TSM Introduction

Customer : VJC Manual : TSM
Type : A318/A319/A320/A321 Selected applicability : 408-408

Rev. Date : Sep 13, 2019
INTRODUCTION
** ON A/C ALL
INTRODUCTION
1. General
A. Trouble Shooting Manual (TSM)
Export control
This data is Airbus S.A.S. proprietary information and shall not be used, disclosed to others, reproduced
or modified without the express written consent of Airbus S.A.S. This notice shall appear in any such
reproduction whether in whole or in part. This Airbus technical data may contain Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) controlled information notably under Export Control Classification Number (ECCN)
9E991 (No License Required - NLR) classification. Hence, transfer of such controlled information by any
means to a Non-U.S. person, whether in the United States or abroad, without the proper governmental
authorization (e.g., license, exemption, NLR, etc.), is strictly prohibited.
TSM Objective:
The TSM is provided by AIRBUS to enable the systematic identification, isolation and correction of aircraft
warnings and malfunctions reported in flight and on the ground.
NOTE TO USERS :
If you cannot find a fault symptom and/or a fault isolation procedure necessary to ensure the continued
airworthiness of the aircraft, or if you think that the information given is not complete, contact Airbus.
B. Effectivity Table
The Effectivity Table contents and description is contained in the Manual Front Matter.
C. Requests for TSM Revision and Correspondence
(1) All communications concerning the TSM should be sent to:
AIRBUS S.A.S.
Technical Data Support and Services
2 Rond Point Dewoitine
BP90112
31703 Blagnac Cedex
France
For any question or documentation update request, you can use the TechRequest application.
D. Publication Format
The format is in Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML)
The standard illustrations are delivered in Computer Graphics Metafile (CGM) format.
E. Revision Service
The TSM is customized and subject to:
· Normal revisions
· Temporary Revisions (TR)
These are managed as follows:
(1) Normal revisions
Normal revisions consist of a complete reissue with a differential marking at the specified revision date.
(2) Temporary Revisions
Temporary revisions are issued to introduce information which cannot wait until the next normal revision.
Each temporary revision remains effective until it is incorporated in the next regular revision or it is
superseded by another temporary revision (if additional changes are required, a replacement temporary
revision will be issued). They must be incorporated as stated on the TR transmittal sheet.
(3) Revision symbols
Revised, New and Deleted parts are identified in the TSM via the Highlights.
F. Highlight
Print Date: December 04, 2019 Page 1 of 37

© AIRBUS S.A.S. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT.
INTRODUCTION
The Highlights will provide the reason for the revision of text and/or illustrations. They are provided in the
Manual Front Matter and are linked to the amended data.
2. Breakdown and Numbering
A. General Structure
(1) Front Matter
The Front Matter contains the following information :
· Title
· Legal notice
· Highlights
· Temporary Revision List
· Introduction
· Effectivity Cross Reference Table
· Service Bulletin (SB) List
· Customer Originated Changes (COC) List
· List of abbreviations
(2) General
Each of the standard chapters contains the following information:
· Fault Isolation Procedures (with links to Highlights and Fault Symptoms)
· Task Supporting Data
B. Breakdown
(1) List of ATA Chapters
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONTENT CHAPTER
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AIRCRAFT GENERAL
INTRODUCTION 00
Times Limits / Maintenance Check 05
AIRFRAME SYSTEMS
Air Conditioning 21
Auto Flight 22
Communications 23
Electrical Power 24
Equipment / Furnishings 25
Fire Protection 26
Flight Controls 27
Fuel 28
Hydraulic Power 29
Ice & Rain Protection 30
Indicating/Recording Systems 31
Landing Gear 32
Lights 33
Navigation 34
Oxygen 35
Pneumatic 36
Water/Waste 38
Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) and Avionics Data
Communication Network 42
Cabin Systems 44
Onboard Maintenance Systems (OMS) 45
Information Systems 46
Inert Gas System 47
Airborne Auxiliary Power 49
Cargo and Accessory Compartments 50
STRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION
Standard Practices and Structures 51

Doors 52
POWER PLANT
Standard Practices - Engine 70
Power Plant 71
Engine 72
Engine Fuel and Control 73
Ignition 74
Air 75
Engine Controls 76
Engine Indicating 77
Exhaust 78
Oil 79
Starting 80
(2) Breakdown
The TSM is divided into chapters to provide a functional breakdown of systems in accordance with the
Air Transport Association (ATA) Specification 100.
Each chapter is sub-divided into sections which are identified by a six digit number made up of three
elements:
----------------------- 2ND ELEMENT
!
!
1ST ELEMENT ------- ! ----------- 3RD ELEMENT
! ! !
--- --- ---
XX XX OO
--- --- ---
! ! !
CHAPTER/ ------- ! ------------ SUBJECT/UNIT
SYSTEM !
!
SECTION/ -----------
SUBSYSTEM
Each standard chapter takes its 1st element number from these ATA groups:
AIRFRAME SYSTEMS (21 - 38, 45, 49, 52)
POWER PLANT (70 - 80)
(3) Page Block Assignment
The information contained in the TSM has been divided into two main categories:
· Fault Isolation Procedures (with links to Highlights and Fault Symptoms) (P. Block 02)
· Task Supporting Data (P. Block 03)
C. AMTOSS (Aircraft Maintenance Task Oriented Support System)
(1) Task/Subtask Numbering System
The fault isolation procedures can generally be considered as corrective maintenance tasks. Therefore,
AMTOSS (Aircraft Maintenance Task Oriented Support System) has been applied to the TSM for the
functional arrangement of the data. This also has the advantage of consistency with the AMM (Aircraft
Maintenance Manual). Consequently, the fault isolation procedures are broken down into AMTOSS
tasks and subtasks. However, only the Task numbers are printed in the TSM and the subtask numbers
are omitted. A brief description of the structure of Task numbers follows, for further information please
refer to the AMM introduction.
Task Elements/ TASK XX-XX-XX-XXX-XXX-XXX-XXX

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

INTRODUCTION
ELEMENT FUNCTION
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 to 3 ATA six digit number
4 This three digit numeric function code is used to indicate the
particular function involved. For the TSM this is always 810.
5 This three digit numeral enables a unique identification task
number to be allocated for all Tasks which are identically
numbered throughout the preceding elements.
Task idents begin at 801 and raise, in sequence, to
999 (maximum) within the P. Block.
Illustrations and tables are considered as tasks.
6 This three digit alphanumeric indicator consists of:
- First digit alpha to indicate a different configuration
(modification, service bulletin(s), etc.).
- Second and third digit numerals to indicate alternative
methods/techniques of trouble shooting
Example:
-78-31-00-810-801-A 01
! !
! !
! !
This alpha digit-! !
identifies a !
configuration !
(SB etc.). !
!
!
These two numerical-!
digits identify a
configuration of
method/technique.
- Configurations due to different modification standard, Service
Bulletin (SB) incorporation, etc.:
78-31-00-810-801-A
-
!
!
--------------------------------
* when there is only one configuration,
always letter A
* when subsequent configurations
of criteria are incorporated, this digit
changes as follows:
78-31-00-810-801-A first configuration
78-31-00-810-801-B second configuration
78-31-00-810-801-C third configuration
- Configurations due to different methods/techniques for trouble shooting
78-31-00-810-801-A01
--
!
-------------------------------------
* these two digits are blank
when only one maintenance configuration
exists

INTRODUCTION
* when there are several configurations

of method, these digits change as
follows:
78-31-00-810-801-A first configuration
78-31-00-810-801-A01 second configuration
78-31-00-810-801-A02 third configuration
The method/technique configurations have always the same A/C effectivities.
The deletion of one configuration does not change the three digit alphanumeric
indicator of the remaining task(s).
NOTE: When a trouble shooting operation is completely different because the
equipment design is different, (example: different vendors),
the mention "Config." appears at the bottom of the page to
differentiate all configurations.
7 A three digit alphanumeric indicator can be assigned
by the airline to highlight unique airline data.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Structure and Content
A. Front Matter
The Front Matter contains the following information:
(1) Title
Provides the name of the manual, the revision date and the revision number.
(2) Legal Notice
Provides the Manufacturer contact address.
(3) Highlights
The Highlights provide the reason for the revision of text and/or illustrations. They are sorted by ATA
Chapter.
(4) List of Effective Temporary Revision
This list is always empty when delivered, to allow to attach the List of Effective TR (LETR) dispatched
separately each time a Temporary Revision (TR) is issued.
Temporary Revisions are supplied in digital via Airbus World. These TRs have to be loaded as soon as
received.
(5) Introduction
The Introduction provides general information on how to use the manual.
(6) Effectivity Cross Reference Table
This table provides the correspondence between Fleet Serial Number (FSN) and Manufacturer Serial
Number (MSN) for your fleet. Only the aircraft identified in this table are covered in this document.
(7) Service Bulletin (SB) List
This is the List of the Service Bulletins which are applicable for at least one aircraft of the fleet.
(8) Customer Originated Changes (COCs) List
This is the list of the Customer Originated Changes (COCs) which are applicable for at least one aircraft
of the fleet. Where applicable, PRE and POST COC are clearly indicated.
(9) List of Abbreviations
The list of abbreviations provides the list of all approved abbreviations.
B. Standard Chapters
(1) Fault Isolation Procedures
(Ref. Fig. Example Fault Isolation Procedure SHEET 1)

INTRODUCTION
** ON A/C ALL
TASK 21-63-00-810-805--
TRIM-AIR PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE FAULT
1. POSSIBLE CAUSES
- VALVE-PRESSURE REGULATING (14HK)
- WIRING
2. JOB SET-UP INFORMATION

A. REFERENCED INFORMATION
REFERENCE DESIGNATION
AMM 21-63-00-710- OPERATIONAL TEST OF THE COCKPIT AND CABIN TEMPERATURE CONTROL WITH
004 CFDS/MCDU
AMM 21-63-52-000- REMOVAL OF THE PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE 14HK
001
AMM 21-63-52-400- INSTALLATION OF THE PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE 14HK
001
ASM 21-63/01
ASM 21-63/03
3. FAULT CONFIRMATION
1. DO THE OPERATIONAL TEST OF THE COCKPIT AND CABIN TEMPERATURE-CONTROL
SYSTEM WITH CFDS/MCDU AMM TASK 21-63-00-710-004.
NOTE: IF A FAULT IS DETECTED, THE ZC GIVES A FAULT CODE FOR SHOP MAINTENANCE
IN ADDITION TO THE RELATED CFDS MESSAGE(S). FOR DETAILED INFORMATION
SEE THE APPLICABLE PAGE BLOCK 301.
- REPLACE THE VALVE-PRESSURE REGULATING (14HK) (REFERRED TO AS VALVE (14HK))

4. FAULT ISOLATION
1. IF THE TEST GIVES THE MAINTENANCE MESSAGE TRIM AIR PRESS VALVE:
- REPLACE THE VALVE-PRESSURE REGULATING (14HK) (REFERRED TO AS VALVE (14HK))
AMM TASK 21-63-52-000-001 AND AMM TASK 21-63-52-400-001.
(1) IF THE FAULT CONTINUES:

- DO A CHECK AND REPAIR THE WIRING
ASM 21-63/01 AND ASM 21-63/03 FROM:
- THE VALVE (14HK) TO THE ZC (8HK),
- THE VALVE (14HK) TO GROUND AND,
- THE VALVE (14HK) TO THE CB (3HK) VIA THE P/BSW (7HK).
2. DO THE TEST AS GIVEN IN THE PARA. 3.A.

5. CLOSE-UP
1. PUT THE AIRCRAFT BACK TO ITS INITIAL CONFIGURATION.
N_TS_000000_0_ADN0_01_00
Figure 00-00-00-13800-00-A- / SHEET 1/1 - Example Fault Isolation Procedure

** ON A/C ALL

INTRODUCTION
The Fault Isolation Procedures contain the information required to isolate and correct each fault
symptom.
They are similar in structure to the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) maintenance procedures and
are considered as maintenance tasks.
The breakdown of each procedure is as follows:
· Fault identification (procedure title)
· 1. Possible Causes
· 2. Job Set-up Information
· 3. Fault Confirmation
· 4. Fault Isolation
· 5. Close-up.
The contents of these is as follows:

(a) Possible Causes
This lists all the suspect items which are replaced or checked during the procedure.
The list is given to enable the collection of all items required to correct the fault and not for "shot-gun"
trouble shooting. This form of trouble shooting is not recommended.
The list does not give details of wiring to be checked. This is detailed in the procedure and only
mentioned in the list (eg: aircraft wiring).
(b) Job Set-up Information
This lists any tools, equipment and procedures required to be carried out before commencing the
fault isolation and is the same as the AMM job set-up.
(c) Fault Confirmation
Any test procedure needed to confirm that the fault is genuine is given here. This is to avoid
unjustified LRU removals. Confirmation tests of spurious warnings will also be covered, if applicable.
(d) Fault Isolation Procedure
The procedure gives the appropriate actions to isolate and correct the related fault symptom.
Before you get access for a wiring check, make sure that you obey the electrical safety practices
given in ESPM 20-10-00 and the applicable warning(s):
WARNING:
PUT THE SAFETY DEVICES AND THE WARNING NOTICES IN POSITION BEFORE YOU START
A TASK ON OR NEAR:
· THE FLIGHT CONTROLS
· THE FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES
· THE LANDING GEAR AND THE RELATED DOORS
· COMPONENTS THAT MOVE.
MOVEMENT OF COMPONENTS CAN KILL OR INJURE PERSONS.
WARNING:
MAKE SURE THAT YOU DO THE DEACTIVATION OF THE THRUST REVERSER BEFORE YOU
DO MAINTENANCE WORK ON OR AROUND THE THRUST REVERSER. IF YOU DO NOT DO
THIS PROCEDURE, THERE IS A RISK OF UNWANTED OPERATION AND THUS OF INJURY TO
PERSONS AND DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT.
WARNING:
YOU MUST OBEY ALL THE SAFETY PROCEDURES WHEN YOU DO WORK IN OR NEAR THE
FUEL TANK. IF YOU DO NOT OBEY THE SAFETY PROCEDURES, THERE IS A RISK OF:
· DEATH OR INJURY TO PERSONS
· DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT OR OTHER EQUIPMENT.
Specific instructions for the wiring check are given where necessary. These include values (eg.
resistance) and connector/pin numbers where applicable.

INTRODUCTION
NOTE: When a wiring is provided in the TSM, the connectors and pins identifications are separated
by a "/" (example: 2DG2 pin B/A means connector B pin A of the 2DG2).
If no specific instructions are given for the wiring check, the check must include a continuity test
(ESPM 20-52-21) and a test for short circuit (ESPM 20-52-22).
(e) Close-up
If it is necessary to return the A/C to its initial configuration after fault confirmation or fault isolation,
the applicable procedure is given.
(2) Task Supporting data (P. Block 03)
Task Supporting data are given to show the system layout and interconnections with other systems.
4. Effectivity Statements
A. General
(1) Text
The effectivity in the manual is expressed in Fleet Serial Number (FSN).
The Task and Subtask numbers are preceded by the associated A/C effectivity statements. There is no
link between a Task variant letter (6th element) and a Subtask variant letter not even when Task and
Subtask have the same A/C effectivity.
In the case of effectivity differences within the text, a statement of effectivity indicates the effectivity of
the following text.
(2) Service Bulletins
Service Bulletins are incorporated automatically in the TSM if at least one aircraft is potentially
applicable and quoted in the Service Bulletin.
Data related to Service Bulletins are only incorporated upon notice from the customer that subject
Service Bulletins have or will be embodied on the aircraft.
The effectivity statement will provide the following status:
Example:
** ON A/C 001-001
PRE SB 49-XXXX for A/C 001-001
Subtask 21-63-00-710-109-A
A. Do the self Test of teh ECB (Ref. AMM TASK 49-00-00-710-001).
NOTE: Make sure that the circuit breakers 1HK, 2HK, 3HK and
4HK are closed during the test.
Confirmation.
** ON A/C 002-100
POST SB 49-XXXX for A/C 001-001
Subtask 21-63-00-710-109-B
B. Do a read out of the APU Last Leg Report.
The above statement indicates that the information is
valid for A/C 002-100 as the modification/SB was
embodied before delivery. For A/C 001-001 the
information is only valid after accomplishment of the
SB.
After embodiment of the SB 49-XXXX on A/C 001, the PRE
SB configuration will be deleted and the POST SB
configuration will become:
** ON A/C 001-100
EMB SB 49-XXXX for A/C 001-001
Subtask 21-63-00-710-109-B
B. Do a read out of the APU Last Leg Report.
(3) COC
(a) COC Identification

INTRODUCTION
COCs incorporated into the manuals at Customer request to reflect data or procedures originated by
and peculiar to that specific customer, will be identified by the COC reference number followed by
the COC effectivity.
The data affected or introduced by the COC are identified by green stars. Some COCs are also
identified by the customer documentation code at the beginning and again at the end of the COC
data.
(b) COCs can be of two different types :
1 Editorial COC
"Editorial COCs" impact procedures. The related data is shown in permanent pre and post COC
configuration.
2 Modification COC
"Modification COCs" install or remove equipment(s) on the A/C.
They will be shown in pre and post configuration until the EO is embodied on all involved A/C.
Once the EO is reported as embodied, data will be shown in post configuration only.
(c) Disclaimer Clause
Where the Customer requests the Seller to incorporate the Customer's originated data or that of any
other party into the technical data issued by the Seller ("Technical Data") relating to the operation,
maintenance, overhaul, repair or modification of the aircraft, the Seller shall do so on the condition
that the use of the COC data shall be entirely at the Customer's risk the Seller being under no liability
whatsoever in respect of either the content of any COC data, or the effect which the incorporation of
such COC data may have on the Technical Data issued by the Seller. The Customer is responsible
for obtaining airworthiness clearances from the relevant authorities resulting from the incorporation
of the COC data into the Technical Data.
Moreover, the Seller's liability shall in no event be affected by any oral or written communication,
unless it makes explicit reference to this section, which the Seller may make to the Customer in
respect to the COC data.
If the Customer is not the owner of the aircraft, the Customer hereby represents that he has
obtained the prior written authorisation from the owner for incorporation of the COC and the owner's
acknowledgement and agreement of the conditions stated in this transmittal sheet
In the event of the Customer selling, leasing or otherwise transferring the Aircraft to which the COC
data apply, the Customer hereby agrees that, unless the COC data are removed from the Technical
Data at the Customer's request and expense prior to such transfer:
· the Customer shall remain fully liable for the COC data and any and all effects of their
incorporation, as set forth in the Purchase Agreement Clause 14.9,
· the Seller may disclose the COC data to the subsequent owner(s) or operator(s) of the transferred
Aircraft,
· it shall be the sole responsibility of the Customer to notify, or cause to be notified, the subsequent
owner(s) or operator(s) of the existence of the such COC data in the Technical Data applicable to
the corresponding Aircraft.
The Seller hereby disclaims any and all liabilities whatsoever for the COC data in the event of
transfer, sale or lease as set forth here above. In the event of the Seller being required under any
court order or settlement to indemnify any third party for injury, loss or damage incurred directly
or indirectly as a result of incorporation of any COC into the Technical Data, the Customer will
reimburse the Seller for all payments or settlements made in respect of such injury, loss or damage
including any expenses incurred by the Seller in defending such claims.
NOTE: Customer Originated Changes (COC) are not part of the Airbus Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness (ICA), that Airbus, as the Type Certificate Holder, is required to provide and
maintain. COC data are included by Airbus on behalf of the Customer and remain the full re-
sponsibility of the Customer.
5. Warnings, Cautions and Notes

WARNING : CALLS ATTENTION TO USE OF MATERIAL, PROCESSES, METHODS, PROCEDURES
OR LIMITS WHICH MUST BE FOLLOWED PRECISELY TO AVOID INJURY OR

INTRODUCTION
DEATH TO PERSONS.
CAUTION : CALLS ATTENTION TO METHODS AND PROCEDURES WHICH MUST BE FOLLOWED

TO AVOID DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT.
NOTE: Calls attention to methods which make the job easier or provide supplementary or explanatory informa-
tion.
6. Functional Item Numbers (FIN)

The equipment on the A/C is identified by a unique identifier called a Functional Item Number (FIN). The basic
element of the FIN is a two letter code indicating to which system/circuit the equipment belongs. To this code
are added prefixes and/or suffixes which provide the unique identification for individual items of equipment.
For electrical equipment (any component with an electrical connection) the FIN is of the form 2CA1 where:
· 2 = Second component in circuit CA
· CA = Circuit two letter code
· 1 = Suffix - First of several similar systems (System 1)
NOTE: Several identical components which perform the same function in the same circuit can be differentiated
by the suffix number.
For mechanical equipment the FIN is similar to the electrical FIN.

The FIN sequence number serves to differentiate between mechanical and electrical equipment. Sequence
numbers below 5000 are reserved for electrical FINs and 5000 and above are reserved for mechanical FINs.
7. Philosophy and Use
A. Philosophy
(1) The Maintenance concept is based on the use of Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS)
and TSM.
(2) CFDS
The CFDS directly monitors and identifies faulty Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) in the aircraft systems
and displays items identified as faulty to the maintenance crew. This is essentially achieved by analysis
of all cockpit events which are triggered by the monitoring of the aircraft systems. Refer to paragraph 8
for a description of the CFDS and how to use it.
The CFDS contributes also to avoid unjustified removals of equipment because the CFDS makes a
detailed analysis to identify the responsible LRUs and to confirm that the event was actually due to a
hardware failure and not an intermittent fault.
To achieve its purpose, the CFDS has several major functions which supply:
· A maintenance Post Flight Report (PFR) which is printed at the end of each flight. The PFR (Ref.
Para. 8.E.(1) allows association of ECAM warnings and CFDS maintenance messages.
· Directly usable maintenance messages which identify faulty LRUs.
· Access to test of the aircraft systems.
(3) TSM philosophy
The TSM is a trouble shooting guide of all probable aircraft faults monitored and displayed by the aircraft
systems. Faults not monitored by the aircraft systems are also covered.
NOTE: Based on the guidance from the TSM, it is the operator responsibility to establish specific pro-
cedures regarding fault management in accordance with their local regulations.
B. How to Use the TSM

(1) Types of faults
In the TSM, there are two basic types of faults : monitored faults and non-monitored faults.
Monitored faults are those which are monitored and displayed by the aircraft systems (mainly ECAM and
CFDS).
Non-monitored faults are generally not displayed by the aircraft systems and can be of a general nature,
such as: "Nose landing gear doors slow to move".

INTRODUCTION
(a) Monitored faults:

· ECAM
· EFIS
· CFDS
(b) Non-monitored faults
· Crew and/or maintenance observations.
· local effects.
NOTE: All these types of fault are used as entry points into the TSM.
(2) Trouble Shooting Function
Trouble shooting function is initiated by a logbook entry from the flight crew or maintenance crew.
The logbook entry serves as an entry point into the TSM using Fault Symptoms, Warnings/Malfunctions,
or CFDS Fault Message, depending on the type of fault. The troubleshooter is directed to the procedure
to isolate the fault.
The monitored faults (ECAM, EFIS) reported by the flight crew are usually associated with CFDS fault
messages. The association principle of a Warning Malfunction and a CFDS fault message is described
in paragraph 8.E.(1)(b).
CFDS fault messages are used by maintenance crews. They can be displayed alone without an
associated warning or malfunction, in which case they may be the entry point for maintenance-related
troubleshooting. TSM entry is via the appropriate reported effect (monitored or non-monitored) or the
CFDS Fault Messages using the message text.
Crew or maintenance observations are usually a single fault without an associated CFDS fault message.
TSM entry is via fault text or keywords and ATA chapters.
C. Trouble Shooting of Faults Reported on the PFR
The following general procedure describes trouble shooting of Upper ECAM DU warnings, ECAM STS
(Status) Maintenance messages or CFDS fault messages given on the PFR.
(1) Compare the ECAM warning or ECAM STS message with the CFDS fault message (if
applicable) on the PFR to obtain the fault symptom and the ATA chapter reference.
NOTE: A time difference of 1-3 minutes between the fault message and the warning message may oc-
cur due to CFDIU internal behaviour.
(2) Use the Troubleshooting function to retrieve the fault symptom using Warnings/malfunctions
or the correlated CFDS messages and retrieve the associated fault isolation procedure.
D. Trouble Shooting of Faults not Reported on the PFR
The following general procedure describes troubleshooting of Inop System messages, Lower ECAM DU
flags/advisories, local warnings and crew or maintenance observations.
(1) Use the Trouble Shooting function to retrieve the fault symptom and correlate the CFDS
message (if any).
(2) The fault isolation procedure is displayed after identification of the relevant fault symptom.
E. Trouble Shooting of CFDS Fault Messages
The following general procedure describes troubleshooting of CFDS Fault Messages.

(1) Note the CFDS fault message ATA chapter reference.
Use the troubleshooting function to retrieve the CFDS message. The fault isolation procedure is
displayed when the CFDS message is identified.
F. Trouble Shooting Tips
(1) Fault symptoms
Fault Symptoms given in the TSM contain primary faults (identified as "Correlated with" in the
Troubleshooting function) and associated faults (identified as "Possible Warnings/Malfunctions" in the
Troubleshooting function).

INTRODUCTION
(a) APU Fault Symptom Peculiarities

Whenever the operation of the APU may result in damage to the aircraft, or to the APU or the
Electronic Control Box (ECB) of the APU, the ECB shuts down the APU automatically. The cause of
the shutdown and the associated LRUs are stored in the ECB memory. This information is available
on the APU SHUTDOWNS menu page of the CFDS.
i.e. NO FLAME (shutdown cause)
IGNITION EXCITER P12 (faulty LRU)
In parallel, the ECB generates a maintenance message with associated ATA Chapter and related
Fault Class of the faulty LRU. This maintenance message is available on the Post Flight Report
(PFR), which is, in the AIRBUS TSM philosophy, the entry point to the TSM.
i.e. ATA 494138
CLASS: 1
IGNITION EXCITER P12
However, during several operator conferences concerning the APU, it has been shown that most
operators prefer to enter the TSM via the information of the APU SHUTDOWNS menu, which shows
the same faulty LRU as the PFR but additionally the shutdown reason.
It has been decided to follow the operators preference and to combine the PFR maintenance
message with the Shutdown cause in one Fault Symptom.
i.e. Source Message ATA Class
ECB NO FLAME ASD *
associated with
ECB IGNITION EXCITER P12 494138 1
(2) Fault isolation procedures
A computer reset may clear intermittent fault without correcting the cause. In some cases a computer
reset may hide failure conditions (i.e. in-flight condition no longer present on ground) that may lead to
unsafe conditions on the next flight.
A reset table is provided in the TSM which provides a list of allowable computers that may be subject
to a reset to confirm intermittent faults or faults generated by electrical transient. A reset is not
recommended on computers not listed in this reset table.
In some cases a computer reset may hide failure conditions (i.e. in-flight condition no longer present on
ground) that may lead to unsafe conditions on the next flight.
(a) Fault confirmation
1 Permanent fault
The fault is confirmed on the ground by performing the test given in the fault confirmation
paragraph. Consequently, the procedure must be applied to troubleshoot the A/C.
2 Intermittent fault
The fault is not confirmed on the ground by performing the test given in the fault confirmation
paragraph. The CFDS for some systems, may display (INTM) when an intermittent operation of
the system is detected.
Example of message:
NO BSCU DATA (INTM)
If the confirmation test result is "TEST OK" or equivalent, the aircraft may be dispatched
providing recording in logbook and monitoring of the subject fault.
NOTE: When a fault is not confirmed on ground, AIRBUS recommends using the Ground Scan-
ning function of the related system in addition of the test required in the Fault Confirma-
tion paragraph. The ground Scanning function is an additional mean to track intermittent
faults and to confirm faults on ground.
NOTE: When the fault confirmation is "not applicable", the next step (fault isolation) must be fol-
lowed.
The TSM has been designed to isolate/troubleshoot permanent faults. However depending on
the airlines organization, the following can be applied for intermittent fault indications:

INTRODUCTION
· if the test result is "TEST OK" (fault not confirmed), dispatch the aircraft, then monitor the
reported symptom on the following flights by checking:
* the previous leg reports
* the PFR/Previous PFRs (if available)
* the logbook of the previous flights.
After three occurrences of the same fault indication, (even though the test
is still OK), the fault isolation procedure must be applied.
(3) Fault indications generated by Electrical Transients:
On ground, especially during power-up, engine/APU start, electrical transfer, etc, Warnings may be
generated by electrical transients without the related aircraft system being actually faulty. Only in such
situation if after a reset the fault indication disappear, the aircraft can be dispatched.
If after a reset the fault is confirmed, apply the troubleshooting procedure, or MEL if applicable for
aircraft dispatch.
(4) Swapping policy
Swapping for trouble shooting purpose.

When a reported fault is not confirmed on the ground (all tests given in the fault confirmation paragraph
are done and the results are correct), it is possible to swap identical LRUs installed on the same A/C for
subsequent flights for data analysis and decrease the NFF rate.
When a fault is confirmed on the ground, it is not allowed to swap LRUs as a trouble shooting step
unless the TSM tells you to do so.
Swapping for aircraft dispatch purpose.
When there is a logbook entry (Flight Deck effect...), and the suspected LRU (e.g. LRU x) is a NO GO
as per MEL in its original position X (e.g. X=1) but less penalizing in another position Y (e.g. Y=2).
At that stage, the mechanics are allowed to remove the faulty LRU X and swap it with the same P/N
LRU Y if and only if:
· the subject LRU is confirmed faulty by the applicable TSM fault isolation
· the specific TSM procedure does not forbid swapping
· no spare is available
· LRU X and Y are installed on the same A/C
· Swapping is not used to extend a dispatch under MEL condition
NOTE: The maintenance must apply MEL procedures and limitations for LRU X in position Y. Corrective
maintenance must be applied as soon as possible and in any case before the MEL time limit.
· LRU X and Y have dedicated C/Bs

· the faulty LRU X (installed after swapping in position Y) is de-energized.
In accordance with LRU Removal/Installation AMM procedures, a BITE test of LRU Y
(installed in position X) shall be performed after swapping.
CAUTION : BEFORE YOU SWAP LRU'S X AND Y, AND IF THERE WERE TRIPPED C/B'S OR
SMOKE WITH THE INITIAL FAILURE, BE VERY CAREFUL WHEN YOU DOTHE CHECK
OF THE CONDITION OF THE PLUGS (LRU AND AVIONICS RACK).
ALSO, FREQUENT DISCONNECTIONS AND CONNECTIONS WILL INCREASE THE RISK
OF DAMAGE TO PLUG AND CONNECTORS.
CAUTION : WHEN DOING FAULT ISOLATION ON ETOPS IMPORTANT SYSTEMS, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE TSM, IT MAY REQUIRE THE SWAPPING OF
LRUs. THE OPERATOR'S APPROVED MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES MUST
BE FOLLOWED TO KEEP THE ETOPS STATUS OF THE AIRCRAFT.
The TSM does not give the action to be taken if a suspect unit removed from the
aircraft during trouble shooting is found to be serviceable rather than failed. This is
due to differing replacement policies of airlines on such units (reinstall, or send to the
workshop). If such a situation occurs airline internal replacement policy shall be applied.
Continuity and isolation checks on LRUs and system wiring made on the equipment rack
ARINC 600 connectors, should only be done with the use of a breakout box and test
cables or equivalent.

INTRODUCTION
After a fault isolation procedure action has been completed a check must be done to
make sure that the reported fault has been corrected.
When an AMM LRU replacement procedure is referenced in the TSM, the AMM
procedure usually specifies a test. This AMM test is to make sure that the replacement
unit is installed correctly. It does not always confirm the correction of the fault symptom.
In such a case the TSM refers to the appropriate operational or system test procedure.
Warnings about static sensitive devices may have to be used to prevent damage to
sensitive devices.
On the ground, a tripped circuit breaker must not be engaged without trouble shooting of
the associated system.
G. Trouble Shooting Summary
(Ref. Fig. Trouble Shooting Flow SHEET 1)

WARNING MALFUNCTION
CREW/MAINTENANCE
REPORT
Print Date: December 04, 2019

* ATA CHAPTER W/M
MONITORED ? NO OF THE SYSTEM NO ECAM
KNOWN ? EFIS
ATA REF FROM PFR LOCAL
YES + OBSV
WORD SEARCH
Customer : VJC
YES
FUNCTION
USE CFDS FOR LRU ATA REF

FAILURE CONFIRMATION
ATA REF OR SYSTEM FAULT

SYMPTOMS NO
Type : A318/A319/A320/A321
AFFECTED
ECAM
EFIS TASK
FOUND ? YES
ATA REF LOCAL
LRU CONFIRMED ? NO OBSV
** ON A/C ALL
FAULT
YES TASK ISOLATION
CFDS FAULT ATA REF CFDS FOUND ? YES
TASK
MESSAGE ONLY
REPLACE LRU (AMM) NO

INTRODUCTION
ATA REF
CFDS
WORD SEARCH
FUNCTION
Figure 00-00-00-20100-00-A- / SHEET 1/1 - Trouble Shooting Flow

RETURN
AIRCRAFT
TO SERVICE
* TSM ENTRY FOR MONITORED FAULTS NOT SHOWN ON THE PFR CAN FOLLOW THIS ROUTE ALSO.
+ TSM ENTRY FOR MONITORED FAULTS NOT SHOWN ON THE PFR CAN FOLLOW THIS ROUTE IF THE SYSTEM (ATA REF) IS KNOWN.
N_TS_000000_0_APN0_01_00
Selected applicability : 408-408
Manual : TSM
Page 15 of 37
INTRODUCTION
The various possibilities for using the TSM are summarized in the flow chart in the following figure.
8. How to Use the CFDS
A. Types of systems
Systems have been divided into three categories in order to limit the complexity:
· type 1
· type 2
· type 3
depending on the type of interface that they may have with the CFDIU.
This system organization in three types essentially remains transparent for the operator as the
CFDIU manages any differences. Nonetheless, their definitions make it possible to understand
why certain menus are simplified.
(1) Type 1 systems
These systems are characterized by an input/output interface with the CFDIU of the ARINC 429 bus/
ARINC 429 bus type. Most systems are provided with this type of interface.
This type of system enables:
· output: permanent transmission to the CFDIU of maintenance messages generated during the current
flight or during the last flight
· input: an operator to dialog on the ground with the BITEs and therefore have access to
complementary information (test, ground report, etc.).
(2) Type 2 systems
These systems are characterized by an input/output interface with the CFDIU of the discrete/ARINC 429
bus type.
· output: permanent transmission to the CFDIU of maintenance messages generated during the current
flight or during the last flight, as well as permanent transmission while on the ground of maintenance
messages generated on the ground
· input: an operator to launch on the ground the system test and to obtain the results via the output bus.
(3) Type 3 systems
These systems are characterized by an input/output interface with the CFDIU of the discrete/discrete
type.
· output: permanent transmission of the operating status (OK, not OK)
· input: an operator to launch on the ground the system test and to obtain the result (OK, or not OK) via
the discrete output.
The CFDIU decodes the corresponding maintenance message into plain language.
B. System BITE
(Ref. Fig. System BITE SHEET 1)

INTRODUCTION
BITE
LRU1
SYSTEM
CFDIU
BITE
BITE
LRU2 LRU3
ARINC BUS
N_TS_000000_0_AEM0_01_00
Figure 00-00-00-22000-00-A- / SHEET 1/1 - System BITE

** ON A/C ALL

INTRODUCTION
When a system includes several computers, one of the computers collects the maintenance information
and provides the link between the system and the CFDIU. It then performs the BITE function and therefore
reports on behalf of all system computers.
This architecture provides a better targeted diagnosis by correlating data between system computers as
well as reducing bus links with the CFDIU.
For the operator, the resulting consequences are minor:
· it is the maintenance message itself which identifies, where necessary, the message source in the
system.
Example: source = ECAM1; message = SDAC1 : NO DATA FROM BMC1.
The SDAC which is part of the Flight Warning System has generated the message.
C. Flight/ground conditions
(Ref. Fig. Flight/Ground Conditions SHEET 1)

INTRODUCTION
1ST ENGINE START ENGINES

TAKE-OFF TOUCH DOWN
PLUS 3 MN SHUT DOWN
80kts
PLUS 30s
GND FLIGHT GND

TYPE
1 AND 3
PFR
GND FLIGHT GND

TYPE2
PFR
PFR
AUTOMATIC
PRINT-OUT
N_TS_000000_0_BGM0_01_00
Figure 00-00-00-22600-00-A- / SHEET 1/1 - Flight/Ground Conditions

** ON A/C ALL

INTRODUCTION
Information concerning detected faults is generated by the CFDS according to flight/ground conditions.
Faults detected on ground may be due to maintenance actions on the aircraft and therefore are not to be
taken into account (e.g. loss of a system because the circuit breaker is open).
This is the reason why the aircraft systems have 2 types of memorization:
· the first one for the faults detected on ground
· the second one for the faults detected in flight.
The flight/ground condition used by the CFDS is specific and has been selected so as to
eliminate the false faults while covering, in the best possible manner, all operations. This is
calculated by the CFDIU.
The flight condition is located between first engine start up plus three minutes (or eighty knots plus thirty
seconds if flight plan is not available in the FMS) and eighty knots plus thirty seconds after touch down.
NOTE: In case of engine run up for maintenance purpose, a flight number (at least one character) must be
entered using the MCDU to get a PFR, the eighty knots condition being never reached.
Type 1 systems provided with an ARINC bus from the CFDIU will use this flight/ground condition defined by
the CFDIU (correct synchronization, monitored range optimized).
Management of messages of type 3 systems (no input or output bus) is via the CFDIU which uses its own
flight/ground condition.
Type 2 systems cannot receive this information (no input bus) and generate it by default. For these systems,
the flight condition is between takeoff and landing.
This difference only causes minor consequences for maintainability of type 2 systems.
In fact, only:
· the faults which may be detected between startup of the first engine plus three minutes and takeoff, still
present after the ground/fight transition, are reported on the PFR as faults occurred in the CLIMB phase
(phase 5).
· the faults which may be detected between touch down and eighty knots plus thirty seconds are not
reported on the PFR on the last flight (Ref. Para. 8.E.(1)).
Nonetheless, type 2 systems having no specific function during these phases, the probability of
occurrence of these cases is very low.
For the CFDS, a cycle is defined as a set of sequences between two ground/flight transitions as
defined by the CFDS.
Conclusion:
Faults detected during flight will generate maintenance messages in the PFR associated with
this flight (if class 1 or 2 as defined in Para 8.D.).
Other faults, exceptionally detected on the ground after the flight, may generate maintenance
messages in a ground report (Ref. Para. 8.E.(3)(b)) of the associated system. However, if no
corrections are made, effective faults will still be present in the next cycle and will consequently
generate maintenance messages in the next PFR following the ground/flight transition.
Maintenance messages are stored only once during a given cycle at the first detection after the
beginning of the cycle.
D. Maintenance message classification
(1) General
Maintenance message classification is based on fault consequence.

All faults can be divided into three groups:
· the faults leading to an operational event in the cockpit
· the faults leading to an ECAM MAINTENANCE STATUS
· the faults without cockpit events.
NOTE: The list of fault symptoms provides :

- all the possible theorical cases.
In order to limit the number of cockpit events displayed to the pilots after a single fault, some
systems do not generate a cockpit event while they send a class 1 or class 2 fault message
because it is already done by another system.

INTRODUCTION
This means that in most of the cases, the fault message is associated with a cockpit event
(ECAM warning, local warning, maintenance status...).
But in specific cases of fault e.g. only a small part of wiring is faulty and only one of the re-
ceivers detects the fault, it is possible to find in the PFR only the fault message.
- fault messages which are only displayed in a test result page.
Some faults can be detected only during a specific test.
The associated fault message is therefore only displayed on the MCDU as a test result and
will never appear on a PFR.
- fault messages which need a manual switching in order to generate a cockpit event.
For systems which are in standby and which fail, the fault message is immediately avail-
able in the PFR but the associated cockpit event is shown in the cockpit only when a manu-
al switching activates this system (example ADIRU3).
(2) Faults with operational cockpit event
This event is also called a cockpit effect. Examples of cockpit effects are: an ECAM warning, a local
warning, a flag, or any invalid function such as a missing audio signal, amber crosses on a system page,
etc.
Some of these faults have consequences on the system safety objective and are NO GO items (i.e.: the
failure must be fixed before the next departure) or GO IF items (GO if the conditions given in the MEL
are fulfilled). The others are GO without conditions.
For some of these faults the cockpit effect does not automatically appear to the crew when it is activated
(e.g.: amber crosses on a system page).
The status regarding all these faults is given by the MEL.
When the crew take notice of a fault through the cockpit effect they must report it in the aircraft LOG
BOOK.
In order to be able to launch the proper maintenance actions, all faults:
· having a cockpit effect and
· detected by the systems are covered by a CLASS 1 maintenance message transmitted to the CFDIU.
Class 1 maintenance messages are presented in the Post Flight Report at the end of the
flight.
NOTE: Some of the system faults having an effect in the cabin are also covered by a CLASS 1 mainten-
ance message transmitted to the CFDIU.
(3) Faults triggering an ECAM MAINTENANCE STATUS
These faults have no consequence on the system operating conditions. Dispatch is permitted without
condition, except if mentionned in MMEL section MI-00-08. These faults must be fixed at the first
opportunity and not later than the "rectification interval" required as per MMEL section MI-00-05 "Repair
Interval".
Recording of these faults in the Logbook is the trigger to start the countdown of the corresponding
MMEL rectification.
In order to launch at the first opportunity the proper maintenance action it is necessary to provide
the information to the maintenance teams. Consequently, these faults are covered by a CLASS 2
maintenance message transmitted to the CFDIU.
Class 2 maintenance messages are presented in the Post Flight Report at the end of the flight.
(4) Faults without cockpit event
(a) General philosophy
These faults have no consequence on the system operating conditions and the crew is not aware of
them.
Class 3 fault messages are not shown on the PFR.
All faults detected by the systems without cockpit event are covered by a CLASS 3 fault
maintenance message.
These messages are recorded in each system BITE (class 3 report).

INTRODUCTION
AIRBUS recommend through the MPD (Maintenance Planning Document) to read Class 3 failures
every 750 flight hours / 6 months.
Further to troubleshooting and replacement of affected component(s), Class 3 faults may or may no
longer be displayed in AVIONICS STATUS, depending on the following three failure cases:
· If the component removed was the computer and the failure was internal to the computer:
The CLASS 3 FAULT message should no longer be present further to the BITE
test. The CLASS 3 REPORT should be empty, since the memory of the computer
coming from the shop should have been reset before installation on A/C. If no
further CLASS 3 failure detected, the CLASS 3 REPORT will be empty at the end
of the next flight.
· If the component removed was the computer and the failure was external to the computer:
The CLASS 3 FAULT message should be triggered again further to the BITE test.
The CLASS 3 REPORT should contain the CLASS 3 fault recorded during the
last flight(s). If no further CLASS 3 failure detected (case of intermittent failure
that was cleared without any maintenance action), the CLASS 3 REPORT will be
empty at the end of the next flight.
· If the component removed was not the computer and this component was the root cause of the
failure:
The CLASS 3 FAULT message should no longer be triggered further to the BITE
test. The CLASS 3 REPORT should contain the CLASS 3 fault recorded during
the last flight(s). If no further CLASS 3 failure detected, the CLASS 3 REPORT
will be empty at the end of the next flight.
(b) Class "S" fault messages
Class "S" fault messages are specific to engine BITE and to SFCC BITE.
Class "S" fault messages are not shown on the PFR.
1 Engine system
The class 3 faults (without cockpit event) have been classified in the two following categories:
· the TIME LIMITED dispatch faults: which means that the fault may remain uncorrected within a
maximum time frame specified by the Maintenance Planning Document.
· the UNLIMITED TIME dispatch faults: which means that the fault may remain uncorrected
within an unlimited time frame.
All these faults are presented by the FADEC BITE in the 'Scheduled
Maintenance Report' at the aircraft level and classified "S" in the Trouble
Shooting Manual.
Within class "S" faults, an (*) at the end of the maintenance message will
highlight UNLIMITED TIME dispatch faults.
Faults without the (*) correspond to TIME LIMITED dispatch faults.
Example:
'CFDIU,EIU (FLGT), J3*' is an UNLIMITED TIME dispatch fault and should
be treated like any other aircraft system CLASS 3 fault.
'T495L harn (En-4028 KS2)J9/ECU(En-4000Ks)' is a TIME LIMITED

dispatch fault and must be corrected in accordance with the Maintenance
Planning Document.
NOTE: For engines that give separate "Class 3" and "Scheduled Maintenance Report" (SMR) re-
ports, the (*) is not used in the message wording. The CLASS 3 messages are classified
directly as CLASS 3 in the TSM and not "S".
2 SFCC Class "S" Fault messages

SFCC class "S" is a special message that is not shown on the PFR neither in the Class 3 Fault
Report. It is only available during SFCC BITE test.
(5) Internal fault/external fault

INTRODUCTION
A unique fault may disturb several systems. In this case, it will lead to the generation of several
maintenance messages (one per system). One of these messages may be more accurate than the
others. Depending on the fault and its effect, it will be the one generated either by a computer which
detects itself faulty (self monitoring) or by the computer in charge of the BITE of the system.
Under these conditions this message is qualified by the unit generating it as having priority over all
messages transmitted by the other systems for the same fault. It will be the one retained by the CFDIU
(refer to the PFR). This message is called internal.
The other maintenance messages related to the same fault are called external by the other systems.
They have less accuracy, have not priority and are not recorded in this case by the CFDIU. Only their
origins are memorized by the CFDIU as identifiers (refer to the PFR).
Therefore, each system has in memory an information linked to every message transmitted to the
CFDIU which defines its internal or external attribute so that the CFDIU can give priority to the most
accurate one.
When no priority messages are received by the CFDIU for the same event it is considered that the
accuracy is the same for all messages received. In this case the CFDIU retains the first one received.
Remark: as a general rule, the LRUs incriminated by the maintenance messages shown in the PFR are
part of the systems which generated the internal messages.
Example:
(Ref. Fig. Example of ADM Sensor Fault Detection SHEET 1)

INTRODUCTION
ADM
SENSOR
19FP1
ADIRU
EIS AFS ECAM FADEC
INT
EXT
EXT
CFDIU EXT
EXT
N_TS_000000_0_BAM0_01_00
Figure 00-00-00-23500-00-A- / SHEET 1/1 - Example of ADM Sensor Fault Detection

** ON A/C ALL

INTRODUCTION
A fault of the ADM sensor is detected by the ADIRU.

The ADIRU sends a fault message (e.g. ADIRU1: NO ADM 19FP1 DATA) to the CFDIU and invalidates
some parameters on its output buses (e.g. Airspeed). This fault message is coded as internal by the
ADIRU.
The users of the ADIRU data (EIS, AFS, ECAM, FADEC, ...) detect the loss of the airspeed parameter.
They send fault messages to the CFDIU, coded as external (e.g. EIS1: NO ADIRU1 DATA).
The CFDIU stores the fault message from the ADIRU and the name of the systems which have detected
the fault.
The PFR is:
SOURCE IDENTIFIERS
ADIRU1 : NO ADM19 FP1 DATA ADIRU1 EIS, AFS, ECAM
FADEC
E. Maintenance functions
(1) First group: the PFR
(a) Description of the PFR A maintenance report on the last flight is automatically printed
after touch down, 2 minutes and 30 seconds after the aircraft speed decreases below
80 kts.
This document is the Post Flight Report (PFR). The PFR is a result of the CFDS automatic operating
mode.
This report is the main source of information used to initiate trouble shooting and to decide on the
required maintenance actions.
(Ref. Fig. POST FLIGHT REPORT - For Information only (Not customized) SHEET 1)

INTRODUCTION
A/C ID DATE GMT FLTN CITY PAIR

D-AIPA 29JAN 2304 974 GCTS EDDF
MAINTENANCE DB/N
POST FLIGHT REPORT
A/C ID DATE GMT FLTN CITY PAIR

D-AIPA 29JAN 1507/1935 LH4747 GCTS EDDF
ECAM WARNING MESSAGES
GMT PH ATA
1511 04 77-00 ENG 2 FADEC
1527 06 34-00 NAV ADR 3 FAULT(5)
1528 06 27-00 F/CTL
1744 06 32-00 WHEEL TYRE LO PR
FAILURE MESSAGES
GMT PH ATA SOURCE IDENTIFIERS

1511 04 73-22-52 FMU/HC/EEC2 EIU2FADEC
1527 06 34-11-17 ADM8(19FP8) ADR 3 EFCS 1/AFS
EFCS 2
1528 06 27-94-34 SEC2 OR WIRING FROM EFCS1 EFCS2
ACCLRM3 12CE3
1744 06 32-41-13 CHECK TIRES 1/2 PRESS TPIS
2649/2650GM
1744 06 32-49-18 TIRE 1 ROTATING MECH 7GV TPIS
OR PRESS TRANSDUCER 13GV
N_TS_000000_0_ALM0_01_00
Figure 00-00-00-23600-00-A- / SHEET 1/1 - POST

FLIGHT REPORT - For Information only (Not customized)
** ON A/C ALL

INTRODUCTION
A backup of the printed PFR is available on the MCDU. It should only be used if the printed PFR is
not available as the information is less complete and the presentation is not so friendly.
Conditional maintenance operations are carried out in response to the observations made by the
flight crew in the LOG BOOK.
This information represents a cockpit effect as previously defined.
The following data are recorded in the PFR:

· ECAM WARNING MESSAGES
The ECAM WARNING MESSAGES contains:
. the warning message available on the upper ECAM display unit
. the maintenance status
These warning messages are associated with their ATA reference (aid for cross
referencing with the maintenance message).
· FAULTS:
Maintenance messages are listed in the PFR in the FAILURE MESSAGES part.
Additional information is associated with each message.
· FLIGHT PHASE - GMT
Flight operational phases (CLIMB, CRUISE, etc.) are indicated in coded form in
the PFR in front of the warning message. The time (GMT) is also given in front of
the warning message and the maintenance message.
. FLIGHT PHASE decoding:
02 : Engine start + 3 mn up to TO Power
03 : TO Power up to 80 kts
04 : 80 kts up to lift off
05 : Climb
06 : Cruise
07 : Descent
08 : Touch down up to 80 kts
09 : 80 kts up to last engine shut down.
· ATA:
This is the ATA chapter of the first suspected component.
It is the entry point to the technical documentation. It may also be an aid in
relation to the corresponding warning message and with the GMT.
· SOURCE:
The source is the system (for system BITE) or the computer which generated the
maintenance message retained by the CFDIU for this event and recorded in the
PFR.
· IDENTIFIER(S):
The identifier(s) are the computers which have also reacted in relation to the fault
by generating:
. external maintenance messages not retained by the CFDIU
. cockpit effects.
(b) Correlation principle
1 Correlation between fault messages:
In order to limit the number of fault messages printed on the PFR and to give the line mechanic
only the root cause of a fault, the CFDIU correlates the fault messages.
This correlation is based on the GMT and the ATA chapter of the received fault messages.
2 Correlation between fault message and ECAM warning or Maintenance Status:

This correlation has to be performed by the line mechanic.
The ATA Chapter and the GMT have to be used (general case).
If a fault appears and disappears several times during the same flight leg, the corresponding fault
message is transmitted only at the first detection, but the ECAM warning (for a Class 1 fault) or

INTRODUCTION
the Maintenance Status (for a Class 2 fault) is displayed every time in the cockpit and transmitted
every time to the CFDIU.
Therefore, it is possible to find in the PFR several times the same ECAM warning or Maintenance
Status but only one fault message.
Example:
GMT PH ATA
1000 06 31-00 DAR(3)
1030 06 21-31 CAB PR SYS 2 FAULT
1045 06 31-00 DAR
FAILURE MESSAGES
GMT PH ATA SOURCE IDENT.
1000 06 31-36-52 DAR DMU
1030 06 21-31-34 PRESS CONTR 2 CPC2
The DAR fails several times during the flight.
The figure (3) displayed after the Maintenance Status "DAR" means that this Maintenance Status
was sent 3 consecutive times to the CFDIU for PFR recording. In order to prevent the recording
of 3 "DAR" messages, the "occurence counter" has been activated, and only the fault message
related to the first occurrence of the DAR fault is recorded (GMT = 1000).
But as a warning "CAB PR SYS 2 FAULT" has been recorded (GMT = 1030), followed by a new
"DAR" Maintenance Status (GMT=1045), then in this case the "occurence counter" is reset.
If the warning "CAB PR SYS 2 FAULT" would have not been recorded, the "DAR" message
would have been recorded at GMT=1000 with a counter set to 4.
(c) An ECAM warning or a Maintenance Status can be associated with a system only
shown as an identifier in the PFR, because it is not the root cause of the fault.
Example:
GMT PH ATA
0844 06 34-00 NAV RA 2 FAULT
0844 06 27-00 F/CTL
FAILURE MESSAGES
GMT PH ATA SOURCE IDENT.
0844 06 34-42-33 NO RA2 DATA CFDS EFCS 1
EFCS 2
ECAM 1
ECAM 2
EIS 1
EIS 2
There is a Radio Altimeter 2 fault.
The RA2 is really faulty and is not able to send a fault message. The users of the RA2 signals detect
the fault (CFDS, EFCS, ECAM, EIS). For the EFCS, the loss of the RA2 is a class 2 fault. The
associated Maintenance Status is available (F/CTL).
The installation of a new RA2 on the aircraft will eliminate the ECAM warning and the Maintenance
Status.
NOTE: The number of identifiers is limited to 6. If more than 6 are correlated, the CFDIU keeps only
the first six systems received. The remaining are ignored. It is therefore theorically possible
to have an ECAM warning or a Maintenance Status without any indication on the associated
system in the FAILURE MESSAGES part.
(2) 2nd group: reports available via the SYSTEM REPORT/TEST
The manual test function is the main function of the CFDS manual operating mode.

INTRODUCTION
The purpose is to be able to test on the ground, the maximum number of components, i.e. the integrity
of the computer managing the test, the system LRUs and the validity of the external signals used by the
system with a single test.
(a) Various types of tests
(Ref. Fig. Examples of Main Menu SHEET 1)

INTRODUCTION
<
<
<
<
< >
< >
BSCU
<
<
<
<
< >
<
LGCIU
N_TS_000000_0_AQM0_01_00
Figure 00-00-00-23800-00-A- / SHEET 1/1 - Examples of Main Menu

** ON A/C ALL

INTRODUCTION
Nonetheless, in order to optimize the test function and better satisfy operator requirements, certain
adaptations have been introduced:
· To limit system complexity and their BITE, the test function does not always fully cover complete
system integrity.
In the TSM with each maintenance message, the test or the procedure will be
indicated making it possible to recheck the component on the ground
· To better manage the effect of the test on the system and its ground handling the test function
may be divided into two groups:
. BASIC TEST (OR SYSTEM TEST)
. COMPLEMENTARY TESTS.
This makes it possible to have at least one test available at the terminal gate
(the basic test) which is quickly to start-up by a single technician, the other tests
making it possible to increase the global coverage level of the tests where useful
and possible.
All these tests are run on the ground from the MCDU using, first of all, the CFDIU
menu (SYSTEM REPORT/TEST) then the system MENU.
* Basic test or system test

This test has no effect on the aircraft and does not require that any long or
complex actions be performed by the operator.
Consequently, this test may be initiated from the cockpit by a single operator
whenever required during stopovers.
All faults present on ground and actually detected by the system will be analyzed
and reported by this test. Furthermore, it must be run before any other test to
check the integrity of the computer housing the BITE.
* Complementary tests
(Ref. Fig. Example of Caution SHEET 1)

INTRODUCTION
N_TS_000000_0_ASM0_01_00
Figure 00-00-00-23900-00-A- / SHEET 1/1 - Example of Caution

** ON A/C ALL
These tests may affect the aircraft (and may require actions by the operator). In
fact these tests send stimuli to various components such as actuators, valves,
etc.
For this reason, CAUTIONS may be displayed on the MCDU before activation of
test.
The wording of the cautions is in fact simply a reminder of the consequences on
the aircraft following test activation. In fact, the safety procedures associated with
these tests are in the AMM.
Consequently, normally these tests are not performed during a short stopover.
Test names are related to the tested parts.
These tests can also be menu-guided tests. The actions to be taken are
displayed in plain language on the MCDU. (Description of the initial configuration,
description of the actions, wording of the questions to which the operator must
respond). Test names are related to the tested parts.

INTRODUCTION
(b) Presentation of the test pages

· Certain information may require several pages. Each page is then numbered and the MCDU
NEXT PAGE function key is used to run through the test
· In certain cases, the system waits until the operator has performed an action to continue the test.
Then there is a limited time out so as not to stop in this configuration when the monitored signals
are blocked. This implies that the operator action must be performed before this time out.
· A dash may be shown when data is not available. This does not necessarily mean that an effective
failure is present. Only maintenance messages indicate possible failures.
(c) Initial aircraft configuration for test activation
The general configuration of the aircraft for test activation is basically as follows:
· aircraft on ground
· engines stopped
· all systems power supplied (ADIRS, FADEC may be off)
· pushbutton switches and switches in normal configuration.
If a test calls for a different configuration, this configuration will be described in the AMM.
To limit BITE complexity all these conditions are assumed to be correctly applied by the operator.
Consequently, if a difference is detected by a system it is considered as a fault and therefore
generates a maintenance message in the test results.
In all cases, it is recommended to restart the tests indicating faults in the results to eliminate any
possible disturbances or wrong initial conditions.
(d) TEST IN PROGRESS
When a test is run without any operator action being requested the TEST IN PROGRESS can be
displayed on the MCDU.
(e) Test results
The result of a test is one of the following:
· The mention TEST OK, PASS, NO FAULT, ...:
The test has not detected any faults
· The display of maintenance messages on the MCDU:
The test has detected at least one fault.
In certain multiple fault cases, the test may only indicate the first fault
encountered. In fact, certain faults prevent to run the test more extensively.
Test re-running after repair of the fault is therefore always necessary to check
whether there is another fault or not. Only the mention TEST OK, PASS, NO
FAULT ... is proof that the test has not detected any other faults.
· No response from the system to the test request or no results displayed:
In this case, the test has not been completed.
Return to initial condition is obtained by pressing the MCDU MENU key then
CFDS key and selecting the system again.
If the same sequence reoccurs then the computer managing the BITE of the
system or the wiring from the CFDIU must be the cause.
(f) Test stop
In some cases, a key is allocated to stop a test in progress.
(g) Configuration resetting after a test
The operator may be requested to reconfigure after a test if the initial conditions required by the test
have had a significant effect on the aircraft (instructions are in the AMM). If the operator wants to
repeat the test he is not obliged to apply these instructions on configuration resetting.
(h) Ground handling of the tests
As maintenance messages are stored in the PFR or the GROUND REPORT they will not be erased
until the next beginning of flight. Therefore, a test is a means of checking whether a fault is still
present and a means of isolating a failed LRU.
Activation of a test will be requested in the TSM by the fault isolation procedure related to a
maintenance message. It will be used to confirm the presence of a fault or to eliminate any
ambiguity. As a general rule, the test of the system including the LRU incriminated by the

INTRODUCTION
maintenance message (message ATA) will be activated. By default, the test of the system which
generated the message (SOURCE) may be activated.
The activation of a test may also be part of the removal/installation procedure of an LRU given in the
AMM.
(3) 3rd group
(a) AVIONICS STATUS
This function displays the identity of the systems detecting a class 1, 2 or 3 internal or external fault
when the function is called.
The AVIONICS STATUS thus rapidly provides a global overview of the status of all systems. It is
a user-friendly monitoring device providing direct access to system menus which detect a fault (for
example, flag displayed on the PFD).
Furthermore, after aircraft power up, it enables to check that all computers have correctly satisfied
the related power up tests.
In order to know the reason for which a system is displayed in the AVIONICS STATUS it is
recommended to get access to the system menu and to activate the system test (or test).
NOTE: Certain systems are listed in the AVIONICS STATUS due to normal absence of a ground
power supply. Therefore, it is recommended to supply all systems prior to gaining access to
the AVIONICS STATUS. It shall be noted that when a computer is not supplied it is not dir-
ectly displayed in the AVIONICS STATUS as it no longer detects, itself, this fault. However,
the systems using the signals from this computer appear in the AVIONICS STATUS.
(b) GROUND REPORT

This function displays on ground the class 1, 2 and 3 internal maintenance messages related to
new faults detected on ground and which are therefore not recorded in the PFR. The faults detected
during flight and which remain present on ground are in the PFR and not in the ground report.
It is necessary to confirm all faults of the ground report by activating a test or a procedure described
in the TSM.
NOTE: Case related to Type 2 systems: This function is in the LAST LEG/GROUND REPORT sec-
tion specific to type 2 systems. The messages in this section concern faults detected during
flight and on ground, the wording GND preceding the list of messages related to the faults
detected on the ground in accordance with the same ground report logic as for type 1 sys-
tems. Case related to Type 3 systems: There is no ground report function for Type 3 sys-
tems. The test function shall be used in this case.
(c) GROUND SCANNING

The GROUND SCANNING enables fault trouble shooting based on ground activation by the
operator himself of functions normally performed during a flight.
The advantage of this is that it is not restrictive as far as actions are concerned. In fact, the operator
decides what type of actions to be performed on the system, which is in GROUND SCANNING, as a
function of the problems to be processed.
This action may include dynamic phases (for example: engine startup, flight control surface
movement, etc.).
This is also an aid in trouble shooting faults difficult to resolve.
All maintenance messages (class 1, 2 and 3, internal and external) related to all faults detected in
real time by the system will be displayed during the GROUND SCANNING.
In order to indicate a transient fault source to the operator, the maintenance messages,
automatically displayed in GROUND SCANNING, are only erased when exiting from the function.
Furthermore, GROUND SCANNING must always be preceded by a system test in order to identify
the possible static faults.
The use of this function may also be requested by the TSM procedures.
(d) LAST LEG REPORT
This section presents a portion of the information given in the PFR.
It contains the class 1 and 2 fault messages transmitted to the CFDIU during the previous flight.

INTRODUCTION
NOTE: For information purposes, the messages generated by the identifiers are accessible in the
last leg report of these identifiers. The user who wants to use these messages must do so
carefully as the information involved is non-correlated and non-priority information.
(4) 4th group

(a) PREVIOUS LEGS REPORT
The PREVIOUS LEGS REPORT function is the history of the LAST LEG REPORT limited to 64
flights. Therefore, it is displayed with the same restrictions.
(b) TROUBLE SHOOTING DATA
In most cases, this concerns primary and coded data.
The purpose is to supply additional information on conditions prevailing when the maintenance
message was generated.
In general, these data are read in the case of events which do not result from effective part failure,
already covered by the replacement of the failed part.
Analysis of this data will be effectively useful in the study which may enable the identification of the
cause of an event.
If certain trouble shooting data are required for fault trouble shooting, data readout will be requested
by a TSM procedure. Wherever possible, these data will be displayed decoded on the MCDU.
(c) LRU IDENTIFICATION
The purpose of this section is to display on ground the part numbers of computers of the selected
system and possibly their serial numbers. This section may be consulted to check the interrogated
computer standard.
This is a configuration management aid.
(5) 5th group
(a) CLASS 3 REPORT
All class 3 (internal and external) maintenance messages corresponding to the selected system are
grouped under this report. This function enables a quick access to the class 3 messages of a given
system.
NOTE: Some systems do not have class 3 reports.
(6) Summary of the functions
Summary of the functions available in ground menu mode (Manual Mode).

----------------------------------------------------------------------
! HISTORY DATA ! REAL TIME !
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
! CFDIU ! - POST FLIGHT REPORT ! - AVIONICS STATUS (at activation) !
! driven ! ! !
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
! ! - LAST LEG REPORT ! - TEST (all) !
! SYSTEM ! - PREVIOUS LEGS REPORT ! - GROUND SCANNING !
! driven ! - GROUND REPORT ! !
! ! - CLASS 3 REPORT ! !
! ! - TROUBLE SHOOTING DATA ! - LRU IDENTIFICATION !
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Units of Measurement
A. Symbols
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
! US CUSTOMARY SYSTEM ! SI METRIC MEASUREMENT SYSTEM !
!------------------------------------------------------------------------------
! ABBREVIATION ! DEFINITION ! ABBREVIATION ! DEFINITION !
!-------------------!-------------------!------------------!------------------!

INTRODUCTION
! deg.f ! Degrees Fahrenheit! deg.C ! Degrees Celsius !

! ft. ! Foot ! m ! Meter !
! US gal ! US Gallon ! l ! Liter !
! USquart ! US Quart ! l ! Liter !
! in. ! Inch ! mm ! Millimeter !
! in.2 ! Square Inch ! mm2 ! Square Millimeter!
! in.2 ! Square Inch ! cm2 ! Square Centimeter!
! lb ! Pound ! kg ! Kilogram !
! lbf ! Pound Force ! daN ! Deca Newton !
! lbf.in ! Pound Force-Inch ! m.daN ! Meter deca Newton!
! ! (Torque) ! ! !
! lbf.ft ! Pound Force-Foot ! m.daN ! Meter deca Newton!
! ! (Torque) ! ! !
! in.HG ! Inch of Mercury ! hPA ! Hecto Pascal !
! oz ! Ounce (Weight) ! g ! Gram !
! psi ! Pound Square Inch ! bar ! Bar !
! USgal.min ! US Gallon per ! l.min ! Liter per minute !
! ! minute ! ! !
! lb.min ! Pound per minute ! kg.min ! Kilogram per !
! ! ! ! minute !
! USgal.min ! US Gallon per ! l.min ! Liter per minute !
! ! minute ! ! !
! ! ! cc ! Cubic Centimeter !
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Conversion Tables
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FROM: S.I.MEASUREMENT TO: US CUSTOMARY SYSTEM
SYSTEM
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 bar = 14.5037 psi
1 mm2 = 0.0016 in.2
1 cm2 = 0.1550 in.2
1 daN = 2.2481 lbf
1 g = 0.0353 oz
1 hPA = 0.0295 in.Hg
1 kg = 2.2046 lb
1 kg.min = 2.2046 lb.min
1 l = 0.2641 USgal
1 l = 1.057 USquart
1 l.min = 0.2641 USgal.min
1 mdaN = 88.4956 lbf.in
1 mdaN = 7.3801 lbf.ft
1 m = 3.2809 ft
1 mm = 0.0394 in
1 cm3 = 0.06102 in3
1 hPa = 0.0145 psi
Temperature conversion from degrees Celsius (deg.C) to degrees
Fahrenheit (deg.F) :
deg.F = 1.8 x deg.C + 32
1 psi = 0.0689 bar
1 in.2 = 645.1600 mm2
1 in.2 = 6.4516 cm2
1 lbf = 0.4448 daN
1 oz = 28.3495 g

INTRODUCTION
1 in.Hg = 33.8640 hPa

1 lb = 0.4536 kg
1 lb.min = 0.4536 kg.min
1 USgal = 3.7854 l
1 USgal.min = 3.7854 l.min
1 USquart = 0.9464 l
1 lbf.in = 0.0113 mdaN
1 lbf.ft = 0.1356 mdaN
1 ft = 0.3048 m
1 in = 25.4 mm
1 in3 = 16.3871 cm3
1 in.Hg = 0.491 psi
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1 - Example Fault Isolation Procedure
Figure 1 - Trouble Shooting Flow
Figure 1 - System BITE
Figure 1 - Flight/Ground Conditions
Figure 1 - Example of ADM Sensor Fault Detection
Figure 1 - POST FLIGHT REPORT - For Information only (Not customized)
Figure 1 - Examples of Main Menu
Figure 1 - Example of Caution
End of document


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Customer : VJC Manual : TSM

Type : A318/A319/A320/A321 Selected applicability : 408-408

Print Date: December 04, 2019 Page 1 of 37

Print Date: December 04, 2019 Page 2 of 37

Standard Practices and Structures 51

Task Elements/ TASK XX-XX-XX-XXX-XXX-XXX-XXX

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* when there are several configurations

Print Date: December 04, 2019 Page 5 of 37

TRIM-AIR PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE FAULT

2. JOB SET-UP INFORMATION

- REPLACE THE VALVE-PRESSURE REGULATING (14HK) (REFERRED TO AS VALVE (14HK))

(1) IF THE FAULT CONTINUES:

2. DO THE TEST AS GIVEN IN THE PARA. 3.A.

Figure 00-00-00-13800-00-A- / SHEET 1/1 - Example Fault Isolation Procedure

Print Date: December 04, 2019 Page 6 of 37

The contents of these is as follows:

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5. Warnings, Cautions and Notes

Print Date: December 04, 2019 Page 9 of 37

CAUTION : CALLS ATTENTION TO METHODS AND PROCEDURES WHICH MUST BE FOLLOWED

6. Functional Item Numbers (FIN)

For mechanical equipment the FIN is similar to the electrical FIN.

B. How to Use the TSM

Print Date: December 04, 2019 Page 10 of 37

(a) Monitored faults:

(2) Trouble Shooting Function

The following general procedure describes troubleshooting of CFDS Fault Messages.

Print Date: December 04, 2019 Page 11 of 37

(a) APU Fault Symptom Peculiarities

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Swapping for trouble shooting purpose.

· LRU X and Y have dedicated C/Bs

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USE CFDS FOR LRU ATA REF

ATA REF OR SYSTEM FAULT

REPLACE LRU (AMM) NO

Figure 00-00-00-20100-00-A- / SHEET 1/1 - Trouble Shooting Flow

© AIRBUS S.A.S. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT.

(Ref. Fig. System BITE SHEET 1)

Print Date: December 04, 2019 Page 16 of 37

Figure 00-00-00-22000-00-A- / SHEET 1/1 - System BITE

Print Date: December 04, 2019 Page 17 of 37

(Ref. Fig. Flight/Ground Conditions SHEET 1)

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1ST ENGINE START ENGINES

GND FLIGHT GND

GND FLIGHT GND

Figure 00-00-00-22600-00-A- / SHEET 1/1 - Flight/Ground Conditions

Print Date: December 04, 2019 Page 19 of 37

Maintenance message classification is based on fault consequence.

NOTE: The list of fault symptoms provides :

Print Date: December 04, 2019 Page 20 of 37

(2) Faults with operational cockpit event

(3) Faults triggering an ECAM MAINTENANCE STATUS