Historical Formation of Pan-Islamism : Modern Islamic

Title Reformists Project for Intra-Umma Alliance and Inter-

Madhahib Rapprochement

Author(s) Hirano, Junichi

Kyoto Working Papers on Area Studies: G-COE Series (2008),

Citation 10: 1-43

Issue Date 2008-12

URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/155788

Right © 2008 Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

Type Article

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 Historical Formation of Pan-Islamism:
Modern Islamic Reformists Project for
Intra-Umma Alliance and Inter-Madhahib Rapprochement

J unichi Hirano

Kyoto Working Papers on Area Studies No.l2

(G-COE Series 10)
December 2008
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 Historical Formation of Pan-Islamism:
Modern Islamic Reformists Project for
Intra-Umma Alliance and Inter-Madhahib Rapprochement

J unichi Hirano

Kyoto Working Papers on Area Studies No.l2

JSPS Global COE Program Series 10
In Search of Sustainable Humanosphcrc in Asia and Africa
December 2008
 Historical Formation of Pan-Islamism:
Modern Islamic Reformists Project for
Intra-Umma Alliance and Inter-Madhhib Rapprochement *

HIRANO Junichi **

0. Introduction
I. Pan-Islamism: An Imagined Term in the West
II. Al-Afghn’s Political Vision: Toward Constructing an
Alliance among Islamic Countries
III. Al-Afghn’s Religious Attempt towards Transcending the
Sunn-Sh Dichotomy
IV. Rashd Ri: Pragmatic Approach for Intra-Madhhib
Cooperation
V. Al-Kawkib in the Makka Congress: Towards an Arab
Caliphate
VI. Al-Kawkib’s Prospect for Inter-Madhhib Rapproachment
VII. Conclusion

0. Introduction

This paper aims to rethink pan-Islamism from the latter half of the 19th
century to the former half of the 20th century in the Islamic world.

It has been pointed out that Pan-Islamism has its origin in the latter
half of the nineteenth century, the period of imperialism. Islamic
countries were subordinated by the West one by one, although they tried
to resist it and through the process, Islamic intellectuals began to show
the idea of Pan-Islamism. Therefore, mention of the name tends to

*
This paper includes additional modification to the presentation at IAS-AEI
International Conference on “New Horizons in Islamic Area Studies: Islamic
Scholarship across Cultures and Continents”, Kuala Lumpur, 22-24 Nov. 2008.
**
Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto
University, Kyoto, Japan, E-mail: hirano@asafas.kyoto-u.ac.jp

1
immediately call to mind anti-colonial struggles against the West
imperialism. However, Pan-Islamism has another aspect, which aims to
transcend the political divisions and religious disputes within Islamic
Umma. For the latter purpose to reconstruct the unity of Umma, what did
Islamic reformists living in the modern age see as critical issues?

To bring light into the issues, it focuses on Arabic countries and

prominent Islamic reformers in those countries, especially Jaml al-Dn
al-Afghn(1838/9-1897), Muammad ‘Abduh(1849-1905), Rashd
Ri(1865-1935), and ‘Abd al-Ramn al-Kawkib(1854-1902). They
are considered to be distinguished Islamic proponents who advocated
pan-Islamic alliance through Islamic countries, and transcendence of
narrow religious schools of thought in Islam. They proposed those ideas
through modern printing media including newspapers, magazines, books
and so on and those materials which conveyed their Pan-Islamic visions
have been read through the Islamic world so that those who read the
articles obtained strong Muslim identity as consisting of the Islamic
Umma. To focus on modern pan-Islamic ideologies and movements, it is
useful to utilize those newspapers and magazines for looking into their
visions towards the Islamic alliance and the relationship between Islamic
schools of thought. To achieve this task, it will take some examples of
modern Islamic printing media as “al-‘Urwa al-Wuthq”(1884-1885),
“al-Manr”(1898-1935), “Umm al-Qur”(1902), scrutinize the contents
and reveal diversity of Pan-Islamism.

I. Pan-Islamism: An Imagined Term in the West

It is said that the term “pan-Islamism” was coined in the 19 th century in

Western Europe. Originally, the term captured the Europeans’ fearful
perception of the Islamic world; it had an invasive ring to it 1 . Accordingly,
the transnational vision of pan-Islamic solidarity, as a geopolitical

1
Lockman says that “pan-Islamism” is the shadow of a widespread European anxiety
about Muslim solidarity, the term (literally meaning “encompassing all Muslims,” on
the model of “pan-German” or “pan-American”) that European colonial officials and
experts on Islam used to denote the persistent feelings of solidarity among Muslims
and across national boundaries—feelings which, they feared, might be mobilized
against colonial rule. At the very zenith of European global hegemony, Europeans
conjured up vague but threatening notions of secretive cabals of cruel and fanatical
Muslims plotting to overthrow colonial rule everywhere across the Muslim world
(Lockman 2004: 91).

2
concept, belongs to the 1880s (zcan 1997: 45–46). The thesis of Islamic
solidarity surged after the Ottoman loss of large territories in the Balkans
and Eastern Anatolia in 1878, suggesting that the Ottomans could
compensate for the loss of the Christian-majority areas in the Balkans by
attracting Muslim-majority lands in southern Asia into its sphere of
international influence. The occupation of Tunisia by France in 1881 and
of Egypt by Britain in 1882 further stimulated the emotional and
intellectual attitudes of educated Muslims toward the Eurocentric world
order.

Indeed, there were some struggles for resistance against the West in
the Islamic world. In 1882, the Egyptian general Arb encouraged his
fellow countrymen to free themselves from British colonial rule, under
the slogan of “Egypt for the Egyptians.” In Egypt’s neighbor, Sudan,
Muammad Amad declared himself the Mahd and began a resistance
movement against Britain in 1882, during which the British General
Charles Gordon died fighting for what seems, in retrospect, a lost cause.
In Iran, the Tobacco Boycott Movement of 1891 brought about the
withdrawal of British economic suppression. Thus, Western countries in
general—and Britain in particular—began to hold a fearful perception of
the Islamic world as a whole. Hence, neither an intellectual or religious
bent, nor the actual steps to exploit them, should be separated from their
proper context—which is to say, the Oriental-Occidental cultural and
political conflict.

Indeed, it was during this period of rising Muslim protest against

increasing threats from the West that the great powers began to worry
about a pan-Islamic solidarity: European newspapers began to refer to the
idea of a pan-Islamic reaction to Western expansion and discuss this issue.
One of the first uses of the term “pan-Islam” can be attributed to Gabriel
Charmes, a prolific French journalist, in his description of the Muslim
response to the French domination of Tunisia (Landau 1990: 2). From that
point forward, numerous visions of pan-Islamism cropped up all over the
Muslim world, either in the form of diplomatic cooperation among
independent Muslim countries like Ottoman Turkey, Persia, and Afghan,
or in the sense of cultural awakening, economic development, and
political solidarity.

3
 One of the prominent German Orientalists, Carl Becker, defines
“pan-Islamism” as “the realization of the Islamic concept of Islamic
world integration, by uniting under the sole leader of the community
(Imm)”; he maintains that the term “pan-Islamism” originated after the
Berlin conference in 1884 (Becker 1924: 231–51).

Other Orientalists claim that the expression was created in the 1870s,
and that it was compared to “pan-Slavism,” which was then in full bloom
in Eastern Europe (Lee 1942: 281). A prominent Iranologist, Edward
Browne, reports that he cannot find any words equivalent to
“pan-Islamism” in the Arabic, Turkish, or Persian languages, and says
that when he asked his Muslim friend about the term, he replied that
“pan-Islamism” had been coined with a dark connotation by his Western
colleague in Vienna (Browne 1903: 306–07). Moreover, the Orientalist
David Margoliouth says that pan-Islamism was “a ghost,” according to
some Arabic resources (Margoliouth 1912: 3–4, 16–17). Lee says that it
was one aspect of the reaction of Muslims to the impact of the Christian
West (Lee 1942: 281). As secondary material sources in Western
European languages offer confusing and contradictory views, we can only
surmise that the term “pan-Islamism” was produced by the West in the
modern imperial era 2 .

Judging from these Orientalists’ insistences, pan-Islamism did come

about through the Muslims’ natural and traditional sense of unity, but it
was only a way of thinking that was formed through their common
experience, under the threat of Western imperialism and colonialism as a
whole. That is to say, pan-Islamism was a shadow cast over global
integration under Western imperialism, and it ultimately highlighted the
negative aspects of imperialism itself (Kurita 2002: 4).

In this sense, the term “pan-Islamism,” which al-Afghn uses

frequently in his many articles and books to resist European—and
especially British—imperialism, required the very existence of the West
to begin with. Indeed, as seen below, his famous pan-Islamic journal
al-Urwa al-Wuthq (UW hereafter) was published from Paris and

2
The Indian Muslim scholar Seyyed Amr Al also defines the word as “the
imaginary product aiming to break the freedom of Muslims” (Ali 1938: 19–20).

4
delivered throughout the world using modern technology 3 . In addition, a
contemporary Iranian Islamic writer, Hd Khosr Shh, describes his
journey to Paris as pilgrimage (Hijra) (Shh 2000: 23). “Hijra” is a key
concept in Islamic history, as it marks the beginning of the Islamic Umma
in the Arab Peninsula in the seventh century. From here, we can judge
how important the existence of the West was for the Islamic world in
starting the modern revival of its Umma.

As will be shown in the following chapter, the Islamic world was

contending with advancing Western imperialism and colonialism at that
time. The West felt threatened by the Islamic world—although they had
invaded it—and had coined the term “pan-Islamism,” along with its
connotations of fear and dread. On the other side of the coin, al-Afghn
employed the Arabic term “al-Wada al-Islmya,” which corresponds
directly with “pan-Islamism.” There is the possibility that after he saw the
term “pan-Islamism” circulating in Europe, he began using the same term
in Arabic 4 . If this were so, it could be said that he borrowed the term
“pan-Islamism” from the West.

However, we must first and foremost pay attention to the fact that he
used the term “al-Wada al-Islmya” to unite Muslims and liberate
Islamic countries from Western encroachment. Therefore, his term does
not contain any connotation of a threat, regardless of context. Indeed, the

3
There is an indication that pan-Islamic propaganda was made possible—and was
perhaps actually engendered—by mechanical progress in communications, the
introduction of the printing press, and the increase of commercial transactions
between the Islamic world and the West (Becker 1924; 239–42; Hurgronje 1915:
23–25; Ritter 1924: 329–50; Wirth 1915: 432–33).
4
According to Keddie, al-Afghn was the first in his time to use the Qur ’nic term
“al-urwa al-wuthq” to express Muslim solidarity and advertise pan-Islamism, with
his sincere praise for the Ottoman Khalfa in the latter half of the 1870s (Keddie
1972a: 184). As mentioned, it was in 1884 that Afghn and Abduh published the
pan-Islamic journal UW in Paris. In the very same year, the Berlin Conference—the
symbol of colonial partition by the West, of Asian and African countries—was held in
Germany. There is the great possibility that UW, as an expression of his pan-Islamism,
was a reflection of Western imperialism itself. Moreover, al-Afghn took Czarist
Russia as a model to follow in realizing pan-Islamism, because of its absolute unity
and unbending self-assertion (al-Afghn 2002a: 161); he also took the unification of
the German Empire in 1871, incidentally, as the model for an agreement that could
lead to solidarity. Indeed, he praised Bismarck and Cavour for realizing their national
unity (al-Afghn 2002a: 207, 333, 356, 413, 428, 429, 447, 452, 453). Imra also
points out that he expressed his positive evaluation of Italian political leaders for
creating the Italian language, integrating many prefectures, kingdoms, and republic
states, and acquiring a noble freedom and perfect unity (tawd) (Imra 1984: 175).

5
West and al-Afghn used the same term, but their intended meanings
were quite different; the latter modified and re-appropriated the term for
his own purpose. In this sense, pan-Islamism was the concept of a man
who had deeply internalized the West and then strongly resisted its
influence, for the sake of Islamic salvation. In the end, he had a deep fear
of the West—especially of his main opponent, Britain 5 . Regarding the
term “pan-Islamism,” both sides appear to have influenced each other in
its introduction.

II. Al-Afghn’s Political Vision: Toward Constructing an Alliance

among Islamic Countries

When al-Afghn’s political thought became widely known, Muslim

intellectuals loved to use the term “pan-Islamic,” on the grounds that it
was the very expression of true Islamic belief that enhanced the Muslim
sense of solidarity. It is now customary, both in the West and in Islamic
countries, to regard him as a pioneer of pan-Islamism 6 .

It is well-known—and quite commonsense—that Islam strengthens

the spirit of Muslim solidarity; in reality, however, it is not quite so
simple. In al-Afghn’s time, Islamic countries maintained rather hostile
relationships, and deep disagreements among religious schools were
erupting. When the Islamic Empire was the superior world power, such
disagreements did not cause any problems; however, when the

5
Hans Cohn says that the term “pan-Islamism” was first used in Britain in 1882 (Cohn
1920: 44), when Britain subdued the Arb revolution and occupied Egypt. In the very
same year, al-Afghn visited Britain and had a discussion with British high officials
about the Arb revolution and the Mahd movement in Sudan (Keddie 1972a: 229;
Lof Allh Khn 1926: 38; Imra 1984: 67–68; Blunt 1983: 409–10). So,
pan-Islamism was a concept that reflected the correlation and interrelation between
al-Afghn (or the Islamic world) and the West.
6
For example, there have been some studies of al-Afghn in the West (Kamrava
2006: 12; Sardar 2006: 562). On the other hand, a great many al-Afghn studies
appear in the contemporary Islamic world—in the Arab world (asan 1982: 13–17;
al-Murashl 1983: 41–82, 105–51;Abd al-Ghanī 1998: 45–49; al-Asadī 1999: 39;
Shalash 1987: 35; Imāra 1968: 49–62, 1984: 27–29; Yūsuf 1999: 63–88; 165–189;
anaf 1998: 11; ahr 1999: 28–39, 65–69), in Iran (Asadbd 1971: 154;
abab’ 1972: 46–52, 92–110; Khorsh 1979: 358–63; Modarres 1982: 3–4; Jam
az Nevsandegn-e Majalle-ye ouze 1997: 101–54; Farhdiyn 1997: 99; Shh 2000:
14; Movaeq 2003: 59; Karam 2004: 227–60; Kermn 2006: 64; Moqaddem 2007),
and in Afghanistan (Bashr 1977: v; abb 1977: 15–19, 94; Ghan 1977: 31–43;
Nevn 1977: 4–10; Rasht 1977: 6; Samandar 1977: ii; idq 1977: 1–3; Abd
al-Quym 2000: 9–10). All of these studies assert that he is a precursor to
pan-Islamism in the 19th century Islamic world.

6
relationship between Europe and the Islamic world was reversed in the
19th century—so that Western, imperialistic countries began invading
Islamic territories—they became crucial.

By the beginning of the 20th century, there were only three Muslim
countries that had retained their independence, albeit only formally:
Ottoman Turkey, Qjr Persia, and Durrn Afghan. For the Islamic world,
the 19th century was one of disassembly (Nakata 2001: 41–42),
experienced as an integration into the modern world system (Wallerstein
1974) politically, economically, and militarily, even though it was neither
single-lined nor inevitable. These political changes signaled what seemed
to be an irrevocable extension of Europe’s political and economic
hegemony and, consequently, a rethinking of the reason for the Muslim
world’s decline.

Al-Afghn detected the essence of these serious crises; in response,

he started the so-called first Islamic revival movement, in the 19th
century (Kosugi 2006: 188–89).

When surveying his entire life, it can be seen that the impact of the
invasions of Tunisia by France and Egypt by Britain played a critical part
in the emergence of his global pan-Islamic vision. These events caused
him to have ideas about the necessity for Muslim solidarity against the
larger expansion of Western hegemony. Indeed, it was immediately after
the formal British occupation of Egypt that al-Afghn began to publish
his pan-Islamic ideas in Paris, in the journal he edited together with his
Egyptian disciple, Muammad Abduh 7 , UW—a highly influential
publication that was distributed throughout the Islamic world 8 . Hd
Khosr Shh, who compiled a complete works of al-Afghn in 2002,

7
Both stayed in Europe at this time involuntarily—and, ironically enough, due to
European colonialism in the Middle East. Al-Afghn had been expelled from Egypt by
the Khedive Tawfq and reached Paris via India. Abduh joined him there after being
expelled from Cairo in the wake of the Arb Revolt and the British occupation in
1882.
8
While one cannot be absolutely certain whether al-Afghn himself wrote it, or
whether Abduh did (if so, probably under his mentor ’s inspiration), the style seems to
point to the former ’s authorship. Moreover, no less an Islamic scholar than Muaf
Abd al-Rziq republished this article in 1938, with an introduction of his own,
maintaining that he recognized it as a product of al-Afghn’s thought (al-Afghn
1938). This is also the opinion of Muammad Imra, who compiled his complete
collection and reprinted this article (Imra 1968: 339–46).

7
explains the significance of the journal thus: first, it was an expression of
resistance against European colonialism in general and that of the British
in particular; second, it was an expression of Islamic solidarity and the
abolition of narrow religious factionalism; third, it was a discussion of
the Islamic Empire’s decline that brought the cause to light (Shh 2000:
519). Indeed, this periodical expressed his views on pan-Islamism in
general, at that time, especially in an article entitled “al-Wada
al-Islmya,” and designed Muslim solidarity to expel foreign intruders
and establish their own independence and freedom. His was the Islamic
voice that blamed Western imperialism for the Muslim Empire’s decline;
he succeeded in raising the alarm across the Islamic world with these
words: Islamic sovereignty used to extend to Maghrib (Andalsia) in the
West, Tonkin at the border of China in the East, Fazan in the North, and
Sarandib at the equator in the South, and there were so many Muslims
who lived within its borders. They had one Khalfa, and when he raised
his voice, Chinese emperors surrendered and European kings became very
frightened. They had never invaded the Islamic Umma until recently.
Once, Muslims rejected being put under a non-Muslim ruler, and when
some Muslims were under the control of foreigners, every other Muslim
mourned wholeheartedly throughout the entire Islamic brotherhood
(al-Afghn 2002a: 157).

Al-Afghn goes on to say that Muslims east and west, north and
south, would unite and work together against the dangers facing them.
The only ones opposing this union were those local rulers who were
steeped in their own daily pleasure and vanity. These individuals, he says,
were like chains around the necks of Muslims. The heirs of the notables
should not let themselves despair, for there was an unbroken sequence of
Muslim lands, from Edirne to Peshawar, inhabited by no fewer than
50 million Muslims who were long distinguished by their courage. If
these Muslims could agree among themselves, says Al-Afghn, and show
regard for the needs of fellow Muslims, they could unite and dam the
floods imperiling them from all sides. Melancholy and despair help no
cause, but hope and action do; by uniting in the name of the Qur ’n, says
al-Afghn, Islam would be guaranteed success (al-Afghn 2002a:
160–62).

In another article (“al-Taaub”), al-Afghn points out that Arabs,

8
Turks, Persians, Indians, Egyptians, and Maghribis had originally held
onto their religious reins so tightly and kept so deep a kinship, that when
one of their companions was troubled by misfortune or their country was
being loosened and divided, they would all feel great sorrow (al-Afghn
2002a: 139). However, the reality he faced in his time was quite the
reverse. He complains bitterly: When the Indian Revolt occurred (in
1857), Afghan and Baluchi Muslims failed to help Indian Muslims, and
when the Afghan-British War broke out (in 1878–81), they also did not
participate in the political struggle against British encroachment. The key
point in opposing the British occupation of Egypt lies in solidarity among
the Indians, Afghans, and Persians, and that is the very expression of
Muslim brotherhood and a clue to the revival of the Islamic Umma in the
future (al-Afghn 2002a: 123).

According to al-Afghn, no Muslim ought to rely on national or

ethnic ties, but should instead depend on only religious ties (al-Afghn
2002a: 103–06). Muslims must oppose racism wherever they live, and
throw off any kinds of kinship (aabya) which would undermine Islamic
solidarity. Because the people who believe in the Islamic principles, once
they have accepted this belief, reject their own race and nationality when
they turn from personal ties to universal relationships, that is, religious
ones. Muslims, who are on the truth of Allh’s sacred law (Shara), do
not perceive any differences among nationalities, for if there are
differences among Muslims, these depend on their degree of enthusiasm
for keeping and embodying the religious law.

Then, he proclaims that racial and national solidarity are the very
things Allh denounces strictly, taking as a proof a Qur’n verse: Allh
rebukes all solidarities, besides the one made through Islamic law.
Whoever relies on such a solidarity cannot afford to repel the rebuke or
whoever approves of such a tie deserves criticism….there is nobody
among us who can call for a racial tie (aabya), and struggle and die for
it. “O you men! Surely we have created you of a male and a female, and
made you tribes and families, that you may know each other” (al-Hujrt:
13) (al-Afghn 2002a: 104–105).

Al-Afghn sincerely respected the Qur’n and Sunna of the prophet

Muammad, referring to those religious books and quoting their sentences

9
or passages in many places in this political periodical. To begin with, the
title of his periodical, “al-Urwa al-Wuthq,” is a direct derivation from
the Qur’n: “There is no compulsion in religion; truly the right way has
become clearly distinct from error; therefore, whoever disbelieves in the
false deities (Tght) and believes in Allah he indeed has laid hold on the
firmest handle (al-Urwa al-Wuthq), which shall not break off, and Allah
is All-Hearing, All-Knowing” (al-Baqara: 256). At the same time, he
maintains in an article: “The Qur’n is alive, not dead. …The Book is not
invalidated. Return to it” (al-Afghn 2002a: 162). The articles in his
periodical contain so many political, economic, and religious messages;
each message is accompanied by Qur’nic or adth passages and thus
reminds the readers of the significance of religion. The periodical is a
resonant appeal for Muslim solidarity, based on communal memory.

At the same time, we cannot overlook the fact that he preached

Islamic solidarity, not only for the Muslim masses but for Muslim rulers
in general. Notice should be paid, however, to the fact that he believed
that the reform of monarchism and absolutism in Muslim
countries—which would lead the revival of Islam—precedes
independence and autonomy from Western domination. The periodical
contains some articles which, in the name of Islam, spoke out readers to
work against those local rulers who stood in the way of the achievement
of unity (al-Afghn 2002a: 191–92).

According to Landau, at some unknown point in his career,

al-Afghn must have reached the conclusion that he would have to
convert the Muslim rulers, or at least one of them, to his pan-Islamic
views, if he were to carry out his plans (Landau 1990: 18) 9 . Indeed, the
concept of a united Muslim community with a spiritual and political
leader at its head was essential to the pan-Islamism of late 19 th century

9
During his short stay in London, he contributed the articles “British Policy in East
Countries” (“al-Siysa al-Injilizya f Mamrik al-Sharqya”) and “The Reason for War
in Egypt” (“Asbb al-arb bi-Mir”) to a newspaper compiled by Lis Sbunj, The
Bee (al-Nala). The former is a strong criticism of British foreign policy in India and
Egypt, and the latter points out that the true reason for the British invasion was the
Britons’ concern over the project of the Ottoman Suln Abd al-amd II, to gather all
the Muslims under the Islamic Khalfa—that is, pan-Islamism—and that the British
Army dispatch was to break up this rising sign of Islamic solidarity ( aabya), for
fear of its deep influence in Eastern countries, especially in India (Keddie 1972a:
184).

10
(Fakhry 1954: 451). Al-Afghn adopted this concept and markedly toned
down his attacks on the Ottoman Sultan Abdlamd II, whom he selected
as the most likely personality to lead a successful pan-Islamic campaign
(al-Bashr 1975: 18–19).Thus he supported the Ottoman caliphate,
though not willingly, in UW.

Relating to the failure to grasp his political thought, according to

Kramer, it must be said that there is no critical evidence that al-Afghn
ever advanced an articulate proposal for a Muslim congress (Kramer
1986: 19). However, according to al-Afghn’s nephew, Mrz Lof Allh
Khn Asadbd, there was a concrete plan devised by al-Afghn for an
Islamic congress in Istanbul: The Sayyid determined that, from each of
the major Islamic lands, one person would be selected by the state as an
official representative, and one person from the first ranks of the ulam’
of (each) people (millet) would be selected by the people as a true
people’s representative, to assemble and meet in Istanbul. In Istanbul, a
great congress would be founded and organized, and important problems
anywhere, at any time, would be given over to the arbitration of this
congress. All states and peoples of the Muslim faith would recognize the
obligation to respect and follow the decisions and verdicts of the Islamic
congress.... The purpose of the Sayyid in organizing this Islamic congress
was to amass the means for progress and fulfillment of the Muslim
peoples collectively, and to restore the glory and might of early Islam 10 .

Moreover, the idea of having an Islamic congress can be found in the

pages of UW, where Makka was cited as “the most favorable city for the
exchange of their ideas and dissemination in all parts” (al-Afghn 2002a:
122–27). This identical idea was repeated once again in another article,
“Wada al-Siyda” (al-Afghn 2002a: 163–68). Hardly more explicit
were his remarks on Muslim solidarity, which stressed the role of the
ulam’ in this regard: The ulam’, the religious leaders everywhere
should join together and establish centers in various lands, to advance
their solidarity, and take the hands of the masses, so that the Revelation
(Qurn) and true tradition (adth) will guide them. They should gather
these threads into one knot, with its center in the Holy Lands, the most

10
The account went on to relate that the plan fell through when Abdlamd II
attempted to assert his prerogative as caliph by demanding that he serve as president
of the congress, a move resisted by al-Afghn (Lof Allh Khn 1926: 56).

11
noble of which is the House of Allh (al-Afghn 2002a: 126).

Now we can grasp the grand design in al-Afghn’s pan-Islamic

politics: the establishment of an important Muslim bloc, comprising the
Ottoman Empire, Persia, and Afghan under the guide of Ottoman
caliphate(Mamd 1979: 318)—the only independent Muslim states at
that time—as a milestone in attracting Muslims to a pan-Islamic union 11 .
Moreover, he had the beginning of a plan for an Islamic congress led by
the religious leader in Istanbul or Makka. Western colonial aggression
had awakened Muslim solidarity from its slumber, and al-Afghn gave
expression to that solidarity running through the Islamic world, with
“al-Wada al-Islmya.” He aimed to construct a unified common front
that united Islamic independent states against imperialism. Hence, he
diverted the traditional religious mentality among the Muslims toward a
modern ideology for political solidarity among Islamic countries (Kosugi
2006: 215). In this sense, he chose Islam as a political ideology by which
Muslims could achieve liberation and independence from Western
imperialism.

III. Al-Afghn’s Religious Attempt Towards Transcending the

Sunn-Sh Dichotomy

However, at the same time, we must also pay attention to al-Afghn’s

advocacy, beyond the Sunn-Sh dichotomy (Enayat 1982: 41–42;
Landau 1990: 15). In his paradigm for pan-Islamism, al-Afghn
advocated the solidarity of the Islamic religious schools of thought (i.e.,
Sunn and Sh). One of al-Afghn’s ambitions was to bridge their
differences. Well acquainted with the writings of both groups, he argued,
again and again, that their differences were a matter of past relevance and
that a modus vivendi between them could—indeed, should—be found.
Thus, in his confidential discussions with his disciple and friend,
Muammad al-Makhm, he repeatedly stresses the modern irrelevance
of these differences (al-Makhzm 1931: 112–14).

11
Al-Afghn himself, when referring to the concrete project of the political alliance
between the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and Afghanistan, used the Arabic term
“al-Jmia al-Islmya.” See the article “Awakening from Sleep” (al-Afghn 2002a:
405–06).

12
 Not surprisingly, al-Afghn reffered to the Sunn-Sh differences
in his periodical articles (Key 1951: 545). After having been exiled from
Egypt, he not only contributed to various European newspapers 12 , but also
set up several Arabic periodicals, the best-known of which was UW. UW
repeated al-Afghn’s wish to reconcile Sunns and Shs. In an article
entitled “Call for the Persians to Reach an Agreement with the Afghans,”
for example, he says that: Both nations are like two branches of one tree
and they have one root. That is an ancient Persian origin. When Islam
came, both became so powerful through the deep unification that true
religion brought. Actually, there are few differences between these
nations, and those differences do not require branches to be split or
clothes to be cut. I am very sorry that these slight differences have
become so serious, although both parties have wise ways of thinking
(al-Afghn 2002a: 193) 13 .

According to him, Afghans and Persians had become overly

particular about tiny and frivolous differences between them. Originally,
the two nations had been one and had been so mighty by virtue of the true
Islamic faith they shared. Islam has two religious schools in general,
Sunn and Sh; the Afghans belong to the former, while the Persians
belonged to the latter. Sunns and Shs originally followed one Islam,
and the disparity and disunity between them emerged only with the
passage of time. “Now we must go back to the pure Islamic principle and
revive its true meaning,” he advocated 14 .

So what, then, was his motivation for advocating the necessity of

12
For example, A. Abdullh refers to an article by al-Afghn in Figaro (Paris) of
November 8, 1883, in which he warns that, should the Mahdi be victorious in Sudan,
Muslims would rise everywhere (Abdullh 1981: 42–43).
13
He goes on to say, “Oh, Persians, remember that you have contributed your
knowledge to Islam and turn your eyes to your inheritance in Islam. As you made a
great effort in spreading Islam all over the world, you should become a pillar of the
religion, Islam. You are the best people to restore Islam’s past glory and to build a firm
foundation for bringing about Islamic solidarity in the Umma. This deed is not
impossible, on account of your great nationality and firm will” (al-Afghn 2002a:
195).
14
On the other hand, Brunner points out that the call for al-Wada al-Islmya and the
struggle against European predominance is a leitmotif that runs through the entire
journal. Nowhere, however, is there explicit mention of rapproching the Suun  and
Sh. Particularly with respect to Egypt and Sudan, the fight against British
colonialism formed the main emphasis in the news reports carried inUW, and so he
considers the journal a “classic example of an anti-imperialist argument couched in
religious terms” (Brunner 2004: 35–36).

13
transcending the narrow dichotomy between Sunn and Sh? We can see
the background of the pan-Islamic nature of his thinking, in the following
points.

Firstly, it could be subscribed to a fundamental change in the

worldwide historical system in general. By the early 20th century, the
Islamic world had been absorbed into the worldwide political and
economical system, and these differences made little critical sense. The
integration of the world economy, together with the advance of
secularization and Westernization, caused Islamic historical and religious
differences to be put aside; Islamic intellectuals were less concerned with
internal disunity, than with taking care of the crisis caused by their
confrontation with Western imperialism (Kosugi 2006: 706).

Secondly, the pan-Islamic nature of his thinking can be seen in his

description of the Afghan nation in his notable book History of Afghan
(Tatimma al-Bayn f Ta’rkh al-Afghn) 15 . In this book, he mentions the
unreasonably narrow religious factionalism that existed among the
Afghans in his time. For example, he points out that: The Afghan ulam’
avoid eating food slaughtered by Shas. On the other hand, they do not
hesitate to eat meals slaughtered by Jews or Christians, because they
believe that Shas have already disavowed their faith, and do not take
any food slaughtered by those who have lost their own creed. This is their
point of difference with ahl al-Kitb (the people of the Sacred Book)
(al-Afghn 2002d: 179).

Furthermore, he points out the meaningless and ugly struggles

between Sunns and Shs, as follows: There was a political struggle in
Qandahar that was derived from Islamic sectarian factionalism. It went as
follows. One of the greatest (Sunn) ulam’ declared the Shas to be
unbelievers. Then the Afghan people revolted against them and so much
blood flowed. Houses were broken and shops were invaded. The same
situation happened in Kabul. The ulam’s declaration that the Shias
were unbelievers led to an appalling war between Sunns and Shs that

15
According to Rasht, a prominent al-Afghn researcher in contemporary
Afghanistan, al-Afghn’s pan-Islamism was guaranteed by his experience of
engagement in Afghan policy in the 1860s. The fruit of his experience is expressed in
his book (Rasht 1977: 5).

14
continued for a few months (al-Afghn 2002d: 177–78).

Thus, the experience of al-Afghn during his stay in Afghan in his

youth contributed greatly to his later concept of pan-Islamism, because he
had grown intolerant of the miserable conditions resulting from the
repeated factional struggles that occurred between the two religious
schools, despite the fact they were both Muslim 16 . He looked to offer a
solution to break through the useless conflicts, by advocating tolerance
and the solidarity of Muslims 17 .

In this respect, he offered a typical argument vis-à-vis the Islamic

schools of thought, in his later years in Istanbul. First of all, he thought of
the Shia as people who “follow the school of thought of Imam Jafar
16
On the other hand, he praised an aspect of co-existence among Sunn and Sh in
History of Afghn. Al-Afghn points out that “Afghans have a strong attachment
toward their religion, law school, and race (jins). They never discriminate rights
among foreigners, and they have little concern about whether Shas or non-Muslims
follow the Islamic principles or not, so they do not forbid them from taking a high rank
in Afghan government. Actually, you can see al-Qizil Bsh transporting landlords in
Afghan.” Then al-Afghn says that all Afghans, though they are poor, are proud of
their “Afghanness” and are convinced that they are from the noblest nation in this
world. He also insists that there are none more pure in faith and complete in Islam than
the Afghans and the Arabs (al-Afghn 2002d: 175). In this respect, it is very
interesting to point out that he insists that the Afghans and Persians are the same
nation in origin (al rn) and that the Afghan language derives from the old Persian
language (ma’khdh min lisn Zendst) (al-Afghn 2002d: 114). For him, there are
no peculiar distinctions between Afghan and Persia from national or linguistic
viewpoints.
17
Kosugi points out that during his stay in many countries, he became able to
transcend the narrow religious factionalism by which the thoughts of most people at
that time had been arrested. On that basis, he was accustomed to both Sunn and Sh
scholarship traditions. Judging from the traditional Islamic knowledge system, his was
a very rare case (Kosugi 2006: 216). For the background of his education, see ( Abduh
1972: 17; Ri 1931: 28; al-Makhm 1931: 111; Imra 1984: 45; Lof Allh Khn
1926: 17; Shh 2000; 17; Moqaddem 2007: 402–03) and especially (Abduh 1972: 12;
al-Makhzūmī 1931: 76; Ri 1931: 28; Amn 1955: 24, 66–67; Imra 1984: 53; alab
2005: 7). He took his education at Tehran and Sh sacred places like Najaf or Qazvn
in his teenage (Ri 1931: 28; Imra 1984: 47; Lof Allh Khn 1926: 20-21; Shh
2000: 17). According to al-Makhm, he had profound knowledge in rational
scholarship, especially in old philosophy, Islamic historical philosophy, Islamic
civilization, and so on. He also mastered Afghan (Dar/Pasht), Persian, Arabic,
Turkish, French, and understood English and Russian (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 76). Abduh,
who had accepted his education in Egypt during 1871-79, said that al-Afghn had
offered him the high level education as below; al-Kalm al-Al, al-ikma al-Naarya,
al-ikma abya, al-ikma al-Aqlya, al-Haya al-Falakya, Ilm al-Taawwuf, Ilm
al-Fiqh al-Islm, Taawwuf (al-Zawr), Maniq (Shar al-Qub al al-Shamsya,
al-Mali, Salam al-Ulm), Falsafa (al-Hidya, al-Ishrt, ikma al-Ayn, al-ikma
al-Ishrq), Tawd (Aqid al-Jall al-Dawwn), Ul al-Fiqh (al-Taw,
al-Talw), Falakya (al-Jaghmn, Tadhkira al-s) (Abduh 1972: 12; Ri 1931: 28;
Amn 1955: 24, 66-67; Imra 1984: 53; alab 2005: 7).

15
iq, who is a great law scholar of Bayt Allh. These people, who are
Muslim, obey Imm Jafar, (and) are distinguished by their enthusiastic
love for Imm Al and respect for his family” (al-Makhzm 1931: 152).
However, according to him, this does not necessitate banishing them from
Islam (category), and making a big deal of these trivial differences.
Likewise, the Sunns should not make these differences determining
factors in disparity, struggle, and murder. These things are derived from
the ignorance of the Umma, and the stupidity of greedy rulers hoping to
expand their own land (al-Makhzm 1931: 152). In reality, however, he
points out that Sunn rulers exaggerated Sha-ness to horrify and mislead
the people with novel fantasies; they tried to convert the Shs into
Sunns, prompting disparity, mobilizing armies, and killing them one by
one, even though they all followed the Qur’n and the guidance of
Muammad (al-Makhzm 1931: 152). Thus, al-Afghn criticized the
unreasonable Sunn attitude toward the Shia. On the other hand, he also
denounced the Shs for their own attitude. For example, he mentions
that “as to the problem of respect for Imm Al, hoping for his
advent...we see remnants of this pride and adherence to this problem
nowadays, and this does nothing other than bring damage and disunity to
Islamic solidarity. Ab Bakr and Al would not have approved of such a
struggle and such disparity under their own names” (al-Makhzm 1931:
152–53). This does not mean that al-Afghn aimed to abolish the two
religious schools of thought, but he insisted on the necessity of recalling
the principle of Islam as Ab Bakr and Al had proposed: Islam is one.
Indeed, he had many disciples and companions, Sunn or Sh alike. He
warned both schools not to adopt extreme, opposing positions.

At this point, it is very interesting to consider al-Afghn’s remark

that the German people saw religious differences in Christianity, just as
Persians and Afghans saw differences in Islamic religious schools of
thought. These frivolous differences influenced Germany’s political unity,
weakness emerged within the German community, and the neighboring
enemy flooded into it. When they had reflected on their condition, taken
hold of their essential roots (ul al-jawharya), taken account of the
public interest (maslaa), and achieved the integration of their nation,
Allh would give them the power and strength to become the master of
Europe and the political balance would tilt for them (Imra 1968:
318–19). Thus, he compared differences between religious schools of

16
thought in Christianity and Islam.

It is known that there has been confrontation and somewhat nervous

relations between Sunns and Shs in Islamic history. The differences
between these religious schools derive from their respective viewpoints
toward the early Islamic period, and in their ways of thinking about
jurisprudent and theological affairs. In this respect, it is interesting to
note that al-Afghn even says that as to veneration (tafl), if it had
occurred some centuries later, it would have revealed skepticism to say;
that the feeblest among the orthodox caliphs was Umar, hence he carried
the caliphate before them. Had Al b. Ab lib succeeded to the
caliphate after the prophet Muammad, Ab Bakr, Umar, and Uthmn
would have died without being able to make contributions to Islam
(al-Makhzm 1931: 153). From this statement, we can understand that
his principal purpose was to reinterpret early Islamic history and
re-construct a historical consensus between the Sunns and the Shs
(Enayat 1982: 185) 18 .

In this respect, it should be pointed out that he stressed the fact that
there had been a historical co-existence among several religions and
religious schools of thought in the Islamic world; nonetheless, he showed
that Islam is the teaching of Allh which recommends humans to co-exist
and co-habit each other. Indeed, al-Makhzm points out in his retrospect
book about al-Afghn (Khirt al-Afghn: r wa Afkr) that
al-Afghn during his late stay in Istanbul, preached to the people around
him—including Judaists and Christians—that the principle (mabda’) and
the purpose (ghya) of the three religions (i.e., Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam) is the same: creating oneness (tawd) and human happiness in this

18 At the same time, there is no evidence more clear in proving his independence from

solid religious sectionalism than his testimony. When al-Afghn was asked about his
own belief (aqda) by some Sunn ulam’ in Turkey, he replied “I am a Muslim.”
When they asked him about his religious sect (madhhab), he answered “I do not know
of any madhhab leaders who are greater than me.” When the question was repeated, he
said, “My madhhab corresponds to them in part, but is mostly different” (al-Makhzm
1931: 112–13; al-Murashl 1983: 39). Abduh and al-Makhzm, and other later
researchers, rank him as a “complete Muslim” or a pure monotheist (anf)
(al-Makhzūmī 1931: 73; Abduh 1972: 27; Riā 1931: 41; Imāra 1984: 61, 1997: 53;
Yūsuf 1999: 57–62; anaf 1998: 31) and as a man belonging to the Ashar or Mtrd
schools of theology (kalm), not to any schools in aqda, to the four law schools in
ibda, or to any of the schools in mumalt to which each land ruler belonged
(al-Makhzūmī 1931: 73; Abduh 1972: 27; Riā 1931: 47; Imāra 1984: 68; anaf
1998: 31).

17
world (al-Makhzm 1931: 313–18). It is very interesting to observe that
when told by a Judaist that the principle of Christianity is the trinity and
not tawd, al-Afghn replied that the principle of Christianity is not
contradictory to that of the Judaism Tr, because when it can be seen to
contradict by its external appearances, he says, it must be re-interpreted
(ta’wl) in an inner sense (al-Makhzm 1931: 220). When explaining this,
he assumed a taawwuf point of view and said “ahl al-Kitb is ahl
al-taawwuf” (al-Makhzm 1931: 219). For al-Afghn, solidarity
beyond Islam is not regarded as being contradictory to Islamic principles.
Rather, it was the very essence of the teaching of the Qur’n.

In this sense, al-Afghn had already transcended the narrow

Sunn-Sh dichotomy, even in the 19th century Islamic world; even more,
he transcended the persistently rigid Islam/non-Islam dichotomy that
persisted in depending on Islamic principles 19 .

IV. Rashid Ri: Pragmatic Approach for Intra-Madhhib

Cooperation

The Syrian disciple of Abduh, Rashd Ri advocated the

solidarity(tawfq) between the Sunni and the Shi’ite. The schools of
19
There is some insistence, therefore, that the term “pan-Islamism” is not suitable for
designating the whole of his project. For example, Kurita points out that in the preface
of the journalUW, he says that the purpose of the journal is to benefit Orientals in
general and Muslims in particular (al-Afghn 2002a: 102). Actually, the journal
contained articles that treat not only political events in the Middle East and sub-Indian
continent, but also the relationship between China and France and the struggle for
independence in Ireland. Thus, the call for solidarity, as advocated by al-Afghn, was
designed not only for Muslims but also for all Orientals and exploited people around
the world. In this sense, Kurita concludes that the term “pan-Islamism” is not
preferred to understanding al-Afghn’s thought more comprehensively (Kurita 2000:
5–6).
There is another reason to reconsider the suitability of the focus. In the periodical
UW, he treats Islam as a civilization (Hourani 1962: 115), hence his understanding of
the connection between Islamic civilization and others is flexible. Through this
attitude, it is clear to see that he stresses that the Islamic civilization is the legitimate
heir of the ancient Greek and Persian civilizations. For instance, he says that Muslims
have imported the medical science of Hippocrates and Galenus, the geometry of Euclid,
the astronomy of Ptolemy, and the philosophy of Socrates and Aristotle; he
exaggerates when he says that Muslims succeeded in those studies and thus created an
important heritage (al-Afghn 2002a: 115). Also, he points out that the men who
mastered rational studies like theosophy (-), medicine (-), geography
(-H’), and engineering (H)—such as I S, -F, -R, I B,
I R, and I -y—brought the golden age to Islamic civilization
(al-Afghn 2002a: 157). As seen above, then, his term “Islam” includes the
intellectual heritage of old civilizations, like those of Greece and Persia.

18
thought which Ri advocated recognition and rapproachment with the
Sunni contained 12 Imam Shi’ite in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Hind, Jawa and
Zaydi in Yemen. His project was continuation of the Pan-Islamic project
started by al-Afghn(al-Shawbika 1989: 48).

It is said that he had two basic strategy for the project; 1) to

cooperate the issues over which both schools can make solidarity, to be
tolerate to situation in which each individuals show their differences, and
to demand all people of religious schools of thought to resist novel(bid‘a)
and its spreading. 2) concerned with persons who bring division and
hostility to another religious schools, it is duty for ‘ulam’ who belong to
his school to oppose him(S.S. vol.2.: 208-209). And Ri thought that it
is enough to realize the common interest (al-mali al-mushtarika)and
actual welfare (al-manfi al-amalya)in political, military, and
economical domain rather than to seek the perfect unity between both
schools. The common actual interest between both schools would
transcend the historical difference and division of religious definition, he
imagined.

As a milestone for religious solidarity, he abstained from sticking to

oppose bid‘a and superstition which the Shi’ite had been performed. He
knew the bid‘a which the Shi’ite brought in its religious ceremony called
shr. However, he made silent to it and accepted the call for the
ceremony performed by the Shi’ite at Egypt in each year. He seeks to
deepen knowledge for them and strengthen trust thorough real mixing(M
vol.13, no.4.: 312).

At another place, he praised the Shi’ite as follows; when British

governor imposed the Shi’ite for their religious special stipulations, they
answered that there were not any division which lead such a typical
stipulation between Shi’ite and Sunni. To the contrary, what is exist
between both schools would never oppose to what is exist between those
who obey the other law schools(S.S. vol.1.: 129).

Ri decided his place to stand, called on the Shi’ite ‘ulam’ in Iraq
and seeked to strengthen the brotherhood among them, looking for the
good method for rapproachment. When ‘ulam’ in Najaf heard that the
Ri decided to visit them, started letter exchange with him and showed

19
approval on his visiting, his critical role to realize the general Muslim
interest and his open attitude towards their religious School,
Shi’ite(al-Shawbika 1989: 50).

When he got decree which ordered the Shi’ite ‘ulam’ to spread

Shi’ism in Arab Iraqs, he accepted it as useful from religious viewpoint
which is conditioned to teach religious duty and border of all/arm(M
vol.13, no.4.: 312).

He had a opportunity to hold the Islamic Conference(al-Mutamar

al-Islm) at Jerusalem in 1931, and he demand one of the prominent
Shi’te Mujtahid in Iraq, Shaykh Moammed l Kshef Al-Ghi’ to
commit the conference(S.S. vol.2.: 216-18). ajj Amn usayn also
showed approval for his attendance to the conference(M vol.33, no. 5.:
394) 20 . Thus, He realized the actual recognition and solidarity among
‘ulam’ of religious schools of thought.

At the Islamic conference, Ri proposed the establishment of

college which produces both religious schools member. At the university,
all muslims can learn Islamic studies including theology, law, languages
along with modern science and technology under the guide of ‘ulam’ of
both schools, then graduate without knowing differences between both
schools except difference of interpretation to the past historical
experiences, and spread Islamic light thorough the world. Thus, the
university aims to stabilize the base of solidarity among muslim
individuals in Islamic Umma and to finish differences within the society
actually(M vol.32, no.4.: 317). To underweight the teaching and guide for
means to correspond individuals and societies to certain aim and road is
more closer to what ‘Abduh taught than that of al-Afghn(al-Shawbika
1989: 52) 21 .

Besides the level of International conference, Ri argues individual

and concrete cases of religious antagonism between the Sunni and the

20 Kshef al-Ghi’ sent a letter to Ri in 15 Raman 1350 which stressed the
importance of solidarity among Islamic schools and governments, estimated his
positive role in this point(al-Shawbika 1989: 53).
21 After his death, the committee for realization of recognition and rapproachment

began to be held, at which the Sunni ‘ulam’ of al-Azhar and the Shi’ite ‘ulam’ can
meet each other(al-Shawbika 1989: 55).

20
Shi’ite in al-Manr. When the struggle between the Sunn and the Shi’ite
in Jawa, leaders of the both schools demand Ri to put forward the
judgment towards the struggle. He wrote an article which rebuked the
leaders of both schools and ordered to stop the struggle immediately. The
article continues to present an idea to consist common committee to
control the problems which lied between the Sunni and the Shi’ite and
bring peace by both schools members who are equal to attend the
committee, then, spread decisions at the committee towards all muslims
thorough preaching in Mosque or printing media including newspapers
and magazines(M vol.33, no.1.: 66-78, 617-19).

His reply on religious issues was not limited to the case of Southeast
Asia. There are some cases of South Asia in al-Manr. Fro example,
when he travelled in India, he preached in front of both religious schools
members. He call for recognition of both schools, forgetfulness of things
which remember differences, conformity to economical interest,
establishment of common schools, resistance against risks suffering both
schools inside or outside India(S.S. vol.2.: 110) 22 .

He understood that most of the Shi’ite was opposed to the Sunni and
their ‘ulam’. He brings into light novels and superstitions in religious
creeds and deeds which the Shi’ite had embraced and performed 23 . Ri
added his refutable comments on those superstitious novels and criticism
including what the Shi’ite said as “call for worship of idols by Quraysh
family”, which Ri counted as disrespect towards the Prophet
company(aba) (S.S. vol.2.: 29, 253).

In spite of those matters which the Shi’ite sticks to, he sought

22 Along with this line to preach his idea on religious school issues with modern
printing media, it should be attended that Ri helped to launch the Shi’ite Persian
newspaper “Teaching(Tarbiyat)” in his house and his viewpoint was widespread among
another Islamic reformists who read and write Persian. He specified the role of the
newspaper as a tool for rapproachment of elements of Islamic Umma. The newspapers
were edited towards increase of actual benefit transcendence over the political and
historical differences, whistle a warning to political leader of Persia and Ottoman
Turks to discard the various difference between both countries, to deal with foreign
crises over them correspondently(S.S. vol.1.: 16).
23 A Syrian Shaykh Musin Amn ‘mir wrote the book titled “Fort of Refutation

against what al-Manr editor mentioned to Shi’ism. Then Sunni ‘ulam’ in Iraq
Mamd Shuqr rs wrote the book titled “Refutation against the Fort” and
criticized the viewpoints of ‘mir towards Ri.

21
methods to make bridge and consist cooperative relationship with them.
Then he define what the recognition and rapproachment mean as follows;
making the principle of the Sunni adjusted to the principle of the Shi’ite,
correspondent to what the Shi’ite principles or both schools principles
make coincide(S.S. vol.2.: 5, 157) 24 .

On the other hand, it should be noted that there are many religious
schools which Ri regarded as out of Islam. Among them, he especially
took two sects and made comments; the Bb and the Qdyn. The
reason why he took was wide of spread of both side and his recognition of
relationship with the emergence of the sects and the benefit of colonial
state(al-Shawbika 1989: 56).

He thought the Bb as one of the latest sects of the Bn. its
followers worshiped Bah’, they called their leader Abbs Effend as
laqab “‘Abd al-Bah’”, venerate his revelation. They borrowed various
principles from other religions, had special religious law, two noble
books “al-Kitb al-Aqdas”, “al-Bayn”. Ri also believed that the
principle of the Bb is far from Islam than that of Judaism, because
Judaism puts Tawd on its bases on the other hand, the Bb puts
materialistic worship of idols on its bases(M 3, vol. 23.: 548). He
acknowledged that the preaching of the Bb (and Bah) embraced the
denial of division which was brought by religious, racial, national
fanaticism, the open attitude towards other religions, schools of thought
and the teaching with which all humankind would satisfied(T.U. vol.1.:
931).

After the revolution lead by the Young Turks, the Bah recover its
influence, and starts rigorous activity in Egypt too(M vol.13, no.10: 789).
“The Explanation of Egypt(al-Bayn al-Mir)” was the newspapers
which carried articles about the Bah and its leader Abbs Effendi. Ri
also mentioned about the newspaper(M.vol.17 no.3.: 178) and quoted

24 At another article in al-Manr, he showed his wonder why the struggle between the
Sunni and the Shi’ite in Bukhar has happened? The struggle would not make any
sense and profit for both schools. It is Russia which hope mutual collapse. … Why the
Zaydi and the Shfi‘ kill each other? It leads each ruin” (M. vol.13 no.7.: 541). He
thought that the narrow religious struggles and oppositions lead the foreign powers to
fish in troubled waters and carry their imperial and colonial subdue in Islamic world.
That’s why he advocated the solidarity among Islamic religious schools of thought.

22
article of Arabic newspaper “the Helped(al-Muayyad)” which made
comment on Abbs in al-Manr(M.vol.17 no.3.: 178). he even reported
that a student of al-Azhar published a book, which insisted that the
teaching of the Bah was “beautiful parl(durar al-bahya)” and showed
his tafsr of Qur’n along with the Bah preaching(T.U. vol.1.: 937).

The fact that they were assigned to some British government post let
him to think that they served for British colonial rule and her interest. He
reminded two Bah; usayn Ru Effendi Bah and Amad Effendi
awat. The former was assigned to Amn of ijz and the latter was to
the reformative program of law in Palestine by British
government(M.vol.27 no.5.: 399).

Another case which Ri took and made comments on, is the
Qdyn. The Qdyn has its nisba to Ghulm Amad Qdyn. That
the revelation was descended to Qdyn and he was regarded as Christ
so that the prophethood and revelation were not closed is the core of its
teaching(M.vol.23 no.10.: 799). Ri bring into light general
circumstances of the emergence of this sect, pointed that Britain helped
its emergence and development, and that the sect divided the muslim
solidarity, praised British men and served for British colonial
rule(M.vol.24 no.5.: 580, M.vol.31 no.7.: 560).

Ri thought that the Qdyn tried to call Indian muslim to

abandon the duty of Jihd, to yield to sovereignty of British rule and
power and to discard all kind of weapon for resistance(M.vol.5: 790). He
quoted the voice of Amad about British rule from the book called “The
Locus of Amad”. He--Amad—insisted that the God would not prefer
infidels who commit evil toward people who treat them kindly, and that it
was the biggest sin to perform Jihd against British government which
treats Indian Muslim well(M.vol.31 no.7.: 560). During his stay in India,
some follower of Ghulm Amad visited him and requested him to call on
Qdyn. However, he abandoned the visit with fear of his visiting being
used for spread of their preaching(M.vol.23 no.1.: 35).

Along with the solidarity of the Sunni and the Shi’ite, he also
advocated the solidarity of law schools(tawd al-madhhib al-fiqhya).
According to Ri, differences between schools of thought mean

23
differences between each individual for understanding and ability, and
also mean freedom of thought. It is the very thing which Islam respects
and approves(W.I.: 137). The emergence of jurisprudences is based on
fact of freedom of ijtihd in general on Islamic law(W.I.: 137). Ijtihd
depends on surrounding circumstance and accept positive or negative
influences through it. When this aspect is disregarded, movement of
society turns to stiffening, movement of ijtihd is halted, changing into
individual attempt which sees only partial and secondary
matters(M.vol.13 no.9: 672; vol.25 no.8: 626-27, W.I.: vii).

Thus, the intellectual effort turns to be restricted to refer to what the

preceding generations wrote, backing to the teaching and only making
comment or explanation. ‘Ulam’ turn around the preceding schools of
thought, respect what they preach, disregarding other studies. At last,
they think much of views of preceding jurisprudences than original
Islamic texts as Qur’n and adth(W.I.: 99).

According to him, it is not better to think that Islam performed by

preceding generation of these schools was correct than to think that the
correctness of their Islam precedes their establish of law schools. They
themselves exaggerated that their ijtihd was so specific, individual that
it is not necessary to persons who can understand fundamental basis of
Shar‘a and embrace creative ability. The conditions they performed their
individual ijtihd were limited to what is not contradict with Qur’nic
verses, Prophet Sunna, and Companion’s Ijm’ (M.vol.25 no.8: 626-27;
W.I.: 88-90).

According to his understanding, reason of the division of Islamic law

schools should be ascribed not only to religious intellectuals but also
political rulers. He insists that some rulers have used the differences
between schools of thought and hidden their political differences or
individual interests. Every states have its own schools of thought and
propagate the value to obey. Ottoman Turk is Sunni, Yemen is Zaydi,
Oman is Ibadi, and Iran is Shi’ite. People who obey to schools which their
state does not adopt as official has been regarded as treason to the state.
In fact, Islamic states have witnessed so many struggles derived from the
problem of schools. He admitted that the Zaydi has been prohibited to
attend the pray on Friday in Sultanate state(M.vol.13 no.9: 679).

24
 Ri proposed that each state adopting its own schools of thought
should protect intellectual and jurisprudent treasure of other schools of
thought, which would bring solutions for problems the state has
suffered(M.vol.16: 4, 271). He reports struggles between Shi’ite Persia
and Sunni Ottoman, dispute between Zaydi Yemen and Salafi Sa‘udi 25 .

Ri advocated the necessity for generalization of religious teaching,

awakening each individuals to his/her own religious affairs. Then he
demand ‘ulam’ to battle with stifle of thought and blind emulation, to
proceed the road of ijtihd and push aside the notorious theme “gate was
closed” (M.vol.13 no.9.: 672).

In this sense, Ri did not only call for open the gate of ijtihd but
took a first step to construct open relationship between law
schools(al-Shawbika 1989: 65). Ri proposed the establishment of
academic committee which represents all Islamic law schools and
discusses stipulations of creed affairs, religious ceremonies and social
rituals. At the same time, the committee guarantees everything with which
‘ulam’ of each law schools can correspond and aims to erase individual
differences brought by individual ijtihd, to start ijtihd in general at
Shar‘a and to seek solutions for problems in muslim life(M. vol.25 no.2:
126).

In fact, what he said about solidarity(al-tawfq) means to

acknowledge the prestige of all law schools (talfq) and to get out from
old system of law schools, making a new school. He did not think to

25 For instance, he proposed muslims in general and the Shi’ite in particular not to
make pilgrimage as a divine duty on account of not affirming the peace from the ijz
kingdom and the Wahhbist. He also stated them infidel if not changing their attitude
towards other muslims(S.S vol.2.: 5). Ri sought a way to recognition between both
Iran as Shi’ite state and Sa’udi kingdom as Salaf state. He require the Sa’udi kingdom
family to decrease their insult toward Iran and their disturbance towards Shi’ite people
in making pilgrimage to Makka, to forgive certain part of their activities unless
breaking peace and sacred law. He continued to insist that making alliance with Iran is
correspond with Sa’udi national interest and that when the exchange of recognition
between both countries is accomplished, it would be the complete circle which links
chain of Pan-Islam(M. vol.31 no.2.: 142-44). In this context, it deserves to note that
Ri approve Sh Mozaffar al-Dn for his intelligence on “constitution(dustr)” and
for opening the national parliament, adjusting the parllamentary system in Iran from
1905. He even exaggerated that the government of Iran is the most attractive in Islamic
government(S.S. vol.2. 16).

25
realize total accordance between all law schools(M. vol.28 no.6: 432). To
gather under common affairs among all law schools, to open the gate of
various schools. It did not mean to necessitate only one
school(al-Shawbika 1989: 66) 26 .

V. Al-Kawkib in the Makka Congress: Towards an Arab Caliphate

At last it will examine another prominent Islamic reformist ‘Abd

al-Ramn al-Kawkib and his books, “Umm al-Qur”. First of all, as to
its form, this is a book of the minutes of a hypothetical conference
consisting of twelve sessions which was supposed to be held in Makka
during two weeks of November 1899 which heralded the season of
Islamic pilgrimage. Actually, this conference was held in his imagination.
However, his idea that Islamic intellectuals around the world should
gather at a place to discuss the current reality of the Islamic world is so
original and its content is so stimulating that the prominent Orientalist at
that time, Margoliouth mistakenly judged the conference to have actually
been held in Makka (Kramer 1986: 34). Plenty of Islamic intellectuals
participated in this imaginary conference. The writer of the minutes was
Sayyid— al-Kawkib--who was elected to the register. He called himself
by his penname “Furt”, for he was borne in Aleppo, an old city in
northern Syria. Table 1 shows the whole list of participants at the
conference.

26 Actually, Ri showed possibility to open the law schools one by one or to gather
the followers of law schools. Actually, with his influence and plea from Iraqi
Sulaymani and Yemeni people, Ottoman Sultan Abdlhamid II put forward the
Sultaniya decree which forgives to obey law schools except anaf school(T.U. vol.1:
617; M.vol.16, no.4: 264-67). And he also comments on what the jurisprudences
should do for legislation. See(M.vol.26 no.6: 453, W.I: 118).
In this context it is interesting to see that a Turkish anaf ‘ulam’ accused Ri as
if he attacks Islam and destructs Islamic law schools, called him “non-schools of
thought(al-lmadhhabya)” or “non-religion(al-ldnya)” (Bayram 1977: 107). He
responded the rebuke as follows; he would not aim to abolish the old law schools or
launch his new school. He identified himself as Shfi‘ in Islamic law school at the
same time he also acknowledge to belong to Salafi muslim. He did not obey specific
‘lim or stick to special mujtahid in jurisprudent problems(M.vol.25 no.8: 629).
Shaykh Muammad Mutaf Margh left his biography on Ri. He stressed in it
that Ri was a man of Salaf Sunn, disgust taqld and call for ijtihd as duty to
people like him or who has ability to perform(M. vol.35 no.3: 188). At the same time,
Margh points out that Ri has new principles towards Islam on the one hand, which
is better to be attributed to himself, his principles were accord with the basis of
‘ulam’ of ancestors(salaf).

26
Table1: The participants in the imaginary conference in Makka
Source:(Kawkib 1975: 39, 237-38)
Pen Name City Area
The Euphrates sayyid Aleppo Aleppo
(Al-Sayyid al-Furt) (alab) (alab)
The Syrian notable Damascus Syria
(Al-Fil al-Shm) (Dimashq) (Al-Shm)
The Jerusalemite eloquent Jerusalem Palestine
(Al-Balgh al-Quds) (Al-Quds) (Filasn)
The Alexandrian person of
Alexandria Egypt
character
(Al-Iskandarya) (Mir)
(Al-Kmil al-Iskandar)
The Egyptian great scholar Cairo Egypt
(Al-Allma al-Mir) (Al-Qhira) (Mir)
The Yemeni scholar of
Sanaa Yemen
adth
(an) (Al-Yaman)
(Al-Muaddith al-Yaman)
The Basri reciter Basra Iraq
(Al-fi al-Bar) (Al-Bara) (Al-Irq)
The Najdi scholar Hail Najd
(Al-lim al-Najd) (il) (Najd)
The Median researcher Medina Medina
(Al-Muaqqiq al-Madan) (Al-Madna) (Al-Madna)
The Meccan professor Mecca Mecca
(Al-Ustdh al-Makk) (Makka) (Makka)
The Tunisian Doctor Tunis Tunis
(Al-akm al-Tnis) (Tnis) (Tnis)
The Fezian guider Fez Marrakech
(Al-Murshid al-Fs) (Fs) (Markish)
The British optimist Liverpool England
(Al-Sad al-Inkilz) (Lfarbl) (Injiltur)
The Greek guardian Constantinople Turkey
(Al-Mawl al-Rm) (Al-Qusannya) (Turkya)
The Kurdish mathematician Kurdistan Kurdistan
(Al-Riy al-Kurd) (Kurdistn) (Kurdistn)
The Tabrizi jurist Tabriz Persia
(Al-Mujtahid al-Tabrz) (Tabrz) (Frs)
North Tatarstan
The Tatari wise man Boghja Sarai
(Bild al-Ttr
(Al-rif al-Ttr) (Bughja Sary)
al-Shamlya)
The Kazak preacher Kazan Kazakhstan
(Al-Khab al-Qzn) (Qzn) (Kazkstn)
Central Asia
The Turkish inspector Kashgar
(Al-Mawin al-Al
(Al-Mudaqqiq al-Turk) (Kashghar)
li-l-Atrk bi-Wasa siy)
(The Afghan jurist) Kabul Afghanistan
Al-Faqh al-Afghn (Kbul) (Afghnistn)
The Indian possessor Delhi India
(Al-ib al-Hind) (Dihl) (Al-Hind)
The Sindi elder Calcutta India
(Al-Shaykh al-Sind) (Kalkatt) (Al-Hind)
The Chinese guider Beijing China
(Al-Imm al-n) (Bikn) (Al-n)

27
 Al-Kawkib’s argument is typical in that he perceives the reason for
the decline of the Umma to be not only due to the superstitious deeds of
the Muslims but also to the role of the Ottoman Turks. According to
al-Kawkib, the Ottomans did not at first want their subjects to be
Turkized or Arabized but later they showed an affirmative attitude
towards being Franchised or Germanized 27 . Their opinion should be
understood from their deep disgust for the Arabs, and the Ottoman Turks
deserve to be criticized severely for their blind imitation of western
countries. Then al-Kawkib lists the Turkish terms by which they insult
the Arabs and expresses his rebuke to them and mentions that the Turks
have not contributed much to Islam except for building a few
mosques(Imra 1975: 324-25).

Being disillusioned with the Ottoman government which was

unable to resist western imperialism and colonialism, al-Kawkib seeks a
new political leadership that will lead the Islamic world as a whole,
replacing with Ottoman Turks. He thought the new leader should be
chosen from amongst the Arabs. He stresses that the Arabs are qualified
to lead the revival of the Islamic Umma for two reasons; firstly, the Arab
peninsula is the center of the world and the birthplace of Islam, contains
the Bayt Allh and Prophet’s mosque, is the most protected from ethnical,
religious and sectarian mixture, and the most remote place for Muslims to
live to avoid foreign influence. Secondly, the Arabs living in the Arab
peninsula have established the noble foundations of the Islamic
community and they follow religious ethics and the law, are the most
pious for religious solidarity, and the most ardent in preserving and
promoting their own religious customs.

According to al-Kawkib, they the Arabs are the holders of

civilization, the most able to endure any difficulties and persevere in
achieving their goals, heeding their freedom and independence, hating
oppression, and preserving their own nationality and customs. They are

27
On the other hand, al-Kawkib lists the following dynasties that have Arabized
their subjects; Umayya, Abbas, Muwahhid, Buwayh, Seljuk, Ayyub, Ghol, Cherkes
Amirs and Muhhamad Ali dynasty(Imra 1975: 324). They became Arabs ethically,
equipped with Arabic virtues. By the way, this theme to Arabize was a reaction to
Western colonial rule at that time, adopting the motto that the ruled should become one
with the rulers in their languages, ethnicity and race. Thus, he rebukes the Turks for
not making their subjects Turkized, as well as not Arabizing themselves(Imra 1975:
324).

28
associated with many nations but not mixed with them in lineage and
customs(Imra 1975: 356-57). He specifies that from the standpoint of
geography, ethnicity, and nationalism, the most suitable nation for the
Islamic revival of the Umma is the Arabs 28 .

In short, whether they are Muslims or not, the Arabs share a

common language and way of thinking and it is they that have embodied
the qualities which modern western civilization has praised—the
principles of equal rights, democracy, shared wealth, security of life,
conforming to international pacts and so on. He stresses that the ideal of
the Arabs coincides with that of modern West and is embodied in their
sacred book, al-Qurn(Rahme 1999: 174) 29 .
28
Strictly speaking, al-Kawkib lists up 25 items which assure the qualifications of
the Arabs to lead the Islamic revival. 1). The Arab peninsula is the source of the light
of Islam, 2). It contains the Kaba , 3). It contains the Prophet’s mosque, 4). It is an
ideal political and religious center located between the far east of Asia and far west of
Africa, 5). It is an area which is free from the intermixture of races, religions,
religious schools, 6). It is an area remote from foreigner influence, 7). It is a free area
and the most respected place, 8). The Arabs in the peninsula are capable of being the
advocators of pan-Islamism (al-jmia al-islmya) for it is the the birthplace of Islam.
9). They hold a tendency towards religion, 10). They are the most accustomed to
religious principles among Muslims, 11). It is most ardent to preserve religion among
the Muslims, 12). Their religion has been pure monotheism (anf salaf), 13). They
hold the strongest aabya and pride of all Muslims, 14). Their ruler is Muslim 15).
Their Umma is the oldest, 16). They are the most efficient of Muslims 17). They are
the most preserving of their racial identity and the customs of the Muslims, 18). They
are the most interested in the freedom and independence of the Islamic Umma, 19).
Among the Arabs in general, their language is the most graceful of the languages
spoken by Muslims, 20). The Arabic language is universal in that more than 300
billion Muslims speak it, 21). The Arabic language is the specific language of more
than 100 billion Muslims and non-Muslims, 22). It is the oldest Umma complying to
the principle of equal rights, 23). It is the Umma most deep-rooted in democracy
(shr), 24). It is the most right-guided Ummas in the principle of shared property
(al-masha al-ishtirkya), 25). It is the most concerned Ummas with regard to making
contracts(Imra 1975: 356-57).
29
By the way, some have commented that al-Kawkib regards socialism as having
borrowed the motto of ‘an equal standard of living for all, as ownership of the land or
immovable property has always been regulated in Islam(Atiyeh 1988: 49-50). In fact,
he articulates that socialism is contained in Christian and Islamic principles. However,
according to him, socialism under Christianity has not realized its full potential, while
socialism was fully realized during the classical Islamic era. The right-guided
caliphates succeeded in establishing a just government which considered themselves to
be on the same social level as the poorest of their subjects, which prompted something
which is understood in a socialistic society as brotherhood and solidarity among the
Muslims. In addition, Islam imposed a law (qnn) whose principle is based on
property being the result of labor (qayyima al-aml) and great wealth could not be
gathered except by robbery and plunder. Then he stresses that land, immovable
property, and machines used in giant industries are the common property of the people
of the Umma and that the profits and benefits should be distributed among the society
justly within the stipulations of the law which the government emulates in order to
share even the most trivial things fairly among them, with reference to socialist

29
VI. Al-Kawkib’s Prospect for Inter-Madhhib Rapproachment

As confirmed at the beginning of this chapter, there is no doubt that this

imaginary conference is held with the aim of realizing pan-Islamic
solidarity. He proposed to invoke the unity of the Umma using the symbol
of a caliphate. However, when aiming at Islamic inner solidarity, he
considered that religious sectionalism would be a tough roadblock. The
Islamic world in the latter half of the 19th century kept experiencing
religious struggles and disputes related to the Sunni/Shi’ite religious
split(Kosugi 2006: 215).

According to al-Kawkib, the differences among the leaders, if

they are utilized for the good are in fact a blessing (raima). On the
other hand, if they result in religious disparity between Salafs in the Arab
peninsula and Egyptian, Maghribi, Syrian and Turkish Muslims or among
Iraqis or Persians in Ajam and the notables of the Shiites in India, or
among Zanzibarians and Ibians, these differences will be a reason for
antipathy (niqma). Then he points out that “In spite of this big disparity,
all of them believe that they themselves are the people of the Sunna and
Jama and think that everyone except for themselves is contaminated
with heresies. He reminds reasonable people that this disparity and
disunity come from antipathy and from not seeking to utilize the
differences for good(Imra 1975: 313-14)”, and then he rebukes the
latters narrow, fanatical sectionalism which exaggerates the very issue of
disparity 30 .

Al-Kawkib was born at Aleppo in northern Syria and belongs to

the Sunni madhhab. It would be an acute and urgent issue for arguing the
solidarity of the Islamic world and its internationalism to confirm his
views on other Islamic schools of thought.

First of all, by listing up the groups he mentions in the congress

societies in the West (Imra 1975: 171).

30
In his article “Pan-Islamism (al-Jmia al-Islmya)”contributed to the political
magazine “al-muqattam”, he criticizes Muslims who believe that the misfortunes the
Islamic world is experiencing as a whole today will never stop without the extinction
of all the Christians and it is this attitude that presents the West with a pretext to
intervene and for the Cristians to call on European nations for help(Atiyeh 1988: 51).
He rebukes the Muslims fanatical attitude towards the Christians which has led to
Western imperialistic interference in the affairs of the entire Islamic world.

30
under the name of “branches (firaq) , schools (madhhib), associations
(jamyt), parties (azb)”, we can create Table 2 below.

Table 2: Schools of thought, Associations, Parties with which the

congress deals Source:(Imra 1975: 409-10)
Sun Theolo The West
Sha Other
n gy, Christian Other schools/par
school Tarqa Islamic
Scho Law schools schools ties/secret
s schools
ols schools sosieties
Al-Kha
Ahl izb
Al-Sh Al-Mu Al-Qdir wrij Al-Burti
al-Su Al-iba al-Umml
a tazila ya (al-k stntya
nna al-Imjilz
imya)
Ahl
Al-Im Al-Ash Al-Sans Al-Ib Al-Fthg
al- Juzwya Al-abyn
mya ira ya ya hrasya
adth
Al-Zay Al-Mt Al-Naqsh Al-as Al-Kthl Al-ashs
―― Al-Dahryn
dya urdya bandya hwya kya hshiyn
Al-Kmn
(al-Jamya
Al-Jaf Al-an Al-Rif Al-Jah Al-Maw
―― ―― /
arya afya ya mya rina
al-Shuyy
a)
Al-Ism
lya Al-Mli Al-Jaba Al-Arth
―― ―― ―― Ssiylist
(Al-B kya rya dhaksya
inya)
Al-Nhlist
（ al-adam
Al-Qar Al-Shf Al-Qad
―― ―― ―― ―― yn/
mia iya arya
al-fawawy
n）
Al-Dur Al-an al-mush Al-Fibyny
―― ―― ―― ――
z bila abbiha a
Al-Rf Al-Wah Al-Finyny
―― ―― ―― ―― ――
ia hbya a

As can be seen from the table 2, he gives an overview of various groups in

his discussion. Concerning pan-Islamism, it is necessary to focus on his
perception of the Shiits, because it is the largest group among Islamic
schools of thought after the Sunnis.

Al-Kawkib selects the mujtahid of Jafar school from Tabrz to

attend the congress as a representative of the Shiite schools of thought.
The mujtahid mourns the reality of the Islamic world at that time in which
there were so many disparities in religious thought and he calls for the
overcoming of blind imitation of the authorities which leads to the

31
disunity through the application of the spirit of ijtihd. According to the
mujtahid, Islam as religion commands Muslims not to obey their leaders
(Imms) but to submit to Allh as the Lawgiver on every issue and as for
issues which need innovative interpretation of law, he commands them to
perform ijtihd for themselves, even if the ijtihd of others is superior
to there own(Imra 1975: 315).

The most interesting point is his description of the Wahhbs and

Zayds in Yemen area. He demonstrates both schools of thought through
their speeches at the congress; the Turks are concerned about the Salaf
movement, which includes Wahhbism in Hijz and Zaidism in Yemen.
According to their insistence, both conflict with the schools of the Sunna,
the latter being Shiite and the former denouncing as bida things which
the Ottomans would call Sunna. However, al-Kawkib stresses that this
insistence does not have any intellectual grounds for Zaidism is closest in
relationship to the tenets of the Sunna or the Mutazilite among Shiite
schools and Wahhbism is a kind of Salafi movement in origin and merely
imitates the vigorous attitude of early Islam. Most Yemenis are in conflict
with the doctrines of the Salaf in applying the principle of ijtihd which
Imm Zayn al-bidn performed, or the principle of istinb which Imm
Ibn ambal executed(Imra 1975: 296).

What makes al-Kawkibs argument original is his perception of

combining Zaydism with the Shite school, clarifying Wahhbism as one
of the Salaf movements and unifying both schools within the same
area—the Arab peninsula. This confirms that he regards the Shiites as
closer to the Sunna than we imagined possible at that time and views them
along with Wahhbs as Salafi. It also confirms that he defines the border
between Sunni and Shite schools very flexibly 31 .

His flexibility on the typological border between religious schools

31
In addition, his bundling the Wahhbs and the Zayds into Salafism can be seen
(Imra 1975: 241, 296). Al-Kawkib points out in(Imra 1975: 241) that the Arabs
living in the Arab peninsula are Salafi Muslims and most of them belong to the
Hanbal or Zayd schools of thought. In addition to the Zayd school of thought, he
introduces Shite Twelver Imamism affirmatively in the book. For example,
see(Imra 1975: 314). He emphasizes that it imitates the school of thought of Imm
Jafar al-diq and he focuses on its accent on using reasoning (aql) when
interpreting Islamic law (ijtihd). His praise for this school seems to be mainly due to
this point. Indeed, he calls the ulam of the school mujtahid.

32
of thought is confirmed as not only between the Sunnis and the Shiites
but also among the different groups of Sunnis, especially in his
interpretation of their law schools.

The evidence as to his flexible perception of the relationships

between Islamic schools of thought derives from his reference to “talfq”
and his praise of it. According to Kosugi, talfq is to mix the stipulations
of different law schools when interpreting a law case, and talfiq in
classical jurisprudence means to mix the stipulations of other schools
simultaneously or at different times in same case(Kosugi 2002: 622).

For example, al-Kawkib proposes through the remarks of the

Tabrzi mujtahid that he would propose the concept of talfq as
jurisprudents of all law schools have admitted it in principle(Imra 1975:
314-15), then insists as follows; Ab anfa and his companions were so
superior that they believed themselves more superior than Ab Bakr or
Umar. Due to this, they are different from the latter schools in their
interpretation of law using ijtihd. Jurisprudents of all law schools have
permitted taking the advice of an Imm or his followers. According to
al-Kawkib, this is the very reason for talfq. From this perspective, he
expresses his doubt that the anaf law school does not permit talfq
taking as an example the remarks between Ab anfa and Shfi, though
there is nobody to say that an Imms followers were superior to Shfi,
Mlik, or Ibn Abbs(Imra 1975: 315).

He, being afraid that the dispute derived from differences in

interpretation of the law by mujtahids from all schools of law would lead
to disunity between the Mlik, anaf, and Shfi schools again, quotes
profoundly a Qurnic verse “He has enjoined on you the same way of
religion that He enjoined upon Noah and that which We have revealed to
you and that which We enjoined upon Abraham and Moses and Jesus,
saying: “Establish the Religion and do not be divided in it.” Dreadful for
the unbelievers is that which you call them to. Allah chooses for Himself
whom He pleases, and guides to His way only him who turns to Him in
repentance”(42: 13)(Imra 1975: 315), insisting on the necessity of
interpreting Islam with reason and concludes “it is obvious that we need

33
the interpretation of Islamic law by ijtihd”(Imra 1975: 316) 32 .

Thus, al-Kawkib urges the utilization of talfq as permitted by

many jurisprudents and the performance of ijtihd towards understanding
Islam correctly. For him the disunity among Muslims and their fanatic
attitude towards their religion is a treason to the absolute order of Allh,
and it was indeed the narrow fanatical religious sectionalism that he tried
to overcome at that time 33 and dealing with it in the international
conference at Makka is the most symbolic indication of his pan-Islamism.

The intellectual catalyst coming from the West can be seen in a

discussion which compares Christian Protestantism with Islam as
understood by an Orientalist (mustashriq). An Orientalist who attends the
conference defines the protestant believers as follows; when
Protestantism appeared, it aimed to revive the original rigorous power, to
proclaim any privileges not stipulated clearly in the sacred book as false,
to widen the domain of the intelligence and science throughout the realm
Christianity, and to resist the activities of the clergymen. They are “the
People of the Gospels (al-al-ifa al-injlya)”. Then the Catholics and
the Arthdhaks 34 disappeared from the elite completely - which was
welcomed among the people for their brand of Christianity and rational
thought could never be combined. On the other hand, Islam was
confounded by false scientists (al-mutafanninn) who led reason in a false
32
Al-Kawkib also highlights taqld as the counter-concept of ijtihd. According to
him, the early Muslims performed ijtihd till the 8 th or 9 t h century. However, from 9 t h
century, they began to practise blind imitation (taqld am) among others. It is the
very blind imitation which he believes to be the source of intellectual stagnation and
ignorance and that the re-introduction of ijtihd is necessary to overcome this bad
habit. For him, Allh originally commanded Muslims to make choices (khiyr) within
permitted limits to coincide with the needs of each situation(Imra 1975: 310).
33
Al-Kawkib maintains that there are two struggles which caused disunity among
the Umma in Islamic history; a political one and a religious one. The former was
concerned with relationship between the caliph and kings; the latter was concerned
with the relationship between Islamic schools of thought. He considers the latter in
some detail and focuses on the dispute between the Hanaf school and the Shfi
school in particular, and then points out that no Islamic schools of thought could
remain except for the Zayd school and Amad school in the Arab peninsula, the
Mlik and Khazar schools in the Maghrib, and the Jafar school in Persia(Imra
1975: 312).
Thus, the indication by Brunner that his existence was crucial to developing the
idea of a Muslim congress but had no effect on the rapprochement movement within
Islamic schools of thought in 20th century(Brunner 2004: 38)needs certain
modifications. His subjective argument on the differences among schools of thought
could be regarded as an early sign for the movement along with Muslim congress.
34
It means a sect of the Eastern Orthodox Church(al-Munjid 2001:16).

34
direction and bewitched healthy thought(Imra 1975: 310).

It is necessary to do as Protestantism has done in the history of

Christianity by returning to its origin, referring to its sacred book directly,
regaining its rigorous power, spreading intelligence and science
throughout the Umma in order to rescue an Islam compounded by
scientific forgeries and false beliefs 35 .

Al-Kawkib sees Christianity and Islam comparatively, even

comparing Catholicism with an Islam polluted by blind imitation and
corruption, and Protestantism with an Islam rigorous in returning to its
sacred source and performing innovative interpretation of Islamic law.
From another angle, it means that emphasizing the necessity to return to
true Islam and its rational interpretation is brought about reflexively by
referring to the Orientalist who reminds us about the Protestant sect of
Christianity.

VII. Conclusion

Above chapters, this paper reveals inner Pan-Islamism which aims to

transcend the political divisions and the religious struggles and the logic
of modern Islamic reformers towards it. Now arranging the content, it
should be focused on two points. 1) solidarity among Islamic countries
under the symbol of Caliphate against political divisions--Intra-Umma
Alliance, 2) recognition and correspondent between the Sunni and the
Shi’ite against religious struggle--Inter-Madhhib Rapproachment. With
this two pillars, they sought to confirm the unity of Umma.
35
For another case which explains Protestantism, see(Imra 1975: 292). Al-Kawkib
stresses the characteristics of the sect in it as; 1. Attaching importance to the original
sentences of the sacred book, 2. Respecting the truth which was introduced and
founded on reason, 3. Criticism of the intervention of religious leaders or priests and
their atonement, 4. Rejecting the religious infallibility of the pope or the sacred ranks
of the priests without any conviction in the Gospels.
It is impressive that the British optimist defines Catholicism as an imitation sect
(tifa taqld) and Protestantism as the Gospel sect (tifa Injl) and reports the
increase of conversion from the latter sect to Islam in the fifth conference( Imra
1975: 291). At the same time, he also mentions that Muslims are guided only by the
sacred book and the Sunna of the Prophet Muammad and that they were never
imitators of Hanaf and Shfi, Hanbal and Mlik, even though they regarded them
as trustworthy transmitters of the Prophetic Sunna (nqiln). Thus, Al-Kawkib
compares Protestantism and Islam correlatively and points the relationship between
them both. In this context, he criticizes the traditional institution of Islamic law
schools of thought while emphasizing the importance of the original religious texts.

35
 On the other hand, it should be attended to their individual
differences. For instance, al-Afghn and ‘Abduh recognized the Ottoman
Sultan as caliphate in “al-‘Urwa al-Wuthq”, al-Kawkib in “Umm
al-Qur” and Ri in “al-Manr” aimed to substitute the Turk caliphate to
the Arab caliphate. These individual differences among Islamic reformists
can be seen in how to transcend the religious sectarianism. Al-Afgh n
proposed the religious solidarity among three monotheisms, namely
Judaism, Christianity and Islam along with the recognition among the
Sunni and the Shi’ite and ‘Abduh followed his master. On the other hand,
al-Kawkib advocated the solidarity among Islamic law schools in
addition to religious recognition. Ri also stepped the same way.

Confirming these individual differences among them, it is possible to

sketch roughly that the inter-madhhib rapproachment proposed by the
Islamic reformers consists of three layers, 1) divine revelation religions,
2) Islamic religious schools especially the Sunni and the Shi’te, 3)
Islamic law schools like anaf, anbal, Mlik, Shfi‘ and Ja‘far, and
they tried to reconstruct relationships of each layer.

36
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