Meynardo Sabili vs.

Commission on
Elections, et al.

G.R. No. 193261

MEYNARDO SABILI, Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, Respondents.

DECISION
SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to annul the Resolutions in SPA No. 09-047 (DC) dated 26 January 2010 and
17 August 2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied due course to and
canceled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (petitioner) for the
position of Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections. At the

heart of the controversy is whether petitioner Sabili had complied with the one-year
residency requirement for local elective officials.

When petitioner filed his COC1 for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein
that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the
2010 elections, he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial Board Member
representing the 4th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the
position of Representative of the 4th District of Batangas, but lost. The 4th District of
 2
Batangas includes Lipa City. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC
during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in
Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.

Private respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due
Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing
Some Grounds for Disqualification"3 against him before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No.
09-047 (DC). Citing Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code,4
private respondent alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the
latter’s COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under
Section 39 of the Local Government Code. 5 Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath
in his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months
prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.

In support of his allegation, private respondent presented the following:

1. Petitioner’s COC for the 2010 elections filed on 1 December 20096

2. 2009 Tax Declarations for a house and lot (TCT Nos. 173355, 173356 and
buildings thereon) in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City registered under the name of
Bernadette Palomares, petitioner’s common-law wife7

3. Lipa City Assessor Certification of Property Holdings of properties under the

name of Bernadette Palomares8

4. Affidavit executed by private respondent Florencio Librea9

5. Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Eladio de Torres10

6. Voter Certification on petitioner issued by COMELEC Election Officer Juan D.

Aguila, Jr.11

7. 1997 Voter Registration Record of petitioner12

8. National Statistics Office (NSO) Advisory on Marriages regarding petitioner13

9. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 3, Brgy. Lood,

Lipa City registered in the name of petitioner14

10. NSO Certificate of No Marriage of Bernadette Palomares15

11. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 5, Brgy. Lood,
Lipa City registered in the name of petitioner16

12. Lipa City Permits and Licensing Office Certification that petitioner has no
17
business therein

13. Apparent printout of a Facebook webpage of petitioner’s daughter, Mey

Bernadette Sabili18

14. Department of Education (DepEd) Lipa City Division Certification that the
names Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili
(petitioner’s son) do not appear on its list of graduates19

15. Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City that Bernadette
Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili do not appear in its
list of voters20

16. Affidavit executed by Violeta Fernandez21

 17. Affidavit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet22

18. Affidavit Executed by Pablo Lorzano23

19. Petitioner’s 2007 COC for Member of House of Representative24

For ease of later discussion, private respondent’s evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1)
Certificates regarding ownership of real property; (2) petitioner’s Voter Registration and
Certification (common exhibits of the parties); (3) petitioner’s COCs in previous elections;
(3) Certifications regarding petitioner’s family members; and (4) Affidavits of Lipa City
residents.

On the other hand, petitioner presented the following evidence to establish the fact of his
residence in Lipa City:
 1. Affidavit executed by Bernadette Palomares25

2. Birth Certificate of Francis Meynard Sabili26

3. Affidavit of Leonila Suarez (Suarez)27

4. Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain,

Dominador Honrade28

29
5. Affidavit executed by Rosalinda Macasaet

6. Certificate of Appreciation issued to petitioner by the parish of Sto. Nino of

Pinagtong-ulan30

7. Designation of petitioner in the Advisory Body (AB) of Pinagtong-ulan, San

Jose/Lipa City Chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.31

8. COMELEC Voter Certification on petitioner issued by Election Officer Juan

Aguila, Jr.32

9. COMELEC Application for Transfer/Transfer with Reactivation dated 6 June

2009 signed by Election Officer Juan Aguila, Jr.33

34
10. Petitioner’s Income Tax Return for 2007

11. Official Receipt for petitioner’s income tax payment for 200735

12. Petitioner’s Income Tax Return for 200836

13. Official Receipt for petitioner’s income tax payment for 200837

14. Birth Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili38

15. Affidavit executed by Jacinto Cornejo, Sr.39

16. Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including past

and incumbent Pinagtong-ulan officials.40

For ease of later discussion, petitioner’s evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1) his Income
Tax Returns and corresponding Official Receipts for the years 2007 and 2008; (2)
Certification from the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan; (3) Affidavit of his common-law
wife, Bernadette Palomares; and (4) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors,
Certificate of Appreciation from the barangay parish and Memorandum from the local
chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

The COMELEC Ruling

In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010,41 the COMELEC Second Division granted the
Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the
mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a
resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the statutory one-year residency
requirement under the law.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC,
during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he
was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of
votes cast for the said position. He accordingly filed a Manifestation42 with the COMELEC en
banc to reflect this fact.

In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010,43 the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no
prior notice setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by him.
Meanwhile, Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification Cases
Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2012 Automated National and Local Elections) requires
the parties to be notified in advance of the date of the promulgation of the Resolution.

SEC. 6. Promulgation. - The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or

a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in
advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax,
or thru the fastest means of communication.

Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely
Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special
Raffle of this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC.
Petitioner attached to his Petition a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and proclamation of
Winning Candidates for Lipa City Mayor and Vice-Mayor issued by the City/Municipal Board
44 45
of Canvassers, as well as a copy of his Oath of Office. He also attached to his Petition
another Certification of Residency46 issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain
Dominador Honrade and sworn to before a notary public.
4
On 7 September 2010, this Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order47 requiring the parties to
observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
Thereafter, the parties filed their responsive pleadings.

Issues
The following are the issues for resolution:

1. Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules
of Procedure; and

2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that

Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for
local elective officials.

The Court’s Ruling

1. On whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate
its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure

Petitioner argues that the assailed 17 August 2010 COMELEC Resolution, which denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, is null and void. The Resolution was allegedly not
promulgated in accordance with the COMELEC’s own Rules of Procedure and, hence,
violated petitioner’s right to due process of law.

The rules governing the Petition for Cancellation of COC in this case is COMELEC Resolution
No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification of Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2010
Automated National and Local Elections), which was promulgated on 11 November 2009.
Sections 6 and 7 thereof provide as follows:

SEC. 6. Promulgation. - The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or

a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in
advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax
or thru the fastest means of communication.
SEC. 7. Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a Decision, Resolution, Order
or Ruling of a Division shall be filed within three (3) days from the promulgation thereof.
Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the Decision,
Resolution, Order or Ruling.

Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk of the Commission shall
notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the
case to the Commission en banc.

The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the Motion for Reconsideration for the
resolution of the Commission en banc within three (3) days from the certification thereof.

However, the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 201048 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696 by ordering that "all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the
Commission for immediate promulgation" in view of "the proximity of the Automated
National and Local Elections and lack of material time." The Order states:

ORDER
Considering the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of
material time, the Commission hereby suspends Sec. 6 of Resolution No. 8696 promulgated
on November 11, 2009, which reads:

Sec. 6. Promulgation. - The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a

Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served upon the
parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest
means of communication."

Let all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner claims that he did not receive notice of the said suspension of Section 6 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Thus, his right to due process was still violated. On the other
hand, the COMELEC claims that it has the power to suspend its own rules of procedure and
invokes Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which gives it the power "to promulgate
its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices."

We agree with the COMELEC on this issue.

4
 49
In Lindo v. Commission on Elections, petitioner claimed that there was no valid
promulgation of a Decision in an election protest case when a copy thereof was merely
furnished the parties, instead of first notifying the parties of a set date for the promulgation
thereof, in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 35 of the COMELEC’s own Rules of Procedure,
as follows:

Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. — The decision of the court shall be
promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties. It shall become
final five (5) days after promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

Rejecting petitioner’s argument, we held therein that the additional rule requiring notice to
the parties prior to promulgation of a decision is not part of the process of promulgation.
Since lack of such notice does not prejudice the rights of the parties, noncompliance with
this rule is a procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the decision. Thus:

This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published,

officially announced, made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing,
coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel (Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration,
L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 812). It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 433). It is the filing of the
signed decision with the clerk of court (Sumbing v. Davide, G.R. Nos. 86850-51, July 20,
1989, En Banc Minute Resolution). The additional requirement imposed by the COMELEC
rules of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation. Hence,
We do not agree with petitioner’s contention that there was no promulgation of the trial
court's decision. The trial court did not deny that it had officially made the decision public.
From the recital of facts of both parties, copies of the decision were sent to petitioner's
counsel of record and petitioner’s (sic) himself. Another copy was sent to private
respondent.

What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently objected to was not the promulgation
of the decision but the failure of the trial court to serve notice in advance of the
promulgation of its decision as required by the COMELEC rules. The failure to serve such
notice in advance of the promulgation may be considered a procedural lapse on the part of
the trial court which did not prejudice the rights of the parties and did not vitiate the validity
of the decision of the trial court nor (sic) of the promulgation of said decision.

50 51
Moreover, quoting Pimping v. COMELEC, citing Macabingkil v. Yatco, we further held in
the same case that failure to receive advance notice of the promulgation of a decision is not
sufficient to set aside the COMELEC’s judgment, as long as the parties have been afforded an
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, viz:
The fact that petitioners were not served notice in advance of the promulgation of the
decision in the election protest cases, in Our view, does not constitute reversible error or a
reason sufficient enough to compel and warrant the setting aside of the judgment rendered
by the Comelec. Petitioners anchor their argument on an alleged denial to them (sic) due
process to the deviation by the Comelec from its own made rules. However, the essence of
due process is that, the parties in the case were afforded an opportunity to be heard.

In the present case, we read from the COMELEC Order that the exigencies attendant to the
holding of the country’s first automated national elections had necessitated that the
COMELEC suspend the rule on notice prior to promulgation, and that it instead direct the
delivery of all resolutions to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation.
Notably, we see no prejudice to the parties caused thereby. The COMELEC’s Order did not
affect the right of the parties to due process. They were still furnished a copy of the
COMELEC Decision and were able to reckon the period for perfecting an appeal. In fact,
petitioner was able to timely lodge a Petition with this Court.

Clearly, the COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally granted power to make its own
rules of procedure when it issued the 4 May 2010 Order suspending Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696. Consequently, the second assailed Resolution of the COMELEC cannot
be set aside on the ground of COMELEC’s failure to issue to petitioner a notice setting the
date of the promulgation thereof.

2. On whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed
to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials

As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when
the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as
to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden
constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.52

In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, (G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010), we explained that the
COMELEC’s use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to
taint its action with grave abuse of discretion -

As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to

"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that
the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a
decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.

Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section
5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by
substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree
of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.

In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a
certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the
COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene.
When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse
mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.

Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELEC’s use of wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding the issue of whether petitioner made a material
misrepresentation of his residency qualification in his COC as to order its cancellation.
Among others, petitioner pointed to the COMELEC’s inordinate emphasis on the issue of
property ownership of petitioner’s declared residence in Lipa City, its inconsistent stance
regarding Palomares’s relationship to the Pinagtong-ulan property, and its failure to
consider in the first instance the certification of residence issued by the barangay captain of
Pinagtong-ulan. Petitioner bewails that the COMELEC required "more" evidence to show
the change in his residence, notwithstanding the various pieces of evidence he presented
and the fact that under the law, the quantum of evidence required in these cases is merely
substantial evidence and not clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner further ascribes grave
abuse of discretion in the COMELEC’s brushing aside of the fact that he has been filing his
ITR in Lipa City (where he indicates that he is a resident of Pinagtong-ulan) on the mere
expedient that the law allows the filing of the ITR not only in the place of legal residence but,
alternately, in his place of business. Petitioner notes that private respondent’s own evidence
shows that petitioner has no business in Lipa City, leaving only his residence therein as basis
for filing his ITR therein.

Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling
that petitioner had not sufficiently shown that he had resided in Lipa City for at least one
year prior to the May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence adduced by the parties and the
COMELEC’s appreciation thereof.

In the present case, the parties are in agreement that the domicile of origin of Sabili was
Brgy. Sico, San Juan, Batangas. He claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin and
established his domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, thereby making him
qualified to run for Lipa City mayor. On the other hand, respondent COMELEC held that no
such change in domicile or residence took place and, hence, the entry in his Certificate of
Candidacy showing that he was a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City constituted a
misrepresentation that disqualified him from running for Lipa City mayor.

To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode.53
As in all administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary in election cases is substantial
evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a
54
conclusion.

The ruling on private respondent’s evidence

We begin with an evaluation of the COMELEC’s appreciation of private respondent’s

evidence.

a) Petitioner’s Voter Certification, Registration and COCs in previous elections

Petitioner’s Voter Certification is a common exhibit of the parties. It states, among others,
that petitioner is a resident of Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, Batangas; that he had been a
resident of Lipa City for two (2) years and three (3) months; and that he was so registered on
31 October 2009. The information therein was "certified correct" by COMELEC Election
Officer Juan B. Aguila, Jr.

Private respondent presented this document as proof that petitioner misrepresented that he
is a resident of Lipa City. On the other hand, the latter presented this document as proof of
his residency.

The COMELEC correctly ruled that the Voter Certification issued by the COMELEC Election
Officer, Atty. Juan B. Aguila, Jr., was not conclusive proof that petitioner had been a resident
of Lipa City since April 2007. It noted that Aguila is not the competent public officer to
certify the veracity of this claim, particularly because petitioner’s COMELEC registration
was approved only in October 2009.
The Voter Registration Record of petitioner accomplished on 21 June 1997 showing that he
was a resident of Sico, San Juan, Batangas, as well as his various COCs dated 21 June 1997 and
March 2007 indicating the same thing, were no longer discussed by the COMELEC - and
rightly so. These pieces of evidence showing that he was a resident of Sico, San Juan,
Batangas on the said dates are irrelevant as, prior to April 2007, petitioner was admittedly a
resident of Sico, San Juan Batangas. Rather, the relevant time period for consideration is
that from April 2007 onwards, after petitioner’s alleged change of domicile.

b) Certificates regarding ownership of real property

The various certificates and tax declarations adduced by private respondent showed that the
Lipa property was solely registered in the name of petitioner’s common-law wife,
Bernadette Palomares. In discussing the import of this document, the COMELEC reasoned
that, being a "seasoned politician," he should have registered the Lipa property (which he
claimed to have purchased with his personal funds) in his own name. Such action "would
have offered positive proof of intent to change actual residence" from San Juan, Batangas to
Lipa City, considering that he had previously declared his ancestral home in San Juan,
Batangas as his domicile. Since Palomares and petitioner are common-law spouses not
capacitated to marry each other, the property relation between them is governed by Article
148 of the Family Code,55 where only the parties’ actual contributions are recognized.
Hence, petitioner cannot prove ownership of a property and residence in Lipa City through
the registered ownership of the common-law wife of the property in Lipa City.

On the other hand, petitioner bewails the inordinate emphasis that the COMELEC bestowed
upon the question of whether the Lipa property could be considered as his residence, for the
reason that it was not registered in his name. He stresses that the issue should be residence,
not property ownership.

It is true that property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for
56
local election. Rather, it is a candidate’s residence in a locality through actual residence in
whatever capacity. Indeed, we sustained the COMELEC when it considered as evidence
tending to establish a candidate’s domicile of choice the mere lease (rather than ownership)
of an apartment by a candidate in the same province where he ran for the position of
governor.57 In the more recent case of Mitra v. Commission on Elections,58 we reversed the
COMELEC ruling that a candidate’s sparsely furnished, leased room on the mezzanine of a
feedmill could not be considered as his residence for the purpose of complying with the
residency requirement of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.59
The Dissent claims that the registration of the property in Palomares’s name does not prove
petitioner’s residence as it merely showed "donative intent" without the necessary
formalities or payment of taxes.

However, whatever the nature of the transaction might be, this point is immaterial for the
purpose of ascertaining petitioner’s residence. We have long held that it is not required that
a candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a
place. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a
60
friend or relative. What is of central concern then is that petitioner identified and
established a place in Lipa City where he intended to live in and return to for an indefinite
period of time.

Hence, while the COMELEC correctly ruled that, of itself, Palomares’ ownership of the Lipa
property does not prove that she or - and in view of their common-law relations, petitioner
- resides in Lipa City, nevertheless, the existence of a house and lot apparently owned by
petitioner’s common-law wife, with whom he has been living for over two decades, makes
plausible petitioner’s allegation of bodily presence and intent to reside in the area.

c) Certifications regarding the family members of petitioner

Private respondent presented a Certification from the DepEd, Lipa City Division, indicating
that the names Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili (petitioner’s daughter) and
Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioner’s son) do not appear on the list of graduates of Lipa City.
Private respondent also presented a Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of
Lipa City that the names of these family members of petitioner do not appear in its list of
voters.

As the issue at hand is petitioner’s residence, and not the educational or voting record of his
family, the COMELEC properly did not consider these pieces of evidence in arriving at its
Resolution.

The Dissent nevertheless asserts that because his children do not attend educational
institutions in Lipa and are not registered voters therein, and because petitioner does not
maintain a business therein nor has property

in his name, petitioner is unable to show the existence of real and substantial reason for his
stay in Lipa City.

As to the Dissent’s first assertion, it must be stressed that the children, like the wife, do not
dictate the family domicile. Even in the context of marriage, the family domicile is jointly
decided by both husband and wife.61 In addition, we note that the transfer to Lipa City
occurred in 2007, when petitioner’s children were already well into college and could very
well have chosen to study elsewhere than in Lipa City.

Also, it is petitioner’s domicile which is at issue, and not that of his children. But even
assuming that it was petitioner himself (rather than his children) who attended educational
institutions or who registered as a voter in a place other than Lipa City, we have held that
"absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence."62 In fact,
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that transfer of residence to any other
place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public service;
educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air
force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government
institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of residence.

As to the Dissent’s second assertion, petitioner apparently does not maintain a business in
Lipa City. However, apart from the Pinagtong-ulan property which both Suarez (the
previous property owner) and Palomares swear was purchased with petitioner’s own funds,
the records also indicate that there are two other lots in Lipa City, particularly in Barangay
Lodlod, Lipa City63 which are registered jointly in the name of petitioner and Palomares. In
fact, it was private respondent who presented the Lipa City Assessor’s Certificate to this
effect. Even assuming that this Court were to disregard the two Lodlod lots, it is well-
established that property ownership (and similarly, business interest) in the locality where
one intends to run for local elective post is not requirement of the Constitution.64

More importantly, we have gone so far as to rule that there is nothing "wrong in an
individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able
to prove with reasonable certainty that he has

effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law."65

d) Affidavits of Lipa City residents

Private respondent also presented the affidavits of Violeta Fernandez66 and Rodrigo
Macasaet,67 who were also residents of Pinagtong-ulan. Both stated that petitioner did not
reside in Pinagtong-ulan, as they had "rarely seen" him in the area. Meanwhile, Pablo
Lorzano,68 in his Affidavit, attested that although the Lipa property was sometimes used for
gatherings, he did "not recall having seen" petitioner in their barangay. On the other hand,
private respondent69 and Eladio de Torres,70 both residents of Brgy. Calamias, reasoned
that petitioner was not a resident of Lipa City because he has no work or family there.
The COMELEC did not discuss these Affidavits in its assailed Resolution. It was correct in
doing so, particularly considering that these Affidavits were duly controverted by those
presented by petitioner.

Moreover, even assuming the truth of the allegation in the Affidavits that petitioner was
"rarely seen" in the area, this does not preclude the possibility of his residence therein. In
Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,71 we held that the averments of
certain barangay health workers - that they failed to see a particular candidate whenever
they made rounds of the locality of which he was supposed to be a resident - is of no
moment. It is possible that the candidate was out of the house to attend to his own business
at the time. The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a
day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.

The ruling on petitioner’s evidence

We now evaluate how the COMELEC appreciated petitioner’s evidence:

a) Petitioner’s Income Tax Returns for 2007 and 2008

The Income Tax Returns of petitioner presented below showed that petitioner had been
paying his Income Tax (2007 and 2008) to the Revenue District Office of Lipa City. In waving
aside his Income Tax Returns, the COMELEC held that these were not indications of
residence since Section 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code does not only state that
it shall be filed in a person’s legal residence, but that it may alternatively be filed in a
person’s principal place of business.

In particular, Section 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code72 provides that the
Income Tax Return shall be filed either in the place where a person resides or where his
principal place of business is located. However, private respondent’s own evidence - a
Certification from the City Permits and Licensing Office of Lipa City- showed that there was
no business registered in the City under petitioner’s name.

Thus, COMELEC failed to appreciate that precisely because an individual income tax return
may only be filed either in the legal residence OR the principal place of business, as
prescribed under the law, the fact that Sabili was filing his Income Tax Returns in Lipa City
notwithstanding that he had no business therein showed that he had actively elected to
establish his residence in that city.

The Dissent claims that since the jurisdiction of RDO Lipa City includes both San Juan and
Lipa City, petitioner’s filing of his ITR therein can also support an intent to remain in San
Juan, Batangas - petitioner’s domicile of origin.
However, a simple perusal of the Income Tax Returns and Revenue Official Receipts for 2007
and 2008 shows that petitioner invariably declares his residence to be Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa
City, rather than San Juan, Batangas.73 Hence, while petitioner may be submitting his
income tax return in the same RDO, the declaration therein is unmistakable. Petitioner
considers Lipa City to be his domicile.

b) Certification from the Barangay Captain of Pinagtong-ulan

The COMELEC did not consider in the first instance the Certification issued by Pinagtong-
74
ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade (Honrade) that petitioner had been residing
in Brgy Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this oversight was raised as an issue in
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that
the said Certification was not sworn to before a notary public and, hence, "cannot be relied
on." Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially identical, Certification from
the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now been sworn to
before a notary public.

We disagree with the COMELEC’s treatment of the Barangay Captain’s Certification and find
the same tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrade’s Certification would not only
be admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled to due consideration.

Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose

Cooperative, Inc.,75 we explained that the following three (3) requisites must concur for
entries in official records to be admissible in evidence:
 (a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;

(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated
by him, which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to
"keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay."76 Regarding the second
requisite, we have explicitly recognized in Mitra v. Commission on Elections,77 that "it is
the business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay."
Anent the third requisite, the Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and duties78
concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay
Secretary.

Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrade’s
Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not notarized.

Meanwhile, the Dissent opines that the sworn affidavit of the barangay chair of Pinagtong-
ulan that petitioner is a resident of Lipa City does not help petitioner’s case because it was
not shown that the term "resident" as used therein carries the same meaning as domicile,
that is, not merely bodily presence but also, animus manendi or intent to return. This Court
has ruled otherwise.

In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,79 the declaration of Aborlan’s punong barangay that

petitioner resides in his barangay was taken to have the same meaning as domicile,
inasmuch as the said declaration was made in the face of the Court’s recognition that Mitra
"might not have stayed in Aborlan nor in Palawan for most of 2008 and 2009 because his
office and activities as a Representative were in Manila."

Assuming that the barangay captain’s certification only pertains to petitioner’s bodily
presence in Pinagtong-ulan, still, the COMELEC cannot deny the strength of this evidence in
establishing petitioner’s bodily presence in Pinagtong-ulan since 2007.

c) Affidavit of petitioner’s common law wife

To substantiate his claim of change of domicile, petitioner also presented the affidavit of
Palomares, wherein the latter swore that she and petitioner began residing in Lipa City in
2007, and that the funds used to purchase the Lipa property were petitioner’s personal
funds. The COMELEC ruled that the Affidavit was self-serving for having been executed by
petitioner’s common-law wife. Also, despite the presentation by petitioner of other
Affidavits stating that he and Palomares had lived in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, the
latter’s Affidavit was rejected by the COMELEC for having no independent collaboration.

Petitioner faults the COMELEC’s stand, which it claims to be inconsistent. He argues that
since the property regime between him and Palomares is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code (based on the parties’ actual contribution) as the COMELEC stressed, then
Palomares’s Affidavit expressly stating that petitioner’s money alone had been used to
purchase the Lipa property (notwithstanding that it was registered in her name) was not
self-serving, but was in fact, a declaration against interest.

Petitioner’s argument that Palomares’s affidavit was a "declaration against interest" is,
strictly speaking, inaccurate and irrelevant. A declaration against interest, under the Rules
of Civil Procedure, refers to a "declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify
against the interest of a declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position
80
would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true." A declaration
against interest is an exception to the hearsay rule. 81 As such, it pertains only to the
82
admissibility of, not the weight accorded to, testimonial evidence.

Nevertheless, we see the logic in petitioner’s claim that the COMELEC had committed grave
abuse of discretion in being inconsistent in its stand regarding Palomares, particularly
regarding her assertion that the Lipa property had been purchased solely with petitioner’s
money. If the COMELEC accepts the registration of the Lipa property in her name to be
accurate, her affidavit disavowing ownership thereof in favor of petitioner was far from
self-serving as it ran counter to her (and her children’s) property interest.

The Dissent states that it was not unreasonable for the COMELEC to believe that Palomares
may have committed misrepresentations in her affidavit considering that she had perjured
herself as an informant on the birth certificates of her children with respect to the supposed
date and place of her marriage to petitioner. However, this was not the reason propounded
by the COMELEC when it rejected Palomares’ affidavit.

Moreover, it is notable that Palomares’ assertion in her affidavit that she and petitioner
have been living in the Pinagtong-ulan property since April 2007 is corroborated by other
evidence, including the affidavits of Pinagtong-ulan barangay officials and neighbors.
d) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors, certificate from parish and
designation from socio-civic organization

The Affidavit issued by Leonila Suarez83 (erstwhile owner of the Lipa house and lot) states
that in April 2007, after she received the down payment for the Lipa property and signed an
agreement that petitioner would settle her bank obligations in connection with the said
transaction, he and Palomares actually started residing at Pinagtong-ulan. The COMELEC
brushed this Affidavit aside as one that "merely narrates the circumstances surrounding the
sale of the property and mentions in passing that Sabili and Palomares lived in Pinagtong-
ulan since April 2007 up to the present."84

We disagree with the COMELEC’s appreciation of the Suarez Affidavit. Since she was its
owner, transactions for the purchase of the Lipa property was within her personal
knowledge. Ordinarily, this includes the arrangement regarding who shall pay for the
property and when, if ever, it shall be occupied by the buyers. We thus consider that her
statements impact positively on petitioner’s claim of residence.

The Dissent on the other hand argues that the claim that petitioner started living in the Lipa
house and lot in April 2007 is made dubious by the fact that (1) there might not be enough
time to effect an actual and physical change in residence a month before the May 2007
elections when petitioner ran for representative of the 4th District of Batangas; and (2) the
Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized, and the subsequent transfer of ownership in the tax
declaration was made, only in August 2008.

Before further discussing this, it is pertinent to point out that these were not the reasons
adduced by the COMELEC in the assailed Resolutions. Assuming that the above reasons were
the unuttered considerations of the COMELEC in coming up with its conclusions, such
reasoning still exhibits grave abuse of discretion.

As to the Dissent’s first argument, it must be remembered that a transfer of

domicile/residence need not be completed in one single instance. Thus, in Mitra v.
85
Commission on Elections, where the evidence showed that in 2008, petitioner Mitra had
leased a small room at Maligaya Feedmills located in Aborlan and, in 2009 purchased in the
same locality a lot where he began constructing his house, we recognized that petitioner
"transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008 and concluded his transfer
in early 2009" and thus, he transferred his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan
within the period required by law. We cannot treat the transfer to the Pinagtong-ulan house
any less than we did Mitra’s transfer to the Maligaya Feedmills room.
Moreover, the Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including former
and incumbent barangay officials, attests that petitioner had begun living in the Pinagtong-
ulan house and lot before the May 2007 elections such that it was where his coordinators for
the May 2007 elections went to meet him.86 Jacinto Cornejo Sr., the contractor who
renovated the Pinagtong-ulan house when it was bought by petitioner, also swore that
petitioner and his family began living therein even while it was being renovated.87 Another
Affidavit petitioner adduced was that of Rosalinda Macasaet, a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-
ulan,88 who stated that she also sold a lot she owned in favor of petitioner and Palomares.
The latter bought her lot since it was adjacent to the Lipa house and lot they had earlier
acquired. Macasaet also swore that the couple had actually resided in the house located in
Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007, and that she knew this because her own house was very
near the couple’s own. Macasaet’s Affidavit is a positive assertion of petitioner’s actual
physical presence in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City.

While private respondent had adduced affidavits of two Pinagtong-ulan residents (that of
Violeta Fernandez89 and Rodrigo Macasaet)90 attesting that petitioner could not be a
resident of Pinagtong-ulan as he was "rarely seen" in the area, these affidavits were
controverted by the Joint affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents who plainly
accused the two of lying. Meanwhile, the affidavits of private respondent91 and Eladio de
Torres92 stating that petitioner is not a resident of Lipa City because he has no work or
family there is hardly worthy of credence since both are residents of Barangay Calamias,
which is, and private respondent does not contest this, about 15 kilometers from Pinagtong-
ulan.

As to the Dissent’s second argument, the fact that the notarization of the deed of absolute
sale of the property was made months after April 2007 does not negate petitioner’s claim
that he started residing therein in April 2007. It is clear from the Affidavit of the property’s
seller, Leonila Suarez, that it was not yet fully paid in April 2007, so it was understandable
that a deed of absolute sale was not executed at the time. Thus:

That initially, the contract to sell was entered into by and between Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa
Sabili and Bernadette Palomares and myself, but eventually the spouses changed their mind,
and after the couple settled all my loan obligations to the bank, they requested me to put the
name of Ms. Bernadette P. Palomares instead of Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili and
Bernadette Palomares in the absolute deed of sale;

That it was Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili who came to my former residence at Barangay
Pinagtong-ulan sometime in the month of April 2007. At that time, Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili
was still running for Representative (Congressman) in the 4th District of Batangas;
That after payment of the down payment and signing of an agreement that Mr. Meynardo
Asa Sabili will be the one to settle my bank obligations, Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo A. Sabili and
Bernadette Palomares had an actual transfer of their residence at Barangay Pinagtong-ulan,
Lipa City;

That they started living and residing in Pinagtong-ulan in the month of April, 2007 up to
93
this point in time; xxx

As to the rest of the documents presented by petitioner, the COMELEC held that the
Memorandum issued by the Guardians Brotherhood Inc. San Jose/Lipa City Chapter merely
declares the designation of petitioner in the organization, without any showing that
residence in the locality was a requirement for that designation. Meanwhile, the Certificate
of Appreciation was nothing more than an acknowledgment of petitioner’s material and
financial support, and not an indication of residence.

We agree that considered separately, the Guardians Brotherhood Memorandum and the
Pinagtong-ulan Parish Certificate of Appreciation do not establish petitioner’s residence in
Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City. Nevertheless, coupled with the fact that petitioner had twice
been elected as Provincial Board Member representing the Fourth District of Batangas,
which encompasses Lipa City, petitioner’s involvement in the religious life of the
community, as attested to by the certificate of appreciation issued to him by the Pinagtong-
ulan parish for his "material and financial support" as President of the Barangay Fiesta
Committee in 2009, as well as his assumption of a leadership role in the socio-civic sphere
of the locality as a member of the advisory body of the Pinagtong-ulan, San Jose/Lipa City
Chapter of the Guardians Brotherhood Inc. , manifests a significant level of knowledge of
and sensitivity to the needs of the said community. Such, after all, is the rationale for the
residency requirement in our elections laws, to wit:

The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding
elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the
needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of
their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers’
qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for xxx. 94

Considering all of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that while separately, each evidence
presented by petitioner might fail to convincingly show the fact of his residence at
Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, collectively, these pieces of evidence tend to sufficiently
establish the said fact.
Petitioner’s actual physical presence in Lipa City is established not only by the presence of a
place (Pinagtong-ulan house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of
various persons in Pinagtong-ulan, and the Certification of its barangay captain.
Petitioner’s substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa City is
also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the
transfer of his voter registration, but also his participation in the community’s socio-civic
and religious life, as well as his declaration in his ITR that he is a resident thereof.

We therefore rule that petitioner has been able to adduce substantial evidence to
demonstrate compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials
under the law.

In view of this Court’s finding that petitioner has not misrepresented his residence at
Pinagtong-ulan and the duration thereof, there is no need to further discuss whether there
was material and deliberate misrepresentation of the residency qualification in his COC.

As a final note, we do not lose sight of the fact that Lipa City voters manifested their own
judgment regarding the qualifications of petitioner when they voted for him,
notwithstanding that the issue of his residency qualification had been raised prior to the
elections. Petitioner has garnered the highest number of votes (55,268 votes as opposed to
95
the 48,825 votes in favor of his opponent, Oscar Gozos) legally cast for the position of
Mayor of Lipa City and has consequently been proclaimed duly elected municipal Mayor of
96
Lipa City during the last May 2010 elections

97
In this regard, we reiterate our ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that "(t)o
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal
principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of
the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and
juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote."

98
Similarly, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections, we concluded that "when the evidence of
the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or
inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by
upholding the victor's right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For
the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters."

In sum, we grant the Petition not only because petitioner sufficiently established his
compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials under the
law. We also recognize that "(a)bove and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the
electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must
99
prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to hold sacred."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed COMELEC

Resolutions dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 in Florencio Librea v. Meynardo A.
Sabili [SPA No. 09-047(DC)] are ANNULLED. Private respondent’s Petition to cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Meynardo A. Sabili is DENIED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued
by this Court on 7 September 2010 is MADE PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(no part)
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

1. Rollo, p. 79. ↩

2. The 4th district of Batangas is composed of the municipalities of Ibaan, Padre Garcia,
Rosario, San Jose, San Juan and Taysan, and the City of Lipa.
[^http://www.batangas.gov.ph/index.php?p=15]: (last accessed on 30 January 2012). ↩

3. Rollo, p. 70-76. ↩

4. Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and
that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city of district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is
 assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the
facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
(Emphasis supplied.) ↩
5. Section 39. Qualifications. -

(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect. (Underscoring supplied.) ↩

6. Id. at 137. ↩

7. Id. at 138, 152-155. ↩

8. Id. at 139. ↩

9. Id. at 140-141. ↩

10. Id. at 142-143. ↩

11. Id. at 144. ↩

12. Id. at 145-146. ↩

13. Id. at 147. ↩

14. Id. at 148. ↩

15. Id. at 149. ↩

16. Id. at 150. ↩

17. Id. at 156. ↩

18. Id. at 157-158. ↩

19. Id. at 159. ↩

20. Id. at 160. ↩

21. Id. at 161. ↩

22. Id. at 162. ↩

23. Id. at 163. ↩

24. Id. at 164. ↩

25. Id. at 102. ↩

26. Id. at 103. ↩

27. Id. at 104. ↩

28. Id. at 105. ↩

29. Id. at 106. ↩

30. Id. at 107. ↩

31. Id. at 108. ↩

32. Id. at 109. ↩

33. Id. at 110. ↩

34. Id. at 111. ↩

35. Id. at 112. ↩

36. Id. at 113. ↩

37. Id. at 114. ↩

38. Id. at 187. ↩

39. Id. at 190. ↩

40. Id. at 211-212. ↩

41. Id. at 48-62. ↩

42. Id. at 296-299. ↩

43. Id. at 63-69. ↩

44. Id. at 294. ↩

45. Id. at 295. ↩

46. Id. at 300. ↩

47. Id. at 314-315. ↩

48. Id. at 739. ↩

49. 271 Phil. 844 (1991). ↩

50. 224 Phil. 326, 359 (1985). ↩

51. 128 Phil 165 (1967). ↩

52. Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G..R. No. 191938, 19 October 2010, 633 SCRA 580. ↩

53. Domino v. Commission on Elections, 369 Phil. 798 (1999). ↩

54. Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 347 Phil. 510 (1997). ↩

55. Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith. ↩

56. Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 187478, 21

December 2009, 608 SCRA 733. ↩

57. Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106 (1999). The other pieces of evidence
considered by the COMELEC in the Perez case were the candidate’s marriage certificate,
the birth certificate of his daughter, and various letters bearing the address, all
showing that he was a resident of the province for at least one (1) year before the
elections. ↩
58. G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010, 622 SCRA 744. ↩

59. As further proof of his change in residence, Mitra had adduced affidavits from the seller
of the lot he purchased, the owner of Maligaya Feedmill, the barangay captain and
sangguniang barangay members of Isaub, Aborlan, as well as an Aborlan councilor. He
also presented photographs of the residential portion of Maligaya Feedmill where he
resides, and of his experimental pineapple plantation and cock farm. He further
submitted the community tax certificate he himself secured, and a House of
Representatives Identification Card, both indicating that he resides in Aborlan. ↩

60. De los Reyes v. Solidum, 61 Phil. 893 (1935). ↩

61. Family Code, Article 69. ↩

62. Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954). ↩

63. Rollo, pp. 148 and 150, Office of the City Assessor of Lipa Certification dated 14
December 2009. ↩

64. Maquerra v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 (1965). ↩

65. Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, citing Aquino v.
Commission on Elections, 318 Phil 467 (1995). ↩

66. Supra note 21. ↩

67. Supra note 22. ↩

68. Supra note 23. ↩

69. Rollo, pp. 82-83. ↩

70. Id. at 84-85. ↩

71. G..R. No. 187478, 21December 2009, 608 SCRA 733. ↩

72. SEC. 51. Individual Return. -

(A) Requirements. - ... … ...

(B) Where to File. - Except in cases where the Commissioner otherwise permits, the
return shall be filed with an authorized agent bank, Revenue District Officer, Collection
Agent or duly authorized Treasurer of the city or municipality in which such person has
 his legal residence or principal place of business in the Philippines, or if there be no
legal residence or place of business in the Philippines, with the Office of the
Commissioner. xxx ↩
73. Rollo, pp. 112-114. ↩

74. Rollo, p. 105. ↩

75. 425 Phil. 511 (2002). ↩

76. SEC. 394. Barangay Secretary: Appointment, Qualifications, Powers and Duties. - (a)
The barangay secretary shall be appointed by the punong barangay with the
concurrence of the majority of all the sangguniang barangay members. The
appointment of the barangay secretary shall not be subject to attestation by the Civil
Service Commission.

(b) The barangay secretary shall be of legal age, a qualified voter and an actual resident
of the barangay concerned.

(c) No person shall be appointed barangay secretary if he is a sangguniang barangay

member, a government employee, or a relative of the punong barangay within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.

(d) The barangay secretary shall:

(1) Keep custody of all records of the sangguniang barangay and the barangay assembly
meetings;

(2) Prepare and keep the minutes of all meetings of the sangguniang barangay and the
barangay assembly;

(3) Prepare a list of members of the barangay assembly, and have the same posted in
conspicuous places within the barangay;

(4) Assist in the preparation of all necessary forms for the conduct of barangay
elections, initiatives, referenda or plebiscites, in coordination with the Comelec;

(5) Assist the municipal civil registrar in the registration of births, deaths, and
marriages;

(6) Keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay containing the following
items of information: name, address, place and date of birth, sex, civil status,
citizenship, occupation, and such other items of information as may be prescribed by
 law or ordinances;

(7) Submit a report on the actual number of barangay residents as often as may be
required by the sangguniang barangay; and

(8) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be
prescribed by law or ordinance. ↩
77. Supra note 56. ↩

78. SEC. 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Functions. - (a) The punong barangay,
as the chief executive of the barangay government, shall exercise such powers and
perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and other laws.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code,
the punong barangay shall:

(1) Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay;

(2) Negotiate, enter into, and sign contracts for and in behalf of the barangay, upon
authorization of the sangguniang barangay;

(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or
municipal mayor and the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and
functions;

(4) Call and preside over the sessions of the sangguniang barangay and the barangay
assembly, and vote only to break a tie;

(5) Upon approval by a majority of all the members of the sangguniang barangay,
appoint or replace the barangay treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other appointive
barangay officials;

(6) Organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the
maintenance of peace and order or on occasions of emergency or calamity within the
barangay;

(7) In coordination with the barangay development council, prepare the annual
executive and supplemental budgets of the barangay;

(8) Approve vouchers relating to the disbursement of barangay funds;

 (9) Enforce laws and regulations relating to pollution control and protection of the
environment;

(10) Administer the operation of the Katarungang Pambarangay in accordance with the
provisions of this Code;

(11) Exercise general supervision over the activities of the sangguniang kabataan;

(12) Ensure the delivery of basic services as mandated under Section 17 of this Code;

(13) Conduct an annual palarong barangay which shall feature traditional sports and
disciplines included in national and international games, in coordination with the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports;

(14) Promote the general welfare of the barangay; and

(15) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be
prescribed by law or ordinance. ↩
79. G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010. ↩

80. Rules of Court, Rule 130C (6), Sec. 38. ↩

81. Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, 16 April 2009, 585 SCRA 421. ↩

82. People v. Catalino, 131 Phil. 194 (1968). ↩

83. Rollo, p. 104. ↩

84. Id. at 66. ↩

85. G.R. No. 191938, 19 October 2010. ↩

86. Rollo, pp. 211-212, Pinagsama-Samang Salaysay executed by 21 Barangay Pingtong-ulan

residents, namely Esmeraldo P. Macasaet (former barangay captain of Pinagtong-
Ulan), Eduardo R. Lorzano (former barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan), Patricia L.
Alvarez (incumbent councilor of Pinagtong-ulan), Pedro Y. Montalba (former councilor
of Pinagtong-ulan), Loida M. Macasaet, Mario P. Lingao, Sancho M. Garcia, Jr., , Atilano
H. Macasaet, Baby Jean A. Mercado, Ligaya C Mercado, Rosalinda M. Macasaet, Olga M.
Reyes, Jennifer D. Garcia, Sancho C. Garcia, Sr., Marissa G. Mercado, Wilma C. Mercado,
Aireen M. Macasaet, Eden R. Suarez, Noemi R. Ubalde, Arthur A. del Rosario, and
Norberto M. Layog. ↩

87. Rollo, p. 190. ↩

88. Id. at 106. ↩

89. Rollo, p. 161. ↩

90. Rollo, p. 162. ↩

91. Rollo, p. 82-83. ↩

92. Rollo, pp. 84-85. ↩

93. Rollo, p. 188. ↩

94. Torayno v. Commission on Elections, 392 Phil. 343 (2000). ↩

95. [^http://www.comelec.gov.ph/results/2010_natl_local/res_reg1014000.html]: (last

accessed on 3 April 2012). ↩

96. Rollo, p. 294. ↩

97. G.R. No. 137329, 9 August 2000, 337 SCRA 574. ↩

98. G.R. No. 180088, 19 January 2009, 576 SCRA 331. ↩

99. Sinaca v. Mula, 373 Phil. 896 (1999). ↩

View Footnotes

Short Title
Meynardo Sabili vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. Number
G.R. No. 193261
Date of Promulgation
April 24, 2012
Nature
En Banc

Name of Ponente
Sereno, Maria Lourdes P.A.

15 Justices Participated