Catalista v.

NLRC, 247 SCRA 46

Facts:

This is a request for certiorari under Rule 65 to overturn the National Labor Relations
Commission's decision dated April 29, 1994, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter's ruling
holding individual petitioners, along with Reah's Corporation, jointly and severally liable
for the underpayment of wages, holiday pay, 13th-month pay, and separation pay to the
private respondents in NLRC Case No. 005024-93.

The complainants worked in a health and sauna parlor and alleged various labor
violations, including underpayment, lack of overtime pay, and illegal closure of the
establishment. The respondents, Reah's Corporation, argued that they acquired the
business from the previous owner and cited business losses as the reason for closure.

The Labor Arbiter initially dismissed unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal claims but
upheld separation pay and other monetary claims. The NLRC affirmed the decision,
noting the lack of evidence supporting the closure due to serious business losses.

Petitioners contested the NLRC decision, claiming exemption from termination pay due
to business losses and asserting that individual petitioners should not be held liable
without evidence of criminal negligence.

The NLRC upheld the decision, citing non-compliance with termination notice
requirements and the absence of proof for serious business losses. They referred to a
Supreme Court case emphasizing the need for employers to sufficiently prove business
reverses as a just cause for termination.

The petitioners sought to overturn a decision holding them liable for labor violations, but
the NLRC and Supreme Court rulings emphasized the necessity of providing evidence
for business reverses as a just cause for termination, leading to the affirmation of
separation pay claims.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners-officers can be held jointly and severally liable with the
corporation in the payment of separation pay to private respondents under article 283 of
the Labor Code

Ruling:

The petitioners argue that since the labor arbiter dismissed charges of illegal dismissal
and unfair labor practices, they should not be jointly liable with the corporation for
separation pay and labor standard benefits to private respondents. They claim that as
top corporate officers, they are separate entities from the corporation and cannot be
held liable without violating the Corporation Code.
However, the petitioners misinterpret Article 283 of the Labor Code, specifically the last
sentence. This provision mandates separation pay in cases of closure or cessation not
due to serious business losses. The law does not aim to interfere with management
decisions but requires employers to prove valid reasons for termination.

The law obligates employers to provide separation pay unless there is sufficient
evidence of serious business losses or financial reverses leading to the closure. Without
such proof, the employer must fulfill the statutory obligation to pay separation pay to
affected employees.

The general rule is that employees are entitled to separation pay in cases of business
closure. The exception is when serious business losses are proven, which was not
adequately demonstrated in this case.

University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan, 127 SCRA

691

Facts:

The petitioner union filed several complaints against the University of Pangasinan for
nonpayment of benefits, extra loads, salary differentials, and other labor standards
violations. The Labor Arbiter dismissed some of the complaints, and the Executive
Labor Arbiter upheld the decision, requiring the integration of the cost of living
allowance (ecola) into the basic pay and reminding the university to pay its employees
at intervals not exceeding sixteen days. The petitioner appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).

Issues:

1. Whether the NLRC should have resolved the unresolved complaints filed by the
petitioner.

2. Whether the petitioner has the legal personality to institute and prosecute money
claims.

3. Whether the NLRC erred in disallowing the emergency cost of living allowance to the
petitioner's members.

Ruling:

The court dismissed the petition for mandamus, stating that the circumstances did not
warrant the issuance of the writ. The petitioner failed to substantiate negligence on the
part of the respondents in handling the complaints.
The court affirmed the petitioner's legal personality as a registered union to file
complaints on behalf of its members, rejecting the university's argument to the contrary.

The NLRC did not abuse its discretion, except for disallowing the emergency cost of
living allowance, which the court modified to require the university to pay it for a specific
period.

The petition for mandamus was dismissed, and the decision of the NLRC was affirmed
with a modification on the payment of emergency cost of living allowance. The
university was required to pay its regular and full-time teachers and employees the
allowance for a specified period. Costs were imposed against the university.

Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan v. Marcelo Enterprises, 118 SCRA 422

Facts:

On May 23, 1967, the Lakas had existing Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs)
within the bargaining units of the Marcelo Companies. These CBAs were established
while they were affiliated with the national federation, Phil Social Security Labor Union
(PSSLU). Two CBAs were set to expire in May and June 1967, while another faced
conflict due to a rival union.

On March 14, 1967, Marcelo Steel's management received a letter from PSSLU,
representing UNWU, requesting negotiation for a new CBA. Proposals from unions in
Marcelo Tire and Marcelo Rubber were also received as their existing CBAs were
nearing expiration. On the same day, the union in Marcelo Tire disavowed PSSLU as its
agent, and the rival union submitted its own proposals. Additional requests were
received on May 3, 1967, and May 23, 1967, from two different unions.

The management, confused about which union truly represented the workers,
requested proof of authorization from the unions. They were informed of conflicting
claims and suggested filing for a certification election, with the court's decision being
respected. PSSLU rejected this suggestion and threatened to file an Unfair Labor
Practice (ULP) case. Subsequently, all unions filed Notices of Strike.

MUEWA was certified as the bargaining agent, representing the majority of workers in
Marcelo Tire, without opposition from other unions or interested parties. Notices of
Strike were withdrawn, and the management agreed to resume bargaining. However,
during the fourth conference, Lakas declared a strike against Marcelo Companies,
involving acts of violence and vandalism during picketing, blocking premises, and
damaging plant windows.
Legal actions were taken against the strikers, and a Return to Work order was agreed
upon. Marcelo Companies resumed operations, and the strikers returned to work.
Bargaining negotiations between Marcelo Companies and Lakas were resumed.

On October 13, 1967, negotiations reached their final stage, but Lakas declared another
strike without filing a notice of strike, causing a complete business paralysis. Notices to
return to work were posted, some strikers returned, and the management required them
to fill out forms for scheduling. However, the workers refused and insisted on admission
without complying with this requirement.

Lakas then filed a ULP case based on the alleged non-readmission of striking members.
The trial court ruled that Marcelo Companies fulfilled their obligation to bargain, and the
strikes conducted were illegal. However, it was determined that there was ULP in not
readmitting all the strikers.

Issue:

Whether or not Marcelo Companies are guilty of ULP

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Marcelo Companies. Lakas was not the recognized
bargaining representative, yet the management neither ignored nor outright refused the
demand for collective bargaining.

Marcelo Companies had the right to seek reasonable proof of majority representation
from the supposed or putative bargaining agent, as it aligns with the employer's duty to
negotiate with the agent representing the majority of workers. This demand, however,
should be made in good faith and not as a pretext for delay or evasion.

Importantly, Marcelo Companies did not engage in Unfair Labor Practices (ULP). The
case's facts demonstrate that the strikers were readmitted to work, and the requested
form aimed at proper scheduling, not hindering workers from returning. Only those who
failed to report back to work were not readmitted.

Development Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, 205 SCRA 802

Facts:

The crux of this case revolves around the prerequisites for a local or chapter of a
federation to initiate a petition for certification election and secure certification as the
exclusive bargaining agent for the petitioner's employees.
On June 19, 1990, respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) - TUCP
(referred to as Kilusan) lodged a petition for certification election with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE). The petition sought to represent the rank-and-file
employees of the petitioner, asserting that Kilusan, a legitimate labor federation, had
chartered its local chapter, Progressive Development Employees Union, under charter
certificate No. 90-6-1-153. Kilusan contended that there was no existing collective
bargaining agreement and no other legitimate labor organization in the bargaining unit.

Petitioner PDC submitted a motion to dismiss on July 11, 1990, arguing that the local
union failed to comply with Rule II, Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the
Labor Code. This rule mandates the submission of the constitution and by-laws, names
and addresses of officers and/or members, and books of accounts.

Respondent Kilusan countered on July 16, 1990, asserting in its rejoinder that it had
submitted the requisite documentary requirements for registration, including the
constitution and by-laws of the local union and the list of officers/members with their
addresses.

In its "Supplemental Position Paper" dated September 3, 1990, the petitioner contended
that upon verification with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), it discovered that the
alleged minutes of the organizational meeting lacked authentication, the list of members
lacked corresponding signatures, and the constitution and by-laws lacked signatures
and proper subscription. The petitioner argued that the respondent failed to substantially
comply with the registration requirements stipulated by the rules.

In a resolution dated September 5, 1990, Med-Arbiter dela Cruz ruled that there was
substantial compliance with the requirements for forming a chapter. He asserted that
the mere issuance of the charter certificate by the federation sufficed as compliance
with the rules. Considering the unorganized nature of the establishment, he maintained
that a certification election should be conducted to determine the question of
representation.

Treating the motion for reconsideration filed by PDC as an appeal to the Office of the
Secretary, Undersecretary Laguesma deemed it a mere "reiteration of the issues
already discussed in the proceedings before the Med-Arbiter, specifically, the matter
involving the formal organization of the chapter."

Issue:

When does a branch, local or affiliate of a federation become a legitimate labor

organization?

Ruling:

The Court has consistently emphasized that the conduct of a certification election is
rooted in a statutory policy that must not be evaded.
Workers should have the freedom to express their choice in a process where their
sound judgment prevails and the risk of fraud and misrepresentation is eradicated.

Typically, a labor organization attains legitimacy only upon registration with the BLR.
Under Article 234 (Requirements of Registration):

"Any applicant labor organization, association, or group of unions or workers shall

acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law
to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based
on... the following requirements:

In the present case, the constitution and by-laws and the list of officers submitted to the
BLR, although attested to by the chapter's president, lacked certification under oath by
the secretary.

The certification and attestation requirements serve as preventive measures against

fraud and provide a level of protection to unsuspecting employees who might be enticed
into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions with the sole purpose of manipulating...
union funds or exploiting the union for dubious ends.

Without compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not
achieve the status of a legitimate labor organization.

In this case, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the required
documents under oath is fatal to its attainment of legitimate status.

It is evident from the facts of this case that the formation of a local or chapter becomes
a convenient tool for bypassing union registration requirements. In the absence of
safeguards, it becomes a convenient device for a small group of employees to... impose
a less-desirable federation or union on unsuspecting co-workers and circumvent the
need for wholehearted voluntariness, a fundamental aspect of free unionism.

The Court's conclusion should not be misunderstood as hindering the local union's right
to be certified as the employees' bargaining agent in the petitioner's establishment. We
are simply stating that the local union must first adhere to the statutory requirements
to... exercise this right. Larger federations and national unions of workers should lead in
urging their locals and chapters to diligently comply with the law and rules, instead of
hastily absorbing one union after another in a fierce competition with rival federations...
to garner the highest number of members.

Dong Seung, Inc. v. BLR, 551 SCRA 211

Facts:
Petitioner filed with DOLE a petition for cancellation of the union registration of
respondent union on the grounds that:

a.) The List of Officers and Constitution and By-laws which the respondent union
attached to its application forunion registration contain the union secretary's certification
but the same is not under oath, contrary toSection 1, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules
of Book V of the Labor Code,; and2.

b.) As shown in a Sinumpaang Petisyon, 148 out of approximately 200 employees-

members have sincedenounced respondent union for employing deceit in obtaining
signatures to support its registrationapplication.

DOLE Regional Director issued an order delisting the said union from the roster of
legitimate labor organizations.Respondent union appealed to the BLR. Both the BLR
and later on, the CA ruled in favor of the union and declared itsregistration valid.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent’s union registration is valid

Ruling:

Yes.

The first part mentions that some applicants, not fully familiar with the forms, submit
applications without using the prescribed forms. To address this, the Regional Offices
are advised that applications with separately notarized supporting documents need not
comply with the notarization requirement in the official forms.

The second part explains that the respondent union's certification may be notarized
separately or with the main application. The BLR finds that the union correctly notarized
its application, complying with the necessary requirements for creating a local/chapter.

The third part clarifies that Article 235 only requires the secretary's certification to be
under oath, and the BLR's interpretation allows for wholesale notarization of the
application, recognizing its effects on attachments. The BLR's interpretation is given
weight as it has the authority and expertise to implement the law.

The fourth part addresses petitioner's reliance on a previous court case, emphasizing
that it is not applicable to the present case, which involves a petition for cancellation of
union registration. It highlights the differences in the nature of the cases and asserts
that the BLR found the respondent union's documents to be duly notarized.
The fifth part discusses the second ground for canceling the union registration, citing
alleged misrepresentation in securing members' signatures. The Sinumpaang Petisyon
is questioned for being a mere photocopy, and the BLR expresses skepticism about its
authenticity. The court adopts the observations of the CA and BLR, emphasizing the
lack of specific details regarding when and how the alleged fraud occurred.

Indeed, all that Article 235 requires is that the secretary's certification be under oath. It
does not prescribe a specific manner of its notarization. Based on its interpretation of
Article 235, the BLR, in its October 14, 1998 Advisory, allows for the wholesale
notarization of a union's application for registration and recognizes the effects thereof
even on the attachments, including the secretary's certification. This is a reasonable
interpretation considering that the form of notarization contemplated in said Advisory
adequately serves the purpose of Article 235, which is to forestall fraud and
misrepresentation. More importantly, such interpretation of the BLR is accorded great
weight by the Court for it is said agency which is vested with authority and endowed
with expertise to implement the law in question.

The Court adopts the foregoing observations of the CA and BLR.

Another factor which militates against the veracity of the allegations in the Sinumpaang
Petisyon is the lack of particularities on how, when and where respondent union
perpetrated the alleged fraud on each member. Such details are crucial for in the
proceedings for cancellation of union registration on the ground of fraud or
misrepresentation, what needs to be established is that the specific act or omission of
the union deprived the complaining employees-members of their right to choose.

San Miguel Foods, Inc. Cebub-Meg Plant v.Laguesma, 263 SCRA 68

On September 24, 1993, the Labor Federation Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM)
initiated a petition for a certification election among the monthly-paid employees of San
Miguel Foods, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feeds Plant (SMFI). The petition, filed before Med-
Arbiter Achilles Manit, claimed that approximately 75 employees in SMFI supported the
petition. It highlighted that there had been no prior certification election in SMFI to
determine its sole bargaining agent, and IBM asserted compliance with the necessary
requirements for establishing its local or affiliate in SMFI’s establishment.

Responding to the petition, on October 25, 1993, SMFI filed a Motion to Dismiss, citing
a similar pending petition between the same parties, involving the same cause of action,
before Med-Arbiter Achilles V. Manit. The earlier petition, dated April 28, 1993, sought
an order allowing the conduct of a certification election.

On December 2, 1993, IBM submitted an opposition to SMFI’s Motion to Dismiss,

explaining that the first petition was denied primarily due to IBM’s failure to meet certain
mandatory requirements of the law. IBM asserted that a new petition for a certification
election could be refiled once these requirements were fulfilled.
The Med-Arbiter granted the second petition for certification, a decision upheld by the
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). SMFI's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the DOLE. Subsequently, SMFI brought the case to the
Supreme Court via Rule 65.

The petitioners argue that the legitimacy and proper issuance of IBM's local Charter
Certificate at SMFI remain uncertain, as the authorized representative of the IBM
Federation, who can validly issue such a certificate, is still unknown. According to Article
234 of the Labor Code, a group of workers or a local union gains legal recognition only
upon receiving a Certificate of Registration from the Bureau of Labor Relations. IBM at
SMFI lacks this essential certification. Despite being a local or chapter of the IBM
Federation, SMFI is not a recognized labor organization due to the absence of the
Certificate of Registration issued by the Bureau of Labor Relations, a requirement
outlined in Article 234 of the Labor Code for the legal status of any labor organization.

On the other hand, respondets countered that The mere presence of two contending
factions in the IBM does not prevent the issuance of valid and authentic charter
certificates in favor of IBM at SMFI.

Issue:
Is IBM a legitimate labor organization? –YES.

Ruling:
Article 234 of the Labor Code outlines the requirements for the registration of labor
organizations, including the submission of necessary documents, a registration fee, and
compliance with specific conditions for unions affiliated with a federation.

In addition, Article 242 enumerates the rights of legitimate labor organizations, such as acting as
representatives for collective bargaining, certification as exclusive bargaining representatives,
access to financial statements, ownership of property, legal standing, and the pursuit of
activities for the benefit of the organization and its members.

The case involves Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) filing a petition for certification election
for its local affiliate IBM at SMFI-CEBU B-MEG. Despite internal disputes, the local affiliate had
obtained the status of a legitimate labor organization by submitting required documents to the
Bureau of Labor Relations, even though leadership issues within the federation are not relevant
to the legality of the local union's charter certificate.

Chrysler Philippines v. Estrella, 86 SCRA 338

Facts:

This Petition for Review concerns the reversal of the Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-
G.R. No. 65328-R, which overturned the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XX, in Civil Case No. 16624. The case involved petitioner Chrysler
Philippines Corporation's Damages suit against Sambok Motors Company (Bacolod) for
a breach of contract.

Chrysler Philippines Corporation, a domestic corporation involved in assembling and

selling motor vehicles, had Sambok Motors Co. as its dealer for automotive products.
The complaint alleged that Sambok, Bacolod, ordered automotive products worth
P30,909.61, but upon delivery, refused to pay, claiming non-receipt of the merchandise.
Despite the Trial Court finding Sambok, Bacolod, liable for damages, the Appellate
Court reversed this decision on November 26, 1980, stating that Chrysler had not
fulfilled its obligation by misdelivering the goods to Sambok, Iloilo, instead of the
designated place.

The Trial Court had initially dismissed the case against Allied Brokerage and Negros
Navigation but found Sambok, Bacolod, liable for the claim. However, the Appellate
Court disagreed, citing misdelivery as the reason for the reversal.

Issue:

The Respondent Court of Appeals erred in finding that the issue of misshipment or
misdelivery of the automotive spare parts involved in the litigation was raised by the
private respondent Sambok Motors Co. (Bacolod) in the Trial Court.

Ruling:

The issue of misdelivery does not absolve Sambok, Bacolod, of liability. Although the
Parts Order Form indicated Iloilo as the destination, Sambok, Bacolod, and Sambok,
Iloilo, are considered one entity. Despite this, Sambok, Bacolod, failed to pursue
delivery upon receiving the Bill of Lading, being informed by Negros Navigation about
missing parts. It was only four years later that the missing parts were found in
deteriorated condition. Under these circumstances, Sambok, Bacolod, cannot be
blamed for not accepting the shipment, and Negros Navigation's negligence in failing to
deliver the complete shipment is evident. The petitioner failed to comply with the
conditions precedent for a judicial action, and, consequently, it must bear the resulting
loss. The decision of the Appellate Court, based on non-delivery rather than
misdelivery, is affirmed. No costs are awarded.

Villar v. Inciong, 121 SCRA 444

The Amigo Employees Union (AEU), affiliated with the Federation of Unions of Rizal
(FUR), sought a certification election, but it was denied due to opposition from AEU-
PAFLU. AEU-PAFLU, in response, held a special meeting to investigate certain
members, including the petitioners, for alleged acts of continuously maligning, libelling,
and slandering union officers, spreading false propaganda, and causing divisiveness. A
Trial Committee was formed to look into these charges. A new Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) was established between AEU-PAFLU and the company, including a
union security clause.

The petitioners were summoned to appear before the PAFLU Trial Committee, but they
refused, asserting their right to freedom of association. They also contested PAFLU's
jurisdiction over their case and declined to participate in the investigation. Instead, they
filed an Answer to the charges and requested dismissal. The PAFLU trial committee
found them guilty, recommending termination per the security clause. The petitioners
were placed under preventive suspension and denied workplace access.

Issue:

Whether or not the Minister committed grave abuse of discretion by upholding the
decision that led to the preventive suspension and subsequent dismissal of the
petitioners for exercising their freedom of association.

Ruling:

While disaffiliation from a labor union is generally permitted, a closed shop, as a valid
form of union security, does not infringe upon the constitutional right to freedom of
association. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Company and
AEU-PAFLU, which includes a union security clause, clearly obliges the employer to
dismiss employees, including the petitioners, for non-union membership.

Upon expulsion from AEU-PAFLU's general membership, the petitioners became non-
union members. PAFLU, having the authority to investigate and expel members under
its constitution, acted within its rights. The central issue revolves around whether
PAFLU had the authority to investigate and expel dissenters from the Amigo Employees
Union-PAFLU.

When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization, it is bound by the laws and
regulations of the parent organization. The constitution, by-laws, and rules of the parent
body, along with the charter it issues, constitute an enforceable contract. The term 'due
process' implies that parties were given a fair chance to be heard, and evidence shows
that the oppositors were offered this opportunity.

Inherent in any organization is the right of self-preservation. When members sow

discord and aim to destroy the union, they forfeit their rights. The ruling is that, although
entitled to disaffiliate, the petitioners must accept the consequences of separation under
the CBA's security clause.

Filipino Pipe v. NLRC, 318 SCRA 68

Facts:
On February 10, 1986, the National Labor Union-Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (NLU-TUCP), acting on behalf of its local chapter, the Filipino Pipe Workers
Union-National Labor Union (FPWU-NLU or Union), filed a notice of strike against the
Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation. The grounds cited were union busting and non-
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The initial conciliation conference was originally scheduled for February 24, 1986, but
due to a lack of notice to the petitioner company and failure to furnish a copy of the
notice of strike to FPWU-NLU, it was rescheduled to March 3, 1986.

On the early morning of March 3, 1986, before the scheduled conciliation conference,
FPWU-NLU initiated the strike, which continued until June 13, 1986, when a return-to-
work agreement was reached.

On April 8, 1986, the petitioner company filed a petition with the Arbitration Branch to
declare the strike illegal, seeking damages against FPWU-NLU, NLU-TUCP, and its
national president, Atty. Eulogio Lerum.

On December 23, 1988, the petitioner company requested the partial dismissal of the
complaint against 43 officers and members of FPWU-NLU while maintaining the action
against NLU-TUCP and Atty. Eulogio Lerum.

The Labor Arbiter issued a decision in favor of the petitioner company, absolving Atty.
Eulogio Lerum from liability.

The petitioner company moved for partial dismissal, maintaining the action against NLU-
TUCP and Atty. Eulogio Lerum.

The Labor Arbiter's decision favored the petitioner company, absolving Atty. Eulogio
Lerum due to a lack of evidence of personal capacity involvement.

Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which
rendered a decision on September 29, 1993.

Dissatisfied with the NLRC decision, the petitioner company filed the present petition
before this Court.

Issue:

Wether or not the issue at hand revolves around whether gravely abused its discretion,
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction, in concluding that private respondents
National Labor Union (NLU)-TUCP; and whether or not Atty. Eulogio Lerum bear no
primary responsibility and, consequently, hold no liability for the damages incurred by
the petitioner due to their direct aid, assistance, abetment, and participation in the illegal
strike.
Ruling:

The Court has determined that the strike conducted by FPWU-NLU lacked legal basis,
as the alleged union busting and non-implementation of the collective bargaining
agreement were not substantiated. The demands of FPWU-NLU were subject to a
pending application for a writ of execution, rendering the strike premature.

As for the damages suffered by the petitioner company due to the illegal strike, the
petitioner argued that NLU-TUCP and Atty. Eulogio Lerum were liable for actively
participating in the strike. The argument is based on the claim that FPWU-NLU, being a
local union directly affiliated with NLU-TUCP, cannot act independently and should not
be recognized as a legitimate labor organization.

The Court clarified that the relationship between a mother union/federation and a local
union involves the mother union serving as an agent, while the local union remains the
basic unit. This holds true even if the local union is not a legitimate labor organization. In
this case, whether or not FPWU-NLU complied with procedural requirements is
irrelevant to its status as the principal entity responsible for the illegal strike.

Therefore, the Petition is dismissed, and the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission is affirmed. No costs are awarded.

THEU v. Tropical Hut Food Market, 181 SCRA 173

Facts:

The rank and file workers of Tropical Hut Food Market Incorporated formed the Tropical
Hut Employees Union (THEU) and sought affiliation with the National Association of
Trade Unions (NATU). The CBA between the company and THEU-NATU included a
union security clause requiring employees to maintain union membership for continued
employment. A disaffiliation letter from THEU to NATU led to employee dismissals
based on an alleged violation of the union security clause.

Issue:

Whether disaffiliation constitutes a violation of the union security clause justifying

employee dismissal.

Ruling:

No, the dismissals are not justified by the union security clause in the CBA. The clause
specifies dismissal only for employees expelled for joining another federation, forming
another union, or failing to maintain membership. The case involves the entire THEU
withdrawing from its federation, not individual employees violating the union security
provision. The inclusion of NATU after THEU's name in registration merely emphasizes
their affiliation at that time, and it doesn't imply dependency or limitations on pursuing
independent interests.

The local union has the right to disaffiliate from its parent federation, especially when
the federation's constitution lacks enforceable provisions against disaffiliation. NATU,
not recognized as a national federation, lacks legal standing. The alleged non-
compliance with NATU's withdrawal procedure is technical and cannot override the
fundamental right to self-organization. Additionally, NATU's lack of registration at that
time further diminishes its authority to enforce rules or rights under the Labor Code.
Therefore, the disaffiliation of THEU from NATU is valid and not nullified by
technicalities.

Volkschel Labor Union v. BLR, 137 SCRA 42

Facts:

Petitioner was once affiliated with the Associated Labor Union for Metal Workers
(ALUMETAL). Both unions, using the name Volkschel Labor Union-Associated Labor
Union for Metal Workers, jointly entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
respondent companies, specifying the check-off provision for union dues.

"Section 3. CHECK-OFF. The COMPANY agrees to make payroll deductions not

oftener than twice a month of UNION membership dues and such special assessments,
fees, or fines duly authorized by the UNION. These deductions shall be promptly
transmitted within five (5) days by the COMPANY to the UNION Treasurer, with
separate checks for the local union and the ALU Regional Office regarding the
remittance of the UNION dues deduction."

On March 10, 1976, a majority of petitioner's members decided to disaffiliate from the
respondent federation to operate independently, following Article 241 of the Labor
Code. Faced with the dilemma of continuing to deduct and remit union dues to
ALUMETAL, respondent companies sought legal advice from the Bureau.

The Bureau deemed the disaffiliation legal but advised that petitioner's members should
continue paying dues to ALUMETAL, considering it as agency fees.

Issues:
I
Is petitioner union's disaffiliation from respondent federation valid?
II
Do respondent companies have the right to effect union dues collections despite
revocation by the employees of the check-off authorization? and
III
Is respondent federation entitled to union dues payments from petitioner union's
members notwithstanding their disaffiliation from said federation?

Ruling:

The court affirmed the first issue.

The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother union is well-established.
Previous cases have consistently upheld the freedom of a local union, as a separate
and voluntary association, to disaffiliate when deemed necessary. This right aligns with
the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of association (Article IV, Section 7, Philippine
Constitution).

In applying and interpreting the Labor Code and its regulations, the primary
consideration should be the welfare of the workers. In this case, restricting petitioner's
right to self-organization due to the existence of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) would contradict the spirit of labor law. The Med-Arbiter's view that "A
disaffiliation does not disturb the enforceability and administration of a collective
agreement" is well-founded.

ALUMETAL is entitled to receive dues from respondent companies only as long as the
petitioner union is affiliated with it, and the companies are authorized by their
employees (members of the petitioner union) to deduct union dues. Without this
affiliation, the employer has no obligation to the mother union. The employees' check-off
authorization, even if deemed irrevocable, is valid only as long as they remain members
of the union.

KMP v. Trajano, 134 SCRA 236

Facts:

On June 30, 1981, private respondent Silvestre and 13 other employees, members of
the KMP Labor Union at Franklin Baker Company in San Pablo City, filed a written
request for an accounts examination of the union's financial status. Union Account
Examiner Vicedo conducted an investigation based on the request, leading to
revelations prompting private respondents to petition for the expulsion of union officers.

The allegations included gross violations of the Labor Code and the union's constitution
and by-laws. The union officers, in response, denied imputation, arguing that the
disallowed expenditures were made in good faith for the benefit of members. They
expressed willingness to reimburse from personal funds and contended non-
accountability for the missing records.

Med-Arbiter Cabibihan ordered a referendum supervised by BLR. Petitioners appealed

to respondent Trajano, challenging the order. They argued that the disallowed
expenditures were made in good faith and suggested postponing the resolution until the
general election on Oct. 4, 1982.

Respondents claimed that the Med-Arbiter erred and insisted on the expulsion of union
officers. Trajano dismissed both appeals and upheld the Med-Arbiter's order.

Issue:

Whether the union officers were guilty of the alleged acts, justifying expulsion.

Held:

No. If the union officers were indeed guilty, expulsion, not a referendum, should have
been the appropriate penalty. The alleged falsification and misrepresentation lacked
substantial evidence. The disbursement, although disallowed, appeared to be made in
good faith for reasonable purposes, and the members' acceptance or concurrence
indicated a level of reasonableness.

The holding of the referendum became moot, considering the members' demonstrated
faith in the officers' leadership and their condonation of alleged acts. The court
emphasized not removing public officers for acts predating their current term, respecting
the people's right to elect their officials. Petitioners won.

Duyag v. Incion, 98 SCRA 522

Facts:

On January 14, 1977, the five petitioners, arrastre checkers of E. Razon, Inc. in the
South Harbor, Port Area, Manila, and members of the Associated Port Checkers and
Workers Union, filed a complaint against the four private respondents, union officials,
with the Department of Labor. The charges included unauthorized increases in union
dues, withholding of union members' profit shares, disbursements exceeding P500
without board approval, and maladministration of the welfare fund.

E. Razon, Inc. paid P25,684.61 as profit share to the union on December 18, 1973.
However, only P19,974 was distributed to the members, and the remaining P5,710.61
was unaccounted for. The med-arbiter's decision on August 29, 1977, ordered the
removal of private respondents as union officers and directed them to reimburse the
amounts illegally collected.
Private respondents appealed to the Director of Labor Relations, who affirmed the
decision, stating that intra-union remedies were not necessary. The Director ruled that
the complainants had the right to institute proceedings, question illegal disbursements,
and recover the amounts collected or withheld.

The Director further asserted jurisdiction to examine the union's books and records,
directing the Labor Organization Division to submit a report after examining the financial
records.

Issue:

Whether the Director of Labor Relations has the authority to order an examination of the
union's books and records.

Held:

Yes. Labor officials must strictly enforce laws governing trade unions to protect
members and ensure honest administration. Vigilance and monitoring are necessary to
prevent corruption and oppression by abusive union officials. The Bureau of Labor
Relations and the Ministry of Labor should exercise close supervision over union
activities, particularly fund handling, to prevent abuses.

The Director correctly ordered an examination of the union's books and records,
including verifying charges of usurious petty loans and unwarranted fees for check
issuance related to cash loans. This action is essential to prevent abuses and maintain
the integrity of union affairs.

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR v. Hernandez, 20 SCRA 109

Facts:

On December 12, 1960, Rafael S. Hernandez and around four hundred members of the
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company filed a complaint against
the union and its officers for violating various sections of Republic Act No. 875. The
charges included unauthorized assessments, misuse of funds, inappropriate salary
increases, and refusal to allow inspection of union books.

Before the court's decision, respondents submitted a certification stating that members
had passed resolutions in a convention held on March 23-25, 1961.

On July 27, 1961, the trial court rendered a judgment, dismissing most charges but
finding respondents guilty of unfair labor practices. The court ordered them to cease
such practices, allowed inspection of the union's books, and dismissed one specific
charge.
The complainants sought reconsideration, leading to a resolution on April 26, 1962. The
court directed respondents to cease unfair labor practices, stop monthly collections,
account for expenses, reimburse unauthorized expenditures, and post the resolution in
two prominent locations at the Manila Railroad Company premises within 30 days.

Issue:

Whether or not the CIR may interfere with the internal labor organization procedure of
the union where the evidence shows that redress to the highest union governing body
has not been availed of

Ruling:

The Industrial Peace Act, specifically Section 17 of Republic Act 875, allows judicial
intervention in the internal affairs of labor unions under certain conditions. These
conditions include a minimum of 10% of union members reporting a violation and
exhaustion of internal union procedures.

For court intervention, it's required that at least 10% of union members agree to report
the violation, and the union's internal procedures must be exhausted. The petitioner
argues that the 10% requirement wasn't met, but the lower court found otherwise, and
this finding is accepted.

While the law suggests seeking redress within the union first, exceptions exist. In this
case, the complaint was against the union and its officers, some of whom were on the
board of directors. The union's constitution requires filing charges with the board, but
doing so would mean the board acts as respondent, investigator, and judge
simultaneously. In such circumstances where internal remedies would result in a denial
of justice, especially involving property rights, the court's aid can be invoked without
insisting on exhausting internal remedies.

Globe Machine and Stamping Co., 3 NLRB 294

Democratic Labor Union v. Cebu Stevedoring Co., G.R No. L-10321, February 20,
1958

Facts:

A petition for certification election was filed to determine the collective bargaining unit
for employees of Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc. Three labor unions intervened: Democratic
Labor Association, Cebu Trade Union, and Katubsanan sa Mamumuo. Disagreement
led to hearings on the proper bargaining unit and union memberships.
The court found the Cebu Stevedores Association ineligible as it wasn't registered.
Katubsanan Sa Mamumuo waived its claim, favoring the Cebu Stevedores Association.
A certification election was ordered for casual laborers, with only Democratic Labor
Association and Cebu Trade Union eligible.

Cebu Stevedoring, Cebu Stevedores Association, and Katubsanan sa Mamumuo

sought reconsideration. The trial court's decision to have two bargaining units based on
employment terms was challenged.

Cebu Stevedoring operates in stevedoring and lighterage, employing regular and casual
workers. The trial court, following American precedents, suggested two bargaining units:
one for regular employees and one for casual stevedores.

The trial court proposed certifying the Democratic Labor Association for regular
employees. The Cebu Stevedores Association had more casual members but was
ineligible due to non-registration.

The court en banc found uncertainty about the Democratic Labor Union's composition
and decided in favor of holding a certification election.

Issue:

Should there be one collective bargaining unit for each set of employees (regular and
permanent, and casual or temporary) at the respondent company, as the trial court
suggested, or just one collective bargaining unit for all workers, regardless of their
employment terms, as proposed by the court en banc?

Ruling:

The Court affirmed the trial court's decision that forming two separate bargaining units
for the respondent company is appropriate—one for regular and permanent employees
and another for casual laborers or stevedores. This conclusion aligns with established
precedents on the matter.

As a result, we modify the decision of the industrial court en banc dated November 7,
1955, with the following adjustments: (1) The Democratic Labor Association is
recognized as the collective bargaining agent for regular and permanent employees of
the respondent company, and (2) a certification election should be conducted for casual
or temporary employees, with the participation of the Cebu Stevedores Association,
Democratic Labor Association, Katubsanan Sa Mamumuo, and Cebu Trade Union. No
pronouncement is made regarding costs.

This issue is unprecedented in our jurisdiction, and while there are no local precedents,
we turn to American precedents as our current Magna Carta draws inspiration from
American labor laws. According to these precedents, several factors come into play in
determining the appropriate constituency of a bargaining unit. No single factor is
decisive, and the weight given to each factor depends on the specific circumstances of
the case. Relevant factors include: (1) the will of employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity
and unity of employees' interests, such as similarity in work, duties, compensation, and
working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) employment status,
including temporary, seasonal, and probationary employees (Rothenberg on Labor
Relations, pp. 488-510). A brief discussion of the nature of each of these factors is
necessary.

Alhambra Cigar v. Kapisanan 107 Phil 23;

Facts:

On April 3, 1962, the court found Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Factory Co., the
predecessor of petitioner Alhambra Industries, Inc., guilty of unfair labor practice. The
court ordered the reinstatement of certain employees, a decision affirmed by the court
en banc on May 26, 1962. Despite this, there has been no reinstatement until now.

On July 6, 1962, the respondent Union, Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Alhambra

(PAFLU), filed a motion for execution of the April 3, 1962 order. The petitioner's
predecessor opposed it, claiming it ceased business due to the expiration of its
corporate life on January 12, 1962. On May 30, 1963, the court held the predecessor no
longer liable but held petitioner Alhambra Industries, Inc., as the successor, responsible
for reinstatement and back wages. Petitioner unsuccessfully sought review in a petition
dismissed by the court on September 10, 1963.

The respondent Union filed a motion for reinstatement and computation of back wages
on October 4, 1963, emphasizing the finality of the May 30, 1963 order. Five days later,
petitioner Alhambra Industries, Inc., opposed the motion and requested a hearing to
present evidence against reinstatement and back wage payment.

Respondent Court issued an order on October 28, 1963, which is the subject of this
appeal. The order detailed past events and justified its inability to grant petitioner's
requests or further postpone the execution of the final order for reinstatement and back
wages.

Issue:

Can the Court, when directly approached by an employer, rightly reject evidence
claiming that the employees it ordered to reinstate cannot be reinstated due to the
abolition of their previous positions for valid reasons, and there are no substantially
equivalent positions for them? And, can it bypass the determination of this fact and
arbitrarily dismiss this proposition?

Ruling:
While the intrinsic merit of the issue is acknowledged, the court is not tasked with
resolving it in this petition. The respondent Court has made a factual finding that the
grounds raised against reinstatement were available during the trial and cannot be
availed of now. It's well-established that the findings of fact by the respondent Court, if
supported by substantial evidence, are binding on us. The appealed order is in
accordance with the law and can't be disturbed. The principle of the law of the case,
particularly significant in labor litigations, supports this conclusion. The persistence in
refusing to abide by a final judgment goes against the essence of the Industrial Peace
Act, aimed at achieving industrial democracy. Reopening the case to allow evidence
against compliance with the order would render futile the rights of labor and frustrate the
policies of the Industrial Peace Act, considering the circumstances disclosed.

University of the Philippines v. Ferrera-Calleja 211 SCRA 451

Facts:

On March 2, 1990, the labor union "Organization of Non-Academic Personnel of UP"

(ONAPUP) filed a petition seeking a certification election for the non-academic
employees of the University of the Philippines (UP) across its campuses. ONAPUP
claimed a membership of 3,236, representing over 33% of the non-academic personnel.

The University expressed no objection to the election, while another union, the "All UP
Workers' Union," also registered support, emphasizing its aim to unite all UP rank-and-
file employees. However, it sought clarification on the organizational unit, suggesting
that academic non-teaching personnel should be distinct.

The University proposed two unions—one for academic and one for non-academic
personnel, citing differing interests, conditions, and rules. Director Calleja, in a ruling,
determined that the appropriate organizational unit should encompass all regular rank-
and-file employees, both teaching and non-teaching, without a separate grouping for
non-academic personnel.

A certification election was ordered among rank-and-file employees across all UP

campuses. The University requested the exclusion of supervisory non-academic
personnel and teaching staff with the rank of Assistant Professor or higher. They argued
that not all teaching personnel should be considered "rank-and-file," limiting it to those
at the instructor level.

ONAPUP accepted the University's classification of rank-and-file employees. In

contrast, the "All UP Workers' Union" opposed this classification in a Position Paper
presented on October 18, 1990.

Issue:
Two questions arise from these facts. First, whether professors, associate professors,
and assistant professors fall under the category of "high-level employees" with functions
deemed policy determining, managerial, or highly confidential. Second, whether they,
along with other employees performing academic functions, should form a separate
collective bargaining unit from the non-academic employees of the University,
considering their distinct interests, conditions, and rules.

Facts:

The Director determined that these teachers are considered rank-and-file employees
eligible to participate in unions and certification elections.

Regarding high-level employees, their functions involve making decisions about

managerial, executive, or organizational policies, such as hiring, firing, disciplinary
actions, salaries, working hours, benefits, and other employment terms. These are
common issues in collective bargaining negotiations, and allowing individuals with these
powers to join rank-and-file employee unions may create conflicting interests.

The personnel actions recommended by departmental and college academic personnel

committees must align with the general guidelines established by the university
personnel academic committee. These committees operate within established policies
and practices, having limited freedom of action as their primary role is to implement the
university's orders, plans, and policies.

NAFTU v. Mainit Lumber, 192 SCRA 598

Facts:

Petition for Certiorari to annul the resolution of the public respondent Bureau of Labor
Relations.

Petition for Direct Certification or Certification Election filed by the National Association
of Free Trade Unions (NAFTU) against Mainit Lumber and Development Company, Inc.
(MALDECO).

NAFTU, a registered labor organization, filed a petition for certification election with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment to determine the exclusive collective bargaining
representative among the rank-and-file workers of MALDECO. The company is
engaged in logging and saw-mill operations, employing approximately 136 rank-and-file
employees. The case was scheduled for a hearing twice.

During the hearings, NAFTU's counsel requested a postponement due to overseas

travel. The parties agreed to submit their respective position papers within twenty (20)
days. MALDECO, in its papers, raised several points, including the absence of a
certification election within the last 12 months and the petition being filed within the 60-
day freedom period. It also claimed that the petition had the support of 101 rank-and-file
employees, exceeding the required thirty percent (30%).

The Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election, and NAFTU appealed,
arguing that MALDECO had two bargaining units.

The Bureau of Labor Relations affirmed the decision, and a certification election was
conducted separately at the sawmill division and logging area. MALDECOWU-ULGWP
received 146 votes, while NAFTU obtained only 2 votes.

NAFTU filed an election protest, alleging vote buying and serious threats, force, and
intimidation. The case involved separate units at the Sawmill Division and the Logging
Division, a fact both the petition and decision acknowledged.

Issue:

Whether or not it was right for the med-arbiter to change the employer from two
separate bargaining units to only one

Ruling:

The resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated January 29, 1987, is affirmed.

One hundred seventy-five employees supported the petition for a certification election,
indicating their desire for a single bargaining representative. While bargaining history is
a factor, it is not decisive.

The fundamental test is the community or mutuality of interests. The acceptability of a

bargaining unit is based on whether it best ensures the exercise of collective bargaining
rights for all employees.

Employees in the Sawmill and Logging Divisions share a mutuality of interest, with their
functions complementing each other. Differences in individual assignments are not
significant enough to warrant separate bargaining units.

The issue was previously raised by the petitioner, and the Bureau of Labor Relations
had already ruled on it in its April 28, 1986 decision, affirmed by NAFTU's participation
in the election. The principle of res judicata applies.

There is no compelling reason to invalidate the certification election or order a run-off.

The minutes of the certification elections, as per Section 3, Rule VI, Book 5 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, show no protest on the alleged vote-
buying, threats, force, or intimidation, and such issues are deemed waived.
PLASLU v. CIR, 110 Phil. 176

Facts:

The petitioner lodged a complaint with the CIR, contesting the unwarranted dismissal of
its workers and employees and seeking their reinstatement. The Secretary of Labor
informed the petitioner that its status as a labor union had been removed from the
registered organizations list due to non-compliance with certain book inspection
requirements.

In response, the petitioner restructured itself as a non-stock corporation under the

Corporation Law, with registration at the SEC. The respondent then filed a Motion to
Dismiss (MTD), arguing that as an unregistered union, the petitioner lacked the legal
capacity to bring a lawsuit under Commonwealth Act No. 213.

Issue:

Whether or not PLASLU has capacity to sue.

Ruling:

Certainly, PLASLU possesses the legal standing to pursue legal actions.

Even when the permit of a labor union party is revoked, it can continue its involvement
in the ongoing case without the necessity of substituting parties. However, it is crucial to
note that any decision rendered will only bind those union members who have not
expressed their intention to withdraw from the case before its trial and final judgment.

"This jurisdiction remains intact even if the Department of Labor suspends the permit of
the respondent Kaisahan as a labor organization. Once jurisdiction is established by the
Court of Industrial Relations, it persists until the case reaches a conclusive resolution."
(Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel)

Knitjoy Manufacturing, Inc. v. Ferrera-Calleja, 214 SCRA 174

Facts:

Petitioner KNITJOY entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the
Federation of Filipino Workers (FFW), covering regular rank-and-file employees paid on
a daily or piece-rate basis, excluding those paid monthly. The CBA expired on 15 June
1987.
Before its expiration, the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
sought a certification election for daily and piece-rate workers. In the election, CFW
won, initiating negotiations for a new CBA.

During negotiations, KMEU filed for a certification election exclusively for monthly-paid
employees. Med-Arbiter Rolando S. de la Cruz dismissed the petition, but KMEU
appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).

On 1 December 1987, BLR Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja reversed the Med-Arbiter's

decision. KNITJOY's arguments about working incentives, CFW's willingness to include
monthly-paid employees, and the exclusion of managerial or confidential/technical
positions were disregarded.

Issues:

1. Whether or not petitioner KNITJOY'S monthly-paid regular rank-and-file employees

can constitute an appropriate bargaining unit separate and distinct from the existing unit
composed of daily or piece-rate paid regular rank-and-file employees, and

2. Whether or not the inclusion in the coverage of the new CBA between KNITJOY and
CFW of the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees bars the holding of a certification
election among the said monthly paid employees.

Ruling:

The court ruled in favor of the respondents.

While the Labor Code generally favors the one company-one union policy due to the
mutual benefits derived from unity, exceptions exist. Article 245 explicitly permits
supervisory employees, not performing managerial functions, to form their own union
but prohibits their membership in a rank-and-file employees' union.

"ART. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees. -- Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist, or form
any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist, or form separate
labor organizations of their own."

This provision allows multiple unions in a company.

Section 2(c), Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations recognizes
exceptions by allowing a legitimate labor organization to file a petition for a bargaining
unit description that may deviate from the employer unit, when circumstances warrant.

The right to form a union or association encompasses freedom and power, granting
employees the liberty to act for themselves and the ability to join or refrain from joining
an association as they please.

Allied Free Workers Union v. Cia maritime, 19 SCRA 258;

Facts:

MARITIMA is a local shipping company, and Teves serves as its branch manager in
Iligan City. AFWU is a registered labor organization with 225 members. In 1952,
MARITIMA, through Teves, entered into a contract with AFWU, initially providing
satisfactory service. However, by late 1953, MARITIMA complained of unsatisfactory
service, prompting Teves to hire additional non-union laborers to address the
inefficiency.

In 1954, AFWU proposed a collective bargaining agreement, but MARITIMA did not
respond. AFWU then filed for certification as the bargaining agent, leading to a dispute.
MARITIMA terminated the contract due to inefficiency and contracted with another
union. AFWU charged MARITIMA with unfair labor practices.

On September 1, 1954, AFWU members formed a picket line, disrupting the new
arrangement. MARITIMA filed a case to rescind the contract, enjoin AFWU, and seek
damages. Legal proceedings ensued, with various injunctions and appeals.

In 1960, the Civil Court ordered the rescission of the contract and permanently enjoined
AFWU. A series of legal actions followed, including an order of execution, a writ of
injunction, and a subsequent lifting of the injunction. The Industrial Court finally
rendered its decision on November 4, 1963.

Issue:

Whether there is an employer-employee relationship between MARITIMA, on the one

hand, and AFWU and/or its members-laborers who do the actual stevedoring and
arrastre work on the other hand.

Ruling:

AFWU argues that the trial court made errors in concluding that MARITIMA did not
refuse to bargain collectively, did not engage in discriminatory acts, and that the
contract couldn't be interfered with. While MARITIMA admitted not responding to
AFWU's proposal, the duty to bargain arises only between an "employer" and its
"employees." The court held that under the contract, AFWU was an independent
contractor, not an "employee."

The court agrees with this conclusion, stating that AFWU is an independent contractor,
and independent contractors are not employees. There is no direct employment
relationship between MARITIMA and the laborers; they are hired by AFWU. AFWU,
through its officers, selects and hires laborers, pays wages, supervises them, and has
the power to discipline and dismiss them.

While a union can be an "employer," AFWU appears to be a distinct business group

with its own organizational structure and operational system. It engages in business
beyond its union functions, evident in its arrastre and stevedoring contracts with other
shipping firms. AFWU's attempt to be considered a mere "agent" of MARITIMA is
dismissed, as an agent cannot represent conflicting interests, and the cited cases did
not involve representatives of opposing interests.

Progressive Development Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 205 SCRA 802

Facts:

Respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) - TUCP filed a petition for

certification election with the DOLE, seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of
the petitioner. KILUSAN claimed legitimacy as a labor federation, and its local chapter,
Progressive Development Employees Union, held a charter certificate. The petitioner,
PDC, moved to dismiss, arguing non-compliance with DOLE rules requiring submission
of essential documents.

The Solicitor General, representing the public respondent, contended substantial

compliance with formation requirements. Furthermore, he invoked Article 257 of the
Labor Code, which mandates a certification election in the absence of a certified
bargaining agreement.

Issue:

At what point does a branch, local, or affiliate of a federation become a legitimate labor
organization?

Ruling:

A labor organization gains legitimacy only upon registration with the BLR. Article 234
outlines the registration requirements, while Article 235 mandates BLR action within 30
days. Section 4 of Rule II, Book V, adds that the application should be signed by 20% of
employees in the bargaining unit and accompanied by a sworn statement.
When an unregistered union becomes a branch, local, or chapter of a federation, some
registration requirements are waived under Rule II, Section 3, Book V. The intent is to
encourage affiliation, thus increasing bargaining power. However, the local or chapter
must still submit a charter certificate, constitution, by-laws, officers' list, and books of
accounts certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, attested to by the president.

In the present case, the constitution, by-laws, and officers' list submitted to the BLR,
while attested by the president, lacked certification under oath by the secretary. This
omission is fatal to the local's acquisition of legitimate status.

Philippine Phosphate v. Torres, 231 SCRA 335

Facts:

Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI) initiated a petition for certification election
with the Department of Labor and Employment, seeking to represent the supervisory,
professional, technical, and confidential employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer
Corporation. Initially, Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado ordered a certification election
for supervisory employees, excluding superintendents and professional/technical
employees. However, PMPI filed an amended petition, expanding its representation to
include professional/technical and confidential employees. After the submission of
position papers, Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition for a
certification election among the specified employee categories. PHILPHOS appealed to
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, but the appeal was dismissed. Alleging denial
of due process, PHILPHOS now seeks relief through this petition, contending that the
DOLE, including the mediator-arbiter, failed to uphold its right to due process.

Issue:

Whether or Not there was denial of due process.

Ruling:

There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, this means having an
opportunity to explain one's side or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling in
question. Petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter
and considered the case submitted for decision based on the filed position papers. This
amounted to sufficient compliance with due process requirements, providing petitioner
with a reasonable opportunity to present its side. Additionally, petitioner had the option
to request a hearing to cross-examine the other party's witnesses, but it chose to submit
its position paper. Furthermore, petitioner had ample opportunity to present its
arguments in the appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
United Aluminum Fabricators v. Drilon, 211 SCRA 104

Facts:

This case involves petitions seeking to annul the decisions and orders related to a
petition for certification election filed by Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL-
KATIPUNAN) against United Aluminum Fabricators Workers’ Union (UAFWU). The
central issue is the existence of a valid collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between
United Aluminum Fabricators (United Aluminum) and UAFWU.

Before the expiration of the original CBA on April 29, 1989, and with no pending petition
for certification election, United Aluminum and UAFWU renegotiated a new CBA for five
years starting April 29, 1989. The new CBA was filed and registered on April 3, 1989.
However, on July 7, 1989, KAMPIL filed a petition for direct certification/certification
election.

United Aluminum moved to dismiss KAMPIL's petition, citing the existing CBA as a bar
to the certification election. UAFWU also filed a motion to intervene. On August 15,
1989, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin dismissed KAMPIL's petition for lack of merit.

The crucial points are as follows: Article 232 of the Labor Code prohibits the filing of a
petition for certification election during the existence of a CBA except within a 60-day
freedom period before the CBA's expiry. In this case, a new CBA was validly negotiated
and registered before KAMPIL filed its petition. Additionally, KAMPIL's petition lacked
the required written consent of at least 20% of the rank-and-file employees.

The Med-Arbiter's decision to dismiss KAMPIL's petition is supported by law and

jurisprudence. The Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed this decision, rejecting
KAMPIL's subsequent motions for reconsideration.

The petitions seek to set aside decisions that correctly applied labor laws and
regulations, especially regarding the prohibition on certification elections during the
existence of a valid CBA. The existing CBA between United Aluminum and UAFWU is a
lawful bar to KAMPIL's petition. The Secretary of Labor and Employment's decisions are
consistent with established legal principles.

UAFWU and United Aluminum filed motions for reconsideration after the denial of their
previous motions. The new Secretary of Labor, Ruben D. Torres, issued an order on
February 28, 1990, denying the motions and directing the immediate conduct of the
certification election. A subsequent motion for reconsideration on April 25, 1990, was
also denied.
As a response, petitions were filed in this Court. A temporary restraining order was
issued on May 3, 1990, preventing the scheduled pre-election conference and the
certification election. The Court resolved to consolidate the petitions on July 4, 1990.

On October 31, 1990, KAMPIL expressed that its individual members were no longer
interested in pursuing the case due to an agreement with United Aluminum.

The Court, in a resolution dated September 25, 1991, accepted the petitions and
requested memoranda from both parties. The Solicitor General and KAMPIL asked to
be excused from filing memoranda.

UAFWU and United Aluminum submitted their memoranda on December 2, 1991, and
December 6, 1991, respectively. The case was scheduled for deliberation on February
24, 1992.

Issue:

Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
conduct of a certification election notwithstanding the existence of a valid CBA.

Ruling:

But because of KAMPIL’s aforementioned manifestation which in effect is a withdrawal

from the case, there appears to be no reason to pass upon the parties’ varied
contentions.

In addition law and jurisprudence fully support the merits of the petition Article 232 of
the Labor Code, provides that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 232. Prohibition on Certification Election. — The Bureau shall not entertain any
petition for certification election or any other action which may disturb the administration
of duly registered existing collective bargaining agreements affecting the parties except
under Article 353-A and 256 of this Code."

KAMPIL filed a petition for certification election 69 days after the Freedom Period
ended. According to the rule, a petition during a CBA's existence is prohibited, except
within a 60-day freedom period. During this time, UAFWU faced no challenges to its
majority status, allowing it to form a new CBA with United Aluminum lasting from April
29, 1989, to April 28, 1994.

The submitted and registered CBA on April 13, 1989, was valid until 1994, barring the
certification election. Additionally, KAMPIL's petition lacked the required written consent
of at least 20% of rank-and-file employees, making it mandatory for the Bureau to order
a certification election.
The public respondent's decision to set aside the Med-Arbiter's orders and order a
certification election despite a valid CBA constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Therefore, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 93016 and 93079 are granted, annulling the
decisions, reinstating the Med-Arbiter's order, and making the temporary restraining
order in G.R. No. 93016 permanent.

Monarck Int’l v. Noriel, 83 SCRA 114

Facts:

The petitioner, a corporation, challenges the Director's order, claiming an abuse of

discretion and raising a procedural due process question. The petitioner contends that
the respondent union, Philippine Technical Clerical Commercial Employees Association
(PTCCEA), failed to obtain the required written consent of at least 30% of the
employees in the bargaining unit. However, the Assistant Solicitor General argues that
the petitioner's contention is untenable, pointing out discrepancies in the petitioner's
employee count and supporting the Director's decision to order a certification election to
determine the legitimate collective bargaining representative. The legal principle
emphasized is that when there is doubt about meeting the required number of
supporters, a certification election is the appropriate method to ascertain the union that
truly commands the allegiance of the rank-and-file employees.

Issue:

The legal issue in this case revolves around the authority of the Director of the Bureau
of Labor Relations to order a certification election, despite the alleged failure to strictly
comply with the statutory requirement of 30% of the labor force requesting such an
election.

Ruling:

The petition clearly lacks merit and must be dismissed.

The Solicitor General pointed out that the Director's finding of full compliance with the
30% requirement is supported by legal decisions. These decisions establish that, even if
the required number of employees is lacking, it is within the official's discretion to order
a certification election to determine the exclusive bargaining representative. The court
should only intervene if there is an imprudent exercise of discretion, raising a procedural
due process question. Additionally, on matters of fact, the Director's determination is
decisive.

The petition, filed by the employer, raises concerns because collective bargaining aims
to allow labor to freely choose its representative. Certification elections are the
appropriate means to determine the workers' choice. Exceptions may exist, such as
when the employer invokes the contract-bar rule, but this case does not fall under that
exception. Management is generally expected to maintain a hands-off policy to avoid
suspicions of favoritism, which goes against the principles of collective bargaining and
labor protection.

The petition's attempt to criticize the Director for holding preparatory conferences for the
certification election lacks merit. There is no valid objection to the official taking
necessary steps for a fair election, as long as there is no favoritism. The judiciary should
not interfere in administrative matters unless there is a clear display of favoritism, which
could raise equal protection concerns. The employer lacked standing to raise such
questions, as it was not a party in the proposed certification election.

In summary, the petition lacks sufficient grounds for the court to exercise its certiorari
jurisdiction, as it does not demonstrate a clear need for corrective action.

Benguet Consolidated Inc. v. BCI Employees Union, 23 SCRA 465

Facts:

On June 23, 1959, the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union (BBWU) entered a Collective
Bargaining Contract with Benguet Consolidated Inc. (BENGUET) for a duration of four
and a half years. The agreement included a No-Strike, No-Lockout clause. In 1962, a
certification election certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent for all
BENGUET employees. Subsequently, the Union filed a notice of strike against
BENGUET, citing issues like the refusal to grant a monthly living allowance, violation of
conciliation agreements, refusal to dismiss an erring executive, and discrimination
against union members.

The strike began on March 2, 1963, and after negotiations, an agreement was reached
on May 2, 1963. Despite this, BENGUET filed a lawsuit against the Union, alleging
breach of the no-strike clause and seeking damages totaling P1,911,363.83 for
expenses incurred during the strike. The Union argued that they were not bound by the
previous contract, the strike was a response to unfair labor practices, and it was a lawful
exercise of their rights under Republic Act 875.

In response to the legal action, the Union maintained that they were not bound by the
previous contract with BBWU, and the strike was a lawful response to unfair labor
practices by BENGUET. The case involves a dispute over whether the Union's actions
violated the terms of the existing contract and the legitimacy of their strike under labor
laws.

Issue:
WON the CBA executed between BENGUET and BBWU automatically bind UNION-
PAFLU upon its certification as sole bargaining representative of all BENGUET
employees.

Ruling:

NO.

The principle of vicarious liability has been explicitly removed by Republic Act 875. The
current standard requires clear evidence of direct involvement, authorization, or
approval by a labor union, its officials, or members for them to be held accountable for
any illegal actions.

Manila Electric Co. v. Quisumbing, 302 SCRA 173

Facts:

In the decision issued on January 27, 1999, the Court granted the petition and set aside
the orders of the Secretary of Labor dated August 19, 1996, and December 28, 1996.
The parties were instructed to execute a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with
certain terms and conditions, and the retirement fund issue was sent back to the
Secretary of Labor for further proceedings.

Some members of the union and the supervisor's union of the petitioner filed motions for
intervention and reconsideration, respectively. The Court requested comments on these
motions, but the Solicitor-General sought to be excused, stating that the petition had
already been granted. The petitioner submitted a consolidated comment, and the newly
elected president of the Union filed an "Appeal Seeking Immediate Reconsideration."

The issues raised in the motions for reconsideration had already been addressed in the
January 27, 1999 decision, and no new arguments were presented. However, certain
matters related to wages and the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral awards will be
considered in this context.

Issue:

Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the
Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such increase to the
consumers through an increase in the rate of electricity.

Ruling:

This argument is a non sequitur and does not hold. The Court cannot be swayed by
such a misleading claim. It suggests that an increase in employee wages automatically
leads to a rise in electric current prices, but this is inaccurate. Any increase in the cost
of electricity requires approval from the appropriate government regulatory agency and
is not an automatic consequence of a wage hike for the petitioner's employees.
Moreover, this argument assumes that the petitioner has the financial capacity to
accommodate a wage increase.

The Union relies on the All Asia Capital report to support its stance on the wage issue.
However, this report cannot serve as a reliable basis for determining the rate of wage
increase. According to Section 45 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, statements in a
published compilation, like a periodical, are admissible if it is intended for use by
individuals in a specific occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them. In
this case, the cited report is merely a newspaper account, not a commercial list, and
lacks the necessary figures and testimony to support its validity. The report cannot be
considered a widely relied-upon source among businessmen.

Our previous Decision on January 27, 1999, correctly identified the report as a mere
newspaper account without persuasive weight in this case. It lacks the necessary
evidence to establish its accuracy, and there is no indication that it is regularly prepared
by someone connected with the market or regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Without
extrinsic proof of accuracy, such reports are inadmissible. Similarly, newspapers
containing stock quotations are not admissible when the source is available. In this
case, the source of the report is easily accessible, especially for compliance with
governmental requirements.

Rivera v. Espiritu, 374 SCRA 351

Facts:

PAL was suffering from a difficult financial situation in 1998. It was faced with
bankruptcy and was forced to adopt a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force
by more than 1/3. PALEA (PAL Employees Association) went on a four-day strike to
protest retrenchment measures in July 1998. PAL ceased operations on Sep 23, 1998.

PALEA board again wrote the President on Sep 28, 1998. Among others, it proposed
the suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA for a period of ten years, subject to certain
conditions. PALEA members accepted such terms through a referendum on Oct 2,
1998. PAL resumed domestic operations on Oct 7, 1998.

Seven officers and members of PALEA filed instant petition to annul the Sep 27, 1998
agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA.

Issue:

Whether or not negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.

Ruling:

YES. CBA negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.

The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining
negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the
employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial
peace at PAL, but preventing the latter’s closure.

There is no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. CBA
under Article 253-A of the Labor Code has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote
industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement sought to promote
industrial peace, at the PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreement satisfied the first
purpose of said article. The other purpose is to assign specific timetable, wherein
negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A
prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetable and agreeing
on the remedies to enforce the same.

Biflex Phils. Labor Union v. Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corp., 511 SCRA
247

Facts:

The petitioners held positions as officers in two labor unions: Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor
Union and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Labor Union. Both of these unions,
affiliated with the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), serve as the collective
bargaining representatives for the employees of their respective corporations.

The respondents, Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing
Corporation, are sister companies operating in the garment business.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioners were guilty of holding an illegal strike when circumstances
showed that respondents were the ones who were guilty of an illegal lockout.

Ruling:

A work stoppage resulting from "welga ng bayan" is akin to a general strike, an

extensive sympathy strike. It impacts various employers, even those not involved in any
dispute with their employees over employment terms and conditions.

Employees without a labor dispute with their employer who, on a scheduled workday,
refuse to work and participate in a "welga ng bayan" engage in an illegal work stoppage.

NUWHRAIN v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 192 (Wildcat Strike)

Facts:
The Hotel and HI-MANILA PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION (HIMPHLU) agreed to a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for five years until June 30, 2005. Before the
CBA expired, they negotiated a two-year extension effective July 1, 2005, to June 30,
2007. NUWHRAIN, a newly recognized labor organization, challenged HIMPHLU's
majority status by filing a Petition for Certification Election in June 2005. Despite
ongoing negotiations, HIMPHLU demanded the dismissal of 36 employees for alleged
disloyalty. NUWHRAIN filed a Notice of Strike in September 2005, claiming unfair labor
practices by the Hotel. The Secretary of Labor intervened, and the case was certified for
compulsory arbitration with the NLRC. NUWHRAIN argued that the Hotel committed
unfair labor practices by issuing notices to employees who switched allegiance to
NUWHRAIN. In a reconciliatory conference, HIMPHLU's Vice President expressed a
preference for dealing with HIMPHLU, blaming NUWHRAIN for the labor issues.

Issue:

Is there an unfair labor practice on the part of the Hotel?

Ruling:

The law allows "union shop" and "closed shop" agreements to encourage workers to
join and support their chosen union, promoting collective bargaining power. In this case,
the Collective Bargaining Agreement includes a union security provision. To avoid
breaching this provision and protect its interests, the Hotel conducted an inquiry into the
demand for the dismissal of 36 employees who defected from HIMPHLU. The issuance
of notices to the employees was a reasonable step in the investigation, and the Hotel
did not proceed to terminate them. Instead, reconciliatory conferences were arranged to
prevent dismissals and resolve the union dispute.

Contrary to NUWHRAIN's claim, the surrounding circumstances contradict the

allegation that the respondent interfered with or coerced employees' union membership
choices. NUWHRAIN admitted that the respondent maintained a neutral stance in the
dispute and did not threaten or dismiss employees for affiliating with NUWHRAIN. There
is no evidence of the respondent violating employees' freedom to decide on union
membership, and, therefore, no unfair labor practice was committed.

Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines v. Sulpicio Lines, 426 SCRA 319

Facts:

The background of the case is as follows:

On February 5, 1991, Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (the respondent) and the Samahang
Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines Inc. NAFLU (the petitioner) entered into a five-year
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) lasting from October 17, 1990, to October 16,
1995.
After three years, on December 15, 1993, negotiations began between the petitioner
union and the respondent company regarding the CBA's economic provisions. However,
these negotiations reached a deadlock.

On March 1, 1994, the petitioner filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB), National Capital Region, citing a collective bargaining
deadlock (NCMB-NCR-NS-03-118-94).

In response, on March 21, 1994, the respondent filed a petition with the Office of the
Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, requesting that the Labor Secretary
assume jurisdiction over the dispute.

Alleging unfair labor practices by the respondent, the petitioner union promptly
conducted a strike vote. On May 20, 1994, around 9:30 in the morning, 167 rank-and-
file employees, officers, and members of the petitioner abstained from work, gathering
in front of Pier 12, North Harbor at Manila.

Issue:

Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction over a petition to declare the strike illegal

Ruling:

In the case of International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and

Employment,[17] it was clarified:

"The Secretary, under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, is expressly authorized to take
charge of a labor dispute that may lead to a strike or lockout in an industry vital to
national interest. In doing so, the authority extends to addressing all related questions
and disputes, even those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter"

Similarly, when the Secretary of Labor and Employment forwards the labor dispute to
the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, the NLRC is simultaneously granted the power to
resolve all arising questions and controversies, encompassing cases that would
normally fall exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

Sarmienta v. Tuico, 162 SCRA 676

Facts:

The case involves a labor dispute between Asian Transmission Corporation (ATC) and
Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU). The dispute led to a notice of strike
by BATU, alleging unfair labor practices by ATC. The Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE) intervened, certifying the dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) and enjoining both parties from taking certain actions.

The NLRC issued orders for ATC to accept returning workers, but ATC challenged
these orders through a petition for certiorari. Additionally, criminal complaints were filed
against the striking workers. The petitioners sought the lifting of arrest warrants and the
referral of charges to the NLRC, arguing that these matters fell under the NLRC's
jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court addressed the first issue related to NLRC orders in G.R. No.
77567. The MOLE initially assumed jurisdiction, but due to changes in the NLRC, the
case was returned to the NLRC. The NLRC issued resolutions ordering ATC to accept
returning workers. These resolutions were challenged by ATC in a petition for certiorari,
leading to a temporary restraining order by the Supreme Court.

The second issue involved criminal complaints against the striking workers. The
petitioners argued that these cases fell under the NLRC's primary jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent the enforcement of
arrest warrants and further proceedings in the criminal cases.

Issue:

1. Can a return-to-work order be validly issued by the National Labor Relations

Commission during the determination of the strike's legality?

2. Can the criminal prosecution of individuals involved in the strike be validly restrained
pending the determination of its legality?

Ruling:

The return-to-work order was issued on June 3 and reiterated on June 13, 1986. The
strike allegedly began on June 9, 1986. Petitioners claim they engaged in peaceful
picketing, suggesting they did not comply with the return-to-work order. Non-compliance
implies abandonment of employment, and they cannot demand the right to return based
on a defied order.

The return-to-work order is applicable during the determination of the strike's legality,
maintaining the status quo. It is not contingent on the strike being legal or illegal. The
Court emphasizes fairness to both labor and management, preventing an unfair
situation where workers claim payment for work not done while impeding company
operations.

Regarding the second issue, the Court allows the suspension of criminal proceedings,
considering their connection to the pending compulsory arbitration proceedings in the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Circulars from the Ministry of Justice
require clearance before prosecuting cases related to labor disputes, ensuring harmony
and industrial peace.

The Court refrains from making findings on the merits of the labor dispute and criminal
cases, expressing hope for a just resolution and emphasizing collaboration between
labor and management for mutual prosperity.

St. Scholastica’s College v. Torres, 210 SCRA 565

Facts:

On July 20, 1990, St. Scholastica's College (COLLEGE) and the Samahan ng
Manggagawang Pang-Edukasyon sa Sta. Eskolastika-NAFTEU (UNION) initiated
negotiations for their first Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). When negotiations
reached a deadlock, the UNION filed a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE).

In response, the UNION declared a strike, leading to a standstill in the COLLEGE's

operations. The DOLE Secretary promptly took control of the labor dispute, issuing a
return-to-work order. The next day, the UNION sought reconsideration of the order,
challenging, among other things, the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction over the
dispute. The Secretary denied the reconsideration and cautioned the striking employees
to comply with the return-to-work order.

Despite attempting to return to work, the COLLEGE refused to accept the UNION
officers and members. The UNION then sought the enforcement of the return-to-work
order from the Secretary. In response, the COLLEGE requested the Secretary to uphold
the dismissal of employees who defied the return-to-work order.

The Secretary issued an Order mandating the reinstatement of striking UNION

members, citing the absence of violent or illegal acts during the strike. However, the
Secretary held UNION officers accountable for violating the return-to-work orders and
upheld their termination.

Issue:

Whether or not the UNION’s non-compliance with the return-to-work order because they
questioned the assumption of jurisdiction of respondent SECRETARY is proper.

Ruling:

No. According to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, if a strike has already commenced at
the time of assumption, "all striking employees shall immediately return to work." This
indicates that a return-to-work order becomes effective and enforceable right away,
even if a motion for reconsideration is filed. It must be strictly adhered to, even while
any petition questioning its validity is pending. The assumption and/or certification order
is issued through the Secretary's compelling power of arbitration and, until overturned,
must be promptly followed. Therefore, the failure of the UNION to promptly comply with
the return-to-work order cannot be excused.

Grand Bouelevard Hotel v. GLOWHRAIN, 406 SCRA 688

Facts:

In 1987, the Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant, and Allied
Industries (GLOWHRAIN-Silahis) and Grand Boulevard Hotel executed a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Disputes arose, leading to a strike notice in 1987 and
subsequent legal proceedings.

Notably, on June 15, 1990, a third CBA was signed. Issues emerged in 1990, involving
alleged CBA violations and dismissals. A strike notice was filed, leading to a status quo
ante bellum order. In response, the hotel implemented a retrenchment program, leading
to more conflicts, terminations, and a notice of strike.

Legal battles ensued, and despite compliance with some labor laws, the strike was
deemed illegal due to procedural lapses. The National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) urged financial assistance for terminated employees. The NLRC decision was
contested, leading to a series of appeals and remands.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals granted the petitions, remanding the case to the labor
arbiter for the computation of backwages for the terminated employees.

Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision. On
May 27, 2002, the CA issued a resolution denying the said motion.

In its petition at bar, the petitioner assails the decision and resolution of the CA and
prays for the reversal thereof.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals' finding of legality of the union's strike was a clear
disregard of the requirements for a legal and valid strike as prescribed by law and
jurisprudence.

Ruling:
The petition is valid. According to Article 263 of the Labor Code, for a strike to be valid,
the following conditions must be met: (a) a notice of strike filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) 30 days before the intended date (or 15 days in case of
unfair labor practice); (b) approval of the strike by a majority of the total union
membership through a secret ballot; (c) notice given to the DOLE of the voting results at
least seven days before the intended strike. The seven-day period allows the DOLE to
verify if the strike is genuinely supported by the majority. Non-compliance with these
requirements makes the strike illegal, as the notice and cooling-off period aim to
facilitate mediation and conciliation. Striking immediately after the notice undermines
these essential periods.

In this case, the respondent union filed its notice of strike with the DOLE on November
16, 1990 and on the same day, staged a picket on the premises of the hotel, in violation
of the law. Police operatives of the Western Police District had to disperse the picketers
and take into custody Union President Rogelio Soluta and the other officers of
respondent union, Henry Babay and Dennis Cosico. The respondents cannot argue that
since the notice of strike on November 16, 1990 were for the same grounds as those
contained in their notice of strike on September 27, 1990 which complied with the
requirements of the law on the cooling-off period, strike ban, strike vote and strike vote
report, the strike staged by them on November 16, 1990 was lawful. The matters
contained in the notice of strike of September 27, 1990 had already been taken
cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued on October 31, 1990 a status quo ante
bellum order enjoining the respondent union from intending or staging a strike. Despite
the SOLE order, the respondent union nevertheless staged a strike on November 16,
1990 simultaneously with its notice of strike, thus violating Article 264(a) of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, as amended.

SMC v. NLRC, 403 SCRA 418

Facts:

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng

Manggagawa (IBM), exclusive bargaining agent of petitioner’s daily-paid rank and file
employees, executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which they
agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings. The CBA also
included a mutually enforceable no-strike no-lockout agreement.

On April 11, 1994, IBM submitted a notice of strike against the petitioner, listing various
allegations such as illegal dismissal, violation of the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA), and unfair labor practices. The following day, another notice of strike was filed
with similar grounds. The groups within the union disagreed on consolidating their
notices.

The petitioner sought to sever and dismiss the strike notices, arguing that the issues
raised were not subject to striking and involved different corporations. After conciliation
meetings, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) Director found that the
main issues were non-strikeable, including illegal dismissal, labor-only contracting, and
internal union disputes. The notices were converted into preventive mediation for four
distinct companies.

While mediation was ongoing, one group filed a notice for a strike vote. The petitioner
objected, citing the PAL v. Drilon case, which prohibits declaring a strike during
preventive mediation. The NCMB Director reiterated the conversion of the notice into
preventive mediation, emphasizing that the issues were related to intra-union conflicts
and not strikeable.

The case revolves around determining which of the two groups will represent the
workers for collective bargaining, a matter under consideration in an ongoing Petition for
Interpleader before the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Other issues
raised are considered secondary to the primary question of union leadership.

On May 23, 1994, the Galvez group filed a second notice of strike against the petitioner,
citing additional grounds. The National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
consolidated this notice with the previous one that had been reduced to preventive
mediation. Despite the NCMB's advice, on June 4, 1994, IBM went on strike, causing
significant daily production losses for the petitioner.

In response, on June 6, 1994, the petitioner filed an amended Petition for Injunction with
the NLRC, seeking relief from the strike's impact. The NLRC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) on June 13, 1994, ensuring free access to and from petitioner's
plants while allowing peaceful picketing. To resolve the situation, on June 16, 1994, the
petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the respondent-union,
leading to the lifting of picket lines and the resumption of work.

Despite this, the respondent moved to reconsider the TRO, claiming that the case had
become moot due to the MOA. The NLRC did not rule on this matter, and on November
29, 1994, it denied the petition for injunction, stating a lack of factual basis. The
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 1, 1995.

Issue:

Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion by letting the TRO expire without
deciding on the injunction request. Additionally, it denied the injunction without clearly
stating the facts and legal basis, and it did so five months after the TRO lapsed.

Ruling:

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner. According to Article 254 of the Labor Code,
courts or entities are generally barred from issuing injunctions in labor dispute cases,
except as specified in Articles 218 and 264 of the Labor Code. The first exception,
under Article 218(e), grants the NLRC the authority to enjoin or restrain acts that may
cause serious harm or render a decision ineffective. The second exception involves
"prohibited activities" under Article 264.

Under Article 218(e), injunctions can be used to prevent an unlawful strike. Past cases,
such as San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC and IBM v. NLRC, have emphasized the
NLRC's duty to enjoin strikes based on non-strikeable grounds or in violation of the law.
Failure to promptly issue an injunction is considered an abuse of discretion.

In this case, the petitioner sought a permanent injunction against the respondent's
strike. While strikes are a crucial tool for employees, they must comply with legal
requirements. Article 263 of the Labor Code mandates the filing of a valid notice of
strike with the NCMB, and the lack of such notice renders a strike illegal. In this case,
the NCMB converted IBM's notices into preventive mediation, dismissing the strike
notices as the real issues were found to be non-strikeable. This aligns with the state
policy favoring voluntary settlement of labor disputes.

NLU v. Philippine Match Co., 70 Phil 300

Facts:

On March 24, 1961, around 300 workers at CEPOC in Tinaan, Naga, Cebu City,
affiliated with the Cement Workers Union, Local 7-ALU (referred to as the Union), went
on strike. The strike was allegedly due to CEPOC's refusal to include a provision in the
renewed collective bargaining agreement for collecting a monthly agency fee of P1.00
from non-Union members. The case was brought to the Court of Industrial Relations as
Case No. 35-IPA. Simultaneously, the Union filed an unfair labor practice case against
CEPOC (CIR Case No. 276-ULP-Cebu) for not bargaining with the workers. CEPOC
countered with unfair labor practice charges against the Union (CIR Case No. 278-ULP-
Cebu), citing an illegal strike that resulted in death and injuries.

While the labor dispute was ongoing, a return-to-work order was issued, allowing the
strikers to resume work on July 6, 1961. On November 6, 1964, the Court declared the
strike illegal, dismissing mutual unfair labor practice charges. However, it found
discrimination against Union members in work assignments and appointments, leading
to specific orders:

1. Payment of wages to those discriminated against in work assignments on Saturdays,

Sundays, and legal holidays.

2. Payment of night premium or salary differential to strikers not given a shift change.

3. Payment of wage differences to six employees due to discrimination in position

classification.
4. Restoration of accumulated leaves and payment of wages to employees forced to
take sick and vacation leaves.

To facilitate award computation, the Chief of the Examining Division was tasked to
examine relevant records and documents. CEPOC's motion for reconsideration was
denied, leading to their appeal.

Petitioner challenges the lower court's findings, arguing that assigning personnel to
work on weekends, holidays, and at night was necessary due to limited work and the
company's financial struggles. However, this argument misses the key point. The lower
court presumed the rotation of personnel for extra work was appropriate.

Issue:

The issue at hand is not the correctness of the rotation measure but whether the strikers
or union members faced discrimination in its implementation.

Ruling:

The lower court found the company guilty of discrimination in appointing six employees
to reclassified positions. The court's reasoning, however, lacked substantial evidence
and relied on inference. The court also ordered the company to restore forced leaves
and pay wages to employees, citing a violation of its return-to-work order. The company
argued its authority to compel leave use for financial reasons. Additionally, the company
sought the dismissal of workers involved in an illegal strike, but the court upheld their
right to reinstatement. The union raised an issue about the strike's legality, but it wasn't
considered as it didn't appeal that specific portion. The decision is affirmed with a
modification on the salary differential for the six employees.

For its part, on the pretext of trying to maintain the judgment on appeal, respondent
Union assigns in its brief as error allegedly committed by the lower court the declaration
of the illegality of the strike of March 24, 1961.The point cannot be entertained in this
proceeding. In spite of respondent's protestations, it is evident that the assigned issue
should have been raised by an appellant. Having failed to appeal from that portion of
the decision declaring the strike illegal, the Union can no longer be heard to question
that ruling which by now has become final.

Dinglasa v. NLU, 106 Phil 671

Facts:

On December 12, 1979, workers formed the Philippine Inter-Fashion Workers Union
and sought certification as the exclusive bargaining agent. In January 1980, the
company planned to retrench around 40 employees due to alleged lack of work.
Attempts to offer voluntary resignations were declined by employees. On February 12,
1980, about 200 workers sought advice from the Ministry of Labor, leading to a Return
to Work Order. Despite returning, they were not assigned work, citing machine repairs
and reorganization. Over 200 employees returned on February 20, 1980, but were only
allowed in the company canteen without work. The company filed applications to
terminate employees who participated in the alleged walkout, citing serious misconduct.
Additional workers were hired, and by October 20, 1980, 150 employees returned,
withdrawing their complaint against the company.

The Solicitor General correctly pointed out that based on the undisputed facts, the
following conclusions can be drawn: the petitioner conducted an illegal lockout, and the
NAFLU engaged in an illegal strike. The 150 striking employees' unconditional offer to
return to work and withdraw their complaint condoned the illegal lockout.
Simultaneously, the petitioner's unqualified acceptance of the offer condoned the illegal
strike for the reinstated employees.

Issue:

The issues at bar arise, however, from respondent commission's approval of its
commissioner's conclusions that (1) petitioner must be deemed to have waived its right
to pursue the case of illegal strike against the 114 employees who were not reinstated
and who pursued their illegal lockout claim against petitioner; and (2) the said 114
employees are entitled to reinstatement with three months' backwages.

Ruling:

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that there was no clear waiver by the
petitioner, and the records show its persistent pursuit of dismissal despite this.
However, due to the undisputed findings of illegal strike by 114 employees and illegal
lockout by the petitioner, both parties are at fault. To restore the status quo ante, the
114 employees must be reinstated.

In line with this restoration, the Court, following the Solicitor General's recommendation,
grants the petition to set aside the award of three months' backwages to the reinstated
employees. The general rule is that strikers are not entitled to backwages, especially
when the strike is deemed illegal, as established in this case. The "no work, no pay"
principle applies, given the confirmed illegality of the strike.

Bacus v. Ople, 132 SCRA 690

Facts:

Findlay Millar Timber Company, a domestic corporation engaged in logging and

manufacturing plywood, veneer, and lumber products, faced a significant labor issue
when approximately 1,400 of its 2,000 employees, including the petitioners, initiated a
mass walk-out due to unpaid salaries, wages, and benefits.
In response to the labor dispute, the Minister of Labor assumed jurisdiction. The
Company, seeking to address the situation, filed clearance applications to terminate the
services of 22 and later 19 employees, including the petitioners. The Company alleged
that these workers were involved in coercive actions during the strike, violating
company rules and regulations and PD 823.

The Minister of Labor and Employment issued an order directing all striking employees
to return to work under previous terms. The management was authorized to replace
workers who failed to comply with the return-to-work deadline.

Subsequently, the Company filed another clearance to terminate 19 more employees,

citing reasons similar to the initial application. The Minister of Labor granted clearance
for their termination, considering them instigators of the declared illegal strike.

Issue:

Whether or not the company may terminate the services of striking employees.

Facts:

No. The automatic dismissal of strikers from their employment solely based on the
finding of an illegal strike is unjustifiable. Moreover, the determination of the strike's
illegality by the Minister of Labor and Employment was reached through an irregular
procedure that relied on summary methods, compromising the fair and swift resolution
of labor disputes.

While administrative agencies are granted flexibility in procedural matters, it is crucial to

uphold the principles of due process. In this case, procedural due process was
neglected, denying petitioners the full opportunity to present their case before facing the
severe consequence of dismissal. Due process necessitates a fair hearing, an orderly
investigation, and judgment only after a thorough inquiry, all of which were lacking in
this instance.

Association of Independent Unions v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 219

Facts:

Densing and others, who were casual employees of CENAPRO Chemicals, sought
regularization after being denied membership in the existing union, CCEA. They formed
a new union, AIUP, and filed a petition for certification election. The Union later went on
strike, which was deemed illegal due to various acts, leading to legal actions by
CENAPRO.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that the strike was illegal, some union members lost
employment, and others were reinstated. Both parties appealed, and pending the
resolution, AIUP moved for execution of reinstatement, which was granted. CENAPRO
opposed, but the LA overruled, ordering actual reinstatement.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the LA's decision but
modified it later, ordering separation pay without backwages. Densing lost employment
status. AIUP filed a petition for review on certiorari to reinstate the LA decision for
reinstatement and backwages.

Issue:

Whether or not the AIUP-sponsored Union committed an illegal strike

Ruling:

The Court initially emphasized that the complaints of the Densing group regarding
Unfair Labor Practices (ULP) were deemed baseless by the Labor Arbiter (LA) and
affirmed by the Supreme Court (SC). The alleged harassment and insults were found to
be scoldings for minor errors, and claims of overworking lacked corroboration.

The Court also upheld the National Labor Relations Commission's (NLRC)
determination that the strike led by AIUP was a union-recognition strike. It clarified that
the petition for certification election during an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) did not violate the contract bar rule, as the petition was filed outside the allowable
period.

Regarding the strike's illegality, the Court noted specific actions, such as barricading
and violating the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), leading to the conclusion that the
strike was unlawful. The Court highlighted that while the right to strike is legitimate, it
must be exercised within legal limits, as outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code.

Consequently, the dismissal of union officers was justified due to the strike's illegality.
The Court clarified that there was no lockout, and the workers ceased working
voluntarily because of the strike.

Concerning the four workers, the Court ruled that they are entitled to reinstatement
since the erring strikers were not duly identified. The Court emphasized that proper
identification is necessary for the severe penalty of dismissal to be justified. Simply
labeling them as "strikers" or "complainants" without clear identification is insufficient.

Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation v. NLRC, 318 SCRA 68

Facts:
On February 10, 1986, the National Labor Union-Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (NLU-TUCP) filed a notice of strike on behalf of its local chapter, the Filipino
Pipe Workers Union-National Labor Union (FPWU-NLU), against the Filipino Pipe and
Foundry Corporation. The grounds for the strike were union busting and non-
implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The initial conciliation
conference was rescheduled due to lack of notice and failure to provide a copy of the
notice of strike. On March 3, 1986, before the scheduled conciliation conference, the
FPWU-NLU initiated the strike, lasting until June 13, 1986. On April 8, 1986, the
petitioner company filed a petition to declare the strike illegal and sought damages
against FPWU-NLU, NLU-TUCP, and its national president, Atty. Eulogio Lerum. On
December 23, 1988, the petitioner company moved for the partial dismissal of the
complaint against 43 officers and members of FPWU-NLU, maintaining the action
against NLU-TUCP and Atty. Eulogio Lerum. The Labor Arbiter issued a decision in
favor of the petitioner company, absolving Lerum from liability. Both parties appealed to
the NLRC, which rendered a decision on September 29, 1993. Dissatisfied, the
petitioner company filed the present petition before the court.

Issue:
Whether or not National Labor Lelations Commission gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it held that private respondents
national labor

Ruling:

The Court finds that the strike by FPWU-NLU lacked a legal basis, as the alleged union
busting and non-implementation of the collective bargaining agreement were
unsubstantiated. The demands made by FPWU-NLU during the strike were the subject
of a pending application for a writ of execution, rendering the strike premature.

The Court concludes that the strike staged by FPWU-NLU was illegal, and as for the
damages incurred by the petitioner company, it attributes responsibility to NLU-TUCP
and its national president, Atty. Eulogio Lerum, for their direct participation and support
in the illegal strike. The petitioner argues that FPWU-NLU, being a local union directly
affiliated with NLU-TUCP, acted as the agent of the latter.

The Court clarifies that the relationship between a mother union/federation and a local
union involves the mother union acting as an agent, while the local union remains the
basic unit. The legitimacy of the local union as a labor organization is deemed
immaterial in this context.

In this case, whether or not FPWU-NLU is a legitimate labor organization does not
affect its status as the principal and basic unit responsible for the illegal strike and
resulting damages. The Court dismisses the petition and affirms the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission.
Rizal Cement Workers v. CIR, 6 SCRA 841

Facts:

On September 2, 1954, the petitioner Union proposed a collective bargaining contract to

the respondent company.

The respondent delayed considering the proposal until the resolution of a pending case.

The Union insisted that the proposals were distinct from the pending case.

The Union filed a notice of strike on October 5, 1954.

Another union, Binangonan Labor Union, entered into a collective bargaining contract
with the respondent.

The petitioner Union declared a strike on May 27, 1956, leading to a certified labor
dispute.

Issue:

whether the strike conducted by the petitioner Union was justified, particularly regarding
the denial of back wages

Ruling:

Inasmuch as the present case has been certified by the President of the Philippines to
the CIR, said Court is authorized to exercise its powers of arbitration under the
provisions of Act No. 103, as amended, including the fixing of the terms and conditions
of employment which embrace reinstatement of the strikers, with or without back wages.

. . . upon certification by the President under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875, the
case comes under the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 103, which enforces
compulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes in industries individual indespensable
to the national interest when the President certifies the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations. The evident intention of the law is to empower the Court of Industrial
Relations to act in such cases, not only in the manner prescribed under said Act No.
103, but with the same broad powers and jurisdiction granted by that Act. If the Court of
Industrial Relations is granted authority to find a solution in an industrial dispute and
such solution consists in the ordering of employees to return back to work, it cannot be
contended that the Court of Industrial Relations does not have the power or jurisdiction
to carry the solution into effect. And of what use is its power of conciliation and
arbitration if it does not have the power and jurisdiction to carry into effect the solution it
had adopted. Lastly, if said court has the power to fix the terms and conditions of
employment, it certainly can order the return of the workers with or without backpay as a
term or condition of employment. (Phil. Marine Radio Officers Association vs. CIR, et
al., Nos. L-10095 and L-10115, Oct. 31, 1957.) (Emphasis supplied).

The doctrine enunciated above, finds a fitting application to the case at bar.

Finding no reason/s, cogent or otherwise, to alter the decision appealed from, or to

declare that said respondent had committed abuse of discretion, in not awarding the
backpay claimed by the Union, the petition is dismissed, and the said decision is
affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

Arica v. Minister of Labor, 137 SCRA 275

Facts:

Petitioners, members of the "Samahang Diwang Manggagawa sa RMC," submitted

proposals for a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to Riverside Mills Corporation
(RMC). The negotiations reached a deadlock, leading to a notice of strike in January
1978. Despite an agreement settled in conciliation proceedings, the Union staged a
walk-out when RMC failed to provide part of the signing bonus. The Minister of Labor
certified the dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory
arbitration. Two return-to-work orders were ignored, and on March 20, 1979, the Deputy
Minister of Labor issued an order settling the issues and directing the execution of a
CBA. RMC applied for clearance to terminate petitioners' employment for engaging in
an illegal strike.

The petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, challenging the orders granting
RMC's application for clearance to terminate. Director Francisco L. Estrella granted the
application, and the Minister of Labor affirmed it. Petitioners sought to annul these
orders, arguing against the constitutionality of P.D. No. 823, asserting the settlement of
issues, and claiming excessive penalty.

Issue:

Whether or not the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 823, which bans strikes
in vital industries, and the validity of RMC's application for clearance to terminate based
on the alleged illegal strike. Petitioners argue that the termination is too drastic a penalty
for an act that would have been legal if not declared otherwise.

Ruling:

Initially, it's important to note that the provisions of PD No. 823, which prohibited strikes
in vital industries, were revoked in 1981. Therefore, the constitutionality of PD No. 823
is no longer an issue.

Even if we assume PD No. 823 is valid, petitioners argue that the issues leading to the
application for dismissal clearance were settled by the Order of March 20, 1978, by the
Undersecretary of Labor. RMC disputes this, stating it never waived its right to dismiss
petitioners and that certain issues were not covered by the settlement.

The core issue is the validity of the Union's strike. RMC claimed to be engaged in a vital
industry, but it failed to prove it produced ordinary fabrics or clothing materials.
However, even if RMC is not a vital industry, the strike was still deemed illegal because
it was not based on unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining, as an
agreement had already been reached. Additionally, the Union did not file a required
notice before the strike and continued the strike despite orders to return to work and
compulsory arbitration.

RMC argues that the Union's refusal to sign the final draft of the CBA led to the non-
payment of the signing bonus, as the bonus required a signed CBA. Therefore, the
responsibility for the non-payment lies with the Union.

UFE v. Nestle, 192 SCRA 396

Facts:

UFE initiated a notice of strike against Filipro (now Nestle) and concurrently filed an
Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) complaint. Responding to Nestle's plea for jurisdiction
assumption or certification to the NLRC, Minister of Labor and Employment Blas F. Ople
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. As a result, any form of concerted action
disrupting company operations, such as strikes or lockouts, was strictly prohibited.

UFE contested this decision by filing a petition with the Supreme Court, challenging the
Minister's assumption of jurisdiction. Despite the automatic injunction against concerted
activities, UFE members, influenced by their leaders, openly defied Minister Ople's
order. They staged a strike and maintained picket lines at Nestle's various locations,
including Makati Administrative Office and factories in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Cabuyao,
Laguna, and Cagayan de Oro City.

Issue:

Whether or not the certification order and/or assumption of jurisdiction of DOLE

Secretary constitutes as a return-to-work order.

Ruling:

Certainly. An assumption or certification order by the Secretary of Labor automatically

mandates the return-to-work of all striking employees, rendering any continuation of the
strike unlawful, irrespective of a specific return-to-work order. Article 264(g) is explicit:
once such an order is issued, ongoing strikes are prohibited, and all strikers must
promptly resume work.
Proceeding with a strike after the Secretary's assumption or certification order is a
prohibited and illegal activity under the second paragraph of Article 264 of the Labor
Code. Consequently, union officers and members involved are considered to have
forfeited their employment status by knowingly engaging in an illegal act.

PAFLU v. Cloribel, 27 SCRA 465

Facts:

PAFLU picketed METBANK at Wellington Building, alleging harassment. Wellington

sued, claiming damages and an injunction against picketing. Respondent Judge Cloribel
granted a restraining order. PAFLU argued lack of jurisdiction, violation of labor laws,
and restrictions on its right to picket.

The Supreme Court granted a temporary restraining order until April 12, 1966, later
extending it to a specific area. In a new case, another similar injunction was issued.
PAFLU sought a second restraining order, alleging violation of the first. The Supreme
Court admitted the supplemental petition but denied a preliminary injunction.

Wellington, METBANK, and Emmanuel T. Galang (recipient of the second injunction)

defended the original injunction, arguing jurisdiction and the need to protect neutral
parties from picketing. The respondent judge clarified the second injunction's scope.

Issue:

Whether or not the two cases involve, or grow out of, a labor dispute

Ruling:

PAFLU is engaged in a strike and picket against METBANK, a separate entity unrelated
to Wellington and Galang, who are only METBANK's landlord and co-lessee. There's no
evident connection between them and the labor dispute. The cases fall under Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court on injunction, and the complaints show facts supporting the relief
demanded.

While the right to picket is protected as free speech, it's not absolute. Courts can
regulate it to protect third parties, like "innocent bystanders." Wellington and Galang are
such bystanders entitled to seek court protection. The court annuls the injunctions due
to irregularities, like the failure to require necessary bonds, amounting to a grave abuse
of discretion. Certiorari is granted, annulling the injunctions without prejudice to the right
of Wellington and Galang to secure others by filing required bonds.

PAFLU v. Barot, 99 Phil 1008

Facts:
Before March 31, 1955, L. C. Eugenio & Co., Inc. leased Republic and Majestic theaters
to Republic Theater Enterprises, Inc., and Majestic Theater, Inc. These corporations
operated the theaters and entered a collective bargaining agreement with PAFLU on
February 16, 1955. The agreement would expire on December 31, 1956, with an option
to renew for two more years. On March 31, 1955, L. C. Eugenio sold the theaters to
Goodwill Trading Co., Inc. for P950,000. On April 25, 1955, Eugenio terminated the
lease with Republic Theater Enterprises and Majestic Theater, Inc.

On April 26, 1955, Goodwill Trading leased the theaters to Rema, Inc. Rema, Inc. then
began operating the theaters, hiring new employees. The original employees,
represented by labor unions, started picketing, claiming their rights under the February
16, 1955, collective bargaining agreement and alleging that the sale to Goodwill Trading
was fictitious.

Rema, Inc. filed a case for declaratory relief with preliminary injunction against the
unions in the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the hearing, Rema presented
evidence of violence and threats by union members. The unions had the chance to
submit counter-affidavits but did not. The court issued an order, prompting Rema, Inc. to
file a petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent court did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
same or to issue injunction in the case.

Ruling:

The trial judge ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between the
union and Rema, a decision previously addressed in another case involving the same
parties. The court stated that a labor dispute need not involve a direct employer-
employee connection for it to be recognized as such. However, it was also emphasized
that the Court of Industrial Relations lacks jurisdiction over labor dispute cases after the
approval of Republic Act No. 875, except in specific instances defined by the law. The
Court of First Instance of Manila had the authority to hear Rema's case against the
unions, and the remaining question was whether the court abused its discretion in
granting the preliminary injunction.

Republic Act No. 875 outlines the procedure for courts to follow when considering
injunctions against picketing. The court order faced objections as there was no open
court hearing with witnesses, no finding of facts regarding threatened unlawful acts or
lack of adequate legal remedy, and no indication that public officers were unable or
unwilling to provide sufficient protection. Moreover, the order wrongly prohibited the
union from picketing, a legitimate labor right. While the Court of First Instance had
jurisdiction, it overstepped its powers by enjoining lawful picketing and not strictly
adhering to the legal procedure outlined in the law for issuing an injunction.
Therefore, the requested writ is granted, and the challenged order is annulled, with no
costs imposed.

Mortera v. CIR, 79 Phil 345

Facts:

The petitioners seek the annulment of the Court of Industrial Relations' order dated
February 21, 1947, in case No. 44-V(1), involving the "Bisig ng Canlubang (NLU) v.
Canlubang Sugar Estate."

The order instructs laborers to return to work immediately, prohibits picketing from
February 23, 1947, onwards, and authorizes the employment of new laborers if the
existing ones fail to report by February 24, 1947.

Petitioners argue that the order is contrary to law and issued without proper jurisdiction.
They also claim that members of the Canlubang Workers’ Union (CLO) were not given
the opportunity to defend themselves.

Issues:

Whether the petitioners, who formed a new union (Canlubang Workers’ Union), are still
subject to the Court of Industrial Relations' jurisdiction in case No. 44-V after seceding
from the original union (Bisig ng Canlubang).

Whether the blanket prohibition against picketing in the court order violates the
constitutional right to freedom of speech.

Ruling:

The Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over the petitioners even after forming
a new union. The court emphasizes that the change in union affiliation does not affect
its jurisdiction, preventing a scheme to undermine court orders and decisions.

The blanket prohibition against picketing is clarified to apply only to illegal picketing that
involves the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing, considered part of freedom of
speech, is not prohibited.

The petition seeking the annulment of the court order is dismissed as the petitioners
failed to show grounds for annulment, and no specific details about other proceedings
are provided.

Philtread Workers Union v. Confesor, 269 SCRA 393

Facts:

Philtread Tire Workers Union (PTWU) filed a notice of strike on May 27, 1994, citing
unfair labor practices by Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, including union busting
and CBA violation.

In response, Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation filed a notice of lockout and a
petition to declare illegal work slowdowns staged by the union.

The National Labor Relations Commission declared the slowdowns illegal on August 15,
1994, resulting in the dismissal of about eighty union members.

On August 31, 1994, the corporation requested the Secretary of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over the labor dispute.

On September 8, 1994, Secretary Confesor issued an order enjoining the strike, leading
to the filing of a motion for reconsideration by the petitioners, which was denied on
September 26, 1994.

Considering the alleged restriction of the Secretary's power to industries indispensable

to national interest and the claim that the tire industry and Philtread Tire and Rubber
Corporation do not meet this criterion, petitioners argue that the order violates Article 3
of the International Labor Organization Convention No. 87, prohibiting public authorities
from interfering in purely union matters.

Issue:

1. Whether Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code is unconstitutional, particularly in relation
to the workers' right to strike as provided by Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution.

2. Whether the Secretary of Labor, in issuing the order to enjoin the strike, acted with
grave abuse of discretion,

Ruling:

The petition, challenging the constitutionality of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code and
the Secretary of Labor's order enjoining a strike, is deemed without merit. The court
references Union of Filipino Employees vs. Nestle Philippines, Inc., stating that Articles
263 and 264 of the Labor Code have not been repealed and are recognized as valid by
Congress. It emphasizes that the Secretary of Labor's jurisdiction, under Article 263 (g),
is an exercise of police power for the common good.

The court asserts that Article 263 (g) does not violate workers' right to strike but
regulates it when national interests are at stake. The Secretary's discretion to determine
industries indispensable to national interest is upheld, emphasizing the need for
industrial peace and a speedy resolution of disputes.

On the second issue, the court finds no grave abuse of discretion in the Secretary's
certification for compulsory arbitration. It cites evidence of work slowdowns affecting the
company's production and financial losses, leading to an indefinite cease of operations.
The court rejects the argument that the company is not indispensable to national
interest, noting its substantial contribution to the tire industry and employment of around
700 workers.

The court affirms the Secretary of Labor's order, emphasizing the necessity of
intervention to settle a prolonged labor dispute affecting both the company and the
union. The petition is dismissed.

Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 193 SCRA 223

Facts:

The 1986-1989 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Philippine Airlines

(PAL) and the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) included pay
increases and the creation of a PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel. Disagreements arose
during panel conferences regarding minimum salary levels, wage adjustments, and
retroactive pay. PALEA accused PAL of bargaining in bad faith, leading to a notice of
strike filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). PAL filed a
motion to dismiss the notice of strike, citing its prematurity.

The real issues were identified as the determination of minimum entry rates, wage
adjustments, and retroactive pay. Despite NCMB's initial advice that the issues were not
grounds for a lawful strike, PALEA proceeded with a strike vote. PAL sought Secretary
of Labor Franklin Drilon's assumption of jurisdiction to avert the strike due to PAL's
national interest and potential economic repercussions.

However, Secretary Drilon's response was delayed, and PALEA declared a strike,
causing significant disruptions. Secretary Drilon eventually assumed jurisdiction, issued
orders resolving the dispute, and declared the strike valid. The awarded benefits
included adjustments to minimum entry levels, across-the-board increases, and a
goodwill bonus. The Secretary warned against retaliatory actions.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which Secretary Drilon denied three
months later. In this petition for review, PAL avers that the Secretary of Labor gravely
abused his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling:

Under Article 263 of the Labor Code, the Labor Secretary's authority is limited to
resolving labor disputes' issues within 30 days, excluding the legality of any strikes. The
Secretary declared the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) strike valid
without jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the legality of strikes is with Labor Arbiters, not the Labor Secretary, as
per Article 217 of the Labor Code. The Secretary's declaration of the strike's validity and
prohibition on retaliatory actions exceeded his authority.

The strike was deemed illegal for three reasons: it was premature, violated the CBA's
no-strike provision, and contradicted the National Conciliation and Mediation Board's
(NCMB) declaration for preventive mediation. The Secretary's delay in acting on PAL's
petition does not excuse the union's irresponsible actions. PAL has the right to take
disciplinary action against the union. The orders of the Labor Secretary were set aside,
but the monetary benefits awarded to the union were affirmed. Costs were imposed on
respondent PALEA.

International Pharmaceuticals v. Secretary of Labor, 205 SCRA 59

Facts:

Before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement between International

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Company) and the Associated Labor Union (Union), the Union's
demands were not met, leading to a deadlock. The Union went on strike, resulting in
several labor cases.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) cases involved a petition for
injunction against the Union, a complaint for unfair labor practice by the Union against
the Company, and a petition by the Company to declare the strike illegal. Due to the
industry's national interest, the Acting Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction.

The Union sought consolidation of the NLRC cases, which the Secretary approved. The
Company argued that the labor arbiter, not the Secretary, has exclusive jurisdiction over
the NLRC cases. The Company also contested the rule that halts proceedings before
the labor arbiter in cases under the Secretary's jurisdiction, claiming it amends Article
263(g) of the Labor Code. The Company further argued that the Secretary overstepped
by consolidating cases beyond the deadlock and contempt issues.
Respondents argued that the Secretary's authority covers all aspects of labor disputes
in industries vital to national interest, extending to related questions and incidents.

Issue:

Whether or not the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment has the
authority to take control of a labor dispute, along with its related issues, such as unfair
labor practices, that may lead to a strike or lockout in a crucial industry for the national
interest

Ruling:

Three key labor law provisions determine the jurisdictional issue:

1. Article 217(a)(1) and (5) of the Labor Code grant Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction
over unfair labor practice cases and matters arising from violations of Article 264,
including questions on the legality of strikes and lockouts.

2. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code empowers the Secretary of Labor and Employment
to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in a nationally essential industry.

3. Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC directs that when the Secretary
assumes jurisdiction over a dispute, parties must inform the Labor Arbiter, who should
then await instructions from the Secretary or the Commission.

These provisions indicate that the Secretary, in issuing the challenged orders, did not
abuse discretion. Jurisdiction involves the authority to hear and decide a case. While
jurisdiction over the person and subject matter is essential, the Secretary's authority to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute, as granted by Article 263(g), extends to related
issues, including those under the exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters.

Article 217 of the Labor Code allows exceptions, and Article 263(g) is designed to share
jurisdiction between the Secretary and labor arbiters. This sharing ensures an effective
resolution of the primary dispute. In this case, the Secretary, through Article 263(g),
gained jurisdiction over matters usually under labor arbiters' exclusive purview due to a
deadlock in collective bargaining negotiations leading to a strike. The NLRC cases are
connected to the negotiation stalemate and strike, justifying the Secretary's
consolidation and assumption of jurisdiction for comprehensive dispute resolution.

Rejecting the company's argument that NLRC cases are separate from the bargaining
deadlock promotes orderly justice administration, preventing split jurisdiction.

Additionally, in interpreting labor laws, doubts should favor labor. Upholding the
Secretary's orders aligns with this principle, ensuring workers prompt access to their
rights and benefits without undue legal hurdles.
Marcopper v. Brillantes, 254 SCRA 595

Facts:
On May 27, 1994, Philtread Tire Workers Union (PTWU), the petitioner, initiated a
notice of strike (NCMB-NCR Case No. 05-281-94) citing unfair labor practices,
particularly union busting and CBA violations.[2] In response, on May 30, 1994,
Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, the private respondent, filed a notice of lockout
(NCMB-NCR Case No. 05-013-94)[3] and a petition to deem the work slowdowns
staged by the PTWU illegal. The cases were consolidated, leading to unsuccessful
conciliation meetings. Subsequently, on June 15, 1994, the private respondent declared
a company-wide lockout that lasted until August 22, 1994. As a consequence,
approximately eighty union members were dismissed, prompting the filing of a notice to
strike in self-defense in NCMB-NCR Case No. 05-281-94.

Issue:

Whether or not the strike is illegal?

Ruling:

Yes, regarding the second issue raised by the petitioners, we conclude that the
Secretary of Labor did not exhibit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the certification
for compulsory arbitration. The Labor Arbiter, in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-04156-94,
had determined that the work slowdowns conducted by the petitioners constituted illegal
strikes. Evidence demonstrated a clear correlation between the company's failure to
meet the petitioner union's demands and a subsequent decline in production. Notably,
each time the union's demand for the restoration of overtime work was met, production
improved. The work slowdowns, akin to strikes on an installment basis, formed a
discernible pattern of manipulating production based on the union's demands. These
strikes significantly impacted the respondent company, leading to its indefinite cessation
of operations on November 11, 1994, due to substantial financial losses.

Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc. 192 SCRA 396

Facts:

Certainly. UFE lodged a notice of strike with the BLR against Filipro, now Nestle, and
concurrently filed an Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) complaint against Nestle and its
officials. Responding to Nestle's petition for the assumption of jurisdiction or certification
to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, then Minister of Labor and Employment Blas F.
Ople issued an assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Under this assumption,
any strike, lockout, or concerted actions like slowdowns, sitdowns, or noise barrages
during office hours that may disrupt company operations were strictly prohibited.

UFE subsequently filed a petition with the Supreme Court challenging the Minister's
assumption of jurisdiction. Despite the automatic injunction against any concerted
activity and the absence of a restraining order, union members, prompted by their
leaders and in clear defiance of Minister Ople's Order, initiated a strike. They continued
to man picket lines not only at the Makati Administrative Office but also at Nestle's
factories and warehouses in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Cabuyao, Laguna, and Cagayan de
Oro City.

Issue:

Whether or not the certification order and/or assumption of jurisdiction of DOLE

Secretary constitutes as a return-to-work order

Ruling:

Yes, when the Secretary of Labor issues an assumption and/or certification order, it
automatically mandates the return-to-work of all striking workers, irrespective of whether
a specific order for such return has been issued. Therefore, the striking workers made
an error in persisting with their strike while claiming an absence of a return-to-work
order. Article 264(g) is explicit – once an assumption/certification order is issued,
ongoing strikes are prohibited, and all strikers must promptly resume work.

Engaging in a strike despite the Secretary of Labor's issuance of an assumption or

certification order transforms the activity into a prohibited and consequently illegal
action, as stipulated in the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code.
Consequently, Union officers and members are considered to have forfeited their
employment status due to their knowing involvement in an unlawful act.

Jaka Food v. Pacot, G.R No.151378, March28, 2005

Facts:

The employees, respondents in this case, were terminated by JAKA Foods Processing
on grounds of retrenchment due to financial difficulties. Consequently, they filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, asserting that the required written notices to the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the employees were not served at
least one (1) month before the intended termination date.

The initial ruling by the Labor Arbiter deemed the termination as illegal, directing the
reinstatement of the employees and the payment of full backwages, with the provision
for separation pay if reinstatement was not feasible.

Upon appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the decision altered
the remedy by denying full backwages but mandated the payment of separation pay.
Additionally, the NLRC acknowledged the failure to adhere to due process in executing
the retrenchment.
The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the NLRC decision but further included the
awarding of backwages, separation pay, and 13th-month pay.

Issue:

What are the legal implications of a situation where an employee is dismissed for cause
but such dismissal was effected without the employer's compliance with the notice
requirement under the Labor Code?

Ruling:

In Agabon, the employees were dismissed for a grave offense, abandonment, falling
under a just cause listed in Article 282 of the Labor Code. Although we upheld the
dismissal, we required the employer to pay P30,000.00 in nominal damages for not
complying with statutory due process, emphasizing the need for a stricter penalty to
deter the practice of 'dismiss now, pay later.' The present case differs as respondents
were terminated due to retrenchment, an authorized cause under Article 283.

Dismissals under Article 282 suggest employee misconduct, while those under Article
283 result from an employer's exercise of management prerogative. The distinction is
highlighted by the absence of separation pay in Article 282 cases, contrasting with the
requirement in Article 283 cases.

JAKA's records confirm serious business losses justifying the retrenchment but reveal a
failure to comply with the notice requirement. Considering these circumstances, we set
the indemnity at P50,000.00. However, the Court of Appeals erred in ordering JAKA to
pay separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary per year of service. The standard
rule mandates separation pay in cases of business closure unless due to serious
business losses, forfeiting employees' right to separation pay, as proven in this
instance.

Alhambra Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R No. 106771, November 18, 1994

Facts:

He was summoned to the Head Office on January 3, 1990, where the company alleged
he violated its rules. On January 8, 1990, Rupisan faced a one-month preventive
suspension for serious breaches of company policies identified in a surprise audit.

On January 22, 1990, Rupisan objected to his suspension, strongly denying the charges
against him.

On March 23, 1990, Rupisan filed a lawsuit against ALHAMBRA for illegal dismissal and
unpaid wages or commissions. The suit was later amended on April 24, 1990, to include
claims of illegal suspension and damages.\
Issue:

Whether or not whether respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in

sustaining the finding of the Labor Arbiter that Rupisan was illegally dismissed but
directing at the same time his reinstatement

Ruling:

Under the amended Labor Code, the lawful dismissal of an employee necessitates
compliance with both substantive and procedural requirements. The termination must
be for a valid cause specified by law, and due process, involving notice and a hearing,
must be observed before dismissal. Without meeting both criteria, the termination lacks
legal validity.

On June 27, 1987, Alhambra Industries, Inc. (ALHAMBRA), a Filipino cigar and
cigarette manufacturing company, hired Danilo C. Rupisan as a salesman on a six-
month probationary basis. From December 9 to 12, 1989, ALHAMBRA conducted a
surprise audit of Rupisan's records.

Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr., determined that Rupisan's termination was justified.
However, he also found a violation of Rupisan's right to due process, specifically
ALHAMBRA's failure to provide him with a copy of the audit report leading to his
dismissal. Consequently, the arbiter ordered ALHAMBRA to pay Rupisan P23,040.00 in
back wages for the period from February 8 to November 19, 1990, along with P6.

The mistake is consequential. A termination without just cause entitles a worker to

reinstatement, irrespective of procedural due process. Conversely, termination for a
valid cause, even without procedural due process, does not warrant reinstatement but
exposes the employer to liability for damages.

In this case, the decision to dismiss Rupisan did not specify the reason for termination,
disregarding Sec. 6, Rule XIV, Book V, of the Omnibus Rules. However, as Rupisan
was found guilty of serious misconduct, he cannot demand reinstatement or separation
pay. Nonetheless, he is entitled to damages due to ALHAMBRA's failure to adhere to
procedural due process, a requirement mandated by law.

Gonzales v. NLRC, G.R No. 125735, August 26, 1999;

Facts:

Lorlene Gonzales, a schoolteacher at Ateneo de Davao University (ATENEO), faced

allegations of using corporal punishment on students. In 1991, she received a letter
about parental complaints but wasn't informed of their identities. Two years later, she
discovered ATENEO soliciting complaints against her.
In 1993, an investigative committee was formed to probe the alleged corporal
punishment. Gonzales objected to the rules, claiming a violation of due process. The
committee proceeded without her participation. Eleven witnesses testified, and affidavits
were obtained.

On November 10, 1993, ATENEO terminated Gonzales based on the committee's

findings. A demand for her voluntary resignation followed. In response, she filed an
illegal dismissal complaint, leading to a decision by Executive Labor Arbiter Conchita J.
Martinez favoring Gonzales.

However, the NLRC reversed the decision in 1996, declaring the dismissal valid but
recommending retirement benefits. Gonzales now seeks to overturn this decision
through this petition.

Issue:

whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining as valid and legal
the dismissal of petitioner by private respondent ATENEO.

Ruling:

The NLRC overlooked crucial issues raised by the petitioner, particularly the absence of
due process. When notified of termination, an employee has the right to due process,
encompassing procedural and substantial aspects. This involves the opportunity for the
employee to defend themselves, understand the charges, and cross-examine
witnesses. The Investigative Committee's refusal to revise rules denied the petitioner
these rights, violating her statutory and constitutional due process.

ATENEO's failure to counter the claim that affidavits were pre-prepared casts doubt on
their evidentiary value. The evidence did not meet the standard of substantial evidence
required in administrative investigations. The case against the petitioner relied on
questionable witness affidavits, and recantation affidavits weakened ATENEO's
position. The dismissal lacked grounds, as evidenced by petitioner's competence and
dedication over 17 years of service.

Given these considerations, the NLRC's conclusion is unwarranted. Employment goes

beyond a contractual relationship; it involves property rights crucial for a family's
sustenance and education. The State protects employees from unjust dismissals,
making the right to security of tenure both statutory and constitutional.

Therefore, the NLRC's decision is reversed, and the Executive Labor Arbiter's decision
favoring the petitioner is reinstated, affirmed, and adopted in this case.

Hellenic Shipping, Inc. v. Siete, GR No. 84082, March 13, 1991;

Facts:

Siete was employed by Sultan Shipping Co., Ltd. as the Master of M/V Houda G on May
22, 1985.

After boarding the vessel in Cyprus, it sailed to El Ferrol, Spain, then to Tripoli,
Lebanon, and back to Cyprus.

On July 8, 1985, Capt. Wilfredo Lim informed Siete that he was relieved of command,
confirmed by a telex on July 10, 1985.

Siete filed a complaint on July 12, 1985, against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of salary and benefits.

The petitioner claimed Siete was dismissed due to failure to comply with instructions to
erase the timber load line and negligence in cargo discharge.

The POEA Administrator dismissed the complaint, citing evidence provided by the
petitioner.

Siete appealed to the NLRC, arguing dismissal violated due process, and documents
presented were hearsay and not verified.

The NLRC reversed the POEA decision, declaring Siete's dismissal illegal and ordering
payment of salaries, wages, and benefits. The accuracy of the awarded amounts in the
NLRC decision and the deduction of $400.90 previously collected by Siete are
questioned.

Issue:

Whether the dismissal of Siete was valid, considering the alleged violations, and if due
process was observed during the termination proceedings

Ruling:

The request for Certiorari is denied. The court upholds the findings of the public
respondent, stating that substantial evidence supports the claim that the private
respondent was not notified of charges against him, and no investigation justified his
dismissal. The reports submitted by the petitioner, prepared after Siete's dismissal, are
deemed suspect. The Labor Code mandates due process, including notice, hearing,
and a clear decision in case of dismissal. The argument that defects in dismissal were
cured during POEA proceedings is rejected, as due process must be observed in both
stages. Even if Siete were a managerial employee, he is entitled to due process, and
the petitioner failed to prove the justification for his dismissal.

It is not correct to say that managerial employees may be arbitrarily dismissed, at any
time and without cause as established in an appropriate investigation. Managerial
employees, no less than rank-and-file laborers, are entitled to due process. Loss of
confidence, which is the usual ground for the removal of the managerial employee, must
be established like any other lawful cause. Even if it be assumed that Siete was a
managerial employee — an issue which, incidentally, was not earlier raised or resolved
— the petitioner has not satisfactorily proved the reason for its supposed loss of
confidence in him.

Inter-Orient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R No. 115286, August 11, 1994;

Facts:

Jeremias Pineda was contracted to work as Oiler on board the vessel, MV Amazonia,
from Dec. 21, 1988 to Sept. 28,1989. When he finished his contract, he was discharged
from the port of Dubai for repatriation to Manila. During his layover in Bangkok,
Thailand, he disembarked on his own free will and failed to join the connecting flight to
Hongkong. During which, he was shot by a Thai Policeman and died. The police report
submitted to the Philippine Embassy in Bangkok confirmed that it was Pineda who
‘approached and tried to stab the police sergeant with a knife and that therefore he was
forced to pull out his gun and shot Pineda.

The deceased’s mother, Constancia Pineda, filed for death compensation benefits
against Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. and it foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping
Corporation and the Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. They averred that the
deceased seaman was suffering from mental disorder aggravated by threats on his life
by his fellow seamen, the Ship Captain should not have allowed him to travel alone.

Respondent agency averred that they are not liable to pay any death/burial benefits
pursuant to the provisions of Par. 6, Section C, Part II, POEA-SEC which states that ‘no
compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death
resulting from a willfull act on his own life by the seaman’; that the deceased seaman
died due to his own wilfull act in attacking a policeman in Bangkok who shot him in self-
defense.”

Issue:

Whether or not the local crewing or manning agent and its foreign principal are liable for
the death of a Filipino seaman-employee who, after having been discharged, was killed
in-transit while being repatriated home

Ruling:
Though the termination of the employment contract was duly effected in Dubai, still, the
responsibility of the foreign employer to see to it that Pineda was duly repatriated to the
point of hiring subsisted. Section 4, Rule VIII of the Rules and Regulations Governing
Overseas Employment clearly provides for the duration of the mandatory personal
accident and life insurance covering accidental death, dismemberment and disability of
overseas workers:

“Section 4. Duration of Insurance Coverage.—The minimum coverage shall take effect

upon payment of the premium and shall be extended worldwide, on and off the job, for
the duration of the worker’s contract plus 60 calendar days after termination of the
contract of employment’, provided that in no case shall the duration of the insurance
coverage be less than one year.”

The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a
companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by
its agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed
by petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some
mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone is appalling.

Samaniego v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 111; PAL v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 672

Facts:

The petitioners, former managerial employees of Sandvik Philippines, Inc., were offered
two options during a company reorganization: termination with separation benefits or
voluntary resignation with improved benefits. After negotiations, three petitioners
accepted the resignation option, and the fourth initially chose termination but later opted
for resignation with enhanced terms. They signed resignation letters, received benefits,
and later protested their acceptance. Despite depositing checks and receiving additional
benefits, the petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, discrimination, and
damages. The labor arbiter ruled in their favor, but the NLRC reversed, concluding the
resignations were voluntary. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners' resignations were voluntary or coerced during the company
reorganization, and if their acceptance of benefits bars them from contesting the validity
of their dismissal.

Ruling:

The discussions relating to the validity of the company reorganization are, therefore,
immaterial. This matter is pertinent only if the petitioners were indeed dismissed from
their employment due to such reorganization. The Court is convinced that this is a case
of voluntary resignation on the part of the petitioners.

It should be emphasized that notwithstanding the intended reorganization of the

company, the petitioners were given the option to resign from the company with
corresponding benefits attending such option. They opted for resignation on account of
these negotiated benefits. In termination cases, the employee is not afforded any
option; the employee is dismissed and his only recourse is to institute a complaint for
illegal dismissal against his employer, assuming of course that there are valid grounds
for doing so. In this particular case, the petitioners were given the option to resign. It
was the option they chose. Thus, there is no illegal dismissal to speak of.

It must be emphasized as well that the petitioners are not ordinary laborers or rank-and-
file personnel who may not be able to completely comprehend and realize the
consequences of their acts. The petitioners are managerial employees holding
responsible positions. They are educated individuals. For his part, petitioner Samaniego
immediately assumed a ranking position in a competing company after his resignation
from Sandvik Philippines, Inc. Under these circumstances, it can hardly be said that
they were coerced into resigning from the company.

It clearly appears that the petitioners voluntarily resigned from the company for a
valuable consideration. The quitclaim they executed in favor of the company amounts to
a valid and binding compromise agreement. To allow the petitioners to repudiate the
same will be to countenance unjust enrichment on their part. The Court will not permit
such a situation.

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R No. 167614, March 24, 2009

Facts:

Serrano was hired by Gallant Maritime under a POEA approved Contract of

Employment. In 1998, on the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept
a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer, upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by
the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence,
petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated. He had served only
two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine
(9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed a Complaint with the Labor Arbiter (LA) against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims.
• The LA declared the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarded him monetary benefits
based on the salary period of three months only - - rather than the entire unexpired
portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner's employment contract. Both petitioner
and respondents appealed from the decision of LA.

• The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to
petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00
because R.A. No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should
be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay.

• The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate

Petitioner claims that the Sec. 10 of RA 8042 violates the OFWs' constitutional rights
because it

(a)impairs the terms of their contract, it unduly interferes with the stipulations in his
contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive.

(b) deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.

He contends that he is entitled of the entire nine months and 23 days left of his
employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00

Issue:

1. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on
non-impairment of contract.

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article Il and Section 3, Article XIlI on labor as a protected sector?

Ruling:

The court supports the petitioner on the issues presented.

In judicial review of co-equal branches like Congress, it's considered when there's a
genuine case involving conflicting rights, raised by a proper party at the earliest
opportunity, and is the main issue in the case. In this case, there's a real conflict with
the petitioner, the constitutional challenge is timely, and it's a critical aspect of the case.

Addressing the constitutionality of the subject clause, it's found not to violate the non-
impairment of contracts under Section 10, Article III of the Constitution. The law was
enacted before the employment contract, so it's considered part of it. Even if the
timeline is disregarded, the law, enacted in the exercise of police power, prevails.
However, the subject clause is found to violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
Section 18, Article II, and Section 3, Article XIII regarding labor rights. While not
absolute, rights are subject to valid classification. The court applies a middle-tier or
intermediate scrutiny, where the government must prove the classification serves an
important state interest and is substantially related to that interest.

Rasonable v. NLRC, G.R No. 117195, February 20, 1996;

Facts:

On March 19, 1993, Danny T. Rasonable filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
Victory Liner, Inc. and Joey Guevarra. Labor Arbiter Ariel C. Santos found the
respondents guilty and ordered them to pay Rasonable P84,957.47. Both parties
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Rasonable sought a
modification for full backwages and additional benefits, while respondents claimed the
case was not yet submitted for decision due to ongoing settlement talks. The NLRC
modified the decision by increasing separation pay and removing attorney’s fees. Both
parties filed motions for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied them. Private
respondents filed a petition to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 116848), which was denied.
Rasonable filed a separate petition against private respondents and the NLRC, claiming
grave abuse of discretion for not awarding attorney’s fees and other benefits.

Issue:

1. The NLRC's modification of the Labor Arbiter's decision.

2. Alleged grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC in not awarding attorney’s fees and
other benefits.

Ruling:

The issue of illegal dismissal is settled, and the focus is on determining the monetary
awards for the petitioner. The NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by denying
attorney's fees, as they are warranted in cases of wage recovery. The denial of service
incentive pay and holiday pay is upheld due to insufficient evidence. The petitioner
claims entitlement to separation pay, backwages, and 13th-month pay not only until the
Labor Arbiter's decision but also until its finality. The NLRC, citing the Labor Code,
contends that backwages should be paid until actual reinstatement. However, the
petitioner, awarded separation pay instead of reinstatement, argues for continued
entitlement to 13th-month pay and backwages after the Labor Arbiter's decision. The
court finds merit in the petitioner's argument.

As the law stands now, an employee who has been illegally dismissed after the
effectivity of R.A. 6715 shall be entitled to reinstatement, full backwages and other
benefits for the entire period that he was out of work and until actual reinstatement.
However, in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may instead be awarded separation pay.
Separation pay is the amount that an employee receives at the time of his severance
from the service and is designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during
the period that he is looking for another employment. 14 The grant of separation pay
does not preclude an award for backwages for the latter represents the amount of
earnings lost by reason of the unjustified dismissal. Additionally, a dismissed employee
is entitled to 13th month pay.

Callanta v. Carnation, 145 SCRA 268

Facts:

Upon clearance approved by the MOLE Regional Office, respondent dismissed the
petitioner in June 1979. On July 1982, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case with
claim for reinstatement with the Labor Arbiter, who granted it. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the judgment based on the contention that the action by the petitioner has
already prescribed, since Art. 291 & 292 of the Labor Code is expressed that offenses
penalized under the Code and all money claims arising from employer-employee
relationships shall be filed within 3 years from when such cause of action arises,
otherwise it will be barred.

Issue:

Is ruling of the NLRC correct?

Ruling:

No. It is a principle well recognized in this jurisdiction, that one's employment,

profession, trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is
an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of the
Constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes
a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Such violation,
however, does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor
Code. In its broad sense, an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime
as defined in the penal law, but which by statute carries with it a penalty similar to those
imposed by law for the punishment of a crime. The confusion arises over the use of the
term "illegal dismissal" which creates the impression that termination of an employment
without just cause constitutes an offense. It must be noted, however that unlike in cases
of commission of any of the prohibited activities during strikes or lockouts under Article
265, unfair labor practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and illegal recruitment
activities under Article 38, among others, which the Code itself declares to be unlawful,
termination of an employment without just or valid cause is not categorized as an
unlawful practice.
Tomas Claudio memorial College, Inc. v. CA, G.R No. 152568, February 16, 2004

Facts:

Pedro Natividad, an employee of TCMC was arrested by the police authorities without
warrant, for violation of RA No. 6425. A memo was served to him informing that his
employment was already terminated. While the investigation was ongoing, Natividad
was barred from entering the school premises. In June 1997, he filed a complaint with
the NLRC for an illegal dismissal on the ground that there was no factual basis for his
dismissal and he was deprived of his right to due process.

Issue:

What are the consequences of an illegal dismissal.

Ruling:

In Santos v. NLRC, the normal consequences of a finding that an employee has been
illegally dismissed are, firstly, that the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement to
his former position without loss of seniority rights and secondly, the payment of
backwages corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual
reinstatement. The statutory intent on this matter is clearly discernible. Reinstatement
restores the employee who was unjustly dismissed to the position from which he was
removed, that is, to his status quo ante dismissal, while the grant of backwages allows
the same employee to recover from the employer that which he had lost by way of
wages as a result of his dismissal. These twin remedies-reinstatement and payment of
backwages – make the dismissed employee whole who can then look forward to
continued employment. Thus do these two remedies give meaning and substance to the
constitutional right of labor to security of tenure. The two forms of relief are distinct and
separate, one from the other. Though the grant of reinstatement commonly carries with
it an award of backwages, the inappropriateness or non-availability of one does not
carry with it the inappropriateness or non-availability of the other…

The payment of backwages is generally granted on the ground of equity. It is a form of

relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of the unlawful dismissal; the
grant thereof is intended to restore the earnings that would have accrued to the
dismissed employee during the period of dismissal until it is determined that the
termination of employment is for a just cause.

Manipon, Jr. v. NLRC, G.R no. 105338, December 24, 1994

Facts:

The petitioner, initially employed as a security guard, faced issues after a service
firearm and ammunition were lost while in the possession of another guard. The
petitioner was held responsible for 75% of the loss, resulting in a salary deduction.
Subsequently, the petitioner was transferred to a new assignment but was given
minimal duties and ultimately not assigned any tasks despite regular reporting. Feeling
unfairly treated, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction,
and other labor law violations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner, ordering the payment of separation
pay. However, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) overturned this
decision, deeming the case without merit. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was also denied by the NLRC.

Issue:

Whether the assailed decision was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when public respondent set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter;
and, whether the act of private respondent in refusing to give petitioner a new
assignment or post for more than six months constitutes constructive dismissal.

Ruling:

The NLRC made an error in adopting the private respondent's claim that the petitioner
was placed on "reserve" or "standby" rather than being dismissed. The NLRC relied on
a previous case, Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency v. NLRC, to support its
decision. However, the circumstances in the current case differ significantly from the
Veterans case, where the security guard was awaiting reassignment after an
investigation. In the present case, the petitioner was relieved from his post and faced
indirect dismissal measures after protesting against a salary deduction related to the
loss of a firearm and ammunition. It is evident that the waiting period in this instance
cannot be considered as constructive dismissal, as opposed to the situation in the
Veterans case. The petitioner's removal from duty and subsequent assignments were
clear indications of an attempt to dismiss him, especially considering the private
respondent's displeasure with the petitioner's objection to being held accountable for
another employee's mistake.

Salvador v. CA, G.R No. 127501, May 5, 2000;

Facts:

Petitioner Conrado C. Salvador had been a permanent employee of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) since 1964. In 1987, DENR underwent
reorganization, converting several positions to co-terminous with termination set for
December 31, 1991. Fearing termination, co-employees filed a case, "Blaquera versus
Civil Service Commission," to prevent service termination, which was ongoing during
the reorganization. Meanwhile, petitioner, facing the threat of termination, accepted
reappointment as Senior Executive Assistant I, R-66/SG-17. He protested this with the
Civil Service Commission. Later, he was "promoted" to Forester III, a lower-ranking
position.

Amidst these events, petitioner received a letter on January 16, 1992, deeming him
terminated due to his co-terminous position. On February 24, 1992, he joined co-
employees in G.R. No. 103121, arguing his removal was illegal. The court, on
September 10, 1993, ruled in favor of the petitioners, nullifying their removal, ordering
reinstatement to former or equivalent positions without loss of benefits, and instructing
the reinstatement of appropriation for their salaries. The court's decision made the
temporary restraining order permanent.

The Decision in G.R. No. 103121, issued on September 10, 1993, became final on
October 25, 1993. On December 8, 1993, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued
Resolution No. 94-6623, directing the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) to appoint the petitioners, including Conrado C. Salvador, under the
same terms as their pre-1987 reorganization employment. Despite this and the court
decision, the DENR refused to reinstate Salvador to his former position. When a
relevant position became vacant, Salvador applied for it, but the appointment was given
to another.

In response, on February 13, 1995, Salvador filed a Motion to Cite Certain Respondents
in Contempt against the Selections and Promotions Board of DENR and a Civil Service
Commission officer. The Court of Appeals, docketing it as CA-G.R. SP No. 37611,
issued a resolution on September 3, 1996, denying Salvador's motion. The court ruled
that since Salvador had received a permanent appointment in the DENR, he was no
longer covered by the G.R. No. 103121 decision. The court also emphasized the
discretionary nature of the DENR's appointing power and stated that Salvador had no
vested right to the position he applied for.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the questioned resolution of the respondent Special Sixth Division of
the Court of Appeals dated September 3, 1996 amounts to an amendment or
modification by the respondent appellate court of the ruling of the Honorable Supreme
Court en banc in Blaquera v. Civil Service Commission.

2. Whether or not the motion to cite the chairman and members of the Selections and
Promotions Board of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR as well as Civil
Service Commission Field Officer Carlito L. Quiazon, Jr. in contempt of court filed by the
petitioner should be granted

Ruling:

The argument revolves around the contention that the petitioner, Conrado C. Salvador,
should not be excluded from the reinstatement order in G.R. No. 103121 simply
because he accepted a permanent position during the case's pendency. The Court of
Appeals, relying on a DENR Memorandum, claimed that Salvador, by accepting
permanent employment, differed from other petitioners who faced job loss. The
petitioner's acceptance of a lower-ranking, co-terminous position was deemed a
practical necessity due to job insecurity.

The memorandum stating that new appointments should cover only those holding co-
terminous positions at the time of the case's resolution. The petitioner argues that his
acceptance of employment elsewhere, while the case was pending, does not forfeit his
right to reinstatement, citing precedent (East Asiastic Company Ltd. v. CIR). The Court
further rejects the Court of Appeals' ruling that the DENR's appointing power is
discretionary, emphasizing the ministerial duty to comply with reinstatement orders.

In conclusion, the Court finds that the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement and
disagrees with the Court of Appeals' exclusion based on employment during the case's
pendency. However, it does not deem the respondents' actions as contempt,
considering the Secretary of the DENR's good faith but erroneous judgment. The
resolution instructs the respondents to comply strictly with the G.R. No. 103121
decision.

Macosero v. Southern Industrial Gases, Phils., G.R No. 178524, January 30, 2009

Facts:

Panfilo Macasero worked as a Carbon Dioxide Bulk Tank Escort for Southern Industrial
Gases, Philippines since September 1995, earning ₱200 for every 24-hour escort duty,
along with allowances. In January 1999, he filed a complaint against the company for
illegal dismissal, claiming he was informed in September 1998 that his services were no
longer needed.

The company argued that no employer-employee relationship existed due to the

occasional nature of Macasero's work and his lack of supervision. The Labor Arbiter
ruled he was a regular employee but not illegally dismissed. The NLRC affirmed,
modifying the separation pay computation. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision,
stating no evidence proved Macasero's dismissal.

Macasero argues the burden of proof lies with the company, claiming illegal dismissal.
Respondents maintain no employer-employee relationship and cite a lack of notice or
prevention from returning to work.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner was dismissed and if the dismissal was legal

Ruling:
The appellate court ratiocinated that before respondent company could be burdened
with proving the legality of dismissal, "there has to be details of acts attributed to
[respondents] constituting illegal dismissal if only to give [petitioner] the opportunity to
adduce evidence to defend himself from or disprove occurrence of such act or inaction,"
but that petitioner failed to do so. Respondents must not, however, only rely on the
seeming weakness of petitioner’s evidence, but must stand on the merits of their own
defense.

The Court finds incongruous the crediting by the labor tribunals and the appellate court
of respondents’ claim that petitioner must prove the fact of his dismissal with
particularity and at the same time accept respondents’ above-said unsubstantiated
claim that business slump prevented it from giving petitioner escorting assignment.

While both labor tribunals and the appellate court held that petitioner failed to prove the
fact of his dismissal, they oddly ordered the award of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement in light of respondent company’s "firm stance that [herein petitioner] was
not its employee [vis a vis] the unflinching assertion of [herein petitioner] that he was
which do[es] not create a fertile ground for reinstatement." It goes without saying that
the award of separation pay is inconsistent with a finding that there was no illegal
dismissal, for under Article 279 of the Labor Code and as held in a catena of cases, an
employee who is dismissed without just cause and without due process is entitled to
backwages and reinstatement or payment of separation pay in lieu thereof:

Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and

reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee
and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee
is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no
longer viable, and backwages.

The normal consequences of respondents’ illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement

without loss of seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the time
compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement
is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for
every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment of separation
pay is in addition to payment of backwages.

Gustillo v. Wyeth Phils, Inc., G.R No. 149629, October 4, 2004

Facts:

Gustilo was employed by Wyeth Phils., Inc. as a pharmaceutical territory manager. He

was in charge of the various branches in Metro Bacolod City and Negros Occidental.
Among his tasks were visiting hospitals, pharmacies, drugstores and physicians;
preparing and submitting his pre-dated itinerary; and submitting periodic reports of his
daily call visits, monthly itinerary and weekly locator and incurred expenses. His
employment records show that on various dates, private respondent has reprimanded
and suspended him for habitually neglecting to submit his periodic reports. When Wyeth
assigned Gustilo in charge of promoting 4 pharmaceutical products, the petitioner
committed to make an average of 18 daily calls to physicians, submit promptly all
periodic reports, and ensure 95% territory program performance every cycle.

However, Gustilo failed to achieve its objectives which prompted private respondent to
send him 2 notices charging him with willful violation of company rules and regulations
and directed him to submit a written explanation. Petitioner thereafter explained that he
was overworked and an object of reprisal by his immediate supervisor, Filemon
Verzano, Jr. Upon the recommendation of a review panel, Wyeth terminated the
services of Gustilo.

Gustilo filed with the Regional Arbiter Branch No. 6 in Bacolod City a complaint against
Wyeth for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter found that Gustilo
was illegally dismissed and ordered Wyeth and Verzano to pay petitioner P991,157.90
representing backwages, separation and benefits. Wyeth thereafter appealed to the
NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision with modification on the award which
ordered reinstatement of the petitioner instead of separation pay. Upon petition of
Wyeth for Certiorari and TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, the CA reversed
NLRC’s ruling and dismissed Gustilo’s complaint for illegal dismissal as his service was
terminated based on Article 282 of the Labor Code (gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties). However, he was awarded with separation pay considering the
mitigating factors of length of service, loyalty awards and Verzano’s grudge against
petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not Gustilo is entitled to separation pay.

Ruling:

No. Gustilo was dismissed with just cause. The SC held that the employer has
prerogative to prescribed reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper for the
conduct of its business or concern to provide certain disciplinary measures to implement
said rules and to assure that the same be complied with. At the same time, it is one of
the fundamental duties of the employee to yield obedience to all reasonable rules,
orders, and instructions of the employer, and willful or intentional disobedience thereof,
as a general rule, justifies rescission of the contract of service and the preemptory
dismissal of the employee.

A series of irregularities when put together may constitute serious misconduct, which
under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, is a just cause for dismissal. The rule
embodied in the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code is that a person
dismissed for cause as defined therein is not entitled to separation pay. In the case at
bar, there is no exceptional circumstances to warrant the grant of separation pay or
financial assistance to the petitioner.

Those who invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their
motives blameless. Therefore, the petition is denied.