Facts:

Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor

In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two
months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional
Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same
was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines
on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme Court declared that there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his
evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of
petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally) Section 9 of Article XVII
[Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the
case. Respondent Yu contended that “... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all
local governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local
government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New
Constitution under its Article XI.” He further submitted that local elective officials (including
mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the
appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII.

The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through
Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its
ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of
office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or
committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that
Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local
government structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question
of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short,
for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest
of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the
government.

Issue:

whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit

Held:
 No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic
pending election protest cases. The constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by
the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the
Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately
encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective
office, albeit under protest or contest” and that “subject to the constraints specifically mentioned
in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the
intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory
right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election
Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial
forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect’s right to the contested office.

The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only
by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been
proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections.
Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and
consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and
emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given
to them by said constitutional provision.

Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent
(protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by
herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent
(protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his
tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.

There is a difference between the ‘term’ of office and the ‘right’ to hold an office. A ‘term’ of
office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform
its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A ‘right’ to hold a public office is the just
and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the
‘term’ refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is
.entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9,
Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose
any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the ‘right’ of the private
respondents to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said
constitutional provision is the ‘term’ to the office, although the ‘right’ of the incumbent to an office
which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the ‘term’ thereof,” and that “it is erroneous to
conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the
private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new
term. They hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected,
although the same is now indefinite.

The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try
and decide election protests: “Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that ‘all
existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
modified or repealed by the National Assembly. ‘And there has been no amendment,
modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein
petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected,” and “according
to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution ‘all courts existing at the time of the ratification
of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in
accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and
determined under the laws then in force.’ Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided
over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and
decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners.”

While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal
elective positions.

General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers
under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to
modify the aforesaid constitutional provision.

General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include
electoral contests of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of
the courts; for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in
accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or
constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated
representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under
Proclamation No. 1081.

In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest case herein involved has
remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case.
Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly
reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term
“political question” connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy.
It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure”.

The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore
beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as
to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be
paid. Political questions should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either
in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon.