Four-

dimensionalism

In philosophy, four-dimensionalism (also

known as the doctrine of temporal parts)
is the ontological position that an object's
persistence through time is like its
extension through space. Thus, an object
that exists in time has temporal parts in
the various subregions of the total region
of time it occupies, just like an object that
exists in a region of space has at least one
part in every subregion of that space.[1]

Four-dimensionalists typically argue for

treating time as analogous to space,
usually leading them to endorse the
doctrine of eternalism. This is a
philosophical approach to the ontological
nature of time, according to which all
points in time are equally "real", as
opposed to the presentist idea that only
the present is real.[2] As some eternalists
argue by analogy, just as all spatially
distant objects and events are equally as
real as those close to us, temporally
distant objects and events are as real as
those currently present to us.[3]

Perdurantism—or perdurance theory—is a

closely related philosophical theory of
persistence and identity,[4] according to
which an individual has distinct temporal
parts throughout its existence, and the
persisting object is the sum or set of all of
its temporal parts. This sum or set is
colloquially referred to as a "space-time
worm", which has earned the perdurantist
view the moniker of "the worm view".[3]
While all perdurantists are plausibly
considered four dimensionalists, at least
one variety of four dimensionalism does
not count as perdurantist in nature. This
variety, known as exdurantism or the
"stage view", is closely akin to the
perdurantist position. They also
countenance a view of persisting objects
which have temporal parts that succeed
one another through time. However,
instead of identifying the persisting object
as the entire set or sum of its temporal
parts, the exdurantist argues that any
object under discussion is a single stage
(time-slice, temporal part, etc.), and that
the other stages or parts which compose
the persisting object are related to that
part by a "temporal counterpart" relation.[5]
Though they have often been conflated,
eternalism is a theory of what time is like
and what times exist, while perdurantism
is a theory about persisting objects and
their identity conditions over time.
Eternalism and perdurantism tend to be
discussed together because many
philosophers argue for a combination of
eternalism and perdurantism. Sider
(1997)[1] uses the term four-
dimensionalism to refer to perdurantism,
but Michael Rea uses the term "four-
dimensionalism" to mean the view that
presentism is false as opposed to
"perdurantism", the view that endurantism
is false and persisting objects have
temporal parts.[6]

Four-dimensionalism about
material objects
Four-dimensionalism is a name for
different positions. One of these uses four-
dimensionalism as a position of material
objects with respect to dimensions. Four-
dimensionalism is the view that in addition
to spatial parts, objects have temporal
parts.[7]

According to this view, four-

dimensionalism cannot be used as a
synonym for perdurantism. Perdurantists
have to hold a four-dimensional view of
material objects: it is impossible that
perdurantists, who believe that objects
persist by having different temporal parts
at different times, do not believe in
temporal parts. However, the reverse is not
true. Four-dimensionalism is compatible
with either perdurantism or exdurantism.

A-series and B-series

J.M.E. McTaggart in The Unreality of Time
identified two descriptions of time, which
he called the A-series and the B-series.
The A-series identifies positions in time as
past, present, or future, and thus assumes
that the "present" has some objective
reality, as in both presentism and the
growing block universe.[8] The B-series
defines a given event as earlier or later
than another event, but does not assume
an objective present, as in four-
dimensionalism. Much of the
contemporary literature in the metaphysics
of time has been taken to spring forth
from this distinction, and thus takes
McTaggart's work as its starting point.

Contrast with three-

dimensionalism
Unlike the four dimensionalist, the three
dimensionalist considers time to be a
unique dimension that is not analogous to
the three spatial dimensions: length, width
and height. Whereas the four
dimensionalist proposes that objects are
extended across time, the three
dimensionalist adheres to the belief that
all objects are wholly present at any
moment at which they exist. While the
three dimensionalist agrees that the parts
of an object can be differentiated based
on their spatial dimensions, they do not
believe an object can be differentiated into
temporal parts across time. For example,
in the three dimensionalist account,
"Descartes in 1635" is the same object as
"Descartes in 1620", and both are identical
to Descartes, himself. However, the four
dimensionalist considers these to be
distinct temporal parts.[9]

Prominent arguments in
favor of four-dimensionalism
Several lines of argumentation have been
advanced in favor of four-dimensionalism:

Firstly, four-dimensional accounts of time

are argued to better explain paradoxes of
change over time (often referred to as the
paradox of the Ship of Theseus) than
three-dimensional theories. A
contemporary account of this paradox is
introduced in Ney (2014),[3] but the original
problem has its roots in Greek antiquity. A
typical Ship of Theseus paradox involves
taking some changeable object with
multiple material parts, for example a ship,
then sequentially removing and replacing
its parts until none of the original
components are left. At each stage of the
replacement, the ship is presumably
identical with the original, since the
replacement of a single part need not
destroy the ship and create an entirely new
one. But, it is also plausible that an object
with none of the same material parts as
another is not identical with the original
object. So, how can an object survive the
replacement of any of its parts, and in fact
all of its parts? The four-dimensionalist
can argue that the persisting object is a
single space-time worm which has all the
replacement stages as temporal parts, or
in the case of the stage view that each
succeeding stage bears a temporal
counterpart relation to the original stage
under discussion.

Secondly, problems of temporary intrinsics

are argued to be best explained by four-
dimensional views of time that involve
temporal parts. As presented by David
Lewis,[10] the problem of temporary
intrinsics involves properties of an object
that are both had by that object regardless
of how anything else in the world is (and
thus intrinsic), and subject to change over
time (thus temporary). Shape is argued to
be one such property. So, if an object is
capable of having a particular shape, and
also changing its shape at another time,
there must be some way for the same
object to be, say, both round and square.
Lewis argues that separate temporal parts
having the incompatible properties best
explains an object being able to change its
shape in this way, because other accounts
of three-dimensional time eliminate
intrinsic properties by indexing them to
times and making them relational instead
of intrinsic.
See also
Extended modal realism
Four-dimensional space
Multiple occupancy view[11]
Rietdijk–Putnam argument advocating
this position
Spacetime
World line

References
1. Sider, Theodore (April 1997). "Four-
Dimensionalism" (https://web.archive.org/
web/20160304074848/http://tedsider.org/
papers/4d.pdf) (PDF). The Philosophical
Review. 106 (2): 197–231.
 doi:10.2307/2998357 (https://doi.org/10.2
307%2F2998357) . JSTOR 2998357 (http
s://www.jstor.org/stable/2998357) .
Archived from the original (http://tedsider.o
rg/papers/4d.pdf) (PDF) on 2016-03-04.
Retrieved 2011-06-12.

2. Kuipers, Theo A.F. (2007). General

Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues (http
s://books.google.com/books?id=qUMuFaXj
NjEC&pg=PA326) . North Holland. p. 326.
ISBN 978-0-444-51548-3.

3. Ney, Alyssa. Metaphysics : an introduction.

OCLC 870919144 (https://www.worldcat.or
g/oclc/870919144) .
4. Hawley, Katherine (2010). "Temporal Parts"
(http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win201
0/entries/temporal-parts/) . In Edward N.
Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2010 ed.).

5. Sider, Theodore (1996-09-01). "All the

world's a stage". Australasian Journal of
Philosophy. 74 (3): 433–453.
doi:10.1080/00048409612347421 (https://
doi.org/10.1080%2F0004840961234742
1) . ISSN 0004-8402 (https://www.worldca
t.org/issn/0004-8402) .
6. ... This view is variously called
"four-dimensionalism",
"perdurantism", or "the
doctrine of temporal parts".
Some think that four-
dimensionalism understood as
the denial of presentism implies
four-dimensionalism
understood as perdurantism.
But whether or not that is true,
the important thing to
recognize is that these are two
very different views. To avoid
confusion, I will in this paper
reserve the term "four-
dimensionalism" exclusively for
 the view that presentism is
false, and I will use the term
"perdurantism" to refer to the
view that objects last over time
without being wholly present at
every time at which they exist.

— Michael C. Rea, Four

Dimensionalism, The Oxford
Handbook for Metaphysics
[1] (https://www.nd.edu/~mrea/papers/Fou
r%20Dimensionalism.pdf)

7. Ney, Alyssa (13 August 2014). Metaphysics:

an Introduction. ISBN 978-1-317-67634-8.
OCLC 887509960 (https://www.worldcat.or
g/oclc/887509960) .
8. Presentism and the Space-Time Manifold
(http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/zimmer
man/Presentism%20and%20Rel.for.Web.2.
pdf) by Dean Zimmerman, p. 7
9. "Time: 8. The 3D/4D Controversy" (https://w
eb.archive.org/web/20081007063003/htt
p://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time#3D4Co
n) . Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
2002-11-25. Archived from the original (http
s://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#ThreDi
meFourDime) on 2008-07-10. Retrieved
2008-12-15. "As in the case of the disputes
between A Theorists and B Theorists, on
the one hand, and Presentists and Non-
presentists, on the other hand, the 3D/4D
controversy is part of a general
disagreement among philosophers of time
concerning the degree to which time is
dissimilar from the dimensions of space.
That general disagreement has been an
important theme in the philosophy of time
 during the last one hundred years, and will
most likely continue to be so for some time
to come."

10. Lewis, David K. (1986-01-01). On the

plurality of worlds. B. Blackwell.
OCLC 12236763 (https://www.worldcat.or
g/oclc/12236763) .

11. Lăzăroiu, A. 2007: Multiple occupancy,

identity, and what matters. Philosophical
explorations, 10(3): 211–225.
doi:10.1080/13869790701535170 (https://
doi.org/10.1080%2F13869790701535170)

Sources
Armstrong, David M. (1980) "Identity
Through Time", pages 67,8 in Peter van
Inwagen (editor), Time and Cause, D.
Reidel.
Hughes, C. (1986) "Is a Thing Just the
Sum of Its Parts?", Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 85: 213-33.
Heller, Mark (1984). "Temporal Parts of
Four Dimensional Objects",
Philosophical Studies 46: 323-34.
Reprinted in Rea 1997: 12.-330.
Heller, Mark (1990) The Ontology of
Physical Objects: Four-dimensional
Hunks of Matter, Cambridge University
Press.
Heller, Mark (1992) "Things Change",
Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 52: 695-304
Heller, Mark (1993) "Varieties of Four
Dimensionalism", Australasian Journal
of Philosophy 71: 47-59.
Lewis, David (1983). "Survival and
Identity", in Philosophical Papers, Volume
1, 55-7. Oxford University Press. With
postscripts. Originally published in
Amelie O. Rorty, editor (1976) The
Identities of Persons University of
California Press, pages 17-40.
Lewis, David (1986a). On the Plurality of
Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Lewis, David (1986b). Philosophical

Papers, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
McTaggart John Ellis (1908) The
Unreality of time (https://en.wikisource.
org/wiki/The_Unreality_of_Time) ,
originally published in Mind: A Quarterly
Review of Psychology and Philosophy
17: 456-473.
Lewis, D. (1976) "Survival and identity",
pages 17-40 in Rorty, A.O. editor, The
identities of persons. Berkeley: University
of California Press. Google books (http
s://books.google.com/books?id=GsxDA
BuVh9YC&pg=PA17)
Markosian, N. (2004) "A defense of
presentism", pages 47-82 in Zimmerman,
D.W. editor, Oxford Studies in
Metaphysics, Volume 1, Oxford
University Press. Google books (https://
books.google.com/books?id=s_ukwM7
mRLMC&pg=PA47)
Muis, R. (2005) Review of Four-
dimensionalism: an ontology of
persistence and time by Theodore Sider
(https://web.archive.org/web/20110928
014437/http://www.arsdisputandi.org/p
ublish/articles/000200/article.pdf) , Ars
Disputandi 5

Robinson, D. (1985) "Can amoebae

divide without multiplying?", Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 63(3): 299–319.
 doi:10.1080/00048408512341901 (http
s://doi.org/10.1080%2F0004840851234
1901)

External links
Rea, M. C., "Four Dimensionalism (http://
www.nd.edu/~mrea/papers/Four%20Di
mensionalism.pdf) " in The Oxford
Handbook for Metaphysics. Oxford Univ.
Press. Describes presentism and four-
dimensionalism.
"Time (http://www.iep.utm.edu/t/time.ht
m) " in the Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
Retrieved from
"https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Four-
dimensionalism&oldid=1144442109"

This page was last edited on 13 March 2023, at

20:02 (UTC). •
Content is available under CC BY-SA 3.0 unless
otherwise noted.