FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003.]

JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC,
MARINDUQUE and GINA S. REY, respondents.

Law Firm of Andrew M. Magturo for petitioner.

Public Attorney's Office for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Private respondent, a married woman but separated de facto from her

husband, cohabited with petitioner. The two were able to acquire properties
during their cohabitation. Subsequently, the couple decided to separate.
Private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
Property with Receivership against petitioner. The trial court declared petitioner
in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief and decided the case in favor of
private respondent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.

The Supreme Court ruled that pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party's
substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the
most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. In the instant case, the fact that
petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax the
application of the rules.
The Court likewise ruled that since the private respondent and the
petitioner were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was
validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter,
their property regime is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. Under this
regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Proof of actual
contribution is required. In the absence of proof of extent of the parties'
respective contributions, their share shall be presumed equal.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PRE-TRIAL; FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO

FILE PRE-TRIAL BRIEF SHALL HAVE THE SAME EFFECT AS FAILURE TO APPEAR
AT THE PRE-TRIAL; CASE AT BAR. — Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules
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 of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have
the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, i.e ., the plaintiff may
present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis
thereof. The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration
showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect. The motion need not really stress the fact that
the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which
contains his defenses is already on record. In the case at bar, petitioner insists
that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is justified because he was not
represented by counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set aside
the order directing private respondent to present evidence ex parte, inasmuch
as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be represented by counsel.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE FACT THAT A PARTY IS NOT ASSISTED BY A

LAWYER IS NOT A PERSUASIVE REASON TO RELAX THE APPLICATION OF PRE-
TRIAL RULES; CASE AT BAR. — Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed
because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party's substantive
rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. In the instant case, the fact that
petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax the
application of the rules. There is nothing in the Constitution which mandates
that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be represented by counsel and that
the absence of such representation amounts to a denial of due process. The
assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession
is not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of
its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.
3. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT
MARRIAGE; ONLY PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY BOTH OF THE PARTIES THROUGH
THEIR ACTUAL JOINT CONTRIBUTION OF MONEY, PROPERTY, OR INDUSTRY
SHALL BE OWNED BY THEM IN COMMON IN PROPORTION TO THEIR RESPECTIVE
CONTRIBUTIONS. — [I]t is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not
capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married to
another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property
regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies
to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, ".
. . only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions . . ." Proof of actual
contribution is required. cITAaD

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE RULE APPLIES EVEN IF COHABITATION OR THE
ACQUISITION OF THE PROPERTY OCCURRED BEFORE THE FAMILY CODE TOOK
EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, although the adulterous
cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the
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 effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144
of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was
no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery
or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION IN THE
ACQUISITION OF THE PROPERTIES IS ESSENTIAL; CASE AT BAR. — In the cases
of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez , which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution
in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the
petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is
without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they
contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano
v. Court of Appeals , we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was
titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient
proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition
of the property. . . . In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house
and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her
complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house.
However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the
purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and December 23,
1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00. On the other hand, both parties claim
that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties came partly
from their joint account with First Allied Development Bank. While there is no
question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is,
however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares
therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of
extent of the parties' respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to
be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00,
the existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence,
their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e ., P55,687.50 each.

6. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF IN CIVIL CASES;

RESTS UPON THE PARTY WHO ASSERTS AN AFFIRMATIVE ISSUE. — As in other
civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the
strength of the party's own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponent's defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case,
the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant
some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in
the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced
that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party
alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
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 evidence.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J : p

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of

parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired
during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. 1

Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, 2 but separated de facto

from her husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque,
sometime in July 1987. 3 After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as
husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto's father. 4 Their
cohabitation was not blessed with any children. Jacinto made a living as the
patron of their fishing vessel "Saguid Brothers." 5 Gina, on the other hand,
worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from
1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacinto's relatives turned sour. Her
periodic absence, however, did not ebb away the conflict with petitioner's
relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year
cohabitation. 6

On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and

Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the
Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that from her salary of
$1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute
P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own
earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and
accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total
value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these
personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.

Private respondent testified that she deposited part of her earnings in her
savings account with First Allied Development Bank. 7 Her Pass Book shows that
as of May 23, 1995, she had a balance of P21,046.08. 8 She further stated that
she had a total of P35,465.00 9 share in the joint account deposit which she and
the petitioner maintained with the same bank. 10 Gina declared that said
deposits were spent for the purchase of construction materials, appliances and
other personal properties. 11
In his answer 12 to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for
the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a
captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private respondent's meager
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 income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of
said house. Besides, selling fish was a mere pastime to her; as such, she was
contented with the small quantity of fish allotted to her from his fishing trips.
Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work continuously in Japan from
1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month duration each year. When their house was
repaired and improved sometime in 1995–1996, private respondent did not
share in the expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the
daily needs and business of her parents. From his income in the fishing
business, he claimed to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which
was placed in a joint account deposit with private respondent. This savings,
according to petitioner was spent in purchasing the disputed personal
properties.

On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for
failure to file a pre-trial brief as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89. 13

On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 14 of the

May 21, 1997 order, which was denied on June 2, 1997, and private respondent
was allowed to present evidence ex parte. 15 Petitioner filed another motion for
reconsideration but the same was also denied on October 8, 1997.
On July 15, 1998, a decision 16 was rendered in favor of private
respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff Gina S. Rey against defendant Jacinto
Saguid:

a) Ordering the partition of the house identified as plaintiff's

Exhibit C and D and directing the defendant to return and/or reimburse
to the plaintiff the amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000,00)
which the latter actually contributed to its construction and
completion;

b) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the

personal properties listed on Exhibit M;

c) Ordering the defendant, and/or anyone in possession of the

aforesaid personal properties, to return and/or deliver the same to the
plaintiff; and
d) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages
in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 17

On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; however,

the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages was deleted for lack of basis. 18 The
appellate court ruled that the propriety of the order which declared the
petitioner as in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new rules now require
the filing of a pre-trial brief and the defendant's non-compliance therewith
entitles the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.
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 Both parties filed motions for reconsideration, which were denied; hence,
petitioner filed the instant petition based on the following assigned errors:
A.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN APPLYING RETROACTIVELY THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT CASE AND HOLDING THE FIRST
ASSIGNED ERROR THEREIN MOOT AND ACADEMIC THUS, FAILED TO
RULE ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SET
ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT DUE TO MISTAKE AND/OR EXCUSABLE
NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.
B.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE

ERROR IN RELYING ON THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
WHICH RECEIVED THE EVIDENCE OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ONLY EX
PARTE. 19
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in
allowing private respondent to present evidence ex parte; and (2) whether or
not the trial court's decision is supported by evidence. TCDcSE

Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure
of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to
appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte and
the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. 20 The remedy of the
defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration 21 showing that his failure to
file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. 22
The motion need not really stress the fact that the defendant has a valid and
meritorious defense because his answer which contains his defenses is already
on record. 23

In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is
justified because he was not represented by counsel. This justification is not,
however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to
present evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not
to be represented by counsel. Even without the assistance of a lawyer,
petitioner was able to file a motion for extension to file answer, 24 the required
answer stating therein the special and affirmative defenses, 25 and several
other motions. 26 If it were true that petitioner did not understand the import of
the April 23, 1997 order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have
inquired from the court or filed a motion for extension of time to file the brief.
Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged receipt of
the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a motion asking the court to excuse his
failure to file a brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because
their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party's substantive rights.
Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed. 27
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 In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is
not a persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. There is nothing in
the Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be
represented by counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts
to a denial of due process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal profession is not engrafted in the due process clause
such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed
ignored or violated. 28
However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered
moot and academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to
present evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief.
While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not called for
in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on
July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under Circular No. 1-89
which became effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular, "
[f]ailure to file Pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure to
appear at the pre-trial," that is, the party may be declared non-suited or
considered as in default. 29

Coming now to the substantive issue, it is not disputed that Gina and
Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was
validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter.
Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 30 of the Family
Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships, where both man and
woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same
married man. Under this regime, ". . . only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions . . ." 31 Proof of actual contribution is required. 32
In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties
commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. 33 Before
Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing
property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 34

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, 35 and Tumlos v. Fernandez , 36 which

involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that
proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The
claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the
bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they failed to
substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the
disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, 37 we ruled that the
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 fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence
of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by the competent evidence and reliance
must be had on the strength of the party's own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent's defense. 38 This applies with more vigor where, as
in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The
plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the
defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the
allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the
court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. 39
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence. 40
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and the personal
properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she
contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in
her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in
the record are receipts 41 in her name for the purchase of construction
materials on November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in the total amount
of P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase
the disputed personal properties came partly from their joint account with First
Allied Development Bank. While there is no question that both parties
contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof
of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148
of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties' respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed
personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of
which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is
equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.

The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
which granted the reliefs prayed for by private respondent. On the basis of the
evidence established, the extent of private respondent's co-ownership over the
disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution
in the construction thereof. Anent the personal properties, her participation
therein should be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50.
As regards the trial court's award of P50,000.0 as moral damages, the
Court of Appeals correctly deleted the same for lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64166 is, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Private
respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the
controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the
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 extent of P55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of
P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing which the house shall be sold at
public auction to satisfy private respondent's claim.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Family Code, Article 148; Agapay v. Palang, 342 Phil. 302, 311–312 (1997),
citing Tolentino, I Civil Code Of The Philippines Commentaries and
Jurisprudence, 500 (1999 edition); Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, 12
April 2000, 330 SCRA 718, 733–734, citing Agapay v. Palang, supra; Adriano
v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 474, 484–485 (2000).
2. Exhibit "A", Marriage Contract showing that Gina S. Rey was married at the
age of 15 to Eduardo V. Salazar on June 19, 1985.
3. Complaint, Records, p. 7.
4. Id., p. 8.
5. Answer, Records, p. 21.
6. Complaint, p. 8.

7. TSN, 20 January 1998, pp. 5–7.

8. Exhibit "K".
9. TSN, 20 January 1998, pp. 16–18.
10. Exhibit "L", First Allied Development Bank Golden Account Pass Book.
11. TSN, 20 January 1998, pp. 5–6 and 9–10.

12. Records, p. 19.

13. Records, p. 41.
14. Records, p. 46.
15. Records, p. 53.

16. Penned by Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano.

17. Records, p. 92.
18. CA-G.R. CV No. 64166, penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona and
concurred in by Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Eloy R. Bello, Jr.
19. Rollo, p. 20.
20. Rule 18, SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear.—The failure of the plaintiff to
appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be
cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant
shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the
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 court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
21. Jungco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78051, 8 November 1989, 179 SCRA
213, 217–218, citing Lucero v. Dacayo, 131 Phil. 99 (1968).
22. Circle Financial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77315, 22 April
1991, 196 SCRA 166, 170.
23. Junco v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 24 at 218.
24. Records, p. 16.
25. Id., p. 19.
26. Records, pp. 44, 46 and 54.

27. Victory Liner, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125034, 30 July 1998, 293
SCRA 378, 384, citing Pedrosa v. Hill, 327 Phil. 153 (1996).

28. Nera v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-24957, 3 August 1988, 164 SCRA 1, 6.
29. Section 2, Rule 20 of the old rules.
30. Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under [Article 147], only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they live
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition of the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until after the termination of the
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
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 of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default or of waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties
are in bad faith.
31. Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 135.

32. Agapay v. Palang, supra, note 1.

33. Tumlos v. Fernandez, supra, note 1, at 733, citing Sempio-Dy, Handbook in
the Family Code of the Philippines, 1997 ed., p. 228; Vitug, Compendium on
Civil Law Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., pp. 210–211.
34. Tumlos v. Fernandez, supra, citing the Family Code, Article 256.
35. Supra, note 1.
36. Supra, note 1.
37. Supra, note 1.
38. Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142546, 9 August
2001, 362 SCRA 531, citing Javier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101177, 28
March 1994, 231 SCRA 498; Pornellosa v. Land Tenure Administration, 110
Phil. 986 (1961).
39. Luxuria Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 989, 1001 (1999), citing
Pascua v. Florendo, 220 Phil. 588 (1985); Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-
40098, 29 August 1975, 66 SCRA 425.

40. Id., citing P.T. Cerna Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91622, 6
April 1993, 221 SCRA 19.
41. Exhibits "O", "O-1" and "O-2".

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