205407-2016-Ang - Lee - v. - Samahang - Manggagawa - NG - Super
205407-2016-Ang - Lee - v. - Samahang - Manggagawa - NG - Super
205407-2016-Ang - Lee - v. - Samahang - Manggagawa - NG - Super
DECISION
SERENO , C.J : p
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on
the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) a rming the assailed
Decision 3 of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). DOLE allowed the
conduct of certi cation election among the rank-and- le employees of Super
Lamination Services (Super Lamination), Express Lamination Services, Inc. (Express
Lamination), and Express Coat Enterprises, Inc. (Express Coat). HTcADC
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted an appeal before the CA, which denied his
Petition and a rmed the Decision of DOLE. It sided with DOLE in nding that Super
Lamination, Express Lamination, and Express Coat were sister companies that had
adopted a work-pooling scheme. Therefore, it held that DOLE had correctly applied the
concept of multi-employer bargaining in nding that the three companies could be
considered as the same entity, and their rank-and- le employees as comprising one
bargaining unit. 2 1
Petitioner led a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision, but the motion
was denied. 2 2 Therefore, he now comes to this Court through the present Petition.
ISSUES
From the established facts and arguments, we cull the issues as follows:
1. Whether the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is
warranted
2. Whether the rank-and- le employees of Super Lamination, Express
Lamination, and Express Coat constitute an appropriate bargaining unit
THE COURT'S RULING
We deny the petition.
An application of the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil is
warranted.
Petitioner argues that separate corporations cannot be treated as a single
bargaining unit even if their businesses are related, 2 3 as these companies are
indubitably distinct entities with separate juridical personalities. 2 4 Hence, the
employees of one corporation cannot be allowed to vote in the certi cation election of
another corporation, lest the above-mentioned rule be violated. 2 5
Petitioner's argument, while correct, is a general rule. This Court has time and
again disregarded separate juridical personalities under the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil. It has done so in cases where a separate legal entity is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, among other grounds.
2 6 In any of these situations, the law will regard it as an association of persons or, in
case of two corporations, merge them into one. 2 7 ATICcS
A settled formulation of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is that when
two business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties,
both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard
the legal ction that these two entities are distinct and treat them as identical or as one
and the same. 2 8
5. Super Lamination included in its payroll and SSS registration not just its
own employees, but also the supposed employees of Express Lamination
and Express Coat. This much was admitted by petitioner in his Motion to
Dismiss 4 0 which was affirmed by the Med-Arbiter in the latter's Order. 4 1
6. Petitioner admitted that Super Lamination had issued and signed the
identi cation cards of employees who were actually working for Express
Lamination and Express Coat. 4 2
7. Super Lamination, Express Lamination, and Express Coat were
represented by the same counsel who interposed the same arguments in
their motions before the Med-Arbiters and DOLE. 4 3
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com
Further, we discern from the synchronized movements of petitioner and the two
other companies an attempt to frustrate or defeat the workers' right to collectively
bargain through the shield of the corporations' separate juridical personalities. We
make this nding on the basis of the motions to dismiss led by the three companies.
While similarly alleging the absence of an employer-employee relationship, they
alternately referred to one another as the employer of the members of the bargaining
units sought to be represented respectively by the unions. This fact was affirmed by the
Med-Arbiters' Orders nding that indeed, the supposed employees of each
establishment were found to be alternately the employees of either of the two other
companies as well. This was precisely the reason why DOLE consolidated the appeals
filed by Unions A, B, and C. 4 4
Due to the nger-pointing by the three companies at one another, the petitions
were dismissed. As a result, the three unions were not able to proceed with the conduct
of the certi cation election. This also caused confusion among the employees as to
who their real employer is, as Union A claims in its Comment. 4 5
We hold that if we allow petitioner and the two other companies to continue
obstructing the holding of the election in this manner, their employees and their
respective unions will never have a chance to choose their bargaining representative.
We take note that all three establishments were unorganized. That is, no union therein
was ever duly recognized or certified as a bargaining representative. 4 6
Therefore, it is only proper that, in order to safeguard the right of the workers and
Unions A, B, and C to engage in collective bargaining, the corporate veil of Express
Lamination and Express Coat must be pierced. The separate existence of Super
Lamination, Express Lamination, and Express Coat must be disregarded. In effect, we
affirm the lower tribunals in ruling that these companies must be treated as one and the
same unit for purposes of holding a certification election.
Petitioner has cited Diatagon Labor Federation Local v. Ople 4 7 and Indophil
Textile Mill Worker Union v. Calica 4 8 in which this Court refused to treat separate
corporations as a single bargaining unit. Those cases, however, are not substantially
identical with this case and would not warrant their application herein. Unlike in the
instant case, the corporations involved were found to be completely independent or
were not involved in any act that frustrated the laborers' rights.AIDSTE
Footnotes
* On official leave.
1. Rollo, pp. 28-38; dated 24 May 2010; penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang,
with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Manuel M. Barrios concurring;
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 109486.
8. Id. at 64.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 65-66, 140.
29. See Vicmar Development Corp. v. Elarcosa (G.R. No. 202215, 9 December 2015); Azcor
Manufacturing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission (362 Phil. 370 [1999]);
Tomas Lao Construction v. National Labor Relations Commission (344 Phil. 268
[1997]).
3 0 . Azcor Manufacturing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission , id.; Tomas Lao
Construction v. National Labor Relations Commission, id.
31. Vicmar Development Corp. v. Elarcosa, supra note 29.
32. Tomas Lao Construction v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 29 at 287.
33. Rollo, pp. 127-129.
48. Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO v. Calica, supra note 24.
49. Diatagon Labor Federation Local 110 of the ULGWP v. Ople, supra note 23.
50. Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO v. Calica, supra note 24.
5 1 . Book V, Rule XVI, Section 1. Policy. — It is the policy of the State to promote and
emphasize the primacy of free and responsible exercise of the right to self-
organization and collective bargaining, either through single enterprise level
negotiations or through the creation of a mechanism by which different employers
and recognized or certified labor union in their establishments bargain collectively.
52. Rollo, p. 68.
58. General Rubber and Footwear Corp. v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 239 Phil. 276 (1987).
59. Azucena, supra note 25, p. 440.
6 0 . Government Service Insurance System v. GSIS Supervisor's Union , 160-A Phil. 1066
(1975).
61. Dated 24 May 2010.
62. Dated 21 September 2010.