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IRRATIONAL BELIEFS, PERCEIVED AVAILABILITY

OF SOCIAL SUPPORT, AND ANXIETY
KENNETH E. HART AND JAMES B. HITTNER
Hofstra University

Based on the assumption that individual difference factors can influence

aspects of the social environment, it was predicted that individuals who ex-
hibit high levels of irrational beliefs would appraise their interpersonal en-
vironment as less supportive than would individuals with lower levels of ir-
rational beliefs. The second prediction was that irrational beliefs would be
related positively to anxiety. Thirdly, it was expected that perceived social
support would be related inversely to anxiety. The final prediction was that
deficits in social support among individuals who exhibit irrational beliefs
may account, in part, for their relatively high levels of anxiety. Results based
on questionnaire data obtained from 39 college students supported all four
hypotheses.

The social support construct typically is viewed as an independent variable that

resides in the social environment and directly or indirectly impacts the mental health
of individuals in an antecedent-consequent linear causal manner. Recently, a growing
number of researchers have called attention to an alternative conceptualization of social
support, one that rejects the notion that level of support should be viewed strictly as
an environmental provision that is independent of individual difference factors. This
emerging model posits that social support also can be viewed as a dependent variable
with its own causes and determinants (Broadhead et al., 1984; Heller & Swindle, 1983;
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Sarason & Sarason, 1985).
A major implication of the conceptual shift toward viewing social support as a
dependent variable is that it suggests an important avenue for investigation in the study of
individual difference factors that might influence the level of support available to in-
dividuals. The first purpose of the present study was to extend our body of knowledge
with respect to psychological factors that are related to the perceived availability of social
support. Specifically, it was predicted that individuals who score high on irrational beliefs
would report social support to be less available than would individuals who score low
on irrational beliefs. This hypothesis was based on two lines of reasoning. First, it is

Requests for reprints should be addressed to Kenneth E. Hart, Department of Psychology, Hofstra Univer-
sity, Hempstead, NY 11550.
 Irrational Beliefs, Social Support, A nxiety 583

possible that irrational thinking may be associated with a dysfunctional interpersonal

style that, in turn, contributes to an impoverished social environment. In addition, ir-
rational thinking may affect adversely the perception of objectively available support.
The second purpose of the present investigation was to replicate previous research
that has demonstrated a positive correlation between irrational beliefs and anxiety (Smith,
1982; Smith & Zurawski, 1983; Smith, Zurawski, & Houston, 1984; Zurawski & Smith,
1987; Zwemer & Deffenbacher, 1984).
The third prediction was based on research (Lin, Ensel, Simeone, & Kuo, 1979;
Williams, Ware, & Donald, 1981) that has suggested that high levels of social support
protect people from experiencing psychological distress. Specifically, the fourth predic-
tion was that social support would be related inversely to anxiety.
The fourth and final purpose of the present investigation was to test the notion
that perceived social support may act as a mediating mechanism in the link between
irrational beliefs and anxiety. Thus, in addition to expecting an inverse relationship be-
tween irrational thinking and anxiety, this investigation also sought to test the hypothesis
that low levels of social support among highly irrational individuals may explain in part
why they tend to experience high levels of anxiety. In empirical terms, it was expected
that the zero-order correlation that links irrational thinking to anxiety would be noticeably
higher than the corresponding partial correlation (in which social support scores are
controlled for).

METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 39 college students enrolled in an undergraduate psychology class
at a private, medium-sized university in Long Isiand, New York. There were 11 males
and 28 females, and their mean age was 19.2 (SD = 1.2). All subjects received course
credit in exchange for completing the following questionnaires.
Instruments
The Assessment of Irrational Beliefs. Smith and Allred (1986) recently have reviewed
the empirical support for Ellis’ Rational-Emotive Theory of psychopathology and dis-
cussed methodological problems associated with many of the self-report inventories used
to assess irrational thinking. These authors note that a problem of considerable magnitude
is the poor discriminant validity of these scales. Evidence in this regard comes from
research (e.g., Smith & Zurawski, 1983) that showed that two of the most commonly
used measures of irrational beliefs correlated equally highly with measures of anxiety
and depression as they did with each other. These data suggest that irrational belief
inventories may be confounded with neuroticism or negative affectivity. (For reviews
of this problem, see Smith, 1982; Smith & Allred, 1986.)
In 1986, Kassinove proposed that lack of discriminant validity may be due in part
to the fact that the wording of many items on popular measures of irrationality is affect-
laden and, therefore, contaminated with measures of negative affect and with the more
general factor of neuroticism. In an attempt to improve the assessment of irrational
beliefs, Kassinove (1986) developed and refined (Demaria, Kassinove, & Dill, 1989) the
Survey of Personal Beliefs, a scale that does not suffer from the problem of item con-
tamination. The present study utilized this new scale.
The Survey of Personal Beliefs (SPB; Kassinove, 1986) is a relatively new measure
of irrational beliefs that is comprised of items free from affect contamination. The scale
has satisfactory reliability as well as factorial validity (Demaria et al., 1989; Kassinove,
1986). High scores on the SPB indicate general rationality. Thus, the direction of ob-
tained correlations should be reversed during interpretation. For example, the present
5 84 Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 1991, Vol. 47, No. 4

study found that the correlation between SPB scores and anxiety was - .46. Concep-
tually, this correlation should be interpreted as suggesting that individuals who engage
in high levels of irrational thinking also suffer from high levels of anxiety.
The Trait Anxiety Scale (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) is a 20-item, self-
report measure of anxiety that assesses the frequency and severity of anxiety symptoms
typically experienced by the individual. Empirical support for the scale is good, and
both reliability and validity data have been well documented (Spielberger et al., 1970).
The revised student version of the Interpersonal Support Evaluation List (ISEL)
is a self-report inventory comprised of 40 statements that tap the individual’s perceived
availability of potentially supportive social ties (Cohen & Hoberman, 1983). In addi-
tion to providing a global index of the total amount of social support that is perceived
to be available, the ISEL also provides scores on four qualitatively different types of
support: tangible, appraisal, self-esteem, and belongingness.
These support subfactors represent four different functions that relationships may
serve. Tangible support, for example, assesses the perceived availability of material aid
(e.g., “I know someone who would loan me $50 SO’Icould go away for the weekend”).
Appraisal support taps the extent to which people are perceived to be available to discuss
one’s problems with (e.g., “I know someone who I see or talk to often with whom I
would feel perfectly comfortable talking about any problems I might have adjusting
to college life”). Selfesteem support measures the perception that social opportunities
are available to view oneself positively in comparison to others (e.g., “Most people who
know me well think highly of me”). Finally, belongingness support assesses the perceived
availability of people to share activities with (e.g., “There are people at school or in
town who I regularly run with, exercise with, or play sports with”).
Both convergent and discriminant validity evidence for the ISEL have been
documented (Cohen & Hoberman, 1983; Cohen, Mermelstein, Kamarck, & Hoberman,
1985). In addition, the ISEL has adequate test-retest reliability for the overall scale and
the subscales. Internal consistency reliability is also adequate, with alpha coefficients
that range from .77 to .86. Reported alpha ranges for the student ISEL subscales are
as follows: appraisal support (.77-.92); self-esteem support (.60-.68); belongingness sup-
port (.75-.78); and tangible support (.71-.74) (Cohen et al., 1985).

RESULTS
Descriptive data that pertain to means, standard deviations, and internal consistency
(Cronbach alpha) for all variables are presented in Table 1. As can be seen, internal
consistency for all the scales is satisfactory.
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for all the variables. In sum, results showed
that the SPB was related inversely to anxiety (r = - .46, p < .01; again, note that a

Table 1
Descriptive Data for All Subjects
n Alpha M SD
1. Survey of Personal Beliefs 41 .84 99.9 18.4
2. ISEL-total score 40 .98 129.3 8.4
3. Tangible support 10 .91 32.6 2.1
4. Belongingness support 10 .96 33.2 3.8
5. Appraisal support 10 .95 33.8 2.9
6. Self-esteem support 10 .95 29.1 2.4
7. Trait anxiety 20 .89 40.0 9.0

Note. -Alpha = Cronbach.

 Irrational Beliefs, Social Support, Anxiety 585

Table 2
Zero-order Correlations that Relate A 11 Variables

2 3 4 5 6 7

1. Survey of Personal Beliefs .34* .25 .27 .I4 .34* - .46**

2. ISEL-total score .52*** .82*** .83*** .7l*** - .65***
3. Tangible support .I6 .43** .20 - .40**
4. Belongingness support ,551' .47** - .58**
5. Appraisal support .44** -.43**
6. Self esteem support - .47**
7. Trait Anxiety

* p < .05. * * p < .01. ***p < ,001.

high score on the SPB indicates more rationality). In addition, SPB scale scores were
related positively to the total Interpersonal Support Evaluation List (ISEL) scale (r =
.34, p < .05) and to the self-esteem ISEL subscale (r = .34, p < .05).
While not reported in the Tables, the partial correlation coefficient that related irra-
tional beliefs to anxiety (after partialling out total social support scores) was - .34 (p< .05).

DISCUSSION

To recap, the present study predicted that: (1) individuals who exhibit high levels
of irrational beliefs would appraise their interpersonal environment as less supportive
than would individuals with lower levels of irrational beliefs; (2) irrational beliefs would
be related positively to anxiety; (3) perceived social support would be related inversely
to anxiety; and (4) deficits in social support among individuals who exhibit irrational
beliefs would account in part for their relatively high levels of anxiety. In general, results
supported all four hypotheses.
Results confirmed the hypothesis that individuals who scored high on irrational
beliefs would report relatively low levels of perceived social support. However, of the
five possible significant correlations, only two emerged as significant. Specifically, in-
dividuals who scored in the irrational direction of the SPB were found to report less
total support and less self-esteem support. These results may be interpreted tentatively
as suggesting that people who exhibit irrational beliefs may suffer from deficits in per-
ceived social support. One possible explanation for these results is that irrational in-
dividuals may alienate potentially supportive others by engaging in socially unpleasant
types of verbal and nonverbal behaviors. Alternatively, or in addition, irrational think-
ing may distort perceptions of objectively available support.
With regard to the second hypothesis, greater levels of irrational thinking were in-
deed found to be related to higher levels of anxiety. These results replicate previous
findings (Smith & Zurawski, 1983; Smith et al., 1984; Zurawski & Smith, 1987; Zwemer
& Deffenbacher, 1984) and, thus, support the construct validity of the Survey of Per-
sonal Beliefs. The fact that the correlation between irrationality and anxiety observed
in the present study was .23 less than the mean coefficient reported in the literature is
consistent with the claim (Kassinove, 1986; Demaria et al., 1989) that relative to other
irrational belief measures, the Survey of Personal Beliefs may be somewhat less con-
taminated by negative affect or neuroticism.
As predicted, results showed that social support was related inversely to anxiety.
Indeed, of the five possible correlations, all five emerged as significant. This pattern of
results suggests a rather robust association between social support and anxiety and is
consistent with the results of previous studies (Lin et al., 1979; Williams et al., 1981)
586 Journal of Clinical Psychology, July 1991, Vol. 47, No. 4

that have suggested that high levels of social support are associated with low levels of
psychological distress.
Finally, results of the present investigation also support the notion that perceived
social support may act as a mediating mechanism in the link between irrational beliefs
and trait anxiety. Evidence in this regard comes from a comparison of the zero-order
correlation that related these two variables to the corresponding partial correlation. In
the latter analysis, which controlled statistically for the effects of social support, the
link between beliefs and anxiety was substantially lower than the corresponding zero-
order association. Specifically, the partial correlation was - .34 (p < .05), while the
zero-order correlation was - .46 (p < .01). The 26% reduction in the magnitude of
the correlation coefficient provides evidence that is consistent with the notion that deficits
in social support may explain in part why highly irrational individuals suffer from anxiety.
There are a number of reasons to urge caution in interpreting the results of this
preliminary study. First, the cross-sectional correlational design renders statements about
the direction of causal influence tentative. It is possible, for example, that deficits in
social support cause people to think irrationally or that high levels of anxiety interfere
with the logical processing of socially relevant information. In addition, recent research
(Watson & Pennebaker, 1989) suggests that measures of trait anxiety such as the
Spielberger scale in fact may assess a more general underlying trait known as neuroti-
cismhegative affectivity, and not anxiety per se. If this is indeed the case, the present
results may be more relevant to understanding the psychosocial correlates of neuroticism
than of anxiety. A third limitation of the present study is that the relatively small sam-
ple size may have contributed to unreliable results. For example, the relatively low cor-
relation between irrational beliefs and anxiety simply may reflect the effects of sampling
error. Clearly, conclusions drawn from the preliminary data reported here should be
viewed with caution until replicated with larger, more heterogeneous, samples. The final,
and perhaps most serious limitation of the present investigation is that the results are
based on a nonclinical “normal” sample. Further research is needed with samples of
patients who are suffering from clinically high levels of anxiety. In this way, the
generalizability of the present results can be assessed.
Despite its limitations, results from the present study provide support for the follow-
ing tentative conclusions: (1) individuals who exhibit high levels of irrational beliefs seem
to appraise their interpersonal environment as being less supportive than individuals
with lower levels of irrational beliefs; (2) irrational beliefs may be related positively to
anxiety; (3) perceived social support may be related inversely to anxiety; and (4) deficits
in social support among individuals who exhibit irrational beliefs may account in part
for the fact that they suffer from relatively high levels of anxiety.

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THE ASSESSMENT OF INVOLVEMENT IN ROLE PLAYING

RANDALL B. MARTIN
Northern Illinois University

T w o experiments (N = 169) focused on involvement in role playing. Sub-

jects rated their level of involvement after each enactment; in addition, a
probe procedure was used with prompts, increasingly disparate from the
content of the role play. In the first experiment, subjects role played an anger
or sad scenario; both measures of involvement correlated with emotional
response, but were not correlated with each other. In the second experiment,
involvement was manipulated experimentally; both measures varied as
expected with the manipulation.

Role playing is a widely used procedure in many different settings for many different
purposes: The most elaborate use occurs in psychodrama, where a goal is to bring about
change in the players and/or observers (Moreno, 1964). Role playing also has been used
as an assessment device; with regard to assertive behavior, there have been a number
of studies that reported low validity, i.e., little relationship between action in the role
play and in naturalistic situations (Bellack, Hersen, & Lamparski, 1979; Bellack, Hersen,
& Turner, 1978). However, de Armas and Brigham (1986) report greater validity for
some subjects than others, and Merluzzi and Biever (1987) reported validity in the assess-
ment of one domain of social skill. Finally, role playing was proposed as an alternative

Thanks are due to the following who served as experimenters: Gerry Becker, Todd Becker, Linda Bedsole,
Kris Ducett, Amy Engelking, Beth Goranson, Lisa Read, Chip Richards, Gerry Sith, and Mike Yost. A por-
tion of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Western Psychological Association, Los Angeles, April
1990.
Requests for reprints should be addressed to Randall Martin, Department of Psychology. Northern Il-
linois University, DeKalb, IL 60115.