G.R. No. 163256 - CICERON P. ALTAREJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 163256 : November 10, 2004]

CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE ALMIÑE and VERNON

VERSOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari , with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set aside the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), First Division, on March 22, 2004 disqualifying petitioner Ciceron P. Altarejos from
running as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, and another resolution of the COMELEC en banc promulgated on
May 7, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10,
2004 national and local elections.

On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almiñe Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of
San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy that "[he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a
foreign country."

Private respondents alleged that based on a letter 1 from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001,
petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507
issued on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846 issued on November
3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.2

On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer 3 stating, among others, that he did not commit false
representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was
already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a
petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that his Filipino
citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections.
Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition.

On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private
respondents filed their Memorandum, while petitioner did not file one within the required period. 4 Petitioner,
however, filed a Reply Memorandum5 subsequently.

Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of this case,
recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor of
San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. He found, thus:

xxx
The provisions of law governing the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials

are found in Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local

Government Code of 1991, which provide as follows:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a

registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of member of the

sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where

he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the

day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

xxx. crvll

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities,

component cities or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election

day.

[SEC. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective

position:]

xxx. crvll

(d) Those with dual citizenship.

xxx. crvll

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside

abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; xxx

Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an elective local

official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a dual citizenship; must not be

a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not have acquired the right to reside abroad.

In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent is

a citizen of the United States of America. Such fact is proven by his Alien Certificate of

Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3 November 1997 and Immigration Certificate of

Residence (ICR) with No. 320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Alien Registration Division,

Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June

2001 of then Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and

Deportation.

Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act

No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not restore to respondent his Filipino citizenship,

because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171 specifically provides that "repatriation

shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and

registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration."

It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has fully

complied with requirements of the above-quoted Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his
 repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship. Respondent has not submitted any document

to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he

has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of

Immigration. In fact, in a letter date 25 June 2001, Commissioner ANDREA DOMINGO stated

that RESPONDENT is still a holder of visa under Section 13 (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act

of 1940 as amended, with an indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying that

respondent did not register his supposed Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of

Immigration otherwise his Alien Visa would have already been cancelled. The rule is that in case

of doubt concerning the grant of citizenship, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the State

and against the applicant (Cheng v. Republic, L-16999, 22 June 1965).

xxx

Not having been able to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino citizenship after being

naturalized as a citizen of the United States, it is clear that respondent is not qualified to be

candidate for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, in the 10 May 2004 National and

Local Elections, pursuant to the aforequoted Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code

of 1991.

As a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent has also committed false

representation in his certificate of candidacy by stating therein that he is a natural-born Filipino

citizen, when in fact, he has not yet even perfected the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Such

false representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a

candidate for public office, which could be a valid ground for the cancellation of his certificate of

candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code x x x. 6

In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, adopted the findings and
recommendation of Director Zaragoza. The dispositive portion of said Resolution stated, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CICERON PEREZ ALTAREJOS is hereby

disqualified to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. Accordingly, his certificate of candidacy for

the position of Municipal Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate is denied due course and cancelled and

his name deleted from the certified list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. 7
On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached the following documents to
prove that he had completed all the requirements for repatriation which thus entitled him to run for an
elective office, viz:

(1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997;

(2) Identification Certificate No. 116543 issued by the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004;

(3) Certification from the City Civil Registration Office, Makati City, that the Certificate of Repatriation and
Oath of Allegiance of petitioner was received by said office and registered, with the corresponding fee paid,
on February 18, 2004;

(4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Bureau on
Immigration and Deportation that it was furnishing said office with the Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of
Repatriation of petitioner for the cancellation of petitioner's registration in said office as an alien, and the
issuance to him of the corresponding Identification Card as Filipino citizen;

(5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Local Registrar of
San Jacinto, Masbate that it was sending petitioner's Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation for
registration in their records and for petitioner's reacquisition of his former Philippine citizenship.

On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby

RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for UTTER LACK OF MERIT and AFFIRMS the

Resolution of the First Division.8

The Comelec en banc held, thus:

The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is

a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the

above provision and to be considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were

submitted during the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are

already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not

able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.

When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the Commission (First Division) the

respondent's only evidence was his Certificate of Repatriation dated 17 December 1977 and

marked as Annex 1 of his answer. This piece of evidence was not enough to controvert the

evidence of the petitioners which consist of the letter of the then Bureau of Immigration

Commissioner Andrea Domingo dated 25 June 2001 which stated that as of the even date

respondent is a holder of permanent resident visa (page 15 of the records) and the certification

of Josephine C. Camata dated 28 January 2004 certifying, that the name of the respondent could

not be found in the records of repatriation. (page 42 of the records) The questioned resolution,

is therefore, in order as the evidence submitted by the respondent were insufficient to rebut the

evidence of the petitioner.

Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration, attempted to introduce to the record

new pieces of evidence, which introduction is not anymore allowed in a Motion for

Reconsideration. These are the following a) Annex "2" - Oath of Allegiance; b) Annex "3" -

Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate; c) Annex "4" - Certification of the City Civil

Registrar of Makati City; d) Annex "5" - Letter addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San

Jacinto, Masbate by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization; and e) Annex "6" -

Letter addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation by Aurora P. Cortes of Special

Committee on Naturalization.

Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are admitted, with more reason should we

cancel his certificate of candidacy for his act of [misrepresenting] himself as a Filipino citizen
 when at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, he has not yet perfected the process of

repatriation. He failed to comply with the requirements under Section 2 of [Republic Act No.]

8171 which provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the

Bureau of Immigration.

The certification was issued by the same Ms. Josephine C. Camata, City Civil Registrar, dated

February 18, 2004. This time, she certifies that Ciceron Perez Altarejos was registered under

Registry No. 1, Page 19, Book No. 1, Series of 2004 and paid under OR nos. 88325/8833256

dated February 18, 2004. (page 65 of the records). Obviously, he was able to register in the

proper civil registry only on February 18, 2004.

The respondent was able to register with the Bureau of Immigration only on March 1, 2004 as

evidenced by the Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate attached to the Motion as

Annex "3."

This fact confirms the finding of the Commission (First Division) that at the time respondent filed

his certificate of candidacy he is yet to complete the requirement under section two (2) of RA

8171.

As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has committed false representation in his

certificate of candidacy. Such false representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it

relates to his qualification as a candidate. As such the certificate of candidacy may be cancelled

on such ground. (Ycain v. Caneja, 18 Phil. 778)9

On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, petitioner filed this petition praying that: (1) The petition be given
due course and a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte
restraining the respondents and all persons acting on their behalf, from fully implementing the questioned
COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004; (2) a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction be issued ordering the COMELEC and all persons acting on its behalf to allow petitioner to run as
Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 elections, and to count and canvass the votes cast in his
favor and to proclaim him as the winning mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate; and (3) after proper proceedings,
judgment be rendered declaring null and void and setting aside the COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on
March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004 and other related Orders of the COMELEC or its representatives which have
the effect of illegally preventing petitioner from running as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.

In its Comment,10 the Office of the Solicitor General stated that, based on the information relayed to it by
the COMELEC, petitioner's name, as a mayoralty candidate in San Jacinto, Masbate, was retained in the list
of candidates voted upon by the electorate in the said municipality. Hence, the cancellation of petitioner's
certificate of candidacy was never implemented. The COMELEC also informed the Office of the Solicitor
General that petitioner's opponent, Dr. Emilio Aris V. Espinosa, was already proclaimed duly elected Mayor of
San Jacinto, Masbate.

The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said supervening event has rendered the instant petition
moot and academic, and it prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

In his Reply,11 petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He claims that the COMELEC resolutions
disqualifying him from running as a mayoralty candidate adversely affected his candidacy, since his
supporters were made to believe that his votes would not be counted. Moreover, he stated that said
COMELEC resolutions cast a doubt on his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 17,
1997. In view thereof, he ran and was even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998
elections. He argues that if there was delay in the registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the
Bureau of Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the same was brought about by the inaction on the
part of said offices since the records of the Special Committee on Naturalization show that his Certificate of
Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance have long been transmitted to said offices.

Petitioner also asserts that the subsequent registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of
Immigration and with the Civil Registry of Makati City prior to the May 10, 2004 elections has the effect of
curing the defect, if any, in the reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship as his repatriation retroacted to the
date of his application for repatriation as held in Frivaldo v. Comelec.

The pertinent issues raised are the following: (1) Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation with the
proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation; and (2)
whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division.

As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, where the issues have become moot and academic, there is
no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or
value.12 Nonetheless, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition,
yet evading review.13

First Issue: Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation

with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8171, 14 thus:

SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic

of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.

The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration

and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." Hence, in addition
to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of
Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the
repatriation of a citizen.

In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation
was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with
the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the requirements of
repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections.

When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office apply? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 15 the Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be construed
as "applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term." The Court,
through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus:

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be

elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."

* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23)

years of age on election day."

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when

the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least

one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three

years of age on election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and

the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no

person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of

territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his

proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-

assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 the very day the term of office of governor (and other

elective officials) began he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office

and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time,

he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that

should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for

which such law was enacted. x x x Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li

Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and

country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another

nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the

citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the

start of his term.16 (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that "the

repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application." In said case, the

repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June

5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute,

which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldo's repatriation to the date of filing of

his application was justified by the Court, thus:

xxx

'The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority

that the law should apply to past events'i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the

law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby

enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and

such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the
 more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events

and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to

Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier

mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on

the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to

anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation.

Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation,

disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.

xxx

Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to

applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee

decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time,

then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo having already renounced his

American citizenship was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be.

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-

making body intended right and justice to prevail.17

Republic Act No. 817118 has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No. 725. They cover the same subject
matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage
to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The Court's ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that
repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one's application for repatriation subsists for the same reasons
quoted above.

Accordingly, petitioner's repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was,
therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.
Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions
disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.

Second Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc

gravely abused its discretion in affirming the
Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of the COMELEC, First Division,
considering that petitioner failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements
of repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of
repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider
said evidence. As the COMELEC en banc correctly stated:

The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is

a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the

above provision and to be considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were

submitted during the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are

already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not

able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners. 19

It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready
with sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a
repetition of this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition seeking the nullification of the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc of May 7, 2004,
affirming the Resolution of its First Division dated March 22, 2004, is hereby DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Puno, and TINGA, JJ., on official leave.
Quisumbing, J., in the result.
Corona, J., on leave.

Endnotes:

1 COMELEC (First Division) Resolution, Rollo, p. 36.

2 COMELEC en banc Resolution, Rollo, p. 43.

3 Rollo, p. 73.

4 Supra, note 2.

5 Supra, note 3, at 87.

6 Supra, note 1, at 39-40.

7 Id. at 41.

8 Supra, note 3, at 47.

9 Id. at 44-47.

10 Id, at 106.

11 Id. at 112.

12 Albaña v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004; Garcia v. Commission

on Elections, 258 SCRA 754, 757 (1996); Yorac v. Magalona, 3 SCRA 76, 77 (1961).

13 Albaña v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, citing Brillantes, Jr. v.

Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004.

14 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171:

"AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE

LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL-

BORN FILIPINOS

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to

aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including

their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire

 Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of

Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:

(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with an

association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines

opposing organized government;

(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,

personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;

(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious

diseases.

SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to

the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the

Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the

pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as

Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.

SEC. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent

with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a newspaper

of general circulation."

15 257 SCRA 727 (1996).

16 Id. at 748-749.

17 Id. at 754-756.

18 Republic Act No. 8171 took effect on January 12, 1996.

19 Supra, note 3, at 44.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 92191-92             July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03             July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that
determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong,
Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied
by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987
Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred (Angara
v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission
under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the
power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and
complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap,
25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal
under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not
be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and
excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it
or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments
of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of
due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting
such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral
Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into
the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government, It comes
in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring
that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to
review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not
they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency
has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter
which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in
the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs —
independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must
permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has place it.
(See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it
exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals.
There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less
independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial
intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this
party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the
HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land
which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish
colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong
Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an
enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural
values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a
natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to
Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store
and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo,
Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an
unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar
an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28,
1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing
his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from
other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the
ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of their
ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to
Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second
house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a 16-door
apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job
in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business
of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the
mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a  natural born
Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it
was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his
childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and
correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family business
decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came
in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress.
Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000
votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino
women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who
elected it under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of
the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of
the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and
Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen
as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons who have elected
Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding
Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he
said that the decision was designed merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that
the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend Father
Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records of
the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
x x x           x x x          x x x
 Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of Philippine
citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to
run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the body to
approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that the
Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a
natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation.  Between 1935
1avvphi1

and 1973 when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien
mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers
would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect,
they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from
February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be
retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal
meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where
adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279
[1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter
thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to be
construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice
Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are organic living
institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino
father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of
a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he
was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien
father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident
of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly,
and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to
correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which
would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage.
Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to
children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask
for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his
mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be
amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already
having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an
unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here
in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as
they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no
racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for
naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive
government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license.
He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen.
There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing
to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass
of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any
member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent
them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice
which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts
of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a
Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only
have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect
Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that
"when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino.
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor
residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for
protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his
death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In
our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.
(See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would
run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be
given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET "Ong
Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not use beyond
where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this
case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to
determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover,
the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his
father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to
be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were
Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced
Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election,
there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of
discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by
that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural
born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa,
and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There would be no basis
to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day
of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred
the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy .
(Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article
40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly,
a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report
of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September
7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of
the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact
that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the
fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had
become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the
Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has
been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place.
(Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te
qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a natural-
born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in
compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to
present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the
proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the best
evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12,
the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot
be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty.
Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the
U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no
governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
(TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44;
TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the
1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12,
1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty.
Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require the
degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent
search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the contents
of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the Committee
Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented
as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent, categorically stated that he saw
the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election protest against the brother of the
private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention, states
that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the election protest
against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief
Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of
delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they
demur to the contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the
procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that
body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong,
Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which they
were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the
parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their
acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave
abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has
been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the
qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there
was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a
candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive
residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in
the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the
1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has
raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather
than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in
the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by
law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and
actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which
regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure,
one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said
permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In
other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang,
Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained
fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that
gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was
built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr.,
November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot,
therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the
demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the
co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the
case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have
a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality
or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be
tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412
[1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.
(Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and
later to practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the
contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always had
the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution.
Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese,
Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To
mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part
Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of
whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one
must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an
interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent
backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating,
and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome
so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the
naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an
applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to
citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the decision * of respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which
declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a legal resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners'
motions for reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong not qualified
to be a Member of the House of Representatives and to declare him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained
the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly elected representative of the second
legislative district of Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner Balanquit prays that the Court
declare private respondent Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not qualified for membership in
the House of Representatives and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected representative of said
district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among
the candidates for the position of Representative or Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar
during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18
May 1987 with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes over petitioner Co who obtained the
next highest number of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests against private respondent with the
tribunal, docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively. Both protests raised almost the same
issues and were thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in
contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3),
Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, in contemplation of Section
6, Article VI of the same Constitution, for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the congressional elections of May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held that respondent Jose L. Ong is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for the required
period prior to the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore, declared qualified to continue in
office as Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, representing the second
legislative district of Northern Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in the tribunal are the following:
 1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses Ong Chuan also known as
Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao. His place of birth is Laoang which is now one of the
municipalities comprising the province of Northern Samar (Republic Act No. 6132 approved on
August 24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived in Manila on December 16,
1915. (Exhibit zz) Subsequently thereafter, he took up residence in Laoang, Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was celebrated according to the
rites and practices of the Roman Catholic Church in the Municipality of Laoang (Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a natural-born Filipino
citizen, both her parents at the time of her birth being Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship, filed his
petition for naturalization with the Court of First Instance of Samar, pursuant to Commonwealth Act
No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law.
6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision approving the
application of Jose Ong Chuan for naturalization and declaring said petitioner a Filipino citizen "with
all the rights and privileges and duties, liabilities and obligations inherent to Filipino citizens. (Exh.
E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and executory;
(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization in
favor of the applicant Ong Chuan who prefers to take his oath and register his name as
Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner may take his oath as Filipino citizen under Ms new christian
name, Jose Ong Chuan. (Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines as prescribed by Section 12 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, was issued the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization. (Exh. G)
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee and a son born on July 25,
1937 at Laoang, Samar to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was elected delegate
from Northern Samar to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had attended grade school in Laoang.
Thereafter, he went to Manila where he finished his secondary as well as his college education.
While later employed in Manila, protestee however went home to Laoang whenever he had the
opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as frequent as twice to four times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of Laoang, he registered as a
voter therein and correspondingly voted in said municipality in the 1984 and 1986 elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all voters in the country, Protestee
re-registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4 of Barangay Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's
affidavit, Protestee indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh. 7) 1
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision having been denied, petitioners filed the
present petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of
the House Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional provision vesting upon said tribunal the power
and authority to act as the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the Members of the
House of Representatives.2
On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe that, contrary to the
respondents' contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence to review the questioned decision
of the tribunal and to decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held
in Morrero vs. Bocar,3 construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . . The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex
rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz.,
23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is
duty-bound to determine whether or not, in an actual controversy, there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a
congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great
legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is,
by constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The present
controversy, however, involves no less than a determination of whether the qualifications for membership in
the House of Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would
be unforgivably remiss in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a
person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives,
solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal would
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the
exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review.
Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for the office of Member of the
House of Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners who, at the same time, claim that they are
entitled to the office illegally held by private respondent. From this additional direction, where one asserts
an earnestly perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a justiciable
controversy proper for this Court to consider and decide.
Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in
contravention of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this
instance simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting, in a
justiciable controversy, the pertinent provisions of the Constitution with finality.
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory)
interpretation, in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost
always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately
from some legitimate area of governmental power (the Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B.
Sevisher, 1958, p. 36).4
Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to determine whether or not private
respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a public office which is specifically reserved by the
Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my considered opinion that the respondent
tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its
questioned decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.
The Constitution5 requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and
write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election.
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizen,
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-quoted constitutional provisions. The
first sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does
private respondent fall within said definition?
To the respondent tribunal,
Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines under the first sentence of
Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution because he did not have "to perform any act to acquire
or perfect his Philippine citizenship." It bears to repeat that on 15 May 1957, while still a minor of 9
years he already became a Filipino citizen by declaration of law. Since his mother was a natural-
born citizen at the time of her marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship at
the moment of his birth and, consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of CA 473 that he
was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his birth without his having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect such Philippine citizenship.6
I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show
that private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and
Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In other words, at birth, private
respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a
Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was enforced at the
time of private respondent's birth on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the
Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens. 7
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935
Constitution, private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by
virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth, although from birth, private respondent
had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching the age
of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen
(father), who were born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization of the parent automatically become
Filipino citizens,8 this does not alter the fact that private respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and
the operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a  natural-born citizen merely
because he did not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be considered a natural-born citizen by virtue
of the operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the naturalization of private respondent's
father was invalid and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private respondent is not even a Filipino
citizen.
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct proceeding for nullity of naturalization
as a Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is
barred in an electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the challenge against Ong Chuan's
naturalization must emanate from the Government and must be made in a proper/appropriate and direct
proceeding for de-naturalization directed against the proper party, who in such case is Ong Chuan, and
also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded the character of impregnability under
the principle of res judicata.9 Section 18 of CA 473 provides that a certificate of naturalization may be
cancelled upon motion made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by
the proper provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee,10 this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of citizenship. He may accept the
offer and become a citizen upon compliance with the prescribed conditions, but not otherwise. His
claim is of favor, not of right. He can only become a citizen upon and after a strict compliance with
the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms
upon which alone the right he seeks can be conferred. It is his province, and he is bound, to see
that the jurisdictional facts upon which the grant is predicated actually exist and if they do not he
takes nothing by this paper grant.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons, no other person is entitled to
such privilege, nor to a certificate purporting to grant it, and any such certificate issued to a person
 not so entitled to receive it must be treated as a mere nullity, which confers no legal rights as
against the government, from which it has been obtained without warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as delicate and exacting
nature, affecting public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise
conditions prescribed by law therefor."11
Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the petitioners that the naturalization of private
respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court should make a ruling on the validity of said
naturalization proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more inevitable and justified in the
present case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office. 12
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of private respondent is derived from his
father. If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning, then there is nothing from which private
respondent can derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring cannot rise higher than its source.
And to allow private respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship by virtue of a void
naturalization of his father, would constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against the
Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by Section 12 of CA 473 on the same day (15
May 1957) that the CFI issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of
Naturalization and for the applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who
has previously obtained a decision favorable to his application for naturalization, is appealable. It is,
therefore, improper and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the issuance of said order and
before the expiration of the reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said order. 13
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic,14 this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of order granting citizenship is
irregular and makes the proceedings so taken null and void. (Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244
[1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan (private
respondent's father) was null and void. It follows that the private respondent did not acquire any legal rights
from the void naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be considered a Filipino citizen, more
so, a natural-born Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of court to issue the certificate of
naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of allegiance was final and not appealable,
the resulting naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic naturalization of
private respondent, then a minor, as a Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection
of the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent acquired the status of a natural-born
Filipino citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his mother was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in
turn leads us to an examination of the second sentence in Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It
expands, in a manner of speaking, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the status
of a natural-born Filipino citizen to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The right or privilege of election is available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935
Constitution, and before the 1973 Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely abused its
discretion as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the conferment by the 1987 Constitution of the status of
"natural-born" Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship — all in its strained effort, according
to petitioners, to support private respondent's qualification to be a Member of the House of
Representatives.15
Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino mothers with alien father, born before 17 January
1973 and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born Filipino citizen. 16
The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions' interpretation, found reason
to refer to the interpellations made during the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution was (sic)
intended by its (sic) framers to be endowed, without distinction, to all Filipinos by election pursuant
to the 1935 Constitution is more than persuasively established by the extensive interpellations and
debate on the issue as borne by the official records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. 17
Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant to the case
at bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of the respondent tribunal, did not elect
Philippine citizenship, as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the controversy regarding the
meaning of the constitutional provisions in question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations petitions and opinions expressed in the
1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and
even nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus —
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It
may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.18
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2, Article IV in relation to
Section 1(3) of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of petitioners that only those born to
Filipino mothers before 17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution, are to be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner Treñas specifically asked
Commissioner Bernas regarding the provisions in question, thus:
MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and
Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born
Filipino citizen as provided in Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, by adding that persons who have
elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I
right, Mr. Presiding Officer?
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution would be contrary to the spirit of that section?
 FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter really. But whether it is contrary
to the spirit is something that has been debated before and is being debated even now. We will
recall that during the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the status of natural-born citizenship of one of
the delegates, Mr. Ang, was challenged precisely because he was a citizen by election. Finally, the
1971 Constitutional Convention considered him a natural-born citizen, one of the requirements to
be a Member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The reason behind that decision was that a
person under his circumstances already had the inchoate right to be a citizen by the fact that the
mother was a Filipino. And as a matter of fact, the 1971 Constitutional Convention formalized that
recognition by adopting paragraph 2 of Section 1 of the 1971 Constitution. So, the entire purpose of
this proviso is simply to perhaps remedy whatever injustice there may be so that these people born
before January 17, 1973 who are not naturalized and people who are not natural born but who are
in the same situation as we are considered natural-born citizens. So, the intention of the Committee
in proposing this is to equalize their status.19
When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to
Commissioner Azcuna thus:
MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this refer only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who
elected it under the 1935 Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision
of the 1935 Constitution, whether the election was done before or after 17 January 1973. 20
And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo explained the purpose of what now appear
as Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935
and 1973, when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien
mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers
would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and, if they do elect,
they become Filipino citizens, yet, but not natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino mothers and those born of Filipino
fathers. So that from January 17, 1973 when the 1973 Constitution took effect, those born of Filipino
mothers but of alien fathers are natural-born Filipino citizens. Also, those who are born of Filipino fathers
and alien mothers are natural-born Filipino citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a Filipino mother and that born of a Filipino
father, why do we not give a chance to a child born before January 17, 1973, if and when he elects
Philippine citizenship, to be in the same status as one born of a Filipino father — namely, natural-born
citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a mother vis-a-vis the child. I would like to
state also that we showed equalize the status of a child born of a Filipino mother the day before January
17, 1973 and a child born also of a Filipino mother on January 17 or 24 hours later. A child born of a Filipino
mother but an alien father one day before January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects Philippine
citizenship, but he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the other child who luckily was born 24
hours later — maybe because of parto laborioso — is a natural-born Filipino citizen. 21
It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino
citizen was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming
natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity date of the 1973
Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse) are
natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect
Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino
citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of the age of majority, may be made before or after
17 January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in consonance with the fundamental purpose of the
Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's individual interests, 22 and to foster equality
among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with
an alien spouse) and should have elected Philippine citizenship on 19 June 1969 (when he attained the
age of majority), or soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen under the
1987 Constitution, the vital question is: did private respondent really elect Philippine citizenship? As earlier
stated, I believe that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to the ruling of the
respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had exercised the right of suffrage
when he came of age, the same constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
(Florencio vs. Mallare) [sic] The acts of the petitioner in registering as a voter, participating in
elections and campaigning for certain candidates were held by the Supreme Court as sufficient to
show his preference for Philippine citizenship. Accordingly, even without complying with the formal
requisites for election, the petitioner's Filipino citizenship was judicially upheld. 23
I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently erroneous and clearly untenable, as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that election of Philippine
citizenship must be made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625. Sections 1 and 2 24 of the Act
mandate that the option to elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare25 which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of the
right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied election of Philippine
citizenship, is not applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban
Mallare reached the age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625 was approved and,
more importantly, eleven (11) years before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of election) took
effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect considering that
prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was
required to exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by Section
1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.26
Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he was an illegitimate (natural) child of
a Filipino mother and thus followed her citizenship. I therefore agree with the petitioners' submission that,
in citing the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal had engaged in an obiter dictum.
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,
providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his
father, the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him. For, assuming arguendo that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was valid, and that there was no further need for private
respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did
not mean that the operation of the Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of Philippine
citizenship as contemplated by the Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship derived from
one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of majority, not during one's minority.
There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625.
Consequently, he cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am constrained to state that private respondent
is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is disqualified or ineligible to be
a Member of the House of Representatives.
At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of required residence, inasmuch as the
Constitution requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be both a natural-born Filipino
citizen and a resident for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be elected.
The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the petitioners can replace private respondent
as the Representative of the second legislative district of Northern Samar in the House of Representatives.
I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may take the place of private respondent in
the House of Representatives representing the second district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court
in Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal,27 is
controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace
Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he obtained only the second
highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for
mayor of that City.
A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in effect, a  quo
warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an election protest. 28 It is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible
person from office but not necessarily to install the protestant in his place. 29
The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate
in an election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. In such a case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. 30
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless
he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S
243, p. 676).
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who lost in an election cannot
be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is found ineligible for the office to
which he was elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) —
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud
or irregularities in the election is quite different from that produced by declaring a person
ineligible to hold such an office. . . . If it be found that the successful candidate (according to
the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another
candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case,
 there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. . . .31
The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as a natural-born Filipino
citizen, in relation to the present case.
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L. Ong, both of them having the same
father and mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention 32 to the effect that Emil L.
Ong was a natural-born Filipino citizen, alleged before the House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is
himself a natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially impressive, is, as will now be shown,
flawed and not supported by the evidence. Not even the majority decision of the electoral tribunal adopted
the same as the basis of its decision in favor of private respondent. The tribunal, in reference to this
submission, said:
Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's disposition of protestee's citizenship based on an
entirely different set of circumstances, apart from the indisputable fact that the matters attempted to
be brought in issue in connection therewith are too far removed in point of time and relevance from
the decisive events relied upon by the Tribunal, we view these two issues as being already
inconsequential.33
The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate its decision on the alleged citizenship by
naturalization of private respondent's father (Ong Chuan) and on the alleged election of Philippine
citizenship by private respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Electoral protests, numbers EP-
07 and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing and Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his
citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election Protests Credentials of the 1971 Contitution
Convention heard the protests and submitted to the Convention a report dated 4 September 1972, the
dispositive portion of which stated:
It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a Filipino citizen under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, thus conferring upon
protestee's own father, Ong Chuan, Philippine citizenship at birth, the conclusion is inescapable that
protestee himself is a natural-born citizen, and is therefore qualified to hold the office of delegate to
the Constitutional Convention.34
On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the election
protests filed against Emil L. Ong were dismissed, following the report of the Committee on Election
Protests and Credentials.35
It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L.
Ong is, to say the least, inconclusive to the case at bar, because —
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil L. Ong case involved the
1935 Constitution; the present case, on the other hand involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the
Philippines; the 1987 Constitution contains a precise and specific definition of a "natural-born
citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2, Art. IV thereof and private respondent does not qualify under
such definition in the 1987 Constitution;
 c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong was a decision of
a political body, not a court of law. And, even if we have to take such a decision as a decision of
a quasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body exercising quasi-judicial functions), said decision in the
Emil L. Ong case can not have the category or character of res judicata in the present judicial
controversy, because between the two (2) cases, there is no identity of parties (one involves Emil L.
Ong, while the other involves private respondent) and, more importantly, there is no identity of
causes of action because the first involves the 1935 Constitution while the second involves the
1987 Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on procedural rules and logic, the evidence submitted
before the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before this Court, does not support the allegations made
by Emil L. Ong before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially adopted by private respondent
in the present controversy. This leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L. Ong was a "natural-born citizen" of the
Philippines under the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the "fact" — and this appears crucial and central to
its decision — that Emil L. Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and, therefore, his descendants like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private respondent) became
natural-born Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on April 11, 1899
and was therefore one of the many who became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899
as well as their children born subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands." (Section 4, Philippine Bill of 1902).36
The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te
private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was "an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to
reside therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he met these requirements of the Philippine
Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W,
X, Y, Z ,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the "Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to
1897 which show that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar where he is claimed to have been a
resident. Petitioners (protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral
Tribunal exhibit V, a certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records and Management and
Archives Office, stating that the name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central de Chinos" for
the province of Samar for 1895. These exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove
that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing
in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face of these
proofs or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING
EVIDENCE, except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong,
previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the majority decision of the House Electoral Tribunal
skirted any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
It is equally not surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and father or private respondent, did not
even attempt to claim Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino citizenship under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the House Electoral Tribunal should no longer have
reviewed the factual question or issue of Ong Te's citizenship in the light of the resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of
1902. The tribunal had to look into the question because the finding that Ong Te had become a Filipino
citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as held in Lee vs.
Commissioners of Immigration:37
. . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding Court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201,
8 May 1984.  In connection with said resolution, it is contended by private respondent that the resolution of
1âwphi1

the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case was elevated to this Court on a question
involving Emil L. Ong's disqualification to run for membership in the Batasang Pambansa and that,
according to private respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report to the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it would help to look into the circumstances of the
case brought before this Court in relation to the Court's action or disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del
Valle were both candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May 1984 election. Valle filed a petition
for disqualification with the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed as SPC No. 84-69
contending that Ong is not a natural-born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
that the judgment of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the Identical issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No.
67201, Rollo, p. 94) The motion was denied by the COMELEC, thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to file with this
Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the COMELEC,
docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
respondent COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del
Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R. Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and
considering that at the hearing this morning, it was brought out that the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, at its session of November 28, 1972, after considering the Report of its Committee on
Election Protests and Credentials, found that the protest questioning the citizenship of the protestee
(the petitioner herein) was groundless and dismissed Election Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed
against said petitioner (p. 237, Rollo), the authenticity of the Minutes of said session as well as of
the said Committee's Report having been duly admitted in evidence without objection and bears
out, for now, without need for a full hearing, that petitioner is a natural-born citizen, the Court
Resolved to ISSUE, effective immediately, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondent
COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the disqualification case entitled Edilberto Del Valle
vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at 3:00 o'clock this afternoon, or any other day, except to
dismiss the same. This is without prejudice to any appropriate action that private respondent may
wish to take after the elections. (emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 67201 was rendered without the benefit of a
hearing on the merits either by the Court or by the COMELEC and merely on the basis of a Committee's
Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is quite significant) did not
foreclose any appropriate action that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish to take after the elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under the 1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or
further proceeding in regard to the same question and that, consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L.
Ong to such recognition. How much more when the Constitution involved is not the 1935 Constitution but
the 1987 Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all such proceedings because the 1987
Constitution was still inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest
number of votes for the elective position of Representative (Congressman) to the House of
Representatives for the second district of Northern Samar, would have had to cease in office by virtue of
this Court's decision, if the full membership of the Court had participated in this case, with the result that
the legislative district would cease to have, in the interim, a representative in the House of Representatives.
But the fundamental consideration in cases of this nature is the Constitution and only the Constitution. It
has to be assumed, therefore, that when the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern Samar
cast the majority of their votes for private respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully eligible
and qualified for the office because he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and
belief can not prevail over, but must yield to the majesty of the Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution mandates that members of the House of
Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the Philippines". The voting majority of the present
Court says, "Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is worse is, the same voting majority, in
effect, says, "even aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme
Court leaves facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the membership in the House, as
follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.1
is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections,2 it was held that this Court can not review the errors of
the Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all election contests) — in the sense of reviewing
facts and unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is to see simply whether or not it is guilty
of a grave abuse of discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on the
Court,3 but as the Charter states, our authority is "to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government."4 It is not to review facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of power amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of due process of law.5
I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion with which men may differ, but
certainly, it is quite another thing to say that the respondent Tribunal has gravely abused its discretion
because the majority has begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the Court to remedy all
imagined wrongs committed by the Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino citizen and
consequently, is possessed of the qualifications to be a member of the House. As the sole judge, precisely,
of this question, the Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in question stands exactly on indefensible grounds. It
is to be noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report dated September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Committee6 on Election Protests and Credentials, in which the Committees upheld the
citizenship, and sustained the qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose Ong's full blood brother.
According to the Report, Ong Te the Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having complied with
the requirements on Filipinization by existing laws for which his successors need not have elected Filipino
citizenship. I quote:
x x x           x x x          x x x
There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be any doubt that Ong Te protestees's
grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and was therefore
one of the many who became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
continued to reside therein and who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, as well as their
children born subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands" (Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902). Excepted from the operation of this rule were Spanish
subjects who shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. But under the Treaty of Paris, only Spanish subjects
who were natives of Peninsular Spain had the privilege of preserving their Spanish nationality. 7
x x x           x x x          x x x
x x x           x x x          x x x
As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established residence in the Philippines in 1895, as shown
by the Registro Central de Chinos. He was also issued a certificate of registration. He established a
business here, and later acquired real property. Although he went back to China for brief visits, he
invariably came back. He even brought his eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the Philippines when
the latter was only 10 years old. And Ong Chuan was admitted into the country because, as duly
 noted on his landing certificate, his father, Ong Te had been duly enrolled under CR 16009-36755
— i.e., as a permanent resident. Indeed, even when Ong Te went back to China in the 1920's for
another visit, he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was then still a minor, in the Philippines — obviously
because he had long considered the Philippines his home. The domicile he established in 1895 is
presumed to have continued up to, and beyond, April 11, 1899, for, as already adverted to, a
domicile once acquired is not lost until a new one is gained. The only conclusion then can thus be
drawn is that Ong Te was duly domiciled in the Philippines as of April 11, 1899, within the meaning
of par. 4, Art. 17, of the Civil Code of 1889 — and was, consequently, a Spanish subject, he
qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. 8
It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, subsequently sought naturalization in the belief that he
was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both Ong Te and his son, Ong Chuan
(protestee's father), appear to have been registered as Chinese citizens even long after the turn of
the century. Worse, Ong Chuan himself believed the was alien, to the extent of having to seek
admission as a Pilipino citizen through naturalization proceedings. The point, to our mind, is neither
crucial nor substantial. Ong's status as a citizen is a matter of law, rather than of personal belief. It
is what the law provides, and not what one thinks his status to be, which determines whether one is
a citizen of a particular state or not. Mere mistake or misapprehension as to one's citizenship, it has
been held, is not a sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture of Philippine citizenship; it does not even
constitute estoppel (Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too, estoppel applies only to
questions of fact and not of law (Tanada v. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957). 9
It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved by the Committee, and on November 28, 1972,
approved without any objection by the Convention in plenary session. 10
I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all candor, I speak from
experience, because when the Convention approved the Report in question, I was one of its vice-
presidents and the presiding officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this Court (on a question involving Emil Ong's
qualification to sit as member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa) 11 in which this Court allowed the use of
the Committee Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit that the question of the Ong's citizenship is a
settled matter. Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of the Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this
Court, involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit, however, that what is sauce for the goose is sauce
for the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or not we will overturn the unanimous ruling of 267
delegates, indeed, also of this Court.

Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1]

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative
 ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

 The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
 The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes.
 On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
 Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
 Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
 The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
  1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
 The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
 A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by
the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
 Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:

 WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:

 The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China.
Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of
hard work.
 As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
 The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to
Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.
 As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural
values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural
 born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith
and practice.
 The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
 Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and
survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
 The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In
the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his
life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15,
1954.
 On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957,
the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and
executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
 Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs
and practices of the local populace were concerned.

 After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila
in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
 Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since
employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the
Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his
family in Manila.
  In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as
a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed
the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly
declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be
aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
 The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

 SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1.             Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2.             Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3.             Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4.             Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

 SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
 The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship
after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before
that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino
father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not,
under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born
 Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to
children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
 To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his
father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.
 He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to
require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a
citizen since 1957.
 In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one
who had been a citizen since he was nine years old
 In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
 The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in
the Philippines.
 Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of
the oath of citizenship.
 SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of his citizenship after his
death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to
ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondent’s father as null and void would run
against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest
 DownloadSave

 The court reiterates that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent
would not
only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen
elect
Philippine citizenship?
 The Court held that respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Additional Notes:
 The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and
no racial
distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for
naturalization
when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive
government agency.
His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has
participated in
political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing
in the
records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge
of
alien-ness, no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern
Samar are fully aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this
Court
will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress.
Because
of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
 The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate
choice
which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office
where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of
similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 163619-20 November 17, 2005

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA, TESS DUMP
MICHELENA, Petitioner,
vs.
CARLOS BOADO, FERNANDO CALONGE, SALVADOR CARRERA, BENITO CARRERA, DOMINGO CARRER
and ROGELIO DE VERA, Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE OR TO CANCEL CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDA
FOR MAYOR, TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA, Petition
vs.
CARLOS BOADO, FERNANDO CALONGE, SALVADOR CARRERA, BENITO CARRERA, DOMINGO CARRER
and ROGELIO DE VERA, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Cases
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari1 assailing the 9 March 2004 Resolution 2 of the Commission on Electio
("COMELEC") Second Division and the 7 May 2004 Resolution 3 of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA 04-0154 and S
04-016.5

The COMELEC Second Division cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Tess Dumpit-Michelena ("Dum
Michelena") on the ground of material misrepresentation. The COMELEC En Banc denied Dumpit-Michelen
motion for reconsideration for late filing.

The Antecedent Facts

Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union during the 10 M
2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Engineer Carlos Boado, Rogelio L. De Vera, Fernando Calon
Benito Carrera, Salvador Carrera and Domingo Carrera ("Boado, et al.") sought Dumpit-Michelena’s disqualificat
and the denial or cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation un
Sections 746 and 787 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 ("Omnibus Election Code").

Boado, et al. alleged that Dumpit-Michelena, the daughter of Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. ("Congressm
Dumpit") of the Second District of La Union, is not a resident of Agoo, La Union. Boado, et al. claimed that Dum
Michelena is a resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian, La Union and that Dumpit-Michelena o
transferred her registration as voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on 24 October 2003. Her presence in S
Julian West, Agoo, La Union was noticed only after she filed her certificate of candidacy. Boado, et al. present
among other things, a joint affidavit of all barangay officials of San Julian West to prove that Dumpit-Michelena is
a resident of the barangay.

Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in San Julian West when she purchased fr
her father, Congressman Dumpit, a residential lot on 19 April 2003. She even designated one Gardo Fontanilla a
caretaker of her residential house. Dumpit-Michelena presented the affidavits and certifications of her neighbors
San Julian West to prove that she actually resides in the area.

The Ruling of the COMELEC

In a Resolution issued on 9 March 2004, the COMELEC Second Division ruled, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby adjudged
be a non-resident of Brgy. San Julian West, Agoo, La Union for purposes of the May 10, 2004 synchronized natio
and local elections. Accordingly, her Certificate of Candidacy is hereby CANCELLED on the ground of mate
misrepresentation under Sections 78 and 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, in relation to Come
Resolution No. 6452.

SO ORDERED.8

The COMELEC Second Division held that Boado, et al. established by convincing evidence that Dumpit-Michelena
not a bona fide resident of San Julian West, Agoo, La Union. The COMELEC Second Division found that among
neighbors of Dumpit-Michelena who executed affidavits in her favor, only one is a resident of San Julian West. T
others are from other barangays of Agoo, La Union. The COMELEC Second Division noted that several affiants w
declared that Dumpit-Michelena resides in San Julian West later retracted their statements on the ground that th
did not read the contents of the documents when they signed the affidavits.

Dumpit-Michelena moved for the reconsideration of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division.

In a Resolution issued on 7 May 2004, the COMELEC En Banc denied Dumpit-Michelena’s motion
reconsideration. The COMELEC En Banc ruled that the motion for reconsideration was filed three days after the l
day of the prescribed period for filing the motion.

Hence, the present recourse by Dumpit-Michelena.

The Issues

The issues raised in the petition are the following:

1. Whether Dumpit-Michelena’s motion for reconsideration was filed on time;

2. Whether Dumpit-Michelena was denied due process of law; and

3. Whether Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

On Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration

We rule that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Dumpit-Michelena’s motion
reconsideration for late filing.

Resolution No. 64529 provides:

SECTION 8. Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a divis
shall be filed within three (3) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends
execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.

Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk of the Commission shall notify the Presid
Commissioner. The latter shall, within two (2) days thereafter, certify the case to the Commission en banc.

The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission
banc within three (3) days from the certification thereof.

In this case, the Resolution cancelling Dumpit-Michelena’s Certificate of Candidacy was promulgated in open co
on 9 March 2004. Dumpit-Michelena’s counsel was present during the promulgation. Following Section 8
Resolution No. 6452, Dumpit-Michelena had until 12 March 2004 within which to file her motion for reconsiderati
However, while Dumpit-Michelena claims to be familiar with Resolution No. 6452, she filed her motion
reconsideration on 15 March 2004. This is because during the promulgation of the cases on 9 March 2004,
COMELEC Second Division issued an Order10 which states:

On call of these cases today for promulgation, counsels for the respondent appeared. There was no appearance
the petitioners. Counsel manifested that they filed a manifestation and motion and an urgent motion holding
abeyance the promulgation of the resolution of these cases. The motions to hold in abeyance the promulgation
hereby denied. However, the respondent may file a motion for reconsideration within five (5) days from receipt of
decision if the decision is adverse to their client. (Emphasis supplied)

Apparently, the COMELEC committed an oversight in declaring that Dumpit-Michelena had five days within which
file her motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC overlooked Resolution No. 6452. For her part, Dumpit-Michele
only followed the period provided in the Order. She filed her motion for reconsideration on 15 March 2004 since
March 2004 fell on a Sunday. This Court can hardly fault her for following the COMELEC Order.
On Denial of Due Process

Dumpit-Michelena asserts that she was denied due process when the COMELEC summarily resolved
disqualification case against her without giving her a fair opportunity to submit additional evidence to support
case.

Resolution No. 6452 delegates the reception of evidence in disqualification cases to field officials designated by
COMELEC.11 The summary nature of disqualification proceedings is provided under Section 5(A)(6) of Resolut
No. 6452 which states:

6. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the parties shall submit their affidavits
counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence including their position paper or memorandum within a period
three (3) inextendible days;

The position paper or memorandum of each party shall contain the following:

a. A "Statement of the Case", which is a clear and concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of
documentary evidence and other matters necessary to an understanding of the nature of the controversy;

b. A "Statement of the Issues", which is a clear and concise statement of the issues;

c. The "Argument" which is a clear and concise presentation of the argument in support of each issue; and

d. The "Relief" which is a specification of the judgment which the party seeks to obtain. The issues raised in his
pleadings but not included in the Memorandum shall be deemed waived or abandoned. Being a summation of
parties’ pleadings and documentary evidence, the Commission may consider the memorandum alone in deciding
resolving the petition.

In these cases, Dumpit-Michelena filed a motion for the inhibition of Atty. Marino V. Salas ("Atty. Salas"),
Provincial Election Supervisor and hearing officer designated to receive the evidence of the parties. She alleged t
Boado, et al.’s counsel was the former Regional Director of the COMELEC Regional Office and undue influen
might be exerted over Atty. Salas. In the meanwhile, she submitted a "semblance of a memorandum if only to ins
x x x that she would be able to convey her opposition to the petitions filed against her." 12 Dumpit-Michelena alleg
that she wanted to submit her evidence to a hearing officer who would not be biased and would not be inclined
side with Boado, et al.

Without resolving the Motion to Inhibit, Atty. Salas forwarded the records of the case to COMELEC Manila. Howev
to obviate suspicion of partiality, Atty. Salas did not make any recommendation as required under Resolution N
6452.

We rule that there was no denial of due process in the cases before the Court.

Section 5(A) of Resolution No. 6452 provides:

7. The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of the answer. The Hearing Offi
concerned shall personally or through his authorized representative submit to the Clerk of the Commission
Hearing/Case report(s) indicating his findings and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of
hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete records of the case;

8. Upon receipt of the records of the case [indicating] the findings and recommendations of the Hearing Offi
concerned, the Clerk of the Commission shall immediately docket the case consecutively and calendar the same
raffle to a division;
9. The division to whom the case is raffled shall, after evaluation and consultation, assign immediately the same t
member who shall pen the decision within five (5) days from the date of consultation.

Resolution No. 6452 is clear. The hearing officer is only designated to hear and receive evidence. His conclusio
are merely recommendatory upon the COMELEC. Dumpit-Michelena knew fully well that the entire records of
case would be forwarded to COMELEC Manila for the resolution of the cases. She had all the opportunity to pres
her evidence to support her stand. Instead, she chose to file a Memorandum which she described as one "done
‘half-hearted’ compliance with the rules." 13 She may not claim now that she was denied due process because s
was unable to present all her evidence before the hearing officer.

On Residency Requirement

Dumpit-Michelena failed to prove that she has complied with the residency requirement.

Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the qualifications for elective provincial, city, munici
and barangay officials shall be those provided for in the Local Government Code. Section 39(a) of the Lo
Government Code of 199114 states:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sanggunia
panglungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least o
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local langua
or dialect. (Emphasis supplied)

The concept of residence in determining a candidate’s qualification is already a settled matter. For election purpos
residence is used synonymously with domicile. 15 In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,16 
Court declared:

x x x The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previo
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualificatio
of a candidate for congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attem
to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So
question is: What is the committee’s concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence
is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned,
proposed section merely provides, among others, ‘and a resident thereof’, that is, in the district, for a period of
less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution,
interpretation given to it was domicile." (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87

xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the sa
point that ‘resident’ has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. Delos Reyes: Domicile.

M[r]s. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rat
than mere intention to reside?

Mr. Delos Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution
the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to
original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence." (Records of the 19
Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110)

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it
having the same meaning as domicile.

Prior to her transfer, Dumpit-Michelena was a resident and registered voter of Ambaracao North, Naguilian,
Union. She claims that she has already acquired a new domicile in San Julian West and is thus qualified to run
the position of mayor. She transferred her registration as a voter of San Julian West on 24 October 2003.

Dumpit-Michelena presented a Deed of Sale dated 19 April 2003 showing her acquisition of a parcel of land in S
Julian West where she eventually built a house. However, property ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or
be voted for an office. 17 Further, domicile of origin is not easily lost. 18 To successfully effect a change of domic
there must be concurrence of the following requirements:

(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

(3) acts which correspond with the purpose.19

Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of ori
continues.20 To effect change, there must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.21 The inten
remain in the new domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time, the change of residence must
voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 22

The Court agrees with the COMELEC Second Division that Dumpit-Michelena failed to establish that she h
abandoned her former domicile. Among the documents submitted by Dumpit-Michelena is a Special Power
Attorney23 authorizing Clyde Crispino ("Crispino") to "apply, facilitate and follow up the issuance of a building per
of the beach house" she intended to put up in her lot. She also authorized Crispino to help her caretaker oversee
lot and the construction of the beach house. As correctly pointed out by the COMELEC Second Division, a bea
house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It can hardly be considered a place of residence.

In addition, the designation of caretaker with monthly compensation of ₱2,500 24 only shows that Dumpit-Michele
does not regularly reside in the place. The Deed of Absolute Sale states that Dumpit-Michelena is a resident
Naguilian, La Union25 while the Special Power of Attorney states that she is a resident of San Julian West, Agoo,
Union and No. 6 Butterfly St. Valle Verde 6, Pasig, Metro Manila. Dumpit-Michelena obviously has a number
residences and the acquisition of another one does not automatically make the most recently acquired residence
new domicile.

We considered the affidavits submitted by Dumpit-Michelena where the affiants retracted their previous affidav
stating that Dumpit-Michelena was not a resident of San Julian West. The affiants alleged that they signed the f
affidavits without knowing their contents. However, the COMELEC Second Division pointed out that Boado, et
also submitted affidavits with the affiants repudiating their previous affidavits that Dumpit-Michelena was a residen
San Julian West. The Court is inclined to give more weight to the joint affidavit of all the  barangay officials of S
Julian West attesting that Dumpit-Michelena is not a resident of their barangay.

Hence, the COMELEC Second Division did not commit grave abuse of discretion in cancelling Dumpit-Michelen
Certificate of Candidacy.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution dated 9 March 2004 of the COMELEC Seco
Division and the Resolution dated 7 May 2004 of the COMELEC En Banc with MODIFICATION that Tess Dum
Michelena’s motion for reconsideration was not filed late.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decis
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
Footnotes

1 Denominated by petitioner as Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of C
Procedure.

2 Signed by Presiding Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Man
A. Barcelona, Jr. Rollo, pp. 29-43.

3 Signed by COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier, Mehol
Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Virgilio O. Garcillano and Manuel A. Barcelona,
Rollo, pp. 271-279.

4 In the Matter of the Petition for Disqualification of Tess Dumpit-Michelena as Candidate for Mayor of Ag
La Union. Carlos Boado, et al. v. Tess Dumpit-Michelena.

5 In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Tess Dum
Michelena as Candidate for Mayor of Agoo, La Union. Carlos Boado, et al. v. Tess Dumpit-Michelena.

6 Section 74 enumerates the contents of certificates of candidacy which include the place of the candidat
residence.

7 Under Section 78, any person may file a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
candidacy exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required un
Section 74 is false.

8 Rollo, p. 43.

9 Rules Delegating to COMELEC Field Officials the Hearing and Reception of Evidence of Disqualificat
Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections; Motu Proprio Actions a
Disposition of Disqualification Cases (10 December 2003).

10 Signed by Presiding Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain. Rollo, pp. 44-45.

11 Section 1, Resolution No. 6452.

12 Rollo, p. 13.

13 Ibid., p. 21.

14 Republic Act No. 7160.

15 Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995, 248 SCRA 300

16 G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 30 July 1991, 199 SCRA 692.

17 Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265, 18 September 1995, 248 SCRA 400.

18 Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, supra note 15.

19 Ibid.
 20 Aquino v. Commission on Elections, supra note 17.

21 Domino v. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798 (1999).

22 Ibid.

23 Rollo, p. 83.

24 Per a Letter dated 19 April 2003 submitted by Dumpit-Michelena as part of her evidence. COMEL
Resolution of 9 March 2004, Rollo, p. 33

25 Rollo, p. 82.

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