Orduña vs. Fuentebella, 622 SCRA 146, June 29, 2010

3/26/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 622
G.R. No. 176841. June 29, 2010.*

ANTHONY ORDUÑA, DENNIS ORDUÑA, and
ANTONITA ORDUÑA, petitioners, vs. EDUARDO J.
FUENTEBELLA, MARCOS S. CID, BENJAMIN F. CID,
BERNARD G. BANTA, and ARMANDO GABRIEL, JR.,
respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; Statute of Frauds; The Statute of

Frauds expressed in Article 1403, par. (2), of the Civil Code applies
only to executory contracts, i.e, those where no performance has yet
been made; The Statute does not come into play where the contract
in question is completed, executed, or partially consummated.—
Foremost of these is that the Statute of Frauds expressed in
Article 1403, par. (2), of the Civil Code applies only to executory
contracts, i.e., those where no performance has yet been made.
Stated a bit differently, the legal consequence of non-compliance
with the Statute does not come into play where the contract in
question is completed, executed, or partially consummated.
Same; Same; Same; The Statute does not deprive the parties of
the right to contract with respect to the matters therein involved,
but merely regulates the formalities of the contract necessary to
render it enforceable.—The purpose of the Statute is to prevent
fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending for
their evidence on the unassisted memory of witnesses, by
requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to be
evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged. The
Statute requires certain contracts to be evidenced by some note or
memorandum in order to
* FIRST DIVISION.
147
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 147
Orduña vs. Fuentebella
be enforceable. The term “Statute of Frauds” is descriptive of

statutes that require certain classes of contracts to be in writing.
The Statute does not deprive the parties of the right to contract
with respect to the matters therein involved, but merely regulates
the formalities of the contract necessary to render it enforceable.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001786dcfb089fcdbd732003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/20
Same; Same; Same; The form required under the Statute is for
convenience or evidentiary purposes only.—Since contracts are
generally obligatory in whatever form they may have been
entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity
are present, the Statute simply provides the method by which the
contracts enumerated in Art. 1403 (2) may be proved but does not
declare them invalid because they are not reduced to writing. In
fine, the form required under the Statute is for convenience or
evidentiary purposes only.
Same; Same; Same; A contract that infringes the Statute of

Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of benefits under the contract.
—Lest it be overlooked, a contract that infringes the Statute of
Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of benefits under the
contract. Evidently, Gabriel, Jr., as his father earlier, had
benefited from the partial payments made by the petitioners.
Same; Property; Reconveyance; Prescription; An action for

annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is
imprescriptible where the suitor is in possession of the property
subject of the acts, the action partaking as it does of a suit for
quieting of title which is imprescriptible.—The basic complaint, as
couched, ultimately seeks the reconveyance of a fraudulently
registered piece of residential land. Having possession of the
subject lot, petitioners’ right to the reconveyance thereof, and the
annulment of the covering title, has not prescribed or is not time-
barred. This is so for an action for annulment of title or
reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the suitor is
in possession of the property subject of the acts, the action
partaking as it does of a suit for quieting of title which is
imprescriptible. Such is the case in this instance. Petitioners have
possession of subject lots as owners having purchased the same
from Gabriel, Sr. subject only to the full payment of the agreed
price.
148
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Double Sales; Buyer in Good Faith; A buyer of a

piece of land which is in the actual possession of persons other
than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of
those in possession; The buyer who has failed to know or discover
that the land sold to him is in adverse possession of another is a
buyer in bad faith.—Basic is the rule that a buyer of a piece of
land which is in the actual possession of persons other than the
seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in
possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly
be regarded as a buyer in good faith. When a man proposes to buy
or deal with realty, his duty is to read the public manuscript, i.e.,
to look and see who is there upon it and what his rights are. A
want of caution and diligence which an honest man of ordinary
prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases is, in
contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has
failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in adverse
possession of another is a buyer in bad faith.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Not being purchasers in good faith,
respondents having registered the sale, will not, as against the
petitioners, carry the day for any of them under Article 1544 of the
Civil Code prescribing rules on preference in case of double sales of
immovable property; Rules in the Application of Article 1544.—
Not being purchasers in good faith, their having registered the
sale, will not, as against the petitioners, carry the day for any of
them under Art. 1544 of the Civil Code prescribing rules on
preference in case of double sales of immovable property. Occeña
v. Esponilla, 431 SCRA 116 (2004) laid down the following rules
in the application of Art. 1544: (1) knowledge by the first buyer of
the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except when
the second buyer first register in good faith the second sale; and
(2) knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats
his rights even if he is first to register, since such knowledge
taints his registration with bad faith.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Benigno Y. Cornes for petitioners.
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VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 149

Galo Reyes for respondents Cids.

Zosimo Abratique for respondents Fuentebella and
Banta.

VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, Anthony Orduña, Dennis Orduña and Antonita
Orduña assail and seek to set aside the Decision[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 4, 2006 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 79680, as reiterated in its Resolution of March 6,
2007, which affirmed the May 26, 2003 Decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 in Baguio City, in
Civil Case No. 4984-R, a suit for annulment of title and
reconveyance commenced by herein petitioners against
herein respondents.
Central to the case is a residential lot with an area of 74

square meters located at Fairview Subdivision, Baguio
City, originally registered in the name of Armando Gabriel,
Sr. (Gabriel Sr.) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 67181 of the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City.[4]
As gathered from the petition, with its enclosures, and
the comments thereon of four of the five respondents,[5] the
Court gathers the following relevant facts:
Sometime in 1996 or thereabouts, Gabriel Sr. sold the
subject lot to petitioner Antonita Orduña (Antonita), but no
formal deed was executed to document the sale. The
contract price was apparently payable in installments as
Antonita
_______________
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-24, dated April 21, 2007.
[2] Id., at pp. 25-35. Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag and
concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and
Noel G. Tijam.
[3] Id., at pp. 38-49. Penned by Presiding Judge Fernando Vil
Pamintuan.
[4] Exh. “D”.
[5] Respondent Gabriel, Jr. did not file his comment.
150

remitted from time to time and Gabriel Sr. accepted partial

payments. One of the Orduñas would later testify that
Gabriel Sr. agreed to execute a final deed of sale upon full
payment of the purchase price.[6]
As early as 1979, however, Antonita and her sons,
Dennis and Anthony Orduña, were already occupying the
subject lot on the basis of some arrangement undisclosed in
the records and even constructed their house thereon. They
also paid real property taxes for the house and declared it
for tax purposes, as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. (TD)
96-04012-111087[7] in which they place the assessed value
of the structure at PhP 20,090.
After the death of Gabriel Sr., his son and namesake,
respondent Gabriel Jr., secured TCT No. T-71499[8] over
the subject lot and continued accepting payments from the
petitioners. On December 12, 1996, Gabriel Jr. wrote
Antonita authorizing her to fence off the said lot and to
construct a road in the adjacent lot.[9] On December 13,
1996, Gabriel Jr. acknowledged receipt of a PhP 40,000
payment from petitioners.[10] Through a letter[11] dated

May 1, 1997, Gabriel Jr. acknowledged that petitioner had
so far made an aggregate payment of PhP 65,000, leaving
an outstanding balance of PhP 60,000. A receipt Gabriel Jr.
issued dated November 24, 1997 reflected a PhP 10,000
payment.
Despite all those payments made for the subject lot,
Gabriel Jr. would later sell it to Bernard Banta (Bernard)
obviously without the knowledge of petitioners, as later
developments would show.
_______________
[6] RTC Decision, p. 5, Rollo, p. 42.
[7] Exh. “A”.
[8] Records, p. 221.
[9] Exh. “H”.
[10] Exh. “G”.
[11] Exh. “E”.
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VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 151

As narrated by the RTC, the lot conveyance from Gabriel

Jr. to Bernard was effected against the following backdrop:
Badly in need of money, Gabriel Jr. borrowed from Bernard
the amount of PhP 50,000, payable in two weeks at a fixed
interest rate, with the further condition that the subject lot
would answer for the loan in case of default. Gabriel Jr.
failed to pay the loan and this led to the execution of a
Deed of Sale[12] dated June 30, 1999 and the issuance later
of TCT No. T-72782[13] for subject lot in the name of
Bernard upon cancellation of TCT No. 71499 in the name of
Gabriel, Jr. As the RTC decision indicated, the reluctant
Bernard agreed to acquire the lot, since he had by then
ready buyers in respondents Marcos Cid and Benjamin F.
Cid (Marcos and Benjamin or the Cids).
Subsequently, Bernard sold to the Cids the subject lot
for PhP 80,000. Armed with a Deed of Absolute Sale of a
Registered Land[14] dated January 19, 2000, the Cids were
able to cancel TCT No. T-72782 and secure TCT No.
72783[15] covering the subject lot. Just like in the
immediately preceding transaction, the deed of sale
between Bernard and the Cids had respondent Eduardo J.
Fuentebella (Eduardo) as one of the instrumental
witnesses.
Marcos and Benjamin, in turn, ceded the subject lot to
Eduardo through a Deed of Absolute Sale[16] dated May 11,
2000. Thus, the consequent cancellation of TCT No. T-
72782 and issuance on May 16, 2000 of TCT No. T-3276[17]

over subject lot in the name of Eduardo.
As successive buyers of the subject lot, Bernard, then
Marcos and Benjamin, and finally Eduardo, checked, so
each
_______________
[12] Exh. “J”. Records, p. 223. Also Exh. “1”.
[13] Exh. “K”.
[14] Records, p. 226.
[15] Exh. “M”.
[16] Records, p. 230. Exh. “N”.
[17] Id., at p. 232.
152

claimed, the title of their respective predecessors-in-

interest with the Baguio Registry and discovered said title
to be free and unencumbered at the time each purchased
the property. Furthermore, respondent Eduardo, before
buying the property, was said to have inspected the same
and found it unoccupied by the Orduñas.[18]
Sometime in May 2000, or shortly after his purchase of
the subject lot, Eduardo, through his lawyer, sent a letter
addressed to the residence of Gabriel Jr. demanding that
all persons residing on or physically occupying the subject
lot vacate the premises or face the prospect of being ejected.
[19]
Learning of Eduardo’s threat, petitioners went to the
residence of Gabriel Jr. at No. 34 Dominican Hill, Baguio
City. There, they met Gabriel Jr.’s estranged wife, Teresita,
who informed them about her having filed an affidavit-
complaint against her husband and the Cids for
falsification of public documents on March 30, 2000.
According to Teresita, her signature on the June 30, 1999
Gabriel Jr. – Bernard deed of sale was a forgery. Teresita
further informed the petitioners of her intent to honor the
aforementioned 1996 verbal agreement between Gabriel Sr.
and Antonita and the partial payments they gave her
father-in-law and her husband for the subject lot.
On July 3, 2001, petitioners, joined by Teresita, filed a
Complaint[20] for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance with
Damages against the respondents before the RTC, docketed
as Civil Case No. 4984-R, specifically praying that TCT No.
T-3276 dated May 16, 2000 in the name of Eduardo be
annulled. Corollary to this prayer, petitioners pleaded that
Gabriel Jr.’s title to the lot be reinstated and that

petitioners be declared as entitled to acquire ownership of
the same upon payment of
_______________
[18] Rollo, p. 40.
[19] Id., at p. 39.
[20] Id., at pp. 56-61.
153
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 153

the remaining balance of the purchase price therefor

agreed upon by Gabriel Sr. and Antonita.
While impleaded and served with summons, Gabriel Jr.
opted not to submit an answer.
Ruling of the RTC
By Decision dated May 26, 2003, the RTC ruled for the
respondents, as defendants a quo, and against the
petitioners, as plaintiffs therein, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED

for lack of merit. The four (4) plaintiffs are hereby ordered by this
Court to pay each defendant (except Armando Gabriel, Jr.,
Benjamin F. Cid, and Eduardo J. Fuentebella who did not testify
on these damages), Moral Damages of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos, so that each defendant shall receive Moral
Damages of Eighty Thousand (P80,000.00) Pesos each. Plaintiffs
shall also pay all defendants (except Armando Gabriel, Jr.,
Benjamin F. Cid, and Eduardo J. Fuentebella who did not testify
on these damages), Exemplary Damages of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos each so that each defendant shall receive Forty
Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. Also,
plaintiffs are ordered to pay each defendant (except Armando
Gabriel, Jr., Benjamin F. Cid, and Eduardo J. Fuentebella who
did not testify on these damages), Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos as Attorney’s Fees, jointly and solidarily.
Cost of suit against the plaintiffs.”[21]

On the main, the RTC predicated its dismissal action on
the basis of the following grounds and/or premises:
1. Eduardo was a purchaser in good faith and, hence,
may avail himself of the provision of Article 1544[22] of the
Civil
_______________
[21] Supra note 3 at pp. 48-49.
[22] Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have
first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable
property.
154

Code, which provides that in case of double sale, the party

in good faith who is able to register the property has better
right over the property;
2. Under Arts. 1356[23] and 1358[24] of the Code,
conveyance of real property must be in the proper form,
else it is unenforceable;
3. The verbal sale had no adequate consideration; and
4. Petitioners’ right of action to assail Eduardo’s title
prescribes in one year from date of the issuance of such
title and the one-year period has already lapsed.
_______________
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.
[23] Art. 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they
may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their
validity are present. However, when the law requires that a contract be in
some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract
to be proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute and
indispensable. In such cases, the right of the parties stated in the
following article cannot be exercised.
[24] Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public document:
(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property; sales of real property or of an interest therein are
governed by Articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405;
x x x x
(4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing
in a public document.
All other contracts where the amount involved exceeds Five hundred
pesos must appear in writing even a private one. But sales of goods,
chattels or things in action are governed by Articles 1403, No. 2 and 1405.
155
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 155

From the above decision, only petitioners appealed to

the CA, their appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 79680.
The CA Ruling
On December 4, 2006, the appellate court rendered the
assailed Decision affirming the RTC decision. The fallo
reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

hereby DISMISSED and the 26 May 2003 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Baguio City in Civil Case No.
4989-R is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.”[25]

Hence, the instant petition on the submission that the
appellate court committed reversible error of law:
1. xxx WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SALE OF THE

SUBJECT LOT BY ARMANDO GABRIEL, SR. AND
RESPONDENT ARMANDO GABRIEL, JR. TO THE
PETITIONERS IS UNENFORCEABLE.
2. xxx IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SALE OF THE
SUBJECT LOT BY RESPONDENT ARMANDO GABRIEL, JR.
TO RESPONDENT BERNARD BANTA AND ITS SUBSEQUENT
SALE BY THE LATTER TO HIS CO-RESPONDENTS ARE
NULL AND VOID.
3. xxx IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE
BUYERS IN BAD FAITH
4. xxx IN FINDING THAT THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT
LOT BETWEEN GABRIEL, SR. AND RESPONDENT GABRIEL,
JR. AND THE PETITIONERS HAS NO ADEQUATE
CONSIDERATION.
5. xxx IN RULING THAT THE INSTANT ACTION HAD
ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
6. xxx IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS ARE LIABLE FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.[26]
_______________
156

The Court’s Ruling

The core issues tendered in this appeal may be reduced
to four and formulated as follows, to wit: first, whether or
not the sale of the subject lot by Gabriel Sr. to Antonita is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds; second,
whether or not such sale has adequate consideration; third,
whether the instant action has already prescribed; and,
fourth, whether or not respondents are purchasers in good
faith.
The petition is meritorious.
Statute of Frauds Inapplicable
to Partially Executed Contracts
It is undisputed that Gabriel Sr., during his lifetime,
sold the subject property to Antonita, the purchase price
payable on installment basis. Gabriel Sr. appeared to have
been a recipient of some partial payments. After his death,
his son duly recognized the sale by accepting payments and
issuing what may be considered as receipts therefor.
Gabriel Jr., in a gesture virtually acknowledging the
petitioners’ dominion of the property, authorized them to
construct a fence around it. And no less than his wife,
Teresita, testified as to the fact of sale and of payments
received.
Pursuant to such sale, Antonita and her two sons
established their residence on the lot, occupying the house
they earlier constructed thereon. They later declared the
property for tax purposes, as evidenced by the issuance of
TD 96-04012-111087 in their or Antonita’s name, and paid
the real estates due thereon, obviously as sign that they
are occupying the lot in the concept of owners.
Given the foregoing perspective, Eduardo’s assertion in
his Answer that “persons appeared in the property”[27] only
after
_______________
[27] Rollo, p. 40.
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VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 157

“he initiated ejectment proceedings”[28] is clearly baseless.

If indeed petitioners entered and took possession of the
property after he (Eduardo) instituted the ejectment suit,
how could they explain the fact that he sent a demand
letter to vacate sometime in May 2000?
With the foregoing factual antecedents, the question to
be resolved is whether or not the Statute of Frauds bars
the enforcement of the verbal sale contract between Gabriel

Sr. and Antonita.
The CA, just as the RTC, ruled that the contract is
unenforceable for non-compliance with the Statute of
Frauds.
We disagree for several reasons. Foremost of these is
that the Statute of Frauds expressed in Article 1403, par.
(2),[29] of the Civil Code applies only to executory contracts,
i.e., those where no performance has yet been made. Stated
a bit differently, the legal consequence of non-compliance
with the Statute does not come into play where the contract
in question is completed, executed, or partially
consummated.[30]
_______________
[28] Id.
[29] Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they
are ratified:
x x x
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in
this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be
unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum
thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without
the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
xxxx
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or
for the sale of real property or of an interest therein;
xxx
[30] Arrogante v. Deliarte, G.R. No. 152132, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA
63, 74, citing Averia v. Averia, G.R. No. 141877, August 13, 2004, 436
SCRA 459, 466.
158

The Statute of Frauds, in context, provides that a

contract for the sale of real property or of an interest
therein shall be unenforceable unless the sale or some note
or memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the
party or his agent. However, where the verbal contract of
sale has been partially executed through the partial
payments made by one party duly received by the vendor,
as in the present case, the contract is taken out of the scope
of the Statute.
The purpose of the Statute is to prevent fraud and
perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending for
their evidence on the unassisted memory of witnesses, by

requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to
be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be
charged.[31] The Statute requires certain contracts to be
evidenced by some note or memorandum in order to be
enforceable. The term “Statute of Frauds” is descriptive
of statutes that require certain classes of contracts to be in
writing. The Statute does not deprive the parties of the
right to contract with respect to the matters therein
involved, but merely regulates the formalities of the
contract necessary to render it enforceable.[32]
Since contracts are generally obligatory in whatever
form they may have been entered into, provided all the
essential requisites for their validity are present,[33] the
Statute simply provides the method by which the contracts
enumerated in Art. 1403 (2) may be proved but does not
declare them invalid because they are not reduced to
writing. In fine, the form required under the Statute is for
convenience or evidentiary purposes only.
_______________
[31] Asia Productions Co., Inc. v. Paño, G.R. No. 51058, January 27,
1992, 205 SCRA 458, 465, citing C.J.S. 513; Shoemaker v. La Tondeña, 68
Phil. 24 (1939).
[32] Rosencor Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
140479, March 8, 2001, 354 SCRA 119, 127.
[33] Art. 1356, Civil Code.
159
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 159

There can be no serious argument about the partial

execution of the sale in question. The records show that
petitioners had, on separate occasions, given Gabriel Sr.
and Gabriel Jr. sums of money as partial payments of the
purchase price. These payments were duly receipted by
Gabriel Jr. To recall, in his letter of May 1, 1997, Gabriel,
Jr. acknowledged having received the aggregate payment
of PhP 65,000 from petitioners with the balance of PhP
60,000 still remaining unpaid. But on top of the partial
payments thus made, possession of the subject of the sale
had been transferred to Antonita as buyer. Owing thus to
its partial execution, the subject sale is no longer within
the purview of the Statute of Frauds.
Lest it be overlooked, a contract that infringes the
Statute of Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of benefits
under the contract.[34] Evidently, Gabriel, Jr., as his father
earlier, had benefited from the partial payments made by
the petitioners. Thus, neither Gabriel Jr. nor the other

respondents—successive purchasers of subject lots—could
plausibly set up the Statute of Frauds to thwart
petitioners’ efforts towards establishing their lawful right
over the subject lot and removing any cloud in their title.
As it were, petitioners need only to pay the outstanding
balance of the purchase price and that would complete the
execution of the oral sale.
There was Adequate Consideration
Without directly saying so, the trial court held that the
petitioners cannot sue upon the oral sale since in its own
words: “x x x for more than a decade, [petitioners] have not
paid in full Armando Gabriel, Sr. or his estate, so that the
sale trans-
_______________
[34] Article 1405, Civil Code, which states:
Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred to in No. 2 of
Article 1403, are ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of oral
evidence to prove the same, or by the acceptance of benefits under
them.
160

action between Armando Gabriel Sr. and [petitioners] [has]

no adequate consideration.”
The trial court’s posture, with which the CA effectively
concurred, is patently flawed. For starters, they equated
incomplete payment of the purchase price with inadequacy
of price or what passes as lesion, when both are different
civil law concepts with differing legal consequences, the
first being a ground to rescind an otherwise valid and
enforceable contract. Perceived inadequacy of price, on the
other hand, is not a sufficient ground for setting aside a
sale freely entered into, save perhaps when the inadequacy
is shocking to the conscience.[35]
The Court to be sure takes stock of the fact that the
contracting parties to the 1995 or 1996 sale agreed to a
purchase price of PhP 125,000 payable on installments. But
the original lot owner, Gabriel Sr., died before full payment
can be effected. Nevertheless, petitioners continued
remitting payments to Gabriel, Jr., who sold the subject lot
to Bernard on June 30, 1999. Gabriel, Jr., as may be noted,
parted with the property only for PhP 50,000. On the other
hand, Bernard sold it for PhP 80,000 to Marcos and
Benjamin. From the foregoing price figures, what is
abundantly clear is that what Antonita agreed to pay
Gabriel, Sr., albeit in installment, was very much more

than what his son, for the same lot, received from his buyer
and the latter’s buyer later. The Court, therefore, cannot
see its way clear as to how the RTC arrived at its simplistic
conclusion about the transaction between Gabriel Sr. and
Antonita being without “adequate consideration.”

The Issues of Prescription and the Bona
Fides of the Respondents as Purchasers
Considering the interrelation of these two issues, we will
discuss them jointly.
_______________
[35] 4 Paras, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED 723 (13th ed.,
1995).
161
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 161

There can be no quibbling about the fraudulent nature

of the conveyance of the subject lot effected by Gabriel Jr.
in favor of Bernard. It is understandable that after his
father’s death, Gabriel Jr. inherited subject lot and for
which he was issued TCT No. No. T-71499. Since the
Gabriel Sr.–Antonita sales transaction called for payment
of the contract price in installments, it is also
understandable why the title to the property remained
with the Gabriels. And after the demise of his father,
Gabriel Jr. received payments from the Orduñas and even
authorized them to enclose the subject lot with a fence. In
sum, Gabriel Jr. knew fully well about the sale and is
bound by the contract as predecessor-in-interest of Gabriel
Sr. over the property thus sold.
Yet, the other respondents (purchasers of subject lot)
still maintain that they are innocent purchasers for value
whose rights are protected by law and besides which
prescription has set in against petitioners’ action for
annulment of title and reconveyance.
The RTC and necessarily the CA found the purchaser-
respondents’ thesis on prescription correct stating in this
regard that Eduardo’s TCT No. T-3276 was issued on May
16, 2000 while petitioners filed their complaint for
annulment only on July 3, 2001. To the courts below, the
one-year prescriptive period to assail the issuance of a
certificate of title had already elapsed.
We are not persuaded.
The basic complaint, as couched, ultimately seeks the
reconveyance of a fraudulently registered piece of
residential land. Having possession of the subject lot,

petitioners’ right to the reconveyance thereof, and the
annulment of the covering title, has not prescribed or is not
time-barred. This is so for an action for annulment of title
or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where
the suitor is in possession of the
162

property subject of the acts,[36] the action partaking as it

does of a suit for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
[37] Such is the case in this instance. Petitioners have
possession of subject lots as owners having purchased the
same from Gabriel, Sr. subject only to the full payment of
the agreed price.
The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of
fraudulently registered real property is 10 years, reckoned
from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, if the
plaintiff is not in possession, but imprescriptible if he is in
possession of the property.[38] Thus, one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner
thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
[39] As it is, petitioners’ action for reconveyance is
imprescriptible.
This brings us to the question of whether or not the
respondent-purchasers, i.e., Bernard, Marcos and
Benjamin, and Eduardo, have the status of innocent
purchasers for value, as was the thrust of the trial court’s
disquisition and disposition.
We are unable to agree with the RTC.
It is the common defense of the respondent-purchasers
that they each checked the title of the subject lot when it
was his turn to acquire the same and found it clean,
meaning without annotation of any encumbrance or
adverse third party interest. And it is upon this postulate
that each claims to be an
_______________
[36] Llemos v. Llemos, G.R. No. 150162, January 26, 2007, 513 SCRA
128, 134; citing Occeña v. Esponilla, G.R. No. 156973, June 4, 2004, 431
SCRA 116, 126; and Delfin v. Billones, G.R. No. 146550, March 17, 2006,
485 SCRA 38, 47-48.
[37] Occeña v. Esponilla, G.R. No. 156973, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 116.
[38] Heirs of Salvador Hermosilla v. Remoquillo, G.R. No. 167320,
January 30, 2007, 513 SCRA 403, 408-409.
[39] Id., at p. 409; citing Arlegui v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126437,
March 6, 2002, 378 SCRA 322, 324.
163
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 163

innocent purchaser for value, or one who buys the property

of another without notice that some other person has a
right to or interest in it, and who pays therefor a full and
fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving
such notice.[40]
The general rule is that one dealing with a parcel of land
registered under the Torrens System may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is
not obliged to go beyond the certificate.[41] Where, in other
words, the certificate of title is in the name of the seller,
the innocent purchaser for value has the right to rely on
what appears on the certificate, as he is charged with
notice only of burdens or claims on the res as noted in the
certificate. Another formulation of the rule is that (a) in the
absence of anything to arouse suspicion or (b) except where
the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry or (c) when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect
of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the
title of the property,[42] said purchaser is without obligation
to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
seller.
Eduardo and, for that matter, Bernard and Marcos and
Benjamin, can hardly claim to be innocent purchasers for
value or purchasers in good faith. For each knew or was at
least expected to know that somebody else other than
Gabriel, Jr. has a right or interest over the lot. This is
borne by the fact that the initial seller, Gabriel Jr., was not
in possession of subject property. With respect to Marcos
and Benjamin, they knew as buyers that Bernard, the
seller, was not also in pos-
_______________
[40] Potenciano v. Reynoso, G.R. No. 140707, April 22, 2003, 401 SCRA
391, 401-402; citing Tsai v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120109, October 2,
2001, 366 SCRA 324.
[41] Republic v. Mendoza, Sr., G.R. Nos. 153726 & 154014, March 28,
2007, 519 SCRA 203, 231.
[42] Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260
SCRA 283, 295.
164

session of the same property. The same goes with Eduardo,

as buyer, with respect to Marcos and Benjamin.
Basic is the rule that a buyer of a piece of land which is
in the actual possession of persons other than the seller
must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in
possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can
hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith. When a man
proposes to buy or deal with realty, his duty is to read the
public manuscript, i.e., to look and see who is there upon it
and what his rights are. A want of caution and diligence
which an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed
to exercise in making purchases is, in contemplation of law,
a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or
discover that the land sold to him is in adverse possession
of another is a buyer in bad faith.[43]
Where the land sold is in the possession of a person
other than the vendor, the purchaser must go beyond the
certificates of title and make inquiries concerning the
rights of the actual possessor.[44] And where, as in the
instant case, Gabriel Jr. and the subsequent vendors were
not in possession of the property, the prospective vendees
are obliged to investigate the rights of the one in
possession. Evidently, Bernard, Marcos and Benjamin, and
Eduardo did not investigate the rights over the subject lot
of the petitioners who, during the period material to this
case, were in actual possession thereof. Bernard, et al. are,
thus, not purchasers in good faith and, as such, cannot be
accorded the protection extended by the law
_______________
[43] Embrado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51457, June 27, 1994, 233
SCRA 335, 347; citing J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-41233, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 413, 422-423 and Angelo v.
Pacheco, 56 Phil. 70 (1931).
[44] Heirs of Trinidad De Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 138660, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 101, 117; citing Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129471, April 28,
2000, 331 SCRA 267.
165
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 165

to such purchasers.[45] Moreover, not being purchasers in

good faith, their having registered the sale, will not, as
against the petitioners, carry the day for any of them under
Art. 1544 of the Civil Code prescribing rules on preference
in case of double sales of immovable property. Occeña v.
Esponilla[46] laid down the following rules in the
application of Art. 1544: (1) knowledge by the first buyer of
the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except
when the second buyer first register in good faith the
second sale; and (2) knowledge gained by the second buyer
of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to
register, since such knowledge taints his registration with
bad faith.
Upon the facts obtaining in this case, the act of
registration by any of the three respondent-purchasers was
not coupled
_______________
[45] Sec. 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which provides:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for
value.––The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by
reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, x x x deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper [RTC] a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later
than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court
where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase
“innocent purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this
Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or
other encumbrance for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in
any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the
applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.
[46] Supra note 37.

166

with good faith. At the minimum, each was aware or is at

least presumed to be aware of facts which should put him
upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary

to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.
The award by the lower courts of damages and
attorney’s fees to some of the herein respondents was
predicated on the filing by the original plaintiffs of what
the RTC characterized as an unwarranted suit. The basis
of the award, needless to stress, no longer obtains and,
hence, the same is set aside.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
appealed December 4, 2006 Decision and the March 6, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
79680 affirming the May 26, 2003 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 3 in Baguio City are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner
Antonita Orduña is hereby recognized to have the right of
ownership over subject lot covered by TCT No. T-3276 of
the Baguio Registry registered in the name of Eduardo J.
Fuentebella. The Register of Deeds of Baguio City is hereby
ORDERED to cancel said TCT No. T-3276 and to issue a
new one in the name of Armando Gabriel, Jr. with the
proper annotation of the conditional sale of the lot covered
by said title in favor of Antonita Orduña subject to the
payment of the PhP 50,000 outstanding balance. Upon full
payment of the purchase price by Antonita Orduña,
Armando Gabriel, Jr. is ORDERED to execute a Deed of
Absolute Sale for the transfer of title of subject lot to the
name of Antonita Orduña, within three (3) days from
receipt of said payment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del

Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.
167
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 167

Note.—The requirement under the Statute of Fraud

does not affect the validity of the contract of sale but is
needed merely for its enforceability. (Yaneza vs. Court of
Appeals, 572 SCRA 413 [2008])
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3/26/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 622

G.R. No. 176841. June 29, 2010.*

Civil Law; Contracts; Statute of Frauds; The Statute of

VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 147

Orduña vs. Fuentebella

be enforceable. The term “Statute of Frauds” is descriptive of

Same; Same; Same; A contract that infringes the Statute of

Same; Property; Reconveyance; Prescription; An action for

148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Orduña vs. Fuentebella

Same; Same; Double Sales; Buyer in Good Faith; A buyer of a

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 149

Galo Reyes for respondents Cids.

Central to the case is a residential lot with an area of 74

150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

remitted from time to time and Gabriel Sr. accepted partial

payment from petitioners.[10] Through a letter[11] dated

VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 151

As narrated by the RTC, the lot conveyance from Gabriel

72782 and issuance on May 16, 2000 of TCT No. T-3276[17]

152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

claimed, the title of their respective predecessors-in-

Gabriel Jr.’s title to the lot be reinstated and that

VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 153

the remaining balance of the purchase price therefor

“WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED

154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Code, which provides that in case of double sale, the party

VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 155

From the above decision, only petitioners appealed to

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

1. xxx WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SALE OF THE

[25] Supra note 2 at pp. 34-35.

156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Court’s Ruling

VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 157

“he initiated ejectment proceedings”[28] is clearly baseless.

the enforcement of the verbal sale contract between Gabriel

158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Statute of Frauds, in context, provides that a

their evidence on the unassisted memory of witnesses, by

VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 159

There can be no serious argument about the partial

the petitioners. Thus, neither Gabriel Jr. nor the other

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

action between Armando Gabriel Sr. and [petitioners] [has]

Gabriel, Sr., albeit in installment, was very much more

VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 161

There can be no quibbling about the fraudulent nature

residential land. Having possession of the subject lot,

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

property subject of the acts,[36] the action partaking as it

VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 163

innocent purchaser for value, or one who buys the property

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

session of the same property. The same goes with Eduardo,

VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 165

to such purchasers.[45] Moreover, not being purchasers in