1

A New Definition of Endurance*

Abstract
In this paper I present a new definition of endurance. I argue that the three-

dimensionalist ought to adopt a different understanding from the four-

dimensionalist, of what it is to have a part simpliciter. With this new

understanding it becomes possible to define endurance in a manner that both

preserves the central endurantist intuitions, whilst avoiding commitment to any

controversial metaphysical theses. Furthermore, since this endurantist

definition is a mereological one, there is an elegant symmetry between the

definitions of endurance and perdurance in that the theories of three- and four-

dimensionalism are both expressed in the language of mereology. Nevertheless,

though both definitions are expressed within the same broad language, some of

the terms of that language have subtly different meanings within the context of

each theory. It is in understanding on the one hand that each theory is

essentially a mereological theory and that therefore each shares some

underlying theoretical similarities, and yet also that there are some subtle

differences in the way each theory understands some of the terms of mereology,

that allows us to see clearly what lies at the heart of the debate between these

two accounts of persistence.

1 Introduction

For some time now, there have been two main competitors when it comes to

accounts of persistence: three- and four-dimensionalism. Three-dimensionalism

is the thesis that persisting objects have only spatial dimensions. Thus since our

world is a world in which there are three spatial dimensions, in our world

* With many thanks to David Braddon-Mitchell and Mark Colyvan for helpful discussion of
these issues.
2

persisting objects are three-dimensional. Four-dimensionalism, on the other

hand, is the view that persisting objects have both spatial dimensions and a

temporal dimension. Since our world is a world with three spatial dimensions

and one temporal dimension, this is the view that persisting objects are four-

dimensional: they are extended in time as well as in space.

The three-dimensionalist holds that all objects are wholly present whenever

they exist, and persisting objects, which exist at more than one time, are wholly

present at each of those times. The most common version of four-

dimensionalism holds that objects persist through time by being only partly

present at each moment at which they exist, that is, by having a temporal part
present at each time at which they exist. Thus objects persist by perduring,

where an object perdures if it persists by being the mereological sum of

temporal parts.1 Call this version of four-dimensionalism, perdurantism.

While three-dimensionalism has been considered the standard view, and four-

dimensionalism the new kid on the block, of late some serious allegations have

been levelled against the very idea of three-dimensionalism. Trenton Merricks2

has argued that the only plausible way to define endurance entails that

presentism is true. That is, it entails that the only ontologically real time is the

present. And Theodore Sider3 holds that there is no coherent way to define

endurance such that the definition will hold for composite objects. These are

serious problems indeed. The central tenet of three-dimensionalism is that

objects persist by enduring. But if endurance cannot coherently be defined, then

1 Of course, there is a further issue as to whether our ordinary linguistic terms refer to these
perduring objects, which is the standard view, or whether our terms refer only to temporal
parts, and claims about the past and future are made true in virtue of the existence of the
relevant temporal counterparts. On the latter view, while it is true that objects perdure, it is not
true that the everyday objects of our ontology persist by perduring. Rather, they persist by
having the relevant temporal counterparts. This view is defended by Sider, T. (2001). Four-
dimensionalism: an ontology of persistence and time. Oxford University Press. Nothing in this paper
hangs on this distinction.
2 Merricks, T. (1999). “Persistence, Parts and Presentism.” Nous 33(3): 421-438.
3 Sider, T. (2001). chp 3.
3

the debate between the three and four-dimensionalist cannot even get off the

ground. Indeed, one would be tempted to say that if no definition of endurance

were forthcoming, then the entire three-dimensionalist project ought to be

abandoned. Moreover, even if it is not the case that endurance cannot

coherently be defined (as I will argue), it is a serious impediment to debate

between these two views, that many four-dimensionalists believe that this is the

case. While a lively and profitable exchange between these two views existed

for some time after four-dimensionalism began seriously to be defended, this

exchange has all but disappeared of late: three-dimensionalists debate with

other three-dimensionalists about the details of three-dimensionalism, and four-

dimensionalists debate with other four-dimensionalists about the details of

four-dimensionalists. But exchange between the views has all but stagnated, not

only because some four-dimensionalists are want to dismiss the language of

three-dimensionalism as inherently incoherent, but also because coherent or

not, three- or four-dimensionalists share no common language within which

they can express their views.

Moreover, even if Merricks is right and endurance can coherently be defined,

this would be cold comfort given that Merricks’ definition commits the three-

dimensionalist to presentism. Presentism, though, is a controversial

metaphysical doctrine, and a wagon to which the three-dimensionalist does not

necessarily wish to be hitched. So providing a compelling, coherent definition

of what it is for an object to endure is a task that the three-dimensionalist ought

take very seriously. It is to this task that I turn in this paper.

I begin by considering some of the difficulties that the three-dimensionalist

faces in defining endurance, and examine some unsuccessful attempts to define

endurance in terms of identity and spatial extension. In section three I move on

to consider a definition suggested by Ted Sider, and argue that it fails
4

adequately to capture the three-dimensionalist’s intuitions. Finally, after

considering some other possibilities, I present a new definition in section five

and argue that this definition does not face any of the problems considered.

Rather, the definition has a number of features to recommend it including

facilitating dialogue between endurantists and perdurantists that is not

obscured by the use of terminology that is not shared by both parties.

2 Definition Difficulties

Typically, three-dimensionalists talk of enduring objects not being “stretched

out” in time, or of having no temporal extension. Enduring objects are said to

be wholly present, all of them existing at every time at which they exist, and to

be strictly identical at each of those times.4 This suggests that we could define

endurance in terms of identity, by saying the following:

ID: An object O endures through interval T iff for any two times t and t’

contained in T, O at t is identical to O at t’.

Unfortunately, as Merricks notes,5 defining endurance in terms of identity is

problematic. A definition of endurance ought clearly to distinguish it from

perdurance. We can see how this is supposed to work with ID. The perdurantist

holds that at each time at which a persisting object O exists, it is a distinct part
of O that exists at that time. Thus if O persists through T, and t1 and t2 are

instants in T, then O-at-t1 is a distinct object from O-at-t2: each of these objects

are distinct temporal parts of O. Thus if O perdures it does not meet the

definition ID.

4 Cf.
Wiggins, D. (1968). "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time." Philosophical Review 77:
90-95; Baker, L. R. (1997). "Why Constitution is not Identity.” Journal of Philosophy 94: 599-621;
Johnston, M. (1992). "Constitution Is Not Identity.” Mind 101: 89-105.
5 Merricks, T. (1995). “On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Entities.” Mind 104:
523-41.
5

The problem with ID though, is that it can be read in a way that is compatible

with perdurantism. For the perdurantist holds that “O” refers to the entire four-

dimensional whole. There is a sense, then, in which when the perdurantist

points to O at t1, he intends the reference of “O” to be the entire four-

dimensional object, and not the temporal part O-at-t1. The four-dimensional

object O which we refer to at t by pointing to part of O, is, however, at all times

self identical. At every time t and t’ at which we refer to O in this sense, O is

identical to itself at those times. Thus understood in this sense, it is true that O

at t is identical to O at t’. The problem with ID then, is that without first

providing an account of what it is for O to exist at a time, ID does not in itself

rule out perdurance.

So perhaps as an alternative to ID, we could define endurance as follows:

S: An object endures iff it has only spatial extension.

The problem here, points out Merricks6 is that to say that an object has only

spatial extension is to say that while not all of an object’s parts exist at one point

in space, all of its parts do exist at one time. Thus it seems that to say that an

object is not temporally extended is to say that all of that object exists at a time,

and that seems to be no more than to say that it is wholly present at every time

at which it exists. Ultimately then, to define endurance we need to be able to

define what it is to exist at a time, and what it is to exist at a time for the three-

dimensionalist, is to be wholly present at that time. This would suggest that we

say the following:

E: An object endures iff it is wholly present at each moment at which it

exists.

6 Merricks, T. (1999). “Persistence, Parts and Presentism.” Nous 33(3): 421-438.

6

We then have the notion of “wholly present” left undefined. Ned Markosian7

suggests the following:

WP: An object x is wholly present at t just in case (a) x exists at t and (b) it is

not the case that there is a y such that y is a temporal part of x at some

time other than t.8

Where temporal part is defined as per Sider’s widely accepted definition:

x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at instant t iff (1) x is part of y. (2)

x exists at, but only at t. (3) x overlaps every part of y that exists at t.9

Combining E and WP we could then define endurance as follows:

E#: An object endures iff it is wholly present at each moment at which it

exists, where an object is wholly present at a time iff (a) it exists at t and

(b) it is not the case that there is a y such that y is a temporal part of x at

some time other than t.

The difficulty with this definition is that endurance is defined in terms of the

negation of perdurantism. This is problematic for two reasons. The first is that

some endurantists hold that the very notion of a temporal part is incoherent, 10

or that although in some very abstract sense they understand the notion of a

temporal part, they can make no sense of the idea that objects are composed of

7 Markosian, N. (1994). “The 3D/4D Controvery and Non-Present Objects.” Philosphical Papers
23: 243-49.
8 The definition is framed in terms of an instantaneous temporal part t, but it can easily be re-
stated to include extended temporal parts. In Zimmerman, D. (1996). “Persistence and
Presentism.” Philosophical Papers 25: 115-126, Zimmerman suggests the following, beginning
with a definition of an extended temporal part where T and T* range over intervals and t and t*
over instants.
x is a temporal part of y throughout T = df (i) x exists during and only during T; (ii) for every
subinterval T* of T, there is a z such that (a) z is part of x, and (b) for all u, u has a part in
common with z during T* iff u has a part in common with y during T*; and (iii) y exists at
times outside of T.
Then we would define wholly present as:
x is wholly present at t=df (i) x exists at t; and (ii) it is not the case that there is a y such that
either (a) for some t* such that t ≠ t*, y is a temporal part of x at t* or (b) for some T which does
not include t, y is a temporal part of x during T.
9 Sider, T. op cit pg 60.
10 Cf. Thomson, J.J. (1983). "Parthood and Identity Across Time." Journal of Philosophy 80: 201-
220.
7

temporal parts.11 One who holds either of these views, justly or not, clearly

would not want to define endurance in terms of the absence of temporal parts.

A broader problem with this approach is that endurantism is typically thought

to be the more intuitive, “folk friendly” view, and a view that significantly pre-

dates four-dimensionalism. But if the only coherent definition of endurance is in

terms of the negation of perdurance, then this significantly undercuts the idea

that there was any clear, coherent view about persistence prior to a perdurantist

account being constructed. If it turned out, for instance, that the only way we

could define absolute simultaneity in Newtonian mechanics was to say that it is

not the case that the theory of special relativity is true, then this would be good
grounds to conclude that there was no clear understanding of absolute

simultaneity prior to the formulation of relativity theory. The point is that prior

to an account of perdurantism being constructed, there was no conception of a

temporal part, and thus if there was some conception about the way objects

persist, it clearly could not have been in terms of the absence of temporal parts.

Of course, none of this is decisive. Perhaps prior to the formulation of

perdurantism, three-dimensionalism was indeed no more than a vague

conception, and so perhaps it will turn out that it is not possible to define

endurance in a way that does not refer to the posits of perdurantism. This

would certainly not imply that three-dimensionalism is not the more intuitive

view, or that it is in some way inferior to perdurantism. Still, I think that all

things considered it would be better if the endurantist could state her thesis in a

way that does not involve the mention of temporal parts. In that case we can, at

least for the moment, put aside E#.

11 Van Inwagen, P. (2000). “Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time.” The Monist 83(3) 437-459.
van Inwagen writes: “Since I understand all the worlds, I understand ‘Lewis-part”andknow
what Lewis-parts are. In a way. In the same way as the way in which I should understand talk
of “propertyless objects” if I were told that “propertyless object” meant “object of which
nothing is true.”...But I should hardly care to say that I know what someone was talking
about...who talked of them in a way that suggested that he supposed there were such things.” p
445.
8

The idea that an object lacks temporal extension if not all of its parts exist at one

point in space, but all of its parts do exist at one time, suggests another way to

define the notion of wholly present. For the idea of being wholly present is the

idea that all of an object is present. Implicitly then, the notion of wholly present

invokes the notion of parthood: for surely if all of an object is present, then all of

its parts must be present. This suggests the following definition of ‘wholly

present’:

WP1: An object x is wholly present at a time just in case all of its parts are

present at that time.

Both Sider and Merricks consider this definition of ‘wholly present’. Sider

rejects the definition on the grounds that it fails for any object that loses or gains

parts over the course of its existence. Given what we know about microphysics,

it follows that no composite object would ever be wholly present, and thus

would not endure. Merricks draws the somewhat different conclusion that this

shows that the three-dimensionalist must accept presentism. For if presentism

is true, then all of an object’s parts are present at every time at which it exists: it

only exists in the present, and in the present, all of its parts are present. We

have already noted, however, that it would be best for the three-dimensionalist

to avoid having to adopt the questionable metaphysics of presentism. We are

faced, then, with the prospect of being unable to define endurance either in

terms of identity, spatial extension, or parthood. Recently, however, Sider has

made a further suggestion, and it is to this that we will now turn.

3 Siderian Suggestions

Sider considers another way to define wholly present, suggesting the following:
9

WP2: x is strongly wholly present throughout interval T =df everything that

is at any time in T part of x, exists and is part of x at every time in T.12

We can see that this definition of strongly wholly present bears a striking

similarity to WP1. If we take the temporal interval T to include the entire

lifespan of x, then WP2 is equivalent to WP1. In both cases x is (strongly)

wholly present at all times in its life just in case at all times at which x exists, it

has all and only the same parts at each of those times. Thus if we were to define

endurance as follows:

E1: x is an enduring object iff x is strongly wholly present at all times at

which it exists.

it will again turn out that the only objects that endure are objects that either

have no spatial parts, (simples) or which neither gain nor lose spatial parts

(mereological constants). In the actual world then, we would be forced to

conclude that only simples endure. Since most three-dimensionalists do not

hold the view that only simples endure, this leads Sider to suggest E2:

E2. An object x endures iff it is possible that x is strongly wholly present for

some interval of time T.13

E2 rules out perdurance as it is usually understood. Since interval T is longer

than a temporal instant, it follows that if x is strongly wholly present through T,

then x is not composed of any instantaneous temporal parts during T. For

suppose t and t* are temporal instants within T. Now suppose that at t there is

some instantaneous temporal part of x. This part exists at t, and at no other

temporal instant. Then there is some part of x that exists in T and which is not

part of x at all times in T: the instantaneous temporal part. So it follows that if x

12 Sider, T. op cit pg 65.

13 Sider, T. op.cit. pg 66.
10

is strongly wholly present through T, no such temporal part exists during T. So

if perdurantism is the view that all objects persist by being composed of

instantaneous temporal parts, then E2 would show that perdurantism is false.

Still, E2 is not inconsistent with the idea that objects perdure, but have no

instantaneous temporal parts. Though a temporal interval is by definition

longer than an instant, it may not be a great deal longer! So it could still be that

persisting objects are the fusions of extended temporal parts, and thus are not

wholly present whenever they exist. But the three-dimensionalist does not just

want to rule out the existence of instantaneous temporal parts, she wants to

show that objects are in fact wholly present at every moment at which they
exist. Thus E2 is too weak.

So at this point I propose a stronger version:

E3: An object x endures in a world w just in case x exists in w and there is

some world z such that in z, x is strongly wholly present throughout

interval T, where interval T includes every time t during which x exists in

z.
11

One criticism the endurantist might level against E3 is that it is too weak. Many

endurantists hold that mereological universalism, is false.14 They hold that there

is no object composed of Lincoln and my dog. Call this putative object Log. It

might be argued that the intuition behind the notion of “wholly present” is one

that would rule out the existence of Log. For there is a long period of time after

Lincoln dies, and before my dog is born, during which no parts of Log exist. So

how can we think that Log is wholly present? There are those endurantists who

will think that any definition of endurance that allows that Log endures, is in

some fundamental way failing to capture the intuition that drives three-

dimensionalism.

E3, however, allows that Log can endure. For although Lincoln and my dog do

not exist at the same time, it is possible that they exist throughout the same time

interval, and that throughout that interval they are mereologically constant.

Thus there is some x such that it is possible that everything that is at any time in

T part of Log, exists and is part of Log at every time in T. Hence Log endures.

Those endurantists for whom the mere thought of Log brings on a severe case

of hives, may argue that if E3 allows that Log endures, this is sufficient reason

to reject E3 in favour of a stronger definition of endurance. On their behalf,

then, we could consider the following:

E4: An object x endures through T iff it is possible that x is strongly wholly

present for some interval of time T, and there is actually some proper part

y of x that exists and is part of x at all times at which x exists.

According to this definition then, an object endures only if it is possible that all

of its parts exist throughout T, and if at least one of its parts is actually part of

14 Cf.Wiggins, D. (1980). Sameness and Substance. Oxford: Blackwell Press. and Van Inwagen, P.
(1987). “When are Objects Parts?” Philosophical Perspectives 1. Metaphysics: 21-47.
12

that object throughout T. This would rule out cases such as Log as enduring.

For there will be no part of Log, that is part of Log at all times at which Log

exists, and so too for any punctuate object.

The endurantist, however, might think that this definition is too restrictive,

since she might hold that there could be objects that persist over a sufficiently

long period of time that none of the parts of the object at the beginning of its life

are parts of it at the end of its life. Thus E4 would seem to result in the

persistence conditions of objects being implausibly arbitrary. For it would turn

out that what determines whether an object persists, is whether or not it has

some particular part at each time it exists. Thus if it is true that in the space of
seven years all of the atoms that compose me have been completely replaced,

then by this definition I endure, and thus persist, only for seven years, and then

I cease to exist. Even more oddly, I might persist for the time I do in virtue of

having one particular atom A as a part: when that atom ceases to be part of me

after seven years, I suddenly cease to exist. Surely though, in general we do not

want to say that an object ceases to exist because it loses some small part.

So let us consider the following, where L is the lifespan of the object:

E5: An object x endures through T iff it is possible that x is strongly wholly

present for some interval of time T and there are actually no temporally

contiguous pairs of intervals I and I- that occur in L, such that none of the

parts that exist in I, also exist in I-.

According to this definition, all that is required for an object to endure is that

there be a succession of overlapping15 parts of that object.16 So for any two

contiguous intervals, there is some part that overlaps both intervals. This

15 Two partsoverlap just in case there is some sub-part that is a part of each.
16This bears some similarity to physical continuity theories in for example personal identity
where identity across time is analysed as bearing the ancestral of the sharing a part relation.
13

proposal too rules out punctuate objects such as Log, since in such cases there

would be some pairs of contiguous intervals in which no part of the object

overlaps both intervals: all those intervals during which no parts of the object

exist.

It might be argued that the advantage of E5 is that it more truly captures the

three-dimensionalist’s intuitions about objects and the manner in which they

persist. I disagree. The endurantist’s ontological views might be correct:

universalism might be false. Perhaps Log does not exist. Whether universalism

is false or not, however, is an issue that is strictly orthogonal to the issue of

whether or not objects persist by enduring. Or at least, it should be. Providing

an answer to the question of whether or not Log exists, requires providing an

answer to the question “what objects exist”? The thesis of endurance, however,

is a thesis about how objects persist, not which objects exist. Many three-

dimensionalists might reject universalism, but this is by no means entailed by

the idea that objects are wholly present whenever they exist.17 We ought not,

therefore, prejudice the issue of ontology by defining endurance in such a way

as to rule out certain objects as enduring. For this will either rule out the

combination of universalism and three-dimensionalism, a combination that

some accept, or it will force those who accept universalism to concede that at

least some objects persist but not endure. Those who believe in Log, for

instance, but hold that objects persist by being wholly present, would either

have to reject E5, or conclude that Log persists by perduring, though some

other objects persist by enduring. I submit, then, that we should not at this

early stage of the debate, presuppose a particular answer to the question of

which objects exist, and should thus define endurance in a broad way.

17 Indeed,for a defence of three-dimensionalist universalism see me “Non-Mereological

Universalism” forthcoming.
14

With this criticism rejected then, it seems that we might be able to accept E3 as a

definition of endurance after all. But not so fast.

3.1 Problems of a Possibilist Definition

There is a potentially more damaging criticism of E3. As Sider points out,18 E2

(and thus of course E3) seems to fail to capture the endurantist intuitions

implicit in the notion of “wholly present.” For it turns out that objects endure in

virtue of it being possible that they persist through time in a particular way,

rather than in virtue of how they actually persist. The endurantist, after all,

began by claiming that objects persist by being wholly present whenever they
exist. But almost all of the objects of our day to day ontology fail to be actually

strongly wholly present throughout even a short interval. If the endurantist

accepts E3, she ought more properly to say that objects endure by having the

property of being possibly strongly wholly present throughout their existence.

But this seems to tell us little about the way objects actually persist, other than

the fact that it is possible that they do not perdure.

E3 does capture something of the endurantist intuition. It captures the intuition

that it is possible that objects have identity of parts over time. For in a world

where O is strongly wholly present, every part of O at t, is identical to every

part of O at t’. This, of course, is precisely what perdurantism rules out. Still,

here we have a conceptual claim about what is possible, not about what is

actual. Indeed, matters are a little more dire than Sider acknowledges. Given

E3, it will be true that O endures in world w just in case there is some world z

such that O is strongly wholly present in z. If O is strongly wholly present in z,

then O does not perdure in z. This means that O endures in the actual world

just in case there is some possible world z in which O does not perdure. So it

18 Sider, T. loc. cit.

15

looks like endurantism is true in the actual world just in case perdurance is not

necessarily true.

Of course, this is not quite right. It could be that there is some world w in which

objects are strongly wholly present, and yet none of the objects in w might have

counterparts of, or be trans-world identical to, any actual objects. Then it would

not follow from the existence of w, that the actual world is an enduring world.

If we think though, that for any actual object O there does exist some strongly

wholly present counterpart of O, then we think that endurantism is true in the

actual world just in case perdurance is not necessarily true. This would be

extremely problematic since definitions E2 and E3 would then be consistent

with O in the actual world enduring, despite persisting by being composed of a

series of distinct temporal parts. For the fact that O’s counterpart is strongly

wholly present in world w, tells us nothing about O in the actual world.

We might think though, that there is really no problem here. For just as we

might reject the sort of flexible counterpart relation that allows that there is a

world in which my counterpart is a hunk of Ashgrove cheese, so too we might

reject the claim that any actual perduring object could have a strongly wholly

present counterpart. Though prima facie there might be reasons to suppose that

this claim is true, it should be acknowledged that it is an additional

metaphysical commitment that an adherent of E3 would be forced to embrace.

And perhaps there are reasons to embrace something like this claim. E3

requires that some actual object O endures only if there is some counterpart of

O that is strongly wholly present, and thus mereologically constant, throughout

its existence. It is not at all clear though, that it is even logically possible that

actual objects have counterparts that are mereologically constant: for perhaps it
is an essential property of some or all actual composite objects that they change
16

over time. In that case there is reason to suppose that no actual composite object

has a counterpart that is strongly wholly present.

I think these considerations add a good deal of weight to rejecting E3. For

although the endurantist is committed to the idea that an object considered at

one time, is strictly identical to that object considered at another time, it is

unclear why she should be committed to the idea that it is possible that

enduring objects be mereologically constant. Of course, if it is impossible that

any actual object have a strongly wholly present counterpart, then it is certainly

impossible that any actual perduring object has a strongly wholly present

counterpart. Thus our earlier problem evaporates. However, since it will turn
out to be impossible that any actual object endures, E3 will certainly be

abandoned by the endurantist as a definition of endurance!

E2 fares better on this score. For E2 requires only that some actual object O

endures if there is a counterpart of O that is strongly wholly present through

some interval of time T. Since interval T could be of very short duration, it is not

obvious that any actual object O should fail to have a counterpart that is

strongly wholly present through some interval T. Suppose that in the actual
world some person P perdures. Then suppose that there is a world w1 in which

there exists an object that is almost an intrinsic duplicate of P, call it P1, except

that at two temporally contiguous temporal instants t and t’, P1 is

mereologically constant at t and t’ while P is not. It seems difficult to believe

that this tiny difference could be sufficient reason to conclude that P1 is not a

counterpart of P. Since it is plausible that actual objects do have counterparts

that are strongly wholly present through some interval T, however, we are

brought back to our original problem that an actual object O can endure solely

in virtue of the existence of such a counterpart, regardless of the manner in

which O persists in the actual world. So unless we believe that there is some
17

reason to hold that no actual perduring object could possibly be strongly

wholly present through any interval of time T, we should also reject E2 as a

definition of endurance.

4 A New Definition

What we have seen is that attempting to define endurantism in such a way as to

distinguish it from perdurantism seems ultimately to return us to the issue of

parthood. A definition of endurantism in terms of identity at different times

brings us to the question of what it is to exist at a time, while it seems natural to

define the idea of being wholly present in terms of parthood. The problem is

that the three-dimensionalist does not want to be forced to embrace presentism,

or eliminativism about composite objects, or to concede that actual objects

might endure despite being composed of temporal parts.

For the perdurantist, parthood is atemporal. If O is a perduring object and P is a

(temporal or spatial) part of O, then ‘P is part of O’ is timelessly true: it is true

when uttered at any temporal location. Even at time t when spatial part P is not

part of O-at-t, P is part of the four-dimensional O. So for the perdurantist, P is

part of O simpliciter just if it is timelessly true that P is part of O. But the three-

dimensionalist rejects an atemporal view of parthood. She holds that there is no

timeless sense in which P is part of O. Rather, ‘P is part of O’ will be true or

false relative to the temporal location at which it is uttered.19 So why should the

endurantist accept the perdurantist notion that ‘P is part of O simpliciter’ is true

just if it is timelessly true? After all, the endurantist does not believe that there

exist any four-dimensional objects that are composed of non-present parts. She

19 Though of course it will be timelessly true that “P is part of O at t”, even though it is not
timelessly true that P is part of O.
18

holds that P is part of O at any time t just in case P exists at t, and P is part of O

at t.

We could say then, that ‘P is part of O simpliciter’ is true at any time t just in

case P exists at t, and P is part of O at t. This would capture the idea that for the

endurantist, all of an object’s parts are present at each time at which it exists,

without ruling out the possibility of objects changing parts over time. This

suggestion, however, would require the truth of propositions to be tensed. The

very same proposition ‘P is part of O simpliciter’ would at one time be true, and

at another be false. Now, perhaps one can embrace a tensed theory of

propositions without also embracing the A theory of time. If so well and good,
for the endurantist might not wish to be committed to that particular piece of

metaphysics. Then the tensed theory of propositions is supposed to allow that

the very same object O can be both wholly red and wholly blue: there is no

contradiction so long as O is red at one time, and blue at another. The magic is

“all in the tense”. It is difficult to see though, how appeal to tensed propositions

is supposed to relieve the endurantist of the burden of Leibniz’ Law: how is it

that an object O considered at t is identical to O considered at t*, if O at t and O

at t* have different propositions true of them at those times and O is wholly

present at each of those times?

So let us put aside the panacea of tensed truth and consider how the analogous

problem of temporary intrinsics is addressed. Suppose an enduring object O is

red at one time, t1, and green at another time, t2. How can be O be strictly

identical at each of these times? Typical endurantist accounts such as

indexicalism20 and adverbialism21 involve temporally relativising properties or

20 A defender of this view includes Van Inwagen, P. (1990). “Four-Dimensional Objects.” Nous
24: 245-255.
21 Defenders of which include Haslanger, S. (1989). “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics.”
Analysis 49: 119-125; Johnston, M. (1987). “Is There a Problem about Persistence?” The
Aristotelian Society Supp 61: 107-135. pp 113-115; Lowe, E.J. (1988). “The Problems of Intrinsic
Change: Rejoinder to Lewis.” Analysis 48: 72-77.
19

the having of those properties such that an object is red-at-t1 or red t1ly.

Although perhaps it turns out that red is not intrinsic22 on this account,

endurantists still typically seem to think that such properties are good

deservers of the everyday notion of being red. That is, they think that everyday

statements of the ‘O is red’ kind are rightly analysed in terms of O being red-at-
tn or red tnly for some appropriate n.

In fact though, instantiating either of these properties at a time is not sufficient

for an object to count as being red at that time in the usual sense in which we

mean to attribute redness to an object at a time. At least, this is so if we are

attributing redness to an enduring object. For given Leibniz’ Law, an object O

will instantiate the property of being red-at-t1 or the second order property of

having red t1ly at every time at which it exists, including times at which O is not

red.23 For clarity, consider the adverbialist account more closely. Suppose that
at t1 O is red, at t2 O is red, and at t3 O is blue. At t1, O has the property of being

red t1ly; it also has the property of being red t2ly and blue t3ly. The advantage

of adverbialism over indexicalism is supposed to be that it allows that an

enduring object can instantiate the very same property at different times, but
simply in a different manner. The red instantiated at t1 is supposed to be the

same red instantiated at t2—a persisting redness—but instantiated in a t2ly

manner at t2. But notice that the manner in which blue is instantiated at t1 is

exactly the same manner in which it is instantiated at t3: namely the t3ly
manner. So if O is blue just in case O instantiates blue in a tnly manner, then O

is blue at t1, t2 and t3.

What the adverbialist needs to say is that there are a range of “metaphysically

basic” properties which are the temporally relativised properties of being, for

22 Atleast according to Lewis and other advocates or perdurantism. See Lewis, D (1986). On The
Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell pg. 204.
23 Unless you believe in ineliminably tensed propositions.
20

instance, red-at-t or red tly. At every time at which an enduring object exists, it

instantiates all of the relativised properties that it will ever instantiate: this is

what makes it true that enduring objects are strictly identical over time. But is

not sufficient for an object to count in the everyday sense as being blue at some

time, that it exemplifies blueness in some manner at that time. Rather, everyday

attributions of blueness such as ‘O is blue at t’ are true iff O is blue in a tly

manner. The only deserver of being the everyday property P at a time t is

having the metaphysically basic P property in a tly manner.

To distinguish between the technical sense of having some property in a tly

manner at a time other than t, and the everyday sense of having a property in a
tly manner at t, let us call this latter having a property simpliciter. Having the
property of blue t3ly at t3 is having the property of being blue simpliciter. Of

course, this is not a usual use of the term ‘simpliciter’, since the property of being

blue is not had in an unqualified or absolute way—‘O is blue simpliciter’ is only

true when uttered at t3—but nothing hangs on the use of this term. Uttered at

t3, though, the everyday claim ‘O is blue’ is true in an unqualified way, though

it is made true by the temporally qualified property of blue t3ly being

instantiated at t3. That is, the ordinary English sense of having a property is

perfectly unqualified, but it corresponds to a philosophical sense of having a

property that is qualified. So let us say that ‘O is blue simpliciter’ is true at some

time t just if at t, O is blue in a tly manner. Then the difference between being

blue and being blue simpliciter marks the difference between being merely blue

in the technical philosophical sense of having a blueness property at some time,

and the everyday sense of just plain being blue.

But wait. If O is blue simpliciter at t3 and O is not blue simpliciter at t1, then it

seems that either we are brought back to a tensed theory of propositions, or O

at t1 is not strictly identical to O at t3. Not so. We can understand ‘O is blue
21

simpliciter’ not as a proposition in the narrow sense, but rather, that as picking

out different propositions at different times in the same manner as do

indexicals. So if O is red simpliciter at t1, then ‘red simpliciter’ picks out the

proposition of being red t1ly at t1. If O is red simpliciter at t2, then ‘red

simpliciter’ picks out the proposition of being red t2ly at t2. For any property P,

‘P simpliciter’ picks out the proposition of being P tly at t. So the property of

being red simpliciter names a relation between a time and having the property

of being red in a particular temporal way. Thus the property of being red
simpliciter is a different property at t1 than it is at t2. Thus there is no

contradiction in saying that the very same object O is red simpliciter at t1 and is

not red simpliciter at t3. For it is not that there is some one property of being red

simpliciter that O has at t1 but lacks at t3. Rather, we can see ‘red simpliciter’ as

naming a family of properties: the red tly at t properties.

The question then is why is it that instantiating red t1ly at t1 and instantiating

red t2ly at t2 both deserve to be called instantiating ‘red simpliciter’? For it might

be argued that there is nothing semantically in common between the

propositions picked out by at least indexicals: perhaps ‘I am here’, is such an

example. If this is so, then why think that there is anything in semantically in

common between the propositions picked out by ‘red simpliciter’? One way to

explicate the heart of this dispute is by considering it in terms of two

dimensional semantics. Briefly, the idea is that sentences have different

intensions when considered along two different semantic dimensions.24 On one

dimension, the C intension (in Jackson’s terminology) we consider what terms

pick out in worlds considered as counterfactual. The C intension then, is what

we might think of as being the “Kripke intension”. If water in the actual world

24 Frank Jackson uses the terminology of an A intension, while David Chalmers uses the
terminology of a primary intension. For more on two dimensional semantics see Jackson, F.
(2004). “Why we need A-intensions.” forthcoming in Philosophical Studies; Braddon-Mitchell, D.
(2004). “Mastering Meaning” forthcoming in Philosophical Studies;; Chalmers, D. (2004). “The
Foundations of Two Dimensional Semantics” forthcoming in Philosophical Studies;.
22

is H20, then considered counterfactually ‘water’ picks out all and only H20 in all

other worlds. On the A intension we consider what terms pick out in worlds

considered as actual. If the actual world is one in which a clear potable liquid of
somewhat different chemical composition than H20 exists, then ‘water’ refers to

that substance. The A intension tracks what is semantically in common between

utterances of ‘this is water’ in different worlds considered as actual.

We can employ a temporal analog of the A intension such that we evaluate

statements such as ‘is red simpliciter’ at different times rather than different

worlds considered as actual. Then the temporal analog of the A intension of

‘red simpliciter’ is what is semantically in common between each instantiation of

red tly at t. Just as the A intension of ‘water’ picks out different chemical

substances at different worlds, the temporal A intension of ‘red simpliciter’ picks

out different redness properties at different times. But in both cases there exists

something that deserves to be called ‘water’ or ‘red simpliciter’.

With this framework for understanding property instantiation in place, it is

now fairly straightforward to use that framework to understand parthood. Just

as we began with the idea that there is, for the endurantist, some

metaphysically basic sense of having a property in a temporally modified way

that does not capture our everyday sense of having a property, so too we can

see that there is a metaphysically basic sense of having a part in a temporally

modified way that does not capture our everyday sense of having a part. For
suppose that there is some object O that is at t1 composed of A and B, and at t2

composed of A and C. Then we can say that at t1 O has part A and B t1ly, and

has part A and C t2ly. So there is some technical sense in which O has part C at

t1. But this sense clearly does not conform to the everyday sense of having a

part or to the sense in which the endurantist affirms that objects are not

composed of non-present parts. So just as we want to say that the everyday

23

sense of having a property is captured by instantiating some property P at t in a

tly manner, so too we want to say that the everyday sense of having a part is

captured by having some part P at t in a tly manner. Once again to distinguish

these two senses we can say that the everyday sense will be known as having a

part simpliciter. Then following our account of what it is to have a property

simpliciter, we can say in an analogous fashion that ‘P is part of O simpliciter’ is

true at any time t iff at t, P is part of O tly. This allows us to define endurance as

follows:

E*: An object endures iff it exists at distinct times, and is wholly present at

each moment at which it exists, where an object is ‘wholly present’ at a

time just in case all of its parts simpliciter are present at that time and

where ‘P is part of O simpliciter’ is true at any time t iff at t, P is part of O

tly.

This definition captures the core endurantist intuition that in some sense all of
an enduring object’s parts are present whenever it exists. So our object O at t2

has parts A and C simpliciter but does not have part B simpliciter. That is, in the
everyday sense of ‘part’ B is not part of O at t2. So O is not a four-dimensional

object. For at t2, it has no parts that exist at times other than t2.

Once again of course, we are faced with the difficulty that at t1 B is part of O
simpliciter and at t2 B is not part of O simpliciter. So it looks as though O has the

property of having a certain part at one time, and the property of lacking that

part at another time. And once again the analogous solution presents itself. Just

as we understood ‘red simpliciter’ as picking out a different proposition at

different times, so too we must understand ‘P is part of O simpliciter’ as picking

out a different proposition at different times. At t, ‘P is part of O simpliciter’

picks out the proposition ‘P is part of O tly’ and at t1 it picks out the proposition
24

‘P is part of O t1ly.’ So the property of having some part simpliciter at a time is a

different property than having that part simpliciter at some other time. The

property of having P simpliciter at t is the property of having P tly at t. The

property of having P simpliciter at t1 is the property of having P t1ly at t1. So

once again, there is no one property of having some part simpliciter that is

instantiated at one time by an object, and is not instantiated at another time by

that same object.

In what sense then, is this definition an indexicalist one? That is, what does it

mean to say that at t, ‘P is part of O simpliciter’ is true—what, we might ask, is at

t? The obvious answer to that question could be that it is O that is at t. When O

is at t, ‘P is part of O simpliciter’ is true, and when O is not at t, it is not true. As

I see it, this is a perfectly acceptable thing to say. It might be objected that in this

case the definition is circular, since it presupposes that O is a three-dimensional

object which exists at t. But this is not so. Three- and four-dimensionalists alike

hold that persisting objects exist at different times, as is represented by their

worldliness through four-dimensional space-time. So everyone can agree that it

makes sense to talk of O at t. Of course, three-dimensionalists will go on to note

that O is wholly present at t, while four-dimensionalists will note that O is only

partly present at t. Nevertheless, the three-dimensionalist presupposes nothing

in supposing that O can exist at multiple times, including t, and then define

endurance in terms of O’s relations to different parts at different times.

It is, however, not necessary to think of the definition in this way. When we ask

ourselves what is at t, the answer we can give is that it is the utterance ‘P is part

of O simpliciter’ that is ‘at t’. When uttered at t, ‘P is part of O simpliciter’ is true

in virtue of that utterance picking out a particular proposition. When uttered at

some other time, it may be true or false, and in either case, it will be true or false

in virtue of picking out some different proposition. Since there is no worry

25

about whether utterances are wholly present or partly whenever at their time of

utterance, there can be no worry about whether the three-dimensionalist is

presupposing something about the nature of O or its parts. Rather, this

definition tells us that at different times, the same utterance is made true by the

obtaining of different propositions, such that it can be true at the time of an

utterance, that an object has all its parts simpliciter.

So E* captures the endurantist intuition that objects have all of their parts at a

time, without committing them to the view that objects are unable to lose any

parts, or to the view that presentism is true. For we can say that all of an object’s

parts simpliciter are present at t, and that the object is strictly identical with itself
over time without being compelled to say that the object exists only at t, or that

t is the only time that is real.

5 What’s Good about this Definition?

The E* definition of endurance has a number of features to recommend it. With

E* in mind the three-dimensionalist can make sense of the earlier unsuccessful

definitions. Recall that we attempted to define endurance in terms of having

only spatial extension. The difficulty with that proposal is that to have no

temporal extension is to have all of one’s parts at the same time, but not at the

same place, and thus ultimately we were returned to the problem of defining

what it is to be wholly present. We can see how E* entails S, that an object

endures iff it has only spatial extension. For E* tells us that all of an object’s

parts simpliciter are had at a single time. Any parts that were parts of an object

at a previous time, or will be parts of an object at a future time, are not parts of

that object simpliciter. This tells us that the object has no temporal extension, for

it is not composed of non-present parts.

26

The most significant benefits of E*, however, are that it does not commit the

endurantist to any questionable metaphysical views, nor to any views about the

scope of the endurantist claim. It does not entail that propositions are tensed,

nor does it entail the truth of presentism, nor that composition is restricted in

some way. Notice though, that although this account is “designed” to be

consistent with eternalism, it is also consistent with presentism. For the

presentist, of course, it will be trivially true that all of an object’s parts simpliciter

are present whenever it exists, since those are the only parts that exist. Thus for

the presentist, the only properties or parts that an object has at t are the tly

properties and parts.

So E* is ontologically neutral: it does not attempt to answer the question “what

objects exist?” nor the question “what temporal locations exist?”. E* does not

rule out the existence of temporally scattered objects, since it may still be true of

such objects that all of their parts simpliciter exist at each time at which they

exists. For instance, if we consider again Log, we can say that at t, all of Log’s

parts include a human body and at t’, all of Log’s parts include a canine body.

But at no time is Log composed of non-present parts. Further, unlike E3, E*

implies nothing about the contingency or necessity of perdurantism. It could be

that all actual objects endure, or, more likely, that all nomologically possible

and actual objects endure, or even that all actual and possible objects endure. E*

is compatible with all of these claims.

Thus E* is a sufficiently broad definition of endurance to be able to

accommodate a range of ancillary metaphysical views. For all the definition

tells us is that if this is a world where objects endure, then it is a world in which

no persisting objects are composed of non-present parts. Perhaps though, we

might think that this is not very illuminating, and that we have learned nothing
new about endurance in formulating E*. I think there is both something true
27

and something false about this claim. On the one hand, it is true that an

adoption of E* does not alter the way in which the endurantist will approach

metaphysical issues such as the problem of change. It will still be necessary to

relativise properties to times, or relativise the having of those properties at

times. Indeed, most of what endurantists say will remain unchanged in the face

of this definition. In this sense then, it tells us nothing new. I do not see that this

is a wholly bad thing. For we should not expect a definition, even one that is

important to the debate, to solve major metaphysical problems. A definition is a

good one to the extent that it captures the relevant intuitions, is coherent, and

illuminates the way in which the position that it defines, is related to opposing

positions. So although defining endurance is a necessary part of the task of

creating a coherent three-dimensionalist account, we should not expect it to

solve all of the problems at hand. That much of what the endurantist says will

remain unchanged, is evidence of the fact that the definition preserves the core

endurantist intuitions: for surely any definition that required substantial

metaphysical change to the relevant metaphysical position, would be a

controversial definition indeed.

Furthermore, there is a clear sense, in which this definition sheds light on the

issue of persistence. For unlike the Siderian definitions, it tells us something

about how objects do persist in the actual world, not just how they might

persist in some possible world. It does not just tell us that actual objects are

such that it is possible that they have no temporal parts, rather, it tells us that

they do not have temporal parts. Although E* does not refer to temporal parts,

it does define endurance in terms of parthood, which not only captures the

endurantist intuition that objects are wholly present whenever they exist, but

also dovetails nicely with the definition of perdurantism in terms of temporal

parts. For it turns out that both endurantism and perdurantism are defined in
terms of the parthood relation. This allows considerable clarification of the
28

relation between these two views. Indeed, we can see that E* entails, and is

entailed by the only other plausible definition of endurance, E#:

E#: An object endures iff it exists at distinct times and is wholly present at

each moment at which it exists, where an object is wholly present at a time

iff (a) it exists at t and (b) it is not the case that there is a y such that y is a

temporal part of x at some time other than t.25

E# says that an object O is wholly present at t just in case there is no temporal

part of O that exists outside of t. So if O is wholly present at t, then at t there is

no part of O, spatial or temporal, that is not present at t. Hence E# entails E*. So

too, E* entails E#. For if at t, O has no parts simpliciter that exist and are part of
O at times other than t, then it follows that O has no temporal parts.

It is a plausible feature of E* that it entails E#. For while it would be less than

optimal if the only coherent definition of endurance were in terms of an absence

of temporal parts, it would be implausible if E# turned out to be false. That E*

and E# are mutually entailing shows that endurantist and perdurantist

terminology is intertranslatable. Since both views are expressed in terms of the

parthood relation, this allows proponents of each view to engage successfully

with one another without the risk that the use of different terminologies results

in misunderstandings. The inter-translatability of the two views facilitates our

understanding of where the central disagreements lie between these views. It

allows us to see that the core of the debate lies in the different understanding by

each, of what it is to have a part simpliciter. It thus allows those who wish to say

that the views present radically different metaphysics, to explain why this is so,

and it provides the grounds for those who wish to claim that they are

equivalent, to do that too.26

25 Markosian, N. (1994). op cit.

26 Cf.McCall, S. (1994). A Model of the Universe: Space-Time, Probability, and Decision. Oxford:
Clarendon Press and my “The metaphysical equivalence of three and four-dimensionalism”
forthcoming.
29

6 Conclusion

The new definition of endurance avoids commitment to questionable

metaphysical views while explicating the notion of endurance in a coherent

manner that preserves the endurantist’s central intuitions. In defining

endurance in terms of parthood we preserve a symmetry with perdurantism,

and thus allow dialogue between proponents of each view to be considerably

more straightforward and illuminating. Debate between the two views becomes

possible once there is the common ground of a pair of definitions that each side
understands.

References

Baker, L. R. (1997). "Why Constitution is not Identity.” Journal of Philosophy 94:

599-621.

Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2004). “Mastering Meaning” forthcoming in Philosophical

Studies;
30

Chalmers, D. (2004). “The Foundations of Two Dimensional Semantics”

forthcoming in Philosophical Studies;.

Haslanger, S. (1989). “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics.” Analysis 49: 119-

125.

Jackson, F. (2004). “Why we need A-intensions.” forthcoming inPhilosophical

Studies .

Johnston, M. (1992). "Constitution Is Not Identity.” Mind 101: 89-105.

Johnston, M. (1987). “Is There a Problem about Persistence?” The Aristotelian

Society Supp 61: 107-135. pp 113-115.

Lewis, D (1986). On The Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell

Lowe, E.J. (1988). “The Problems of Intrinsic Change: Rejoinder to Lewis.”

Analysis 48: 72-77.

Markosian, N. (1994). “The 3D/4D Controvery and Non-Present Objects.”

Philosphical Papers 23: 243-49.

Merricks, T. (1999). “Persistence, Parts and Presentism.” Nous 33(3): 421-438.

Merricks, T. (1995). “On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring

Entities.” Mind 104: 523-41.

Sider, T. (2001). Four-dimensionalism: an ontology of persistence and time. Oxford

University Press.
31

Thomson, J.J. (1983). "Parthood and Identity Across Time." Journal of Philosophy

80: 201-220.

Van Inwagen, P. (1990). “Four-Dimensional Objects.” Nous 24: 245-255.

Van Inwagen, P. (1987). “When are Objects Parts?” Philosophical Perspectives 1.

Metaphysics: 21-47.

Wiggins, D. (1980). Sameness and Substance. Oxford: Blackwell Press

Wiggins, D. (1968). "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time." Philosophical

Review 77: 90-95.

Zimmerman, D. (1996). “Persistence and Presentism.” Philosopihcal Papers 25:

115-126