WE Affirm

resolved the benefits of offensive cyber operations by the united States Federal
Government outweigh the harms
Our sole contention is spacewar

China is preparing for a cyber Spacewar- regardless of U.S. intention

Bill Gertz, 7-30-’13 (lectured on defense, national security, and media issues at the Defense
Department’s National Security Leadership Program, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies, the FBI National Academy, the National Defense University, and the CIA , media
fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, editor of the
Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining the Beacon he was a national security reporter, editor, and
columnist for 27 years at the Washington Times. Bill is the author of six books, four of which were
national bestsellers. ,“China’s Military Preparing for ‘People’s War’ in Cyberspace, Space” , The
Washington Free Bacon, http://freebeacon.com/china-military-preparing-for-peoples-war-in-
cyberspace-space/)

Translated report reveals high-tech plans for cyber attacks, anti-satellite strikes”, ¶ China’s military is preparing for war in cyberspace
involving space attacks on satellites and the use of both military and civilian personnel for a digital
“people’s war,” according to an internal Chinese defense report. ¶ “As cyber technology continues to
develop, cyber warfare has quietly begun,” the report concludes, noting that the ability to wage cyber war in
space is vital for China’s military modernization .¶ According to the report, strategic warfare in the past was built on nuclear weapons.
“But strategic warfare in the information age is cyber warfare,” the report said.¶ “With the reliance of information warfare on

space, cyberspace will surely become a hot spot in the struggle for cyberspace control,” the report said. ¶ The new details of Chinese plans for cyber and

space warfare were revealed in a report “Study on Space Cyber Warfare” by four engineers working at a Chinese

defense research center in Shanghai.¶ The report presents a rare inside look of one of Beijing’s most secret military programs: Cyber warfare
plans against the United States in a future conflict.¶ “Cyber warfare is not limited to military personnel. All personnel with special knowledge and skills on
information system may participate in the execution of cyber warfare. Cyber warfare may truly be called a people’s warfare,” the report says. ¶ People’s War was
first developed by China’s Communist founder Mao Zedong as a Marxist-Leninist insurgency and guerrilla warfare concept. The article provides evidence that
Chinese military theorists are adapting Mao’s peasant uprising stratagem for a future conflict with the United States. ¶ A defense official said the report was recently
circulated in military and intelligence circles. Its publication came as a surprise to many in the Pentagon because in the past, U.S. translations of Chinese military
documents on similar warfighting capabilities were not translated under a directive from policy officials seeking to prevent disclosure of Chinese military writings
the officials feared could upset U.S.-China relations.¶ A Chinese government spokesman could not be reached for comment. However, Chinese spokesmen in the
past have denied reports that China engages in cyber attacks. ¶ The study links China’s
space warfare development programs with its
extensive cyber warfare capabilities. Both programs are considered “trump card” weapons that would allow a

weaker China to defeat a militarily stronger United States in a conflict.¶ “Cyber warfare is an act of war that utilizes space
technology; it combines space technology and cyber technology and maintains and seizes the control of cyberspace,” the study says. ¶ Because cyberspace relies on
satellites, “space will surely be the main battlefield of cyber warfare ,” the report said.¶ Satellites and space vehicles are
considered the “outer nodes” of cyber space and “are clear targets for attack and may be approached directly,” the report said, adding that ground-based
cyberspace nodes are more concealed and thus more difficult to attack. ¶ Additionally, satellites have limited defenses and anti-jamming capabilities, leaving them
very vulnerable to attack.¶ The report reveals that China’s
military, which controls the country’s rapidly growing space program, is preparing to
conduct space-based cyber warfare—“cyber reconnaissance, jamming, and attack”—from space vehicles.¶ Space-based cyber warfare will
include three categories: space cyber attack, space cyber defense, and space cyber support. The space cyber support involves reconnaissance, targeting, and
intelligence gathering.¶ “A space cyber-attack is carried
out using space technology and methods of hard kill and soft
kill,” the report said. “It ensures its own control at will while at the same time uses cyberspace to disable,
weaken, disrupt, and destroy the enemy’s cyber actions or cyber installations.”
We have passed the point of no return- China has no incentive to halt Cyber attacks
Chang 13 (Gordon G. Chang, 6-6-13, JD Cornell law and Author of many books about China, “Cyber
Détente with China”, World Affairs)

The ultimate goal is to arrive at understandings with the Chinese. As a “senior American official involved in the negotiations” told
the paper, “We need to get some norms and rules.”¶ Actually, we have long passed that stage. What we need
to do at this point is stop Chinese cyber intrusions, cyber attacks, and cyber espionage, all part of what many suspect to be the
most extensive cyber campaign conducted by one country against another¶ Administration officials, according to the Times,
say they do not expect the talks will result in an immediate and significant reduction in Chinese attacks .
And as Stanford University’s Tim Junio told the AP, “China benefits too much by stealing intellectual property from the
US, so it’s really hard to imagine anyone convincing them to slow down.”¶ So what is the purpose of further talks?
It’s not as if the Obama administration has not already broached the subject with Beijing. The president and various officials had numerous
conversations with the Chinese during the first term, but the attacks increased dramatically in the middle of last year. This
year,
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Joint Chiefs Chairman Martin Dempsey
have all trooped to Beijing to discuss the issue with no apparent result. Despite the persistent effort to
establish a cooperative relationship, the People’s Liberation Army reportedly ramped up its cyber attacks
sometime around the beginning of April.

There are three ways OCO’s prevent these attacks

First is preemption —we can prevent foreign attacks while new tech prevents miscalc
Austin 2012(Greg, professorial fellow at the East West Institute, senior visiting fellow at King’s
College, October 15, "America's Challenging Cyber Defense Policy",
http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/10/15/americas-challenging-cyber-defense-policy/)

United States Pre-emptive and Deterrent Capability? Panetta talked of some amazing and hitherto unrevealed capabilities. He said that US
agencies could now “hunt down the malicious code before it harms our systems .” The statement has surprised
specialists in the United Kingdom. If true, and perhaps we should not doubt it, this gives the United States some useful
capability and should impact the net assessment of U.S. and Chinese military cyber capability . In a similar
vein, and equally surprising to some analysts, he said that the United States has made “significant advances” in solving
the attribution problem. He said that this made it “far less likely” that adversaries of the United States
would attack it: “Potential aggressors should be aware that the United States has the capacity to locate
them and to hold them accountable for their actions”. Pre-emptive Capability and Nuclear Deterrence?
Panetta specifically talked of the need to be able to pre-empt “an imminent threat of attack that will
cause significant, physical destruction in the United States or kill American citizens.” He said that DoD has
“developed that capability to conduct effective operations to counter threats to our national interests in
cyberspace.” Since cyber operations include the full gamut of digital command and control arrangements for strategic nuclear forces, we
probably could use some explanation form Panetta whether this pre-emptive capacity and policy affects the nuclear deterrence calculation of
potential adversaries of the United States, such as China, or a country like Russia, which while less likely to be an adversary, still maintains a
large military nuclear force. China will be looking to Panetta to offer some clarifications on this in the talks he discussed in his speech. Panetta
said he “underscored the need to increase communication and transparency” on both sides.
Second is deterrence – only OCO’s can solve
Jari Rantapelkonen & Mirva Salminen, ’13 (“THE FOG OF CYBER DEFENCE”, National Defence
University Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy Publication Series 2 Article Collection n:o
10)

Even if we would like to think so, success in the cyber domain is not only a question of defense – at least, not for the
nation states. Defence capabilities have to be as preventive as possible in order to reduce the effectiveness of the adversary ́s – whoever it may be –
cyber attack. However, despite the best defensive efforts, intrusions will occur . Therefore, one also has to be resilient in the cyber

domain, that is, one has to have the ability to withstand attacks and failures, as well as to mitigate harm more than in other domains. The creation of

cyber defense capabilities and resilience are pretty easy for the public to accept. Yet, these acts are [is]
not enough. Deterrence is also needed, that is, the capabilities and policies to convince the others not to
launch a cyber attack against one. Deterrence will only be effective if one can build and demonstrate
offensive cyber capabilities. To put this in a clear manner: offensive cyber capabilities are an essential element for
the nation-states to succeed in their current and future international and security policies.3 Defence, resilience
and offense all contribute to the country’s overall ability to protect herself – one needs them all.

OCO’s provide credibility for deterrence

Jarno Limnéll October 9 2012 “Offensive Cyber Capabilities Need to be Built and Exposed Because of
Deterrence”, http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/22534-Offensive-Cyber-Capabilities-Need-to-be-
Built-and-Exposed-Because-of-Deterrence.html

Within the next couple of years the world will experience more intentionally executed and demonstrated
cyberattacks while the development of offensive cyberweapons will become fiercer and publicly more acceptable.¶ Today, cyber capabilities are
essential for nation-states and armed forces that want to be treated as credible players. Cyberspace, the fifth dimension of
warfare, has already become an important arena of world politics, especially since we are living in a time in which the lines between war and peace have blurred.
The digital world has become a domain where strategic advantage can be either lost or won. ¶ To
succeed in the cyber domain is not merely a question of defense , even if we would like to think of it that way – at least not for
the nation-states. Naturally, defense capabilities have to be as preventive as possible in order to reduce the effectiveness of the adversary´s – whoever it might be –
cyber attack. However, despite the best defensive efforts, intrusions will occur. In the cyber domain, you must also be resilient, i.e. have the ability to withstand
attacks and failures, to mitigate harm, more so than what is needed in other domains. Creating cyber defense capabilities and resilience
are fairly easy for the public to accept. But they are not enough. Deterrence is also needed, that is, the
capabilities and policies to convince others not to launch a cyber attack against you. Deterrence will only
be effective if you can build and demonstrate offensive cyber capabilities. To put it clearly: cyber offensive
capabilities are an essential element for nation-states to succeed in the current and future reality of
both international and security policies. Defense, resilience, and offense contribute to a country’s
overall ability to protect itself. You need them all.¶ From nuclear to cyber deterrence¶ Deterrence theory was developed in the
1950s, primarily to address the new strategic challenges posed by nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was able to keep the United States
and the Soviet Union in check. Nuclear deterrence was the art of convincing an enemy not to take a specific action

by threatening it with intolerable punishment or unacceptable failure. The theory worked well. ¶ Based on that logic, cyber deterrence

should play a similar role in the digitalized world . However, the anonymity, the advantage of attacks, and the global reach and
interconnectedness greatly reduce the efficiency of cyber deterrence. At the same time, there are suspicion and rumors surrounding the kind of capabilities others
have and how they are already using those capabilities.¶ In the kinetic world, it is much simpler to evaluate an opponent’s capabilities. It is typically quite easy to
accurately estimate how many tanks, interceptors, or submarines a given country possesses. Countries also openly expose their arsenal, in military parades for
example, or their operational skills, by organizing large military exercises. In
the logic of deterrence, even more important than
having the actual capability is the perception of having that capability.
Third is threat demonstration
Martin C. Libicki, 2013- “Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities”. RAND.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR175/RAND_RR175.pdf
Any state that would discourage other states from aggression in the physical or cyber world by brandishing cyberattack capabilities should first
ask itself whether the point of doing so is to look powerful or to make others look powerless. Although both aims are useful, the need to
concentrate on one message in a strategic communications campaign suggests the usefulness of making a choice. Emphasizing one’s
power has the advantage of inducing caution in all actual or potential opponents and deflects predators to easier
prey. It may also reflect well on other sources of national power. But trumpeting the weaknesses of others deters
troublesome states by reminding them of their vulnerabilities . It also deflects the accusations of self-promotion by
turning the focus toward potential victims. A bigger challenge is how to demonstrate cyberwar capabilities. The most obvious way to
demonstrate the ability to hack into an enemy’s system is to actually do it, leave a calling card, and hope
it is passed forward to national decisionmakers. If the attack can be repeated at will or if the penetration can be made
persistent, the target will be forced to believe in the attacker’s ability to pop into his system at any time. This should force the target to
recalculate its correlation of forces against the attacker. But as with many things in cyberspace, it sounds simpler than it is. Hinting at outright
success is difficult without conceding one’s participation in mischief in the first place and hence cyberwar’s legitimacy as a tool of statecraft,
something countries only started acknowledging in mid-2012. Targets of little value tend to be easy, but penetrating them is unimpressive.
Targets of some value are, for that reason, much harder, often because they are electronically isolated. Finally, the ability to penetrate a system
does not necessarily prove the ability to break a system. The latter requires not only breaking into sufficiently privileged levels but also figuring
out how to induce a system to fail and keep on failing. But penetration may be sufficiently scary in itself if the target leadership cannot discern
the difference between breaking into and breaking. Breaking a system is more hostile and more difficult than breaking into one. It requires an
understanding of what makes the system fail. Getting the desired results also requires shaping the attack so that those who administer the
system cannot detect the attack and repair the damage quickly .
Conveying to others the ability to bring their systems
down and keep them down is not easy. Intended audiences of such demonstrations may subsequently
identify the flaw that would allow such an attack and fix it. If so, for brandishing to work, cyberattack capabilities may
require repeated demonstration. Alternatively, a less hostile demonstration could be to manipulate the system but not to the point of harming
it, a fine line. Can brandishing help dissuade other states from pursuing a network-centric high-technology force to counter U.S. military
capabilities? The
best way to demonstrate the risk of network-centricity is to hack into military systems to
show their fragility (claiming responsibility is unnecessary; the point is to emphasize not U.S. power but
the vulnerability of the enemy’s network-centric systems). In other circumstances, making what is vulnerable clear may
be unnecessary, perhaps unwise. Every hack leads to fixes that make the next exploitation much harder. But the hint of an attack that leaves no
specific trace leaves nothing specific to fix. The
point is to convince others that they cannot protect their systems
even after paying close attention to their security. The vulnerability of less sophisticated states to
unseen manipulation maybe higher when the target does not really understand the technology behind
its own weapon systems. Often, the target’s lack of access to others’ source code and not having built
any of its own complicates figuring out what went wrong and how to fix it.

This is specifically true for deterring China in space

Steve Lambakis, PhD, Catholic University, Editor, Cmoparatvie Strategy, and Director of Space Studies,
NIPP, A GUIDE FOR THINKING ABOUT SPACE DETERRENCE AND CHINA, National Institute for Public
Policy, 2019, p. 55.

When China acts to coerce or deter, its actions may be misperceived by the United States as possible
preparation for regional or even global war. Consequently, an understanding of Chinese military actions
and signaling activities is necessary to determine, to the extent feasible, the purpose behind apparently
aggressive action.220 On the one hand, Chinese leaders might talk aggressively and act cautiously.221
On the other hand, Chinese deterrence strategy towards the United States might involve the
employment of counter-space weapons, which would be seen by the United States as aggression.
Chinese strategists believe that China must display the use of force or show its determination to use
force to compel the enemy to submit or refrain from taking hostile actions. In China’s view, warfighting
would follow the failure of coercive or deterrence efforts.222 These Chinese viewpoints should be the
basis for forming a sound U.S. space deterrence strategy against China. Words, policies, and threats
mean little to the Chinese leaders compared to the capabilities that they see arrayed against them and
the actions the United States may take in other domains to enforce deterrence. Actions and capabilities
will talk unambiguously. It is what China understands, and it is what U.S. leaders should understand can
be effective.

For U.S. space deterrence strategy to work, Beijing must care greatly about the threat the United States
poses and believe that Washington would be willing to execute it. As we read in Chapter 1, this is the
heart of deterrence. “A deterrence threat that misses what an opponent uniquely cares about most, or a
deterrent threat that an opponent does not believe because of its unique circumstances will not deter
much, whatever the threat or domain.”223 The challenge for U.S. defense planners is to understand
why China’s leaders might believe they are free to interfere with U.S. space systems and then design and
execute a deterrence strategy to change Beijing’s calculations. To create a credible threat, the United
States must develop and have on hand the means to cripple or destroy those high-value assets.

Our First Impact Nuclear War:

Satellites are key to powering the grid and banking
Siciliano 18 (John, “NASA: Space Force needed to protect energy grid from 'existential threat.'” August
26, 2018. Washington Examiner. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/energy/nasa-space-
force-needed-to-protect-energy-grid-from-existential-threat)
President Trump’s “Space Force” proposal would help prevent the U.S. energy grid from going dark in an emergency or an attack, NASA
Administrator Jim Bridenstine said in an exclusive interview with the Washington Examiner .
Bridenstine argued that a disruption
of America’s satellite assets would pose an “existential threat ” to the grid, meaning that a Space Force
is needed more than ever. He compared the threat to those facing the banking system today. Both Wall Street and the
electricity sector are dependent on the same Global Positioning System, or GPS, signals from space to
operate, he explained. “Every banking transaction requires a timing signal from GPS ,” he says. “In other words,
if there is no GPS, there is no banking in the United States. Everything shuts down.” “It becomes an
existential threat,” Bridenstine added. Likewise, the situation would be similar for the electric grid , if a
foreign adversary targeted U.S. assets in space, he said. “Electricity flows on the power grid are
regulated by a GPS timing signal as well,” said Bridenstine. The Commerce Department explains that GPS is being used
more than ever to time transactions and run systems more efficiently . Utilities and power companies have employed
GPS to pinpoint disruptions and make the grid more reliable. Experts say knocking out GPS, or having an enemy
broadcast a phony GPS signal, would mean grid operators would be blind to their operations, resulting
in an out-of-sync system and potential calamity. “We are dependent as a nation … on space to the point
where our potential adversaries have called it the ‘American Achilles heel ,’” noted Bridenstine.

This disruption is comparable to a nuclear war

Lamrani 16
Omar Lamrani (studied international relations at Clark University and holds a master's degree from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, where
his thesis centered on Chinese military doctrine and the balance of power in the Western Pacific. Mr. Lamrani previously worked as an intern
with the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, where he was assigned to the Afghanistan desk). “Avoiding a War in Space.” Stratfor. May 17 th, 2016.
https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/avoiding-war-space

The High Cost of a War in Space Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with
devastating consequences. Humanity depends on space systems for communication, exploration,
navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover, future breakthroughs may
await in space, including solar energy improvements, nuclear waste disposal and extraterrestrial mining.
A war in space would disable a number of key satellites, and the resulting debris would place vital orbital
regions at risk. The damage to the world economy could also be disastrous. In severity, the
consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of nuclear war. What's more, disabling
key constellations that give early launch warnings could be seen as the opening salvo in a nuclear attack,
driving the threat of a wider conflagration. While the United States and other nations are taking measures to better prepare
for a potential war in space, their emphasis will likely remain on deterrence. This is an important notion to understand, not only for potential
U.S. enemies but also for the United States itself. For instance, it is conceivable that technological advancements in the coming decades could
allow the United States to recover militarily from a space clash more quickly than the ever-more space dependent China or Russia. In such a
scenario, the costs that a space war would have for the world as a whole might be enough to dissuade Washington from launching its own
space attack.

Our Second Impact is the SUN

Anti-Satellite operations would cause space debris proliferation
Union of Concerned Scientist 07 (“Debris in Brief: Space Debris from Anti-Satellite Weapons.” The
Union of Concerned Scientists is a nonprofit science advocacy organization based in the United States.
December, 2007. https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-security/space-debris-anti-satellite-
weapons#.XBEf1S1oTRY

What's in Space

Since the beginning of the space age there have been some 4,500 space launches worldwide, and today there are 860 active
satellites in orbit, supporting a wide range of civil and military uses. The United States owns and operates roughly half of
those satellites. This space activity has resulted in millions of pieces of orbiting debris (see table ). There are two main sources of
orbital debris: (1) Routine space activity and the accidental breakup of satellites and stages placed in
orbit by such activity; (2) The testing or use of destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that physically
collide with satellites at high speed (also known as "kinetic energy ASATs"). The international community
is attempting to reduce the first category by developing strict guidelines to limit the debris created as a result of
routine space activities. These guidelines appear to be working and can, with strict adherence, significantly reduce the growth of this type of
debris. The destruction of satellites by ASAT
weapons can produce tremendous amounts of orbital debris: the
destruction of a single large satellite such as a U.S. spy satellite could by itself double the total amount
of large debris currently in low earth orbit (LEO), where nearly half of current satellites reside. There are currently
no international restrictions on the testing or use of military systems intended to destroy satellites .

Development and Testing of Destructive ASAT Weapons

In principle there are many types of ASAT weapons a country could use to interfere with the operation of satellites. Unlike most of these, a
successful attack by a kinetic energy ASAT weapon would likely cause damage that could be detected by sensors on the ground, and detecting
severe physical damage would strongly imply that the satellite was no longer functioning. If
such ASATs are seen as legitimate
weapons, a country might therefore have a strong incentive to develop one for use against satellites
that are deemed highly important militarily . U.S. spy satellites, with masses of about 10 tons, are frequently mentioned targets
of such attacks. Both the United States and Soviet Union developed and tested destructive ASAT weapons during the 1970s and 1980s. The
Soviet system was designed to approach a satellite at low speed and destroy it with shrapnel; the system is not believed to have worked well in
tests. These tests created more than 700 pieces of large debris, roughly 300 of which remain in orbit. The U.S. ASAT was a kinetic energy
weapon designed to home at high speeds and destroy the satellite in a collision. It was successfully tested in 1985, destroying a 1-ton satellite
orbiting at 525 km altitude. This test created thousands of pieces of space debris larger than 1 cm, but because it took place at relatively low
altitude atmospheric drag caused the vast majority of the large debris to decay from orbit within a decade. Following the U.S. test in 1985,
there was a de facto moratorium on such tests until China tested a kinetic energy ASAT weapon in January 2007 against a
1-ton satellite orbiting at 850 km altitude. Like the U.S. test, the Chinese ASAT test created thousands of large
pieces of debris. However, because atmospheric drag is much lower at this higher altitude, a large
fraction of this debris will remain in orbit for many decades . Moreover, this debris is concentrated in
the most densely populated part of space.

It blots out the Sun – extinction

Scheetz 6 [Lori, J.D. Candidate at Georgetown University Law Center, “Infusing Environmental Ethics
into the Space Weapons Dialouge,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Fall, 19 Geo.
Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 57]
Despite the fact that the Outer Space Treaty, the centerpiece of the treaty regime, has declared space as the province of all mankind and has
reserved space for peaceful purposes, n35 countries are currently allowed to test conventional and laser weapons in space, deploy and station
these weapons in space, and use the space environment for ballistic missile interception. n36 In addition to failing to adequately address space
weapons, the Outer Space Treaty and other relevant space treaties are focused on exploration rather than preservation of the space
environment. n37 The
debris resulting from testing, deployment, and collisions of space weapons has potentially
devastating consequences for the space environment. Furthermore, actual warfare in space could entomb the Earth in
hazardous debris, threatening mankind's continued existence. n38 The current international law regime for outer space not only fails to prohibit weaponization of space, but it also
falls short of sufficiently addressing and ensuring the quality of the space environment for future generations. While the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear testing in space n39 and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty bans stationing weapons of mass destruction in space, n40
neither proscribes nuclear weapons traveling through space or addresses conventional space weaponry. Furthermore, although the Outer Space Treaty states that [*64] "exploration and use of outer space ... shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic and scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind," n41 and that outer space "is not subject to national appropriation" n42 and "shall be used... for peaceful purposes," n43 the Treaty is framed mainly in terms of exploration and
use, not preservation of the space environment. n44 Some nations, including the United States, have interpreted "peaceful uses" as "non-aggressive" uses of space and have therefore determined that pursuing space weapons is not only permitted by the Outer Space Treaty, but is also
consistent with the aims of the Treaty. n45 This interpretation of "peaceful purposes," which does not condemn offensive and defensive weapons capabilities in space, further illustrates the weaknesses of the outer space treaty regime for arms control and environmental protection
purposes. Additional international agreements designed to protect the space environment include the 1979 Moon Agreement, which is not in force, and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which has essentially expired. The former was intended to prohibit using or
threatening to use force from the Moon, and the latter forbade development, testing, and deployment of systems designed to place weapons of mass destruction into Earth's orbit. n46 Neither agreement, though, addresses placing conventional weaponry in orbit around the Moon or
Earth. In order to fill the arms-related gaps in international law, the U.N. Committee for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) adopted a draft resolution in 1999 for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The resolution passed by a margin of 138 to 0, with only
the United States and Israel abstaining. n47 Acknowledging the threat to international peace and security that [*65] would result from an arms race in space the U.N. General Assembly has passed, every year since 1999, a resolution for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. n48
In general, the PAROS Resolution reaffirms the "importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space" n49 and acknowledges "that the legal regime applicable to outer space does not in and of itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space" n50 and that
"there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness." n51 Unfortunately, without American support, the PAROS Resolution has little chance of becoming hard international law. The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) n52
has also recognized that weaponizing space would undermine both non-proliferation efforts and the notion of maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes. n53 While COPUOS has opened dialogue on space weapons, it has generally avoided issues of arms control and disarmament
because of its limited mandate. The United States has attempted to make sure that disarmament issues remain only in the mandate of the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD). n54 Within the more limited CD framework, China and Russia have presented proposals to ban weapons
based in space and the use of force directed at objects in space. n55 Although France and Canada support the notion that the space environment [*66] should be free from weapons, n56 the United States has met the Chinese and Russian proposals with hostility and a general
unwillingness to agree to a weapons-free space environment. n57 The lack of international consensus on weapons in space and the narrow, arms-control oriented view that has dominated the space weapons debate have left the space environment in a dangerous state of limbo. The
long-term potential for irreparable environmental damage, along with the instability and likely arms race that will result if the United States introduces weapons in space, highlights the notion that the possible security benefits of weaponizing space are simply not worth the risks. D. THE
LOOMING PROSPECT OF A TRAGEDY OF THE SPACE COMMONS Using an environmental ethics lens, the space environment should be viewed as a global commons in need of international protection. By defining outer space in terms of res communis, space resources, which are already
generally considered safe from the grasp of state sovereignty, will continue to be regarded as such, with emphasis placed on protecting space as a necessary element for the continued existence of mankind. n58 As a commons belonging to no country, space, left unregulated in terms of
conventional space weaponry, is particularly vulnerable to damage and destruction and therefore presents the perfect opportunity to apply Garrett Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" theory. n59 In explaining the tragedy of the commons, Hardin provides the now well-known example of
an open pasture (the commons), which is shared by all. Each herdsman is assumed to act rationally, seeking to maximize his profits. The issue that each herdsman encounters, therefore, is the utility of adding an additional animal to the pasture. The decision to add another animal to the
herd is relatively easy, given that the positive utility is about plus one, and the drawbacks of overgrazing, because they are experienced by all of the herdsmen, have a negative utility of a small fraction of negative one. Thus, each rational herdsman using the commons will keep [*67]
adding animals to his herd, leading to overexploitation of the open pasture. n60 This, Hardin points out, is the tragedy: "Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons." n61 Hardin's open
pasture model applies to the space commons with respect to the weaponization of space and the potential for an arms race in space in the long-term. If the space commons are left unrestricted, countries that are capable, now or in the future, can benefit by introducing space weapons
while spreading the negative externalities among the entire international community. Thus, if Country A decides to move forward with a space weapons program, it will bolster its national security (and possibly the national security of some of its allies) and gain diplomatic leverage. All
countries will bear the costs of weaponizing space, though, including dangers from increased space debris, which could limit other states' use of space, and destruction of the space environment. If more countries follow Country A's path, the space commons will quickly be wrought with
over-exploitation and environmental damage. With little ability to self-regulate and effectively rid itself of debris, space is a particularly delicate and fragile environment. n62 Once debris enters the space environment, it remains there, continuously orbiting Earth at up to 17,000 miles per
hour. n63 Physicists Joel R. Primack and Nancy Ellen Abrams note that, generally, the higher the altitude of space debris, the longer it will remain in outer space: Space is the most fragile environment that exists because it has the least ability to repair itself. Only the Earth's atmosphere
can remove satellites from orbit. When the sun flares up in its eleven year cycle, it heats the upper atmosphere and makes it expand so that debris and spacecraft in low orbits are subjected to increased drag. But the higher the original orbit, the less air there is to collide with. n64
Generally, four categories of space debris threaten the space environment: (1) inactive payloads, which consist of uncontrolled satellites; (2) operational debris, which includes debris left over from space activities; (3) microparticulate matter, which includes spacecraft coatings and other
tiny particles; and (4) fragmentation debris, which results from collisions and explosions in space and represents the largest source of debris from human activities. n65 Low-Earth orbit (LEO), already [*68] congested with debris from space activities, consists of the area 200 to 400
kilometers above the surface of the Earth. n66 Geostationary orbit (GEO), on the other hand, lies above LEO and is a geosynchronous orbit that allows space objects to remain in a stationary orbit. n67 There is no natural expulsion process for objects in GEO. n68 Because there are a finite
number of slots in GEO, where objects can remain in orbit for almost ten million years, this orbit is especially threatened by space debris. n69 Intensifying this peril, over three million kilograms of human debris already orbits within 2,000 kilometers of Earth, n70 and, on average, this
debris in orbit moves ten times faster than a bullet. n71 With current technology, computer models can track space objects in LEO that are over ten centimeters in diameter and objects in GEO that are over one meter in diameter. More than 8,500 trackable objects already orbit Earth.
n72 Estimates show that up to 3,500,000 untrackable objects also reside in space. n73 The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS notes that, currently, collisions resulting from space debris only pose a small risk to the space environment and space operations. n74 If the
amount of space debris continues to grow, however, collisions of debris could significantly threaten space operations, n75 and, by extension, the space environment. While humans have not yet actively deployed weapons in space, weapons pose the most danger of rapidly increasing
space debris and creating an imminent threat to the space commons. n76 Considerable uncertainty exists as to which space weapons will create the most environmental damage. Moltz suggests that a collision between an Earth-based direct ascent interceptor and a non-orbital ballistic
missile will only create temporary debris, which will fall from orbit quickly because the collision is so close to the Earth's atmosphere. n77 In contrast, the FAS believes that, if missiles [*69] are intercepted in their boost phase, the explosion of the fuel will probably prevent the missiles
from reaching an altitude in LEO, which could result in significant debris problems. n78 The FAS does believe, however, that ballistic missile interception in the midcourse phase and beyond could create significant debris. n79 Furthermore, a collision between a ballistic missile interceptor
and an orbital target could produce a considerable amount of debris that has the potential to remain in orbit for months before falling into Earth's atmosphere because the collision would occur at a relatively high altitude in LEO. n80 Given that many environmental issues are plagued by
scientific uncertainty and that the environment has often suffered detrimental effects as a result of inaction, state actors should not allow the doubts surrounding the environmental impact of BMDS to prevent regulation of space weapons. It is important to note that debris orbiting
approximately 800 kilometers above Earth resulting from testing, deployment, and use of space weapons will reside there for decades. n81 After debris settles into orbit at more than 1,500 kilometers above Earth's surface, it will remain there indefinitely. n82 Collisions involving debris

n83 In LEO, a
marble-sized debris fragment can collide with satellites "with about the
exceeding just one centimeter can be disastrous.

same energy as a one ton safe dropped from the top of a five story building." n84 When these fragments
collide, the quantity of debris increases. This prospect is compounded if each nation, in the long-term future, rationally takes
advantage of the space commons and introduces its own weapons systems. Ultimately, these collisions could lead to a chain
reaction, creating a halo of debris and making space virtually unusable for peaceful purposes, such as
communications and GPS satellites. n85 Furthermore, space debris could harm or destroy current military space
applications and thus actually compromise the use of space for national security purposes. Steven Mirmina, a
senior attorney with NASA, asserts, "Maintaining the environment of outer space for future use may also be considered an issue of national
security. If certain orbits in outer space become so laden with debris that they are no longer usable, the U.S. may encounter difficulty in
achieving some of its national security goals." n86 In addition to irreparably damaging the space environment and inhibiting peaceful [*70]
space activities, damage to space will also likely cause
harm to Earth's environment because Earth and outer space are
intricately connected. n87 Eventually, collisions
of debris could produce so much dust that a lasting twilight will
cast over the Earth, shrouding the planet in a haze of metallic pollution. n88 Moreover, the mere existence of space
weapons increases the potential for their use in space in the future. Warfare in space could entomb the Earth, creating a hazardous space
environment. n89 One pair of scholars remarks that "scientists need to emphasize that a war in space could create a battlefield that will last
forever, encasing
our entire planet in a shell of whizzing debris that will thereafter make[s] space near the
Earth highly hazardous for peaceful as well as military purposes." n90