1 Sitel Vs CIR Input VAT

12/03/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 817

G.R. No. 201326. February 8, 2017.*

SITEL PHILIPPINES CORPORATION (formerly
Clientlogic Phils., Inc.), petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Taxation; Tax Refunds; The Commissioner of Internal

Revenue (CIR) is given one hundred twenty (120) days within
which to grant or deny a claim for refund. Upon receipt of CIR’s
decision or ruling denying the said claim, or upon the expiration of
the 120-day period without action from the CIR, the taxpayer has
thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for review with the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).—The CIR is given 120 days within
which to grant or deny a claim for refund. Upon receipt of CIR’s
decision or ruling denying the said claim, or upon the expiration
of the 120-day period without action from the CIR, the taxpayer
has thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for review with
the CTA. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging
Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422 (2010), the Court ruled that
the 120-day period granted to the CIR was mandatory and
jurisdictional, the nonobservance of which was fatal to the filing
of a judicial claim with the CTA. The Court further explained that
the two (2)-year prescriptive period under Section 112(A) of the
NIRC pertained only to the filing of the administrative claim with
the BIR; while the judicial claim may be filed with the CTA
within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision of the CIR
or the expiration of the 120-day period of the CIR to act on the
claim.
Same; Same; In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San
Roque Power Corporation, 690 SCRA 336 (2013), the Court
clarified that the one hundred twenty (120)-day period does not
apply to claims for refund that were prematurely filed during the
period from the issuance of Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
Ruling No. DA-489-03, on December 10, 2003, until October 6,
2010, when Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging
Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422, was promulgated.—In
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation, 690 SCRA 336 (2013), the Court clarified that the
120-day period does not apply to claims for refund
_______________
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000178246d78413f3e3613003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/25
* FIRST DIVISION.

194
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sitel Philippines Corporation (formerly Clientlogic Phils.,
Inc.) vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
that were prematurely filed during the period from the

issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, on December 10, 2003,
until October 6, 2010, when Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422, was
promulgated. The Court explained that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-
03, which expressly allowed the filing of judicial claims with the
CTA even before the lapse of the 120-day period, provided for a
valid claim of equitable estoppel because the CIR had misled
taxpayers into prematurely filing their judicial claims before the
CTA.
Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; As a specialized court dedicated
exclusively to the resolution of tax problems, the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) has accordingly developed an expertise on the
subject of taxation.—The Court accords findings and conclusions
of the CTA with the highest respect. As a specialized court
dedicated exclusively to the resolution of tax problems, the CTA
has accordingly developed an expertise on the subject of taxation.
Thus, its decisions are presumed valid in every aspect and will
not be overturned on appeal, unless the Court finds that the
questioned decision is not supported by substantial evidence or
there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority on
the part of the tax court.
Taxation; Tax Refund; Tax Credit; Burden of Proof; Following
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Burmeister and Wain
Scandinavian Contractor Mindanao, Inc., 512 SCRA 124 (2007),
the Supreme Court (SC), in Accenture, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 676 SCRA 325 (2012), emphasized that a
taxpayer claiming for a Value-Added Tax (VAT) refund or credit
under Section 108(B) has the burden to prove not only that the
recipient of the service is a foreign corporation, but also that said
corporation is doing business outside the Philippines.—Following
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Burmeister and Wain
Scandinavian Contractor Mindanao, Inc., 512 SCRA 124 (2007),
the Court, in Accenture, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
676 SCRA 325 (2012), emphasized that a taxpayer claiming for a
VAT refund or credit under Section 108(B) has the burden to
prove not only that the recipient of the service is a foreign
corporation, but also that said corporation is doing business
outside the Philippines. For failure to discharge this burden, the
Court denied Accenture’s claim for refund. We rule that the

recipient of the service must be doing business outside the
Philippines for the transaction to qualify for zero-rating under
Section 108(B) of the Tax Code. x x x x The evidence presented by
Accenture may have estab-

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VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 195

lished that its clients are foreign. This fact does not
automatically mean, however, that these clients were doing
business outside the Philippines. After all, the Tax Code itself has
provisions for a foreign corporation engaged in business within
the Philippines and vice versa.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Western Mindanao Power Corp.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 672 SCRA 350 (2012), the
Supreme Court (SC) ruled that in a claim for tax refund or tax
credit, the applicant must prove not only entitlement to the grant of
the claim under substantive law, he must also show satisfaction of
all the documentary and evidentiary requirements for an
administrative claim for a refund or tax credit and compliance
with the invoicing and accounting requirements mandated by the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as well as by revenue
regulations implementing them.—The CTA Division also did not
err when it denied the amount of P2,668,852.55, allegedly
representing input taxes claimed on Sitel’s domestic purchases of
goods and services which are supported by invoices/receipts with
preprinted TIN-V. In Western Mindanao Power Corp. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 672 SCRA 350 (2012), the
Court ruled that in a claim for tax refund or tax credit, the
applicant must prove not only entitlement to the grant of the
claim under substantive law, he must also show satisfaction of all
the documentary and evidentiary requirements for an
administrative claim for a refund or tax credit and compliance
with the invoicing and accounting requirements mandated by the
NIRC, as well as by revenue regulations implementing them. The
NIRC requires that the creditable input VAT should be evidenced
by a VAT invoice or official receipt, which may only be considered
as such when the TIN-VAT is printed thereon, as required by
Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Tax refunds or tax credits — just
like tax exemptions — are strictly construed against taxpayers, the
latter having the burden to prove strict compliance with the
conditions for the grant of the tax refund or credit.—Considering
that the subject invoice/official receipts are not imprinted with the
taxpayer’s TIN followed by the word VAT, these would not be
considered as VAT invoices/official receipts and would not give
rise to any creditable input VAT in favor of Sitel. At this juncture,
it bears to emphasize that “[t]ax refunds or tax credits — just like
tax exemptions —

196

are strictly construed against taxpayers, the latter having the

burden to prove strict compliance with the conditions for the
grant of the tax refund or credit.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Baniqued & Baniqued for petitioner.
Amado Rey Pagarigan for respondent.
CAGUIOA, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Sitel Philippines
Corporation (Sitel) against the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision
dated November 11, 20112 and Resolution dated March 28,
20123 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in C.T.A.
E.B. No. 644, which denied Sitel’s claim for refund of
unutilized input value-added tax (VAT) for the first to
fourth quarters of taxable year 2004 for being prematurely
filed.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 50-83.

2 Id., at pp. 88-105. Penned by Associate Justice Juanito C. Castañeda,
Jr., with Associate Justices Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova, Olga
Palanca-Enriquez and Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla, concurring and
Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate Justices Lovell R.
Bautista, Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino and Amelia R. Cotangco-
Manalastas, dissenting.
3 Id., at pp. 118-127. Penned by Associate Justice Juanito C.
Castañeda, Jr., with Associate Justices Erlinda P. Uy, Olga Palanca-
Enriquez, Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino and Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla,
concurring and Associate Justices Lovell R. Bautista and Amelia R.

Cotangco-Manalastas, dissenting. Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta and
Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova were on wellness leave.

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VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 197

Facts

Sitel, a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, is engaged in the business of
providing call center services from the Philippines to
domestic and offshore businesses. It is registered with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as a VAT taxpayer, as
well as with the Board of Investments on pioneer status as
a new information technology service firm in the field of
call center.4
For the period from January 1, 2004 to December 31,
2004, Sitel filed with the BIR its Quarterly VAT Returns as
follows:

Sitel’s Amended Quarterly VAT Returns for the first to
fourth quarters of 2004 declared as follows:

On March 28, 2006, Sitel filed separate formal claims for
refund or issuance of tax credit with the One-Stop Shop
Inter-
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 56, 221.

5 Id., at pp. 56, 221-222.
6 Id., at pp. 56, 222.

198

Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the

Department of Finance for its unutilized input VAT arising
from domestic purchases of goods and services attributed to
zero-rated transactions and purchases/importations of
capital goods for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarters of 2004
in the aggregate amount of P23,093,899.59.7
On March 30, 2006, Sitel filed a judicial claim for refund
or tax credit via a petition for review before the CTA,
docketed as CTA Case No. 7423.

Ruling of the CTA Division

On October 21, 2009, the CTA Division rendered a
Decision8 partially granting Sitel’s claim for VAT refund or
tax credit, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is

hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner is entitled to the
instant claim in the reduced amount of P11,155,276.59 computed
as follows:
Amount of Input VAT Claim P23,093,899.59

Less:Input VAT Claim on Zero-Rated Sales 7,170,276.02
Input VAT Claim on Capital Goods Purchases P15,923,623.57
Not Properly Substantiated Input VAT Claim on
Less:
Capital Goods Purchases
Per ICPA Report (P15,923,623.57 less
2,099,494.43
P13,824,129.14)
Per this Court’s further verification 2,668,852.55
Refundable Input VAT on Capital Goods
P11,155,276.59
Purchases
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 57, 220 & 222.

8 Id., at pp. 220-232. Penned by Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova,
with Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista, concurring and Presiding
Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, dissenting.

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VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 199

Accordingly, respondent is ORDERED to REFUND

OR ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in the
reduced amount of P11,155,276.59 representing unutilized
input VAT arising from petitioner’s domestic purchases of
goods and services which are attributable to zero-rated
transactions and purchases/importations of capital goods
for the taxable year 2004.
SO ORDERED.9

The CTA Division denied Sitel’s P7,170,276.02 claim for
unutilized input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales for
the four quarters of 2004. Relying upon the rulings of this
Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Burmeister
and Wain Scandinavian Contractor Mindanao, Inc.10
(Burmeister), the CTA Division found that Sitel failed to
prove that the recipients of its services are doing business
outside the Philippines, as required under Section 108(B)
(2) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC),
as amended.11
The CTA Division also disallowed the amount of
P2,668,852.55 representing input VAT paid on capital
goods purchased for taxable year 2004 for failure to comply
with the invoicing requirements under Sections 113, 237,
and 238 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, and Section
4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95 (RR 7-95).12
Aggrieved, Sitel filed a motion for partial
reconsideration13 and Supplement (To Motion for
Reconsideration [of Decision dated October 21, 2009]),14 on
November 11, 2009 and March 26, 2010, respectively.
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 231-232.

10 541 Phil. 119; 512 SCRA 124 (2007).
11 Rollo, pp. 226-227.
12 Id., at pp. 228-229.
13 Id., at pp. 238-261.
14 Id., at pp. 270-277.

200

Prior thereto, or on January 8, 2010, Sitel filed a Motion

for Partial Execution of Judgment15 seeking the execution
pending appeal of the portion of the Decision dated October
21, 2009 granting refund in the amount of P11,155,276.59,

which portion was not made part of its motion for partial
reconsideration.
On May 31, 2010, the CTA Division denied Sitel’s
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplement (To Motion for
Reconsideration [of Decision dated October 21, 2009]) for
lack of merit.16
Undaunted, Sitel filed a Petition for Review17 with the
CTA En Banc claiming that it is entitled to the amount
denied by the CTA Division.

Ruling of the CTA En Banc

In the assailed Decision, the CTA En Banc reversed and
set aside the ruling of the CTA Division. Citing the case of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging
Company of Asia, Inc.18 (Aichi), the CTA En Banc ruled
that the 120-day period for the CIR to act on the
administrative claim for refund or tax credit, under Section
112(D) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, is mandatory and
jurisdictional. Considering that Sitel filed its judicial claim
for VAT refund or credit without waiting for the lapse of
the 120-day period for the CIR to act on its administrative
claim, the CTA did not acquire jurisdiction as there was no
decision or inaction to speak of.19 Thus, the CTA En Banc
denied Sitel’s entire refund claim on the ground of
prematurity. The dispositive portion of the CTA En Banc’s
Decision reads as follows:
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 278-286.

16 Id., at pp. 289-295.
17 Id., at pp. 326-371.
18 646 Phil. 710; 632 SCRA 422 (2010).
19 See Rollo, pp. 95-102.

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VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 201

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing considerations,

the Petition for Review En Banc is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
Decision of the CTA First Division dated October 21, 2009 and the
Resolution issued by the Special First Division dated May 31,
2010, are hereby reversed and set aside. Petitioner’s refund claim
of P19,702,880.80 is DENIED on the ground that the judicial

claim for the first to fourth quarters of taxable year 2004 was
prematurely filed.
SO ORDERED.20

Aggrieved, Sitel moved for reconsideration,21 but the
same was denied by the Court En Banc for lack of merit.22
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
x x x WHETHER OR NOT THE AICHI RULING

PROMULGATED ON OCTOBER 6, 2010 MAY BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY TO THE INSTANT CLAIM FOR REFUND
OF INPUT VAT INCURRED IN 2004.
x x x WHETHER OR NOT THE CTA EN BANC CAN VALIDLY
WITHDRAW AND REVOKE THE PORTION OF THE REFUND
CLAIM ALREADY GRANTED TO PETITIONER IN THE
AMOUNT OF P11,155,276.59 AFTER TRIAL ON THE MERITS,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SUCH PORTION OF THE
DECISION HAD NOT BEEN APPEALED.
x x x WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A
REFUND OR TAX CREDIT OF ITS UNUTILIZED INPUT VAT
ARISING FROM PURCHASES OF GOODS AND SERVICES
ATTRIBUTABLE TO ZERO-RATED SALES AND
PURCHASES/IMPORTATIONS OF CAPITAL GOODS FOR THE
1ST, 2ND, 3RD, [AND] 4TH QUAR-
_______________
20 Id., at p. 104.
21 Id., at pp. 419-477.
22 Id., at pp. 118-127.

202

TERS OF TAXABLE YEAR 2004 IN THE AGGREGATE

AMOUNT OF P20,994,405.16.23

In the Resolution24 dated July 4, 2012, the CIR was
required to comment on the instant petition. In compliance
thereto, the CIR filed its Comment25 on November 14,
2012.
On January 16, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution26
denying Sitel’s petition for failure to sufficiently show that
the CTA En Banc committed reversible error in denying its

refund claim on the ground of prematurity based on
prevailing jurisprudence.
Soon thereafter, however, or on February 12, 2013, the
Court En Banc decided the consolidated cases of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation, Taganito Mining Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Philex Mining
Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue27 (San
Roque). In that case, the Court recognized BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03 as an exception to the mandatory and
jurisdictional nature of the 120-day waiting period.
Invoking San Roque, Sitel filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.28
In the Resolution29 dated June 17, 2013, the Court
granted Sitel’s motion and reinstated the instant petition.
In the instant petition, Sitel claims that its judicial
claim for refund was timely filed following the Court’s
pronouncements in San Roque; thus, it was erroneous for
the CTA En Banc to reverse the ruling of the CTA Division
and to dismiss
_______________
23 Id., at p. 63.
24 Id., at p. 479.
25 Id., at pp. 484-508.
26 Id., at p. 511.
27 703 Phil. 310; 690 SCRA 336 (2013).
28 Rollo, pp. 512-525.
29 Id., at p. 527.

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VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 203

its petition on the ground of prematurity. Sitel further

argues that the previously granted amount for refund of
P11,155,276.59 should be reinstated and declared final and
executory, the same not being the subject of Sitel’s partial
appeal before the CTA En Banc, nor of any appeal from the
CIR.
Finally, Sitel contends that insofar as the denied portion
of the claim is concerned, which the CTA En Banc failed to
pass upon with the dismissal of its appeal, speedy justice
demands that the Court resolved the same on the merits
and Sitel be declared entitled to an additional refund in the

amount of P9,839,128.57.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds the petition partly meritorious.

Sitel’s Judicial Claim for VAT
Refund was deemed timely
filed pursuant to the Court’s
pronouncement in San Roque.

Section 112(C) of the NIRC, as amended, provides:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.—

x x x x
(C) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes
shall be Made.—In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a
refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of
submission of complete documents in support of the
application filed in accordance with Subsection (A) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax
credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the
application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer
affected may, within

204

thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim
or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period,
appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax
Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)

Based on the plain language of the foregoing provision,
the CIR is given 120 days within which to grant or deny a
claim for refund. Upon receipt of CIR’s decision or ruling
denying the said claim, or upon the expiration of the 120-
day period without action from the CIR, the taxpayer has
thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for review
with the CTA.
In Aichi, the Court ruled that the 120-day period
granted to the CIR was mandatory and jurisdictional, the
nonobservance of which was fatal to the filing of a judicial
claim with the CTA. The Court further explained that the
two (2)-year prescriptive period under Section 112(A) of the
NIRC pertained only to the filing of the administrative
claim with the BIR; while the judicial claim may be filed
with the CTA within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the
decision of the CIR or the expiration of the 120-day period
of the CIR to act on the claim. Thus:
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has
“120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete
documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit],”
within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial
denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s recourse is to file an appeal
before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the
CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on
the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is
to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were
simultaneously filed on September 30, 2004. Obviously,
respondent did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of
the 120-day period. For this reason,

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VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 205

we find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.
Respondent’s assertion that the nonobservance of the 120-day
period is not fatal to the filing of a judicial claim as long as both
the administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the
two-year prescriptive period has no legal basis.
There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support
respondent’s view. Subsection (A) of the said provision states that
“any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated may, within two years after the close of
the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable
input tax due or paid attributable to such sales.” The phrase
“within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit
certificate or refund” refers to applications for refund/credit filed
with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA. This is
apparent in the first paragraph of subsection (D) of the same
provision, which states that the CIR has “120 days from the
submission of complete documents in support of the application
filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)” within which
to decide on the claim.
In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would

render nugatory Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which already
provides for a specific period within which a taxpayer should
appeal the decision or inaction of the CIR. The second paragraph
of Section 112(D) of the NIRC envisions two scenarios: (1) when a
decision is issued by the CIR before the lapse of the 120-day
period; and (2) when no decision is made after the 120-day period.
In both instances, the taxpayer has 30 days within which to file
an appeal with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day period is
crucial in filing an appeal with the CTA.
x x x x

206

In fine, the premature filing of respondent’s claim for

refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warrants a dismissal
inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.30

However, in San Roque, the Court clarified that the 120-
day period does not apply to claims for refund that were
prematurely filed during the period from the issuance of
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, on December 10, 2003, until
October 6, 2010, when Aichi was promulgated. The Court
explained that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, which expressly
allowed the filing of judicial claims with the CTA even
before the lapse of the 120-day period, provided for a valid
claim of equitable estoppel because the CIR had misled
taxpayers into prematurely filing their judicial claims
before the CTA:
There is no dispute that the 120-day period is mandatory and

jurisdictional, and that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over
a judicial claim that is filed before the expiration of the 120-day
period. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. The first
exception is if the Commissioner, through a specific ruling,
misleads a particular taxpayer to prematurely file a judicial claim
with the CTA. Such specific ruling is applicable only to such
particular taxpayer. The second exception is where the
Commissioner, through a general interpretative rule
issued under Section 4 of the Tax Code, misleads all
taxpayers into filing prematurely judicial claims with the
CTA. In these cases, the Commissioner cannot be allowed
to later on question the CTA’s assumption of jurisdiction
over such claim since equitable estoppel has set in as

expressly authorized under Section 246 of the Tax Code.
x x x x
_______________
30 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of

Asia, Inc., supra note 18 at pp. 731-732; pp. 443-444.

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VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 207

BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule

because it was a response to a query made, not by a particular
taxpayer, but by a government agency tasked with processing tax
refunds and credits, that is, the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax
Credit and Drawback Center of the Department of Finance. This
government agency is also the addressee, or the entity responded
to, in BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. Thus, while this government
agency mentions in its query to the Commissioner the
administrative claim of Lazi Bay Resources Development, Inc.,
the agency was in fact asking the Commissioner what to do in
cases like the tax claim of Lazi Bay Resources Development, Inc.,
where the taxpayer did not wait for the lapse of the 120-day
period.
Clearly, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general
interpretative rule. Thus, all taxpayers can rely on BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10
December 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on
6 October 2010, where this Court held that the 120+30 day
periods are mandatory and jurisdictional.31 (Emphasis
supplied)

In Visayas Geothermal Power Company v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue,32 the Court came up with an outline
summarizing the pronouncements in San Roque, to wit:
For clarity and guidance, the Court deems it proper to outline

the rules laid down in San Roque with regard to claims for refund
or tax credit of unutilized creditable input VAT. They are as
follows:
1. When to file an administrative claim with the CIR:
a. General rule — Section 112(A) and Mirant —
Within 2 years from the close of the taxable quarter
when the sales were made.
_______________
31 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,

supra note 27 at pp. 373-376; pp. 401-405.
32 735 Phil. 321; 725 SCRA 130 (2014).

208

b. Exception — Atlas
Within 2 years from the date of payment of the output
VAT, if the administrative claim was filed from June
8, 2007 (promulgation of Atlas) to September 12, 2008
(promulgation of Mirant).
2. When to file a judicial claim with the CTA:
a. General rule — Section 112(D); not Section 229
i. Within 30 days from the full or partial denial of
the administrative claim by the CIR; or
ii. Within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-
day period provided to the CIR to decide on the
claim. This is mandatory and jurisdictional
beginning January 1, 1998 (effectivity of 1997
NIRC).
b. Exception — BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03
The judicial claim need not await the expiration
of the 120-day period, if such was filed from
December 10, 2003 (issuance of BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03) to October 6, 2010 (promulgation of
Aichi).33 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this case, records show that Sitel filed its
administrative and judicial claim for refund on March 28,
2006 and March 30, 2006, respectively, or after the
issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, but before the date
when Aichi was promulgated. Thus, even though Sitel filed
its judicial claim prematurely,
_______________
33 Id., at pp. 338-339; pp. 149-150.

209
VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 209

i.e., without waiting for the expiration of the 120-day

mandatory period, the CTA may still take cognizance of the
case because the claim was filed within the excepted period
stated in San Roque. In other words, Sitel’s judicial claim
was deemed timely filed and should have not been
dismissed by the CTA En Banc. Consequently, the October
21, 2009 Decision34 of the CTA Division partially granting
Sitel’s judicial claim for refund in the reduced amount of
P11,155,276.59, which is not subject of the instant appeal,
should be reinstated. In this regard, since the CIR did not
appeal said decision to the CTA En Banc, the same is now
considered final and beyond this Court’s review.
Sitel now questions the following portions of its refund
claim which the CTA Division denied: (1) P7,170,276.02,
representing unutilized input VAT on purchases of goods
and services attributable to zero-rated sales, which was
denied because Sitel failed to prove that the call services it
rendered for the year 2004 were made to nonresident
foreign clients doing business outside the Philippines; and
(2) P2,668,852.55 representing input VAT on purchases of
capital goods, because these are supported by invoices and
official receipts with preprinted TIN-V instead of TIN-VAT,
as required under Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95.
Sitel claims that testimonial and documentary evidence
sufficiently established that its clients were nonresident
foreign corporations not doing business in Philippines. It
also asserts that the input VAT on its purchases of capital
goods were duly substantiated because the supporting
official receipts substantially complied with the invoicing
requirements provided by the rules.
In other words, Sitel wants the Court to review factual
findings of the CTA Division, reexamine the evidence and
determine on the basis thereof whether it should be
refunded the additional amount of P9,839,128.57. This,
however, can-
_______________
34 Rollo, pp. 220-232.

210

not be done in the instant case for settled is the rule that
this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
embark in the evaluation of evidence adduced during
trial.35 It is not this Court’s function to analyze or weigh all
over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below, the Court’s jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed
by the lower court.36
Furthermore, the Court accords findings and conclusions
of the CTA with the highest respect.37 As a specialized
court dedicated exclusively to the resolution of tax
problems, the CTA has accordingly developed an expertise
on the subject of taxation.38 Thus, its decisions are
presumed valid in every aspect and will not be overturned
on appeal, unless the Court finds that the questioned
decision is not supported by substantial evidence or there
has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority on
the part of the tax court.39
Upon careful review of the instant case, and directly
addressing the issues raised by Sitel, the Court finds no
cogent reason to reverse or modify the findings of the CTA
Division.
The Court expounds.
_______________
35 General Milling Corporation v. Viajar, 702 Phil. 532, 540; 689

SCRA 598, 606 (2013).
36 Fortune Tobacco Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 192024, July 1, 2015, 761 SCRA 173, 181.
37 See Barcelon, Roxas Securities, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 529 Phil. 785, 794; 498 SCRA 126, 135 (2006).
38 Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 672 Phil. 514, 530; 657 SCRA 70, 84-85 (2011), citing
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 239, 246;
301 SCRA 152, 168-169 (1999), citation omitted.
39 Id., citing Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 628 Phil. 430, 467-468; 614 SCRA 526,
561 (2010), citations omitted.

211
VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 211

Sitel failed to prove that the

recipients of its call services are
foreign corporations doing busi-
ness outside the Philippines.

Sitel’s claim for refund is anchored on Section 112(A)40
of the NIRC, which allows the refund or credit of input
VAT attributable to zero-rated or effectively zero-rated
sales. In relation thereto, Sitel points to Section 108(B)(2)
of the NIRC [formerly Section 102(b)(2) of the NIRC of
1977, as amended] as legal basis for treating its sale of
services as zero-rated or effectively zero-rated. Section
108(B)(2) reads:
SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or

Lease of Properties.—
x x x x
_______________
40 SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.—

(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales.—Any VAT-registered
person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within
two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were
made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of
creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except
transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been
applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in the case of zero-
rated sales under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (b) and Section 108(B)(1)
and (2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds thereof had
been duly accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further, That where the
taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale and also in
taxable or exempt sale of goods or properties or services, and the amount
of creditable input tax due or paid cannot be directly and entirely
attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be allocated
proportionately on the basis of the volume of sales: Provided, finally, That
for a person making sales that are zero-rated under Section 108(B)(6), the
input taxes shall be allocated ratably between his zero-rated and nonzero-
rated sales.

212

(B) Transactions Subject to Zero Percent (0%) Rate.—The

following services performed in the Philippines by VAT-registered
persons shall be subject to zero percent (0%) rate:

x x x x
(2) Services other than those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph rendered to a person engaged in business
conducted outside the Philippines or to a nonresident
person not engaged in business who is outside the
Philippines when the services are performed, the
consideration for which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency
and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP); (Emphasis supplied)

In Burmeister, the Court clarified that an essential
condition to qualify for zero-rating under the aforequoted
provision is that the service-recipient must be doing
business outside the Philippines, to wit:
The Tax Code not only requires that the services be other than
“processing, manufacturing or repacking of goods” and that
payment for such services be in acceptable foreign currency
accounted for in accordance with BSP rules. Another essential
condition for qualification to zero-rating under Section 102(b)(2) is
that the recipient of such services is doing business outside
the Philippines. x x x
This can only be the logical interpretation of Section 102(b)(2).
If the provider and recipient of the “other services” are both doing
business in the Philippines, the payment of foreign currency is
irrelevant. Otherwise, those subject to the regular VAT under
Section 102(a) can avoid paying the VAT by simply stipulating
payment in foreign currency inwardly remitted by the recipient of
services. To interpret Section 102(b)(2) to apply to a payer-
recipient of services doing business in the Philippines is to make
the payment of the regular VAT under Section 102(a) dependent
on the generosity of the tax-

213
VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 213

payer. The provider of services can choose to pay the regular VAT
or avoid it by stipulating payment in foreign currency inwardly
remitted by the payer-recipient. Such interpretation removes
Section 102(a) as a tax measure in the Tax Code, an
interpretation this Court cannot sanction. A tax is a mandatory
exaction, not a voluntary contribution.
x x x x
Thus, when Section 102(b)(2) speaks of “[s]ervices other

than those mentioned in the preceding subparagraph,” the
legislative intent is that only the services are different between
subparagraphs 1 and 2. The requirements for zero-rating,
including the essential condition that the recipient of services is
doing business outside the Philippines, remain the same under
both subparagraphs.
Significantly, the amended Section 108(b) [previously Section
102(b)] of the present Tax Code clarifies this legislative intent.
Expressly included among the transactions subject to 0% VAT are
“[s]ervices other than those mentioned in the [first] paragraph [of
Section 108(b)] rendered to a person engaged in business
conducted outside the Philippines or to a nonresident
person not engaged in business who is outside the
Philippines when the services are performed, the consideration
for which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted
for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP.”41

Following Burmeister, the Court, in Accenture, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,42 (Accenture),
emphasized that a taxpayer claiming for a VAT refund or
credit under Section 108(B) has the burden to prove not
only that the recipient of the service is a foreign
corporation, but also that
_______________
41 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Burmeister and Wain

Scandinavian Contractor Mindanao, Inc., supra note 10 at pp. 132-134;
pp. 137-138.
42 690 Phil. 679; 676 SCRA 325 (2012).

214

said corporation is doing business outside the Philippines.

For failure to discharge this burden, the Court denied
Accenture’s claim for refund.

We rule that the recipient of the service must be doing
business outside the Philippines for the transaction to
qualify for zero-rating under Section 108(B) of the Tax
Code.
x x x x
The evidence presented by Accenture may have

established that its clients are foreign. This fact does not
automatically mean, however, that these clients were doing
business outside the Philippines. After all, the Tax Code
itself has provisions for a foreign corporation engaged in
business within the Philippines and vice versa, to wit:
SEC. 22. Definitions.—When used in this Title:

x x x x
(H) The term “resident foreign corporation” applies to a
foreign corporation engaged in trade or business within the
Philippines.
(I) The term ‘nonresident foreign corporation’ applies to a
foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business within
the Philippines. (Emphasis in the original)
Consequently, to come within the purview of Section
108(B)(2), it is not enough that the recipient of the service
be proven to be a foreign corporation; rather, it must be
specifically proven to be a nonresident foreign
corporation.
There is no specific criterion as to what constitutes “doing” or
“engaging in” or “transacting” business. We ruled thus in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. British Overseas Airways
Corporation:
x x x. There is no specific criterion as to what constitutes
“doing” or “engaging in” or “transacting” business. Each
case must be judged in

215
VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 215

the light of its peculiar environmental circumstances. The

term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and
arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the
performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the
functions normally incident to, and in progressive
prosecution of commercial gain or for the purpose and object
of the business organization. “In order that a foreign
corporation may be regarded as doing business
within a State, there must be continuity of conduct
and intention to establish a continuous business,
such as the appointment of a local agent, and not one
of a temporary character.”
A taxpayer claiming a tax credit or refund has the burden of
proof to establish the factual basis of that claim. Tax refunds, like
tax exemptions, are construed strictly against the taxpayer.
Accenture failed to discharge this burden. It alleged and

presented evidence to prove only that its clients were
foreign entities. However, as found by both the CTA
Division and the CTA En Banc, no evidence was presented
by Accenture to prove the fact that the foreign clients to
whom petitioner rendered its services were clients doing
business outside the Philippines.
As ruled by the CTA En Banc, the Official Receipts,
Intercompany Payment Requests, Billing Statements, Memo
Invoices-Receivable, Memo Invoices-Payable, and Bank
Statements presented by Accenture merely substantiated the
existence of sales, receipt of foreign currency payments, and
inward remittance of the proceeds of such sales duly accounted for
in accordance with BSP rules, all of these were devoid of any
evidence that the clients were doing business outside of the
Philippines.43 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
_______________
43 Id., at pp. 693, 698-700; pp. 338, 344-346.

216

In the same vein, Sitel fell short of proving that the

recipients of its call services were foreign corporations
doing business outside the Philippines. As correctly pointed
out by the CTA Division, while Sitel’s documentary
evidence, which includes Certifications issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission and Agreements
between Sitel and its foreign clients, may have established
that Sitel rendered services to foreign corporations in 2004
and received payments therefor through inward
remittances, said documents failed to specifically prove
that such foreign clients were doing business outside the
Philippines or have a continuity of commercial dealings
outside the Philippines.
Thus, the Court finds no reason to reverse the ruling of
the CTA Division denying the refund of P7,170,276.02,
allegedly representing Sitel’s input VAT attributable to
zero-rated sales.

Sitel failed to strictly com-
ply with invoicing require-
ments for VAT refund.

The CTA Division also did not err when it denied the
amount of P2,668,852.55, allegedly representing input
taxes claimed on Sitel’s domestic purchases of goods and
services which are supported by invoices/receipts with
preprinted TIN-V. In Western Mindanao Power Corp. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,44 the Court ruled that
in a claim for tax refund or tax credit, the applicant must
prove not only entitlement to the grant of the claim under
substantive law, he must also show satisfaction of all the
documentary and evidentiary requirements for an
administrative claim for a refund or tax credit and
compliance with the invoicing and accounting requirements
mandated by the NIRC, as well as by revenue regulations
implementing them. The NIRC re-
_______________
44 687 Phil. 328, 340; 672 SCRA 350, 362 (2012), citations omitted.

217
VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 217

quires that the creditable input VAT should be evidenced

by a VAT invoice or official receipt,45 which may only be
considered as such when the TIN-VAT is printed thereon,
as required by Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95.
The Court’s pronouncement in KEPCO Philippines Corp.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue46 is instructive:
Furthermore, Kepco insists that Section 4.108-1 of Revenue

Regulation 07-95 does not require the word “TIN-VAT” to be
imprinted on a VAT-registered person’s supporting invoices and
official receipts and so there is no reason for the denial of its
P4,720,725.63 claim of input tax.
In this regard, Internal Revenue Regulation 7-95 (Consolidated
Value-Added Tax Regulations) is clear. Section 4.108-1 thereof
reads:
Only VAT registered persons are required to print their
TIN followed by the word “VAT” in their invoice or receipts
and this shall be considered as a “VAT” Invoice. All
purchases covered by invoices other than ‘VAT Invoice’ shall
not give rise to any input tax.
Contrary to Kepco’s allegation, the regulation specifically
requires the VAT registered person to imprint TIN-VAT on its
invoices or receipts. Thus, the Court agrees with the CTA when it
wrote: “[T]o be considered a ‘VAT invoice,’ the TIN-VAT must be
printed, and not merely stamped. Consequently, purchases

supported by invoices or official receipts, wherein the TIN-VAT is
not
_______________
45 Id., citing Section 110. Tax Credits.—

A. Creditable Input Tax.—
(1) Any input tax evidenced by a VAT invoice or official receipt issued
in accordance with Section 113 hereof on the following transactions shall
be creditable against the output tax:
x x x x
46 650 Phil. 525; 636 SCRA 166 (2010).

218

printed thereon, shall not give rise to any input VAT. Likewise,
input VAT on purchases supported by invoices or official receipts
which are NON-VAT are disallowed because these invoices or
official receipts are not considered as ‘VAT Invoices.’”47

In the same vein, considering that the subject
invoice/official receipts are not imprinted with the
taxpayer’s TIN followed by the word VAT, these would not
be considered as VAT invoices/official receipts and would
not give rise to any creditable input VAT in favor of Sitel.
At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that “[t]ax
refunds or tax credits — just like tax exemptions — are
strictly construed against taxpayers, the latter having the
burden to prove strict compliance with the conditions for
the grant of the tax refund or credit.”48
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition for review is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision
dated November 11, 2011 and Resolution dated March 28,
2012 of the CTA En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 644 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the October
21, 2009 Decision of the CTA First Division in CTA Case
No. 7423 is hereby REINSTATED.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED TO REFUND or, in
the alternative, TO ISSUE A TAX CREDIT
CERTIFICATE, in favor of the petitioner in the amount of
P11,155,276.59, representing unutilized input VAT arising
from purchases/importations of capital goods for taxable
year 2004.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
47 Id., at pp. 540-541; pp. 180-181.

48 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation
(now TeaM Energy Corporation), G.R. No. 180434, January 20, 2016, 781
SCRA 346, 376, citing Applied Food Ingredients Company, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 720 Phil. 782, 789; 709 SCRA 164, 169
(2013).

219
VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 219

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del

Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Petition granted in part, judgment and resolution

reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Even if the current law, through its tax

deduction scheme (which abandoned the tax credit scheme
under the previous law), does not provide for a peso for
peso reimbursement of the 20% discount given by private
establishments, no constitutional infirmity obtains
because, being a valid exercise of police power, payment of
just compensation is not warranted. (Manila Memorial
Park, Inc. vs. Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development, 711 SCRA 302 [2013])
Tax refunds or credits, just like tax exemptions, are
strictly construed against the taxpayer. (CBK Power
Company Limited vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
714 SCRA 46 [2014])

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12/03/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 817

G.R. No. 201326. February 8, 2017.*

Taxation; Tax Refunds; The Commissioner of Internal

194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

that were prematurely filed during the period from the

Court denied Accenture’s claim for refund. We rule that the

VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 195

196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

are strictly construed against taxpayers, the latter having the

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

1 Rollo, pp. 50-83.

concurring and Associate Justices Lovell R. Bautista and Amelia R.

VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 197

4 Id., at pp. 56, 221.

198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the

In view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is

Amount of Input VAT Claim P23,093,899.59

7 Id., at pp. 57, 220 & 222.

VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 199

Accordingly, respondent is ORDERED to REFUND

9 Id., at pp. 231-232.

200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Prior thereto, or on January 8, 2010, Sitel filed a Motion

21, 2009 granting refund in the amount of P11,155,276.59,

15 Id., at pp. 278-286.

VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 201

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing considerations,

of P19,702,880.80 is DENIED on the ground that the judicial

x x x WHETHER OR NOT THE AICHI RULING

202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

TERS OF TAXABLE YEAR 2004 IN THE AGGREGATE

the CTA En Banc committed reversible error in denying its

VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 203

its petition on the ground of prematurity. Sitel further

and Sitel be declared entitled to an additional refund in the

SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.—

204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 205

In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would

206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In fine, the premature filing of respondent’s claim for

There is no dispute that the 120-day period is mandatory and

over such claim since equitable estoppel has set in as

30 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of

VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 207

BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule

For clarity and guidance, the Court deems it proper to outline

31 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,

208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

33 Id., at pp. 338-339; pp. 149-150.

VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 209

i.e., without waiting for the expiration of the 120-day

34 Rollo, pp. 220-232.

210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Inc.) vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

35 General Milling Corporation v. Viajar, 702 Phil. 532, 540; 689

VOL. 817, FEBRUARY 8, 2017 211

Sitel failed to prove that the