Return Date: No return date scheduled

Hearing Date: No hearing scheduled

Courtroom Number: No hearing scheduled
Location: No hearing scheduled FILED
6/17/2021 4:08 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS IRIS Y. MARTINEZ
CIRCUIT CLERK
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION
COOK COUNTY, IL
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

2021L001939
Anjanette Young,
13732319
Plaintiff,

v.

The City of Chicago; Chicago Police Officers

Alain Aporongao, Star No. 4870; Alex
Case No.: 2021L001939
Wolinski, Star No. 2605; Bryan Mordan, Star
No. 11437; Gabriel Cruz, Star No. 2844;
Honorable Patricia O'Brien Sheahan
Michael Orta, Star No. 11485; Joseph
Lisciandrello, Star No. 19362; Michael
Donnellly, Star No. 13784; Tito Jimenez, Star
No. 14955; Filip Bieniasz, Star No. 18200;
Cody Maloney, Star No. 13032; and Eric
Acevedo, Star No. 13560,

Defendants.

DEFENDANT CITY OF CHICAGO'S MOTION TO DISMISS

 Now comes Defendant, the City of Chicago (hereinafter the “City”) by and through its

attorneys, Eileen M. Letts and Brian J. Beck of the law firm of Zuber Lawler LLP, and hereby
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

submits its Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil

Procedure. In support of this motion to dismiss, the City states as follows:

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts eight claims that flow from a search executed by Chicago

Police on February 21, 2019. Tellingly, and fatally to those eight claims, Plaintiff never challenges

the underlying validity of that warrant. As a consequence, and as a result of other legal deficiencies

set forth below, this court must dismiss Counts One - Eight against the City of Chicago. As to

Count Nine for “civil conspiracy,” Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege either an underlying tort or

an agreement between individuals to commit a tort, and so must also be dismissed.

On February 21, 2019, the defendant police officers (collectively the “Chicago Police

Officer Defendants” or the “Officers”) executed a legally issued search warrant at Plaintiff’s

apartment. As reflected in the body of the warrant presented to and approved by a circuit court

judge, Defendant Officer Alain Aporongao obtained that search warrant searching for an

individual, Andy Simpson, based on a confidential informant’s statement that Simpson (a

convicted felon) possessed an illegal firearm and showed it to him. Officer Aporongao took

affirmative steps to corroborate the informant’s information: Officer Aporongao drove the

informant to Plaintiff’s building, and the informant identified Plaintiff’s apartment as the location

where Simpson had showed him the firearm. Based on that information, this Court issued a search

warrant for Plaintiff’s apartment. Unfortunately, the apartment turned out to belong to Plaintiff,

and Simpson in fact lived in a different apartment in the same building.

Even more unfortunately and regrettably, when the Officers executed the search warrant,

Plaintiff was naked. Reasonably believing they would find an armed felon, the Officers
 immediately handcuffed Plaintiff, and though they attempted to cover her with a nearby blanket

seconds after handcuffing her, the blanket did not stay fully closed in front. After the officers
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

determined that Simpson was not present, and upon the arrival of a female officer, approximately

ten minutes later, Plaintiff was escorted to her bedroom to get fully dressed. Plaintiff has now filed

a complaint against the officers for eight intentional torts under state common law, for which she

seeks to hold the City liable under the principle of respondeat superior, together with a ninth claim

for “Civil Conspiracy (Conspiracy of Silence),” apparently related to the City’s denial of certain

Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests.

Nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the search warrant was improperly issued, that

the warrant lacked probable cause, or that the Officers used excessive force. Eight of Plaintiff’s

nine counts against the City are respondeat superior claims seeking to hold the City liable for

intentional torts committed by the Officers, but because the complaint does not make any factual

allegations sufficient to challenge the warrant or allege any excessive force or improper conduct

by the Officers in executing the warrant, it does not state a claim. The ninth count is a legally

incoherent claim for “civil conspiracy” that fails to allege either an agreement by any of the

purported conspirators or an underlying tort by the purported conspirators. Plaintiff’s complaint

should be dismissed because it does not allege a legal wrong.

LEGAL STANDARD

The City brings this motion pursuant to sections 2-615, 2-619(a)(3), and 2-619(a)(9) of the

Code of Civil Procedure.

A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenges the

legal sufficiency of the complaint. Tercios v. DeBruler Co., 2015 IL 117962, ¶ 15. In deciding a

motion to dismiss under section 2-615, the Court must determine “whether the allegations of the

complaint, taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to

2
 state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.” Id. However, “[o]nly well pleaded facts

are admitted by a section 2-615 motion to dismiss and it is commonly understood that attached
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

exhibits supersede any inconsistent allegations of a complaint.” Van Duyn v. Smith, 173 Ill. App.

3d 523, 538 (3d Dist. 1988). Similarly, “legal conclusions and factual conclusions which are

unsupported by allegations of specific facts will be disregarded in ruling on a motion to dismiss.”

LaSalle Nat. Bank v. City Suites, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 780, 790 (1st Dist. 2001).

“Section 2-619(a)(3) is designed to avoid duplicative litigation and is to be applied to carry

out that purpose.” Kellerman v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 112 Ill. 2d 428, 447 (1986). In

bringing a motion under section 2-619(a)(3) to dismiss duplicative litigation, it is the movant’s

burden to “demonstrate through clear and convincing evidence that the two actions involve both

the same parties and the same cause.” Overnite Transp. Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters,

Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am., 332 Ill. App. 3d 69, 73 (1st Dist. 2002).

A motion to dismiss based on Section 2-619(a)(9) allows dismissal where the “claim

against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the

claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9). This defense “either negates an alleged cause of action completely

or refutes crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact unsupported by allegations of

specific fact contained in or inferred from the complaint.” Consumer Elec. Co. v. Cobelcomex,

Inc., 149 Ill. App. 3d 699, 703 (1986). Its primary purpose “is to provide a means to dispose of

issues of law or easily proved issues of fact.” Id.

ARGUMENT

By attaching and incorporating the lawfully issued search warrant which authorized the

search of Plaintiff’s apartment, the Plaintiff has failed to establish a legal wrong that this court may

remedy. The entire search warrant is attached to this motion as Exhibit A. The factual allegations

in the Complaint fail to rebut the presumption that the search warrant was validly issued and that

3
 the Officers were lawfully authorized to enter Plaintiff’s home. Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim

also fails to allege a legal wrong that this court may remedy in that there is no alleged underlying
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

tort, and no legal cause of action based on a FOIA violation. The complaint is also duplicative of

a complaint Plaintiff filed on December 16, 2020, in this Court’s Chancery Division that is

currently pending which alleges FOIA violations. As a direct result of this failure, the Complaint

should be dismissed.

I. Plaintiff’s intentional tort claims (Counts I-VIII) should be dismissed because the
Complaint admits that Defendant Chicago Police Officers reasonably executed a valid
search warrant.

Plaintiff has alleged eight common-law intentional torts against the Defendant Chicago

Police Officers, for which Plaintiff alleges the City is liable under respondeat superior: false

imprisonment (Count I), false arrest (Count II), assault (Count III), battery (Count IV), invasion

of privacy (Count V), trespass (Count VI), negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VII),

and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VIII). But Plaintiff fails to state any factual

allegations to support that the Officers’ actions in entering the home were not authorized pursuant

to the law governing the execution of search warrants. Plaintiff also fails to challenge the validity

of the search warrant at issue. Absent those allegations, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to

each of the common-law tort counts.

A. The Complaint admits facts showing that the search warrant for Plaintiff’s
residence was valid.

The Complaint admits that the Officers were executing a search warrant issued by this

Court when it entered Plaintiff’s home and detained her during the search. Complaint at ¶¶ 36,

51-52, Ex. A. Search warrants are presumed to be valid and it is undisputed Plaintiff failed to

challenge the validity of the search warrant at issue in this matter. See People v. Elworthy, 214 Ill.

App. 3d 914, 922 (1st Dist. 1991). To overcome that presumption, a defendant must show “that

4
 the affiant included false statements in the affidavit, either intentionally or with reckless disregard

for the truth, and that without the false statements, there was no probable cause.” Id. An allegation
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

of “reckless disregard for the truth” requires “proof (1) that the affiant entertained serious doubts

as to the truth of the allegations in the affidavit, or (2) of circumstances evincing obvious reasons

to doubt the veracity of the allegations.” People v. Creal, 391 Ill. App. 3d 937, 944 (3d Dist. 2009).

Creal demonstrates that the actions Officer Aporongao took to corroborate his informant’s

statements were sufficient to show that the search warrant was valid. In that case, the officer

presented a complaint for a search warrant stating that he had spoken to a confidential informant

stating that within the past seven days, the informant had been inside the defendant’s residence

and saw cocaine packaged in a plastic bag. Id. at 938-39. Officer Aporongao’s informant similarly

claimed to have been in the apartment that turned out to belong to Plaintiff, where he spotted an

illegal firearm. Ex. A. The officer in Creal had no reason to believe that the informant was being

untruthful. 391 Ill. App. 3d at 944-45. The Complaint here does not allege that Officer Aporongao

had any reason to doubt his informant. The officer in Creal also took steps to corroborate the

information provided by the informant, by viewing the residence and confirming the description

provided by the informant. Id. at 945. Officer Aporongao similarly took steps to corroborate the

information provided by his informant by showing the informant a picture of Simpson and by

driving the informant to Plaintiff’s apartment to confirm the location. Ex. A. The Court in Creal

held that while the officer could have taken additional steps to verify the information in the

warrant, he did not “recklessly disregard[] the truth by failing to do so.” 391 Ill. App. 3d at 945.

Similarly here, while the Plaintiff alleges there were additional steps Officer Aporongao should

have taken to verify the address in the search warrant (Complaint at ¶¶ 62-64), Officer

5
 Aporongao’s not taking those additional steps does not show “reckless disregard for the truth”

rendering the search warrant invalid.1

FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

Plaintiff’s extensive allegations regarding the fact that Simpson did not reside at Plaintiff’s

residence also cannot render the search warrant invalid. Issuance of a search warrant does not

require that the subject of the search warrant reside at the target address; it only “requires a

probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n. 13

(1983). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in Horne v. Wheeler,

determined that the fact that a suspect did not live at the address listed in the warrant did not

undercut an informant’s statement that the suspect sold drugs out of the apartment because “[i]t is

not uncommon for criminals to conduct illegal activity at locations other than their primary

residence.” No. 03-cv-7252, 2005 WL 2171151, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2005). The additional

inquiry that Plaintiff demands in the Complaint would not, therefore, have negated probable cause

because Simpson could have been in Plaintiff’s apartment even if he did not live there.

The search warrant is even further supported by the fact that the judge of this Court who

authorized the warrant heard the recitation of facts directly from Officer Aporongao’s informant.

The search warrant states that the informant “was made available to the undersigned judge for

questioning.” Ex. A at 2. The judge of this Court reviewed Aporongao’s affidavit, reviewed the

informant’s criminal record, had the opportunity to question the informant in person, and

determined that probable cause existed to search the apartment. Id. Nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint

1
The Complaint goes into extensive detail alleging that Officer Aporongao was required by CPD
policy to perform additional investigation to verify the target address. Complaint at ¶¶ 58-69.
Importantly, there is no legal authority which states that a violation of CPD policy renders a
search warrant invalid.

6
 can overcome the presumption of validity of the search warrant issued by this Court. And that

validly issued search warrant in turn defeats each of Plaintiff’s intentional tort claims.
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

B. Counts I (false imprisonment), II (false arrest), and IV (battery) fail because

Plaintiff’s brief detainment was lawful.

The lawfully obtained search warrant authorized the Officers to enter Plaintiff’s apartment

and to detain her temporarily while conducting their search. A lawful search warrant “implicitly

carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search

is conducted.” People v. Connor, 358 Ill. App. 3d 945, 953 (1st Dist. 2005) (citing Michigan v.

Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981)). For that reason, courts routinely dismiss false imprisonment

and false arrest claims based on detention during the execution of a lawfully obtained search

warrant. See Smith v. Village of Broadview, No. 19-cv-5319, 2020 WL 3050768, at *7 (N.D. Ill.

June 8, 2020) (dismissing common-law false imprisonment claim where the complaint admitted

that the detention was performed in the course of executing a lawfully obtained search warrant);

Wormely v. Ponce, No. 06-cv-2965, 2007 WL 4162810, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2007) (granting

summary judgment to defendant on false imprisonment claim because the detention occurred

during execution of a valid search warrant); cf. Jacobs v. Paynter, 727 F. Supp. 1212, 1220 (N.D.

Ill. 1989) (holding that false imprisonment and false arrest claims for a detention during a search

warrant depended on the validity of the search warrant, and accordingly denying a motion to

dismiss where the search warrant’s validity was in question). Plaintiffs’ allegation that she was

handcuffed also does not demonstrate false imprisonment because handcuffs may be lawfully used

to detain an individual during the search of a home. Connor, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 952.

Similarly, the only acts that Plaintiff alleges to constitute battery are the same acts of

handcuffing and detention that Illinois permits police officers to perform while executing a lawful

search warrant: “handcuffing Plaintiff force [sic] and restraining her while naked.” Complaint at ¶

7
 116. These acts cannot constitute battery because police officers are permitted to handcuff people

that they are detaining in the course of executing a lawful search warrant. Connor, 358 Ill. App.
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

3d at 952. Further, the Officers cannot be held liable for battery for handcuffing Plaintiff under the

Illinois Tort Immunity Act, which shields public employees from liability for actions committed

“in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and

wanton conduct.” 745 ILCS 10/2-202. While the Complaint alleges the legal conclusion that the

Officers’ conduct “was willful and wanton,” (Complaint at ¶ 118), it offers no factual allegations

to support any willful or wanton claim; there is no allegation of any conduct such as excessive

force that would constitute “willful or wanton behavior.” See LaSalle Nat. Bank, 325 Ill. App. 3d

at 790 (legal conclusions unsupported by allegations of specific facts will be disregarded). Plaintiff

was handcuffed, questioned, and released during execution of a lawful search warrant. Under

longstanding Illinois law, those acts simply do not constitute battery.

The Officers entered Plaintiff’s apartment to execute a lawfully obtained search warrant,

handcuffed Plaintiff while they executed the search warrant and questioned her, then released her

and left. Under Illinois law, the Officers did not commit the torts of false arrest, false

imprisonment, or battery by doing so, and the City accordingly cannot be held liable for those torts

under respondeat superior. Counts I and II therefore must be dismissed as to the City of Chicago.

C. The Officers did not commit assault (Count III) therefore the City cannot be
found to be liable.

As noted above, the Illinois Tort Immunity Act shields public employees from liability for

actions committed “in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission

constitutes willful and wanton conduct.” 745 ILCS 10/2-202. Conduct is “willful and wanton”

where it is performed with an “actual or deliberate intention to harm or with an utter indifference

to or conscious disregard for the safety of others” or “reckless disregard for the safety of others.”

8
 Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 693 (7th Cir. 2008). An assault under Illinois law is “an

intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury by force unlawfully directed, under such
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

circumstances as to create a well-founded fear of imminent peril, coupled with the apparent present

ability to effectuate the attempt if not prevented.” Parrish by Bowker v. Donahue, 110 Ill. App. 3d

1081, 1083 (3d Dist. 1982). The facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute an assault or

conduct that would constitute willful and wanton conduct.

Plaintiff alleges the legal conclusion that the conduct on the day in question was “willful

and wanton conduct;” however, to state a legally cognizable claim, a plaintiff must allege a

sufficient factual basis to support any such claim. Here, the Complaint contains no allegations of

specific facts to support the “willful and wanton” legal conclusion. (Complaint at ¶ 107). See

LaSalle Nat. Bank, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 790 (legal conclusions not supported by allegations of

specific facts will be disregarded). The Complaint admits that the Defendant Officers entered

Plaintiff’s apartment to execute a search warrant for a convicted felon with an illegal firearm. Ex.

A. Consistent with longstanding protocols and validated by Illinois courts (see, e.g., Torry v. City

of Chicago, No. 15-cv-8383, 2018 WL 950099, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2018)), Officer

Lisciandrello demanded, in the first few seconds of the encounter, that Plaintiff put up her hands

in order to protect both the Officers’ and Plaintiff’s safety. There is no dispute that upon entry into

Plaintiff’s residence, officers had weapons drawn and demanded immediate compliance when

executing a search warrant that the Officers believed was on the residence of a convicted felon

with an illegal firearm. These facts, which are the only ones alleged in support of the assault claim,

do not establish “willful and wanton conduct” necessary to support this claim. These pleading

deficiencies establish that the Officers cannot be held liable for assault, and the City therefore

cannot be held liable as the Officers’ employer.

9
 D. The City cannot be liable for an invasion of privacy (Count V) or a trespass
(Count VI) because the Officers lawfully entered the apartment.
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

The Complaint fails to clearly allege the elements of an invasion of privacy (Complaint at

¶¶ 120-125), as it fails to allege the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. The tort of inclusion upon

seclusion typically applies to voyeuristic prying or eavesdropping into a person’s private life; it

does not apply to lawful surveillance or searches. See, e.g., Schiller v. Mitchell, 357 Ill. App. 3d

435, 440-41 (2d Dist. 2005). Specifically, the tort requires allegation of four elements: “an

unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiff’s seclusion; (2) an intrusion that is [highly]

offensive to a reasonable person; (3) the matter upon which the intrusion occurs is private; (4) the

intrusion causes anguish and suffering.” Schmidt v. Ameritech Illinois, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1030

(1st Dist. 2002). Here, the Complaint admits that the Officers’ entry into Plaintiff’s house was

authorized by the search warrant. Ex. A. It does not allege any voyeuristic behavior on the part of

the Officers; indeed, the bodycam video referenced in the Complaint and shown in the CBS report

incorporated by reference in the Complaint at paragraph 27 shows that the Officers entered

Plaintiff’s apartment at a timestamp of 00:56:45, and that one of the Officers attempts to provide

a blanket to cover her within 35 seconds, at a timestamp of 00:57:20.2 Again, the facts do not

support a tort for which the City can be found liable.

The search warrant that authorized the Officers to enter Plaintiff’s apartment similarly

defeats any claim by Plaintiff for trespass. “[A] party cannot be liable for trespass if acting pursuant

to and within the scope of a valid court order.” Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 686 F. Supp. 2d 782, 795

2
See https://youtu.be/_2Bdjk-KlxU, last visited on June 8, 2021. Though the complaint alleges
that Plaintiff was made to stand naked for 45 minutes (Complaint at ¶ 42), the video in fact
shows that the Officers found a heavy blanket to cover her within minutes, and that the female
officer walked Plaintiff to her bedroom to get dressed at a timestamp of 01:08:03, about 11
minutes after the Officers entered Plaintiff’s apartment. Factual allegations that are inconsistent
with exhibits attached to or incorporated by reference in the complaint are not accepted as true in
ruling on a motion to dismiss. See Van Duyn, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 538.

10
 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2010). Police Officers do not commit trespass when they execute valid search

warrants. Plaintiff’s failure to allege any facts that would render the search warrant invalid is fatal
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

to her claims for invasion of privacy and trespass.

Further, the Illinois Tort Immunity Act also protects the City from liability for the actions

of the Officers for either invasion of privacy or trespass. As set forth in Section C. supra (as to the

assault claim), nothing alleged in the Complaint suggests any willful and wanton conduct by the

Officers which would support Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy and trespass claims: the Officers

entered Plaintiff’s property as authorized by a valid search warrant.

E. The City cannot be liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress based
on the Officers’ conduct in this case (Count VII) under the Illinois Tort
Immunity Act.

Once again, the Illinois Tort Immunity Act sets a high bar for claims against officers for

on-duty conduct. Specifically, the Act does not permit claims for negligence against police officers

acting in the line of duty. 745 ILCS 10/2-202. There is no cause of action for negligent infliction

of emotional distress caused by police officers executing a valid search warrant, as mere

negligence or innocent mistake cannot render a search warrant invalid. People v. Brumfield, 100

Ill. App. 3d 382, 385 (1st Dist. 1981). Plaintiff therefore cannot plead any allegation of negligent

infliction of emotional distress against the Officers, and by extension against the City under a

respondeat superior theory. Count VII must be dismissed.

F. The Officers did not commit intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count
VIII) and therefore the City cannot be found liable.

Illinois courts set a “high bar” for a plaintiff to properly set forth an intentional infliction

of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim. Richards v. U.S. Steel, 869 F.3d 557, 566 (7th Cir. 2017). To

state an IIED claim under Illinois law, the plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct involved must

be extreme and outrageous; (2) the actor must intend that his conduct cause severe emotional

11
 distress or be aware of a high probability of causing severe emotional distress; and (3) the conduct

must actually cause severe emotional distress. Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 263, 269 (2003).
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

The intentional conduct results in liability “only where the conduct has been so outrageous in

character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be

regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Schweihs v. Chase Home

Fin., LLC, 2016 IL 120041, ¶ 51. “Illinois law requires, in the context of police abuse of power,

that the abuse be extreme.” Carr v. City of Richmond, No. 96-cv-50203, 1996 WL 663921, at *8

(N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1996) (citing Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374, 393 (1994), overruled on

other grounds, In re Chicago Flood Litig., 176 Ill. 2d 179 (1997)).

Apart from conclusory allegations of “extreme and outrageous” conduct, the Complaint

fails to allege any intentional conduct by the Officers that is actually “extreme and outrageous.”

There is no doubt that Plaintiff was distressed that she was naked when the Officers executed the

search warrant, but no plausible allegations of the Complaint indicate that the Officers intended to

enter Plaintiff’s apartment while she was naked. And though Plaintiff alleges that she was forced

to stand naked in front of the male police officers for 45 minutes (Complaint at ¶ 42), the video

incorporated by reference in the Complaint demonstrates that Plaintiff’s allegation is false: the

Officers covered Plaintiff with a blanket less than a minute after they entered her apartment, and

allowed her to fully dress about 11 minutes after entering the apartment, after confirming that there

were no other occupants in the residence nor other dangerous conditions. See supra at 11 n. 2. The

Complaint does not allege, and the video incorporated by reference in the Complaint does not

show, that the Officers committed any intentional outrageous conduct purposefully causing severe

emotional distress to Plaintiff.

12
 Plaintiff alleges that she was traumatized by the execution of the search warrant, and the

City has no reason to disbelieve her. But nothing in the Complaint indicates that the Officers had
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

any intent to traumatize Plaintiff. The Officers executed a search warrant, validated by a court, but

which turned out to be at the wrong apartment in a building. That mistake simply does not

constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The only factual allegation identified in Plaintiff’s IIED Count is that the Officers “pointed

guns at her.” Complaint at ¶ 156. Police officers pointing guns at a person while executing a search

warrant concerning an illegally armed convicted felon have not committed any “extreme and

outrageous” conduct. It is in fact less outrageous than the conduct the court held to not constitute

IIED in Carr, where the plaintiff alleged that the police officer “held her against the wall” and

“slammed her against the trunk of the squad car, grabbed her by her pony tail and threw her into

the squad car.” 1996 WL 663921, at *8.

II. Plaintiff’s “civil conspiracy” claim (Count IX) should be dismissed for failure to state
a claim, and as duplicative of Plaintiff’s Chancery Division lawsuit.

A. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for “civil conspiracy.”

Count IX of the Complaint alleging a “Civil Conspiracy (Conspiracy of Silence)” is simply

incoherent. It alleges that on the night of the incident, the Officers “began a conspiracy to withhold

from Ms. Young and the public the fact that they had in fact tortured Ms. Young for nearly an hour

and raided the wrong house.” Complaint at ¶ 162. Leaving aside the hyperbole of the word

“tortured,” it is logically impossible for the Officers to withhold from Plaintiff the facts about how

they treated Plaintiff. The “public” is not a party to this case. Plaintiff has no cause of action against

the City or the Officers for withholding information from “the public.” The Complaint then alleges

that this conspiracy was active among a list of 30 different individuals, many of them non-parties,

without alleging any specifics as to what any of these individuals’ roles was in the alleged

13
 conspiracy. Complaint at ¶ 163. The Complaint does not allege any specific facts regarding what

these 30 individuals are supposedly doing to harm Plaintiff.

FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

The Complaint accordingly fails to allege a claim for civil conspiracy. “In order to state a

claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege an agreement and a tortious act committed in

furtherance of that agreement.” McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 102

(1999). The Complaint alleges neither element. It does not allege an agreement between any of the

30 individuals named in paragraph 163, because it does not explain when, where, or how this

purported agreement was made, or even what the agreement was. Civil conspiracy “is an

intentional tort and requires proof that a defendant ‘knowingly and voluntarily participates in a

common scheme to commit an unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful manner.’” McClure, 188

Ill. 2d 102 (quoting Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54, 64 (1994)). Naming 30 individuals

and stating that they were part of a conspiracy, without more, fails to allege any knowing and

voluntary participation in a common scheme to commit an unlawful act or a lawful act in an

unlawful manner.

The Complaint also fails to allege any tortious act committed in furtherance of the

purported agreement. The only act the Complaint alleges the conspiracy to have committed is

“withholding information,” (Complaint at ¶ 162), but “withholding information” is not a tort. Even

if the Court generously reads this civil conspiracy claim as alleging a conspiracy to violate FOIA,

violations of FOIA are not a tort, and can only be remedied by declaratory or injunctive relief. 5

ILCS 140/11(a).

B. To the extent Plaintiff’s “civil conspiracy” claim concerns the City’s denial of
FOIA applications, it is duplicative of Plaintiff’s Chancery Division litigation.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court’s Chancery Division, Case No. 2020CH07306, on

December 16, 2020, which is attached to this motion as Exhibit B. That complaint alleges that the

14
 Chicago Police Department improperly denied Plaintiff’s FOIA requests, and seeks declaratory

and injunctive relief for those violations. See Exhibit B.

FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

As noted above, it is not clear what exactly Plaintiff is alleging in her civil conspiracy

claim, but it appears to be an allegation that the defendants in this case conspired to violate FOIA

to withhold information from the public. Complaint at ¶ 162. But the exclusive remedy for

violation of FOIA is declaratory and injunctive relief (5 ILCS 140/11(a)), and is already being

pursued by Plaintiff in the Chancery Division. Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim, to the extent it is

cognizable, is therefore duplicative of her procedurally proper Chancery Division lawsuit, and

should be dismissed under Section 2-619(a)(3).

CONCLUSION

It is unfortunate that Plaintiff suffered the indignity of having a search warrant executed on

her apartment while she was naked. But the search warrant was legally and constitutionally valid,

and as a result, Plaintiff has no legal claim against the Officers, and therefore has no respondeat

superior claim against the City. Plaintiff also has not pleaded a coherent claim for civil conspiracy,

and is required to pursue any claims concerning FOIA in the Chancery Division where she has

already filed such a lawsuit. The City accordingly respectfully requests that the Court dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety.

15
 Date: June 17, 2021
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

By: Eileen M. Letts

Attorneys for Defendant City of Chicago

Eileen M. Letts
IL State Bar No. 3123442
Brian J. Beck
IL State Bar No. 6310979
ZUBER LAWLER LLP
135 S. LaSalle Street, Suite 4250
Chicago, Illinois 60603
+1 (312) 346-1100

16
 FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

Exhibit A
 Case: 1:19-cv-05312 DocumentCOURT
IN TIC CIRCUIT #: 24 Filed: 01/24/20
OF COOK Page ILLINOIS
COUNTY, 2 of 4 PageID #:99
The People of the State of Illinois to alI peace officers of the state ~
SEARCH WARRANT R

On this day P.O. Alain Aporongao #4870, Chicago Police Deparkaaent, O11`h District, Complainant and J. Doe has v
~ subscribed and sworn to a complaint for a search warrant before me. Upon Exannination of the complaint, X find that it
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

`~ ~ states facts sufficient to show probable cause. ~j

I therefore cornYnand that you search: C

SIMPSON,Andy L., a Male Black, ~R#2257884,DOB ,approximately 6'03", 1801bs, with medium
complexion

anci the ~remis~s:

164 N. Hermitage Ave. ls`floor aparhnent Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, a Grey brick 3 stony apartment building
with a red front door

a~~ cPi~~ ~h~ ~~nl~~nw~g itZctrnm~ntc5 arti~lPc ar„~~1 thi~r~,igc_

Black semi-auto handgun, ammunition, any articles or documents establishing residency, any locked eon~tainers and
any other illegal contraband.

which have been used in the commission of, or which constitute evidence of the offense.o~:
UNLAWFUL USE OF WEAPON BY FELON 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (a)

G~

I further command that a return ofanything so seized shall be made without necessary delay before me or before:

judge or before any court ofcompetentjuris.dictzon.

.............. ~/.._........_. ..._:._...._._........_.__...__...._

Judge's No.

FS
Date and time ofissuance: YY ~ ~~ ~~~
 COURT BRANCH COURT'DATE
Case: 1:19-cv-05312 Document #: 24 Filed: 01/24/20 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:100
DOROTHY BROWN,CLERK OIL' THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY,ILLINOIS
~..~~.. (3-81) CCIVSC-X-21.9
S`K'ATE OF ILLINOIS TAE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
COUNTY OF COOK
COMPLAINT FOR SEARCI3 WARRANT
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

~~
J P.O. Alain Aporongao #4870, Chicago Police Department,011t'' District, Complainant and .~. Doe
now appears before the undersigned judge of the Circuit Court of Caok County and the request the
.~ issuance of a search warrant to search.

SIMPSON, Andy L., a Male Blac~C, IR#2257884,DOB ,approximately 6'03", 1 SOlbs, with medium
complexion
and the premises:
164 N. Hermitage Ave. IS` Floor Apartment, Chicago, Cook County, lllinois, a Grrey brick 3 story apartment building
with a red front door
at~~ S~IZrG l.~E i~11C)VV~11~ iTiiSiiui?iflECfli5~ aY`iiGI~S aiTitu i~i~iY7~~5:

Black semi-auto handgun, ammunition, any articles or documents establishing residency, any locked containers and
any other illegal contraband.

which have been used in the commission of, or which constitute evidence of the offense of:
0 L1NI~AWFUL USE OF WEAPON BY FELON 720 ]LCS 5/24-1.1 (a) .

complainant says that he has probable cause to believe, based upon the following facts, that the
above listed. things to be seized are now located upon the person az~d premises set forth above:
c~'
J
i I, Officez- Alain Aporongao #4870,have been a Chicago Police Officer for over 6 years and dwriung that tune I have
been assigned to the Ol 1 th District I have been involved in numerous search.warrants and weapon related
investigations. On 2~FEB2019,I, Officer Alain Aporongao #4870, met with an individual whom,from here on will be
1 referred to as J. Doe for the purpose ofsafety and anonymity. 3. Doe stated that with in the last 48 hours, J. Doe went
N
a to 164 N. Hermitage Ave. 1 gt floor apartment Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, to meet an individual ~. Doe has known
for over 10 years and during that time J. Doe has imown SIlvIPSON, Andy L.,IR#2257884 to reside at 164 N.
Hermitage Ave. 16`floor apartment Ctucago, Cook County, Illinois, for approximately the last 3 months. 3. l~oe stated
while inside 164 N. Hermitage Ave. 1 St floor apartment Chicago, Cook County, Illinmis, SIIvIPSON, Andy L.,
IR#2257884 retrieved. asemi-auto black handgun froze his front waist band and showed J. Doe. J. Dce stated that
SIMPSON, Andy L.; TR#2257884 ejected the black nnagazine and showed J_ Doe the live ammunition from the semi-
automatic handgun. J. Doe stated that he knows ~Ja.e handgun was real because of his.familiarity with hand guns and

•/r ~~" /
BUDGE t" ""_ Judge's No.
 ~;uvici uttnnt.;tt I:VUKl llAIA'
Case: 1:19-cv-05312 Document #: 24 Filed: 01/24/20 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:101
DOROTHY BROWN,CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF.COOK COUNTY,ILLINOIS
(3-81) CCMC-1-219
r~+~w~
STATE OF ILLINOIS THE CIRCUIT"COURT OF COOK COUNTY
COUNTY 4F COOK
~ COMPLAINT FOR SEARCH'WARRANT
FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

~ having fired a gun multiple times before.

J. Doe described the building located at 164 N. Hermitage Ave. ls`. floor apartment Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, a
Grey brick 3 story town house with a red front door.

C
~ On 20FEB2Q 19, Officer Alain Aporongao #4870 was able to discover a picture ofSIMPSON, Andy L.,
IR#2257884 on the Chicago Data Warehouse System. I; Officer Alain Aporongao #4870 showed this picture to 7. Doe
and J. Doe innmediately identified the picture of SIMPSON, Andy L.,IR#2257884 to that of STMPSON, Andy L.,
IR#225788 who resided at 164 N. Hermitage Ave. ls` floor apartment Chicago, Cook County., lllinois the individual
s/he observed in the possession of the firearm. On 20FEB2019 I, Officer Alain Aporongao #4870 drove J. Doe to the
apartment building that was cleanly nnarked 164 N. Heranitage Ave Chicago, Cook County, Illinois and J. Doe
'floor apartment. Y, Officer Alain
xdex~kified that building as the one SIlvIl'SQN, Andy L., IR#2257884 resides in ls
Aporon~ao #4870, discovered SIIVIPSON; Andy L., IlZ#2257884 is a convicted feto~ under docket #15CR1135g~?,

J. Doe's cz-iminal history, including possible pending investigations, if any, has been piresented and been made
~~ available to the undersigned Judge. 7. Doe swore to the contents of this complaint, and was made available to the
undersigned Judge for questioning.

.~

E~

J
`~. COM NANT
/v
Subscribed and sworn to before me on ~ v'~ ~ ~~ F~~

JUDGE~~~" `"~ Judge's No.

~~
 FILED DATE: 6/17/2021 4:08 PM 2021L001939

Exhibit B
 FILED
12/16/2020 10:55 AM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS IRIS Y. MARTINEZ
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION CIRCUIT CLERK
COOK COUNTY, IL
2021L001939
PM 2020CH07306

2020CH07306
ANJANETTE YOUNG, )
) 11518374
Plaintiff, )
)
4:08AM

v. )
10:55

2020CH07306
)
6/17/2021
12/16/2020

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, )

)
DATE:

Defendant. )
DATE:
FILED
FILED

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff ANJANETTE YOUNG, through her attorneys at Loevy & Loevy, brings this

suit under the Freedom of Information Act against the CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT.

INTRODUCTION

1. On February 21, 2019, CPD officers executed a search warrant on Ms. Young’s

home that was based solely on an anonymous informant, and in the course of executing the

warrant, forced Ms. Young to stand naked and handcuffed for over 30 minutes in the presence of

multiple male officers before admitting they were at the wrong home.

2. In an effort to keep records about their own mistake and callous humiliation of

Ms. Young from the public, CPD denied Ms. Young’s FOIA request relying on legal positions

that have been repeatedly rejected in prior lawsuits, and later attempted, unsuccessfully, to obtain

a prior-restraint injunction against the news media to prohibit publication.

3. Ms. Young brings this suit to force CPD to release all of these records under

FOIA and seeks a ruling from this Court that CPD’s refusal to release these records was a willful

and sanctionable violation of FOIA.

 LEGAL BACKGROUND

4. Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of

2021L001939
PM 2020CH07306

government, it is the public policy of the State of Illinois that all persons are entitled to full and

complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts and policies of
4:08AM
10:55

those who represent them as public officials and public employees consistent with the terms of
6/17/2021
12/16/2020

the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). 5 ILCS 140/1.

DATE:

5. Restraints on access to information, to the extent permitted by FOIA, are limited

DATE:
FILED

exceptions to the principle that the people of this state have a right to full disclosure of
FILED

information relating to the decisions, policies, procedures, rules, standards, and other aspects of

government activity that affect the conduct of government and the lives of the people. 5 ILCS

140/1.

6. Under FOIA Section 1.2, “[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public

body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a

record is exempt from disclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence

that it is exempt.” 5 ILCS 140/1.2.

PARTIES

7. Plaintiff ANJANETTE YOUNG is a resident of Cook County, IL and made the

FOIA request in this case.

8. Defendant CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (“CPD”) is a public body

located in Cook County, Illinois.

9. Courts in this Circuit have held multiple times that CPD violated FOIA in cases in

which CPD relied on allegedly ongoing investigations as a basis to withhold videos of police

actions.

-2-
 10. The U.S. Department of Justice has found that CPD has engaged in a pattern and

practice of unconstitutional use of force, that CPD’s deficient accountability systems have
2021L001939
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contributed to that pattern and practice, that CPD has not provided officers with sufficient

direction, supervision, and support to ensure lawful and effective policing, and that CPD must
4:08AM
10:55

better support and incentivize policing that is lawful and restores trust among Chicago’s
6/17/2021
12/16/2020

marginalized communities. These findings were true and the time they were issued and are true
DATE:

today.
DATE:
FILED

11. According to a task force that included the now-Mayor of the City of Chicago,
FILED

CPD’s own data gives validity to the widely held belief the police have no regard for the sanctity

of life when it comes to people of color. This finding was true at the time it was issued and is

true today.

NOVEMBER 1, 2019, FOIA REQUEST

12. On November 1, 2019, YOUNG submitted a FOIA request to CPD for “any and

all video recorded from officers’ body worn cameras during a search warrant that was executed

on my home, 164 N. Hermitage Ave., 1st floor apartment, on February 21, 2019.” YOUNG

specified that she is the “subject captured in the body worn camera video” and is “requesting

video from the body worn camera of each officer, respectively, who responded and was on

scene.” YOUNG also provided the warrant number, 19SW5247, to aid CPD’s search. Exhibit

A.

13. On November 4, 2019, CPD acknowledged receipt of the request and assigned

reference number P537723-110419 to the matter. Exhibit B.

14. On November 8, 2019, CPD asked YOUNG to provide a “Government issued ID

in PDF form.” Exhibit C.

-3-
 15. On November 8, 2019, YOUNG sent CPD a PDF copy of her government issued

driver’s license. Exhibit C.

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16. On November 12, 2019, CPD sought an extension of five business days. Exhibit

D.
4:08AM
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17. On November 19, 2019, CPD denied the request in its entirety pursuant to
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12/16/2020

Sections 7(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of FOIA. Exhibit E.

DATE:

18. In its denial letter, which came nine months after the incident occurred, CPD
DATE:
FILED

claimed that it was still conducting an “administrative investigation” into the incident and that
FILED

“disclosure of such file will interfere with our pending and active investigation into this matter

such that our investigation is compromised if witnesses who have yet to meet with our office are

able to review the materials in our possession, including but not limited to the statements of other

witnesses, accused, and complainants.” Id.

19. Courts, including the First District Appellate Court, have repeatedly held that a

law enforcement agency cannot withhold records under Section 7(1)(d) simply because an

investigation is open or ongoing.

20. The asserted exemptions do not apply to records related to “administrative

investigations.” Rather, the plain text of the exemptions makes clear that they only apply to “law

enforcement proceedings” and “active administrative enforcement proceedings.”

21. There have never been any law enforcement proceedings contemplated against

anyone in connection with the raid of Ms. Young’s home.

22. CPD does not claim that there is an ongoing criminal investigation under Section

7(1)(d)(vii).

-4-
 23. There have never been any active administrative enforcement proceedings against

anyone in connection with the raid of Ms. Young’s home.

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24. Even if “administrative investigations” qualified for the exemption, the asserted

exemptions only apply when a public body can prove by clear and convincing evidence that
4:08AM
10:55

release of the requested records “would interfere” with such investigations.

6/17/2021
12/16/2020

25. Courts have repeatedly rejected CPD’s position that release of records from many
DATE:

months after an incident will interfere with any investigation by supposedly impacting the future
DATE:
FILED

statements of witnesses who had not yet been interviewed. CPD was aware of these rulings at
FILED

the time it denied the request.

26. All of the witnesses to the raid, other than Ms. Young, are CPD officers who were

present at the scene of the raid.

27. Under the CPD Department Member Bill of Rights, COPA and BIA are permitted

to share video or audio recorded evidence relevant to an investigation before taking an officer’s

statement, and a CPD officer cannot be charged with a Rule 14 violation if the officer was not

presented with any relevant video or audio of an incident before the officer gave a statement

unless the officer was given the opportunity to “clarify and amend” the original statement after

reviewing the video or audio evidence or the false statement was “willful.”

COUNT I – NOVEMBER 1, 2019, FOIA REQUEST,

FAILURE TO PRODUCE RECORDS

28. The above paragraphs are incorporated by reference.

29. CPD is a public body under FOIA.

30. The records withheld in response to YOUNG’s FOIA request are public records

of CPD.

-5-
 31. CPD has not provided a detailed actual basis that proves by clear and convincing

evidence that the withheld records are exempt.

2021L001939
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32. CPD violated FOIA by failing to produce the requested records.

COUNT II – NOVEMBER 1, 2019, FOIA REQUEST,

4:08AM

FAILURE TO PERFORM AN ADEQUATE SEARCH

10:55
6/17/2021

33. The above paragraphs are incorporated by reference.

12/16/2020

34. CPD is a public body under FOIA.

DATE:
DATE:

35. CPD bears the burden of proving beyond material doubt that it performed an
FILED
FILED

adequate search for responsive records.

36. CPD has not proven that it conducted an adequate search for responsive videos.

COUNT III – NOVEMBER 1, 2019, FOIA REQUEST,

WILLFUL AND INTENTIONAL VIOLATION OF FOIA

37. The above paragraphs are incorporated by reference.

38. CPD willfully and intentionally, or otherwise in bad faith failed to comply with

FOIA by asserting exemptions that clearly do not apply.

39. CPD willfully and intentionally, or otherwise in bad faith failed to comply with

FOIA by denying the request in the interests of protecting itself from negative publicity.

WHEREFORE, YOUNG asks that the Court:

i. declare that CPD has violated FOIA;

ii. order CPD to conduct an adequate search for the requested records;

iii. order CPD to produce the requested records;

iv. enjoin CPD from withholding non-exempt public records under FOIA;

v. order CPD to pay civil penalties;

vi. award YOUNG reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and

vii. award such other relief the Court considers appropriate.

-6-
 Dated: December 16, 2020
2021L001939
PM 2020CH07306

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
/s/ Matthew V. Topic

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

4:08AM

ANJANETTE YOUNG
10:55
6/17/2021
12/16/2020

Matthew Topic
Joshua Burday
DATE:

Merrick Wayne
DATE:

LOEVY & LOEVY

FILED

311 North Aberdeen, 3rd Floor

FILED

Chicago, IL 60607
312-243-5900
foia@loevy.com
Atty. No. 41295

-7-
 DATE:
FILED
FILED 12/16/2020
DATE: 4:08AM
10:55
6/17/2021 2021L001939
PM 2020CH07306

From: Anjane e Young <anjanettelyoung.11@gmail.com>

Sent: Friday, November 1, 2019 5:38:41 PM
To: foia@chicagopolice.org <foia@chicagopolice.org>
Subject: Body Camera Video Request

Greeting

Please find attached a personal request for body Camera Video.

--

Exhibit A
FILED
FILED
DATE:
DATE:
12/16/2020
6/17/2021
10:55
4:08AM
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2021L001939

157K
Body cam FOIA letter.docx
 Date: 11-1-2019

Dear FOIA Officer,

2021L001939
PM 2020CH07306

This is a request under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act.

I am requesting any and all video recorded from officers’ body worn cameras during a search warrant
4:08AM

that was executed on my home, 164 N. Hermitage Ave., 1st floor apartment, on February 21, 2019. I am
10:55

requesting video from the body worn camera of each officer, respectively, who responded and was on
scene. The warrant number is 19SW5247.
6/17/2021
12/16/2020

I would like to emphasize that I am a subject captured in the body worn camera video. Pursuant to 50
DATE:

ILCS 706/10-20 (b)(3), “upon request, the law enforcement agency shall disclose, in accordance with the
DATE:

Freedom of Information Act, the recording to the subject of the encounter captured on the recording or
FILED

to the subjects attorney, or the officer or his or her legal representative.”

FILED

I look forward to hearing from you within five business days, as required by state FOIA law. Please
acknowledge receipt of this FOIA request.

Signature

Anjanette Young
164 N. Hermitage Ave., 1F
630-452-2301
 DATE:
FILED
FILED 12/16/2020
DATE: 4:08AM
10:55
6/17/2021 2021L001939
PM 2020CH07306

---------- Forwarded message ---------

From: Chicago Public Safety <chicagops@mycusthelp.net>
Date: Mon, Nov 4, 2019 at 10:28 AM
Subject: Non-Commercial FOIA Request :: P537723-110419
To: anjanettelyoung.11@gmail.com <anjanettelyoung.11@gmail.com>

Dear Anjanette:
Thank you for your interest in information from the Chicago Police Department. Your FOIA request has been received and is being
processed. Your FOIA Center reference number for tracking purposes is: P537723-110419
You have requested the following records: Date: 11-1-2019 Dear FOIA Officer, This is a request under the Illinois Freedom of
Information Act. I am requesting any and all video recorded from officers’ body worn cameras during a search warrant that
was executed on my home, 164 N. Hermitage Ave., 1st floor apartment, on February 21, 2019. I am requesting video from
the body worn camera of each officer, respectively, who responded and was on scene. The warrant number is 19SW5247. I
would like to emphasize that I am a subject captured in the body worn camera video. Pursuant to 50 ILCS 706/10-20 (b)(3),
“upon request, the law enforcement agency shall disclose, in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, the
recording to the subject of the encounter captured on the recording or to the subjects attorney, or the officer or his or her
legal representative.” I look forward to hearing from you within five business days, as required by state FOIA law. Please
acknowledge receipt of this FO

Exhibit B
 Chicago Police Department (CPD) responds to all public records requests in accordance with the Illinois Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), 5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. If further time is needed to assemble and copy all documents responsive to your FOIA request, we will
contact you with a time estimate and a request to extend.
You can monitor the progress of your request at the link below and you’ll receive an email when your request has been
completed. Thank you for using the Chicago FOIA Center.
2021L001939
PM 2020CH07306

To monitor the progress or update this request please log into the Chicago Public Safety Record System.
FILED
FILED DATE:
DATE: 6/17/2021
12/16/2020 4:08AM
10:55
 DATE:
FILED
FILED 12/16/2020
DATE: 4:08AM
10:55
6/17/2021 2021L001939
PM 2020CH07306

From: Anjane e Young <anjanettelyoung.11@gmail.com>

Sent: Friday, November 8, 2019 3:34:05 PM
To: Chicago Public Safety <chicagops@mycusthelp.net>
Subject: Re: Non-Commercial Police FOIA Request :: P537723-110419

Greetings

You will find attached to this email your request for a PDF copy of my government issued driver license.

Thank You

On Fri, Nov 8, 2019 at 12:39 PM Chicago Public Safety <chicagops@mycusthelp.net> wrote:

--- ---

Please provide us with a Government issued ID in PDF form.

Thank you

--

Exhibit C
FILED
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DATE:
DATE:
12/16/2020
6/17/2021
10:55
4:08AM
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2021L001939

120K
Driver License.pdf
 Lori Lightfoot Department of Police · City of Chicago Eddie.T. Johnson
2021L001939
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Mayor 3510 S. Michigan Avenue · Chicago, Illinois 60653 Superintendent of Police

November 12, 2019

Via Email:
4:08AM

anjanettelyoung.11@gmail.com
10:55

Anjanette Young
6/17/2021
12/16/2020

RE: NOTICE OF RESPONSE TO FOIA REQUEST

FOIA FILE NO.: P537723
DATE:
DATE:

Dear Anjanette Young

FILED
FILED

The Chicago Police Department (CPD) is in receipt of your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

“I am requesting any and all video recorded from officers’ body worn cameras during a search
warrant that was executed on my home, 164 N. Hermitage Ave., 1st floor apartment, on February 21, 2019. I
am requesting video from the body worn camera of each officer, respectively, who responded and was on
scene. The warrant number is 19SW5247.”

Under the Freedom of Information Act, a public body may extend the time to respond to a FOIA request
by up to 5 business days for a limited number of reasons. Pursuant to Section 5 ILCS 143/3(e) of the Act,
the CPD is extending the time to respond to your request by 5 business days from the original due date
for the following reason(s):

1. The requested records require examination and evaluation by personnel having the necessary
competence and discretion to determine if they are exempt from disclosure or should be
revealed only with the appropriate deletions.

2. There is a need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practicable speed, with
another public body or among two or more components of any public body having a
substantial interest in the determination or in the subject matter of the request.

A response will be sent to you on or before November 19, 2019.

Sincerely,

P. Rodriguez
Freedom of Information Act Officer
Chicago Police Department
Office of Legal Affairs, Unit 114
3510 S. Michigan Ave.
Chicago, IL 60653

Exhibit D
Emergency and TTY: 9-1-1 · Non Emergency and TTY: (within city limits) 3-1-1 · Non Emergency and TTY: (outside city limits) (312) 746-6000
E-mail: police@cityofchicago.org · Website: www.cityofchicago.org/police
 Lo ri E. L igh t fo o t D ep ar t me n t o f P ol i ce • C it y o f C h i c ag o Ed d i e T . J oh ns o n
2021L001939
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Mayor 3510 South Michigan Avenue • Chicago, Illinois 60653 Superintendent of Police

November 19, 2019

4:08AM
10:55

Via Email:
anjanettelyoung.11@gmail.com
6/17/2021
12/16/2020

Anjanette Young
DATE:

RE: NOTICE OF RESPONSE TO FOIA REQUEST

DATE:

FOIA FILE NO.: P537723

FILED
FILED

Dear Ms. Young:

The Chicago Police Department (CPD) is in receipt of your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request,
received for the following:

“I am requesting any and all video recorded from officers’ body worn cameras during a search
warrant that was executed on my home, 164 N. Hermitage Ave., 1st floor apartment, on February 21, 2019. I
am requesting video from the body worn camera of each officer, respectively, who responded and was on
scene. The warrant number is 19SW5247.”

CPD reviewed your request and it was determined that your request for Body Worn Camera footage is
denied.

The file that you requested (2019-0004600) is a pending investigation. Therefore, this file is exempt from
inspection and copying under 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(i) and (ii). Our factual basis for this file was compiled
in our administrative investigations into allegations of police misconduct pursuant to our establishing
ordinance (Chicago Municipal Code 2-78-100 et. Seq) and disclosure of such file will interfere with our
pending and active investigation into this matter such that our investigation is compromised if witnesses
who have yet to meet with our office are able to review the materials in our possession, including but not
limited to the statements of other witnesses, accused, and complainants. See, e.g., Clark v. City of Chicago,
10cv1803, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 88124 (N.D. Ill. Aug 25, 2010); Santiago v. City of Chicago, 09cv3137, 2010
U.S. Dist. Lexis 29198 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2010).

You have a right of review by the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor, who can be
contacted at 500 S. Second St., Springfield, IL 62706 or by telephone at 877-299-3642. You may also seek
judicial review under 5 ILCS 140/11.

Exhibit E
Emergency and TTY: 9-1-1 • Non-Emergency and TTY: (within City limits) 3-1-1 • Non-Emergency and TTY: (outside City limits) (312) 746-6000
Email: police@cityofchicago.org• Website: • Non-Emergency and TTY: www.cityofchicago.org/police
 Sincerely,

P. Rodriguez
2021L001939
PM 2020CH07306

Freedom of Information Act Officer

Chicago Police Department
Office of Legal Affairs, Unit 114
3510 S. Michigan Ave.
4:08AM

Chicago, IL 60653
10:55

foia@chicagopolice.org
DATE:
FILED
FILED 6/17/2021
12/16/2020
DATE:

Emergency and TTY: 9-1-1 • Non-Emergency and TTY: (within City limits) 3-1-1 • Non-Emergency and TTY: (outside City limits) (312) 746-6000
Email: police@cityofchicago.org• Website: • Non-Emergency and TTY: www.cityofchicago.org/police