Islamic State Networks in Turkey

FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

Merve Tahiroglu & Jonathan Schanzer

March 2017
Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Merve Tahiroglu
Jonathan Schanzer

March 2017

FDD PRESS
A division of the
FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Washington, DC
 Islamic State Networks In Turkey

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................1

TURKISH RADICAL ISLAM BEFORE THE ISLAMIC STATE..................................................................8

Turkey’s Jihadist Foreign Fighters Before Syria............................................................................................10

TURKEY’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN JIHAD: 2013-2016...............................................................................11

Turkish IS Militants in Syria and Iraq...........................................................................................................15
The Kurdish Factor...........................................................................................................................................15
Turkey and IS at War........................................................................................................................................16

ISLAMIC STATE NETWORKS IN TURKEY.................................................................................................17

ONLINE RADICALIZATION: JIHADISTS ON TURKISH SOCIAL MEDIA.........................................21

The Islamic State’s Turkish-Language Activity on Twitter..........................................................................22
SGA’s Study of IS on Turkish-Language Twitter...........................................................................................23

SECURITY IN POST-COUP TURKEY: GRIM PROSPECTS......................................................................24

RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................................................................................................26

Appendix I - Table I: Islamic State-Linked Attacks in Turkey.........................................................................27

Appendix II - Table II: Anti-Islamic State Operations in Turkey in 2016.....................................................28
Appendix III - SGA Turkish Social Media Study..............................................................................................33
 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Introduction Following the Reina massacre, the parliament

extended the state of emergency for another three
The year 2016 was catastrophic for Turkey. At least 30 months, the second extension since the July 15 coup
terror attacks across the country took more than 300 attempt. Authorities arrested dozens of people and
lives.1 Ankara survived a bloody military coup attempt issued an immediate media ban – as they have after
in July, which claimed the lives of an additional 290. In every crisis in Turkey, including the assassination
a massive purge that ensued, more than 100,000 civil of the Russian ambassador in December. Ankara
servants, academics, and journalists across the political also announced “all social media accounts are being
spectrum were either sacked or detained.2 The economy monitored.”7 But the ruling Justice and Development
was downgraded by nearly all of the major credit-rating Party (AKP)’s censorship of Turkish media and
agencies.3 The military formally joined the Syrian state of emergency measures have clearly failed to
civil war, primarily to carve out a long-desired “safe make Turkey safer. The widespread purges of the
zone” across the border. And, in a historic moment Turkish military and law enforcement officials have
in December, a Turkish police officer assassinated the not helped.
Russian ambassador to Ankara. Turkish citizens spent
half of the year under a state of emergency, which is To be sure, the Islamic State is just one of the groups
still in effect. that has targeted Turkey in the last two years. In
December alone, Kurdish militants conducted three
The nation rang in 2017 with another devastating suicide attacks – twin bombings in Istanbul and
terror attack, this time at an iconic Istanbul nightclub, another one in central Turkey – killing a combined 58
Reina, on New Year’s Eve. The mass shooting killed 39 and wounding more than 150.8
people, becoming the deadliest attack that the Islamic
State (IS) ever claimed in Turkey,4 and the eighth mass The rise of renewed Kurdish radicalism was sadly
assault tied to the group since 2015.5 More than 150 predictable. In July 2015, Ankara’s peace talks with the
people, many of them tourists, have been killed by IS separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated
in Turkey in the last year alone.6 terror organization, ended after a two-year ceasefire.

1. Including the suicide bombers, the exact number of deaths for 2016 is 325, based on a tally of the figures listed in “Bir buçuk yılda 33
bombalı saldırıda 461 kişi hayatını kaybetti; 363’ü sivil (461 people, 363 civilians lost their lives in 33 bombings in a year and a half),” Diken
(Turkey), December 12, 2016. (http://www.diken.com.tr/bir-bucuk-yilda-33-bombali-saldirida-461-kisi-hayatini-kaybetti-363u-sivil/)
2. “Purge in Numbers,” Turkey Purge, February 2, 2017. (http://turkeypurge.com/purge-in-numbers)
3. S&P and Moody’s downgraded Turkey’s ratings in 2016, while Fitch joined them on January 27, 2017. Mehreen Khan, “Turkey cut
to junk by Fitch, losing last major investment-grade rating,” Financial Times (UK), January 27, 2017. (https://www.ft.com/content/
feb883bd-577f-31c6-b977-1c8082eccbad)
4. Thomas Joscelyn, “Islamic State Claims Responsibility for New Year’s Day Attack at Istanbul Nightclub,” FDD’s Long War Journal,
January 2, 2017. (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/01/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-for-new-years-day-attack-at-istanbul-
nightclub.php)
5. The bombing at a Diyarbakir police station on November 4, 2016, which killed 11 people, was claimed by both IS and the Kurdistan
Freedom Falcons (TAK), a Kurdish terror group in Turkey. Based on the target and location of the attack, the author ascribes the attack to
TAK. See: Mahmut Bozarslan, “One bomb, three suspects: Who was behind latest Diyarbakir attack?” Al Monitor, November 13, 2016.
(http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/11/turkey-diyarbakir-bombing-who-did-it-isis-pkk.html)
6. See Appendix I.
7. “Numan Kurtulmuş’tan Sosyal Medya Uyarısı (Social Media Warning from Numan Kurtulmuş),” CNN Türk (Turkey), January 2, 2017.
(http://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/numan-kurtulmustan-sosyal-medya-uyarisi)
8. Daren Butler, “Death toll in Istanbul bombings rises to 44: health minister,” Reuters, December 12, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-turkey-blast-toll-idUSKBN1410VO); “Kayseri suicide bomber arrived from Kobane in Syria before attack,” Hurriyet Daily News
(Turkey), December 19, 2016. (http://www.hürriyetdailynews.com/kayseri-suicide-bomber-arrived-from-kobane-in-syria-before-attack-.
aspx?PageID=238&NID=107471&NewsCatID=341)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

The PKK has fought the Turkish state for four decades, has alarmed its Western allies, particularly the United
but no Turkish government had ever negotiated with States. Knowingly or not, Turkey allowed IS and other
the group’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, before jihadist groups to establish their cells in Istanbul,
the AKP’s reign. The 2013 ceasefire had produced a Ankara, and other Turkish cities near the Syrian
period of unprecedented calm and socio-economic frontier. Turkey’s own radical Islamists have proved
opportunity. Many younger-generation Kurds were easy for IS and other Syria-based jihadists from groups
infuriated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s – such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, also formerly
2015 change of heart vis-à-vis the pursuit of a peaceful known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra)
resolution of the country’s Kurdish conflict. and Ahrar al-Sham – to recruit.

Beyond their physical networks in Turkey, the

“
 s both fights drag on, it seems increasingly
A
clear that Turkey’s fight against Kurdish
jihadists’ online presence in Turkish is growing.
Indeed, social media has become the top recruiting
militants is steadily undermining its struggle platform for IS and other tech-savvy extremist
against the Islamic State.
” groups. And while Turkey has imposed draconian
media laws, Ankara’s online crackdown on jihadists
remains relatively meek, with the AKP showing far
Since the so-called “solution process” ended in 2015, greater alarm over anti-government expressions of
PKK-affiliated Kurds have carried their traditional political dissent.
guerilla warfare in Turkey’s southeast from the villages
into the cities, and have detonated suicide vests in Until 2015, militants had been preoccupied with
major Turkish cities including Ankara and Istanbul. the jihad against the Bashar al-Assad regime (and
Together with its offshoots, such as the Kurdistan all minority groups) in Syria, sparing the Turks for
Freedom Falcons (TAK),9 the PKK has claimed more the large part. Mounting attacks over the last two
than 300 civilian lives in over 30 bombings since July years, however, make clear that is no longer the
2015. Included among their targets was the leader case. As Turkey’s territorial designs in northern Syria
of Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s increasingly clash with those of IS, and the two sides
Party (CHP) Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who survived the engage in direct military combat with greater intensity,
attack on his convoy in August but has received more the Islamic State is increasingly inclined to punish the
threats since.10 Turks at home. With residual IS networks now spread
throughout the country, the worst for Turkey may be
Between the PKK and its more extreme affiliates in yet to come.
Turkey, Ankara has its hands full. But as both fights
drag on, it seems increasingly clear that Turkey’s fight Ankara claims that it foiled nearly 350 terror plots
against Kurdish militants is steadily undermining its last year. If true, that would be an outstanding
struggle against the Islamic State. achievement. But the amount of terror-related
bloodshed Turkey has suffered in the last two years is
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Turkey’s jarring. The prospect of continued violence threatens
indifference towards and even tacit support for IS and the country’s security, as well as the stability of its
other jihadists battling the Kurds across its borders neighbors and allies.

9. For a quick overview of TAK, see Aykan Erdemir, “PKK Offshoot Claims Ankara Attack,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, February 19,
2016. (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/dr-aykan-erdemir-pkk-offshoot-claims-ankara-attack/)
10. “Turkish main opposition CHP leader survives PKK attack on motorcade,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), August 25, 2016.
(http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-main-opposition-chp-leader-survives-pkk-attack-on-motorcade.
aspx?PageID=238&NID=103217&NewsCatID=341)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Turkish Radical Islam Kurdish Hizbullah / Huda-Par

Before the Islamic State Hizbullah, a Sunni Kurdish organization unrelated to

its Lebanese namesake, is among the deadliest Islamist-
Since the founding of the modern Turkish republic, extremist terror groups in Turkish history, and it continues
Turks have largely been spared the sort of violent to enjoy widespread support among Turkey’s Islamist
religious zeal found elsewhere in the region. A majority Kurds today.12 Inspired by Iran’s Islamic revolution in
of Turkish citizens follow the Hanafi school of Islam, 1979, Hizbullah has endeavored to create an Islamic
with the remaining following Shafi, Jafari, and Alevi state for Turkey’s Kurds since the 1980s.13 The violence it
traditions, all of which have historically opposed the unleashed against secular-nationalist Kurds left hundreds
purist religious doctrine of the Salafists.11 Most Islamist dead during the intra-Kurdish conflict in the 1990s.
Turkish citizens are, therefore, unaccustomed to ultra-
conservative Salafi interpretations of the Quran. In December 2012, Hizbullah rebranded as Huda-Par,
a legal political party. But the new outfit is far from
But neither Turkey’s secular tradition nor its peaceful. Since the IS-Kurdish fighting in northern Syria
predominant, moderate Islamic theology has made intensified in 2014, Huda-Par supporters have repeatedly
Turkish citizens immune to radicalization. Modern clashed with secular and nationalist Kurds, who argue
Turkish history has produced several violent Islamist that Huda-Par supports the Islamic State.14 Based on
organizations, appealing to the republic’s Turks and Huda-Par’s performance in the March 2014 municipal
Kurds alike. and the June 2015 general elections, the group today
enjoys the support of an estimated 100,000 Kurds.15
The five most notable Islamist extremist groups in
Turkey today are Kurdish Hizbullah, Kaplancilar, Halis Bayancuk, also known by his nom de guerre
IBDA-C, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Tahsiyeciler. At least Abu Hanzala, is a Turkish Islamist notorious for his
two of these organizations have direct links to IS, pro-IS lectures and public statements. He is the son
while the others advocate Salafi views in line with the of a former Hizbullah convict, and has advocated for
Islamic State’s ideology and contribute to the group’s both the Islamic State and Hizbullah on social media.16
recruitment efforts. And while some of these groups In both 2014 and 2015, Bayancuk led prayers at an
may now be defunct, they are believed to have provided annual Eid picnic in an Istanbul suburb, reportedly
an infrastructure for IS in Turkey. organized by IS sympathizers.17

11. Selim Koru, “Turkey’s 200-Year War against ‘ISIS,’” The National Interest, July 24, 2015. (http://nationalinterest.org/feature/
turkeys-200-year-war-against-isis-13412?page=show)
12. For more on this group and its recent activities in Turkey, see Aykan Erdemir and Merve Tahiroglu, “The ISIS attack and Turkey’s Islamist
Kurds,” NOW Lebanon, July 30, 2015. (https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentary/565659-the-isis-attack-and-turkeys-islamist-kurds)
13. Kadri Gürsel, “New ‘Party of God’ Will Divide Kurdish, Turkish Islamists,” Al Monitor, December 23, 2012. (http://www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/hizbullah-turkey-islamist.html)
14. “The Kurdish Hizbullah in Turkey,” Oxford Islamic Studies, accessed February 2, 2017. (http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/
opr/t236/e0317#e0317-s3)
15. Between the 2014 and 2015 elections, Huda-Par competed in a total of 13 provinces. The author compared the number of votes won by
Huda-Par candidates in each election by province, as published in the Turkish parliament’s official website. To calculate the party’s maximum
electoral capacity, the author tallied the highest number of votes won in each of the 13 provinces, reaching a total of 100,533 votes.
16. Karışık Video İzle, “Halis Bayancuk’tan IŞİD’e Tam Destek (Full Support for ISIL from Halis Bayancuk),” YouTube, December 21,
2014. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pWUp8xohhg)
17. “İstanbul’da bayram namazı kılan IŞİD’den Türkiye’ye tehdit: Aklınızı başınıza alın (ISIL, Holding Eid Prayers in Istanbul, Threatens
Turkey” Cumhuriyet (Turkey), July 18, 2015. (http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/325675/istanbul_da_bayram_namazi_kilan_
ISiD_den_Turkiye_ye_tehdit__Aklinizi_basiniza_alin.html)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

“Kaplancilar” / Anatolian Federated Islamic State Great Eastern Islamic Raiders’ Front (IBDA-C)
(Caliphate State or Kalifasstaat)
Islami Buyuk Dogu Akincilari Cephesi (IBDA-C), or
Kaplancilar, also known as the Anatolian Federated the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders’ Front, is a Sunni
Islamic State and “Kalifasstaat,” is a Germany-based Islamist movement active in Turkey since the mid-
group founded in 1984 by Cemalettin Kaplan, a 1970s. The group’s declared mission is to overthrow the
Turkish asylum seeker sentenced to death in Turkey. secular Turkish government and establish a caliphate.
The movement’s goal is to create an Islamic state in IBDA-C became increasingly violent in the 1990s,
Turkey, modeled after the Islamic Republic of Iran.18 threatening and targeting Turkey’s artists, public
After Kaplan’s death in 1994, his son, Metin Kaplan, intellectuals, and Jewish and Christian charities. In the
took over the leadership and has attracted 1,100 year 1994 alone, the group may have been responsible
followers across Germany.19 for up to 90 terror attacks, including five bombings.22

According to Turkish security forces, the group IBDA-C is particularly infamous for its anti-Semitism.
planned two attacks inside Turkey in October After issuing death threats against Professor Yuda
1998 – including a plot to bomb the mausoleum of Yurum, the leader of Ankara’s Jewish community in
Turkey’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, on 1995, the group’s members attempted to assassinate
the republic’s 75th anniversary. Turkish authorities Yurum by placing a bomb in his car that June.23
arrested 23 members connected to these plots.
Another 40 were arrested in Germany that year at The organization also claimed responsibility for the
a demonstration for the release of Kaplan from jail, twin synagogue bombings in Istanbul in November
which some 500 members attended.20 2003, which killed a total of 24 people and injured
hundreds.24 While those attacks are attributed to
The group was banned in Germany after the September al-Qaeda and were conducted with the global jihadist
11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. – becoming the first network’s assistance, at least one of the perpetrators was
organization to be banned under revised German anti- identified as a former IBDA-C member.25
terror laws.21 German authorities revoked Kaplan’s
refugee status and extradited him to Turkey on terrorism Tahsiyeciler
charges. Kaplan was sentenced to life imprisonment in
Turkey. His organization remains intact, but has been Led by the Islamist journalist Mehmet Dogan,
rather dormant. Tahsiyeciler is a small group sympathetic to al-Qaeda,
though with no known history of violence in Turkey.26
On January 22, 2010, Turkish police carried out

18. Brian R. Farmer, Radical Islam in the West: Ideology and Challenge, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2011), page 43.
19. “Profile: The Caliph of Cologne,” BBC (UK), May 27, 2004. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1705886.stm)
20. Brian R. Farmer, Radical Islam in the West: Ideology and Challenge, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2011), page 43.
21. “‘Caliph of Cologne’ Loses Battle,” BBC (UK), May 26, 2004. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3751341.stm)
22. Ely Karmon, “Islamic terrorist activities in turkey in the 1990s,” Terrorism and Political Violence, December 1998, page 107.
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546559808427484)
23. Ibid, pages 107-109.
24. Amiram Barkat, Yoav Stern and Yossi Melman, “Attacks on Istanbul Synagogues Kill 24,” Haaretz (Israel), November 16, 2003.
(http://www.haaretz.com/attacks-on-istanbul-synagogues-kill-24-1.105755)
25. Ely Karmon, “The Synagogue Bombings in Istanbul: Al-Qaeda’s New Front?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November
18, 2003. (http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-synagogue-bombings-in-istanbul-al-qaedas-new-front)
26. Mustafa Akyol, “Another Turkish witch hunt begins,” Al Monitor, December 15, 2014. (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2014/12/turkey-gulen-movement-media-freedom-crackdown.html)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

simultaneous raids against Tahsiyeciler in 16 Turkish Hizb ut-Tahrir

cities, detaining 132 and arresting 38 suspects.27
Authorities reportedly found handguns, hunting rifles, Hizb ut-Tahrir is a global radical Islamist organization,
grenades, a smoke bomb, electronic parts for explosives, reportedly with branches in over 50 countries. The
and a large cache of ammunition.28 They also found a group was founded in Jerusalem in 1953, and seeks
video, broadcast by Turkish media, in which Dogan to reestablish a caliphate for the Muslim world. Its
calls on his followers to build bombs and mortars in Turkish branch has been operational since the 1960s,
their homes and to join the jihad.29 and has been outlawed by the Turkish government.34
Hizb ut-Tahrir has an active Turkish-language website35
Along with Dogan, Mustafa Kaplan – a former and magazine, Koklu Degisim, which means “radical
columnist for the Islamist daily Vakit – and Mehmet change.” Most recently in March 2016, the group held
Nuri Turan are identified as key members.30 Mustafa two conferences in Istanbul and Ankara to mourn
Gunes, recently identified as the top recruiter for the the 92nd anniversary of the caliphate’s abolishment.
Islamic State in the central Anatolian city of Konya, The “International Caliphate Conference” in Istanbul
reportedly had ties to Kaplan before forming his own attracted around 5,000 supporters; the one in Ankara,
al-Qaeda network in Turkey in 2008.31 themed “Caliphate: A Dream or Soon To-Be Reality,”
also amassed thousands.36
Most experts do not consider Tahsiyeciler part of the
global al-Qaeda network, but rather as the victim of a Turkey’s Jihadist Foreign Fighters
politically motivated witch-hunt.32 Still, it cannot be
ignored that the group continues to profess extremist
Before Syria
views and spread pro-jihadist propaganda. In 2014, Extremist Turks have also historically been animated
Dogan proclaimed on CNN Turk that he loved Osama by global conflicts concerning Muslim populations.
bin Laden.33 Turkish jihadists have been found among the ranks of
foreign fighters in several recent conflict zones abroad.

27. “Askeri Istihbarat da Tahşiyeciler’i Takibe Almış (Military Intelligence Was Also Monitoring Tahşiyeciler),” T24 (Turkey), January 3,
2015. (https://t24.com.tr/haber/askeri-istihbarat-da-tahşiyecileri-takibe-almis,282442)
28. “General Staff Intelligence Warned Military Units About Pro-al-Qaeda Tahşiyeciler,” Facts on Turkey, January 3, 2015. (http://
factsonturkey.org/14972/)
29. Guyverland, “CNN Türk Tahşiye Senaryosunda Gizlenen Gerçekler (CNN Türk Hidden Secrets from Tahsiye Scenario),” YouTube,
December 16, 2014. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eNnXlRUfK0Q&ab_channel=guyverland)
30. “General Staff Intelligence Warned Military Units About Pro-al-Qaeda Tahşiyeciler,” Facts on Turkey, January 3, 2015. (http://factsonturkey.
org/14972/)
31. Aaron Stein, “Islamic State Networks in Turkey: Recruitment for the Caliphate,” The Atlantic Council, October 2016. (http://www.
publications.atlanticcouncil.org/islamic-state-networks-in-turkey/)
32. Mustafa Akyol, “WikiLeaks sheds light on Turkey’s mysterious ‘Annotators,’” Al Monitor, December 22, 2014. (http://www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/originals/2014/12/turkey-wikileaks-mysterious-annotators-al-qeade.html)
33. Leonard Brojan, “Mehmet Doğan: Ladin’i Severim (Mehmet Doğan: I Love Ladin),” YouTube, December 27, 2014. (https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=scuI8e2Dqpk&ab_channel=leonardbrojan)
34. “Hizb-ut Tahrir: Terör örgütü Değiliz, Silah Kullanımına Karşıyız (Hizb-ut Tahrir: We Are Not a Terror Organization, We Oppose Using
Weapons),” T24 (Turkey), September 28, 2014. (http://t24.com.tr/haber/hizb-ut-tahrir-teror-orgutu-degiliz-silah-kullanimina-karsiyiz,272151)
35. Hizb ut-Tahrir website, accessed February 2, 2017. (http://hizb-turkiye.org/)
36. “Radical Islamist Hizb ut-Tahrir calls for caliphate in grand meeting in Ankara,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), March
8, 2016. (http://www.hürriyetdailynews.com/radical-islamist-hizb-ut-tahrir-calls-for-caliphate-in-grand-meeting-in-ankara.
aspx?pageID=238&nID=96179&NewsCatID=341)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Most notably, both the Afghan war in the 1980s and Returning Turkish jihadist foreign fighters have
the Bosnian war in the 1990s drew jihadist Turks to always posed a security threat to Turkey. Jihadists who
their territories.37 At least five Turkish citizens were returned from the Afghan war of the 1980s came to
reportedly killed in the Afghan civil war, and 21 in establish al-Qaeda’s Turkish cells. Perpetrators of the
the Bosnian conflict. Turkish foreign fighters have 2003 al-Qaeda attacks in Istanbul were returnees.
even been documented in conflicts farther from their Several Turkish jihadists reportedly killed in the Syrian
homeland, such as in Ogaden, Ethiopia; Kashmir, civil war since 2011 are believed to have previously
India; and Chechnya.38 fought in the Afghan and Bosnian wars.43 Today, those
returnees appear to have formed the backbone of the IS
The number of Turkish jihadists soared with the advent network in the country.44 Most, if not all, key Turkey-
of al-Qaeda. In the early 2000s, the number of Turkish based IS recruiters today are believed to have links to
foreign fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan reportedly the Afghan jihads of the 1980s and 2001.45
reached hundreds.39 Turkish al-Qaeda members have
reportedly carried out suicide attacks against U.S. forces
in Iraq and now figure prominently among the group’s
Turkey’s Role in the
list of “martyrs.”40 Several others assumed leadership Syrian Jihad: 2013-2016
positions in al-Qaeda, including Serdal Erbasi, who was
identified as al-Qaeda’s regional commander for Turkey When the uprisings against Syrian President Bashar
and the Caucuses in 2010.41 Reports in 2010 pointed al-Assad began in 2011, few observers foresaw the
to a proliferation of Turkish-language jihadi websites, country’s drift into civil war. That June, Erdogan
as well as the growing number of Turkish fighters in the called on his Syrian counterpart to halt the violence
Afghanistan-Pakistan jihadist theater. Analysts warned and implement reforms.46 By August, it was clear that
that Turkey had turned into a “gateway” for al-Qaeda’s Assad had no interest in either. U.S. President Barack
funds and recruits.42 Obama called on the Syrian president to resign that

37. Serhat Erkman, “Suriye ve Irak’ta Savaşan Türkiyeli Mücahitler (Turkish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq),” Al Jazeera Turk (Turkey),
May 25, 2015. (http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/suriye-ve-irakta-savasan-turkiyeli-mucahitler)
38. “Turkey’s Jihadists,” Turkey Wonk: Nuclear and Political Musings in Turkey and Beyond, April 28, 2015. (https://turkeywonk.wordpress.
com/2015/04/28/turkeys-jihadists/); “Turkish Foreign Fighters in Ogaden,” The Loopcast, January 26, 2015. (http://www.theloopcast.
com/e/turkey-foreign-fighters-in-ogaden/)
39. Serhat Erkman, “Suriye ve Irak’ta Savaşan Türkiyeli Mücahitler (Turkish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq),” Al Jazeera Turk (Turkey),
May 25, 2015. (http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/suriye-ve-irakta-savasan-turkiyeli-mucahitler)
40. Mehmet Orhan, “Al-Qaeda: Analysis of the Emergence, Radicalism, and Violence of a Jihadist Action Group in Turkey,” Turkish
Studies, 2010. (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2010.483846)
41. “El Kaide komutanı ‘Ebuzer’ Türk çıktı (Al Qaeda Commander ‘Ebuzer’ Turns Out To Be A Turk),” Milliyet (Turkey), January 20,
2010. (http://www.milliyet.com.tr/el-kaide-komutani--ebuzer--turk-cikti-gundem-1188281/)
42. Simon Cameron-Moore, “Analysis: Al Qaeda fishes for Turks seeking jihad,” Reuters, October 27, 2010. (http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-turkey-security-idUSTRE69Q3EN20101027)
43. “Turkey’s Jihadists,” Turkey Wonk: Nuclear and Political Musings in Turkey and Beyond, April 28, 2015. (https://turkeywonk.wordpress.
com/2015/04/28/turkeys-jihadists/)
44. Aaron Stein, “The Islamic State in Turkey: A Deep Dive Into a Dark Place,” War On the Rocks, April 6, 2016. (http://warontherocks.
com/2016/04/the-islamic-state-in-turkey-a-deep-dive-into-a-dark-place/)
45. Aaron Stein, “Islamic State Networks in Turkey: Recruitment for the Caliphate,” The Atlantic Council, October 2016. (http://www.
publications.atlanticcouncil.org/islamic-state-networks-in-turkey/)
46. “Erdoğan To Assad: Stop the Violence, Implement Reforms,” The Jerusalem Post (Israel), June 14, 2011. (http://www.jpost.com/
Middle-East/Erdoğan-to-Assad-Stop-the-violence-implement-reforms)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

month,47 and Erdogan followed suit in November.48 work. At least one future IS member, Yakup Aktulum,
The Assad regime, however, proved resilient. The said he first traveled to Syria in 2013 with the
Syrian opposition soon splintered into armed factions Humanitarian Aid Foundation (IHH) – an Islamist
with competing interests, and the country descended Turkish charity with suspected ties to al-Qaeda.52
into civil war.
In 2012, the Arab Spring had energized the Muslim

“One former U.S. official claims that Ankara

was deliberately helping the jihadists and
Brotherhood and its affiliates in the region – presenting
Turkey a rare opportunity to exert its influence in the
domestic politics of its neighbors. As Islamists took
acknowledged it.
” power in Egypt and Tunisia, and a region-wide shift
toward political Islam appeared on its way, Turkey’s
Turkey threw its full support behind the opposition own Islamists – having won consecutive elections
– harboring and mobilizing dissidents, arming rebels, for a decade – found themselves uniquely positioned
and allowing free passage along the Syrian-Turkish to lead the transformation and extend their political
border. Even as the war raged along Turkey’s longest influence in the neighborhood. In no country could
and most porous frontier, Ankara refused to close its such influence be more rewarding for Turkey than
border, citing humanitarian concern for refugees. But in its immediate neighbor Syria. Ankara displayed
jihadists began to exploit the security vacuum, including an ideological bias in favor of the Syrian opposition’s
Jabhat al-Nusra (later JFS and now HTS), the Syrian Islamist factions, even as those groups rapidly turned
affiliate of al-Qaeda, right across the border. One violent and radical, as a natural consequence of the war.
former U.S. official claims that Ankara was deliberately
helping the jihadists and acknowledged it.49 While the That ideological bias eventually came to undermine
U.S. designated al-Nusra as a terror organization in Turkish-U.S. plans to provide joint covert support for
December 2012, Ankara publicly opposed the move the Syrian opposition. While the Turkish intelligence
for months,50 only finally designating the group in coordinated the transfer of Saudi and Qatari arms to
June 2014.51 The damage, however, was already done. various rebel groups in northern Syria, the CIA sent
Thousands of Turkish jihadists reportedly traveled to officers to southern Turkey to help vet the Syrian
Syria to join extremist groups between 2013 and late opposition receiving the aid.53 But vetting became a
2014, some under the pretense of doing humanitarian source of disagreement for the two NATO allies. By
October 2012, U.S. officials conceded that the arms

47. Scott Wilson and Joby Warrick, “Assad must go, Obama says,” The Washington Post, August 18, 2011. (https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/assad-must-go-obama-says/2011/08/18/gIQAelheOJ_story.html?utm_term=.aa3df29f7a07)
48. Şebnem Arsu, “Turkish Premier Urges Assad to Quit in Syria,” The New York Times, November 22, 2011. (http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/11/23/world/middleeast/turkish-leader-says-syrian-president-should-quit.html)
49. Hannah Allam, “Once a top booster, ex-U.S. envoy no longer backs arming Syrian rebels,” McClatchy, February 18, 2015. (http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24780202.html)
50. Semih İdiz, “Pressure Mounts on Turkey Over Radical Groups in Syria,” Al Monitor, October 15, 2013. (http://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2013/10/turkey-must-control-jihadists-entering-syria.html)
51. Dorian Jones, “Turkey Designates Al-Nusra Front as a Terrorist Organization,” Voice of America, June 4, 2014. (http://www.voanews.
com/a/turkey-designates-al-nusra-front-as-a-terrorist-organization/1929675.html)
52. “Turkey’s Jihadists,” Turkey Wonk: Nuclear and Political Musings in Turkey and Beyond, April 28, 2015. (https://turkeywonk.
wordpress.com/2015/04/28/turkeys-jihadists/); “Turkish police detain 28 in anti-al-Qaeda op, raid on İHH office,” Hurriyet Daily
News (Turkey), January 14, 2014. (http://www.hürriyetdailynews.com/turkish-police-detain-25-at-ihh-office-in-anti-al-qaeda-raid.
aspx?pageID=238&nID=61000&NewsCatID=341)
53. Eric Schmitt, “C.I.A. Said to Aid in Steering Arms to Syrian Opposition,” The New York Times, June 21, 2012. (http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/06/21/world/middleeast/cia-said-to-aid-in-steering-arms-to-syrian-rebels.html)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

flow from Turkey was mostly helping the jihadists.54 scene, against the prosecutor’s wishes. The incident
By the following October, Washington was openly made clear that there was no room for the military
pointing the finger to Turkey as the reason why.55 or law enforcement to intervene in what appeared to
be state policy. Erdogan dismissed the incident as a
Erdogan and his then-Foreign Minister Ahmet secret plot to overthrow his government, despite clear
Davutoglu were determined to follow through with evidence that the gendarmes merely did their jobs: They
their mission to arm the rebels of their choice, with identified a suspicious truck, searched it, and tried to
or without U.S. support. But that grew complicated prevent it from crossing into Syria.59
on January 1, 2014, when the governor of Hatay, a
Turkish town bordering Syria’s Idlib province west The rise of the Islamic State in the first half of 2014
of Aleppo, stopped a truck full of weapons headed dramatically altered the threat matrix in Syria. IS was
to Syria. Turkish press reported that the truck driver fiercer than other jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda,
had told the governor he was on a mission on behalf and demonstrated an unparalleled ability to conquer,
of Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MIT).56 hold, and govern territory. By July 2014, IS controlled
The government later stated that the truck carried the Iraqi cities of Fallujah and Mosul, as well as Syrian
humanitarian aid for Syria’s Turkmen. But original cities between Deir Ezzor and the Iraqi border.60 In
reports indicated that the trucks were headed to Kilis, September, the United States formally declared war61
closer to jihadist-held territories near Syria’s Azaz.57 and formed a coalition with over 40 countries to
fight IS.62
Later that month, a similar incident was reported in
Adana. On January 19, Turkish gendarmerie stopped a Ankara, however, did not share its allies’ enthusiasm.
truck full of weapons, including artillery and rockets, It was slow to take military action against the group,
which turned out to belong to the MIT.58 When the or crack down on the smuggling of militants, oil, and
gendarmerie called a senior prosecutor to the scene, other goods across the border until the summer of
as standard protocol, and blocked the trucks from 2015. Turkey did not even allow the anti-IS coalition
moving per the prosecutor’s orders, things escalated. to operate from its NATO airbase in Incirlik near IS
The governor ordered the police to withdraw from the territory in Syria. For a year, coalition airstrikes had to

54. David E. Sanger, “Rebel Arms Flow Is Said to Benefit Jihadists in Syria,” The New York Times, October 14, 2012. (http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/jihadists-receiving-most-arms-sent-to-syrian-rebels.html)
55. Adam Entous and Joe Parkinson, “Turkey’s Spymaster Plots Own Course on Syria,” The Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2013. (http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303643304579107373585228330)
56. “Intel not tasked with carrying weapons, Turkish main opposition leader says,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), January
20, 2014. (http://www.hürriyetdailynews.com/intel-not-tasked-with-carrying-weapons-turkish-main-opposition-leader-says.
aspx?pageID=238&nID=61279&NewsCatID=338)
57. “Hatay’da mühimmat yüklü TIR şoku (Weapon-Loaded Truck Shock in Hatay),” CNN Türk (Turkey), January 1, 2014. (http://www.
cnnturk.com/turkiye/hatayda-muhimmat-yuklu-tir-soku)
58. Metin Gurcan, “MIT gun truck bust lands Turkish gendarmes in prison,” Al Monitor, April 20, 2015. (http://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2015/04/turkey-scapegoating-upsets-gendarmerie-shipping-weapons.html)
59. Ibid.
60. Holly Yan and Samira Said, “Floodgates open as ISIS bridges victories between Syria and Iraq,” CNN, July 9, 2014. (http://www.
cnn.com/2014/07/08/world/meast/syria-civil-war/); Liz Sly and Ahmed Ramadan, “Insurgents seize Iraqi city of Mosul as security
forces flee,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2014. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/insurgents-seize-iraqi-city-of-mosul-as-troops-
flee/2014/06/10/21061e87-8fcd-4ed3-bc94-0e309af0a674_story.html)
61. Zeke J. Miller, “Full Text of Obama’s Address on ISIS,” TIME, September 10, 2014. (http://time.com/3320666/obama-isis-speech-full-text/)
62. “U.S.: More than 40 nations joined coalition against ISIS,” Al Arabiya (UAE), September 8, 2014. (http://english.alarabiya.net/en/
News/world/2014/09/08/US-More-than-40-nations-joined-coalition-against-ISIS.html)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

be carried out from bases farther away in Cyprus, the ammonium nitrate is also a common ingredient for
United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.63 making explosives. Investigating the flow of dual-use
goods from Turkey into the Islamic State, Turkish
Admittedly, Turkey likely worried about blowback journalist Tolga Tanis noted the negligible export of
in response to potential Turkish military action. By ammonium nitrate to Syria before the civil war (only
March 2014, IS members had already demonstrated twice, in 2003 and then in 2008) as compared to the
their ability to operate in Turkey by carrying out a export of more than 13,000 tons between 2013 until
small-scale attack in central Anatolia, shooting two the Turkish ban in 2016.67 The Turkish government was
security officials and a bystander.64 The group had enraged by the expose, and put pressure on Hurriyet,
also taken Turkish diplomatic staff hostage in Mosul, which removed Tanis from his post as the paper’s
and threatened a small Turkish outpost in Syria – the Washington correspondent three weeks later.68
Ottoman tomb of Suleiman Shah, then guarded by 38
Turkish soldiers.65 IS also controlled two towns directly In May 2015, The New York Times reported that despite
across the Turkish border, Jarabulus and Tel Abyad, by the border closure, large quantities of fertilizers were
mid-2014. Ankara likely did not want to provoke the still being permitted to cross the Turkish border gate
group, given its proximity. at Akcakale, Sanliurfa into IS-controlled Tel Abyad.69
IS documents captured by Syrian Kurdish forces
Ankara’s unwillingness to engage IS militarily is who liberated Tel Abyad that fall proved that the
understandable. But its indifference towards the jihadists were indeed using the Turkish fertilizers for
group’s activities within and across Turkish territory manufacturing bombs. In one instance, a document
was irresponsible. Remarkably, Turkey took few steps to showed that IS bought up to 125 tons of fertilizer from
seal its Syrian border, despite repeated entreaties from the Turkish side.70
Washington, even after IS captured bordering towns.
While the crossings between Turkey and IS territory IS also uses Turkish potassium nitrate to make
were officially shut in 2014, smuggling through the improvised explosive devices (IEDs). A 20-month
frontier continued apace.66 on-the-ground study in 2014-2015 by the European
Parliament’s Conflict Armament Research (CAR)
Materials, such as ammonium nitrate fertilizers, flowed implicated 50 commercial entities that supplied
into then-IS strongholds in northern Syria from Turkey. materials used for homemade explosives to IS from 20
Fertilizers could be used for agricultural purposes, but different countries. “With 13 companies involved in

63. John Cappello, Patrick Megahan, John Hannah, and Jonathan Schanzer, “Covering the Bases: Reassessing U.S. Military Deployments
in Turkey After the July 25 Coup D’état,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, August 2016. (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/
uploads/documents/Covering_the_Bases.pdf )
64. Semih İdiz, “ISIS emerges as threat to Turkey,” Al Monitor, March 25, 2014. (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/isis-
threat-turkey-syria-jihadists.html)
65. “Turkey vows to respond to any attack on Süleyman Shah Tomb,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), March 23, 2014. (http://www.
hürriyetdailynews.com/turkey-vows-to-respond-to-any-attack-on-suleyman-shah-tomb.aspx?pageID=238&nID=63967&NewsCatID=359)
66. Tim Arango and Eric Schmidt, “A Path to ISIS, Through a Porous Turkish Border,” The New York Times, March 9, 2015. (https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/03/10/world/europe/despite-crackdown-path-to-join-isis-often-winds-through-porous-turkish-border.html)
67. Tolga Tanis, “DEAŞ’ın Türk malı potasyum nitratları (ISIL’s Turkish-Made Potassium Nitrates),” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey),
December 18, 2016. (http://www.hürriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/tolga-tanis/deasin-turk-mali-potasyum-nitratlari-40310131)
68. “Hürriyet gazetesi Tolga Tanış’ı görevden aldı (Daily Hürriyet Removes Tolga Tanis from His Post,” Cumhuriyet (Turkey), January 10,
2017. (http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/658236/Hürriyet_gazetesi_Tolga_Tanis_i_gorevden_aldi.html)
69. Ben Hubbard and Karam Shoumali, “Fertilizer, Also Suited for Bombs, Flows to ISIS Territory From Turkey,” The New York Times, May
4, 2015. (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/world/europe/fertilizer-also-suited-for-bombs-flows-to-isis-territory-from-turkey.html)
70. Ibid.

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

the supply chain,” the report read, “Turkey is the most joined IS.76 Hurriyet reported a higher number that
important choke point for components used in the year, noting that 2,700 Turks had joined the group
manufacture of IEDs by IS forces.”71 and around 1,500 had returned to Turkey.77 According
to one account, however, the number of Turks who
In addition to explosive agents, reports of foreign traveled to Syria and Iraq over the last four years –
fighters crossing in and out of Turkey have been including militants, migrant families, those killed on
commonplace. Indeed, according to more than 4,600 the battlefield, and those who have returned to Turkey
IS documents reviewed by the U.S. army, more than – could be up to 10,000.78
90 percent of all foreign fighters – including Turkish
militants – between 2013 and 2014 entered Syria Admittedly, some families have simply “migrated” to
through the Turkish border. Most fighters flew to IS-controlled territory with the sole purpose of residing
Istanbul, traveled from there to the border provinces under the caliphate. According to Turkish reports,
of Sanliurfa and Gaziantep, and then to transit points families make up around 60 percent of those travelers
in Kilis, Elbeyli, Karkamis, or Akcakale.72 In nearly to Syria and Iraq included in the 10,000-estimate.79
every media interview of former jihadists, the military Many others, meanwhile, have directly gone to fight
and border guards are described as unconcerned about in battles on behalf of IS, even assuming leadership
the flow of fighters. In some, they are described as positions with the group.
openly complicit.73
The Kurdish Factor
Turkish IS Militants in Syria and Iraq
Turkish nationals, both Turks and Kurds, have joined
The majority of foreign fighters that have joined IS are groups like the Islamic State and Nusra Front for
believed to hail primarily from Europe or Arab states.74 another reason: to battle the PKK and its affiliates,
However, since 2012, a steady stream of jihadist which are all designated terrorist groups in Turkey.
Turks have taken up arms to join the war in Syria.75 The PKK’s Syrian wing, the Democratic Union Party
In early 2015, then-Deputy Prime Minister Bulent (PYD), and its armed wing, the Peoples’ Protection
Arinc declared that around 1,000 Turkish citizens had Units (YPG), have vied for self-governance in northern

71. “Tracing the Supply of Components Used in Islamic State IEDs,” Conflict for Armament Research, February 2016, page 11. (http://
www.conflictarm.com/publications/)
72. Aaron Stein, “Islamic State Networks in Turkey: Recruitment for the Caliphate,” The Atlantic Council, October 2016. (http://www.
publications.atlanticcouncil.org/islamic-state-networks-in-turkey/)
73. Katrin Elger, Hasnain Kazim, Christoph Reuter, and Holger Stark, “The Caliphate Next Door: Turkey Faces Up to its Islamic State
Problem,” Spiegel (Germany), September 29, 2014. (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-jihadist-activity-in-northern-
syria-forces-Turkey-hand-a-994392.html)
74. “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, April 2016.
(https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-April-2016_including-
AnnexesLinks.pdf )
75. “Halep’te 50 Türk savaşıyor (50 Turks Are Fighting in Aleppo),” Radikal (Turkey), August 25, 2012. (http://www.radikal.com.tr/dunya/
halepte-50-turk-savasiyor-1098170/)
76. “Bülent Arınç: Türkiye’den IŞİD’e katılan gençlerin sayısı 1000 civarında (Bülent Arınç: Number of Turkish
youth joining IS is around 1000),” Radikal (Turkey), February 23, 2015. (http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/
bulent-arinc-turkiyeden-iside-katilan-genclerin-sayisi-1000-civarinda-1299255/)
77. Serhat Erkman, “Suriye ve Irak’ta Savaşan Türkiyeli Mücahitler (Turkish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq),” Al Jazeera Turk (Turkey),
May 25, 2015. (http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/suriye-ve-irakta-savasan-turkiyeli-mucahitler)
78. Ibid.
79. Ipek Yezdani, “Türkiye’den cihada 10 bin kişi gitti (10,000 people from Turkey have gone to jihad),” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey),
June 27, 2015. (http://www.hürriyet.com.tr/turkiye-den-cihada-10-bin-kisi-gitti-29383934)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Syria since 2012. Turks have joined jihadist groups take long before the decades-long war resumed. Since
to fight the PYD/YPG out of a sense of religious or July 2015, Turkey has carried out numerous airstrikes
national duty, sometimes both. against the PKK in northern Iraq, and the YPG has
emerged as its top enemy in Syria. In August 2016,
The PYD has blamed Turkey for either assisting Turkish troops entered the IS-held town of Jarabulus
these jihadi groups in their attacks against the Kurds to clear IS from its border, as well as to establish a
or turning a blind eye to them. And it is not hard protected zone between two Kurdish enclaves to
to understand why Turkey might have adopted prevent the Kurds from linking their territories into a
this strategy. Ankara has long considered Kurdish contiguous entity.
separatism the top threat to its territorial sovereignty.
Both the PYD and PKK claim to represent millions of The IS-Kurdish conflict in Iraq and Syria, meanwhile,
Kurds residing in southern Turkey and northern Syria, has itself been spilling over to Turkey as well. Some
divided by the border but connected by lineage. An of the most deadly Islamist factions in Turkey, such
autonomous Kurdish region and a strengthened PYD as Kurdish Hizbullah (Huda-Par), have emerged
on the Syrian side of the border could inflame Kurdish from ultraconservative provinces in the country’s
nationalism on the Turkish side, not to mention a predominantly Kurdish southeast.83 Clashes between
resurgent PKK. rival PKK- and Huda-Par-affiliated Kurds in Turkey
during the siege of Kobani in 2014 was one of the early
Tensions soared in the fall of 2014, when the Islamic signs of this spillover.
State’s jihadists sieged the Syrian-Kurdish town of
Kobani, and the Turkish military merely watched from It is unclear whether Huda-Par, which has a support
across the border.80 Finally, after the U.S. air dropped base of about 100,000, actually supports the terror
ammunition for the Kurds under siege, Turkey allowed group. But secular Kurds have reason to worry. At least
the passage of Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighters – who 600 of Turkey’s Kurds have reportedly joined IS in
are unaffiliated with the PKK – into Kobani to help Syria and Iraq since 2014.84
their Syrian brethren there.81
Turkey and IS at War
The YPG’s liberation of Kobani in January 2015
was a turning point for both Turkey and the U.S. The Turkish-IS relationship has grown increasingly
Washington’s decision to partner with the YPG in the hostile since Turkey officially declared war on the
fight against IS in Syria set off alarm bells in Ankara. That group in mid-2015. In addition to Ankara permitting
summer, Erdogan, to the shock of many, declared the the U.S.-led anti-IS coalition to use Turkey’s Incirlik
Dolmabahce agreement, the cornerstone for Turkey’s airbase, Turkish artillery and warplanes began
Kurdish peace process, null and void.82 It did not bombarding the group’s positions along the border.

80. Dexter Filkins, “When Bombs Aren’t Enough,” The New Yorker, October 10, 2014. (http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/
turkey-kurds-battle-isis-kobani); Henri J. Barkey and Eric S. Edelman, “The Obama Administration, Turkey and Syria’s Kurds,” The
American Interest, October 7, 2014.
81. Dasha Afanasieva, “Iraqi peshmerga fighters arrive in Turkey for Syria deployment,” Reuters, October 29, 2014. (http://uk.reuters.com/
article/uk-mideast-crisis-peshmerga-idUKKBN0II0P720141029)
82. “Erdoğan’s denial of ‘Dolmabahçe Agreement’ sparks row,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), July 20, 2015. (http://www.
hürriyetdailynews.com/erdoğans-denial-of-dolmabahce-agreement-sparks-row.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85656&NewsCatID=338)
83. Rustem Erkan, “Güneydoğu’da seçim dinamikleri (Voting Dynamics in the South East),” Radikal (Turkey), December 14, 2008.
(http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/guneydoguda_secim_dinamikleri-912863); “1990’larda Kürt siyasi hareketi (Kurdish Politics in the
1990s),” Al Jazeera Turk (Turkey), December 26, 2013. (http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/dosya/1990larda-kurt-siyasi-hareketi)
84. Mahmut Bozarslan, “Kurds fight Kurds in Syria,” Al Monitor, June 25, 2015. (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2015/06/
turkey-syria-kurdish-is-militants-fight-brethren.html)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Six of the ten major IS attacks in Turkey have taken Islamic State Networks
place since that summer, four of which are among the
deadliest terror attacks in Turkish history and the other in Turkey
two directly targeting tourists in Istanbul – mostly
German and Israeli.85 Between January and May 2016, With IS attacks against Turkey clearly surging,
IS fired more than 70 rockets into Turkey’s border town Ankara significantly widened its intelligence-
Kilis (rockets fueled by the aforementioned Turkish- gathering efforts and crackdowns on local Islamic
made potassium nitrates).86 State suspects. The Interior Ministry announced
that Turkish security forces prevented 22 IS-linked
The hostility took an even sharper turn in August 2016, “major terror incidents” in 2016.91 It also said that
when Turkish troops entered Syria for “Operation 1,338 Islamic State suspects, of whom 694 were
Euphrates Shield,” a move primarily to counter the foreign nationals, were detained throughout the year.
Kurdish territorial gains in northern Syria but also aimed In early February of this year, authorities detained
at targeting IS positions along the way. In October, the 820 IS suspects in a massive two-day operation that
Turks and their Arab-Syrian anti-regime allies began to spanned 29 Turkish provinces.92
advance towards the IS-held city of al-Bab in northwest
Syria. In response, the Islamic State’s “Caliph” Abu Ankara’s recent efforts are commendable, but they
Bakr al-Baghdadi personally called for attacks against are too little and too late in coming. After years of
Turkey for the first time in early November.87 A month permissive border policies, Turkey is deeply exposed
later, a grotesque video emerged showing two soldiers, to the jihadist threat. The AKP government’s initial
allegedly Turkish, burned alive by the group.88 In a indifference to Islamic State activities allowed the group
trademark Turkish move, Ankara tried to bury the to establish its networks inside Turkey, raise funds, and
scandal by blocking access to YouTube, Twitter, and recruit Turkish jihadists.93 Throughout the fall of 2014,
Facebook.89 Harder to hide, however, are the dozens of Turkish newspapers reported often on IS activities
Turkish soldiers so far killed by IS inside Syria since the in large Turkish cities like Gaziantep and Sanliurfa
advance to al-Bab.90 across from IS-held Syrian towns, as well as in more
remote provinces such as Konya in central Anatolia.94

85. See Appendix I.

86. Selin Girit, “Syria conflict: Kilis, the Turkish town enduring IS bombardment,” BBC (UK), May 9, 2016. (http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-36245505)
87. “Daesh terrorist leader Baghdadi calls for attacks against Turkey,” Daily Sabah (Turkey), November 3, 2016. (http://www.dailysabah.
com/mideast/2016/11/03/daesh-terrorist-leader-baghdadi-calls-for-attacks-against-turkey)
88. “IS’ Aleppo Province Releases Video of Burning to Death Two Soldiers in Turkish Army,” SITE Intelligence Group, December 22, 2016.
(https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/is-aleppo-province-releases-video-of-burning-to-death-two-soldiers-in-turkish-army.html)
89. Caroline O’Donnovan, “Social Media Reportedly Blocked In Turkey After Horrific ISIS Video,” BuzzFeed, December 22, 2016.
(https://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/social-media-reportedly-blocked-in-turkey-after-horrific-isi?utm_term=.nomoppO4m#.
mcv3aa1kg)
90. Sarah El Deeb, “Turkey bogged down in Syria as it realigns with Russia,” Associated Press, January 11, 2017. (https://apnews.
com/4b50b17b41fb4ba5a6c70fd1d746f753/Turkey-bogged-down-in-Syria-as-it-realigns-with-Russia)
91. Seval Guler, “Turkey foiled 339 terror plots in 2016: Interior min.,” Anadolu Agency (Turkey), January 3, 2017. (http://aa.com.tr/en/
todays-headlines/turkey-foiled-339-terror-plots-in-2016-interior-min/719684)
92. “Turkey: 820 people detained in operations against Daesh,” Anadolu Agency (Turkey), February 6, 2017. (http://aa.com.tr/en/
todays-headlines/turkey-820-people-detained-in-operations-against-daesh/742315)
93. “ISIS Renting Villas in Istanbul,” Aydinlik (Turkey), September 29, 2014. (http://aydinlikdaily.com/Detail/ISIS-Renting-Villas-In-
Istanbul/4619#.VClv7xuHGzE.twitter)
94. “Looking for ISIL: How jihadists operate among Turks,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), September 22, 2014. (http://www.
Hürriyetdailynews.com/looking-for-isil-how-Turks-become-jihadists.aspx?pageID=238&nID=72054&NewsCatID=352)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Reports indicate that Islamic State recruitment in the Islamic State between 2014 and 2015. The fourth,
Turkey continued despite the concern.95 Hatay, sits across from Idlib, also a jihadist stronghold
in northwest Syria. In addition to these four border
According to Turkish police and security units’ reports provinces, Turkish authorities have carried out anti-IS
from July 2016, a 60-person core cadre inside Turkey operations in at least 50 other provinces across the
is operating along the Istanbul-Sanliurfa-Gaziantep- country in 2016.97 According to a classified 2015
Hatay-Batman-Adiyaman-Kahramanmaras area. This Turkish police report leaked last year, there could be IS
core group has been professionally trained abroad for cells in up to 70 of Turkey’s 81 provinces.98
establishing cells and planning attacks.96

There are undoubtedly more operatives in the

country, and the pool for recruits are at worrying “According to a classified 2015 Turkish police
report leaked last year, there could be IS cells
levels. According to an October 2014 poll by the
Turkish research center Metropoll, nearly two
in up to 70 of Turkey’s 81 provinces.
”
percent of respondents said they knew people who
joined the Islamic State. Turkey’s population is nearly Interrogations of detained Islamic State members
80 million. That means 1.6 million Turks today point to multiple local Turkish IS units established
may personally know IS members. Even if only one throughout Turkey.99 The deadliest, known as “the
percent of those are sympathetic to the jihadist cause, Adiyaman cell,” established in 2013 and led by Mustafa
that would mean 16,000 individuals have the will Dokumaci, has produced multiple perpetrators of IS
and personal connections to join or recruit for the suicide attacks in Turkey.100 Three IS-linked suicide
Islamic State. bombings (two of them twin-bombings) since June
2015 were committed by Turkish citizens, and all
The geographic distribution of detained and arrested IS of the four known perpetrators – Orhan Gonder,
suspects, meanwhile, give a glimpse of how widespread Seyh Abdurraman Alagoz, Yunus Emre Alagoz, and
the group’s network is and how mobile its militants are. Omer Deniz Dundar – were from this unit.101 Along
Of the four Turkish provinces bordering Syria, three – with Mustafa Dokumaci, the group’s top recruiter is
Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, and Kilis – shared a border with reportedly Ahmet Korkmaz, and other key operational

95. Alev Scott and Alexander Christie-Miller, “Exclusive: ISIS Starts Recruiting in Istanbul’s Vulnerable Suburbs,” Newsweek, September
12, 2014. (http://www.newsweek.com/2014/09/19/exclusive-how-istanbul-became-recruiting-ground-islamic-state-269247.html);
Ceylan Yeginsu, “ISIS Draws a Steady Stream of Recruits From Turkey,” The New York Times, September 15, 2014. (http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/09/16/world/europe/turkey-is-a-steady-source-of-isis-recruits.html?_r=0)
96. Metehan Demir, “Rakamlarla IŞİD’in Türkiye’de tüyler ürperten varlığı (The chilling presence of ISIS in Turkey, by the numbers),”
Super Haber (Turkey), July 1, 2016. (http://www.superhaber.tv/dunya/rakamlarla-isidin-turkiyede-tuyler-urperten-varligi/haber-10824)
97. See Appendix II.
98. Alican Uludag, “70 ilde IŞİD hücresi var: CHP ve HDP hedefte (ISIL cells in 70 provinces: CHP and HDP are targets),” Cumhuriyet
(Turkey), April 12, 2016. (http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/514593/70_ilde_ISiD_hucresi_var__CHP_ve_HDP_hedefte.html)
99. Noah Blaser, Aaron Stein, and Has Avrat, “Islamic State in Turkey: Network Charts and Detention Maps,” North Caucasus
Caucus, April 6, 2016. (http://northcaucasuscaucus.blogspot.com.tr/?m=1); Humeyra Pamuk and Orhan Coskun, “Investigators
focus on home-grown Islamic State cell in Turkey bomb probe,” Reuters, October 13, 2015. (http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-turkey-explosion-investigation-idUSKCN0S72AO20151013)
100. Piotr Zalewski, “The Kurdish Town That Hosts Turkey’s Deadliest Terror Cell,” Financial Times (UK), October 18, 2015. (http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/689f9fbe-741b-11e5-bdb1-e6e4767162cc.html#axzz4Bm9bSSpw); Aaron Stein, “Islamic State Networks
in Turkey: Recruitment for the Caliphate,” The Atlantic Council, October 2016. (http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/
islamic-state-networks-in-turkey/)
101. Aaron Stein, “Islamic State Networks in Turkey: Recruitment for the Caliphate,” The Atlantic Council, October 2016. (http://www.
publications.atlanticcouncil.org/islamic-state-networks-in-turkey/)

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members are Ibrahim Bali, Yunus Durmaz, and Halil Turkish city of Adiyaman, where they recruited young
Ibrahim Durgun.102 While Bali is said to have been men.107 The families of these new targets repeatedly
responsible for the cell’s Turkey-based operations, notified the police throughout 2014, urging for action
he reportedly moved to Raqqa around July and was against the Islamic State recruiters. The authorities did
replaced by Mustafa Mol from Sanliurfa.103 not shut the teahouse down until the end of the year.108

Along with the Adiyaman network, the Bingol cell is According to a Turkish intelligence report disclosed by
another homegrown IS unit located in a conservative Jane’s Intelligence Weekly in January 2015, up to 3,000 IS
Kurdish-majority town with a strong history of sleeper cells were suspected to be in Turkey.109 But the
Islamism.104 According to Turkish media reports, other number of IS-related arrests at that time was appallingly
major recruitment centers appear to have been established low. According to one tally, only 127 Islamic State
in Istanbul, Izmir, Konya, as well as Gaziantep.105 The suspects were detained between 2014 and the summer
network in Gaziantep has seen numerous anti-IS police of 2015.110 That number jumped significantly after the
raids in the last year, with large quantities of suicide July 2015 suicide attack in Suruc, reaching nearly 400
vests confiscated in the operations.106 by the following July,111 and more than 1,300 by the
end of the year.112
The Adiyaman cell is testament to the security and
intelligence failures of the Turkish government. The The increasing number of detentions, however, is
two Alagoz brothers owned a teahouse in the southern misleading: Many IS suspects were released within

102. “Turkey’s Jihadists,” Turkey Wonk: Nuclear and Political Musings in Turkey and Beyond, April 28, 2015. (https://turkeywonk.wordpress.
com/2015/04/28/turkeys-jihadists/)
103. Tolga Sardan, “IŞİD’in yeni celladı: MOL (ISIL’s New Executioner: MOL),” Milliyet (Turkey), July 9, 2016. (http://www.milliyet.
com.tr/isid-in-yeni-celladi-mol-gundem-2274994/)
104. Mahmut Bozarslan, “Kurds fight Kurds in Syria,” Al Monitor, June 25, 2015. (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/
originals/2015/06/turkey-syria-kurdish-is-militants-fight-brethren.html)
105. For more on the recruitment activities of the Adıyaman, Istanbul, Konya, and Izmir cells, see: Aaron Stein, “Islamic State
Networks in Turkey: Recruitment for the Caliphate,” The Atlantic Council, October 2016. (http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/
islamic-state-networks-in-turkey/)
106. “ISIL member blows himself up during Turkish police raid,” Al Jazeera, May 20, 2016. (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/
isil-member-blows-turkish-police-raid-160520090343990.html); Fevzi Kizilkoyun, “ISIL militants prepared suicide vests in Gaziantep
on Syrian border: Police,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), December 5, 2015. (http://www.hürriyetdailynews.com/isil-militants-prepared-
suicide-vests-in-gaziantep-on-syrian-border-police.aspx?pageID=238&nID=92101&NewsCatID=509)
107. “İşte IŞİD bombacılarının yollarının kesiştiği Adıyaman›daki İslam Çay Ocağı (Here is the tea house in
Adıyaman where ISIL bombers crossed paths),” CNN Türk (Turkey), July 23, 2015. (http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/
iste-isid-bombacilarinin-yollarinin-kesistigi-Adıyamandaki-islam-cay-ocagi)
108. “Suruç bombacısının ağabeyinin açtığı çay ocağı Adıyaman’daki IŞİD bürosu muydu? (Was the tea house that the Suruç
bomber’s brother opened ISIL’s bureau in Adıyaman?),” Radikal (Turkey), July 23, 2015. (http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/
Suruç-bombacisinin-agabeyinin-actigi-cay-ocagi-Adıyamandaki-isid-burosu-muydu-1401949/)
109. Aki Peritz, “The Islamic State Has Sleeper Cells Throughout Turkey. Does Erdoğan Care?” The New Republic, January 21, 2015.
(https://newrepublic.com/article/120821/islamic-state-isis-has-sleeper-cells-turkey-says-national-police)
110. Noah Blaser, Aaron Stein, and Has Avrat, “Islamic State in Turkey: Network Charts and Detention Maps,” North Caucasus Caucus,
April 6, 2016. (http://northcaucasuscaucus.blogspot.com.tr/?m=1)
111. “Turkey vs. ISIS and the PKK: What’s the Difference?” Bipartisan Policy Center, December 9, 2016. (http://bipartisanpolicy.org/
turkey-isis-pkk-maps/#1467822414183-2ca6b3ce-572c)
112. Metin Gurcan, “Are Turkey’s efforts to combat foreign fighters too late?” Al Monitor, July 12, 2016. (http://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-too-late-dealing-foreign-terrorist-fighters.html)

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days or weeks of detention.113 Following a massive central Anatolia, for example, were not convicted until
anti-IS operation in Konya in December, for example, 2016.118 The trial was postponed several times, and the
all 43 detainees were released within a week.114 While judge was replaced four times.119
Turkey boasted that it detained 1,338 IS-related
suspects in 2016, the number of convictions stood at a
mere seven.115 “While Turkey boasted that it detained 1,338
IS-related suspects in 2016, the number of
One problem for Ankara is that the legal standards for
convicting jihadists in Turkey are too high. Turkish
convictions stood at a mere seven.
”
foreign fighters who return from IS battlegrounds in Additionally, the same suspects often get detained
Iraq or Syria are not convicted unless they are proven and released multiple times. That list includes Ilyas
to have directly attacked the Turkish homeland or Mamasharipov, a Tajik Islamic State member who
its citizens. One former Islamic State executioner, ordered the Reina nightclub attack in Istanbul. Upon
according to his July 2015 interview with the Turkish his arrest on January 31, he testified that he had been
daily BirGun, is now living freely in Ankara, working detained and sent to a deportation center in Turkey,
as a parking lot attendant. Another IS assassin, caught but was ultimately released.120 There is also the case of
on camera shooting a man in Syria’s Latakia, received Hasan Aydin, one of the Turkish IS militants from the
a reduced jail sentence due to “good conduct” December video depicting the burning of two Turkish
last July.116 soldiers in Syria. Aydin was reportedly detained in
Adana in 2012, and then again in Hatay in 2015 for
Islamic State members who have carried out attacks trying to cross into Syria.121
against Turkey, meanwhile, are not sentenced
immediately – nor to the fullest extent of the law.117 The There is also the case of Halis Bayancuk (aka Abu
perpetrators of the March 2014 Islamic State attack in Hanzala), Turkey’s most notorious IS advocate,122 who

113. “IŞİD Davasının ilk Duruşmasında 12 Sanık Tahliye Edildi (12 Suspects Released in the First Hearing of ISIL Case),” Hurriyet Daily News
(Turkey), October 25, 2016. (http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/isid-davasinin-ilk-durusmasinda-12-sanik-tahliy-40258833)
114. “IŞİD Operasyonunda Gözaltına Alınan 43 Kişi Serbest Bırakıldı (43 People Detained in ISIL Operation Released),” Sol (Turkey),
December 23, 2016. (http://haber.sol.org.tr/toplum/isid-operasyonunda-gozaltina-alinan-43-kisi-serbest-birakildi-180036)
115. “Bakanlık: Cezaevlerinde 513 IŞİD üyesi Var (Ministry: There are 513 ISIL Members in the Prisons),” Diken (Turkey), December 28,
2016. (http://www.diken.com.tr/adalet-bakanligi-cezaevlerinde-513-isid-uyesi-var/)
116. “ISIL militant’s jail sentence reduced due to ‘good conduct’ in Turkey,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), July 11, 2016. (http://www.
hürriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nID=101468&NewsCatID=509)
117. Metin Gurcan, “Are Turkish courts delaying trials of IS militants?” Al Monitor, July 31, 2015. (http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/
originals/2015/07/turkey-isis-detentions-questions-remains-legal-system.html)
118. “Niğde saldırısı faili IŞİD’lilere toplam 10 kez ağırlaştırılmış müebbet (10 times aggravated sentence for ISIL-member Nigde attack
perpetrators),” Diken (Turkey), June 15, 2016. (http://www.diken.com.tr/nigde-saldirisi-faili-isidlilere-toplam-10-kez-agirlastirilmis-muebbet/)
119. “IŞİD’in karar çıkması beklenen Niğde saldırısı davası 17 Mart’a ertelendi (ISIL’s Nigde attack trial expected to
issue conviction delayed to March 17),” CNN Türk (Turkey), January 20, 2016. (http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/
isidin-karar-cikmasi-beklenen-nigde-saldirisi-davasi-17-marta-ertelendi)
120. “ISIL militant linked to Istanbul nightclub attacker says he was previously detained, released,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), February
2, 2017. (http://www.hürriyetdailynews.com/isil-militant-linked-to-istanbul-nightclub-attacker-says-he-waspreviouslydetained-released.
aspx?pageID=238&nID=109272&NewsCatID=509)
121. “Askerlere infaz iddiasını içeren Videodaki IŞİD’li iki [Defa] Gözaltına Alınıp Serbest Bırakılmış (The ISIL Member in the Video
Depicting Execution of Soldiers Was Detained and Released Twice),” T24 (Turkey), January 21, 2017. (https://t24.com.tr/haber/
askerlere-infaz-iddiasini-iceren-videodaki-isidli-iki-gozaltina-alinip-serbest-birakilmis,384385)
122. “Seven ISIL Suspects Released By Istanbul Court,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), March 24, 2016. (http://www.hürriyetdailynews.
com/seven-isil-suspects-released-by-istanbul-court.aspx?PageID=238&NID=96893&NewsCatID=509)

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was arrested once in 2008 for planning a synagogue conglomerate, the Dogan Media Group, slapping it
attack in Istanbul, and twice later for his affiliation with a staggering $2.5-billion tax fine.126
with IS – first in January 2014 and then again in July
2015. He was part of a 96-person Islamic State suspect Ankara’s steady dismantling of traditional media
list in a trial which, after its fourth hearing in March outlets, as well as its systematic intimidation of others,
2016, released all 96 suspects.123 fueled the rise of a highly polarized Turkish social
media. By 2011, Turkey had become Facebook’s fourth
This lax enforcement stands in stark contrast to the largest market worldwide with almost 30 million
treatment of Kurdish nationalists and other opposition Turkish accounts – behind only the United States,
figures in Turkey. Kurdish politicians and civilians India, and Indonesia.127 Twitter launched its Turkish-
are often detained and convicted under dubious language version that same year, and the website’s usage
terrorism charges. reportedly “exploded.” According to The Washington
Post, nearly 200,000 Turkish internet users signed up
Online Radicalization: each month in 2011.128 By the next year, that figure
had nearly doubled.129
Jihadists on Turkish
In May 2013, the Turkish police’s decision to disperse
Social Media a small environmentalist sit-in at Istanbul’s Gezi Park
with brute force unleashed a massive, nationwide anti-
In 2007, Turkey’s Savings Deposit Insurance Fund took government movement that lasted months.130 As deadly
over 63 media organizations, including the country’s clashes rocked Taksim Square on June 2, Turks tuned to
second-largest media conglomerate Sabah-ATV.124 This their country’s largest independent television channel,
was the AKP’s first blatant attempt at controlling the CNN Turk, only to find a 3-hour documentary on
media: Columnists critical of the ruling party were penguins.131 With the exception of one channel, Halk
promptly dismissed and replaced with loyalists. By the TV, Turks had only Twitter, Facebook, and blogs to
following spring, Sabah-ATV was sold to a holding keep up with the events. Twitter thus emerged as the
company owned by then-Prime Minister Erdogan’s most important tool for protesters to communicate
close associate and run by the premier’s son-in-law.125 and mobilize.132 It was during these protests that
A year later, Erdogan went after Turkey’s largest media

123. “IŞİD Davası’nda tüm sanıklar tahliye edildi (All suspects in ISIL case released),” Cumhuriyet (Turkey), March 24, 2016. (http://www.
cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/503898/ISiD_Davasi_nda_tum_saniklar_tahliye_edildi.html)
124. “TMSF atv ve Sabah’a el koydu (TMSF seized ATV and Sabah),” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), April 2, 2007. (http://www.hürriyet.
com.tr/tmsf-atv-ve-sabaha-el-koydu-6248828)
125. “Circulation wars,” The Economist, May 8, 2008. (http://www.economist.com/node/11332305)
126. Asli Aydintasbas, “Turkey’s War on the Press,” The Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2009. (http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424
052970203917304574414503346981992)
127. “Turkey is Facebook world country No. 4,” Social Bakers, August 23, 2011. (https://www.socialbakers.com/
blog/207-turkey-is-facebook-world-country-no-4)
128. Neal Caren and Didem Türkoğlu, “Political controversy has helped fuel Twitter’s growth in Turkey,” The Washington Post, March 28,
2014. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/28/political-controversy-has-helped-fuel-twitters-growth-in-turkey/)
129. Ibid.
130. “Raid on ‘Occupy Taksim Park’ demonstrators triggers outcry,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), May 30, 2013. (http://www.
hürriyetdailynews.com/raid-on-occupy-taksim-park-demonstrators-triggers-outcry.aspx?pageID=238&nID=47870&NewsCatID=341)
131. Pelin Turgut, “As Turkey’s Protests Continue, Attention Falls on Failures of Turkish Media,” TIME, June 6, 2013. (http://world.time.
com/2013/06/06/as-turkeys-protests-continue-attention-falls-on-failures-of-turkish-media/)
132. Olga Khazan, “These Charts Show How Crucial Twitter Is for the Turkey Protesters,” The Atlantic, June 12, 2013. (http://www.
theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/these-charts-show-how-crucial-twitter-is-for-the-turkey-protesters/276798/)

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Erdogan infamously called Twitter “the worst menace and implied its intention to conquer it. The magazine’s
to society.”133 second issue made it personal, denouncing Turkish
President Erdogan as tagut – a tyrant.
Today, most traditional media outlets in Turkey are
either directly controlled by or under the pressure of Since 2015, IS’s overall Twitter traffic has reportedly
the AKP.134 Of course, the AKP has had the power to dropped by 45 percent, thanks to U.S. efforts for
unilaterally block websites for the last decade, but since countering jihadi propaganda online.138 Twitter has
April 2015, it has also been legally allowed to block also increased its scrutiny over jihadist propaganda,
them for political reasons, such as defamation. Ankara suspending more than 360,000 accounts between
has now blocked over 100,000 websites.135 In November 2015 and August 2016.139 These are improvements,
2016, Freedom House downgraded Turkey’s internet but both the U.S. government and Twitter’s efforts
freedom rating to “not free,” citing periodic social have, naturally, focused mostly on the group’s Arabic-
media bans and the internet blackout in some Kurdish and English-language accounts. The jihadists and their
areas in Turkey’s east.136 As the Reuters Institute for the sympathizers continue to promote their messages in
Study of Journalism notes, this suppression of print Turkish with little intervention.
media has turned blogs and social media into the most
important news platforms in Turkey.137 One study by the Ankara-based Global Policy and
Strategy Institute analyzed 25,403 tweets posted by
The Islamic State’s Turkish-Language 290 pro-IS Turkish-language accounts over the course
of July 2015 – the same month as the Suruc attack
Activity on Twitter in southern Turkey.140 One month’s worth of tweets
With social media usage skyrocketing inTurkey, the Islamic repeated words such as jihad, idolatry, excommunication,
State has taken note. The caliphate has consistently used kill, assault, and weapon more than 30,000 times. Their
Turkish-language messages in its outreach campaign. In targets were not only westerners, Christians, and Jews,
its online Turkish-language magazine, IS has threatened but also “infidels” who defy IS’s version of Islam, such as
Turkey with conquest and vilified its leaders as secular Kurds and secular Turks. Tweets conveyed news directly
and un-Islamic. The magazine is called Konstantiniyye, from the battlefield, recruitment announcements, or
the Ottoman word for Constantinople, now Istanbul. smuggling opportunities. Others sought to publicize
Its first issue featured a modern cover photo of the city, IS’s worldview and ideology.

133. “Erdoğan: ‘social media is the worst menace to society,’” France 24 (France), June 4, 2013. (http://www.france24.com/
en/20130603-turkey-twitter-social-media-menace-erdoğan-sarkozy-london-goldman-sachs-parallel-diplomacy)
134. Claire Sadar, “Censorship Scandal Leads to Resignation of Head of Turkish Media Conglomerate,” Muftah.org, October 2, 2016.
(http://muftah.org/censorship-scandal-leads-resignation-head-turkish-media-conglomerate/#.WFr-KFMrKM)
135. The figure is from EngelliWeb.com, a project created in 2008 to track internet censorship in Turkey, accessed in November 2016. As of
February 2017, the website is no longer active.
136. “Turkey rated ‘not free’ in internet freedom in new Freedom House report,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), November 15, 2016. (http://
www.hürriyetdailynews.com/turkey-rated-not-free-in-internet-freedom-in-new-freedom-house-report.aspx?pageID=238&nid=106140)
137. Nic Newman, Richard Fletcher, David A. L. Levy, and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, “Digital News Report 2016,” Reuters Institute for the
Study of Journalism, accessed March 21, 2017. (http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/)
138. Bradley Klapper, “AP: Islamic State’s Twitter traffic drops amid US efforts,” Associated Press, July 9, 2016. (http://bigstory.ap.org/
article/21c9eb68e6294bdfa0a099a0632b8056/ap-exclusive-islamic-states-twitter-traffic-plunges)
139. Yasmeen Serhan, “Twitter’s Crackdown on Users Promoting Terrorism,” The Atlantic, August 18, 2016. (http://www.theatlantic.com/
news/archive/2016/08/twitter-suspends-users-terrorism/496481/?utm_source=atltw)
140. Suleyman Ozeren, Hakan Hekim, Salih Elmas, and Halil Ibrahim Canbegi, “ISIS in Cyberspace: Findings From
Social Media Research,” Global Policy and Strategy Institute, February 2016. (https://www.academia.edu/24311407/
ISIS_in_Cyberspace_Findings_From_Social_Media_Research)

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A similar study from June 2015 by Ankara’s TOBB on Turkish Twitter appeared to be animated by the
University captured 51,000 Twitter messages using 52 Palestinian-Israeli conflict, while adopting other
keywords, and identified 21 key accounts with a network common words and themes in the jihadi lexicon.
of 2,567 individuals engaged in pro-IS messaging,
of which 87.7 percent were tweeting from outside of Many of the accounts we recorded were shut down
Turkey.141 Monitoring those accounts for over a year, by Twitter throughout the period of the study, with
researchers studied IS’s overt propaganda and recruitment the authors shortly reemerging on the platform under
efforts. Notably, the study found the top agenda topic similar account names. The account of a suspected IS
of pro-IS accounts to be the PKK and the Kurds. The militant by the Twitter name of Ali Demircioglu, for
IS-PYD clashes in Syria, the study found, translated into example, was suspended and recreated several times
intensified IS recruitment on Turkish Twitter. under similar names. The user’s last known account
was @1ali2demir2, whose profile picture was of a
Sidar Global Advisors' Study of IS on black-clad figure drawing his sword. This account has
also been suspended since.
Turkish-Language Twitter
SGA’s study recorded spikes in jihadi language on
In 2016, FDD commissioned its own study into
Turkish Twitter during or after three types of events:
the Islamic State and jihadist accounts on Turkish
IS-linked terror attacks, important foreign dignitary
Twitter. The study was conducted by Sidar Global
visits, and operational developments in Syria.
Advisors (SGA), which used Brandwatch Analytics,
a social media monitoring and analytics platform, to Among the recorded Turkish-language tweets with jihadist
collect Turkish tweets over a 45-day period between sympathies, two themes stood out in particular: the PKK
March 15 – four days before the IS attack in Istanbul’s and the Assad regime, whose respective atrocities against
Sultanahmet district – until May 1.142 the Turks and Syrians were compared to the Islamic State’s
attacks against Europeans. Following the Islamic State
The study identified 137 key IS-sympathizer accounts
bombings in Brussels, for example, @1ali2demir2 shared
and, searching 18 keywords, analyzed 693,533 mentions
a picture from the attack scene with the Turkish caption:
on Twitter that were analyzed for topic, sentiment,
“You should have protected your airport instead of the
author, geo-location, and gender. In line with the
atheist PKK terror organization’s tent” – implying that
findings of other similar studies, few tweets were found
the Europeans were backing the Kurdish terrorist group.
to be geo-tagged. A geo-locational analysis based on
those tweets, however, showed most of them generating One of the most influential accounts that the study
from Turkey’s three major cities – Istanbul, Ankara, tracked, @Latormenta, also now defunct, tweeted
and Izmir – with some coming from the country’s about the Brussels attacks on March 22 with nearly
east. Outside of Turkey, Turkish-language tweets were 100,000 total author impressions on that day. While
recorded in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. the account did not explicitly praise the attacks, most of
the tweets on the chain conveyed nationalist overtones,
The three most-used keywords were cihad (jihad), kafir
emphasizing the West’s comparatively muted response
(infidel), and Nusra (a reference to al-Qaeda’s Syrian
to PKK attacks in Turkey and to the Assad regime’s
branch). In addition, Brandwatch often picked up
brutality in Syria. Calling on Belgium to speak up
mentions of Kudus (Jerusalem), mucahid (mujahid),
after the attacks, “we didn’t hear you when bombs were
and siyonist (Zionist). Indeed, proponents of jihadism

141. “İşte Twitter›daki Türk IŞİD'çilerle ilgili çarpıcı detaylar (Striking details about Turkish pro-ISIS accounts on Twitter),” Hurriyet Daily News
(Turkey), September 22, 2016. (http://www.hürriyet.com.tr/iste-twitterdaki-turk-isid-sempatizanlarinin-gundemi-40229219)
142. For the full report of the SGA study, see Appendix III.

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

going off in Syria,” @Latormenta wrote. “[N]ow that accounts, and the Union of Turkish Bar Associations said
they’ve detonated over there, have you any pain?” it was preparing to file additional complaints itself.144
Turkey’s jihadists, however, are unlikely to be troubled
These themes were not limited to the immediate by such threats. Ankara’s crackdown on social media
aftermath of IS attacks; they were periodically invoked primarily targets pro-Kurdish activists and government
to raise support for jihadists in Syria. On April 25, for critics. The Islamic State can be expected to continue
example, the Netherlands-based account of a suspected to exploit this platform, thanks to Ankara’s selective
IS sympathizer, @yasinyener4, tweeted scathing approach and to the group’s simple ability to recreate
remarks about an alleged PKK regional leader, whom new usernames when existing ones are expunged.
another Turkish account had accused of insulting an
Islamic prayer in a shared video. @yasinyener4 referred
to the old man as an “infidel dog,” commenting that he
Security in Post-Coup Turkey:
would soon pass away and “meet that blessed maker of Grim Prospects
yours whom you have mocked.”
On the night of July 15, 2016, rogue elements within
Similarly, many accounts invoked religious duty to the Turkish military rolled their tanks into the streets of
animate their followers. Accounts such as the now- Istanbul and began flying their jets over Ankara in an
defunct @Abuahmed0666 and @Kurdimuslim36 were attempted military coup against the AKP government.
recorded tweeting particular Quran verses that stress the The perpetrators failed to capture Erdogan, who called
importance of jihad for salvation. These tweets either on the people to take to the streets and resist the coup.
accompanied or followed tweets regarding battlefield Between the president’s call, the mosques, and social
developments in Syria by the same authors, and appeared media, thousands of Turks mobilized. They flooded
to serve as a tool to recruit militants for the jihad. Of all the streets and reclaimed public areas held by the
the tweets captured in our study, these were among the mutineers. The coup effort failed within hours, but it
most influential, recording some of the highest number continues to have major implications for Turkey.
of shares (retweets) or endorsements (likes).
Erdogan and the AKP promptly blamed the plot on
While the study concluded its data collection in May the followers of Fethullah Gulen, a U.S.-based Turkish
2016, FDD closely watched Twitter following the cleric. Ankara demanded that Washington immediately
Reina nightclub attack on New Year’s Eve 2017. Most extradite the cleric to Turkey, and pro-government
Turkish social media users condemned the attack, but dailies launched a media campaign alleging direct
some justified it with Islamist rhetoric against alcohol CIA complicity in the attempted coup. In addition
consumption and revealing dress for women – sins they to skyrocketing anti-Americanism in Turkey, Ankara’s
accused the Reina socialites of committing on the non- efforts to coerce the U.S. into extraditing Gulen –
Islamic holiday of New Year’s Eve.143 including by challenging the legitimacy of the U.S.-led
coalition’s presence at the Incirlik airbase145 – has severely
Following the New Year’s IS attack in Istanbul, Deputy strained the country’s ties with its top NATO ally.
Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus announced that
investigations were being launched into 347 social media

143. Ezgi Basaran, “Secular citizens of Turkey have never felt so alone,” The Washington Post, January 3, 2017. (https://www.
washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/01/03/secular-citizens-of-turkey-have-never-felt-so-alone/?utm_term=.eafc14818b70)
144. “Probe launched into 347 social media accounts after Istanbul attack,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), January 2, 2017. (http://www.
hürriyetdailynews.com/probe-launched-into-347-social-media-accounts-after-istanbul-attack.aspx?pageID=238&nid=108024)
145. Tulay Karadeniz, Ece Toksabay, Orhan Coskun, Tuvan Gumrukcu, and Nick Tattersall, “Turkey questions U.S.-led coalition presence
at Incirlik air base,” Reuters, January 5, 2015. (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey-usa-idUSKBN14P0XR)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Meanwhile, the AKP unleashed a massive purge to of pilots per warplane from two to less than one. A
clear Gulenists from the Turkish bureaucracy. More prominent former Turkish military adviser commented
than 100,000 civil servants were either sacked or in September that government’s response to the coup
detained within weeks of the coup attempt. Having attempt has “depleted” the armed services, forecasting
declared a “state of emergency,” the president issued at least a two-year period for recovery.148
decree after decree shutting down businesses, media
organizations, and charities. The political scene in In total, nearly 8,000 military officers have been
Turkey now increasingly resembles a witch hunt, with dismissed since July 15, and according to the Interior
the government targeting opposition figures with no Ministry, more than 1,200 personnel from the
ties to the Gulen network, including Kurdish activists, gendarmerie have been removed from their posts.149
journalists, novelists, and academics. The purges have The Turkish police force, meanwhile, has lost more
drained human capital from Turkey’s vital institutions, than 21,000 personnel to the purges.150 With the total
notably the education ministry and the judiciary.146 number of police officers standing at a mere 9,000,
The New York Times likened it to “firing every police
But the worst damage may have been done to the country’s officer in Philadelphia, Dallas, Detroit, Boston and
security and intelligence services, at a time Turkey needs Baltimore.”151 In addition, 87 members of the national
them most. On July 28, only two weeks after the coup intelligence agency have been dismissed.152
attempt, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper warned that Turkey’s purges of the military This instability and polarization in Turkey will likely
were “harming the fight against Islamic State,” referring serve to benefit IS. The group has already been exploiting
mostly to the disruption of U.S. operations from the the country’s ethnic-nationalist divides to recruit both
Incirlik airbase as well as the purge of several key Turkish Turks and Kurds to combat the PKK and its affiliates.
air force members working closely with NATO.147 The Reina attack on January 1 also exposed a secular-
religious fault line: Government incitement against New
The Turkish Armed Services, currently at war with Year’s celebrations, which Islamist Turks denounce as a
Kurdish militants in the Turkey’s east and with both Christian practice, may have inspired the attack.
Kurdish and Islamic State fighters inside Syria, has
been hit the hardest. Within two months of the coup Turkey’s military efforts to combat the Islamic State in
attempt, nearly 40 percent of all Turkish generals, Syria are also raising the stakes. Clashes in al-Bab are
mostly brigadier generals and rear admirals, had likely to generate revenge attacks against Turkish citizens
been removed from their posts and replaced with less at home, like the attack at Reina. In early February 2017,
experienced colonels. The Turkish air force lost nearly Turkish police caught four IS militants in Gaziantep in
half of its combat pilots, reducing the average number possession of two dozen suicide bomber belts and 14

146. “Purge in Numbers,” Turkey Purge, accessed February 2, 2017. (http://turkeypurge.com/purge-in-numbers)

147. Warren Strobel, “Turkey military purge harming fight against Islamic State: Clapper,” Reuters, July 28, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-turkey-security-usa-purge-idUSKCN1082U8)
148. Metin Gurcan, “How post-coup purges depleted Turkey’s military,” Al Monitor, September 16, 2016. (http://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2016/09/turkey-military-needs-two-year-fill-ranks-emptied-by-purge.html)
149. “Purge in Numbers,” Turkey Purge, accessed February 2, 2017. (http://turkeypurge.com/purge-in-numbers); “Turkey
removes 1,218 gendarmerie from duty: interior ministry official,” Reuters, November 3, 2016. (http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-turkey-security-gendarmerie-idUSKBN12Y0JA)
150. “Purge in Numbers,” Turkey Purge, accessed February 2, 2017. (http://turkeypurge.com/purge-in-numbers)
151. Josh Keller, Iaryna Mykhyalyshyn, and Safak Timur, “The Scale of Turkey’s Purge Is Nearly Unprecedented,” The New York Times,
August 2, 2016. (http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/02/world/europe/turkey-purge-erdoğan-scale.html?_r=0)
152. Humeyra Pamuk, “Turkey dismisses 87 members of national intelligence agency: media,” Reuters, September 27, 2016. (http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-intelligence-idUSKCN11X0TH)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

kilograms of TNT, along with Kalashnikov rifles and commitment to disrupting all of the Islamist
other materials.153 With threats from inside Turkey, a networks that advocate on behalf of IS in Turkey.
region in chaos, and a run-down security apparatus since U.S. diplomats should remind Ankara of the fact
the post-coup purges, Ankara’s ability to thwart major that this is in Turkey’s best interest.
attacks is increasingly in doubt. • Washington should issue targeted sanctions against
all actors in Turkey already identified (including
Recommendations those in this report) as IS operatives, recruiters,
financers, advocates, or facilitators, and urge Turkish
The Turkish government has not prioritized its fight officials to identify additional financial targets. This
against the Islamic State. Ankara’s failure to effectively is Turkey’s responsibility as a NATO ally and partner
fight IS at home and abroad has not only increased in the fight against IS.
Turkey’s vulnerability to terror attacks, but also • Given the rising level of IS activity in Turkey
strained its relationship with the United States. The and Ankara’s lackluster approach to the threat,
following eight recommendations are steps the U.S. Washington should consider increasing funding for
government can take to help Ankara curtail the jihadist programs focused on combatting jihadist ideology
threat to Turkey’s security and stability, and strengthen and de-radicalization in Turkey.
cooperation between the two NATO allies against the
• The United States should similarly expand its
Islamic State.
efforts to counter IS’s messaging on social media
• Given that the Turkish-PKK conflict remains the in Turkish. U.S. efforts are primarily focused now
top obstacle for Turkey’s full cooperation in the on English and Arabic languages. The goal must be
fight against IS, the United States should leverage its to prevent radicalization and recruitment among
relationship with Kurdish groups to urge a ceasefire Turkish speakers.
between the PKK and Turkey and an eventual
• To prevent the flow of jihadists and Kurdish
relaunch of the peace process. The de-escalation of
militants between Turkey and Syria, the U.S. should
the Kurdish conflict could allow Ankara to return to
offer Turkey technical and material assistance to
its pragmatic approach to the PYD, and help Turkey
help improve security along the Syrian border.
focus its counterterrorism efforts on the fight against
This assistance could be similar to border security
the Islamic State.
packages provided to Jordan in recent years.
• In the immediate term, the U.S. should provide
• If Turkey continues to pursue its policies that
support to Turkey in its fight against IS in Syria, but
empower jihadists, Washington must convey that
only so long as that mission is confined to fighting
it is prepared to downgrade its relationship with
IS. Similarly, Washington should provide assistance
Ankara, including intelligence, military, and perhaps
to its Syrian partners fighting IS so long as that
even economic ties. U.S. diplomats should make
assistance is not used to target Turkey.
it clear to their Turkish counterparts that Ankara’s
• To support Turkey’s anti-IS operations at home, current policies are unsustainable. They endanger
which have improved in the last year, the U.S. first and foremost Turkey itself, as well as broader
should offer Ankara more intelligence on IS suspects, U.S. interests in Turkey and beyond.
recruiters, financiers, and support networks inside
Turkey. Washington should complement this
with aggressive diplomacy to ensure Ankara’s

153. “Police detain four ISIL suspects, foil terrorist attack in Turkey’s Gaziantep,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), February 9, 2017.
(http://www.hürriyetdailynews.com/police-detain-four-isil-suspects-foil-terrorist-attack-in-turkeys-gaziantep.
aspx?pageID=238&nID=109525&NewsCatID=509)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Appendix I
Table I: Islamic State-linked Attacks in Turkey since 2014
Date Location Type of attack Perpetrators Killed Wounded
March 2014 Nigde Shooting Cendrim Ramadani, 3 0
Benyamin Xu,
Muhammed Zakiri &
unidentified foreign
national
January 2015 Istanbul, Sultanahmet Suicide bombing Diana Ramazova 1 (herself ) 2

June 2015 Diyarbakir, HDP rally Bombing Orhan Gonder 5 (4+1) 400+

July 2015 Suruc Suicide bombing Abdurrahman Alagoz 34 100+

October 2015 Ankara, Peace rally Twin suicide Yunus Emre Alagoz & 102 500+
bombings Omer Deniz Dundar
January 2016 Istanbul, Sultanahmet Suicide bombing Nabil Fadli 10 11

March 2016 Istanbul, Taksim Suicide bombing Mehmet Oztuk 5 36

June 2016 Istanbul, Ataturk Airport Twin suicide Rakim Bulgarov, 48 (45+3) 230+
bombings and Vadim Osmanov
shooting & unidentified foreign
national
August 2016 Gaziantep, Kurdish Suicide bombing Unidentified Turkish 57 90+
wedding national
January 2017 Istanbul, Reina nightclub Mass shooting Abdulkadir Masharipov 39 70

2014: 1 attack, 3 deaths, no one injured.

2015: 4 attacks, 142 deaths, more than 1,000 injured.

2016: 4 attacks, 120 deaths, more than 350 injured.

2017: 1 attack, 39 deaths, 70 injured.

Total: 10 attacks (8 of them mass-scale), 304 killed, and more than 1,000 injured. Of the 16 perpetrators, 10 were foreign
nationals and 6 were Turkish citizens.

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Appendix II
Table II: Police Operations Against Islamic State Suspects in Turkey in 2016
* Materials seized (MS), include weapons, ammunition, suicide vests, documents, or digital files.

Date Location Detained Arrested Released Deported Details

January 6 Yalova, Bursa & Kocaeli 6 Turks
January 10 Istanbul 10 Turks
January 11 Bursa 12 Turks
January 12 Ankara 16 1 Turk 15 Syrians
January 12 Adana 9 (4 Turks)
January 12 Mersin 9 Turks 3 Turks 6 Turks
January 12 Kilis 4 Syrians 2 Syrians 2 Syrians
January 12 Sanliurfa 21
January 13 Batman 2 Turks
January 13 Antalya 3 Russians
January 13 Konya 4 Turks
January 13 Izmir 6
January 14 Balikesir 5 Turks MS
January 14 Osmaniye 1 Turk
January 15 Erzurum 3 Turks 2 Turks
January 16 Konya 10 Turks
January 17 Antalya, Adana & 8 (7 Turks, 1 7 1 Turk
Osmaniye Syrian)
January 20 Kahramanmaras 3
January 22 Afyon 6 Syrians 3 Syrians 3 Syrians
January 25 Adana 4 foreigners
(3 Indonesian,
1 Saudi)
January 29 Giresun & Rize 2 Turks 2 Turks MS
February 10 Adiyaman 4 Libyans 4 Libyans
February 13 Adiyaman 1 Turk 1 Turk
February 23 Gaziantep 5 Turks 5 Turks
February 26 Kilis 1
March 3 Bingol 10 Turks 2 Turks 8 Turks
March 5 Kocaeli 3 Turks 2 Turks
March 7 Kilis 4 (1 Turk) 3 Syrians 1 Turk
March 10 Gaziantep 13 7 6
March 17 Sanliurfa 1 Syrian 1 Syrian
March 24 Malatya 4 2

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Date Location Detained Arrested Released Deported Details

April 5 Gaziantep 4 Turks 4 Turks
April 22 Adana 2 2
April 25 Cankiri 6 Turks 6 Turks MS
April 26 Kocaeli, Kayseri & 5 Turks 5 Turks
Ankara
April 30 Antalya 7 foreigners 4 3
(2 Russians,
4 Syrians)
May 12 Sakarya 2 Iraqis 2 Iraqis MS
May 13 Batman 3
May 16 Malatya 9
May 18 Elazig 7 Turks 2 Turks 5 Turks Included a
high-level member
May 19 Gaziantep Suicide vest
detonated
May 24 Gaziantep 10 foreigners 10
May 31 Antalya 1 Turk 1 Turk
June 4 Bursa 5 Turks 4 Turks 1 Turk
June 7 Yozgat, Ankara & 6
Istanbul
June 12 Duzce 5 (2 Turks) 5
June 14 Kahramanmaras 4 (3 Uzbeks) 1 Turk
June 30 Izmir 9 MS
June 30 Kilis 5 (4 Turks) 4 Turks
July 12 Sanliurfa 4 Syrians 4 Syrians MS
July 13 Canakkale 6 MS
July 14 Bursa 1 Turk 1 Turk
August 6 Adana 16 MS
August 7 Adana 20
August 8 Tekirdag 1 Turk Previously traveled
to Iraq, Syria
August 15 Gaziantep 3 3 MS
August 15 Adiyaman 3 Turks 2 Turks 1 Turk
August 19 Kilis 9 Turks 6 Turks 3 Turks
August 22 Mugla 1 Turk MS
August 25 Nevsehir 3 Syrians
August 25 Samsun 16 (9 Turks) MS
August 26 Konya 20 MS
August 26 Adana 20
August 26 Yalova 5 Turks 2 Turks MS

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Date Location Detained Arrested Released Deported Details

August 26 Ankara 17 16 MS
August 27 Marmaris 1 Syrian 1 Syrian
August 29 Elazig 10 Turks 10 Turks
September 2 Gaziantep 24 Turks 8 Turks 16 Turks
September 5 Ankara 20 16 4 MS
September 7 Izmir 9 Turks 7 Turks 2 Turks
September 8 Hatay 10 foreigners Arrests including IS's
(Azeri & Gaziantep cell leader
Egyptian)
September 10 Bingol 11 7 MS
September 12 Samsun 4 Iraqis
September 16 Istanbul 24 foreign MS
nationals
September 18 Istanbul 40 foreign MS
nationals
September 28 Yalova 5
September 28 Sinop 3 2
October 3 Gaziantep 4
October 7 Antalya 8 8 MS
October 9 Kilis 3 (2 Turks) 2 1
October 9 Gaziantep 32 (20 Turks) 14 7 Suicide bomber
detonated bomb,
killed 4 police
October 14 Nigde 1 Turk MS
October 17 Yozgat 1 Syrian
October 19 Ankara Turkish IS member
October 19 Diyarbakir 20
October 24 Kastamonu 5 Syrians Linked to
Gaziantep cell
October 27 Gaziantep, Sanliurfa 25 (8 Turks) 23 MS
& Aydin
October 27 Istanbul, Gaziantep, 81 (21 Turk) 31 locations,
Sanliurfa, Erzurum, MS, 20 of the 60
Kirklareli & Edirne foreigners who
were detained were
underage
October 28 Samsun 21 Iraqis MS
October 28 Eskisehir 1 Turk 1 Turk MS
October 28 Ankara 1 Turk 1 Turk MS

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Date Location Detained Arrested Released Deported Details

October 28 Malatya 1 IS bomber was
detained
November 2 Bilecik MS
November 3 Kocaeli 8 Syrians
November 7 Bitlis 4 Turks 3 Turks 1 Turk
November 8 Kirklareli 6 foreigners MS
(Russian,
Ukranian,
Uzbek)
November 9 Aksaray 2 Turks
November 10 Sivas 10 Turks 5 Turks MS
November 11 Nigde 4
November 11 Kocaeli 2
November 14 Kayseri 12 Turks 3 Turks
November 15 Corum 1 Iraqi 1 Iraqi High-level member
of IS
November 15 Tekirdag 3 (2 Turks) 2 Turks 1
foreigner
November 17 Sakarya 18 (Iraqis/ MS
Syrians)
November 23 Denizli 1 Syrian 1 Syrian
November 25 Mersin 3 (1 Turk) 3
November 27 Istanbul 11 foreigners MS
November 28 Samsun 8 Iraqis
December 2 Sakarya 3 Iraqis 3 Iraqis MS
December 2 Mugla 1 Syrian
December 3 Agri 1 Russian 1 Russian
December 13 Tokat, Istanbul, 9
Bursa, Ankara/
Gaziantep & Sanliurfa
December 13 Van 12
December 16 Konya 43 Turks 43 Turks
December 24 Kilis 7 foreigners 7 foreigners
December 28 Adiyaman 3 Turks
December 29 Sakarya 7 Iraqis 2 assassins of IS,
1 cyber of IS,
4 fundraisers of IS
December 30 Gaziantep 18 MS
December 31 Ankara 8 MS

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Map of Table II: Police Operations Against Islamic State Suspects in Turkey in 2016

KEY
Anti-IS operations No anti-IS operations reported

Total: 54 Provinces
Adana Diyarbakir Malatya
Adiyaman Duzce Marmaris
Afyon Edirne Mersin
Agri Elazig Mugla
Aksaray Erzurum Nevsehir
Ankara Eskisehir Nigde
Antalya Gaziantep Osmaniye
Aydin Giresun Rize
Balikesir Hatay Sakarya
Batman Istanbul Samsun
Bilecik Izmir Sanliurfa
Bingol Kahramanmaras Sinop
Bitlis Kastamonu Sivas
Bursa Kayseri Tekirdag
Canakkale Kilis Tokat
Cankiri Kirklareli Van
Corum Kocaeli Yalova
Denizli Konya Yozgat

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Appendix III: SGA Turkish 4. Nusra : 49,000 mentions

5. Kudus (Jerusalem): 48,000 mentions
Social Media Study 6. Siyonist (Zionist): 37,000 mentions
7. Mucahid (Mujahid): 34,000 mentions
Main Findings and Executive Summary
8. İslam Devleti (Islamic State): 30,000 mentions
The following report discusses the main findings from data
collected by Sidar Global Advisors through Brandwatch 1. Data Collection
on the Twitter presence of Turkish ISIS operatives/
sympathizers between March 15 and May 1, 2016. This study tracked 18 Turkish queries or keywords
on Twitter and collected the tweets wherein they
An Alarming Development: Introductory Notes appeared. FDD developed the queries based on
& General Findings Turkish concepts used frequently by ISIS members
and sympathizers. Where necessary, different
Between March 15 and May 1, 2016, our project spellings of the keywords were taken into account,
actively tracked the Twitter accounts of 137 Turkish e.g. “Mucahid” and “Mucahit.” The study did not,
Islamic State (ISIS) members/sympathizers, along however, check for tweets with spelling errors.
with 18 pre-established keywords, which were Islamic
concepts often employed by ISIS, transliterated from In addition to keyword collection, SGA also tracked
Arabic into Turkish—e.g., “Cihad” instead of “Jihad.” the accounts of 137 ISIS sympathizers tweeting in
In total, our social media analytics technology, Turkish. We used non-probability snowball sampling
Brandwatch, recorded nearly 694,000 mentions from to identify the accounts of these 137 sympathizers.
these accounts and keywords. Automated sentiment First, SGA’s Turkish analysts worked with FDD to
analysis scored around 20,000 mentions as generally identify a small sample of Turkish-language Twitter
positive, and 83,000 were scored as negative. The accounts that were clearly sympathetic to ISIS based
main topics or concepts of interest ranged from on their profiles and tweets. From these individuals,
general terms such as “Allah” and “Islam” to more we expanded our sample to other Turkish-language
specific alliterations. ISIS sympathizers in their Twitter networks.

The following were the most discussed issues by mention: FDD commissioned this study to begin data
1. ISIS & the Islamic State: 55,000 mentions collection on March 19, when a Turkish suicide
2. Allah: 50,000 mentions bomber with ISIS links struck a busy tourist area
in central Istanbul killing at least four people. The
3. Islam: 46,000 mentions initial plan was to collect data for one month, but
4. Erdogan: 22,000 mentions we extended the data collection process for another
5. AKP: 20,000 mentions two weeks to expand the dataset, and ended the data
6. El-Nusra (al-Nusra): 18,000 mentions collection on May 1, 2016.
7. Hilafet Turkiye (Caliphate Turkey): SGA used its technology partner company’s
13,800 mentions leading social media monitoring and analytics
platform, Brandwatch Analytics, to collect data for
The following queries had the highest number of mentions:
the study. The platform systematically crawls the
1. Cihad (Jihad): 182,000 mentions internet to create a database of social media accounts
2. Kafir (Infidel): 130,000 mentions and websites.
3. Halife & Hilafet (Caliph & Caliphate):
89,000 mentions

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

We specifically limited our data collection to Twitter 2. Data analysis

upon FDD’s request. Based on our initial queries and
137 specified Twitter accounts, Brandwatch crawled We used six primary types of analysis to answer the
Twitter every 5 to 6 hours. The platform saves the research questions for this study. Much of the data
new URLs and accounts in its first-level archive. analysis was conducted using Brandwatch’s analysis
Metadata are applied to these URLs and accounts tools. SGA Turkey analysts conducted additional
(e.g. number of visitors, MozRank, Backlinks, etc.) qualitative analysis to describe how the data fit
and then saved in the second-level archive. Queries within the broader landscape with the Turkish
search the second level of storage to assure that the Twitter universe.
application works as fast as possible.
Volume Analysis
In total, we recorded 693,533 mentions from these
Twitter accounts and keywords between March 19 Volume analysis is the most basic inquiry that we
and May 1 (each tweet that contains content that conducted for this study. Volume analysis provides
matches a query counts as a mention). Of the 137 counts and descriptive statistics on the number of times
tracked accounts, most were shut down by either and proportions that a queried keyword is mentioned
Twitter for having inappropriate imagery or content, on Twitter during the date range of our study. The
or were reported as hazardous and forcibly terminated. volume can be analyzed by a specific date, author,
However, we were able to retain the data from these topic, and sentiment.
accounts for the period from March 15 to May 1,
which are still available in our archives. Topic Analysis

Tracked Queries: We also conducted topics analysis. This type of

inquiry identifies up to 50 top terms or phrases
• Ahrar (Ahrar [al-Sham])
most associated with an author (account) or query
• Cihad (Jihad) (keyword) within our study’s date range. The topics
• Halife (Caliph) are based on a random sample of up to 600 query
• Hilafet (Caliphate) mentions but do not include the query itself. Topics
• İslam Devleti (Islamic State) are calculated in two ways. The first is the overall
volume of mentions. The second is burst: This is
• İstişhadi (Prosperity) calculated by dividing your selected date range into
• Kafir (Infidel) two equal parts and comparing the increase in volume
• Kefere (Infidels) of that topic across the two halves. E.g. if there were
• Konstanniye (Istanbul) 50 mentions of a topic in the first half, and 75 in the
second, that is an increase of 50% and therefore the
• Kudüs (Jerusalem)
topic would have a burst value of 50. Topic analysis
• Mücahid (Mujahid) can be displayed as a word cloud that highlights the
• Mürted (Apostate) 30 most frequently-used words or phrases within
• Müşrik (Polytheist) the study’s the date range. It can also be displayed
• Nusra ([Jabhat al-] Nusra) in a table. Sentiment analysis can be paired with
both table and word cloud topic analysis to show the
• Rafizi
positive or negative value of the most frequently-used
• Siyonist (Zionist) words or phrases.
• Tağut (Tyrant)
• Tekfir (Takfir)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Sentiment Analysis authors. First, the platform looks for geo-coordinates

provided by the GPS-enabled devices from which an
Our technology supports sentiment analysis in 28 author tweeted. Approximately 1-5% of tweets are
languages, including Turkish. The platform automatically tagged with coordinates. This is the most accurate
scores all mentions as “positive,” “negative,” or “neutral” type of geolocation, but this method is not 100%
based on a combination of manual and automated accurate as users can manually change their location.
natural language processing (NLP) techniques. The If no GPS coordinates are available, we scan tweets
system scores sentiment conservatively, only classifying for mentions of a location (e.g. if an author tweets “I
mentions that it is reasonably certain are positive or made it to Raqqa,” and then tags himself in Raqqa,
negative. Mentions for which the sentiment cannot be the platform will geo-locate the author in Raqqa,
classified with enough accuracy are left as “neutral” (or Syria). Third, location can be analyzed via time zone
“unclassified”). Therefore, most of the mentions in our reporting on user profiles. While this method cannot
project were considered “neutral.” determine if an author is tweeting from Raqqa or
Istanbul, since they are in the same time zone, it
Author Analysis can establish if tweets originate in Europe or Asia.
SGA can also use web domain suffixes to geo-locate
Author analysis identifies the most active authors in the
authors. For example, a user posting links with .tr
data. Within this type of inquiry, we can view all query
domain suffix might indicate that the author is in
mentions by author (Twitter account). We can also
Turkey. Finally, if no other information is available
determine how impactful a specific Twitter account is
Brandwatch will identify users by the IP-address of
by its impact score.
the web host. This method can be problematic since
Impact is a score that reflects how much a site, mention, or many web hosts are in the United States. Therefore,
author is seen and shared online. It is a quick way to filter our analysts have chosen to filter out all such
the important from the unimportant. The impact score tweets in order to accurately obtain data from the
is comprised of: disclosed samples.

Factor A: How much potential a mention has to be seen. Gender Identification

Factor B: How much a mention has been viewed, shared, We also attempted to identify the gender of authors. Our
or retweeted. technology determines user gender by first matching
names to a dictionary of over 40,000 names, which
To calculate the impact score for an author, we sum up the are then used to assign a gender. If a user’s name is not
number of mentions the author wrote and the maximum gender-specific, the platform will not assign a gender.
values achieved for Factors A and B (as outlined above) and
then normalize it. 3. Data Overview And Labeling
SGA calculated impact scores using metrics such as Over the course of the 45 days, we gathered a net total of
Kred score, MozRank, and retweets. From this data, 693,533 mentions from the 18 queries and 137 authors.
we assign an author a score from 1-100. The tweets Unlike states with comprehensive internet censorship
of an author with a score of 100 are widely viewed policies, the Republic of Turkey’s censorship laws are
and shared. retroactive—accounts are censored only after Turkish
authorities or Twitter users request the termination of
Geolocation these accounts from social media bodies. Our technology
allowed SGA to retain censored tweets from cancelled
We also analyzed the location of Twitter accounts with accounts except for the images and link shares.
geolocation analysis. We use a 5-tiered scale to locate

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

To make use of this vast and unprocessed data, this report 4. Discussion
sought to assess these mentions within their proper
general and specific contexts. This allowed our analysts 1. The Authors / Accounts
to use filters to deduce any general findings. While
determining the general tendencies of the Turkish Twitter Top authors based on number of tweets:
universe was not possible given Brandwatch’s limitations, 1. AbuuAhmed8: 1,445
certain general inferences could be made regarding the 2. Mucahidakinci: 1,231
tendencies of Turkish social media presence.
3. Kurdiselman36: 1,059
This report attempted to differentiate the authors into 4. AliReddi: 985
categories. While these terms can be relative, some 5. DVIslam: 980
commonalities between several authors allowed us to 6. MuhammedMuhajer: 901
attempt a classification.
7. Abu_ahmed0666: 795
• Islamist: Possesses a theological disposition and
8. Dogrucu_Mucahit: 722
tweets religious content and occasionally political
content. While some of these tweets were of interest 9. Kurdimuslim36: 720
(i.e. expressed sympathies for some of the grievances 10. 72Chd: 678
in Syria), their utility is of dubious importance for
the sake of this report. Regardless of their Twitter mentions, some accounts
were more influential and had a greater impact (viewed,
ûû E.g.: “You cannot say that laicite is an re-tweeted, mentioned) than those that merely had a
imperialist ideology and we are still debating high volume of tweets.
an ideology that states Islam is a back-ward
religion!” (sozunhaysiyeti, 28 April) Top influential authors with their impact variable
• ISIS: Either directly affiliated with or sympathizer (tweet, tweet audience, retweet, retweet audience,
of ISIS “beyond-reasonable doubt.” Their tweets audience of initial audience, etc.):
are of a much more violent and ideological nature 1. Cihatolog: 89
than those of the Islamists. In order to gain more 2. Thesporcu: 88
insight into this group, this report further divided
3. Cihat_bayram: 87
this category into two sub-components.
4. 72Chd: 87
ȊȊ Violent: Mostly shares violent thoughts or
5. MuhammedMuhajer: 86
advocates for violence; tweets often contain
violent images, videos, and messages. 6. Dogrucu_Mucahit: 85
7. Nagihansaka: 85
ûû E.g.: “We could do ten-fold of what we did at
NATO and the heart of EU in Brussels here in 8. 57Islamicc: 84
Turkey...” (EbuMelhame25, 23 March) 9. Hayallerimvben: 84
ȊȊ Non-Violent (propaganda): Expresses or advocates 10. Tevhidmedya_: 84
on behalf of the ISIS; tracks developments in
Of these accounts, most were shut down by either
Syria, Turkey, or Europe. Generally refrains from
Twitter or were reported as hazardous and forcibly
transgressions that would warrant the termination
terminated. Brandwatch was able to retain the data for
of their account.
these accounts from March 15 to May 1.
ûû E.g.: “#ISIS #CaliphateTR #KerkukVilayet
Visuals from the battle for Allas.” Not all of these accounts had a role to play within the
(TevhidMedya, May 1) keyword or specific account data. As far as the general

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

aggregate data is concerned, their contributions mattered 67% could be classified in a broad sense as ISIS
and, in effect, we were able to attain the sum-total of sympathizers—of which 9 (43%) were militant and 5
all things worthy of mention during the timeframe of (24%) and were non-militant.
this study. However, since some of these accounts were
willfully neglected or simply relegated to irrelevance, our From the 137 authors, a total of 97 (71%) were either
scoped data for the queries and tracked specific Twitter shut down or abandoned at one point or another.
accounts did not necessarily involve their contributions. Our analysts scoured the terminated accounts, and
This way, we were able to apply an active filter of whom determined that 39 (40%) of those censored were of a
to track and why, as opposed to involving all which, militant-ISIS disposition.
directly or indirectly, could have confounded our main
findings (e.g. influential accounts using the above terms 2. Topic And Sentiment Analysis
for satirical purposes were left out).
Brandwatch recorded 693,533 mentions from the
Some of these Twitter accounts acted as “post-boxes” 137 accounts and 18 keywords. Automated sentiment
in which different authors deposited nuggets of analysis scored only 3% of the data, with 20,038
information for their audiences for a more coherent mentions, as generally positive. Another 12%, with
online presence. Hence, some accounts are not 82,856 of the overall mentions, were scored with
necessarily accounts of individuals but act as “umbrella negative sentiment. The remaining 85% of the data, or
accounts” that pool the sources together. 590,639 mentions, were of neutral value.

Of the general data, Brandwatch recorded the most

mentioned topics as “Allah” (49,703 mentions),
“Islam” (46,235 mentions), “ISID” (24,273 mentions),
“Turkiye” (24,273 mentions), and “Halep” (23,117
mentions). The least mentioned topics were “Davutoglu”
Figure 1: JN_Cendel2’s tweets are examples of many (2,805 mentions), “Laiklik” (4,803 mentions), “Hz”
re-direct tweets, which inform about terminated accounts (5,779 mentions), “Kuzey Halep” (6,935 mentions),
and re-direct followers to the renewed addresses. and “IslamDevleti Hilafet TR” (6,935 mentions).
Sentiments for these topics could not be obtained.

Our search recorded a total of 694, 779 tweets

containing one or more of the 18 queries (or keywords).
The average mention per keyword came out to 38,598.
Taking this average into consideration, this report
found the three queries most mentioned above average
to be: “Cihad” (182,161 mentions), “Kafir” (130,041
mentions), and “Nusra” (48,867 mentions). According
to these numbers, the word “Cihad” was mentioned in
more than a quarter (26%) of our total sample of tweets.
Figure 2: Tevhid Medya is an “umbrella” account that uses
hashtags to organize a steady stream of information all Of the queries tracked, the following had the highest
under one roof. These accounts act as alternatives to formal negative mentions: “Kafir” (Infidel) had 23,038 negative
news agencies. mentions, “Cihad” (Jihad) had 15,765, “Nusra” had
8,305, and “Siyonist” had 7,615. The most negatively
Our report concluded that of the 21 most impactful
mentioned word in relation to total mentions was the
authors, 7 (33%) were Islamists, while the remaining

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

query for “Siyonist” (21%). The average negative value Figure 3: Tweet from an Islamist-Turkish Dutch account,
for all queries was 8.6%. @1ali2demir2, after the Brussels airport attack: “You
should have protected your airport instead of the atheist
PKK terror organization’s tent.”

While some tweets targeted the Kurds, most recorded

tweets were anti-PKK. The authors often labeled the
group and its supporters as infidels, unbelievers, or
atheists. The PKK has its roots in Marxist-Leninist
ideology and is thus often associated with atheism.
However, the authors’ emphasis on the un-Islamic
character of the group is particular to Islamist rhetoric.

Queries with the highest positive mentions were: “Cihad”

(6,482 mentions), “Kafir” (3,576 mentions), “Kudus”
(1,764 mentions), and “Mucahid” (1,599 mentions).
The most positively mentioned word in relation to total
mentions was the query for “Mucahid” (nearly 5%). The
average positive value for all queries was 3.75%.

In addition to the figures above, our search recorded a

considerable number of tweets discussing the Kurds or the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a designated terrorist
group that has been fighting an insurgency in Turkey for
decades. The tweets by ISIS or ISIS sympathizer accounts
Figure 4: @Yasinyener4 of the Netherlands refers to a
often incited against the Kurds as well as against the
PKK official’s mockery of Islam by using terms as “infidel,”
West, which is seen by Islamists and nationalist Turks as
“dog,” and states that “…you will soon meet your maker
a patron of the PKK. They also appeared to use Turkish
and face justice.”
grievances against the PKK to galvanize support for jihad
among their Turkish-speaking audience. In many instances, anti-Western Turkish sentiments
came hand-in-hand with anti-PKK rhetoric, or came in
the form of accusations against the Europeans for their
hypocrisy in supporting the PKK while demanding
that Turkey do more to combat ISIS. The tweets
suggest an underlying view that Turkey and the West
have two distinct enemies—the PKK for the former,
ISIS for the latter—and they downplay the ISIS threat
to Turkey. The patterns reflect a binary worldview, in
which Europe, the PKK, and the Kurds are presented
as the other, suggesting nationalist undertones.

These kinds of associations allow pro-ISIS or sympathizer

accounts to recruit among Turkish ultranationalists by
presenting the jihadists as crusaders against the infidel

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

enemies, both the West and the PKK alike. The West The vast amount of geo-tagged mentions in Turkey
is implied to deserve the attacks due to its silence on, occurred in the urban regions of Western Turkey—
and thereby complicity in, the PKK’s attacks against Istanbul (2,527 mentions), Izmir (420 mentions), and
Turkey, as well as the Assad regime’s attacks on Syrian Ankara (388 mentions)—along with some cities in
rebels and civilians. Eastern Turkey registering high numbers of mention in
relation to populations, such as Adana (243 mentions).

A random sampling of 5 geo-tagged locations of queries

allowed our report to further differentiate between
East and West Turkey: an average distribution ratio of
20% (Eastern Turkey) and 80% (Western Turkey) was
observed within the country.

Figure 5: Highly influential Latormenta (now defunct)

tweeting about the Brussels attacks on March 22 (total
impressions of author on March 22: 99,702): “Hello
Belgium, raise your voice. We didn’t hear you when bombs
were going off in Syria.” Most tweets have nationalist Figure 6: Region 1, the Marmara region, always registers
overtones, emphasizing the West’s muted response to PKK a high throughput with pro-ISIS mentions, as do Regions
attacks in Turkey or of the Assad regime in Syria. 2 (Ankara region) and 5 (the Turkish cities on the Syrian
border, Gaziantep and Sanliurfa). The Black Sea Trabzon
3. Geographic Distribution region (3 on the map), only occasionally lights up with
Islamist mentions.
Geo-tagged location disclosure findings were limited as
Brandwatch could only register 1% of the data with Based on the sampling, the words “Siyonist” (24%),
geo-tagged location coordinates. Hence, the ceiling “Kafir” (22%), and “Mucahid” (22%) clocked the
on geo-tags was capped at 5,000. Of the geo-tagged highest mention percentages from Eastern Turkey,
mentions associated with the queries, our report whereas “Kudus” (86%), “Kafir” (83%) and “Cihad”
found that an average of 85% of these were within (80%) recorded the highest rates of mentions in
the borders of Turkey. The remaining 15% came from the west.
around the world. Most of the mentions recorded
outside of Turkey registered from within the Belgium-
Netherlands-Germany (BNG) region. This cluster in
the general data segment recorded 291 mentions.

The three most geo-tagged queries within Turkey were

“Kefere” (93%), “Ahrar” (92%), and “Mucahid” (92%).
The most query mentions outside Turkey were “Nusra”
(30%), “Musrik” (28%), and “Siyonist” (27%). The
Figure 7: Distribution of 1,322 registered mentions of
least mentioned geo-tagged queries within Turkey
“Kafir” (Infidel-Heretic) in Turkey.
corresponded with the most geo-tagged mentions
from abroad.

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Figure 8: Distribution of 506 registered mentions of Figure 11: “Kafir” also appeared in the Netherlands and
“Kudus” (Jerusalem) in Turkey. Germany, and to a lesser extent in Belgium.

4. Trigger Events & Moments

This report observed a correlational relationship

between the queries, authors, and global real-time
developments in three main general contexts: terror
attacks and their aftermath during the period of March
19 to March 23 (the Istanbul (Taksim) and Brussels
(airport) suicide bombings), important dignitary visits
Figure 9: Distribution of 460 registered mentions of
from states involved in Syria (Iran and Saudi Arabia),
“Halife” (Caliph) in Turkey.
and other important tactical/operational developments
Geo-tagged mentions from abroad from this sample in Syria.
did not yield a statistically consistent pattern but were
Whenever such events took place, many of the 18
interesting nonetheless. The BNG area recorded an
queries registered abnormal spikes in activity; namely,
average of 31% from all mentions abroad, making it an
these bursts of mentions were above the normal
area with a relatively high mention-to-km ratio. From
mention averages and, after a period of high intensity,
within this cluster, the mentions of “Siyonist” (59%)
often normalized back down to the average or dipped
and “Kafir” (50%) were highest. The least recorded
just below the normal levels of mentions.
mention from within this area was “Cihad” (12%).

Figure 10: Turkish mentions of the term “Cihad” appeared

beyond the expected range in the Ruhrpot (Dusseldorf,
Koln, and Frankfurt) region, along with the Dutch
Randstaad (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Den Haag)
region, and Brussels, Belgium. Figure 12: Mention spike for “Siyonist” (Zionist) from
March 19-22. Most of those killed in the Istanbul
bombings were Israeli citizens. Most of the mentions for
“Siyonist” abated after the attacks.

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

For example, the query “IslamDevleti” (ISIS) was Figure 14: Prolific author Sozunhaysiyeti (still active),
mentioned an average of 624 times per day. During criticizing the Turkish government’s moderate reception of
the period of 4 days between the terror bombings in the Iranian president at the 13th Organization of Islamic
Istanbul (on March 19) and in Brussels (on March 22), Cooperation (OIC) summit from April 10-15 in Turkey.
however, the mention rate rocketed to figures as high as
1,352 per day. Such spikes translated into a 217% jump
from the daily average. Double spikes within short
periods only further confirm the relationship between
the events and reactions to these query mentions.

Figure 15: Ahde_Vefa’s (still active) concept map of

the most used terms, both hashtaged and not, with
“Aleppoisburning” having the most mentions (338). This
is similar to Solhanli4 (246 mentions of Aleppo), JN_
Cendel2 (209 mentions of the situation in Falluja), and
MuhammedAtta4 (110 mentions). Domestic developments
also garnered specific attention: “Diyarbakir” had 413
mentions from Hur_Alem and 70 from Gazzeli_Ilyas.
Figure 13: Mention spike for “IslamDevleti” (ISIS) from
March 19-22. These spikes are essential in “claiming” the
social sphere by partaking in the discourse.

To make sense of these mention escalations, this report

also examined the sentiment values of the spike dates
with “IslamDevleti.” The two sentiment values for
the spike days registered well above average values.
However, each query and mention spike requires an
individual analysis with their dates of importance. A
general conclusion on all spiking mentions could not
be discerned from single or inter-query analyses.
Figure 16: Teror_Gercegi is one of many accounts detailing
the tactical and operational developments on the ground in
Syria. This level of attention to tactical details at the village
level in Syria demonstrates how well in-tune these Turkish
accounts are with real-time military developments.

5. Recruitment & Resistance To The Islamic State

Even though many pro-ISIS and radical Islamists

exploit the social media sphere to their advantage—
or, rather, are allowed to depending on how the
matter is examined—an active and rather vigilant

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counter-ISIS presence also exists from those that Active calls for direct recruitment were hardly ever
wish to challenge these Islamist authors with their found, yet a few notable authors called on their
assertions, facts, and arguments. audiences to take action after sharing images of war
victims in Syria.

Figure 18: Discussions on possible recruitment by way of

“calling for Jihad” and “going to the front” questioned in
such tweets as Muhaysini_3.

Figure 17: Dirilis_TR targets “Laiklik” (Secularism).

Of the pooled data, many influential authors such as

Cihatolog and Nagihansaka, among others, seemed to
directly challenge Islamist or ISIS accounts every step of Figures 19 & 20: Quran verses used as galvanizing
the way. Our automated data incorporated a multitude recruitment instruments. Here, authors Abuahmed0666
of mentions that confounded our data, but yielded an & Kurdimuslim36 mention verses on how those that fight
important finding nonetheless: Turks are prolific social for the cause of Allah are worthy of his affection. These
media users and the social media realm itself is a front authors refer to these select verses amidst other tweets about
within this war of discourse. the situation in Syria—within this context these allusions
gain ominous connotations.
This report discerned many tailored tweets addressed
to the Islamist audience at large with the sole purpose
of swelling the rank-and-file of ISIS. More often than
not, these tweets emphasized the “glorious” sacred Figure 21: Though not as common, tweets such as this
cause and virtues of martyrdom. Though direct tweets one by Ahde_Vefa_ carry a message of recruitment by way
with proper nouns or out-right statements were of praising a select group of terrorists in Syria. The use
lacking—on account of the existing censorship—those of a poster-child group is common when recruitment for
authors that were able to call for more “mujahedeen” a cause is at hand; militaristic praise is used as a norm-
were quite influential and impactful (e.g., they had setting device in which would-be recruits are conditioned
many followers that retweeted and/or mentioned those to want to be more like that trend-setting group.
authors directly).

When assessing the Turkish audience these authors are

directly pleading to, we include not only native Turks,
but also those who are able to understand Turkish and
join the cause. In this regard, we observed a panoply of
Chechens, Islamist Turkic, and native Turks who either
partook in the recruitment, spread the word on social
media, or traversed through Turkey to fight in Iraq.

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

The following are the 20 most influential Twitter authors with their total owner and audience impressions, dates of
intense presence on social media, and their most discussed topics.

1. Sozunhaysiyeti (6,500,000)
• History: April 12-14
April 20-22
April 27-28
• Topics: Islam
Allah
Erdogan

2. Gazzeli_Ilyas (2,985,000)
• History: April 12-14
April 15-17
• Topics: Demirtas
Istanbul
Ahlaksizligasessizkalma (dontstaysilenttoimmorality)
Diyarbakirdakisapkinligadurde (saystoptotheheresyinDiyarkakir)

3. Yahyakurdi001 (2,600,000)
• History: March 22-25
• Topics: ISID (ISIS)
Irak (Iraq)
ABD (USA)

4. Mazlum_Direnis (2,300,000)
• History: April 6-9
April 18-23
• Topics: Allah
Yerigelmiskensoyleyeyim (Letmejustsay)

5. El_sevap (1,824,000)
• History: March 23-24
March 28-30
April 3-4
• Topics: Suriye (Syria)
PKK
Rusya (Russia)
ISID (ISIS)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

6. Muhtar1334 (1,621,000)
• History: March 31 - April 2
• Topics: Irak (Iraq)
ABD (USA)
Turkiye (Turkey)
Musul (Mosul)

7. Ahde_Vefa_ (1,450,000)
• History: April 12
April 16
April 30
• Topics: Halepyaniyor (Aleppoisburning)
Suriye (Syria)
Suriyedekatliamvar (ThereisamassacreinSyria)

8. Muhaysini_3 (950,000)
• History: March 26-28
April 1-2
• Topics: AbdullahMuhaysini
Seyh (Sheikh)
Seyhmuhaysini
Cihad (Jihad)
Allah

9. Almahamamedia (917,000)
• History: March 18-23
March 26
March 30-31
April 8
• Topics: Rusya (Russia)
Suriye (Syria)
ISID (ISIS)

10. Latormenta_ (850,000)

• History: March 22-24
• Topics: ISID (ISIS)
PKK
Belcika (Belgium)
ABD (USA)
Turkiye (Turkey)

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

11. MuhammedAtta4 (833,000)

• History: March 25-28
• Topics: ISID (ISIS)
Kaide ([al-] Qaeda)
ABD (USA)
Esed ([Bashar al-] Assad)
Nusra ([al-] Nusra)
Felluce (Fallujah)

12. Buruciye5 (720,000)

• History: March 31 - April 1
April 7-8
• Topics: Islam
Hilafet (Caliphate)
Cihadinyahudileri (theJewsofJihad)

13. JN_Cendel2 (620,000)

• History: March 27-28
March 30-31
April 17
• Topics: Felluceyeacilinsanyardimi (urgenthumanaaidtoFallujah)
Kafir (Infidel)
Suriye (Syria)
ISID (ISIS)
PKK

14. Skarsavi (613,000)

• History: April 1-2
• Topics: Seyh (Sheikh)
Ummetin (oftheUmma)
AKP

15. Terror_gercegi (558,000)

• History: March 28-31
• Topics: Irak (Iraq)
Suriye (Syria)
Islam Devleti (Islamic State (ISIS))

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

16. Muslumanlaz (555,000)

• History: March 24-26
April 3-5
• Topics: Islam Devleti (Islamic State (ISIS))
Dimesk eyaleti (the Damascus state)
Esed ordusu (the Assad army)

17. 13elyesa13 (495,000)

• History: March 27
April 10 & 13
• Topics: ISID (ISIS)
PKK
TSK (Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri) (Turkish Armed Forces)

18. Solhanli4 (495,000)

• History: March 24-26
April 3-4
• Topics: Halep (Aleppo)
Acil (Urgent)
IslamDevleti (Islamic State (ISIS))
Askerolduruldu (soldierwaskilled)
PKKliolduruldu (PKK[member]killed)

19. Abu_ebu (463,000)

• History: March 22-24
• Topics: Islam Devleti (Islamic State (ISIS))
Suriye (Syria)
Irak (Iraq)
ABD (USA)
Palmyra

20. Hur_alem (424,000)

• History: March 29
April 13
• Topics: Diyarbakirdatarihigun (historicdayinDiyarbakir)
Diyarbakirdasapkinligadurde (saystoptotheheresyinDiyarkakir)
PKK

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

Concepts & General Findings

The following are the top 9 most mentioned queries with any data on usage frequency, location, gender usage,
sentiments, and topics.

1. Cihad (Jihad) (182,000)

• Data: Predominantly always high
Spike: March 18-24, then falls
Spikes again: March 26-28, then falls to regular intensity
• Location: All of Turkey, very active
NL - BE - GR
• Topics: Cihat Cagrisi (Call for Jihad) (8,100)
Erdogan (7,330)
ABD (USA) (7,000)
Baris Cagrisi (Call for Peace) (4,500)

2. Kafir (Infidel) (130,000)

• Data: Spike: March 18-22 (corresponds with Istanbul Taksim and Brussels attack)
Spikes again April 18-20 corresponds with foreign NATO – Merkel Istanbul/Turkey visits)
• Location: All of Turkey
NL - BE - W. Germany
• Mostly men (70+%)
• Topics: AKP
Erdogan
Davutoglu
Halep
PKK

3. Nusra (49,000)
• Data: Gradual spike: March 18-22 & 26-30
Spikes again: April 2-3
Serious spike: April 10-11, then major slowdown
• Location: Istanbul, Ankara, Syrian border (Antakya)
• 72% men
• Topics: El-Nusra (35,000)
ISID (ISIS) (13,600)
Suriye (Syria) (6,500)
Turkiye (Turkey) (5,100)
Boko Haram (3,500)
Halep (Aleppo) (3,600)
• Sentiment: ‘Nusra’ more used by critics of AKP and ISIS

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

4. Kudus (Jerusalem) (48,000)

• Data: Spike: March 24-25, then declines for a long time
Spikes again: April 13-14, does not decline
Serious spike: April 17-18, then falls
Small spike: April 25-27
• Location: All over Turkey
Some NL
Less GR and BE
• 72% men
• Topics: Kuduste (in Jerusalem) (5,500)
Aksa ([al-] Aqsa [mosque]) (3,700)
Halep (Aleppo) (2,900)
Filistin (Palestine) (2,700)
Basbakan (Prime Minister) (1,700)
Osmanli (Ottoman) (1,198)
• Sentiment: Kudus used as rallying call approximately 8 times.

5. Halife (Caliph) (45,000)

• Data: Spikes: April 1-2 & 13-15 & 24-25
• Location: Benelux area
All of Turkey
London, a bit
• 75% men
• Topics: Erdogan (5,000+)
Islam
The One
Allah
Sultan
Prophet

6. Hilafet (Caliphate) (44,000)

• Data: Overall very low number of mentions
Spike: April 18-21 (±700%)
Lower spike: April 24-26
• Location: All of Turkey
NL - BE - W. Germany
• 73% men
• Topics: Islam Devleti (Islamic State)
Hizbut Tahrir
Seriat v. Laiklik (& Laikligikazanacagiz) (Sharia v. Secularism)
• Sentiment: Equal, leans towards Islamists

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 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

7. Siyonist (Zionist) (37,000)

• Data: Spike: March 18-22, remains high
Major spike: March 28-31, then sharply declines and stays low
• Topics: Israel (4,700)
Yahudi (2,500)
Palestine (3,500)
Fetö (2,207)
• 77% men
• Location: All over Turkey, especially 3 main cities
• Sentiment: Israel viewed negatively

8. Mucahid (Mujahid) (34,000)

• Data: Spike: March 18-23
• Location: Predominantly Turkey
Some NL
• 80% men
• Topics: Turkiye
Suriye
AKP
Erdogan
Turkmen
PKK
• Note: Most mentions of this concept due to names of Twitter accounts containing the term Mucahid.

9. Islam Devleti (Islamic State) (30,000)

• Data: Spike: March 19 & 22 + 24, then falls
Spikes again: April 10-11, then falls
Spikes again: April 17-18
• Location: Almost entirely Turkey (Istanbul and Antep)
• 76% men
• Topics: Hilafet TR (4,700)
Islam Devleti Hilafet TR (4,100)
• Sentiments: Very Islamist and concepts used in a negative way

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Acknowledgments
We wish to thank FDD’s Eric Edelman, Aykan Erdemir, and John Hannah for their feedback and edits, both substantive
and stylistic. We also wish to thank our external readers Aaron Stein, Nicholas Danforth, and Aaron Zelin for taking
time out of their busy schedules to provide crucial feedback on our work. We are also grateful to Daniel Ackerman and
Erin Blumenthal for the graphics, design, and production of this report. This report and the issues discussed within
have benefited greatly from the tremendous thought leadership of the advisors to FDD’s Turkey program.
 Islamic State Networks in Turkey

About The Authors

Merve Tahiroglu is a research associate focusing on Turkey. Merve supports the work of
FDD scholars with Turkish language research and analysis on Turkey-related matters. Her
research focuses on Turkey’s foreign policy, domestic politics, and Ankara’s ties to Tehran.
Merve’s personal areas of interest include Turkey’s Syria policy and Islamic extremism
in Turkey. Born and raised in Istanbul, Merve earned her B.A in Political Science with a
concentration in International Relations from Duke University in 2013. Merve is also a
contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.

Jonathan Schanzer is Senior Vice President at FDD. Jonathan is part of the leadership
team of FDD’s Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, which provides policy and subject
matter expertise on the use of financial and economic power to the global policy community.
Previously, Jonathan worked as a terrorism finance analyst at the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, where he played an integral role in the designation of numerous terrorist financiers.
A former research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Jonathan has
studied Middle East history in four countries. He has testified before Congress and publishes
widely in the American and international media.

About the Foundation for Defense of Democracies

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) is a Washington, DC-based non-partisan policy institute focusing on
foreign policy and national security.

For more information, please visit www.defenddemocracy.org.

P.O. Box 33249
Washington, DC 20033-3249
(202) 207-0190
www.defenddemocracy.org