saw above.
But, in what turned out eventually as a very clever political move,
the C.P.P. government in April 1956 made an open declaration of its
intention to create a separate Brong region with its own Regional
Assembly and a House of Chiefs. This appeared in a White Paper
which contained the government’s Constitutional Proposals and
Statement on the Report of the Constitutional Adviser and the Report
of the Achimota Conference.
For the country as a whole, the C.P.P. government rejected
federation in favour of a considerable measure of devolution of
administrative functions to the proposed Regional Assemblies. Not
surprisingly, the N.L.M. and its allies rejected the government’s
constitutional proposals. W ith particular respect to the Brong
question, they were strongly opposed to the carving of a new iegion
of the Asanteman. In view of the constitutional impasse, the Secre
tary of State for the Colonies requested the C.P.P. government to
hold fresh general elections—within two years—to determine the
strength or otherwise of support for its constitutional proposals;
he also announced a firm date for independence. The elections were
duly held in July 1956, and the C.P.P. won seventy-one out of the
one-hundred-and-four seats. Of the six seats in Brongland, the C.P.P.
won four, but it lost the Ahafo seat. In the seven Brong-Ahafo seats,
the C.P.P. polled a total vote of 41,222 as against 32,881 for the
N.L.M. and its allies.51
And this m eant th at of the eight seats (out of twenty-one) the
C.P.P. won in the Asanteman, four were located in Brongland.
The im portance of this fact was not lost on the B.K.C. Indeed,
as M r C. S. Takyi, C.P.P. Member for Wenchi East, stated later
in the National Assembly, the election slogan of the C.P.P. in
Brongland was: “ vote C.P.P., vote Independence; vote C.P.P.
143
F. K. Drah
vote Brong-Ahafo” . 52 Clearly, Brongland had delivered the

political goods: it had, in no small measure, helped the C.P.P. to
meet the condition of a “ reasonable majority” in the elections
laid down by the Secretary of State.
Although Ghana became independent in M arch 1957, it took
the C.P.P. government two more years to redeem its promise to
the Brong. The delay is explained largely in terms of the necessity
of clearing a few major constitutional hurdles, notably the constitu
tional amendment restrictions.53 The C onstitution (Repeal of
Restrictions) Bill was passed in September 1958. And the efforts
of the Brong movement were crowned with success when, on 20th
March, 1959, the M inister of Justice and Local Governm ent, Mr
A. E. A. Ofori A tta, introduced into the National Assembly the
Brong-Ahafo Region Bill, under a Certificate of Urgency. The
Bill went through all its stages on that day. On receiving the Gover-
nor-General’s assent, it came into effect on 4th April, 1959.
In his speech winding up the debate on the Brong-Ahafo Region
Bill, M r A. E. A. Ofori A tta emphasized the C.P.P. governm ent’s
conviction th at “culturally, administratively, and socially, there,
must be a region for the Brong-Ahafos . . .” 54 In other words
there were more than adm inistrative grounds for the creation of
the new region. In 1955, as we have seen, the C onstitutional Adviser
argued magisterially against the creation o f a separate Brong region
on certain general grounds including the adm inistrative. But even
then, and discounting the possibility of the inclusion of Ahafo-
Asunafo, there were, on adm inistrative grounds alone, certain
advantages in the creation of such a region.
To begin with, a separate Brong region would enable the Biong
to participate actively in their own development, thereby serving
to obliterate eventually the Brong feeling of neglect. A Brong
regional organisation would, in all probability, be much nearer
to the peoples of Brongland as a whole, and more concerned with
their economic and social well-being than the remote Kumasi-based
regional organisation.
Secondly, it would, to a large extent, lighten the heavy bureau
cratic load th at was placed on the Kumasi regional office; a load
which became all the heavier following the launching of the N.L.M
in Asante. F or the Kumasi regional office was hard put to it in
coping w ith the subsequent eruption of the numerous local disputes
— especially in some rem ote corners of Brongland — most of which
often resulted in violent riots. In 1957 a Committee of Enquiry
appointed by the M inister of the Interior and Justice, M r Ako
Adjei, underscored in its Report the undersized strength of the
peace officers, mostly stationed in Kumasi, which made for the
144
sluggish handling of the hundreds of alleged cases of intim ida

tion, threat and extortion that became ram pant in Asante at the
height of the federalist ag itatio n .55
N or, thirdly, could one underestim ate the advantage of having
a Regional Officer in Brongland who would be more easily avail
able for consultation by the Brong local authorities as a whole
on m atters which demanded im mediate action. T hat way, the
sense of frustration felt by many Brong local authorities, subject
as they were to distant governmental control, could be obliterated.
This was all the more necessary since the 1951 Local Governm ent
Ordinance, in empowering the Minister of Local Governm ent to
delegate wide powers to Regional Officers, abrogated most of the
powers hitherto exercised by the locally based administrative
officers. A Brong regional office would, furtherm ore, be in a
more advantageous position than the Kumasi-centred one to deal
speedily with the various estimates and petitions or resolutions
subm itted by the local councils in Brongland.
However, to direct attention to the adm inistrative advantage
is not to gloss over the corresponding difficulties involved in the
creation of a separate Brong region. In the first place, disagreement
over the location of the new regional centre was more than just
a rem ote possibility: it was doubtful that Sunyani, for instance,
would be favoured as the regional headquarters by the Brong
states in northen Asante, particularly in view of the existing poor
system of com munications and transport. But this obstacle,
largely a technical one, was not as serious in magnitude as the
internal political difficulties. In 1952 it was not clear that such
Brong areas as Wenchi, N koranza, Nkwanta, Banda and Mo,
which still m aintained their loyalty to the Asanteman Council,
and largely supported the N.L.M ., would be willing to be included
in a separate Brong region. Besides, states like Drobo, Suma and
Berekum were already divided violently over the issue. 56
Above all, there was the question of delimiting the boundaries
of the new region — and this was not only physical but also
human. As has already been seen, there were certain elements in
Ahafo Asunafo who favoured the creation of a new region which
would include th a t area. They were also pro—C.P.P. And yet,
the Ahafo Asunafo area as a whole was not only historically
purely Asante, with close traditional links with the Golden Stool
through the Kumasi clan chiefs; it was also overwhelmingly pro-
N.L.M . Therefore, the inclusion of th at area in a new region
with its own House of Chiefs would mean th at, from the angle of
traditional allegiance, the Kumasi division would consequently
be split between two regions, namely, the new region and what
would be left of the Asanteman.
145
F. K. Drah
In view of the acrimonious political conflict that was unleashed

by the emergence of the N.L.M., the political argument against
a separate Brong region could not be easily dismissed out of
court, as ihe C.P.P. government recognised. On the other hand
as Tordoff has argued forcefully, the case against a separate Brong
region from the standpoint of traditional allegiance was not
clear-cut. It was not clear, that is to say, why premium should
be put on considerations of traditional loyalties in the determina
tion of an administrative issue. According to Tordoff, the answer
to the problem lay in “ the confusion which often prevails in Ashanti
between administrative and constitutional issues” ; a confusion
which could be illustrated by the bitter dispute, for instance,
between Dormaa-Ahenkro and Dormaa-Wamfie which “ made it
administratively impossible, from 1952 onwards, to persuade the
latter to co-operate in working the (newly created) Dormaa Local
Council” . 57
However all this may have been, it is worth noting that the
Brong-Ahafo region was eventually created not merely on the
grounds of its administrative viability; it was created to cater
for needs besides the administrative, as Mr A. E. A. Ofoii A tta
aptly put it in the statem ent already quoted above; needs which
the B.K.C. had effectively dramatized. Which is to say, in effect,
th at the creation of the new region was due partly — but signifi
ca n tly — to the intransigent stand taken by the B.K.C. Although
in the immediate post-indcpendence period it had no tangible
reason for thinking th at the C.P.P. government would possibly
renege on its 1956 promise, the leadership of the Brong secessionist
movement did not take the issue of the creation of a new region
for granted. Thus the Dormaahene in November 1957:
. . . As the Prime Minister, D r Kwame Nkrumah, had
said th at the freedom and independence of G hana is meaning
less unless it is linked up with the freedom of the continent
of Africa, in the same way, the freedom of Dormaa is, to
me meaningless, except it is linked up with the freedom and
indep'ndence of the whole of BRONG, including Ahafo-
Asunafo . . . I take this opportunity to appeal to the pro
gressive government of Ghana to take immediate steps to
set free the 300,000 chiefs and people of Brong-Ahafo-Asunafo
from the Asantehene’s misrule. I have no doubt th at the
socialist government of Ghana will never support or encourage
by direct means or otherwise, a section of the community
to enslave another . . .58
On the evidence available, since 1956 the C.P.P. government had
been all along fully aware of its obligations towards Brongland
as a whole; an awareness which was expressed succintly by M r
A. E. A. Ofori A tta thus:
146
The B ong Political Movemen
“The Bill before this House . . . is a fulfilment of the solemn

promise of 1956 based on the conviction of the Government
and the C.P.P. and made to the people of Brong-Ahafo.” 59
But, in addition to the need to fulfil its “ solemn promise” to
the peoples of Brong-Ahafo, the C.P.P. government had its own
reasons for creating the new region. By 1959 the political argument
against the creation of the new region had been undercut consider
ably by the attainm ent of independence in 1957. Moreover, some
chiefs like the Mamponghene, Berekumhene, Adansihene, Essume-
jahene, Wenchihene and so on, who were staunch supporters of
the N.L.M., had either abdicated or been deposed. And their
successors, beside other chiefs in the Asanteman, had emulated
the example of the Asantehene in making their peace with the
C.P.P. government. The N.L.M. itself no longer existed as an
independent political force, since on 3rd Novembei, 1957, it
merged with the other splinter opposition groups to form the
United Party (U.P.) with Dr K. A. Busia as its leader. (The U.P.
was formed in anticipation of the Avoidance of Discrimination
Act which was passed by the C.P.P. dom inated National As
sembly in Decembei 1957. The Act made illegal the existence of
political parties on a regional, tribal, or religious basis). It was
from this vantage-point th at the C.P.P. government made an
earnest of its determ ination to break the back of what it considered
as dangerous Asante nationalism by carving the new legion from
the Asanteman. In the event, it was a punitive action; and the
rest of the Asanteman as a whole saw it as such.
To put this action in the correct perspective, further elabora
tion may be necessary. In view of the kind of interpretation it
put on events in Asante, especially from September 1954 to the
eve of independence, the C.P.P. government persuaded itself
about the inherent rightness of the course of action it took against
Asante in the immediate post-independence period. The political
atmosphere in the country as a whole was doubtless tense from
August 1956 to the eve of independence, mainly because of the
continued intransigence of a section of the leadership of the
N.L.M .-dominated opposition.
In the first place, Nkrum ah was bitterly disappointed at his
failure to bring independence to Ghana in 1956; a failure for
which he held the N.L.M. in particular responsible, as his Auto
biography well shows. His disappointm ent may have become
all the more unbearable when he realised his own failuie to grasp
the im port, and the disruptive possibilities for his independence
programme, of the emergent federalist movement. In 1954 he
naively dismissed the N.L.M. as only an eleventh-hour irritant,
something th at would soon “ all blow o v er” . 6o By December
147
F. K . Drah
1955, however, he had realised the full implications of “ The

Ashanti Problem.” But, he still counselled patience. “ The Ashanti
situation,” he told his supporters at an Accra rally, “is such that
it should be handled wiih tact and patience; it is only those of
us who know what is really happening in Ashanti who know
what steps should be taken to deal with the situation.” 61
From Nkrumah’ s standpoint, the issue of early independence
was also intim ately bound up with th at of national unity. The
disruption of his carefully planned programme of independence
in 1956 at the latest by the Asante-dominated opposition forces
was sufficiently disappointing; what was unpardonable was the
serious threat they posed to national unity — the national unity,
he convinced himself, which he had carefully and deligently
nurtured since the foundation of his party. There was even the
possibility that independence might not be granted by the British
government. He was, therefore, concerned to impress upon the
opposition the gravity of the situation. Hence, he said at a Ho
party rally th at: “ The presentation of a united front to the world,
whatever our internal differences, will enable us to achieve our
am bition (i.e. independence).” 62 Failing that, independence was
a highly impossible dream.
Indeed, the bold secession threats which came to be made by
many opposition leaders after the 1956 general elections were
sufficiently serious to alarm the C.P.P. government as a whole,
and Nkrumah in particular. S. G. A ntor of the Togoland Congress
(T.C.) talked of the secession of Southern Trans-Volta Togoland
in terms of the “ inalienable rights” of its people; while opposition
m ilitants in the N orthern Territories explained the right of their
region to secede in terms unrelated to the interests of their opposi
tion allies in the other regions. Since their region, it was claimed,
had special treaties of protection with Britain, the departure of
the latter ipso facto gave the region the special right to secede.63
At a Kumasi rally Baffuor Osei Akoto, the national chairman of
the N.L.M ., advised his Asante audience to put themselves in a
psychological readiness “ to shed their blood to preserve their
national identity and heritage.” At another N.L.M. rally, speakers
emphasized the determ ination of the Asante to re-enact, for the
benefit of the C.P.P. government, the historic reputation of their
ancestors “ in being warlike in defending their liberty.” 64
Then in late November 1956, the m ilitants on the Executive
Com m ittee of the N.L.M. sent a cable to the Colonial Secretary
to the effect th at:
“ . . . pending the final withdrawal of British control, (an)
interim Government shall be established before March 6,
1957, in A shanti and the N orthern Territories.”
148
The Colonial Secretary, in his reply, called their bluff, emphasiz

ing that “ the partition of the Gold C oast” was not “ in the interests
of the Gold Coast as a whole or of any of its component parts,”
and th at the British government could not “ abandon their estab
lished policy” which was “ directed towards the grant of
independence to the Gold Coast as a w h o l e . ” 6 5
Fortunately, through the personal intervention of the Colonial
Secretary — he came to Ghana — a settlement of the costitu-
tional dispute was reached to the satisfaction of virtually all the par
ties involved. The opposition spokesmen openly announced to the
world the satisfactory results o f the consultations between them,
the C.P.P. government and M r Lennox Boyd, the Colonial Secre
tary. And the Asantehene counselled his people that the moment to
“ forgive and forget” had arrived; he assured the Asante political
refugees in other parts of the country a safe and warm welcome on
their return home. After independence, however, the C.P.P. govern
ment was in no mood to “ bury the hatchet, forget the past” — as
Baffour Osei Akoto, who had been one o f the most militant advo
cates of Asante secession, also advised all the sundry on the eve of
independence.66 For Nkrum ah and his followers (who, in fact,
demanded punitive measures against the N.L.M. leadership and its
allies) that past was too fresh and bitter to live down with equanimity.
Hence the powerful, added reason for creating the Brong-Ahafo
Region. From the point of view of the Asanteman Council, the N.L.
M. and their ardent followers, the action was not only vindictive;
it also undercut considerably the economic and geo-political power
of the Asante.
It is rather strange that, in almost all accounts of politics in post
war Ghana, little attention is paid to the importance attached to the
numerical factor in Asante political calculations. One of the major
factors underlying Asante’s hesitant approach to the Colony-Asante
unification issue, for instance, was the Asante’s uncertainty about
the strength of their representation on the Legislative Council, which,
they feared, would be dominated by the Colony. The same uncer
tainty was expressed during the deliberations of the Coussey Cons
titutional Commission.67 The creation of the new region, then,
must have been seen as the cutting down of the Asanteman to a
less dangerous, geo-political size — which, indeed, was part of
the C.P.P. government’s motivation. It is debatable, though, how
crucial this factor in C.P.P. calculations would have been in the ab
sence of a politically powerful Brong movement.
Summary
Such, then, in bald, rough-hewn outline is the story of the Brong
political movement which was an organized expression of the quest
for independence from the Asanteman. The story may be briefly
summarised thus:
149
F. K . Dr ah
(/) Broadly speaking, the Brong movement arose out of the

deeply felt need of hitherto, relatively diverse peoples in Western
Asante for a separate, independent, and authentic Brong self-
identity. The consciousness of this Brong self-identity was noi a
sudden outarow th in the immediate post-war years; rather, it had
reached a fairly developed stage by that period. Then, these rela
tively separate peoples were no more in doubt about what they
considered to be their dependent status — in every respect — within
the Asante Confederacy.
(») The growth of this consciousness of a single Brong self-
identity o f such peoples, then, was the paradoxical, because unin
tended, end-product of their inclusion in the restored Confederacy.
For, it was most improbable that such a consciousness would have
developed, had each of these peoples continued its individual
existence independent of the Asante — as was largely the case in
the period 1900-1935. But their re-entry into the Asante orbit of
power involved their common exposure to certain “abuses” at the
hands o f the true Asante.
( h i ) Founded on a modest scale (in terms o f membership);
having nearly become still-born (as evidenced by its dorm ant
condition from 1952 to 1954); and with all the odds virtually
stacked against it at its inception (what with the Asantehene’s
intransigence and the fledgling C.P.P. government’s felt need for
national unity which implied Asante unity), the Brong movement
nevertheless had by early 1956 brilliantly managed to be at its most
self-assertive, with the emotionalism of all its adherents heated up.
It thus compelled national attention.
(iv) Such a development was due to the combined strength of

three major factors:
(a) the almost granite-like belief of the BKC in the rightness
of the Brong cause.
(b) the resourcefulness and the determ ination o f the leader
ship in the persons of N ana Ameyaw, Nana Agyeman
Badu and M r Ntow, the General Secretary of the BKC,
to mention only a few; and
(c) the sudden change in the national political configuration
following the emergence of the federalist movement.
The eventual realisation o f the dangerous political
implications of this movement induced the C.P.P.
government to form a working alliance with the BKC.
Caught between the pincers of these two forces, the
Asanteman C ouncil— N.L.M. alliance struggled valiant
ly but in vain to m aintain the status-quo in the Asanteman.
150
The Brong Poltical Move men
(v) A separate region for the Brong — and the Ahafos — was
eventually created not on administrative grounds only — allhough
these were important. For the C.P.P. government an additional
consideration was the need to settle old scores. For the BKC also,
the new region answered to more than administrative conveniences:
it signified, above all, a most welcome release from what may be
regarded as the psychological entrapment of the soul-destroying
inferiority complex the Brong had indeed developed during the
long period of their relations with the true Asanle as a whole.
EPILOGUE
It is appropriate to end this introductory essay with a rather
brief discussion of one or two significant implications of the Brong
movement for the political and constitutional developments in
Ghana during the period under review. But, in view of the continuing
significance of what is now the Brong-Ahafo question, it is also
appropriate that the discussion encompass some recent develop
ments.
The first, and most obvious, implication may be briefly put.
When the Brong-Asante dispute came to be merged with the fierce
C.P.P. - N.L.M . confrontation, the C.P.P. government’s planned
independence programme was consequently thrown out of joint.
Thus A. E. Ofori Atta during the debate on the Brong-Ahafo
Region Bill:
“ I need not remind hon. Members that the battle for indepen
dence was nearly lost on [the Brong] issue” . 68 For ill or good the
Brong movement succeeded to some extent in dogging the relentless
efforts of the C.P.P. government to reach an early settlement with
the N.L.M .-dominated opposition on the national constitutional
and political issue. Fortunately for the Brong movement Nkrumah
did not abandon it owing to his altered perspective on the “Ashanti
Problem” .
In the event, however, the Brong cause served as a convenient
pretext for the C.P.P. government to strike at the core of chief
taincy in Asante: the Golden Stool and its supporting institutions,
with the Asanteman and the Kumasi State Councils bearing the
brunt of the attack. With the passage of the State Councils (Ashanti)
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1955, the considerable room for manoeu
vre the clan chiefs of the Kumasi State Council, for example, had
hitherto had over the Ahafo and Brong Sub-chiefs in local constitu
tional matters was virtually wiped out at a stroke. No longer would
the balance of political advantage in such matters always lie with
them. In effect, therefore, the Ordinance considerably undermined
the traditional allegiance of Brong and Ahafo sub-divisional chiefs
in particular to their Kumasi overlords and, through them, to the
Asantehene.
151
F. K. Drah
One should have thought that with the creation of the Brong-
Ahafo Region the ghost of the Brong-Asante dispute (which now
embraces Ahafo also) would be laid. But such is the nature of local
politics in Ghana that a facet of that dispute has persisted to this
day. This is the problem consisting of the twin issues of traditional
allegiance and titles to land owership, a problem which exists in
many parts o f Ghana.
In Asante, however, it has assumed a significance of major
proportions, as we have seen, on account of the character of Asante’s
historical evolution. Through the efforts of Osei Tutu and some
o f his successors, Asante was able to achieve a unity greater in
depth and scope than that attained by its Akan counterparts else
where in the country. This unity was epitomized by ihe Golden
Stool, the mythical creation of which by Okomfo Anokye was
by all accounts, a stroke of genius. The Golden Stool was — and
still is — believed to embody the “ soul” of the Asante. As much,
it evoked awe and veneration in the true Asante. And its occupant
and custodian, the Asantehene, naturally enjoyed their allegiance.
After they had pursued the policy o f physically dismembering
the Asante Union, especially from 1900 to 1932, the British set
about re-invigorating the formal structure of Asante unity as an
instrument of colonial policy. The result was the restoration of the
Asante Confederacy or Union in 1935. For the true Asante that
historic event, whatever may have been the real intentions of the
British, involved the restoration o f the Golden Stool and its occu
pant to their former position and status in the hierarchy of the
traditional Asante political system. Hence the Golden Stool conti
nued to constitute the traditional symbol of Asante unity.
Thus, like Buganda in Uganda until the “ Obote Revolution” 69
o f M ay 23rd, 1966, Asante as a historical kingdom has presented
modern Ghana with the problem of the “ dual polity” : the existence
of two focal points of allegiance, the central government on the
one hand, and the Golden Stool and its occupant on the other, in
the Asante region. The problem might still have existed and per
sisted even in the absence o f a Brong political movement. But it is
arguable that it was largely this movement which threw that problem
into sharp focus. In 1951 the unmistakably serious challenge its
emergence presented to the Asanteman Council, the nationalist
C.P.P. government and the country as a whole cannot be seriously
disputed, as we have seen.
From the Asanteman Council’s point of view, although the Brong
states as a whole may not have been Asante by origin, yet they were
doubtless Asante by conquest. In that case, they had to do their
duty by their Asante overlords through continued allegiance to
the Golden Stool and its occupant; and this, in the nob k cause of
152
maintaining the historic unity of Asante. As the hon. B. D. Addai

said in October 1949:
Ashanti commands great reputation everywhere in the
country . . . because there is unity in Ashanti. To maintain
and enhance this reputation that unity must be guarded
very jealously and knit together more closely.70
And this meant continued allegiance to the Golden Stool. From
1948 onwards some Brong states came to think otherwise.
The C.P.P. government eventually agreed with them. It, therefore,
dealt a blow at Asante sense of historic unity and pride; a blow that
was as brilliantly calculated in its delivery as it was stunning in its
impact: for the C.P.P. government included Ahafo, which was not
only historically puiely Asante but also endowed with a rich heri
tage of natural resources, in the new region it created in 1959.
And yet the creation of the new region did not involve a perma
nent solution of the problem of traditional allegiance and titles to
land ownership. The C.P.P. government may have considered the
elevation of some sub-chiefs to param ountacy status and the demo
tion of some param ount chiefs in the area as a political solution to
the issue oftraditional allegiance. On the issue of stool lands revenue
paid by the Kumasi “ islands” to the central treasury in Kumasi, the
C.P.P. government had earlier in September 1958 passed the Ashanti
Stool Lands Act. This Act transferred the adm inistration of the
Golden Stool land in the Kumasi division from the Asantehene’s
Lands Office to the Commissioner of Lands.71
In all this the C.P.P. government mistook a legal, for a political,
solution. And it hardly reckoned with Kumasi determination to
cling to titles to land ownership, however much their origins may
have been blurred by— or even lost in—the mists of the past.
On the accession to power after the military overthrow of the C.P.P.
government in 1966 the N ational Liberation Council (N L.C.),
doubtless under pressure, demoted the C.P.P.—elevated chiefs;72
it even appointed a Committee to inquire into the issue of tradi
tional allegiance and related m atters in the Brong-Ahafo Region.
The widespread impression was thus created that the Committee’s
real business was to decide on the very existence of the region.7?
In the event, it wound up business for reasons which were not made
public. The government of the Progress Party (P.P.) was widely
believed to have also had a shot at the problem and devised a politi
cal formula for its solution; but it did not have the opportunity to
complete the business, to put the seal on the matter. The National
Redemption Council (N.R.C.) has re-opened the m atter with the
appointment of yet another Committee to look into it.74 Which all
153
F. K. Drah
shows th a t, thanks to the Brong m ovem ent,the Brong-Ahafo Region

has since its creation affected national politics in a disturbing way.
Whatever may have been the N .R.C .’s m otivation, there is no
question that most of the educated commoners — who were young
at the time of the b irth of the Brong movement—have grown to
attach considerable importance to its offspring, so to say: namely,
th e Brong-Ahafo region. M ost probably the issue of traditional
allegiance, which is still of significance to a great many of their chiefs
and elders, does not weigh very much with them. The financial
considerations are bound to do so, however, for them the emotional
attachm ent to a separate Brong-Ahafo existence cannot be easily
divorced from its economic co n ten t.75
And they still have a leader in the person of the Dormaahene*
N ana Agyeman Badu. Following the announcement in June 1973
by the Asantehene, Nana Opoku Ware II, of his intention to create
nine divisional councils in Asante and Brong-Ahafo, there was an
angry outbrust among the Brong-Ahafo you th .76 Earlier in May
at a Sunyani rally held by the Brong-Ahafo Y outh Association,
N ana Agyeman Badu, not to be outdone, declared: “ The time of
slavery is dead and buried forever.” He asked if the youth would
stand aloof to see their region abolished: “ It is now the turn of the
youth to show up strength and resistance and put a stop to all sorts
o f calculated cheating.” Imploring the Brong-Ahafo youih to pro
ject the image of the region because it was the land of their birth, he
lashed out thus: “ . . . no Ghanaian youth from any other region is
better than any Brong-Ahafo youth, unless th at individual submits
himself to the person.” 77
In a memorandum sent to the Com mittee on Brong-Ahafo chief
taincy affairs in O ctober 1973, the Brong Ahafo Students’ Union
(BASU) also declared:
“M r Chairman, it is being suggested in certain circles that the
Brong-Ahafo Region was created for administrative convenience.
With due respect, we would like you to treat such claims as
coming from people who are not informed; for it certainly ignores
the stormy relations th at existed between the component tradi
tional areas of present-day Ahafo and our erstwhile so-called
Kumasi/Ashanti overlords. We very uncompromisingly reject
any such claims and assert positively that the boundaries of pre
sent-day Brong-Ahafo were drawn with due respect to and cogni
sance of the fact of people who abhorred the dishonour, the dis
respect and the cheating that they had suffered under their former
‘lords’. If we should accept the rather wrong claim th at some
people in the region are Ashanti and should be part of the Ashanti
region, we [would] like to submit that this is not incompatible
w ith the regionalisation of this country, for the Eastern Region,
154
The Brong Poitical Movement
for example, is made up of such ethnic groups as the Krobos, the

Kwahus, the Akuapims and the Juabens. We do not find anything
wrong wii h Brong-Ahafo being made up of Brongs and Asante-
speaking Ahafos. In any case the claim th at Ahafo or any part of
our region is ‘A shanti’ is spurious and we reject i t . .. we would
like to emphasise th at the argument that because we have once
been the ‘servants’ of Ashanti we should continue to occupy that
that pariah status is porous and therefore not acceptable to
u s . . .” 78
It would, appear that N ana Agyeman Badu has been placed in a
position to start the battle all over again. And, considering the
nature of the support he can muster in the 1970’s his strategy will,
in all probability, be different from that of the 1950’s
And this brings us to the final significant implication of the Brong
movement. First, in a polyethnic society like Ghana, the persistent
habit of taking other people’s sensibilities for granetd and according
them an inferior status in the political and social reality never pays
off in the long run. The foregoing discussion of Asante-Brong rela
tions, it is hoped, has clearly underscored this point; otherwise
there would have been no Brong political movement. As the
Akwamuhene succinctly put the m atter in 1949;
. . . in addition to love and unity we must have m utual respect
for one another; because love without respect is vain; and unity
divested of respect is also p o o r.. .we should cultivate the habit
of respect towards one another.” 79
Secondly, since Ghana is still a fledgling state nation, there is a
point beyond which certain historical claims—whatever their justi
fication—cannot be pressed into service without endangering the
fragile foundations for national integration that have with great
effort been laid.
The Brong Ahafo—Asante question can be solved only if and when
the fact of the existence of the Brong Ahafo region, with all that it
entails, is acknowledged by all and sundry. All the regions in pre
sent day Ghana are related to one another in the primary—albeit
significant—sense that all of them exist within one territorial unit
under a single central authority. Any attem pts at questioning,
however slightly, such an arrangement can only be interpreted as
a demand for a special, privileged status within it; and that would be
unfortunate, to put it rather mildly.
155
F. K. Drah
Notes And References
1 I am grateful to Dr Kwame Arhin, the editor, for his very useful comments
and suggestions on the first draft of this introductory essay.
2 Report o f the Committee on Asanteman-Brong Dispute (Accra, 1955), p.3.
The other members were Mr J. H. Allasani and MrA.Y.K. Djin. Owing
to other business commitments, the latter could not participate in the work
of the Committee from September 1951 on; consequently, he did not sign
the Report. In the body of the essay, the Committee is variously referred
to as the Mate Kole Committee or the Committee of Enquiry, while in
subsequent notes the Report is cited as Report of the Mate Kole Committee.
Various institutions and organisations, mainly from Brongland, sent
memoranda. See App. 1. The Asanteman Council also presented its case
through a four-man delegation (p.3, para. 6).
3 The names and number of the original member—states are as they appear
in the Statement o f Grievances (hereafter cited as SG). Other states such
as Bechem, Sunyani and Berckum joined later.
4 The term (t) “ethnic nationalism”, is used in a general sense in this

context: the quest of different but related peoples for a single, separate
identity in contradistinction to other identities (//) “ Brong nationalism”
makes sense only in the contest o f Brong-Asante relations (///') ‘Brongness’
and “ Brongland” are in this context “ethnic” and political designations,
and they posit the idea of differentiation of “distinctiveness”, e.g. “ Brong
ness” as distinct from “Asanteness” ; “ Brongland” as distinct from
“Asanteman”. (tv) The idea of “distinctiveness” may (that is not neces
sarily) lead to the “ideal of independence”, which it did in the case of the
Brong movement: i.e. independence of the Asanteman. (v) This usage
must be distinguished from another, more technical one: ethnic nationa
lism arises, we are told, primarily from the concern to ensure the survival
of a group's cultural identity. It, therefore, presupposes an existent, re
cognisable, homogeneous cultural entity. Hence the concern for cultural
survival involves ensuring the political survival o f the group and the
physical protection of its members. Establishing a separate political
organisition or state for the group is seen ultimately as the only way of
ensuring its political survival and protection from hostile outside inter
ference. See, A.D. Smith, Theories o f Nationalism (Duckworth, 1971),
pp. 215-17. (yi) It is clear that the Brong movement was not an ethnic
nationalist movement in Dr Smith’s sense. There was no pre-existent
cultural homogeneity to serve as a basis; on the contrary, a single cultural
identity had to be artificially created through political action. A cons
ciousness of Brong self-identity developed from the exposure of the
diverse peoples in that part of Asante to a common external factor:
“Asante domination”. Nor did the Brong movement aspire to nation
hood and statehood outside Ghana. The “outgroup” was the “Asante
man” and not Ghana as a whole. The Asante-inspired N.L.M. would
possibly illustrate Dr Smith’s usage, if not in its initial stages, at least in
its final phase. See Note below.
5. See W. Tordoff: “Ashanti Under the Prempehs 1888-1935 (Oxford, 1965)

pp. 1-109, and passim”, and “The Brong-Ahafo Region”, The Economic
Bulletin (Accra, May 1959), Vol. 3, No. 5, p. 3. K. Y. Daaku, Supra.
6. See Nana Kwakye Ameyaw and K. Arhin, Supra, (i) Significantly, in

distinguishing between the “true Ashanti” and “ Brong”, the BKF was
apparently only following established practice. The colonial administra
356
tion had used the distinction as a convenient criterion for determining

membership of the projected restoration of the Asante Confederacy—
Papers Relating to the Restoration o f the Ashanti Confederacy (Gold
Coast, 1935), p. 9, para. 9. (//) For the origins of the Mos and Bandas,
see J. N. Matson, A Digest o f the Minutes o f the Ashanti Confederacy
Council, 1935-49 (Cape Coast, n.d.) p. 1, and for those of the Berekums
and Dormaas, W. Tordoff (1965), op. cit., p. 338, note 2. (»7) For the
political implication of “Brongness”, see Kwame Arhin, ed. Ashanti
and the North-East, Supplement No. 3, RESEARCH REVIEW, March,
1970, p. 4 and Kwame Arhin, Introduction, Supra.
7. Proceedings o f the Meetings o f the Committee o f Privileges, 18tli June,

1935— 3rd January, 1936, pp. 216-248; for a critical analysis of the origins
of the land dispute and the committee’s decision, see W. Tordoff (1965),
op. cit., pp. 141—2 and 355-6.
8. Lord Hailey, An African Survey (Oxford, Rev. Ed., 1956), pp. 685-774.
9. In 1949 the Akyempimhene, e.g., deplored the dereliction of duty by the

Kumasi clan chiefs as a whole to their subjects in the “Kumasi islands’’
when he said: “It is gratifying to hear the advice given by the Otumfuo
regarding the relation between us, the Kumasi clan chiefs, and our sub
jects living outside Kumasi. It is desirable as well as advisable that we
should visit our subjects very frequently; because it is only by personal
contact with them that we can know their feelings, wants and sufferings
and so be able to assist them solve their difficulties. The District Com
missioners go to these villages very frequently and ask the villagers how
often their senior chiefs in Kumasi visit them. It will shock you to hear
the answers which are often given them. They are not very complimentary
. . . ”— Minutes o f the \4th Session o f the Ashanti Confederacy Council,
1949; 6th October, 1949, pp. 83-4. It would seem that the Kumasi clan
chiefs were more interested in the rewards (including the stool lands
revenue) attendant on their overlordship.
10. Minutes o f the 3rd Session o f the Ashanti Confederacy Council, 1950;
22nd June, 1950, p. 54.
11. In 1959 Nana Kwame Ntow II, Akwamuhene o f the Dormaa State,
claimed that, at an emergency meeting the Dormaa State Council held
on 11th February, 1951, to discuss the troubled state of Dormaa-Asante-
man Council relations, Nana Kwasi Ansu (then Krontihene of the Dormaa
State) emerged as the moving spirit behind the Dormaa secessionist
campaign. “The campaign for the consolidation of forces and contact
for more forces in the Brong states was suggested by Kwasi Ansu before
the initiative was taken” — The Address during the Durbar of the “Kwa-
fie” and Victory Celebrations, 7th February, 1959, Dormaa Ahenfie
Papers for a brief account of the “Kwasi Ansu episode” December
1951-1952.
12. See, e.g., Bankole Timothy, Kwame Nkrumah (Allen and Unwin, Paper
back, 2nd ed. (1963), p. 94.
13. It is not being implied here that the interpretations offered by the Brong
states were all of them without any foundation in fact. The constitutional
interpretation of the restored Confederacy offered by the Dormaa State
Council, e.g. could be seen as a re-statement of British intentions at the
time of the restoration. It is arguable that Sir Arnold Hodson’s statement
on the restoration as not a “new creation but a return to former institu
157:
F. K. Drah
tions” was historically misleading. But he was, perhaps, pointing to

what the British intended as the underlying principle of the Confederacy
when he said: “In this retoration . . . the domestic affairs and property
rights of properly constituted divisions will not be interfered with unless
the native authorities concerned invite assistance . . . ” — J. N. Matson,
— D igest. . . , p. 2, See A Triulzi, “The Asantehene — In — Council:
Ashanti Politics Under Colonial Rule, 1935-1950”, AFRICA, Vol.
XLII, No. 2, April 1972, pp. 98-9.
14. Report of the Mate Kole Committee, p. 4, para. 17.
15. Ibid. It must be noted, though, that the form o f oath-taking applied to
all the divisional chiefs in the Confederacy. But this does not explain
away the Brong objection, since the Brong chiefs as a whole, unlike their
true Asante counterparts, may not have developed a deep sense of reve
rence for the Golden Stool to warrant this kind of “humiliation” at the
hands of its occupant. See W. Tordoff (1965), op. cit., pp. 14-15.
16. See J. N. Matson, A D igest. . . , pp. 3-4.
17. K. A. Busia, The Position o f the Chief in the ModernPolitical System o f

Ashanti (Frank Cass, 1968), p. 169, the co-option of educated commoners
was first suggested by Major Jackson, the C.C.A.— Minutes o f the Con
federacy Council, 1st Session, 1935; 7th June, 1935, p. 5.
18. Report of the Mate Kole Committee, p. 4, para. 12 (xii) ; Cp. K. A. Busia
(1968), op. cit., pp. 192-3.
19. J. N . Matson, A D ig est . . . , p. 4.
20. E. Triulzi (April, 1972), op. cit., p. 109.
21. Report of the Mate Kole Committee, p. 5,para. 24and for membership
of the Board. See Minutes o f the ConfederacyCouncil, 14th Session,
Sept./Oct. 1949; Presidential Address, App. I (a), p. 93.
22. K. A. Busia (1968), op. cit., pp. 184-5; for Asantehene’s repeated admo
nitions, see e.g. Minutes . . . , 8th Session, Sept./Oct. 1949; closing Re
marks, pp. 85-86.
23. Report of the Mate Kole Committee, p. 5, para. 20.
24. J. N . Matson, A D ig est. . . , p. 23.
25. Minutes . . . , 8th Session, 1946; 4th March, 1946, pp. 20-22.
26. K. A. Busia (1968), op. cit., p. 188.
27. K. A. Busia (1968), op. cit., pp. 173-5.
28. M inutes.. . ., 3rd Session, June 1950; App. 7, p. 67.
29. Minutes . . . 14th Session, Sept./Oct. 1949; App. I, pp. 93-4.
30. Report of the Mate Kole Committee, p. 5, paras. 23 & 25.
31. The Brong rejoinder would be that, compared with the true Asante as a
whole, they in fact had a raw deal.
158
32. Quoted in Report of the Mate Kole Committee, p. 5, para. 26.
33. Constitution of the Brong-Kyempem Federation; Article 2, SG, App. III.

This Constitution appears as a whole to have been patterned after that of
the Asante Confederacy. There are some striking differences, though:
e.g. there is no permanent President; the office is held by yearly rotation
among the Head Chiefs through election — an incumbent is eligible for
re-election for a further term not exceeding one year at a time; member
ship is open to every Brong state or town or Ohene of Brong origin; and
equality of status of all members is stressed (Article 3(</).
34. W. Tordoff, “ Brong-Ahafo Region” . . ., p. 5.
35. But for considerations of space, an extended case study of this interesting
but bitter quarrel, which became a component o f the Brong-Asante
dispute, would have been given here in illustration of some aspects of
local politics in Brongland in the period; its tangled, factional character
involving a number of individuals or clans forming themselves into
groups that almost invariably broke up into splinter-groups, which, in
turn regrouped into kaleidoscopic mergers or coalitions around such
issues as chieftaincy titles to land and party affiliation.
36. He had left for Britain in 1952 to study public administration at Ruskin
College, Oxford, although according to Yeboah Afari, the Dormaahene
was not inactive: he managed to have the Brong question raised in the
British Parliament.
37. See SG, App. II and Report of the Mate Kole Committee, App. I.
38. Cf. Papers . . . Ashanti Confederacy. “The political amalgamation o f the

Ashanti and the Brong will make for a stronger State, and will make
administration easier” (Gov. T.S.W. Thomas, in 1934), p. 2, para. 9.
39. M inutes. . . 8th Session, February/March, 1946; closing remarks, p. 83,

Later in 1949 he referred to Techiman’s action in 1948 as a “revolt against
me” — and an arrogance. See Minutes . . . 14th Session, Sept./Oct.,
1949; 6th October, 1949, p. 77. The significance o f the Asantehene’s
opposition to secession cannot be overemphasized. But in the post
restoration period the Asantehene no longer had the monopoly of physical
force to back up his religious and political authority. That force now
belonged to the colonial administration, later to be inherited in some
measure by the C.P.P. government in 1951. Thus, the Asantehene could
not physically coerce recalcitrant, rebellious states back into the Asante
man, unless the central government was willing to do so, as it did in the
case of Bekwai in 1945. He could resort to customary sanctions like
destoolment; but this was unlikely to affect a situation where the offend
ing chief was himself an “overmighty subject” .
40. See Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960 (Oxford Paperback,
1970), ch. vi., for the origins and objectives o f the N.L.M ., and its con
frontation with the C.P.P. The N.L.M. leadership took great pains to
represent the party as national; and it is true that it attracted into its
fold a great many individuals and groups who found themselves out on
the political limb during the course o f the spectacular rise of the C.P.P.
to power. In this respect, it makes considerable sense to see the events in
the period 1952-1956 in terms of the “struggle for power”, as Dennis
Austin has done. But “power” for whom, and for what? On the evidence
159
F. K. Drah
provided by the origins, structure and the leadership o f the N.L.M. as

well as the pronouncements of the leadership, the struggle would seem
to be between the Asante and the Colony (mainly the Fanti) for power
over the allocation of economic resources and related perquisites. And
if they lost, there was a possible alternative. True, the N.L.M. was able
to rope in some influential elements in the Northern Territories to its
side, so that the confrontation appeared to be between the North and the
South. In this Northern axis, however, there was no doubt about who
was the senior partner. The most revealing and clearest evidence of
Asante motivation and intentions is provided by the joint statement
issued by the N.L.M. and the Asanteman Council in January 1955:
(0 The statement described as fraudulent and illegal the 1954 Nkrumah
Constitution which the C.P.P. government considered as a sufficient
basis for an independent Ghana, (/*) Raising the tantalising spectre of
other ominous sources of cleavage within the country, the statement
expressed in no uncertain terms a deeply-felt anxiety for Asante ethnic
interests as against the interests of the country as a whole. There is no
“mistaking the explicit overtones of Asante nationalism.” For a full
reproduction of this highly interesting joint statement, see the Ashanti
Pioneer, 4th February, 1955, p. 2.
41. See Dennis Austin, op. cit. pp. 143-4. (/) In the 1951 general elections
Nana Agyeman Badu stood in his own area against the C.P.P. candidate,
B. Yeboah Afari in the electoral college and lost by 19 votes to his oppo
nent’s 36. (//) Interestingly, his name appeared also on the list of con
testants for the seven Asanteman Council seats, and he polled a single
vote. (Hi) The change o f name may have been dictated by the concern to
ensure that the BKF would not be confused with the Asante Federal
Movement.
42. Gold Coast, Legislative Assembly Debates, 18th February, 1955. Signifi
cantly, in explaining why the Report had not been released, Mr E. O.
Asafu-Adjaye, the Minister of Local Government, said in February 1955:
“Government felt that publication . . . would not promote an easier
settlement of the question at issue; and the Government had thought it
fit, having found out the underlying causes of this Secession movement,
and considered it lost, to try to remove those causes rather than try to
give emphasis to them by publication” — ibid., 21st February, 1955, my
italics. The Minister must have been rather out of touch with events in
Asante at the time — unless this was part of the government’s strategy.
43 Gold Coast, Legislative Assembly Debates, 25th March, 1955; Statement
by the Prime Minister. The two new members were Sunyani and Bechem.
The BKC’s Petition to the P.M. was dated 12th Feb., 1955.
44 See W. Tordoff, “Brong-Ahafo . . . ”, p.7 Daily Graphic, 22nd October,
1955.
45. Minutes o f the Emergency Meeting o f Asanteman Council, 27th and 28th
October, 1955. Nana Essumejahene, in his fairly long and emotional
speech, did not doubt at all that: “Nkrumah and his followers had found
Ashanti a hard nut to crack owing to its peculiar and unique culture and
traditions. It was this uniqueness of Ashanti that had inspired support for
the demands of the N.L.M .” By this Bill, Nkrumah “was determined to
destroy Ashanti both as a Nation and as a people, for he was asking for
power to determine who should be and who should not be a ch ief. . . ”
pp.3—5).
46 Report o f the Constitutional Adviser (Gold Coast, 1955), p.4
47 There were two major opposing groups of chiefs and commoners: (/) the
pro-C.P.P. and secessionist faction undei the Kukuomhene; (//) the pro-
NLM and pro-Asante faction under the leadership o f the Mimhene. For
160-
a discussion of the political ramifications of the Ahafo clearage, see A.F.

Robertson, “Histories and Political Opposition in Ahafo. Ghana,”
AFRICA, VOL. XLI11, No. 1, Jan., 1973 and J. Dunn and A.F. Robert
son, Dependence and Opportunity: Political Chance in Ahafo. (Cambridge,
1973), especially ch. 3, where J. Dunn offers a penetrating analysis of the
economic dimension of Ahafo-Kumasi relations. A major source of Ahafo
discontent was (and still is)— economic: Ahafo contribution o f stool lands
revenue, especially cocoa-tribute revenue, to the central revenue of the
Golden Stool on behalf of some Kumasi clan chiefs.
48 Report o f the Achimota Conference (Gold Coast, 1956), p.7, paia. 24.
italics added.
49 Ibid., p.7, para. 23
50 Ibid., p.8, para. 31.
51 See Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana .. . (1970), ch. VII, pp. 361— 4; and
for the full election reults by constituency, see the Ghana Evening News,
19th July, 1956, pp.l— 3. Mr A.W. Osei, the N.L.M. candidate who won
the Ahafo seat from Mr B.K. Senkyire, the previous C.P.P. M.P. for
the area, is now the President of the Ahafo Youth Association which is
demanding a severance of all links with Kumasi; while Mr Senkyire is
the President of the Brong-Ahafo Youth Association — personal commu
nication (May 1974) from Mr K. Yeboah-Konadu—a post-graduate
student in Political Science (1972—74), Legon, and current President of
the Brong-Ahafo Students’ Union (BASU).
52 Ghana Parliamentary Debates, 20th March, 1959.
53 See The Ghana (constitution ) Order in Council 1957 (S.I. No. 277), Part V,
sections 32 and 33, and Dennis Austin, op. cit., pp. 379—80. To say
the least, the Independence Constitution made the creation of any new
region extremely difficult.
54. Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 20th March, 1959.
55 Report o f the Committee o f Enquiry into Allegations o f Intimidation Threat
ening and Extortion in Ashanti (Nov. 1957, unpublished), p.8, paras. 18-20.
In 1954, it noted, the strength of the police in Asante, excluding the Rail
way and Harbour Police and the C.I.D., was 642 all ranks; but in 1956 it
was increased to 1,136 all ranks. The members of the Committee were:
Mr C.W. Quist (Chairman), Mr George S. Lassey (Barrister-at-Law) both
of Accra, and Mr. J.P. Tyrie, Superintendent of Police, Kumasi.
56 W. Tordoff, “Brong-Ahafo Region”, p.9. The factional strife over the
Brong issue in Berekum will, like the one of Dormaa, repay extended
study also.
57 Ibid.
58 Address delivered by Nana Agyeman Badu during the “KWAFIE”
Festival, 2nd November, 1957, Dormaa Ahenfie Papers.
59 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 20th March, 1959; e.g. on 1st November,
1957, the C.P.P. government had appointed a number of Regional Com
missioners to represent it in the regions; one of them was the Commis
sioner for Western Asante—the Brong areas in spite o f the fact that the
new region had not yet been cieated.
60 Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography o f Kwame Nkrumah
(Edinburgh, Nelson, 1957), ch. 19. It is significant that ch. 20 headed
“In Search of Relaxation” is interposed between ch. 19 titled “The Ashanti
Problem” (when the NLM came to Nkrumah’s notice for the first time)
and ch. 21 titled “The ‘Federation’ Issue” (when he became seriously
concerned with the NLM as a significant political movement).
61 Daily Graphic, 13th December 1955, p .l.
62. Daily Graphic, 11th September 1956, p.l
63. See the Ashanti Pioneer, 13th December 1956, 5th January 1957; and Gold
Coast, Legislative Assembly Debates, 2nd August, 1956.
161
F. K. Drah
64 Ashanti Pioneer, 24th September, 1956, p.l, and 17th November 1956, p.l,
respectively.
65 See the Ashanti Pioneer, 27th November 1956, p .l, and the Ghana Evening
News, 11th December, 1956, p.l respectively.
66 See the Ashanti Pioneer, 11th, 12th February, and 9th March, 1957.
67. See W. Tordoff (1965), op. cit., pp.303—6; Report of the Committee on
Constitutional Reform—popularly known as the Coussey Committee
Report (Colonial No. 250, 1949), para. 44; H.K. Akyeampong, The
Doyen Speaks: Some o f the Historic Speeches by Dr. J.B. Danquah
(Accra, 1956), pp.35—36; M. Wight, The Gold Coast Legislative Council
(London, 1947), p. 194; and Memorandum by the Asanteman Council to
the Rt. Hon. Allan T. Lennox-Boyd, dated 25th January, 1957.
68 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 20th March 1959.
69 See M. Crawford Young, “The Obote Revolution.” Africa Report (Wash
ington, June 1966), pp.8— 14.
70 Minutes . . . 14th Session, Sept/Oct.; 6th Oct., 1949, p.83.
71 The passage of this Act followed the publication of the Report o f a Com
mission appointed to enquire into the affairs o f the Kumasi State Council
and the Asanteman Council, by Mr Justice Sarkodee-Addo, (Accra 1958).
The Act did not, however, divest the chiefs of ownership of stool lands in
the Kumasi division; (//) on the issue of traditional allegiance, Mr Ofori
Atta stated that the Brong-Ahafo Region Bill was not intended “to dis
turb any traditional allegiance which may be cut across by the new boun
dary . . . ” —Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 20th March 1959. For an
extended discussion of this issue, see W. Tordoff, “ Brong-Ahafo. . . ”,
pp. 16— 18.
72 N.L.C. Decree 112,1966.
73 Some members of the NLC found it necessary to deny such reports; and
Dr. Busia was emphatic that the NLC would not compel Brong-Ahafo
back into the Asante fold. See the Daily Graphic, 24 and 25th March,
1966.
74 The four-man committee is under the chairmanship of Mr Justice Charles
Coussey; it was appointed in the latter part of 1972 to enquire partly
into “whether any chiefs in the Brong-Ahafo Region owe allegiance to
any other chiefs outside the region, and if so what are the privileges and
duties arising from such allegiance.”
75 E.g. a one-day Youth Congress, attended by representatives of the various
student and youth organisations in Brong-Ahafo, in early July 1973
passed a resolution demanding, inter alia: (/) the dissolution of the Coussey
Committee; (//') a firm government declaration on the autonomy of the
B— A. region “so that no chief in the region (would owe) allegiance to
any other chief outside it”, and (Hi) that “the land and other revenues of
the region be used for its development.” The case for the dissolution was
that: “It is improper in the modern age to set up a Committee to find out
whether a person or group of persons belong to a certain ethnic group,
e.g. Ashanti or the North, for such enquiry tends in the final analysis to
fan naked tribalism which ought to be seriously discouraged”— The
Pioneer, 9th July, 1973, p.5.
76 The Pioneer, 14th June, 1973, p .l. The report was rather misleading, for
it gave the impression that all the councils had in fact been already establi
shed; on the contrary, the Asantehene was aware that the divisional
councils in Brong—Ahafo could not be inaugurated until after the Com
mittee had completed its business; but see also The Pioneer, 25th June,
1973, p.l.
77 The Pioneer. 29th May 1973, p.5.
78 Memorandum presented by the Brong-Ahafo Students’ Union (BASU) to
Coussey Committee, dated 21st October 1973, paras. 19—21.
79 Minutes .. 14th Session, Sept/Oct.; 6th October 1949, p.81.
162
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24th September, 1956
13th December, 1956
5th January, 1957
11th February, 1957
12th February, 1957
9th March, 1957
The Pioneer 29th May, 1973
14th June, 1973
25th June, 1973
9th July, 1973
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13th December, 1955
11th September, 1956
24th March, 1966.
25th March, 1966.
Ghana Evening News 19th July, 1956
11th December, 1956
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170
INDEX
Names (authors, etc. mentioned in the text)

Abo Kofi (Gyamanhene), 59, 60
Adinkra, Kwadwo (King of Gyaman), 70ft'
Adinkra War 73
Adjei, Ako (committee), 146
Adu Ben (Dormaahene) 70
Afari Yeboa Nana, (Dormaahene) 135
Agorsah, E. K. 24
Agyeman Badu, Nana (Dormaahene), 125, 131, 139, 141, 144, 152, 156, 157
Agyeman Kofi (Gyamanhene) 66
Agyenim-Boateng, C. E. 15
Aidoo, B.J. 89, 90
Akrasi (Dwabenhene), 83
Allasani, J. H. 139
Amankona Diawuo (Berekumhene) 60
Amankwatia, (Bantamahene), 78
Ameyaw Akumfi, Nana (Techimanhene), 123, 124, 152
Ameyaw Kwakye, Nana (Techimanhcne) 11, 12, ch.iii, 51-56, ‘Interview’
Ampaw, Koragye (Chief o f Akyem Bosome) 78
Anquandah, J.R. 25, 26
Ansu, Kwasi (chief of Wamfie), 138
Antor, S.G., 15
Apau (son of Adinkra), 74, 78
Arhin, Kwame, 11, 16, 51, 58, 65
Asubonteng II, Nana (Dormaahene), 135-136
Ataara Finam (Atere Firaw) Guan King, 54, 82, 86
Atwereboana (contestant with Prempeh I for Asante Golden Stool) 85
Azu Mate Kole (Konor of Manya Krobo) 121 (see under Mate Kole Report)
B.
Baba (Head of Kumasi Moslems) 77

Bak’r-as-Sadik, Abu, 71,72
Ben Kompi Kwadwo (Gyamanhene) 11, 71
Binger, L.G., 48
Boadi, L.A. 101
Boateng, Kwame (Berekumhene), 64, 66
Bourne, Sir Frederick (Constitutional adviser), 143
Bowdich, T.E. 12, 58, 60, 70, 73, 74, 75, 83
Bravmann, R. 26
Britwum, K.A. 15, 70
Busia, K.A., 129, 131, 133, 149
Busia, B.K. 134
Butuakwa, Kwame 75
C.
Clozel, F. 75
Crossland, L.B. 28, 35
D.
Daaku, K.Y., 15, 82

Dapper, O. 12
Davies, O. 24, 25, 29
Delafosse, M. 26
171
Diawuo. Kwasi (Berekumhene) 66
Dolphyne, F. 11, 13, 87
Drah, F.K. 17, 121
Duah, Kwaku (Asantehene) 66
Dupuis, J. 12, 30, 43, 44, 47, 60, 63, 71, 73, 75, 78, 79, 83.
Edusei, Krobo, 141

Effa Gyamfi, E. 34
Ferguson,G.E. 85
Fernandes V. 41
Flight, C. 24
Fromkin, V. 99, 105
Fynn, J.K. 61, 64
G.
Goody, J., 11, 24, 26, 28, 34, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44 46 58 61 63
Gyane, Kwame (Atebubuhene) ’ ’
H.
Hailey, Lord 124
Hutchison, W. 77
J.
Jackson, Major (Chief Commissioner o f Ashanti) 128
Jakpa, N. (Gonja warrior-leader) 33, 34
K.
Karikari, Kofi, (Asantehene) 15, 66, 84
Kra, Adwo 78
Kyerematen, A.A.Y., 53
L.
Lang, Captain, 88
Lennox Boyd, A. (Colonial Secretary) 151
Levtzion, N. 38, 41, 44, 47
Lonsdale, R.T., 47-48, 85, 86
M.
Mathewson, R.D., 26, 27, 33
Mensa Bonsu (Asantehene) 47, 66, 84
Meyerowitz, E.R.L. 13, 26, 34, 42, 45, 54, 55
N.
Nlaumah, Dr Kwame, 20, 141, 142, 148, 149, 150
Nti Panyin (Dadiesoabahene) 61
Ntow (General Secretary, BKC), 152
Nyankura (princess o f Kong) 74
O.
Odom, K.O. 14, 38
Ofori Atta, A.E.A., 146,-149, 153
Okomfo Anokye, 154
172
Opoku Ware I (Osei Poku) Asantehene, 12, 14, 53, 59, 60, 61, 70, 86
Opoku Ware II, Nana (Asantehene), 156
Osei, C.E. 134
Osei Kwame (Asantehene), 71, 72
Osei Tutu (Asantehene), 12, 14, 61, 154
Osei Tutu Assibey Bonsu (Asantehene) 70, 71, 72-73
Ozanne, P. 26, 29
P.
Posnansky, M. 12, 13, 14, 24, 38, 40
Prempeh I (Asantehene) 83, 85
R.
Rattray, R.S., 62, 65, 75, 77, 83
Reindorf, C.C. 75, 77, 83
Robertson, G.W. 71, 72
Schachter, P. 99, 105
Schapera, I. 62
Shinnie, P.L. 26
Tait, D . 66
Takyi, C.S. 45
Tauxier, L. 41
Tia Kwaku (Berekumhene) 62
Tordoff, W. 61, 138, 148
Van Landewijk, J.E.J.M., 30
Ward, W.E.F. 85
Wilks
Yeboah, S.W., 141.
SUBJECT INDEX
Abease (Eastern Brong) chiefdom, 14, 82, 83, 86, 126, traditions of origin, 82
Abonowoo 51
Abron (Gyaman) 59, 61
Abrono (Brong) 123
Accra Plains
Achimota Conference (on regional devolution) 143, 144ff
Adanpankron 61, 64, 65
Adanse 82
Adanse (Berekum royal line) 60
Affram, river 82
Ahafo (district of Brong-Ahafo Region) 11
— Asunafo 146, 147
— Settlements 58
— security posts 61
Ahwene Koko (capital of old Wenchi) 14, 25

Akan 15
— Muslims, 44
— tribes, 56
— dialects 89
— languages 89-119
Akomadan, 53
Akuapem, 157
Akwamu, 42
Akwasidae, (festival) 56
Amanfokeseso 26
Amanianpong highway, 83, 85
Amoowi, 51
Anum-Boso 82
173
Ansu, Kvvasi (chief o f Wamfie) 1 3«
Anyi-Baule language, 99 , 103 109
Archaeology at Begho 24
Archaeology Department Museum 7 u
Arehaeo o g y a , Bontwnanso 34 ' 9
A ^ S S e ^ S ^ the28Bron8-Ahafo * * « . 24,,'
Archaeological Rsearch Centre 3
Archaeological sites 35 ’ '
Asante (Ashanti)
~ conquests, 11, ]2 , 14, 25 46 55 70
__ empire, 4 3 ,7 0 72 73 *
districts, 17-18. ’ '
— conquest o f Techiman, 55
__ security posts, 58ff, 60
__ great oath, 65
gyaman War, 71, 78.
—• vt?una campaign, 72
— ?:koraPza War (1893) 85 .
— Confederacy Council, 86,121 122 17*
__ National Fund, 124, 134 135 ’ 6
mst°rical evolution of, 154
Union, 154
Asantehene's Lands ^ ’55'
Asanteman 148-149, 153. ’
Asanteman Council, ’ 121 , 128, 154
membership of, 129
— F w rf°rH-nary Members, 129
— Extraordinary Committee, 130
Scholarship Selection Board 131)
and formal education, 131-1 34
__ and courts 131-133
a a mane?' V5beration Movement (NLM)
Asantemanso, 82 > 5.
Asokore (migrants in Berekum) 59

(Berekum ruling line) 60
Warriors (m Berekum) 60
Asuoso, 82
Ataramanso, 82
Atebubu (Eastern Brong), 14, 54 , 82, 83 86

traditions of, 83 ’
attack on Krakye, 84
revolt against Asante, 84-85
market 8? " " Br°" g Conf«leration, 84-85
relations with the British Government. 85
Atebubu | ^ aO fProt«tion with the British government, 85
Awaasu, 59
Awua-Domase 52
Badu, 11, 15
Banda (Banna) 14. 41, 43. 52, 53. i 47

cloth weaving, 55
174
Bassa (Eastern Brong) 83
— traditions of, 83
Bechem, 141
— stool affairs, 142.
Ahafo Youth Association, 142-143.
Begho, 13, 14, 25ff, 30

— trade at, 24
— situation, 26
— as ‘Bicu’, 26
— as ‘Bew’, 26, 54
— quarters of, 26-27, 40
— excavations at, 28
— trade goods, 30, 41
— and Gonja, 33
as commercial centre, 41,42
— decline of, 42
— Asante invation of, 43.
Beposo, 82
Benue-Congo language group, 103
Berekum, 12, 139, 147

— cultural self-identification of, 12
as an administrative sub-unit o f Kumasi, 15, 61
as Asante security post, 15, 58ff, 61, 67
— Gyaman and Dormaa attack on, 16
— Stool list, 60
— borders/boundaries, 61, 65
political organization, 61-62
Principal Councillors (adanpankron) 61, 64, 65
participation in Asante wars, 64
— relations with Asante, 64
relations with neighbours, 65-66
/Sunyani sub-dialect 112.
Bima (contemporary with Begho) 27

Bobo-Dioulasso 42
Bonduku, 26, 58
Bonkeseso, 26
Bono (Brong) 51
Bono Kingdom 12
Bono-man, 12, 20
Bono-Manso, 11, 14, 42, 43, 51, 53

— Asante conquest of, 11, 46
— dismemberment of, 15
Bote (contemporary o f Begho), 27, 53

Bouna (Bona), 52, 72
Brassware, 31-32
Brong (‘Booroom’, ‘Bouromy’, Bono) 12
— area, 11, 89
— as a reference name, 12
— festivals, 11-12
Chiefs’ Council, 13
— district 14
Asante conquest of, 14
market towns, 15
175
— opposition to Asante rule, 15
— seccessionist revolts, 15
— relations with Kumasi chiefs, 16-17
— relations with the Asante (Ashanti)
— confederacy council 17,137
— relations with the Asantehene, 18-20
— under the government o f Kwame Nkrumah, 20
— under the National Liberation Council, 20
— under the National Redemption Council, 20
— quarter (of Begho), 26
— ceramics, 35
— dialect cluster 90
— Tones 96
— Nominal Affixes 98
— Personal Pronouns 99
— Vocabulary 106
— Consonant innovations in, 108
— distribution o f dialect characteristics, 108
— historical inferences from dialects, 116
— innovations (in language) 117.
— political movement, 121ff
— council, 137
— Asante dispute, 153,154
— House of Chiefs, 137, 141, 142, 144
(Eastern) Brong borders of, 82
— population, 82
— anti-Asante confederation, 15,84-87
traditions o f origin, 82
revolt against Asante, 84-85
relations with the British Government, 85
relations with the Ashanti confederacy, 86,121, 122, 126
Brong Ahafo 11,
— Region, 11
— — Act, 19,
— Archaeological Aspects of, 24ff.
Youth Association, 139, 156
Women’s Association, 139
— Bill, 146, 153
— Creation, 148;
— Asante question, solution of, 157
Brong Kyempim Federation, (BFK), 121
— Members of, 121
— relations with the AsanteConfederacy, 121
Statement o f Grievances, (S.G.) 122ff.
Constitution, 137
Buipe, 52
Clans, (Techiman) 52
Commercial centres, 41,4 2
Commissioner o f Lands, 155
Committee o f Privileges, 123
Constitution (Repeal of Restrictions) Bill, 146
Convention Peoples’ Party (C.P.P.), 121ff., 140

— and the Brong Political Movement, 121ff
government, 143ff., 151, 154, 155
National Liberation Movement (N.L;M.) confronta
tion.
176
Cousscy (Committee) Report on Local Government, 137
Dankyira, 58
migrants (in Berekum) 59
Degha, 12
Denteh, Oracle, 83, 84, 86
— Priest Of, 87
Department of Archaeology, Lcgon, 24

Domase, 52
Dormaa, 14, 127
— historic relations with Asante, 14
— territories, 15
boundary with Berekum, 65
relations with Berekum, 66
— connection with Gyaman, 70
Wamfie sub-dialect, 112
— member o f B.K.F., 121
— State Council, 126
— Ahenkro, 148
— Ahenfie, 148.
(N ew) Drobo 61, 63, 121, 147.
Dumpo (quarter of Degho), 27
Dwaben (Juabin) 83,157
Dyula (Wangora, Ungoros) trading community, 26
— traders, 39, 40, 42
(Proto) Dyula 26, 41
Eastern Region, 156
Ejura (Mampong) 52, 83
Festivals 56, 65
‘Gagauca' (cloth) 56
General Elections (1956) 145
Gold, 30
Gold as currency, 54
Goldfields (mines) 38-39, 41
Gold trade, 39
Golden Stool (of Gyaman), 74-75
(of Asante), 122, 137, 138, 139, 153, 155
— land of, 155
Gonja, 12, 52, 53, 89
— area, 33
Mande in, 33
Guan (Guang) quarter (of Begho) 26

Gur-speaking peoples, 11
Gyaman (Abron) 14, 52, 53,59, 61

— War(s) with Asante, 60, 71, 78
Gyaman Kingdom, foundation and growth, 70
Gyaneboafo, 82
Hani research centre, 21
— oral history, 26
Hausa migration, 44
— trade 46
— trade 48
Islam 38
spread of, 38-39
lslamization, 38
— signs o f 30
Japekrom/Adamso subdialect, 109
Jenne, 41-42
Jukwa, 82
Kabere, 52
Kintampo, Geological Survey, 24

— Cultural tradition, 24-25, 29, 34
trade at, 26
‘neolithic’, 29
Kokofu, 85
Kong, 78, 79
Kotei, 78
Koulango, 12
Krachi (Krakye) 46-48, 52, 54, 82

traditions of origin, 82
Kramo (Muslim) quarter of Begho, 26-27
— trading community, 27
Krobo, 157
Kumasi, Native Committee of Administration, 16
Kumasi, trade at, 26
Kumasi pottery farms, 28
Kumasi Clan Chiefs, 124
Kumasi State Council, 142,153
Kumasi/Ashanti overlords, 156
Kumawu, 82
Kwabre, 82
Kwahu. 54,82,157
Kwafie (festival) 65
K yekye (cloth) 55
Larteh, 82
Ligbi language, 89
Ligby, 1 2 ,4 1 ,4 7 ,8 9
Long-distance trade, 24
Mampong, 83, 85
Mande-speaking trade establishment, 13

Mande (Dyula) traders, 30
— migration, 33
at Begho, 33
in Gonja, 33
cultural traits, 34
— state, 74
Manso-Nkwanta security post, 58 60

Mate Kole Committee, on the Asanteman-Brong dispute, 1 2 1 , 1 3 7
Report on the Asanteman-Brong dispute, 126, 128, 130,
131, 134, 136
Mo (Degha) 14, 89
Moslem(MusIim) traders, 43
dispersion, 43, 44, 48
— cultural influence, 43-46
in Gonja state, 44
in Dagomba, 44
178
— in Nkoranza and Takyiman, 44
— as Gberi 44
— (Akan), 46-48
— market centres, 46
in revolt, 73
in Kumasi, 73
Nafana, 12, 89, 109

Nchumuru, 89
Nzema (language) 99, 103, 109
Odumase, 58
N ational Liberation Council, 20,155 ^
N a tio n a l L ib eration M ovem en t (N .L .M .) 126, 140-142, 143, 145, 146 148,
149, 150
and the Brong Political Movement, 126.
National Redemption Council (N.R.C.) 20, 155, 156

Nchumuru, 13
Nkoranza, 51, 53, 82, 139, 147
— /K intam po subdialect, 113
N kyibena oath 65, 66
Nkyibena tuotu 66
Nsawkaw 15
— oral history, 26
Nsoatre, 15, 16, 59, 61
— relations with Berekum, 59-61
Nsuta, 83, 85
Numu (blacksmiths) 26, 41
Nyafoman, 53
Nyaho, 26
Nyamaga quarter (of Begho), 27
Obote revolution, 154
Odumase (D om ase), 15, 52. 58. 126
Odwira (festival) 65
Offinso 52
Pepease, 59
Pinihi, 51
Pottery finds, 28
— forms, 29
Prang, 82
— traditions of origin, 82
Progress Party, 155
Republican Constitution (1960) 67.
Salaga, 26
— trade at, 26
— market, 85
— market centre, 85
Salt trade 39, 41-42

Saman, 82
Sehwi chiefdom, 58
— language, 101
Seikwa, 15, 52
Seketia, 18
Sene (river), 82
Som, meaning of, 64-65
State Councils Ordinance (1952), 142
State Councils (Ashanti) Amendment Ordinance (1955), 142-143.
Sutan of Kong, 74
Suma, 78, 126, 147
179
Sunyani, 15, 52, 139, 142
— sub-dialect, 112.
Tain (river), 53, 78
Tain Kwasi, 63, 65
Takyiman (Tekyiman), 1 4 ,5 2 ,5 3 ,6 1
— boimdaries, 53
participation in Asantc wars, 53
Asantc conquest of, 54
trade centres, 54
secondary school, excavations at, 29
Tano Subin villages, 16

— Subin valley, 123.
Tobacco pipes, 30
Tonfo (Tumfu) Blacksmiths, 26
Trade, 25,26
with Mali, 28
— centres, 54
— goods, 47, 48
Trans. Saharan trade, 38-39
Tuobodom, 15
Twumfuor (Blacksmith) quarter (of Begho), 28
United Party, 149
Wamfie, sub-dialect, 112
Wassa, 82
Wassaw language, 103
Wenchi (Wankyi, Waraki), 12, 43, 147
— sub-dialect, 112
(The) West African Trade Project, 27
Wiase, 15, 54, 82
— traditions o f origin, 82
Volta river, 52
Volta (Black), 29
Yaa Asantewa War, 61
Yagbumwura, 52
Yefri, 51, 53
Yeji, 82
— traditions of origin, 82
Yakaase (Gyaman ruling line), 71
Zanzan (Gyaman dynasty), 71, 72, 79.
180
T O W N S AND VILLAGES MENTIONED
ABOUT THIS BOOK
This book offers a historical, cultural, social

and political portrait of the Brong district of the
Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana from the view
points of several social science disciplines. It demon
strates how, though they differ in language and other
cultural aspects, the peoples of the region have
become united on the basis o f certain common
social and political aspirations. It shows ‘Brong’
contributions to the evolution of the culture of
modern Ghana. It also examines the historical and
socio-political mainsprings of the Brong political
movement which culminated in the establishment of
the Brong-Ahafo Administrative Region and House
of Chiefs in 1959, and outlines the problems that
hang over from that political act.
A F R A M P U B L IC A T IO N S (OH AN A ) L IM IT E D
( S ) ® © ®
This work is licensed under a

Creative Commons
Attribution - Noncommercial - NoDerivs 4.0 License.
To view a copy of the license please see:

http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/bv-nc-nd/4.0/
This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs

http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/
if^ i Institute of
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ESSAYS ON THE SOCIETY,

HISTORY AND POLITICS OF

Edited with introduction by

Edited with Introduction

Senior Research Fellow, Institute o f African Studies, University o f

(f) Institute o f A frican Studies

Printed at New Times Corporation, Accra

M ap of Brong Ahafo ..................................................... 8

Introduction: The B r o n g ..................................................... 9

NANA KW AKYE AMEYAW & KWAME A R H IN

M. Posnansky ... Professor in Archaeology and

K. O. O d o o m ............... ... Research Fellow in Islamic Studies

Kwakye Arneyaw II ... ... Omanhene of Techiman in the

Kwame Arhin ... Senior Research Fellow in Social

K. A. Britwutn............... ... Senior Lecturer in History, D epart­

K. Y. Daaku ... Senior Lecturer in History at the

Florence Dolphyne ... Senior Lecturer in Linguistics at

F. K. Draft ............. ... Senior Lecturer, Departm ent of

As noted in the Preface, eight of the nine papers in this volum e1

traditions of origin or ‘histories’, observed separate rituals of

In the northwest, Gyaman was also at the head of a confederation

It was probably the same habit of centuries (enforced by common

Atwima, Amansie, Ahafo, Brong, Kwabre, Manso and Sekyere.

N orth rn ............................ 27,175 30% 727,618 6 2

Sources: (1) G hana Fopulation Census 1970.

(2) Socio-Economic Survey 1969, Departm ent of Rural Planning, Accra.

the central government into the Kumasi stool or chiefs’ treasury

10 The Confederation, first mentioned in the records of the govern­

19 See D. Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946— 1960 O.U.P. 1964, pp

The Kintampo tradition, objects of which have been found in

Begho IS said by various authorities to have been founded as

said to have met. The blacksmiths quarter is the smallest in area.

century date. The bowl is reputed to have come from heavem

Begho And The Gonja

Priorities For Future Research

1. M. Posnansky, ‘Ghana and the Origins o f West African Trade’, Africa

2. O. Davies, Ghana Field Motes Pt. Ill, Ashanti, Department o f Archaeology

3. J. Goody, Introduction to Ashanti and the Northwest ed. J. Goody and K .

4. I. Wilks, The Northern Factor in Ashanti History, Institute of African

5. O. Davies, Neolithic cultures in Ghana’ Proc. 4th Pan African Congress o f

6. West African Archaeological Newsletter, 8, (1963), pp. 15-20.

9. P. Ozanne, Ghana Notes and Queries, 8, (Legon, 1966) p. 18.

10. R. A. Bravmann and R. D. Mathewson, ‘A note on the History and Archaeo­

11. R. N. York, R. D. Mathewson, D. Calvocoressi and C. Flight, Archaeology

13. op. cit. notes 3 and 4.

17. M. Delafosse, Vocabulaires comparatifs, (Paris 1904).

19. L. Tauxier, Le Noir de Bondoukou, (Paris 1921).

20. I. Wilks, op. cit. p.

21. Goody 1964, op. cit., p. 194.

22. Bravmann and Mathewson, op. cit. note 10.

24. J. Goody 1964, op. cit. pp. 195-6.

29. O. Davies, ‘Gonja Painted Pottery’, Transactions o f the Historical Society

30. O. Davies, Excavations at Mampongtin, 1955, privately xeroxed and circu­

31. O. Davies, 1964, op. cit.

32. R. D. Mathewson, ‘The Painted Pottery Sequence in the Volta Basin’,

33. P. Ozanne, ‘Early Historic Archaeology of Accra’, Transactions o f the

34. J. R. Anquandah, 1965 op. cit., p. 128.

35. R. N. York, Volta Basin Research Project Excavations at New Buipe;

36. J. Dupuis, Journal o f Residence in Ashantee, (London 1824), p. 244.

K. A. Britwutn............... ... Senior Lecturer in History, D epart

10 The Confederation, first mentioned in the records of the govern

10. R. A. Bravmann and R. D. Mathewson, ‘A note on the History and Archaeo

30. O. Davies, Excavations at Mampongtin, 1955, privately xeroxed and circu

on the Brongs both religiously and culturally and as Goody obser

from M poano (Gold Coast), he could send any of his sub

1. E. Meyerowitz (1952:33) places the foundation of the Bono Manso king

become as great and powerful as the Asantehene who, by the consti