OCTOBER TERM, 1924.

Syllabus. 268 U. S.

GITLOW v. PEOPLE OF NEW YORK.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

No. 19. Argued April 12, 1923; reargued November 23, 1923.-
Decided June 8, 1925.

1. Assumed, for the purposes of the case, that freedom of speech

and of the press are among the personal rights and liberties pro-
tected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States. P. 666.
2. Freedom of speech and of the press, as secured by the Constitu-
tion, is not an absolute right to speak or publish without responsi-
bility whatever one may choose or an immunity for every possible
use of language. P. 666.
3. That a State, in the exercise of its police power, may punish those
who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public wel-
ware, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime or disturb
the public peace, is not open to question. P. 667.
4. For yet more imperative reasons, a State may punish utterances
endangering the foundations of organized government and threat-
ening its overthrow by unlawful means. P. 667.
5. A statute punishing utterances advocating the overthrow of
organized government by force, violence and unlawful means, im-
ports a legislative determination that such utterances are so
inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of sub-
stantive evil that they may be penalized under the police power;
and this determination must be given great weight, and every pre-
sumption be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute.
P. 668.
6. Such utterances present sufficient danger to the public peace and
security of the State to bring their punishment clearly within the
range of legislative discretion, even if the effect of a given utterance
can not accurately be foreseen. P. 669.
7. A State can not reasonably be required to defer taking measures
against these revolutionary utterances until they lead to actual
disturbances of the peace or imminent danger of the State's
destruction. P. 669.
8. The New York statute punishing those who advocate, advise or
teach the duty, necessityi or propriety of overthrowing or over-
turning organized government by force, violence, or any unlaw-
ful means, or who print, publish, or knowingly circulate any book,
 GITLOW v. NEW YORK.
652 Counsel for Parties.

paper, etc., advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that

organized government should be so overthrown, does not penalize
the utterance or publication of abstract Aoctrine or academic dis-
cussin having no quality of incitement to any concrete action, but
denounces the advocacy of action for accomplishing the overthrow
of organized government by unlawful means, and is constitutional
as applied to a printed "Ma n ifesto" advQcating and urging mass
action which shall progressively foment industrial disturbances
and, through political ilass strikes and revolutionary mass action
overthrow and destroy organized parliamentary government; eyen
though the advocacy was in general terms and not addressed to
particular immediate acts or to particular persons. Pp. 654, 672.
9. The statute being constitiutional, it may constitutionally be ap-
plied to every utterance-not too trivial to be beneath the notice
of the law-which is of such a character and used with such in-
tent and purpose as to bring it within the prohibition of the
statute; and the question whether the specific utterance in question
was likely to bring about the substantive evil aimed at by the
statute, is npt open to consideration. Schenck v. United States,
249 U. S. 47, explained. P, 670.
195 App. Div, 773; 234 N. Y,, 132, 539, affirmed.

ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of New

York, affirmed by the Appellate Division thereof and by
the Court of Appeals, sentencing the plaintiff in error for
the crime of criminal anarchy, (New York Laws, 1909,
c.88), of which he had been convicted by a jury.
Messrs. Walter Nelles and Walter H. Pollak, with whom
Messrs. Albert De Silver and Charles S. Ascher were on
the brief, for plaintiff in error.
Messrs W. J. Weatherbee, Deputy Attorney General of
New York, and John Caldwell Myers, Assistant District
Attorney of New York County, with whom Messrs. Carl
Sherman, Attorney General of New York, Claude T.
Dawes, Deputy Attorney General of New York, Joab H.
Banton, District Attorney of New York County, and John
F. O'Neil, Assistant District Attorney of New York
County, were on'the briefs, for defendant in error.
 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.
Opinion of the Court. 268 U. S.

MR. JusICEc SANFORD delivered the opinion of the

Court.
Benjamin Gitlow was indicted in the Supreme Court of
New York, with three others, for the statutory crime of
criminal anarchy. New York Penal Laws, §§ 160, 161.'
He was separately tried, convicted, and sentenced to im-
prisonment. The judgment was affirmed by the Appel-
late Division and by the Court of Appeals. 195 App.
Div. 773; 234 N. Y. 132 and 539. The case is here on
writ of error to the Supreme Court, to which the record
was remitted. 260 U. S.703.
The contention here is that the statute, by its terms and
as applied in this case, is repugnant to the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its material pro-
visions are:
"§ 160. Criminal anarchy defined. Criminal anarchy
is the doctrine that organized government should be over-
thrown by force or violence, or by assassination of the
executive head or of any of the executive officials of gov-
ernment, or by any unlawful means. The advocacy of
such doctrine either by word of mouth or writing is a
felony.
"§ 161. Advocacy of criminal anarchy. Any person
who:
"1. By word of mouth or writing advocates, advises or
teaches the duty, necessity or propriety of overthrowing
or overturning organized government by force or violence,
or by assassination of the executive head or of any of
the executive officials of government, or by any unlawful
means; or,
"2. Prints, publishes, edits, issues or knowingly cir-
culates, sells, distributes or publicly displays any book,
paper, document, or written or printed matter in any
'Laws of 1909, ch. 88; Consol. Laws, 1909, ch. 40. This statute
was originally enacted in 1902. Laws of 1902, ch. 371.
 GITLOW v. NEW YORK.
652 Opinion of the Court.

form, containing or advocating, advising or teaching the

doctrine that organized government should be overthrown
by force, violence or any unlawful means . ,
"Is guilty of a felony and punishable" by imprison-
ment or fine, or both.
The indictment was in two counts. The first charged
that the defendant had advocated, advised and taught
the duty, necessity and propriety of overthrowing and
overturning organized government by force, violence and
unlawful means, by certain writings therein set forth
entitled "The Left Wing Manifesto"; the second that
he had printed, published and knowingly circulated and
distributed a certain paper called "The Revolutionary
Age," containing the writings set forth in the first count
advocating, advising and teaching the doctrine that organ-
ized government should be overthrown by force, violence
and unlawful means.
The following facts were established on the trial by un-
disputed evidence and admissions: The defendant is a
member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party,
a dissenting branch or faction of that party formed in
opposition to its dominant policy of" moderate Socialism."
Membership in both is open to aliens as well as citizens.
The Left Wing Section was organized nationally at a
conference in New York City in June, 1919, attended by
ninety delegates from twenty different States. The con-
ference elected a National Council, of which the defendant
was a member, and left to it the adoption of a "Mani-
festo." This was published in The Revolutionary Age,
the official organ of the Left Wing. The defendant was
on the board of managers of the paper and was its business
manager. He arranged for the printing of the paper and
took to the printer the manuscript of the first issue which
contained the Left Wing Manifesto, and also a Com-
munist Program and a Program of the Left Wing that
had been adopted by the conference. Sixteen thousand
656 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.
Opinion of the Court. 268 U. S.

copies were printed, which were delivered at the premises

in New York City used as the office of the Revolutionary
Age and the headquarters of the Left Wing, and occupied
by the defendant and other officials. These copies were
paid for by the. defendant, as business manager of the
paper. Employees at this office wrapped and mailed out
copies of the paper under the defendant's direction; and
copies were sold from this office. It was admitted that
the defendant signed a card subscribing to the Manifesto
and Program of the Left Wing, which all applicants were
required to sign before being admitted to membership;
that he went to different parts of the State to speak to
branches of the Socialist Party about the principles of
the Left Wing and advocated their adoption; and that
he was responsible for the Manifesto as it appeared, that
"he knew of the publication, in a general way and he
knew of its publication afterwards, and is responsible for
its circulation."
There was no evidence of any effect resulting from the
publication and circulation of the Manifesto.
No witnesses were offered in behalf of the defendant.
Extracts from the Manifesto are set forth in the mar-
gin.2 Coupled with a review of the rise of Socialism, it
2 Italics are given as in the original, but the paragraphing is
omitted.
"The Left Wing Manifesto"
"Issued on Authority of the Conference by the National Council of
the Left Wing.
"The world is in crisis. Capitalism, the prevailing system of
society, is in process of disintegration and collapse.
Humanity can be saved from its last excesses only by the Communist
Revolution. There can now be only the Socialism which is one in
temper and purpose with the proletarian revolutionary struggle.
The class struggle is the heart of Socialism. Without strict
conformity to the class struggle, in its revolutionary implications,
Socialism becomes either sheer Utopianism, or a method of reac-
tion. . . . The dominant Socialism united with the capitalist
 GITLOW v. NEW YORK.
652 Opinion of the Court.

condemned the dominant "moderate Socialism" for its

recognition of the necessity of the democratic parliamen-
tary state; repudiated its policy of introducing Socialism
by legislative measures; and advocated, in plain and un-
equivocal language, the necessity of accomplishing the
"Communist Revolution" by a militant and "revolu-
tionary Socialism ", based on" the class struggle" and mo-
governments to prevent a revolution. The Russian Revolution was
the first act of the proletariat against the war and Imperialism ...
[The] proletariat, urging on the poorer peasantry, conquered power.
It accomplished a proletarian revolution by means of the Bolshevik
policy of 'all power to the Soviets,'-organizing the new transitional
state of proletarian dictatorship. . . Moderate Socialism affirms
that the bourgeois, democratic parliamentary state is the necessary
basis for the introduction of Socialism. . . . Revolutionary
Socialism, on the contrary, insists that the democratic parliamentary
state can never be the basis for the introduction of Socialism; that
it is necessary to destroy the parliamentary state, and construct a
new state of the organized producers, which will deprive the bour-
geoisie of political power, and function as a revolutionary dictatorship
of the proletariat. . . Revolutionary Socialism alone is capable
of mobilizing the proletariat for Socialism, for the conquest of the
power of the state, by means of revolutionary mass action and
proletarian dictatorship. . . . Imperialism is dominant in the
United States, which is now a world power. . . . The war has
aggrandized American Capitalism, instead of weakening it as in
Europe. . . . These conditions modify our immediate task, but
do not alter its general character; this is not the moment of revolu-
tion, but it is the moment of revolutionary struggle. . . Strikes
are developing which verge on revolutionary action, and in which the
suggestion of proletarian dictatorship is apparent, the striker-work-
ers trying to usurp functions of municipal government, as in Seattle
and Winnipeg. The mass struggle of the proletariat is coming into
being. . These strikes will constitute the determining feature
of proletarian action in the days to come. Revolutionary Socialism
must use these mass industrial revolts to broaden the strike, to make
it general and militant; use the strike for political objectives, and,
finally, develop the mass political strike against Capitalism and the
state. Revolutionary Socialism must base itself on the mass struggles
658 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.
Opinion of the Court. 268 U. S.

bilizing the "power of the proletariat in action," through

mass industrial revolts developing into mass political
strikes and "revolutionary mass action ", for the purpose
of conquering and destroying the parliamentary state and
establishing in its place, through a "revolutionary dic-
tatorship of the proletariat ", the system of Communist
Socialism. The then recent strikes in Seattle and Win-
nipeg' were cited as instances of a development already
verging on revolutionary action and suggestive of prole-
of the proletariat, engage directly in these struggles while emphasiz-
ing the revolutionary purposes of Socialism and the proletarian
movement. The mass strikes of the American proletariat provide
the material basis out of which to develop the concepts and action
of revolutionary Socialism. . . Our task . . . is to articu-
late and organize the mass of the unorganized industrial proletariat.,
which constitutes the basis for a militant Socialism. The struggle
for the revolutionary industrial unionism of the proletariat becomes
an indispensable phase of revolutionary Socialism, on the basis of
which to broaden and deepen the action of the militant proletariat,
developing reserves for the ultimate conquest of power.
Revolutionary Socialism adheres to the class struggle because through
the class struggle alone-the mass struggle-can the industrial
proletariat secure immediate concessions and finally conquer power
by organizing the industrial governm~nt of the working class. The
class struggle is a political struggle . . . in the sense that its
objective is political-the overthrow of the political organization
upon which capitalistic exploitation depends, and the introduction
of a new social system. The direct objective is the conquest by the
proletariat of the power of the state. Revolutionary Socialism does
not propose to 'capture' the bourgeois parliamentary state, but to
conquer and destroy it. Revolutionary Socialism, accordingly, repu-
diates the policy of introducing Socialism by means of legislative
measures on the basis of the bourgeois state. . . . It proposes to
conquer by means of political action . . . in the revolutionary
(Footnote 2 continued on foflowing pages.)
3 There was testitnony at the trial that "there was an extended
strike at Winnipeg commencing May 15, 1919, during which the pro-
duction and supply of necessities, transportation, postal and
telegraphic communication and fire and sanitary protection were
suspended or'seriously curtailed."
 GITLOW v. NEW YORK.
652 Opinion of the Court.

tarian dictatorship, in which the strike-workers were

"trying to usurp the functions of municipal govern-
ment "; and revolutionary Socialism, it was urged, must
use these mass industrial revolts to broaden the strike,
make it general and militant, and develop it into mass
political strikes and revolutionary mass action for the an-
nihilation of the parliamentary state.
At the outset of the trial the defendant's counsel
objected to the introduction of any evidence under the
Marxian sense, which does not simply mean parliamentarism, but the
class action of the proletariat in any form having as its objective
the conquest of the power of the state. . . . Parliamentary action
which emphasizes the implacable character of the class struggle is an
indispensable means of agitation. . . . But parlianientarism can-
not conquer the power of the state for the proletariat. . . . It is
accomplished, not by the legislative representatives of the proletariat,
but by the mass power of the proletariat in action. The supreme
power of the proletariat inheres in the political mass strike, in using
the industnal mass power of the proletariat for political objectives.
Revolutionary Socialism, accordingly, recognizes that the supreme
form of proletarian political action is the political mass strike.
. . . The power of the proletariat lies fundamentally in its con-
trol of the industrial process. The mobilization of this control in
action against the bourgeois state and Capitalism means the end of
Capitalism, the initial form of the revolutionary mass action that will
conquer the power of the state. . . . The revolution starts with
strikes of protest, developing into mass political strikes and then into
revolutionary mass action for the conquest of the power of the state.
Mass action becomes political in purpose while extra-parliamentary
in form; it is equally a process of revolution and the revolution itself
in operation. The final objective of mass action is the conquest of
the power of the state, the annihilation of the bourgeois parliamentary
state and the introduction of the transition proletarian state, func-
tioning as a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.
The bourgeois parliamentary.state is the organ of the bourgeoisie for
the coercion of the proletariat. The revolutionary proletariat must,
accordingly, destroy this state. . . . It is theiefore necessary that
the proletariat organize its own state for the coercion and suppression
of the bourgeoisie. ... Proletarian dictatorship is a recognition
of the necessity for a revolutionary state to coerce and suppress the
660 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.
Opinion of the Court. 268 U.S.

indictment on the grounds that, as a matter of law, the

Manifesto "is not in contravention of the statute," and
that "the statute is in contravention of" the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This objection
was denied. They also moved, at the close of the evi-
dence, to dismiss the indictment and direct an acquittal
"on the grounds stated in the first objection to evidence ",

bourgeoisie; it is equally a recognition of the fact that, in the Com-

munist reconstruction of society, the proletariat as a class alone
counts. . . . The old machinery of the state cannot be used by
the revolutionary proletariat. It must be destroyed. The proletariat
creates a new state, based directly upon the industrially organized
producers, upon the industrial unions or Soviets, or a combination of
both. It is this state alone, functioning as a dictatorship of the
proletariat, that can realize Socialism. . . . While the dictator-
ship of the proletariat performs its negative task of crushing the old
order, it performs the positive task of constructing the new. Together
with the government of the proletarian dictatorship, there is developed
a new 'government,' which is no longer government in the old sense,
since it concerns itself with the management of production and not
with the government of persons. Out of workers' control of industry,
introduced by the proletarian dictatorship, there develops the com-
plete structure of Communist Socialism,-industrial self-government
of the communistically organized producers. When this structure is
completed, which implies the complete expropriation of the bourgeoisie
economically and politically, the dictatorship of the proletariat ends,
in its place coming the full and free social and individual autonomy
of the Communist order. . . . It is not a problem of immediate
revolution. It is a problem of the immediate revolutionary struggle.
The revolutionary epoch of the final struggle against Capitalism may
last for years and tens of years; but the Communist International
offers a policy and program immediate and ultimate in scope, that
provides for the immediate class struggle against Capitalism, in its
revolutionary implications, and for the final act of the conquest of
power. The old order is in decay. Civilization is in collapse. The
proletarian revolution and the Communist reconstruction of society-
the struggle for these-is now indispensable. This is the message
of the Communist International to the workers of the world. The
Communist International calls the proletariat of the world to the final
struggle !"
 GITLOW v. NEW YORK.
652 Opinion of the Court.

and again on the grounds that "the indictment does not

charge an offense" and the evidence "does not show an
offense." These motions were also denied.
The court, among other things, charged the jury, in
substance, that they must determine what was the intent,
purpose and fair meaning of the Manifesto; that its words
must be taken in their ordinary meaning, as they would
be understood by people whom it might reach; that a
mere statement or analysis of social and economic facts
and historical incidents, in the nature of an essay, accom-
panied by prophecy as to the future course of events, but
with no teaching, advice or advocacy of action, would not
constitute the advocacy, advice or teaching of a doctrine
for the overthrow of government within the meaning of
the statute; that a mere statement that unlawful acts
might accomplish such a purpose would be insufficient,
unless there was a teaching, advising and advocacy of
employing such unlawful acts for the purpose of over-
throwing government; and that if the jury had a reason-
able doubt that the Manifesto did teach, advocate or
advise the duty, .necessity or propriety of using unlawful
means for the overthrowing of organized government, the
defendant was entitled to an acquittal.
The defendant's counsel submitted two requests to
charge which embodied in substance the statement that
to constitute criminal anarchy within the meaning of the
statute it was necessary that the language used or pub-
lished should advocate, teach or advise the duty, necessity
or propriety of doing "some cfefinite or immediate act
or acts" of force, violence or unlawfulness directed toward
the overthrowing of organized government. These were
denied further than had been charged. Two other re-
quests to charge embodied in substance the statement
that to constitute guilt the language used or published
must be "reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite
certain persons" to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness,
 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.
Opinion of the Court. 268 U.S.

with the object of overthrowing organized government.

These were also denied.
The Appellate Division, after setting forth extracts
from the Manifesto and referring to the Left Wing and
Communist Programs published in the same issue of the
Revolutionary Age, said: "" It is perfectly plain that the
plan and purpose advocated . . . contemplate the
overthrow and destruction of the governments of the
United States and of all the States, not by the free action
of the majority of the people through the ballot box in
electing representatives to authorize a change of govern-
ment by amending or changing the Constitution,
but by immediately organizing the industrial proletariat
into militant Socialist unions and at the earliest oppor-
tunity through mass strike and force and violence, if
necessary, compelling the government to cease to func-
tion, and. then through a proletarian dictatorship, taking
charge of and appropriating all property and administer-
ing it and governing through such dictatorship until such
time as the proletariat is permitted to administer and
govern it. . . . The articles in question are not a
discussion of ideas and theories. They advocate a doc-
trine deliberately determined upon and planned for mili-
tantly disseminating a propaganda advocating that it is
the duty and necessity of the proletariat engaged in
industrial pursuits to organize to such an extent that, by
massed strike, the wheels of government may ultimately
be stopped and the government overthrown .

The Court of Appeals held that the Manifesto "advo-

cated the overthrow of this government by violence, or
by unlawful means." ' In one of the opinions represent-
4 195 App. Div. 773, 782, 790.
5Five judges, constituting the majority of the court, agreed in this
view. 234 N. Y. 132, 138. And the two judges, constituting the
minority-who dissented solely on a question as to the construction
of the statute which is not here involved-said in reference to the
 GITLOW v. NEW YORK.
652 Opinion of the Court.

ing the views of a majority of the court,' it was said:

"It will be seen . . . that this defendant through
the manifesto . . advocated the destruction of the
state and the establishment of the dictatorship of the
proletariat. . . . To advocate . the commis-
sion of this conspiracy or action by mass strike whereby
government is crippled, the administration of justice
paralyzed, and the health, morals and welfare of a com-
munity endangered, and this for the purpose of bringing
about a revolution in the state, is to advocate the over-
throw of organized government by unlawful means." In
the other' it was said: "As we read this manifesto
we feel entirely clear that the jury were justified in
rejecting the view that it was a mere academic and harm-
less discussion of the advantages of communism and
advanced socialism" and "in regarding it as a justifica-
tion and advocacy of action by one class which would
destroy the rights of all other classes and overthrow the
state itself by use of revolutionary mass strikes. It is
true that there is no advocacy in specific terms of the
use of . . force or violence. There was no need to
be. Some things are so commonly incident to others that
they do not need to be mentioned when the underlying
purpose is described."
And both the Appellate Division and the Court of
Appeals held the statute constitutional.
The specification of the errors relied on relates solely
to the specific rulings of the trial court in the matters
hereinbefore set out.' The correctness of the verdict is not
Manifesto: "Revolution for the purpose of overthrowing the present
form and the established political system of the United States gov-
ernment by direct means rather than by constitutional means is
therein clearly advocated and defended . ." p. 154.
6
Pages 141, 142.
7 Pages 149, 150.
8 Exceptions to all of these rulings had been duly taken.
 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.
Opinion of the Court. 268 U. S.

questioned, as the case was submitted to the jury. The

sole contention here is, essentially, that as there was no
evidence of any concrete result flowing from the publica-
tion of the Manifesto or of circumstances showing the
likelihood of such result, the statute as construed and ap-
plied by the trial court penalizes the mere utterance, as
such, of "doctrine" having no quality of incitement,
without regard either to the circumstances of its utter-
ance or to the likelihood of unlawful sequences; and that,
as the exercise of the right of free expression with relation
to government is only punishable "in circumstances in-
volving likelihood of substantive evil," the statute con-
travenes the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The argument in support of this contention rests
primarily upon the following propositions: 1st, That the
"liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in-
cludes the liberty of speech and of the press; and 2nd,
That while liberty of expression "is not absolute," it may
be restrained "only in circumstances where its exercise
bears a causal relation with some substantive evil, con-
summated, attempted or likely," and as the statute "takes
no account of circumstances," it unduly restrains this
liberty and is therefore unconstitutional.
The precise question presented, and the only question
which we can consider under this writ of error, then is,
whether the statute, as construed and applied in this case
by the state courts, deprived the defendant of his liberty
of expression in violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The statute does not penalize the utterance or publica-
tion of abstract "doctrine" or academic discussion having
no quality of incitement to any concrete action. It is not
aimed against mere historical or philosophical essays. It
does not restrain the advocacy of changes in the form of
government by constitutional and lawful means. What
it prohibits is language advocating, advising or teaching
 GITLOW v. NEW YORK.
652 Opinion of the Court.

the overthrow of organized government by unlawful

means. These words imply urging to action. Advocacy
is defined in the Century Dictionary as: " 1. The act of
pleading for, supporting, or recommending; active
espousal." It is not the abstract "doctrine" of over-
throwing organized government by unlawful means wyhich
is denounced by the statute, but the advocacy of action
for the accomplishment of that purpose. It was so con-
strued and applied by the trial judge, who specifically
charged the jury that: "A mere grouping of historical
events and a prophetic deduction from themwould neither
constitute advocacy, advice or teaching of'a doctrine for
the overthrow of government by force, violence or unlaw-
ful means. [And] if it were a mere essay on the subject,
as suggested by cpunsel, based upon deductions from al-
leged historical events, with no teaching, advice or ad-
vocacy of action, it would not constitute a violation of the
statute. "
The Manifesto, plainly, is neither the statement of ab-
stract doctrine nor, as suggested by counsel, mere predic-
tion that industrial disturbances and revolutionary mass
strikes will result spontaneously in an inevitable process
of evolution in the economic system. It advocates and
urges in fervent language mass action which shall pro-
gressively foment industrial disturbances and through
political mass strikes and revolutionary mass action over-
throw and destroy organized parliarientary government.
It concludes with a call to action in these words: "The
proletariat revolution and the Communist reconstruction
of society-the struggle for these-is now indispensable.
. . . The Communist International calls the prole-
tariat of the world to the final struggle!" This is not the
expression of philosophical abstraction, the mere predic-
tion of future events; it is the language of direct
incitement.
The means advocated for bringing about the destruction
of organized parliamentary government, namely, mass in-
 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.
Opinion of the Court. 268 U. S.

dustrial revolts usurping the functions of municipal gov-

ernment, political mass strikes directed against the parlia-
mentary state, and revolutionary mass action for its final
destruction, necessarily imply the use of force and violence,
and in their essential nature are inherently unlawful in a
constitutional government of law and order. That the jury
were warranted in finding that the Manifesto advocated
not merely the abstract doctrine of overthrowing organ-
ized government by force, violence and unlawful means,
but action to that end, is clear.
For present purposes we may and do assume that
freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected
by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-
are among the fundamental personal rights and "liber-
ties" protected by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment from impairment by the States. We
do not regard the incidental statement in PrudentialIns.
Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 543, that the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes no restrictions on'the States concern-
ing freedom of speech, as determinative of this question.'
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the
freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by
the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to
speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one
may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that
gives immunity for every possible use of language and
prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.
2 Story on the Constitution, 5th ed., § 1580, p. 634;
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281; Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462; Fox v. Washington, 236
9 Compare Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462; Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 108; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 17;
Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 276; Schaefer v. United-States, 251
U. S. 466, 474; Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 338; Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399; 2 Story On the Constitution, 5th Ed.,
§ 1950, p. 698.
 GITLOW v. NEW YORK.
652 Opinion of the Court.

U. S. 273, 276; Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52;

Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 206; Debs v.
United States, 249 U. S. 211, 213; Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U. S. 466, 474; Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254
U. S. 325, 332; Warren v. United States, (C. C. A.) 183
Fed. 718, 721. Reasonably limited, it was said by Story
in the passage cited, this freedom is an inestimable privi-
lege in a free government; without such limitation, it
might become the scourge of the republic.
That a State in the exercise of its police power may
punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inim-
ical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public
morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not
open to question. Robertson v. Baldwin, supra,.p. 281;
Pattersonv. Colorado, supra, p. 462; Fox v. Washington,
supra,p. 277; Gilbert v. Minnesota, supra,p. 339; People
v. Most, 171 N. Y. 423, 431; State v. Holm, 139 Minn.
267, 275; State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351, 359; State
v. Boyd, 86 N. J. L. 75, 79; State v. McKee, 73 Conn.
18, 27. Thus it was held by this Court in the Fox Case,
that a State may punish publications advocating and
encouraging a breach of its criminal laws; and, in the
Gilbert Case, that a State may punish utterances teaching
or advocating that its citizens should not assist the United
States in prosecuting or carrying on war with its public
enemies.
And, for yet more imperative reasons, a State may
punish utterances endangering the foundations of organ-
ized government and threatening its overthrow by unlaw-
ful means. These imperil its own existence as a con-
stitutional State. Freedom of speech and press, said
Story (supra) does not protect disturbances to the public
peace or the attempt to subvert the government. It does
not protect publications or teachings which tend to sub-
vert or imperil the government or to impede or hinder it
in the performance of its governmental duties. State v.
668 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.
Opinion of the Court. 268 U. S.

Holm, supra, p. 275. It does not protect publications

prompting the overthrow of government by force; the
punishment of those who publish articles which tend to
destroy organized society being essential to the security of
freedom and the stability of the State. People v. Most,
supra,pp. 431, 432. And a State may penalize utterances
which openly advocate the overthrow of the representa-
tive and constitutional form of government of the United
States and the several States, by violence or other unlaw-
ful means. People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 34. See also,
State v. Tachin, 92 N. J. L. 269, 274; and People v.
Steelik, 187 Cal. 361, 375. In short this freedom does
not deprive a State of the primary and essential right of
self preservation; which, so long as human governments
endure, they cannot be denied. Turner v. Williams, 194
U. S. 279, 294. In Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States, 247 U. S.402, 419, it was said: "The safeguarding
and fructification of free and constitutional institutions
is the very basis and mainstay upon which the freedom
of the press rests, and that freedom, therefore, does not
and cannot be held to include the right virtually to
destroy such institutions."
By enacting the present statute the State has deter-
mined, through its legislative body, that utterances advo-
cating the overthrow of organized government by force,
violence and unlawful means, are so inimical to the gen-
eral welfare and involve such danger of substantive evil
that they may be penalized in the exercise of its police
power. That determination must be given great weight.
Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the
validity of the statute. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S.623,
661. And the case is to be considered "in the light of
the principle that the State is primarily the judge of regu-
lations required in the interest of public safety and wel-
fare; " and that its police "statutes may only be declared
unconstitutional where they are arbitrary or unreason-
 GITLOW v. NEW YORK.
652 Opinion of the Court.

able attempts to exercise authority vested in the State

in the. public interest." Great Northern Ry. v. Clara
City, 246 U. S. 434, 439. That utterances inciting to the
overthrow of organized government by unlawful means,
present a sufficient danger of substantive evil to bring
their punishment within the range of legislative discre-
tion, is clear. Such utterances, by their very nature,
involve danger to the public peace and to the security of
the State. They threaten breaches of the peace and
ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger is none
the less real and substantial, because the effect of a given
utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The State can-
not reasonably be required to measure the danger from
every such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler's
scale. A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire
that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping
and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the
State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when in the ex-
ercise of its judgment as to the measuresnecessary to pro-
tect the public peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the
spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or
blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be re-
quired to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace
and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual
disturbances of the public peace or imminent and im-
mediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the
exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened danger
in its incipiency. In People v. Lloyd, supra, p. 35, it
was aptly said: "Manifestly, the legislature has authority
to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine designed and intended
to overthrow the government without waiting until there
is a present and imminent danger of the success of the
plan advocated. If the State were compelled to wait
until the apprehended danger became certain, then its
right to protect itself would come into being simultane-
ously with the overthrow of the government, when there
 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.
Opinion of the Court. 268 U. S.

would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the

enforcement of the law."
We cannot hold that the present statute is an arbitrary
6r unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State
unwarrantably infringing the freedom of speech or press;
and we must and do sustain its constitutionality.
This being so it may be applied to every utterance-
not too trivial to be beneath the notice of the law-which
is of such a character and used with such intent and pur-
pose as to bring it within the prohibition of the statute.
This principle is illustrated in Fox v. Washington, supra,
p. 277; Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 624;
Schaefer v. United States, supra, pp. 479, 480; Pierce v.
United States, 252 U. S. 239, 250, 251; 10 and Gilbert v.
Minnesota, supra, p. 333. In other words, when the legis-
lative body has determined generally, in the constitu-
tional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a cer-
tain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they
may be punished, the question whether any specific utter-
ance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and
of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open to
consideration. It is sufficient that the statute itself be
constitutional and that the use of the language comes
within its prohibition.
It is clear that the question in such cases is entirely
different from that involved in those cases where the
statute merely prohibits certain acts involving the danger
of substantive evil, without any reference to language it-
self, and it is sought to apply its provisions to language
10 This reference is to so much of the decision as relates to the con-
viction under the third count. in considering the effect of the de-
cisions under the Espionage Act of 1917 and the amendment of 1918,
the distinction must be kept in mind between indictments under those
provisions which specifically punish certain utterances, and those
which merely punish specified acts in general terms, without specific
reference to the use of language.
 GITLOW v. NEW YORK.
652 Opinion of the Court.

used by the defendant for the purpose of bringing about

the prohibited results. There, if it be contended that the
statute cannot be applied to the language used by the de-
fendant because of its protection by the freedom of speech
or press, it must necessarily be found, as an original ques-
tion, without any previous determination by the legisla-
tive body, whether the specific language used involved
such likelihood of bringing about the substantive evil as
to deprive it of the constitutional protection. In such
cases it has been held that the general provisions of the
statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific
utterance of the defendant if its natural tendency and
probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body might prevent. Schenck v.
United States, supra,p. 51; Debs v. United States, supra.,
pp. 215, 216. And the general statement in the Schenck
Case (p. 52) that the "question in every case is whether
the words are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils,"-upon which great
reliance is placed in the defendant's argument-was mani-
festly intended, as shown by the context, to apply only in
cases of this class, and has no application to those like the
present, where the legislative body itself has previously
determined the danger of substantive evil arising from
utterances of a specified character.
The defendant's brief does not separately discuss any
of the rulings of the trial court. It is only necessary to
say that, applying the general rules already stated, we find
that none of them involved any invasion of the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant. It was not necessary,
within the meaning of the statute, that the defendant
should have advocated "some definite or immediate act
or acts" of force, violence or unlawfulness. It was suffi-
cient if such acts were advocated in general terms; and
it was not essential that their immediate execution should
 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.
HOLMES and BRANDEIS, JJ., dissenting. 268 U. S.

have been advocated. Nor was it necessary that the

language should have been "reasonably and ordinarily
calculated to incite certain persons" to acts of force, vio-
lence or unlawfulness. The advocacy need not be ad-
dressed to specific persons. Thus, the publication and
circulation of a newspaper article may be an encourage-
ment or endeavor to persuade to murder, although not
addressed to any person in particular. Queen v. Most,
L. R., 7 Q. B. D. 244.
We need not enter upon a consideration of the English
common law rule of seditious libel or the Federal Sedition
Act of 1798, to which reference is made in the defendant's
brief. These are so unlike the present statute, that we
think the decisions under them cast no helpful light upon
the questions here.
And finding, for the reasons stated, that the statute is
not in itself unconstitutional, and that it has not been
applied in the present case in derogation of any constitu-
tional right, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTCE HOLMES, dissenting.
MR. JusTicE BRANDEIS and I are of opinion that this
judgment should be reversed. The general principle of free
speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in
the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has
been given to the word 'liberty' as there used, although
perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger lati-
tude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the
sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the
laws of the United States. If I am right, then I think
that the criterion sanctioned by the full Court in Schenck
v. United States, 249 U. S.47, 52, applies. "The question
in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substan-
 GITLOW v. NEW YORK.
652 HOLMES and BRANDEIS, JJ., dissenting.

tive evils that [the State] has a right to prevent." It is

true that in my opinion this criterion was departed from
in Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, but the con-
victions that I expressed in that case are too deep for it to
be possible for me as yet to believe that it and Schaefer v.
UnitedStates, 251 U. S. 466, have settled the law. If what
I think the correct test is applied, it is manifest that there
was no present danger of an attempt to overthrow the
government by force on the part of the admittedly small
minority who shared the defendant's views. It is said that
this manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an in-
citement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself
for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other
belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the
movement at its birth. The only difference between the
expression of an opinion and an incitement in the nar-
rower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result.
Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be
thought of the redundant discourse before us it had no
chance of starting a present conflagration. If in the
long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship
are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the
community, the only meaning of free speech is that they
should be given their chance and have their way.
If the publication of this document had been laid as an
attempt to induce an uprising against government at once
and not at some indefinite time in the future it would
have presented a different question. The object would
have been one with which the law might deal, subject to
the doubt whether there was any danger that the publica-
tion could produce any result, or in other words, whether
it was not futile and too remote from possible con-
sequences. But the indictment alleges the publication
and nothing more.