Africa Broadcasting Policy

BROADCASTING
POLICY AND
PRACTICE IN AFRICA
ARTICLE 19
GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION
BROADCASTING
POLICY AND
PRACTICE IN AFRICA
First published 2003 by ARTICLE 19.
© ARTICLE 19
ISBN 1-902598-50-4
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be photocopied, recorded or

otherwise reproduces, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form by
electronic or technical means without prior permission of the copyright owner and
publisher.
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements iii
Notes on Authors v
INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter 1: EQUITABLE FREQUENCY ALLOCATION 7
Chapter 2: REGULATORY MODELS FOR

BROADCASTING IN AFRICA 34
Chapter 3: AFRICAN REGULATION OF

SATELLITE BROADCASTING IN
THE ERA OF CONVERGENT ICTS 71
Chapter 4: MEDIA PLURALISM AND DIVERSITY:

A Critical Reveiw of Competing Models 114
Chapter 5: VIABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF

PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING 138
Chapter 6: ISSUES IN LOCAL CONTENT OF

BROADCAST MEDIA 162
Annex 1: ACCESS TO THE AIRWAVES

Principles on Freedom of Expression
and Broadcast Regulation 181
Annex 2: AFRICAN CHARTER ON BROADCASTING 200
Annex 3: AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN

AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
Declaration of Principles on Freedom
of Expression in Africa 205
REFERENCES 214
i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
e are deeply indebted to the authors of the publication, who are
W individually acknowledged in the Notes on authors. We thank the
many individuals and organisations, too numerous to mention, who
provided valuable advice and information for this publication.
This publication was edited by Tawana Kupe who also supervised
the individual authors and produced and copy edited by John Barker
Director of ARTICLE 19 Africa Programme. Wallace Chuma a PhD
student in Media Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand provided
editorial assistance towards the end of the project.
RTICLE 19 gratefully acknowledges the support of the Swedish

A International Development Agency (SIDA) for this publication.
iii
NOTES ON AUTHORS
Katrin Nyman-Metcalf (PhD) is associate professor at Riga Graduate
School of Law, Latvia, visiting professor at Universities in Estonia and
Sweden as well as international advisory to the Communications
Regulatory Authority in Bosnia-Herzegovina and active as a consultant on
e.g. telecommunications law.
Jill Hills (PhD) is Professor of Telecommunications and Broadcasting

Policy, School of Communication, Design and Media at Westminster
University, United Kingdom.
Russel Honeyman is the editor of Africa Film & TV journal and

yearbook since 1993.
Adolf Mbaine is Lecturer at the Department of Mass Communication,

Makerere University, Uganda.
Francis B. Nyamnjoh (PhD) is Associate Professor, Department of

Sociology University of Botswana, Botswana.
Nixon Kariithi is Pearson Chair Economics Journalism, Department of

Journalism and Media Studies, Rhodes University, South Africa.
Tawana Kupe (PhD) is Senior Lecturer in Media Studies, School of

Literature and Language Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, South
Africa.
v
INTRODUCTION
Background and Context

roadcasting is very important in Africa because a majority of Africans
B get their information, education and entertainment from primarily
radio and then television. The press tends to have an urban bias and is
dependent on literacy. Radio uses more African languages than television
and is therefore more accessible. However, the influence and role of
television has grown among urban dwellers in Africa. Television has low
penetration because of the high costs of sets, lack of electricity and
weak coverage.
In the overwhelming majority of African countries, broadcasting has
been the most controlled medium for both technical and political reasons.
The technological limits to the frequency spectrum and its allocation at
both the international and national level have meant that unlike the press,
not just anyone can broadcast. Broadcasting’s ability to reach the majority
of citizens in a country has obvious political implications. Colonial
administrations, which introduced broadcasting to Africa, controlled it
and used it for largely political propaganda purposes. Post colonial
African governments also followed a policy of control of broadcasting
mainly for political reasons. Between 1960s and 1980s when coups were
West and Central Africa’s most favoured mode of change of government,
broadcasting stations were often the first institutions to be taken over by
coup plotters.
In the recent democratization processes of the 1990s privately
owned FM radio stations, where they have been allowed, have been cited
as an important factor in giving the opposition a platform during elections
and in ensuring that elections are conducted freely and fairly. In Uganda,
Mali and Ghana talk shows and discussions have been influential in
providing a forum for robust political debates. Equally control of
broadcasting has been cited as an impediment to democratization or
pluralist politics. It has also been noted that FM radio stations have tended
to be dominated by popular western music rather than local music or
programmes in local languages.
In most if not all countries in Africa broadcasting has since
independence been a monopoly of the state justified on the grounds that it
1
Broadcasting Policy and Practice in Africa
was a public service critical to development, the fostering of unity and the
promotion of national culture and identity. To achieve these policy goals,
broadcasting was often located in Ministries of Information or
Broadcasting and the state broadcaster was answerable and accountable to
the Minister and the State President. This arrangement allowed the
Minister and State President a direct say in appointments to boards,
management issues and programming content in the ‘national interest’.
The national interest was often defined as or meant the political and policy
choices of the ruling party. Rarely was there a reference to the ‘public
interest’ which was more pluralist and inclusive. More often than
not, these institutional arrangements violated the editorial and
programming independence of the public broadcasters and turned them
into state broadcasters.
It could said then that broadcasting policy and regulation used to be
‘simple’. Simple in the sense that it seemed self evident that like other
public services, broadcasting should be run by the state. In the immediate
post independence period, it seemed also that the tasks of nation building
and development were clear priorities and governments which had lead
the independence struggle the undisputed leaders. Simple also in the sense
that in many countries, private broadcasting was not permitted and the
only broadcasting entity to regulate was the ‘public’ broadcaster operating
under the ambit of the government.
Liberalization of the Airwaves

The 1990s witnessed the beginnings of changes in broadcasting in Africa
that have been described as ‘liberalization of the airwaves’. Liberalization
of the airwaves is a reference to a process that has led to the emergence of
private broadcasters and to a much lesser extent and in a very few
countries, ‘community’ broadcasters. It has also included the emergence
and growth of satellite and subscription or pay services. By 2002, direct
to home satellite TV had reached 41 countries in Africa.
The liberalization of broadcasting, is happening in a context of
political change from military and one party state governments of the
period after independence to multi party governments. These political
changes have been called democratization and are a result of broader
political changes at the international level in which the former socialist
and communist governments in East and Central Europe and the former
2
Introduction
Soviet Union collapsed and western liberal democracy gained ascendance.

The relevance of these changes to broadcasting is that pluralist politics is
now linked to the existence of pluralist and diverse media systems as
opposed to government and state monopolies. Freedoms of expression and
the media especially with regards to editorial and programming
independence have become central issues linked to the provision of
alternative sources of information. New buzzwords of deregulation,
commercialization and privatization of broadcasting and
telecommunications became popular and in some people’s minds
immediate policy choices that would create a new broadcasting landscape.
Demands for democratic reforms include demands that state
broadcasters be transformed into public service broadcasters that enjoy
editorial and programming independence, as well as the licensing of
private broadcasters to exist in their own right and as alternatives and
competitors to the public broadcasters.
Technologically, the 1990s also witnessed the rapid development of
satellite broadcasting and the convergence between broadcasting and
telecommunications, which meant the presence in national broadcasting
systems of foreign broadcasters not necessarily subject to local regulation.
The rapid development of digital technologies also meant the promise of
more channel availability, which could in technical terms mean an end to
the problem of limited spectrum availability.
It is important to note that the advocates of liberalization of the
airwaves have not often thought through the full implications of
liberalizing the airwaves. Many if not most thought that the entry of
private broadcasters was sufficient and would result in competition,
editorial and programming independence and choices for audiences. In
short, private ownership is equated to editorial and programming
independence. Pluralism of stations equated to diversity of programme
choices for audiences. While these equations are understandable in the
light of a history of monopoly of state-controlled broadcasting being
contrary to editorial and programming independence and to choice for
audiences, it is a simplification that is not borne out by the practice. They
did not realize that the existence of many broadcasters does not
necessarily mean more choices in programmes for audiences. Private
ownership does not exclude editorial controls for political and commercial
reasons. They also did not realize that private broadcasters also entered the
broadcasting arena as legitimate commercial activity and would operate
them according to how they could make money even if it meant just
3
playing popular music or showing popular television programmes

imported from abroad with very little news or locally made programmes,
if any.
They also did not realize that without transparent regulatory
mechanisms licenses could and would be easily awarded to either the rich
and powerful, or to those linked to powerful politicians or even to
politicians who doubled up as private businesspeople. Finally, they did not
realize that building democratic societies characterized by pluralist
politics and respect for human rights including freedom of expression,
required not only a pluralistic media system, but media diversity as well.
Achieving both media pluralism (many media owners and operators
including genuine public service media) and diversity (different media
owners and operators offering the widest possible range of content
relevant to needs and wants of audiences as citizens in a democratic
dispensation) required deliberate policy development.
Broadcasting policy and regulation is no longer going to be ‘simple’.
What is actually needed is a different policy regime from that which
existed in the immediate post independence period in the 1960s and up to
late 1980s. Liberalization requires broadcasting policies which favour
diversity and pluralism. Government can no longer define the role of
broadcasting as just nation building and development. In line with
political changes, broadcasting has to play democratic roles as well.
Democratic roles come with the imperatives of respecting and upholding
freedom of expression and a free flow of information and ideas. State
control and regulation has to give way to independent regulation.
Independent regulation requires new institutional arrangements, which are
inclusive and transparent.
It is important also to point out that the economics of broadcasting is
much at the fore than in earlier decades. Broadcasting institutions are no
longer just political and cultural institutions but also economic
institutions. In this respect, the challenge of policy and regulation is to
ensure that they do not become purely economic institutions to the neglect
of their democratic and cultural roles.
Therefore, policy and regulatory frameworks have to cover a whole
host of issues.
4
Introduction
New Directions in Policy and Regulation

Frameworks
First, the question of how to create a pluralistic and diverse broadcasting
landscape characterized by different (but complementary) forms of
broadcasting i.e. public, commercial/private and community. This
includes, determining the number of players in the sector as a whole and
in each tier given that frequency spectrum is not infinite, but due to recent
technological developments especially digitalization, channel availability
has expanded tremendously. In this regard, technological developments
should be harnessed in a proactive fashion to not only increase the number
of players and but also to promote diversity of ownership and content.
Second, devising funding mechanisms for the entire system and in
particular public service broadcasting, as funding is critical to survival and
to what kind of programming is offered to audiences. Third, creating
independent, credible, adequately funded and viable regulators, which
ensures the achievement of the policy goals and the viability of
broadcasting. The independent regulators would perform the duties of
allocation of frequency spectrum and licensing and the monitoring of
broadcasters’ compliance with license conditions, including content issues
and competition, as well as protecting and upholding the editorial and
programming independence of all broadcasters.
Developing new policies and regulatory frameworks necessitates a
different kind of politics from that of the pre 1990 period and a
qualitatively different kind of politics of the post 1990 period, which tend
to be characterized by rhetorical affirmations of democratization and
democracy. Democratization or democracy is often taken to be the
exercise of some degrees of political pluralism often in conditions where
competition for political power was unfair as institutions had not been
sufficiently reformed to play independent roles. The media including the
state broadcaster and the new private broadcaster, often did not
necessarily play impartial roles during elections and in their general
coverage of currents affairs. The new politics that is required would open
the policy process to all stakeholders and to entrench the notion of
independent, transparent and credible regulation. To a large extent, this is
an essential element of a democratic dispensation.
A first step is the institutional separation of policy making and
regulation. Such separation means that government and their designated
5
ministers cannot as the ultimate policy makers double up as regulators just

as regulators are not policy makers. Separation does not mean there are no
principled and defined links. Regulators exist by virtue of policy,
implement policy and operate in a policy environment defined by
governments. Because of the institutional knowledge they gather in the
regulatory process, regulators should be able to feed into policy processes,
including policy reviews.
A second step linked to effecting the separation between policy
making and regulation is creating all the institutional arrangements, which
are necessary for regulators to be independent. These arrangements
include locating the regulators outside the government ministries, giving
them constitutional guarantees of independence, devising appointment
systems to governance and management structures that are transparent
and exclude representation of political and economic interests and the
allocation of adequate financial and human resources to enable credible,
effective, efficient regulation. Institutional arrangements should also
include transparent lines of accountability, which do not undermine
independence. There are different ways of achieving such arrangements
and the contributions in this volume refer to some. The South
African example is often quoted in Southern Africa as a model well
worth emulating.
It is important to point out that the intention of this volume is not to
prescribe a particular model rather to suggest different models. Ultimately
is important is not a particular model but whether the objectives of a
pluralistic and diverse broadcasting system that is accessible, well funded,
well managed, viable and responsive to the needs and wants of all the
citizens are achieved.
6
Chapter 1
EQUITABLE FREQUENCY ALLOCATION
Dr. Katrin Nyman-Metcalf
Abstract
s a global resource, frequency allocation is made at two levels,
A internationally and nationally. At the international level, which is the
first step, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is in charge
of frequency allocations to three defined regions.
It is the responsibility of each nation to do frequency planning at a
national level. In the frequency allocation process, African countries
should take into account:
• the importance of a transparent, open and a participatory

approach to the decision making process;
• the application of the principle of fair and equitable use;
• the existence of independent regulators, operating in a clear
policy context, to manage frequency allocation;
• the equitable sharing of frequencies among the three tiers of
broadcasting, whilst public service broadcasting should be
allocated the most effective frequencies to ensure national
coverage;
• the existence of clear, open and transparent frequency licensing
criteria consistent with promoting the goals of pluralism and
diversity of ownership and content;
• the granting of frequencies for a reasonable length of time to
allow users to develop their operations;
• the active monitoring of frequency use by regulators to ensure
actual usage adheres to license conditions. the pricing of
frequency spectrum, which differs from country to country, as
this has implications for equitable allocation at the national level;
• the use of new technologies to increase channel availability
where frequency spectrum is limited.
7
Introduction
When gazing up at the starry sky on a dark night, space may appear
endless, but the radio frequency spectrum, which is found up there, is a
limited natural resource. It is a resource that belongs to all of humankind
in common and should be used for its benefit in an equitable manner.
These fine words not only reflect a beautiful principle but are also the
guideline for a very practical and concrete activity: the allocation of
frequencies for different uses in all countries on Earth. With modern
technology there are more ways of using frequencies and of getting more
information on to the limited frequencies available, but even so the
spectrum is not limitless. Convergence of technologies may mean more
efficient use of the frequency spectrum but also more users needing space
in the spectrum. Consequently, there must be a way to distribute
frequencies in a fair and equitable manner so that everybody can enjoy
this important resource. This is crucial for broadcasting but also for the
development of other modern means of communication such as mobile
telephony and Internet.
As it is a global resource that does not recognise national boundaries,
frequencies have to be distributed on a global level, with an equitable
allocation between states. In order for the aim of achieving an equitable
use of the frequency spectrum for all humankind to have any real value,
the allocation must also be equitable on the national level – within the
states. The international system and its obligations must be transferred
down to the national level and put into practice in a manner that allows the
fair and equitable use to permeate to the end users of frequencies.
The availability of different forms of broadcasting and
telecommunication has changed the world and brought people closer
together in a way other forms of communication cannot. The use of the
frequency spectrum is the technical basis for modern communications; the
importance of a fair and efficient use of frequencies thus becomes
apparent. The increase in communications is beneficial for humankind in
many ways, but puts increased stress on the use of the underlying resource
– the frequency spectrum. Although the use may be more efficient today
with new technologies, thus increasing the capacity, the need for the
resource is also growing.
Broadcasting is an important tool as well as consequence of freedom
of expression. The importance of broadcasting for development, for
8
Equitable Frequency Allocation
education and culture, for the security of states and for a variety of reasons
and purposes, cannot be stressed enough. The use of the frequency
spectrum is in turn a necessary tool for broadcasting. This way, the rather
technical issue of spectrum management moves from being a practical-
technical matter for specialists to being a matter of great importance for
anyone involved in broadcasting or any other forms of communication.
This paper describes the system of frequency allocation at the
international level, especially as concerns broadcasting frequencies, as
well as the principles for national spectrum management seen especially
from the African situation. It provides some ideas and makes some
recommendations on how to try to ensure that the frequency spectrum is
used in the most equitable manner.
Radio Frequency Spectrum for Broadcasting

The radio frequency spectrum as well as orbital positions for satellites are
not finite natural resources in the sense that they could be “taken” to be
completely used up for all future – they have no physical mass and if a
certain use of them ends they are there to be used again. But the resource
is limited in the sense that only so many users can enjoy it at any given
time. This is not so much determined by the physical size of the resource
as by the characteristics of it like its sensibility to interference. For the
purpose of frequency allocation, the frequency spectrum is divided into
sections called bands. The different bands have different characteristics
that make them useful and adaptable to specific uses, like AM and FM
radio, UHF and VHF television, meteorology, air and marine navigation,
electronic mail, telephone, etc.i Different users and uses have to co-exist
in certain bands. To be able to transmit information the user must have
exclusive access to a frequency over a geographical area, which is the size
of the signal travelling from its source to the designated receivers. If there
is no such exclusive use, the signal may encounter interference and the
message will not be properly transmitted. This is why the number of users
that can be simultaneously accommodated is limited and the number and
location of users that can co-exist depends on the characteristics of the
band. The range of frequencies allocated by the body in charge, the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has grown since it first
started such work early in the 20th century as technological developments
9
makes more and different access possible.ii ITU does not allocate
frequencies directly to states or specific users, but administers a system of
registrations. It is up to states to notify ITU if a specific frequency use may
cause interference internationally or otherwise have an effect across the
state border. Given the nature of the radio frequency spectrum, it is
obvious that cross-border issues will often occur – the spectrum cannot be
divided along national borders, but follows its own rules. If the relevant
organ in ITU finds that the frequency is used in accordance with ITU
plans, the frequency is deemed to be protected and other spectrum users
should prevent interference to it.iii
The basic law for frequency use with the detail of how the
international spectrum management is handled is set out in the Radio
Regulations, which is a large mass of rules and regulations for spectrum
use, which is binding on member states of the ITU. The Radio Regulations
are very detailed and thus voluminous and they are updated regularly. It is
a huge mass of rules that the national regulators need to keep available and
make sure is updated with the latest amendments. As this is the basis on
which frequency assignment is made also nationally, the Radio
Regulations should be available to be read by those interested. Given the
volume and the technical nature, in many countries the texts will be kept
physically available at the regulator’s premises rather than being
published in official gazettes or the like. In any case, the rules must be
available in some form as they form part of also national law, being an
international agreement binding for the state. For each band of the
spectrum, plans are made at regular intervals for different geographical
regions. There may be modifications of the plans and additions to them in
the interval between plans. As this interval would normally be 20 or 30
years with rapid technological development there is a danger of plans
lagging behind development and it is in practice quite common with
additions. Conditions for use of the bands are set out in regional
agreements in connection with the plans that further specify requirements
for and characteristics of spectrum use in the different bands. There may
also be elements in the Radio Regulations as such that determine criteria
that are more detailed.
The overall usable radio frequency spectrum extends from very low
frequencies of a few Kilohertz (about 3kHz) to extremely high ones of
some hundred Gigahertz (300,000,000 kHz). Radio communications
depend on a combination of properties of nature, on the earth and the
atmosphere. The value of frequencies is different and their usefulness
10
varies depending on the purpose of the use. The bands between 3 and 30
MHz are where conventional radio systems operate and with this they
have a potential of covering the entire world, as the radio waves in these
frequencies are reflected by the ionosphere and the earth and can travel
around the globe. In the higher frequency bands, radio wave propagation
follows line of sight principles and are affected by rain, material obstacles
and generally follows optical laws. Very low frequencies can only be used
by outside aerial systems covering a limited area. Various systems of
transmission like microwave repeaters are used to ensure long distance
transmission on land. Satellites operate on the line of sight principle,
taking into account that from certain positions like in the geo-stationary
orbit a satellite can cover a vast area of the globe – provided it is not
interfered with by another satellite. The number of satellites that can be
launched to certain orbits is thus more limited than the available space
itself may indicate.iv
In all bands it is important to establish criteria on technical
parameters like on channel separation (bandwidth, spacing, etc) to ensure
interference-free broadcasting. Antenna heights and transmitter outputs are
important factors. This is why ongoing monitoring by the regulator is
important – if a broadcaster or other spectrum user changes the parameters,
the situation in the spectrum also changes and interference may result.
Faulty and outdated equipment may lead to this, as might lack of proper
technical knowledge among those responsible for the transmissions.
Apart from the issue of spectrum use as such, with the liberalisation
of broadcasting and other communications services, transmission systems
and infrastructure can also be looked at as a means of ensuring that
broadcasting reaches more people. The public communications
infrastructure often possesses transmission facilities (transmitters, masts
and other equipment) which could also be used by other users. As there is
a close connection between the use of transmission facilities and spectrum
use, facilitating a more effective use of transmission equipment is likely
to lead to efficient spectrum use. It is also a benefit not just to the
broadcasters (cheaper than building your own facilities) but also to society
as a whole, to make more use of existing facilities rather than to build
more of them. One method used in many Central and East
European countries is the creation of separate companies (privatised or
still with state ownership) that are independent from broadcasters or
telecommunication systems and that lease out the facilities on
commercial terms.
11
Given the special role of public broadcasting, it is normal to treat the

public broadcasting service (PBS) differently from other broadcasters in
connection with spectrum allocation as well as other matters. Sometimes
certain bands may be reserved for PBS to make sure that PBS gets the
range it needs. Otherwise, there may just be a priority for PBS to be
ensured the spectrum it needs in any band to reach all parts of the country
and population. Other spectrum users will be assigned spectrum after it is
determined what PBS needs. In this context, it is important that PBS does
not (especially if it used to be the only permitted broadcaster) occupy
frequencies it does not need or use. It may be the case that PBS reserved
spectrum just in case it would need it, as the demands on them to show the
actual need and use would often be different and less strict than for other
broadcasters (if there were any such demands at all) or it may be that the
use has changed. In order to accommodate more users, alternatives to
traditional aerial broadcasting such as satellite and cable may at times
increase the range and accessibility without increasing the need for
spectrum. PBS as the normally dominant broadcaster in a country should
make sure to look at such possibilities. It is also important to look at
reaching population rather than just reaching geographical areas.
There are many important developments going on in the
broadcasting sphere at the moment. Satellite use is no longer very new, but
keeps evolving and presenting new opportunities for broadcasting. The
digitalisation of broadcasting can mean a very important technical change
and breakthrough, allowing more choice for viewers, more efficient use of
spectrum, etc. In line with ITU rules, states are obliged to make the most
efficient use of spectrum by using modern technologies. This is not always
easy though, as it may be costly for governments and users, and thus may
be beyond reach for some countries and for groups of people in countries.
International Frequency Allocation

A resource that is limited and that needs to be shared between users needs
regulation. Even in this era of deregulation and liberalisation in many
fields, the basic fact that we are dealing with something of which there is
not an unlimited amount shows that there must be a form of regulation,
unless we want to accept that the strongest gets all. The global nature of
the resource also shows us that the regulation and system for it must be
developed and implemented on a global level. This brings us into the
12
sphere of public international law. Public international law – the law

between states – differs from national law in that there is no global
legislator or any implementers at the global level. Even with a multitude
of international organisations, some with far-reaching powers, there is still
at least in theory a possibility for states to decide if and how they will be
part of the international legal system, in a way in which subjects of
national law cannot decide whether or not they will follow the law. The
effect and impact of international law thus fundamentally depends on the
will of states to follow the rules. Frequency allocation and the system set
up for it through the ITU are often quoted as a success story of
international law. The rules and decisions of the ITU are more often than
not followed by the member states, even if ITU like all international
organisations lacks any special force to implement its decisions.v
The ITU is the world’s largest existing international organisation
(with 189 member states in 2002) and the oldest still operating one. It was
set up in 1865 as the International Telegraphic Union and merged in 1932
with the International Radiotelegraphic Union (formed 1906), when it
changed its name to the International Telecommunications Union.
Although the organisation is still a state organisation (and since 1947 a
UN specialised organisation) in more recent years, apart from member
states there are also sector members, different bodies active in the
communications field. This is a reflection of the increased private
involvement in the communications sector. The size and age of the ITU
and the fact that it has a well-established system for dealing with issues
within its remit provide some explanation to why the spectrum
management and other elements of international telecommunications law
is successful in the sense of ITU gaining wide recognition for its
decisions. The interdependence of states when it comes to organising
functioning communications is another part of the explanation. When
states have a practical and direct interest in working together
internationally, this co-operation is likely to be desired by all. It is when
the joint interest is more abstract and ideological that certain states tend to
prefer not to bind themselves to any international co-operation. In
communication, from the very first radio broadcasts and telegraphic
messages it was clear that there were a lot to be gained from working with
other countries.
Frequency allocation means that the ITU determines the spectrum
bands to be used for a special service (like for space to Earth or Earth to
space for satellite communications, different types of radio, etc). An
13
allotment plan is made and state administrations must adopt

characteristics in accordance with the plan when they assign the
frequencies to end users. The allotment is thus when a state is given a
share of the frequency spectrum. The state gives the right to use that for
various purposes through assignments. The assignment is made by the
national administration, notified to the ITU and if it is in accordance with
the plan and there are no objections, it is registered and thus obtains a
certain protection.vi Through procedures of notification and registration,
harmful interference is avoided. The idea behind the system with plans
made at regular intervals is that no permanent priority is given to countries
or to users of a certain share of the spectrum, but only a right to use it for
a specified period of time. The Earth has been divided by the ITU into
three regions for the purpose of spectrum management. The regions are
determined by the nature and characteristics of the spectrum, which has
lead to Europe and Africa becoming region one.
ITU was reformed to an important extent in 1992 (entered into force
in 1994) with new structures created to meet new demands put on the
organisation with changing communications. The new structure consists
of a Telecommunications Development Sector, a Telecommunications
Standardisation Sector and a Radio communications Sector. The Radio
communications Sector (ITU-R) deals with frequency allocation mainly
through its Radio Regulations Board. Previously the same activities were
carried out by the International Frequency Registration Board. The work
of the ITU as a whole and in the Sectors is carried out through conferences
at different levels, uniting countries all over the world or regionally. ITU-
R will to an important extent deal with the routine but important matters
of frequency allocation, registration of frequencies and orbital positions,
checking compatibility of assignments and systems of member states with
ITU rules and verifying the proper co-ordination.vii
ITU-R is responsible for the allocation of bands of the radio
frequency spectrum to different uses, the allotment of frequencies and the
registration of radio frequency assignments and associated orbital
positions, in order to avoid harmful interference. ITU-R shall also co-
ordinate efforts to eliminate harmful interference and improve the use
made of radio frequencies. Specifics of the task of ITU-R are set out in a
strategic plan in Resolution 71 of the 1998 ITU Plenipotentiary
Conference. Rational, equitable, efficient, and economical use of the
spectrum by all radio communication services is set out as the mission.
The Resolution describes the environment in which these principles
14
should be ensured, including e.g. growing recognition of the economic

value of the spectrum; market-driven and user-oriented rapid development
and ever increasing demand for spectrum; growing role of regional
organisations and private-sector activities; convergence of technologies,
digital techniques and increased interest of the developing countries.viii
The Radio Regulations Board is an important part of ITU-R. The
members of the Radio Regulations Board shall according to the ITU
Constitution not represent any country or region but shall serve as
“custodians of an international public trust” (ITU Constitution, Article
14.3.1). The same words were used regarding members of the predecessor
organ and the idea behind it was to make it possible to elect members
based on their competence alone. However, as often happens in the UN
system as well as in other international co-operation other considerations
also play a part. Different regions feel they should be represented, issues
that do not necessarily have to do with the actual matter at hand (political
relations between states) influence what support different candidates get,
etc. Even if the Radio Regulations Board would appear well placed to be
elected only on technical merit, this is not the case in practice but
considerations of geographical distribution do play a part. This is also
reflected in the Constitution and it means that there must be a combination
of knowledge in the field with geographical distribution. The importance
of qualification in the field of radio communication is stressed also in
Article 14.1 of the Constitution. It is underlined furthermore that members
of the Board cannot take instructions from anyone.ix
The Radio Regulations Board meets several times a year and can
convene without meeting by using modern technologies. Unanimity is
sought but it is possible to take decisions by voting. As there is an existing
system with procedures for frequency allocation with a Master
International Frequency Register it has at different times been suggested
that it is sufficient if only staff of the ITU deal with frequency allocation
rather than an international board. However, the board has been
maintained as it gives more emphasis and perhaps inspires greater trust in
the work. The Board also has a role in helping to solve disputes, in
proposing areas for action and in otherwise promoting the issues.x
Among specific matters for ITU-R apart from the traditional work
with the spectrum and implementation of the Radio Regulations, are also
the development of criteria for frequency sharing and co-ordination of
new and existing systems in space and terrestrial environments to increase
efficiency as well as improving flexible working methods for ITU-R.
15
ITU-R should also in co-operation with those sections of ITU directly

responsible for development assist developing countries in spectrum
management. Not just least developed states, but all member states should
be assisted with guidance on economical and timely implementation of
radio communication systems.
The World Radio Communication Conference (WRC) of the ITU is
the key decision-maker in the frequency management field. It is the organ
that revises the Radio Regulations, instructs the Radio Regulations Board
and deals with other issues of a global nature. The WRC is normally held
every two years. At the WRC the future frequency allocation is normally
discussed and how this affects the potential of future telecommunication.
Any new uses or applications must be accommodated, so there is a need
for constant review. Study groups as well as Radio communication
Assemblies help prepare issues relating to new technologies and anything
else that should be considered by the WRC. The Plenipotentiary
Conference held every four years is the top decision-making body of the
ITU. Such a conference is held in October 2002 in Marrakech, Morocco.
ITU has a secretariat based in Geneva as a permanent executive organ and
some field offices with different tasks.
ITU has developed and is still refining different processes to take
into account the risk of saturation and to try to ensure as much as possible
that only real and relevant use is made of the spectrum. This is especially
important for satellite positions and also in other space-related contexts.
What is called the administrative due diligence system is one such element
– making sure that care is taken to get information from potential user, to
be able to determine that the intended use is real and feasible and to
ascertain the seriousness as well as usefulness of the applicant. Systems
introduced in recent years are subject to evaluation to determine the most
feasible way forward.
ITU assumes new issues as they arise to try to achieve a better and
more equitable communications area. The issues dealt with can vary. One
topical matter at the moment (second half of 2002) is the pricing for
spectrum. There are great differences between countries on how spectrum
is priced. This question is within the competence of states themselves, but
ITU is discussing it and issuing questionnaires to states in order to come
up with a recommendation on how to harmonise pricing systems. Even
if the ITU cannot impose rules on this, it can have an important role
in harmonising.
16
ITU and Equitable Frequency Allocation

Article 44 of the Constitution of the ITU (now from 1992, in force
1994) says:
Use of the Radio-Frequency Spectrum and of the

Geo-stationary-Satellite Orbit.
Members shall endeavour to limit the number of
frequencies and the spectrum used to the minimum
essential to provide in a satisfactory manner
the necessary services. To that end, they shall
endeavour to apply the latest technical advances as
soon as possible.
In using frequency bands for radio services, Members
shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and the geo-
stationary satellite orbit are limited natural resources
and that they must be used rationally, efficiently and
economically, in conformity with the provisions of
the Radio Regulations, so that countries or groups of
countries may have equitable access to both, taking
into account the special needs of the developing
countries and the geographical situation of
particular countries.
Frequency allocation must permit equitable access. By using the word

“equitable,” it is shown that different aspects must be taken into account
so that the end result is the most appropriate from the viewpoint of as
many different interests as possible. There is no definition in ITU legal
texts for the word “equitable.” In the well-known Black’s Law Dictionary,
equitable is explained as just, fair and right in consideration of the facts
and circumstances of the individual case. So it is clear that the content
must be looked at in each individual case. In the context of frequency
allocation and allocation of orbital positions, there has been a discussion
since at least the 1970’s on how the needs of developing states must be
seen vis-à-vis needs of developed states. The latter require more
frequencies at the present time but thus they may potentially hinder
frequency use of developing states once these have the technical and
economic conditions for needing frequencies. It has been discussed if it
17
would be more equitable to reserve parts of the spectrum and orbit or if it

is indeed better to allow those who need it now to have the right to use it.
The ITU system attempts a balance between interests, which is seen by the
fact that the word equitable is used rather than “equal.” The legal texts
furthermore talk about efficient use and in other ways indicates that there
is no question of just equal distribution, but that the use of the spectrum is
what is the key. This said, the gaps between different countries should be
taken into account to give some content to the equitableness. If it is
ignored that not only current needs but also possibilities to make the most
efficient use vary between states, then the distribution would in no way be
globally equitable but just confirm the advantage of certain states.xi
Although the ITU system for frequency allocation as well as that for
allocating orbital positions for satellites is construed around the equitable
distribution and concern for many different things, it can still not provide
any guarantee that more developed states do not come to dominate
globally over those that have less technical resources. This can concern
frequency use but is perhaps even more likely to be of concern for orbital
positions, where the connection with certain territory on Earth is less
direct. These concerns lay behind different initiatives of developing states
to ensure a guarantee of future allocations – something not well received
by developed states and other market actors, who point to the need of
efficient spectrum and orbit use. This conflict of interest is likely to
remain, although technology develops so fast that some issues take care of
themselves in one way or another.xii The fact that ITU by and large
functions well and is respected, in itself provides some guarantee that the
issues are dealt with in a proper forum and not just used to make
relationships between states complicated.
Even if one can debate how well it succeeds, the international ITU
system does attempt to ensure equitability on the international level. It
also presupposes that the member states ensure the continuation of
equitability to the national level. The ITU system is a state-based system,
which means that even if the actors in the communications field – those
actually using the frequency or orbital position – are increasingly private
subjects, the state they are based in must be responsible for their actions
in the international context. To ensure that a state knows what goes on in
its territory, it has a system of licensing and national regulation – here the
principle of equitable allocation must be included.
18
National Frequency Allocation

International law is the system of law between states. In order for it to be
effective, the states must make sure that the rules they agree to at the
international, inter-state level, are also implemented and enforced within
each state. The state and its organs are responsible for its citizens and
subjects and must make sure they follow international law. The state is
independent in its decisions about what the system for implementing
international law should look like and what the details of it are to be, but
it must be efficient and effective. If the international system is ignored at
the national level it may break down totally or at least become ineffective
in that whatever is agreed internationally never has any effect when it
comes down to the level of individual subjects of law. For frequencies, the
system must e.g. be capable of dealing with interference between
countries. The frequency allocation system and the responsible bodies
must be clearly designated, known to those concerned and the process
must be known and accessible. Article 44 of the ITU Constitution also
puts the demand of use of the latest technologies in order for the use of the
spectrum to be as efficient as possible. Regulators are the tools for
implementing international rules in national law and making sure the
desired results of the international system are properly implemented on
the national level. If there were no system for implementing rules at the
level of individual broadcasters and other users of the spectrum, there
would be chaos. Broadcasters may cause interference, they may find that
their frequency gets taken over, they cannot plan and the audience and/or
customers would not have any security.
It is in accordance with ITU instruments a sovereign responsibility
for states to regulate the frequency spectrum. It means that it is a right for
states to do it, but also a responsibility. Member states of the ITU must
determine the minimum amount of spectrum and orbital positions they
require, they must licence the specific frequencies and orbital positions,
they must apply procedures for international co-ordination and take
responsibility for what is licensed.xiii As shown, ITU allocates frequency
bands for certain usage but it is for the member states to determine how
the frequencies in these bands are specifically used. The state assigns
specific frequencies to specific users and this means that the state has a
possibility to influence which users get access within the scope of use
determined by the ITU. The ITU or any other international body cannot
19
determine the exact make-up of frequency users, even if it is indeed ITU

that determines the make-up of frequency use.xiv
As the radio frequency spectrum is a limited resource – limited
through the use made of it at any given time – it must be allocated to a user
based on the need this user has for a specific frequency at a specific
location and time period. The regulators must be able to determine as
clearly as possible that need and use. Regulators should have plans for
frequency allocation that not only ensure that the use is in accordance with
ITU rules and the use designated by the ITU for a specific band, but also
ensure the most efficient use for the country. As use of the spectrum is a
matter under development, not only present uses but also potential uses,
new technologies and other developments must be taken into account in
order for these to be accommodated as well as can be. This means a need
for flexibility, but at the same time there must be some stability so that
both broadcasters and the audience know where in the spectrum to find
what and can plan accordingly. Licences should not be given for very
short periods of time but at the same time, regulators should have some
possibility of amending licences – in accordance with set procedures so as
not to compromise legal certainty.
It is important that the issuing of frequencies is followed-up by
inspection of spectrum users to verify that licence parameters are
complied with, that the frequency assigned is really used and for the
purpose for which it was given. This task must be carried out by the
regulators, data of it must be gathered and at times supplied to the ITU.
When creating a licensing system, this important element must not be
forgotten, as an important building block in the security and stability of
the system.
With all of these important tasks of the regulator, it is crucial that
there is confidence in the regulator from those affected by its decisions.
Transparency as well as a firm legal basis for the work of the regulator are
important elements promoting such confidence. If it is seen that the
regulator takes into account only objective facts, clear performance
criteria and bases its decisions on what is best for the entire country, the
decisions will be accepted and it is more likely that also those who get a
negative decision will accept it. As it is impossible to have a fool-proof
guarantee against unlawful uses of the spectrum, it is important to have an
environment in which most users follow the rules, so that policing of
unlawful uses does not become such a huge task that there are no
resources for normal regulatory work.
20
One new element to think about in the frequency allocation sphere is

the need to harmonise regulation of telecommunications and broadcasting.
There is more and more convergence between these two sectors and more
and more of frequency use has impact on use for other services, coherence
and co-ordination are growing in importance. Convergence in the sense of
the same legal basis for regulation, joint regulators or established systems
for joint regulation has recently started and has not been completed or got
very far anywhere in the world. In Europe, more and more attention is
given to this and there are some joint regulators or established structures
for joint regulation. This is also the case in North America. In most of the
rest of the world, Africa included, the harmonisation has not got very far.
It is desirable and important that this proceeds. The convergence may
mean that new possibilities open up for a more efficient use of the
spectrum as well as of infrastructure related to spectrum use. A simple
example is that the same mast may be used for broadcasting and mobile
telephony. As regulators should make demands when it comes to technical
facilities used, the regulators can influence such a positive development of
frequency and infrastructure use. The fact that systems are now being built
up in e.g. Africa, gives a possibility to take such steps that may even be
greater and more efficient than in countries with an older and more
established infrastructure.
Whatever system is used for the licensing process, before granting a
licence to any potential broadcaster, the regulatory authority will and
should ask for certain information and will pose certain questions.
Procedural rules for the licensing processes vary from country to country,
even if they are all designed for the same purpose and in the same
international framework. Certain basic questions and demands tend to be
similar however. The entity applying for licence must be set up in a proper
manner and have a certain stability, technical requirements must be met
and generally it must be proven that the entity applying will be capable of
meeting demands put on it. It is more and more common that not everyone
applying for a licence can get one, because of scarcity of spectrum. Some
applicants will be disqualified for not meeting the demands, but
increasingly it may be the case that there are just more applicants than
what the available spectrum can accommodate, even if the regulators do
what they can to suggest shared frequencies, smaller coverage areas than
what applicants ask for, etc. When designing the rules for selecting
between candidates that all meet the basic requirements ITU rules do not
offer much guidance, but states have to determine the system from their
own criteria and needs.
21
Frequency allocation is furthermore not the only element of

international law that broadcasting bodies have to deal with. Apart from
this technical issue, matters of freedom of expression come into the
picture. Diversity and plurality of broadcasts should be ensured, while
respect for other laws and rules – like protection of privacy and against
incitement to violence – must not be forgotten. In some countries, the
same body will deal with the various aspects of broadcast licensing and
monitoring, elsewhere there will be different bodies that must work
together. A broadcaster that incites ethnic violence should be deprived of
its frequency or should never get one in the first place if this intent can be
seen, so even if content and technical parameters are quite different topics,
they must be treated in close connection with one-another. The great
impact broadcasting media has underlines the importance of some
regulation. For media as a whole, as far as content regulation is concerned
the need for regulation depends on the amount and effectiveness of self-
regulation. If there is a functioning system of self-regulation, the need for
official regulation is less. The need for co-ordination with the frequency
regulation however remains.
Away from technical issues, economic reforms and liberalisation
also influence the licensing process. To begin with, if private broadcasters
are only just beginning to be permitted the whole procedure as such is
new. But also in countries that have had some private broadcasters and
communications operators for some time, the share of these as compared
to the state sector is generally increasing. The importance of private
telecommunications operators has an influence for the whole spectrum
management field. Reforms of regulatory systems may aim at giving the
market forces more say in the determination of how spectrum is used. One
element of this is that it is quite common that frequencies may be
auctioned off at certain given times among those who meet certain basic
requirements. Many broadcasting laws prescribe that the consequence of
the auction shall be that the broadcaster that provides the most needed
content will win the auction, provided other criteria are met. The most
needed content may be something that does not already exist or simply
that is oriented towards a wider public demand. There are however also
systems (as used in some form in e.g. the United Kingdom and Australia)
under which those who pay the most get the spectrum. The philosophy
behind this total market approach is that the most efficient use will be
made as those who pay the most must be presumed to have a great interest
in the spectrum and furthermore state organs should not interfere with the
22
content. As this approach is coupled with the existence of public

broadcasting systems, it still gives a possibility for cultural and
educational broadcasting policy. Even so, by choosing this approach the
regulators give up a large part of the possibility of directing what spectrum
should be used for. Ensuring diversity in also private broadcasting is hard
with this type of licensing process. It is also possible to go further in
giving up regulatory influence over the use of spectrum by issuing
spectrum licences without proscribing what service the spectrum is to be
used for (whether broadcasting, telecommunications or other use).
Convergence of technologies makes this a practical possibility but
whether the ideas behind allocation for different purposes must be
dismissed just because technology allows this to be so is another issue.
What is probably inevitable is that ITU must make sure that its rules do
not prohibit the free use of technologies, as the technological development
is so rapid that the ITU system otherwise would risk becoming obsolete.
In international law, in a more direct manner than in national law, rules
that are seen by the users as obsolete and not in tune with reality will
be disregarded.
The African Situation

The frequency assignments plans for Africa at the present time include:
• Medium Wave Sound Broadcasting: Geneva Plan of 1975 for

Africa, Europe and Asia between 535,5 kHz and 1606,5 kHz
• VHF FM Sound Broadcasting. Geneva Plan of 1984 for Africa
and Europe between 87,5 MHz and 108 MHz
• VHF and UHF television: Geneva Plan of 1989 for Africa and
neighbouring countries between 174 MHz to 254 MHz and 470
MHz to 854 MHz.
There is also a broadcasting satellite service plan from 1997 with later
updates (originally made in 1977).xv
Many least developed countries of the world are situated in Africa
and there is a need here for building up capacity in the form of
infrastructure as well as human resources in the various fields related to
spectrum use. The ITU development work supports this, e.g. through field
23
offices in different African states and regional activities aimed at reducing

dependence on foreign especially non-African undertakings for different
communications facilities. A summit of African regulators and
development of regional action plans have also been supported by ITU
recently. The convergence of technologies and the increasing importance
of various forms of telecommunications precipitate the need for
strengthening structures in relation to spectrum use.xvi
Although the basic issues of frequency allocation are the same for all
countries, there are important practical differences depending on the
differences in development between different countries and regions. The
ITU system with its reference to equitable allocation is supposed to take
into account interests of all countries and to make sure its rules to some
extent compensate for differences that would otherwise mean that some
countries are disadvantaged because they are developing at a slower pace
than others. At the same time, ITU rules recognise that frequency use must
be efficient seen in a global perspective, so systems of giving equally
regardless of need would not be more suitable than systems just looking
at current need. One or the other system would mean that frequencies are
not used in the best possible manner seen from the viewpoint of all people
having the use of a scarce resource. The balancing between satisfying
current needs, which are more dominant among more developed states
using modern technologies in an intensive manner and the respect for
current and potential future needs of states at a slower pace of
development, is a dilemma for ITU. The organisation has been criticised
not least by African states for not taking into account the needs of less
developed states sufficiently. But ITU has also been criticised for
excessive regard to less developed countries and their future needs and
thus for an in-effective management of the frequency spectrum. On
balance, the system does have respect from different sides, which shows
that the balancing is not totally ineffective.
One aspect not to be overlooked is that with rapid development of
technology in the communications field, countries who reach a higher
stage of development later do not have to go through the same stages as
those who got there before, but can leap-frog several steps and go directly
onto new technology. Using mobile phones rather than fixed lines in areas
that previously had no phone systems is one example, using satellite
transmission rather than terrestrial and digital rather than analogue are
other examples. Many parts of Africa provide possibilities for these kinds
of rapid developments. African regulators are well placed to explore such
possibilities, as they have fewer vested interests to deal with.
24
On the legal and regulatory side, it is notable that many African

countries have new broadcasting and telecommunications laws adopted in
recent years. This is not specific only for Africa – indeed globally, this is
an area in which there is a lot of legislative activity going on. New
regulatory bodies are established or existing ones reformed. One reason
that this happens not least in Africa, is that there has been across the
continent a liberalisation of broadcasting as well as of other
communications in recent years. There is thus at the moment a good
possibility to influence the design of frequency allocation systems. But
with a lot of reform going on and with perhaps certain gaps in legislation,
the situation may also be uncertain to the detriment of spectrum users.
Even when new rules and systems are adopted, they may in many cases
not be fully implemented. In many countries in Africa legislation followed
development. Media – including broadcast media – became more
pluralistic even before the laws actually allowed for it and forced more
freedom on the sector. There are of course still many examples of
countries in Africa as well as on other continents where media is still not
totally free (or free at all) but more freedom is to some extent forced by
technical developments as well as the general world liberalisation. There
is no contradiction in welcoming this liberalisation and in advocating for
regulation – frequency regulation is needed to avoid the chaos that
otherwise may ensue. In many African countries, there is a lack of
transparency of the regulators, which makes it very difficult to understand
on what basis or why decisions are taken. Increasing transparency and
accessibility of the activities of regulatory bodies should be priorities in
new regulation or the implementation of it. The new laws may include
some such guarantees, but getting it to have full impact on implementation
is still difficult.xvii
One complaint in many African countries is that the licensing system
entails that the licensee must obtain different licences from different
places, paying for each one of them. This is cumbersome and may
discourage broadcasters and other users. There is much that speaks in
favour of a system with one body authorised to deal with the licence
application. This can and should be the case even if more than one body
must be involved in the decision-making (most notably different instances
for determining issues related to content and those related to frequency
allocation). The person applying for a licence should not have to go to
more than one place. This also ensures that the organs involved must have
a system of co-ordination, which in any case is necessary for efficient
spectrum management.
25
Another issues that occurs in some countries in Africa (and

elsewhere) is that frequencies assigned to a user are offered for sale by this
user. Laws on frequency allocation should – and normally do – prohibit
this, as there are special procedures for transferring a frequency to another
user, normally only after approval of the regulator. But such rules can be
circumvented if there is not a sufficient control. Obviously, with this
practice the aims of frequency regulation are lost, as is the control that the
regulator can have on proper technical means and equipment being used.
Another negative effect is that the person who has initially been granted
the frequency, if he or she only wanted it to be able to earn money by
selling it, it is likely that the frequency may remain unused for some
length of time. The control that assigned frequencies are really used must
also be in place. The stockpiling of frequencies and keeping them for
potential future use but keeping them away from any use at the present is
a problem in African states, where the control may not be so developed.
One deterrent against trade in frequencies is to demand thorough
documentation to ensure as far as possible that the applicant indeed will
use the spectrum assigned to him or her, coupled also with a fee. At the
same time, such demands should not be too far-reaching, as they will then
also deter serious applicants.xviii
In this time of rapid and often profound change, many NGOs and
other organisations are active in Africa in promoting media freedom. This
work includes developing and implementing principles on broadcasting
freedom as well as general principles on media freedom. Apart from
stressing the importance of freedom of expression and other issues that are
of interest for different types of media, special issues of concern for
broadcasting are highlighted in various documents. The importance of no
prior control of material is at least as important for broadcasting as for
other media. Such principles are not the topic for this chapter, but
frequencies are also often mentioned in different principles, as it is
impossible to imagine broadcasting freedom without appropriate rules in
this area. The open and participatory nature of decision-making is
promoted, the need for plans to ensure the optimal use of frequencies and
the independence of the body in charge and the need to ensure frequencies
to different types of broadcasts. This is reflected among other instruments
in the African Charter on Broadcasting from 2001, adopted in the
Windhoek +10 process, ten years after the Windhoek Declaration on
Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic African Press was adopted
under the auspices of UNESCO.xix
26
How to Achieve a Really Equitable Frequency

Allocation: Ideas for Improvement
Finally, as concluding remarks and to sum up the matters discussed, some
issues will be highlighted as needing attention by those who are working
for an equitable broadcasting situation in Africa. A key element in any
improvement of the frequency allocation situation in order to allow the
spectrum to be used equitably for the benefit of all is to strengthen the
regulators. This does not mean to make more rules and regulations for
broadcasters or to create bodies with dictatorial powers, which would
definitely not be in the interest of a pluralistic and accessible broadcasting
market. It does mean to ensure that the body in charge of spectrum
management is capable of carrying out its task in the best possible manner
and that its work will be respected. The regulators must be independent,
transparent and operate on an objective and non-discriminatory basis.
Broadcasters, other spectrum users as well as the public must be able to
trust the regulators. They will not do this if the regulator is not
professional and competent as well as open about its work. The regulator
is in charge of implementing the international rules. These are complex,
technical and change often and are thus not easy for non-experts to follow
and understand. Spectrum users should be able to rely on the
professionalism and expertise of the regulator in applying the rules. If a
frequency is assigned to a user, that user is entitled to expect that it will
not encounter interference or indeed cause interference to any other
recognised user and that it can continue using the frequency for some
length of time.
For anyone to be able to take the decision of investing in
broadcasting and the equipment necessary, the staff, etc, or to at least
make plans for this, it must be known what the chances are of getting a
frequency and what the criteria are. Again, transparency and clear rules
are important. Not just for lawyers but also for anyone who wants to find
out what applies in a certain field, if there are clear rules it is possible to
look at these, to get a picture of how and on what ground a decision is
taken. If there are allegations of wrongdoing, of discrimination or of
invitations to bribe and otherwise influence wrongly, the possibility for
anyone concerned to see the decisions and the basis on which such
decisions should be taken makes corruption much more difficult and thus
less likely. Broadcasting laws or laws on frequency management (that
27
may be in the same or separate laws) should list criteria as well as set out
the competence of the regulator. Often it is better that detailed conditions
for licences are set out in regulations by the regulator rather than in the
law (to allow for more flexibility), but also in this case the body of rules
must be easily accessible.
In frequency regulation, one of the key issues is evidently who
qualifies for frequencies and how to determine this. The legislation and
process showing this must be de-mystified and clear. The public
concerned must understand why someone gets a frequency and others
denied, what the process is and the criteria. The decisions should be
explained and in case of rejections, there must be an independent appeal.
In order to influence the plurality of the broadcasting field, only
auctioning off frequencies to the highest bidders is not a good idea, but
some form of “beauty contest” among applicants that meet certain basic
criteria gives more of a possibility to affect the content of broadcasting.
Such rules and criteria must be clear and understandable, based on
accepted ideas and set out in some form that ensures some stability. It
should not be so that the government in office at any given time decides
to give frequencies only to its supporters. The independence and
professional background of the regulator should give a certain guarantee.
Furthermore, although it is acceptable that the regulator charges a fee for
its administrative work and as an application fee for spectrum applications
may be a useful tool to deter non-serious applicants, fees should not be so
high that they deter applicants. There may be special rates or exemptions
for e.g. community broadcasters, public broadcasters also apart from the
countrywide PBS services and maybe other types of desirable and not
necessarily commercially viable broadcasters. The possibility of making
ad hoc exemptions from licence fees or setting different rates on a case-
by-case basis should however be avoided.
Regulators should be independent. Not only should they be
independent from the operators (broadcasters and telecommunications
operators) but they should also enjoy an independent status in the state
structures. Even if it will be the government that in the end is responsible
for policy issues and for spectrum in the relation with ITU, the day-to-day
running of the regulator should not be influenced by the government or
other political bodies. This can be ensured by making sure that the
working methods permit independent decision-making, that members of
the governing organs are chosen based on merit and in a manner to ensure
a plurality of interests. Civil society organisations should be able to
28
nominate members to the governing bodies of regulators and/or there

should be frameworks for the close co-operation between the regulator
and such bodies.
ITU has among its aims and strategies to assist less developed
countries with spectrum matters and related issues. It also stresses the
need to promote broader participation by member states including
developing countries in its activities, including on frequency matters. The
opportunity to influence ITU is there and should be used. Also, there may
be assistance available to set up the best possible system for registering
frequencies and implementing the Radio Regulations. Such assistance
could prove very useful for states in the process of building up systems of
frequency management. However, as always with international aid it is
important to ensure that it is relevant and useful, targeted at the right
issues and recipients. Again, transparency helps monitor that the
international assistance available is indeed used for the benefit of
the sector.
Broadcasters and others active in the field in Africa, where
regulators are undergoing changes following the liberalisation of the
communications field should campaign for and in other ways try to ensure
the maximum independence, objectivity and transparency possible of the
regulators and for a possibility to participate in the work of the regulators.
There is no need for secrecy concerning principles for frequency
assignment. Some of the information broadcasters have to submit, like
financial information, may be sensitive and should not be publicly
available, but on the whole, the regulators should allow access to most
information they hold and in any case, decisions must be public.
Regulators have an important role not just for creating order in the
broadcasting field by protecting frequencies and ensuring that
broadcasters have the access they need, but also in shaping the
broadcasting scene. A liberalised broadcasting market means that there
should not be a strict regulation, but that there should be freedom to
broadcast. Even so, regulators can have a positive impact on liberalisation
by ensuring that different interests are represented. It is not incompatible
with a liberalised market to have rules ensuring that there is programming
suitable for different groups and that money is not only what determines
what will be broadcast. Public service and community broadcasts are very
important not least in rural areas of Africa and regulators must make sure
such broadcasts get licences and the frequencies they need. If the
international system for frequency allocation wants to ensure equitable
29
access for humankind as a whole to a resource, which is the common

heritage of humankind, the idea must be that humankind as a whole enjoys
the resource.
The broadcasting systems in most of the world were until recently
dominated by state broadcasters. The liberalisation of the sector has
occurred with different speed in different parts of the world. In most of
Africa it is relatively recent but now going ahead in many countries at
considerable speed. Frequency allocation is a key to a successful
liberalisation as obviously broadcasters cannot operate without
frequencies and the better the allocation and the more protected the
spectrum use, the better the chances for good and high-quality
broadcasting. Regulators must be prepared to work for this allocation to
private broadcasters, community broadcasters and whatever the actors that
provide a pluralistic media scene. PBS has a special position and need, as
it has a special responsibility to the public. For it to merit the special rules
on spectrum access it must fulfil the special duties, like providing a wider
range and higher quality of programming also for narrower interests than
what the private broadcasters tend to do. The regulator must have a
possibility to determine if PBS fulfils its special duty – whether this is
done by the same regulator as for other broadcasters or by a special body
(both methods exists in different countries). The preferential treatment
should not be more far-reaching than necessary. Private as well as
community broadcasters must have a realistic possibility to get the
spectrum they need, which in most cases with an effective assignment
should be possible. It is important that PBS are not allowed to occupy too
much of the frequency spectrum. At the same time of course, given the
importance of PBS, it must have a proper allocation of the most useful
frequencies to be ensured good coverage of the country. PBS should
however not be allowed to occupy frequencies maybe just out of old habit,
if they do not need them. Alternatives to traditional aerial broadcasting
such as satellite and cable may at times increase the range and
accessibility without increasing the need for spectrum. Technical issues
such as what technology to use to reach the most people take on much
more than a technical importance in this context.
There are many ways of promoting a pluralistic media market
without introducing too heavy-handed and interfering regulation.
Regulators and broadcasters should be working together to ensure a fair
and equitable broadcasting field. The regulator should not hinder
broadcasters and the broadcasters should not see the regulator as an
obstacle but as a facilitator.
30
End Notes
iThe radio spectrum or the range of Hertzian rays ranges from 3 kHz to
3,000,000 MHz (3000 GHZ) and is divided into nine bands officially
numbered band 4 to 12, of which 4 to 11 are broadcasting bands with band
12 being studied for possible use.
ii
Already in 1903, a radio conference discussed interference, even if that
was not really a problem then. ITU has issued frequency bands since
1927. See Lyall Law and Space Telecommunications (Dartmouth 1989)
and Nyman-Metcalf Activities in Space – Appropriation or Use? (Iustus
1999).
iii
See for a discussion on this (mainly on space communications) Soroos
“Global Commons, Telecommunications and International Space Policy”,
Chapter 8 in Papp & MacIntyre (eds.) International Space Policy
(Quorum Books, 1987).
iv“Managing the Scarce Radio Frequency Spectrum and Orbital
Positions”, pp 344-355 in World Communications, Le Monde
Economique International Publications (with ITU), 1995.
v Authors discussing the force of international law and the way
telecommunications and other “practical” issues are areas in which
international law works well, include the classic Brierly The Law of
Nations (Clarendon Press 1963), also Harris Cases and Materials on
International Law (Sweet & Maxwell, many editions) and sources quoted
there, Zacher “Multilateral Organizations and the Institution of
Multilateralism” in Ruggie (ed) Multilateralism Matters (Columbia
University Press 1993).
vi Note the ITU terminology: Allocation – Allotment – Assignment. These
are the different steps from the most global and encompassing to the final
act giving spectrum to the user.
viiOn the ITU, see e.g Lyall, op. cit. n 2. Later changes are treated by the
same author e.g. in the European Centre for Space Law Summer Course
on Space Law and Policy, 1993 Basic Materials in “The International
Telecommunications Union Reconstructed” and in “The Role of the
International Telecommunications Union” in Lafferranderie/Crowther
(eds) Outlook on Space Law over the Next 30 years (Kluwer 1997). See
also Noll “The Space Law related role, activities and contributions of the
ITU in the last decade of the 20th Century” in International Organisations
31
and Space Law, Proceedings of the Third ECSL Colloquium (ESA, 1999)
and by the same author “The International Telecommunications Union” in
Multimedia und Recht, (8/1999 M¸nchen).
viii
The information comes from the ITU web-site, , visited in September
2002.
ixThat geographical and other non-technical criteria is more and more of
a determinant for membership of different bodies in UN organs or other
international organisations is discussed by many authors of international
law. Whether seen as negative or not, it is in any case an illustration to
how the actual practical issues at hand in today’s international context
cannot be the predominant determining factors in creating international
systems: national borders and national decision-making is still too strong
for that. Even in the EU, the world’s most far-reaching international co-
operation it has not been possible to totally do away with nationality
criteria. For the telecommunications sector and ITU, this phenomena is
discussed by Lyall, op.cit. n. 2 and 7, and Smith International Regulation
of Satellite Communication, especially Chapter 5.(Martinus Nijhoff
1990).
x Lyall and Noll discuss the need for the Board and its predecessor, see n 7.
xi See e.g. Smith op.cit. n. 9.
xii New use of different satellite orbits is an example.
xiii World Communications, op. cit. n 4, especially at page 350.
xivIn the sphere of telecommunication rather than broadcasting, this has
lead to occasional fears that states will favour domestic operators and
hinder expansion of international enterprises by treating the latter
unfavourably at the frequency assignment. US global mobile satellite
systems expressed such fears in context with WTO telecommunications
negotiations. In the end, due to the less favourable development if such
systems, the issue has not yet had any major practical consequences. See
e.g. Lessard “International Trade in Telecommunications Services” in
Annals of Air and Space Law Vol. XXII-I 1997 pp 403-411 at p 408.
xvDetailed information about the plans is found in ITU documents, most
however not electronically freely available. The African plans are also
described on the web-site of the South African regulator.
xvi The ITU web-page gives further information on the development
activities.
32
xvii These issues where discussed by experts from many different countries
at a broadcasting policy and legislation conference held in Nairobi in
October 2001, organised by Article 19 and the Kenya Community Media
Network (KCOMNET).
xviii
Examples of this were given during the conference in Nairobi (see fn.
17) regarding e.g. Kenya but also other countries. The Ghanaian
experience was presented at the Forum on Telecommunications
Regulation in Africa and in the Arab States in September 2001 in a paper
by Kanor “Frequency Management – Ghana’s Experience”, available on
Internet at the ITU web-page under the heading of the above mentioned
Forum.
xix Southern African Media Law Briefing, Vol. 6, No. 2, August 2001.
33
Chapter 2
REGULATORY MODELS FOR
BROADCASTING IN AFRICA
Jill Hills
Abstract
t is necessary to regulate broadcasting and that regulation must exist
I within a policy context that has defined goals about the structure of the
broadcasting system. In the current context, both at a global level and in
Africa, broadcasting policy debates revolves around creating pluralism
and diversity of ownership and content.
The principles that underpin differing models of regulation are the
importance of editorial and programming independence and a pluralistic
and diverse broadcasting system differentiated into three tiers public,
commercial and community.
The regulatory framework must address both structural and
behavioural aspects. Structural regulation refers to the broadcasting
system and institutional arrangements; while behavioural regulation refers
to programming and content issues.
Government policy in relation to broadcasting is critical to the shape
and size of the system and must address issues of ownership and funding
for the entire system. Regulating competition between the players is also
part of structural regulation.
Local content regulation is important, as are regulations about
specific programming or what are called ‘must carry rules’ as a way of
promoting pluralism and diversity in content.
The models suggested emphasize independent regulation and
regulatory agencies whose independence is secured through open and
transparent appointments processes, which are participatory and not
hostage to any political and economic interests.
A critical issue is the viability and affordability of regulatory
agencies in the African context, where financial and human resources are
a constraint. Ineffective regulation stifles the growth of the broadcasting
sector and trumps policy goals.
34
Regulatory Models for Broadcasting in Africa
Introduction: Changing International

Environment
Traditionally, broadcasting has been a national market, often with a state-
owned national broadcaster. As a result, in 1985 there were only ten
commercial broadcasters in Africa. And, in general, over the past fifty
years, in countries gaining independence from colonial powers,
governments of liberation have been unwilling to give up their control of
the content of national broadcasting. To a large extent state broadcasters
have been the propaganda tools of government. In Africa, the output of
these national broadcasters has been supplemented by broadcasts from
overseas. Industrialised states— and some non-industrialised— have
maintained overseas broadcasters such as BBC World Service and
Deutsche Welle, as an adjunct to their foreign policy objectives. In a
recent example, the visit of President Clinton in 1998 to six African
countries was the occasion for his promise that the US external
broadcaster, Voice of America, would come to Africa.
However, these traditional domestic markets with limited foreign
penetration have changed since the 1990s. The liberalisation of
telecommunications in the industrialised West in the 1980s and its export
to the developing world through the World Trade Organisation agreement
of 1997 has brought the opening of telecommunications to private
companies in many African countries. In turn, that market opening has
overlapped into the broadcasting sector. In parallel, the decline in aid and
the emphasis on ‘governance’ by Western governmental aid donors has
pushed the ‘free flow of information’ up the agenda with Western private
companies and domestic lobby groups looking to exploit new markets.
Today satellite broadcasting reaches not only into Europe from the
USA, but from the USA, Europe and South Africa into the rest of Africa.
PanAmSat’s launch of a satellite in 1995 allowed satellite distributed pay
TV. By 2002 direct-to- home satellite TV had reached 41 countries in
Africa. New companies have arisen to take advantage of such new
technologies as satellite and microwave distribution.
Faced with harsh economic circumstances, existing broadcasters are
also pooling resources and entering into new commercial arrangements.
For instance, the African Broadcast Network was set up in 2001 to link
public broadcasting companies in Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia and
Zimbabwe with a British broadcaster so as to cut costs by the delivery of
35
identical daily programming. And, from 2002, the commercial arm of the
South African Broadcasting Corporation, the South African public service
broadcaster, has been competing with the likes of CNN and BBC World
to deliver TV news to Africa via satellite. African countries are moving
towards the liberalisation of the broadcasting sector, and to the private
provision of both TV and radio.
In general, in Africa, it is satellite broadcasting that is opening up
domestic TV markets. Using digital technology, such broadcasters can
compact large numbers of TV channels into a small spectrum bandwidth.
Whereas TV markets are still largely confined to the urban elites, it is
radio that is more universal. Previously the state broadcaster had a
monopoly of radio broadcasts but today there are commercial stations in
many African countries. To some extent the opening up of the airwaves is
seen as an indicator of and adjunct to democracy. For instance, in Uganda
where commercial radio began in 1994, by the year 2000 there were
between fifteen and twenty FM stations. In South Africa in 2002, there
were 180 FM and AM radio stations. Yet, as Mandla Langa, the Chair of
the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), has
pointed out, whereas an absence of democracy ‘features a corresponding
lack of media diversity,’ a plurality of media does not necessarily make a
democracy. Numbers of broadcasters who transmit the same diet of
programming without regard for diversity or local people’s concerns, or
who transmit no news or informative programmes, do not create broadcast
diversity. In turn, ‘diversity means codifying the subterranean
implications of language, to shape it in a manner that empowers rather
than bewilders. It is to understand that the public will be the first to hear
the eloquence of silences from the broadcasters, where the public strives
to hear what is not broadcast, and to what extent what broadcasters say has
(or does not have) any relevance to their lives.’i In this situation of
changes to national broadcasting markets and increased
commercialisation and competition, there is an urgent need for regulation
by national governments.
There are those who argue that the broadcasting market is no
different from other markets and that competition within the market can
take care of consumer needs. In the 1980s, the Chairman of the US
Federal Communications Commission, Mark Fowler, argued that: ‘The
public interest...defines the public interest,’ and attempted to reduce the
role of government regulation in the sector.ii His view was that there was
no overriding national interest that demands regulation of broadcasting.
36
Deregulation of broadcasting, particularly in terms of concentration, is

once more gaining currency under the Bush-appointed Chairman of the
FCC, Michael Powell, and is likely to penetrate developing countries in
parallel with USAID.iii
But the economics of information are different from the economics
of other markets. The major costs come in the creation of information. Its
reproduction and distribution is much less costly. Hence, rather than create
programmes, the economic incentives are to buy in programmes that
others have created and to spread the costs of creation by distributing the
information in as many formats as possible. There is therefore an
economic incentive to control both content and delivery systems, an
incentive which has led to concentration of media and transmission
companies at international level, for instance between AOL and
Time Warner.
In addition, there is an economic incentive to broadcast to as many
receivers as possible. Those broadcasters with a large home market are
therefore at an advantage in that they can cover their costs of creation in
their home market and export programmes at a low price. It is for this
reason that US programmes are cheap. In addition, the incentive to cover
as large a market as possible leads to concentration. Without regulation,
the market would be dominated by one commercial company repeating
programmes and buying in programmes at as low a cost as possible.
A broadcasting market without regulation would favour the
industrialised country exporter of programmes and those in majority
languages – English, French, German and Spanish. Programming in
minority languages that cannot be exported or re-used elsewhere is
expensive. In fact, it was not that long ago in 1998, that the European
Commission proposed that minority language broadcasts in Europe
should cease because only those broadcasting in the major languages had
economically viable markets (Hills, 1998). However, in Europe because
broadcasting is a cultural matter as well as one of economics, this
proposal failed.
Nevertheless, there is an economic incentive for any commercial
broadcaster to use only the majority language of the country in which it
transmits. When those using minority languages are poor, the demands of
advertisers increase that commercial incentive. For instance, Mandla
Langa has asked why private radio stations in South Africa broadcast
predominantly in English (with a smattering of Afrikaans).iv Without local
programmes in local languages, broadcasting fails to reflect the
37
communities and cultural identities of the population. Only with

regulation can local languages survive. Without regulation in Africa, there
would be no local programming industry and no local music industry, only
Western imports.
There are other reasons for governments to regulate. Broadcasting
can have adverse external effects. It can fan hostile attitudes and violence.
So, for instance in Rwanda, it is widely argued that radio broadcasting
played a part in the genocide of 1994. Although in the USA the press is
covered by the First Amendment which guarantees freedom of speech,
while US broadcasters now argue that regulation infringes their freedom
of speech, most countries control what may be broadcast. Regulation can
prevent the broadcast of provocative or insulting material.v
Left to themselves, broadcasting markets suffer ‘market failure’
linked to ‘externalities’. This economic term ‘externalities’ means that one
person’s decision to purchase affects another person’s although the market
alone cannot take account of this link between individual decisions
(Graham and Davies,1997:17). And it is because of these externalities that
without regulation, the broadcasting market will end up providing less
choice for consumers than if it were regulated. The problem is that the
consumers of broadcasts do not know what they are consuming until they
have consumed it. Left to themselves they will not try new things. ‘This
is not because consumers are stupid, but because it is only in retrospect
that the benefits of such investment become apparent (Graham & Davies,
1997:20). If no one will try anything new, the end result of all those
individual decisions is that the market coalesces on a narrow set of topics
or formats, thereby reducing choice for everyone. Such an outcome is
termed ‘market failure’ by the economists, and is the economic reason
behind regulation of content.
Commercialisation exacerbates the trend towards uniformity
because advertisers want larger audiences, and commercial broadcasters
look to their audience share in order to sell advertising. The economic
incentive is to look to the tried and tested and to the lowest common
denominator. For instance, the US broadcasting market, which is perhaps
the nearest of the industrialised countries to a free market in broadcasting,
has a high proportion of game shows and low cost entertainment formats
and a low proportion of news, current affairs, drama, educational or more
challenging programmes. To quote Mandla Langa again: ‘Have
broadcasters played their role in transforming South Africa or have they
taken the safer route of using formats and processes tried and tested under
38
the apartheid regime, while offering facile arguments that any

experimentation might affect their bottom line?”vi If broadcasting is to do
more than pump out low cost and lowest common denominator
programmes, it requires regulation of content.
Regulation imposes rules to stand in for the market. It consists of
mechanisms to put into effect government policy. It is part of the domestic
political process of each country. It defines the ‘public interest’ balancing
the interests of commercial lobbies and citizens, it can keep markets
separate (for instance telecommunications from broadcasting), thereby
preventing concentration of the ownership of information and creates both
winners and losers according to its overall goals. It can advantage
citizens/consumers or advertisers/large corporations or politicians/elites
or local owners/ foreign investment or local content/foreign imports or
programmers/ operators, or majority language/local languages within
the broadcasting sector. How then should the broadcasting sector
be regulated?
Broadcasting Policy
It is the government’s role to determine overall broadcasting policy and
the structure of the domestic market. The government has to decide how
many players there will be in which technologies, and where they should
be located. That policy is then given effect through legislation. It is within
this framework setting out the goals of policy and the structure of the
broadcasting market that the regulator will work. Without legislation the
regulator, be it a Minister or appointed agent, works without structure,
targets and accountability. Hence it is important that the legislation sets
out not only the form of regulatory agency, how it will be appointed, its
powers and to whom it is accountable, but also the goals of that policy. To
produce competition and increase the numbers of broadcasters is not a
goal in itself. A democracy requires something more. The aim must be that
each citizen, however poor, should have access to broadcast information
from which he or she can make choices. In turn, that goal holds
implications for market structure and for content. However,
communications is about much more than economics. In the words of a
British minister opening Parliamentary debate on the Communications
Bill of 2002:
39
The Bill deals with the means by which our society

speaks to itself and, as it were, hears the echo. It is the
means by which we talk to the world. It is a shaper of
our culture, our identity and our values. For the
Government, therefore, the Bill is not simply a device
to regulate or deregulate an industry; it plays a vital
role in every one of our wider aspirations for Britain.
It will give consumers choice-the variety that they
demand and deserve-and will give citizens the
information that they need. It will free the industry of
unnecessary interference, give it freedom to grow and
diversify, allow it an opportunity to change as the
world of communications changes, and to gain access
to new sources of investment, as well as new ideas
and challenges. It prepares us for a digital era. vii
The words may be British, but the goals are universal. What is needed is
one or more African ways of implementing them.
Market Structure
The outline broadcasting market structure contained in legislation usually
refers to the licences that will allow holders to transmit in certain bands of
radio spectrum. The legislation should state how many licences will be
issued covering what geographical areas and how broadcasters will be
financed. It should also state which agency is responsible for the award of
licences. But, as John Barker has argued, many governments in Africa
have not passed such legislation.viii Rather, where new private entrants
have been allowed, the broadcasting market has been left to develop
according to commercial priorities, while the government has retained
control of the state broadcaster. This pattern produces the worst of both
worlds – commercial organisations dependent on advertisers expanding
into the most lucrative areas, and state broadcasters dependent on
government with little editorial independence. The policy legislation
needs to bring all types of broadcasters under a transparent regulatory
framework setting out their place in the market and what is expected of
them in return for their licences. That regulatory framework needs to
specify how the broadcasters will be financed.
40
The regulatory framework itself needs division into two aspects,

which include structural regulation as well as behavioural regulation.
Structural regulation determines who may broadcast, how many
broadcasters, where they broadcast and at what power, with what
technology and in which portion of the spectrum, together with their
financing. Behavioural regulation sets out the main principles by which
they are expected to work. We consider the financial aspects of structural
regulation first.
Structural Regulation: Financing

Methods of financing have important consequences for programming.
Whereas the stability of licence fee income or subsidy allowed the state-
owned broadcaster in Europe to develop programmes for the public
without concern that some attracted only minority audiences, the
American commercial system demanded that broadcasters deliver
audiences to advertisers. Programmes were part of an integrated process
that attracted audiences to advertisers who then sold consumer goods.
Commercial radio was a means of developing a mass market for
expanding industrial production. Then, because radio companies looked
for low costs in a competitive market, radio became linked to the
burgeoning recorded music industry. To fill in the gaps between
advertisements, recorded music, phone-ins and headline news have
become US commercial radio’s staple programming diet.
An ideal market would contain radio and TV outlets supported by
different forms of financing. But in the fledgling poor markets of Africa,
this ideal situation is unlikely to exist. Instead, with a deteriorating
economic situation, state subsidies to broadcasters have been cut back
leaving the state broadcaster to rely increasingly on advertising. In turn,
where satellite TV broadcasting is coming in from outside the country,
major international advertisers such as car firms are likely to concentrate
on the elite markets of satellite subscribers. State broadcasters dependent
on other advertising are then likely to crowd out commercial broadcasters,
particularly where per capita income is low and the advertising market
is small.
In the African context, where licence fees from would-be
broadcasters produce much-needed income, there may be a tendency for
government to allow into the market large numbers of commercial
41
broadcasters. But, if there is no advertising market to support them, then

the economics of information would suggest that these outlets will use
stratagems to cut costs and gain cheap programmes. They may opt for
‘free’ programmes, perhaps donated by overseas broadcasters, play
repeats ad infinitum, or evade royalties on the music they play. They will
also become concentrated. Hence, by not taking a view on how many
broadcasters the advertising market can support, governments can impede
the development of commercial radio as well as prevent the development
of local programming and local music.
The fact that a broadcaster is financed by advertising and aims to be
profitable does not mean it should not be regulated. For instance, in
Britain there has been a ‘duopoly’ system of state and commercial
broadcasting. All off-air broadcasters, including the BBC owned by the
state and the commercial broadcasters financed by advertising, have been
regulated according to the same broad criteria with some differences in the
amount of advertising and imports they may carry. In other words, the
form of financing does not necessarily determine the regulation of
the broadcasters.
The financing of radio and TV by advertisers can take a number of
forms. It can include not only direct advertising but sponsorship of
individual programmes and product placement within TV programmes.
But advertising has to be controlled; otherwise there would be only
advertising and no programmes. From the customer’s point of view, in
order to assess the information given, there must be a distinction between
advertising and programmes. Broadcasters must make it plain to the
audience that they are watching an advertisement. Hence legislation needs
to contain a definition of what is an ‘advertisement.’
The economics of information and incentives to concentration in
both commercially funded and state broadcasters have favoured vertical
integration. In a vertically integrated system, broadcasters create the
programmes, package them into channels and then transmit them. Such a
system leaves little room for local programming. In the USA, the Federal
Communications Commission has controlled this vertical integration by
insisting that 30 minutes of the four-hour prime time slot should be
devoted to local or other than network programming. In Britain in the
1980s, to end such vertical integration and reduce its power over the
market, the state-owned broadcaster, the BBC, was forced to sell off its
transmission network and to take 25% of its programmes from
independent producers. In a small market, it may not be economically
42
viable to allow other than vertical integration, but such integration means
there is an even greater need for regulation of the content broadcast.
It is possible then for the broadcasting market structure to include
broadcasters and programme makers financed from a number of sources:
• Pay TV: payments made for individual sports events or films.

• Satellite TV and digital radio, cable TV or that distributed by
microwave systems financed by subscription and/or
advertisement
• Commercial off-air broadcasters financed by advertising
• State owned broadcasting financed by subsidy, licence fee and/or
advertising.
• Local/community radio financed by charitable donations/
subsidy or advertising.
• Independent production companies creating local content
Yet it is not the method of financing that determines the extent of

broadcasting regulation anymore than it is the technology that is used.
Simply because digital broadcasting is coming to Africa does not mean
that its use should be regulated differently from the old technologies.
Technologies may change but the goals of broadcasting policy remain
the same.
Structural Regulation: Radio Spectrum and the

Public Broadcaster
The national regulation of the radio spectrum is the only element of
broadcasting that is subject to international rules to prevent interference.
The International Telecommunication Union, based in Geneva, decides on
allocation tables for the use of the radio spectrum. To do so, the ITU
divides the globe into three regional areas: the Americas; Europe
(including the old Soviet Union) together with Africa; and Asia. Within
each region, at World Administrative Radio Conferences, the members of
the ITU agree on which services shall use which portion of the spectrum.
A specific service is allocated a specific waveband or has to share it with
43
other services. In order to avoid interference between services, national

governments must make allocations within those internationally
specified bands.
Regulation of broadcasting originally came out of the scarcity of
spectrum frequency and the practical necessity of preventing interference
between stations. Out of this initial spectrum licensing, even in the
commercially driven system of the USA, came a very detailed system of
regulation. The transmission licence was the primary instrument of
regulation. It specified the area in which a station might operate, the
technology it could use and the area in which it might broadcast its signal.
In contrast, in Europe governments solved the problem of radio
interference by only licensing one operator – the state controlled
broadcaster – and financing that operator through state subsidy or licence
fees paid by the consumer.
These monopoly state broadcasters then outlasted the original reason
for their establishment. Many of these state broadcasters subsequently
served the political interests of the European government in power. For
instance, in France the state broadcaster, directly controlled by
government appointees, has been expected to be the ‘Voice of France.’
Because of fear of the power of broadcasters, liberalisation of the
broadcasting market did not begin until the 1950s in Britain and the 1980s
on the European continent.
Just as in Africa today, in the industrialised West private commercial
broadcasts presented a light relief from the stultifying monopoly of the
state-owned broadcaster. But another broadcasting model, positioned
between commercial broadcasting on the one hand and state
broadcasting on the other developed in Britain. As a result of the
personality of John Reith, the first Director of the British Broadcasting
Corporation – his strong sense of mission and his desire for independence
from government – state broadcasting in Britain became ‘public
service broadcasting’.
The BBC became the primary model of a broadcaster at arms length
from government with the public service goals being to ‘inform, educate
and entertain.’ In response to the Nazi misuse of the state broadcaster, this
public service model also became strong in Germany after the Second
World War.
44
An ideal model of public service broadcasting has emerged.

Garnham defines it to be:
a means of providing all citizens, whatever their

wealth or geographical location, equal access to a
wide range of high quality entertainment, information
and education, and as a means of ensuring that the
aim of the programme producer is the satisfaction of
a range of audience tastes rather than only those tastes
that show the largest profit (Garnham 1983 13-14).
The most important features of this form of state-owned broadcasting

are then:
• Universal access
• Promotion of national cultural identity
• Editorial independence
• Impartiality
• Programme diversity
• Accountability
Subsequently, these principles have undergone some modification. It is

now generally appreciated that there is not one national cultural identity
but a number of regional or local cultural identities subsumed into the
national concept of identity; that there should be content that represents
ethnic and regional diversity. In both Britain and Germany, these
principles are upheld by a governing board, which regulates the
broadcaster. In Germany, legislation lays down the representation of
particular groups in society – such as labour unions -on these Boards,
whereas in Britain, despite attempts by the Blair government to open up
the process, nomination to the Board is still non-transparent. The
governing board also has the role of acting as a buffer between the
politicians and the broadcasters, preventing political interference in
editorial decisions. To all intents and purposes, the Governors of the BBC
have been its regulators. Nevertheless, in Britain, the Minister does have
the overriding power of intervention in the ‘national interest’ and although
this power is rarely used, on various occasions governments have
45
intervened in programme content. In addition, the very fact that the BBC’s
board is made up of government appointees leads to questions concerning
its impartiality.
This model of public broadcasting where there is some space
between the broadcaster and the government has recently been adopted in
some Southern African states, such as South Africa, Malawi, Namibia and
Botswana. Lobbying by civil society organisations such as the Media
Institute of Southern Africa and Article 19 has brought it into discussion
elsewhere.ix However, in Northern Africa, its adoption has a long way to
go.x Nevertheless, the model that is emerging in Southern Africa is of an
‘African way’ which tends to feature a transparent system of appointment
to the public broadcaster’s board, with open nomination from a range of
professions, or appointment by an independent quasi-judicial body as in
Botswana. Such transparency creates additional space between
government and broadcaster. Yet, in the African context, such a board
alone is not sufficient to prevent the intervention of politicians in editorial
decisions. In fact, if the board contains political appointees, it can become
the mechanism for that intervention. So, for instance the President of
Namibia has been able to intervene in the content decisions of the
Namibian Broadcasting Corporation in 2002 leading to accusations that
the ‘public service’ broadcaster has become a state broadcaster.xi
While governments hold financial controls over the public
broadcaster, it is difficult for the broadcaster not to self-censor, so that
news items which are likely to offend certain quarters are not broadcast.
The tension between editorial independence and government desire to
spin events in its own favour is one that is ongoing. Even in Britain in
2002, reports of political manipulation of editorial appointments to BBC
news programmes illustrate the day-to-day difficulties of retaining
editorial independence (Wells 2002). In effect, while a Governing Board
helps to bring about some distance between government and broadcaster,
editorial independence – that is the concept that programming decisions
are taken by broadcasters on the basis of professional criteria and the
public’s right to know – requires a commitment from the government and
enshrinement in legislation. The British model of a ‘Charter’ (a kind of
agreement between broadcaster and government) to separate the
broadcaster and the government may work within a mature political
system which relies on unwritten rules, but is hardly any barrier to
intervention in a more volatile political environment. In the African
context, legislation which, as in the South African case, guarantees
46
‘freedom of expression and journalistic, creative and programming

independence,’ to the public broadcaster, is essential. xii Also in the
African context, legislation that forbids political appointees to the
broadcaster or political intervention within appointments or political
intervention in editorial decisions would allow appeals to the judiciary.
The principle of ‘impartiality’ is important in that it ensures that the
broadcaster does not represent only one set of interests. In Germany, the
public broadcaster must pursue internally pluralistic programming, which
is defined in legislation. It ‘must present all social interests in a balanced
fashion’ and, in particular its programs are ‘forbidden from pursuing any
one-sided interest or viewpoint’ (Hoffman-Reim, 1996,117). To
strengthen the public broadcaster’s ability to balance conflicting views, it
may seem advantageous to legislate for such ‘impartiality.’ But it is
possible for governments to legislate in such a way that the edicts of
‘accuracy and impartiality’ come to mean that no opposition or criticism
of government can be aired. In six Southern African Development
Community (SADC) countries, there are surviving colonial laws
preventing criticism of the state and governments under pressure may seek
to target the broadcaster or journalists for airing criticism however
balanced that criticism may be. Again, it is commitment from government
to openness and debate that is necessary.
Other aspects of the public service broadcasting model that are
useful in the African context are those of programme diversity and
accountability. The goal of programme diversity implies that the
broadcaster will not only attempt to represent the community to which it
broadcasts, but that it will seek to cover a diversity of voices and news,
not simply government and boardroom spin. In the ideal model, the public
broadcaster represents within programmes the cultural, religious and
language diversities of the community. In reality, there is a tendency for
public broadcasters serving a national audience, to concentrate on the
capital city and its environs. The model in which the broadcaster produces
a diversity of programmes also implies some form of decentralisation. In
South Africa, the SABC has been criticised for the fact that 70% of its
broadcasts have been in English and that it has not provided programming
for the poor and disadvantaged.
The notion of accountability, not just to the formal institutions of
Parliament, but to the civic society helps to reinforce diversity of
programming. For instance, in Britain, the BBC must not only publish an
Annual Report to Parliament but has advisory committees of consumers
47
in different regions and hosts road shows around the country at which
citizens can make their views known. Although this may be an imperfect
method of democracy, these events do allow demands for specific
programming content to be made by members of the public. In the
Broadcasting Amendment Act of 2002, the SABC will be similarly
required to find the means for the input of public opinion before creating
programming policies. Competition may also focus more attention on
audiences and may increase accountability, but it can also lead to
uniformity of product as the broadcaster fears the impact that minority
broadcasting will have on advertising income or subsidy.
In general, Africa can learn from the European public broadcasting
model, in terms of its goals. But the ideal of editorial independence that
the model holds out can easily be subverted. Silences can creep in through
self-censorship. And when economic circumstances deteriorate, unless
there is a legislative defence, state control can reassert itself, either by the
targeting of individual journalists as in Zimbabwe or, as appeared to be
happening in South Africa in 2002, where the government sought to
legislate to empower the Minister over the broadcaster.
An additional drawback of the traditional European public service
model for African countries is that to have a Governing Board for the state
broadcaster and a regulatory agency for commercial broadcasters is likely
to be too expensive in both money and personnel resources. In addition,
there is the problem that financial stringency forces public broadcasters
into commercial activities. Because they may be supported by licence fee
or subsidy, these commercial activities may become anti-competitive and
need to be regulated. In South Africa, this problem led to the splitting of
the regulation of SABC with its commercial activities regulated by
ICASA, the telecommunications and broadcasting regulator. In Britain,
commercial aspects of the BBC’s activities will in future come under the
new regulator of telecommunications and commercial broadcasting,
Ofcom. In both countries, programming will be subject to review by the
independent regulator. SABC will have its programming policies
reviewed and the BBC will be subject to fines if it fails on programme
quality.xiii In other words, a Governing Board for the public broadcaster
is a necessary, but not sufficient regulatory safeguard to ensure it meets
the goals set for it by legislation.
To some extent, change is likely to force itself on the African state
broadcasters. Where it is possible for people to access foreign broadcasts
via satellite or radio, then, unless the government is to become so
48
authoritarian that it forbids such access, state-controlled broadcasting

which censors news tends to undermine public confidence in itself. If
people do not believe what they hear they will look to alternatives – a
reason why external foreign broadcasters are still important within
Africa.xiv But the major advantage the state broadcasters have is their
ability to broadcast in the local language. The lessons from countries as
diverse as India, China and Korea is that state broadcasting has to look to
its programming to survive, particularly if it is forced to rely more heavily
on advertising. In Russia and China, as in some African countries, the
state broadcasters have had to cope with the withdrawal of state subsidy.
In the UK in the 1990s, the BBC was also told to cut costs and raise more
money through commercial activity. It now sells its own programmes in
magazine format, on video, reuses them on the internet, and exports both
programmes and formats. In similar circumstances, the South African
Broadcasting Corporation has begun to create an export market for its
programmes through satellite broadcasting, leading to the risk that it could
dominate the regional market. Hence a regional strategy from other
smaller African broadcasters joining together to create regional content
could form a counterbalance.
Public service broadcasters have also taken other actions to raise
money. The hiring out of programme making facilities has taken place in
both the UK and Russia as it is now taking place in Africa. John Barker
has pointed out that in Malawi and Zambia, it has been possible for private
entities to buy prime-time slots to stage private productions, and in some
cases to sell their own advertising and keep the income.xv This practice of
‘barter’ of airtime for programmes has a long history among African
broadcasters with little money and there is an international company that
specialises in this practice. But the danger is that the broadcaster allows
the use of the airwaves at too little cost to the private company, that it does
not pursue the expansion of its own advertising finance, and that non-
accountable private interests come to hold control over the public
broadcaster. Taken to its logical conclusion, the practice equates to the
unofficial privatisation of the public broadcaster. Even where there is a
Board of Governors, they can be uncritical of content in the face of
financial stringency. The practice reinforces the need for state
broadcasters to be subject to independent regulation, which ensures they
meet the programming goals set out in legislation.
It is possible then to have a model of regulation, which separates out
the state broadcaster from government by the means of self- regulation
49
through a Board of Governors and then regulates private commercial

broadcasters through another regulatory agency. In such a system, a
regulatory agency responsible for telecommunications would also have to
regulate broadcasters use of the radio spectrum. But, although a Board of
Governors acting solely as the regulator of the public broadcaster is useful
in acting as a buffer to political interference, it is not sufficient to ensure
that programme quality and diversity is maintained, or that the broadcaster
does not act in an inappropriate or an anti-competitive manner. For
broader regulation, an alternative model of an external regulator for the
whole sector including the state broadcaster may be less expensive and
more effective.
Where should that external regulation be located?
The Regulator
What agency should regulate broadcasting? Currently, in Africa the
tendency is for the Ministry of Information to regard control of the
broadcaster as its domain. While having the regulator inside the Ministry
is the cheapest solution, it is also that which is likely to lead to political
interference in day-to-day editorial decisions. In Britain, when
commercial broadcasting was introduced, the commercial broadcasters
also became subject to the goals set for public service broadcasters, but a
separate agency regulated them.xvi Commercial radio was regulated by a
third agency, broadcasting standards by a fourth, the regulatory spectrum
by a fifth and telecommunications by a sixth. This British model, with
fragmented, technologically specific regulators is not a suitable model for
Africa. There needs to be one regulator for the whole sector.xvii In Britain,
this regulator will now be Ofcom, to be set up in 2002 under new
legislation bringing telecommunications and broadcasting under one
agency. This agency model will go outside the British tradition of one
Director, appointed by the Prime Minister and supported by a primarily
civil service staff. Instead, it is headed by a Board of part-time appointees
with a Chair, under which will be an Executive Director. The new model
is more akin to that adopted in African countries such as Botswana. The
new agency will be accountable to Parliament but financed by a
proportion of the licence fees it collects from telecommunications
operators, from broadcasters and for use of the radio spectrum.
50
An alternative regulatory agency model from the industrialised

countries is that of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). In
that model, the regulator is subject to the legislature. Congress has
traditionally voted the FCC’s finance but this revenue is now
supplemented by licence fees. The Commission consists of five persons
(no more than three from one political party) nominated by the President
and confirmed in their appointment by Congress. The problem with this
model, as described by a previous Chairman, Reed Hundt (2000), is that
each of the commissioners tends to become the spokesperson for a
particular lobby and decisions become trade-offs with no regulatory logic.
In this system the FCC gives notice that it intends to issue a rulemaking.
Those lobbies with an interest in the rulemaking then make
representations and Congressmen pressure the Commissioners into
favouring their causes under threat of the withdrawal of finance. The
Commission then issues the rulemaking notice, which is subsequently
challenged in the courts by those affected. The whole process is very
expensive and favours those companies who can pay for lobbyists to
challenge regulation within Congress, within the Commission and in the
Courts. Because of its expense, the model is not suitable for Africa.
In general, multi-member Commissions take up scarce personnel
resources, and open up too many informal channels for lobbyists, whilst
single person directors accountable only to Parliament accrue
considerable personal power. Although the majority of African countries
that have set up regulatory agencies have opted for Commissions, the
Botswana alternative represents a potential middle way between the US
and traditional British systems. Here the Executive Director works to a
part-time, or unpaid Board selected for its representation of citizen
interests. Such a system allows the Director to be linked into the political
system. The split of responsibilities tends to mirror those in public
companies between Managing Director, Board and Chairman. But it is
important that Ministers are not Chairs of the Board (as in Ghana) and that
those with financial interests in the sector (whether their own or their
family’s) are not members of the Board.
How then could broadcasting regulation ‘fit’ within such a
regulatory agency? If the agency is financed from licence fees and is
originally set up for broadcasting, then it is likely to be poor. It will be
much richer if it is also a telecommunications regulator. But the problem
is that broadcasting content regulation is quite different from
telecommunications regulation. How then could the two be combined?
51
Broadcasting and Telecommunications

Regulation
Throughout the past ten years in Europe, there has been discussion on how
broadcasting and telecommunications regulation could be brought
together under one regulatory framework. Although both developed out of
the same technology – the telephone – regulation of the two sectors has
diverged. Whereas, following liberalisation of the sector, regulation of
telecommunications has been economic in character, concerned at anti-
competitive behaviour on the part of the previous state-owned national
operator, concerned with access to networks and bottlenecks, regulation of
broadcasting has traditionally been concerned with content. However,
with the liberalisation of the broadcasting sector and new modes of
delivery of content, such as satellite broadcasting and cable or MMDS, a
similar concern with economics has arisen. For instance, if there is only
one satellite broadcaster there are questions about whether it should be
subject to a ‘must carry’ rule regarding the programming of public service
broadcasters and what access charges to its network are reasonable.
The debate in Europe has centred on how to construct
technologically neutral regulation to replace the previous regulatory rules,
which tended to regulate each telecommunications and broadcasting
technology differently. The issue has become more urgent as digitalisation
of broadcasting and penetration of the internet has seemingly brought
about technological convergence between telecommunications and
broadcasting. For a time, it seemed that telecommunications interests
which favoured the treatment of broadcasting as a value added service
subject to no regulation would win the European debate and succeed in
creating a regulatory regime where there was no regulation of content at
all. But, if there were no content regulation there could be no public
service broadcasting and scenting danger to their existence the
broadcasters fought back.
Finally, an agreement was reached that content regulation would
vary, not according to technology but according to the choice exercised by
those in receipt of the broadcast. Regulation of content is therefore
differentiated between public service broadcasters and those supported by
subscription. The argument in favour of this differentiation in regulation
is that whereas everyone receives public service broadcasting, only those
who choose to do so receive subscription television. Because of this
52
element of choice satellite broadcasting will be regulated less heavily than

commercial off-air public service broadcasting and the internet will be
regulated less than satellite broadcasting. The more the element of
individual choice,the less the regulation of content. Hence in the British
2002 Communications Bill, regulation will be tiered according to that
element of choice, with general principles concerning the protection of
minors and standards of taste and decency applicable to all.
An African Model for a Telecommunications and

Broadcasting Regulatory Agency
Working within this model of combining telecommunications and
broadcasting into one agency, there is a model for telecommunications
regulation already available in Africa, which could be adapted to cover
broadcasting. Those African countries, which signed up to the World
Trade Organisation agreement of 1997 on Basic Telecommunications
Services also signed up to what was called a Reference Paper. This paper
set out basic principles of regulation, such as transparency, which were
designed to protect companies undertaking inward investment. Those
WTO member states which signed the Reference Paper, also undertook to
set up a regulator ‘independent’ of the telecommunications network
operator. The original intention was to ensure that the national operator
could not skew the terms of regulation for its competitors, but
subsequently international bodies, such as the World Bank, have
interpreted the terms of the Reference Paper to mean ‘independent’ of the
Ministry. In this scenario, governments must set up semi-autonomous
regulatory agencies for the telecommunications sector.
In fact one year before the WTO agreement on basic
telecommunications was signed the member countries of the Southern
Africa Development Community had agreed something similar to the
Reference Paper. In 1996, helped by the United States Agency for
International Development, the regional body for Southern Africa agreed
a Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology under which
member countries would harmonise telecommunications policy on a
regional basis. Under the Protocol, members agreed to ‘develop
supportive regulatory and investor-friendly legislation.’ not just over the
telecommunications sector but also covering the provision of broadcasting
53
and information technology infrastructure. They agreed that member

states should ‘strengthen the co-operation and coordination between the
broadcasting and telecommunications sectors whilst retaining the
structural separation between the operating organisations.’ Member states
would establish ‘appropriate institutional mechanisms for co-operation
and coordination between appropriate sector coordinators.’ In other
words, they would proceed to bring together the regulation of
broadcasting, telecommunications and information technology.
The Protocol did not deal with content regulation. It recognised ‘the
need for the content or substance of that which is transmitted to be dealt
with in another appropriate Protocol.’xviii The Second Protocol on Culture
Information and Sport of 2001 did not address broadcasting specifically
and has been criticised for its provisions on the licensing of journalists.
However, the Protocol included a commitment to the right of access to
information and participation in cultural and sporting activities by all
citizens.’xix The Protocol did not spell out how this right of access was to
be achieved in terms of regulation either at the national or regional level
nor did it link up with the existing strategy on telecommunications.
However, a model had already been established by SADC, which could be
used for this purpose.
In 1998, the SADC Ministers agreed a Model Telecommunication
Bill, which would establish a regulatory authority in each member state.
This Model Authority would have between three and five members
‘appointed by the appointing authority through a competitive and
transparent selection procedure.’ for terms of five years.xx The ‘appointing
authority’ is defined as the Head of State, the Minister, or other person or
body vested with the power to appoint. The exact procedure is not
specified and therefore could vary from appointment by a Minister subject
to legislative oversight to a public nomination and consultation process as
adopted in South Africa. However, the Model Bill states that the
appointing authority in appointing members to the Board must ‘have
regard to a broad representation of the whole population’ and ‘appoint
persons who collectively have knowledge or qualifications or experience
in the fields of economics, accountancy, telecommunication technology,
engineering, public policy, business practice, finance or law or any other
relevant experience.’ Hence the emphasis on appointments to the Board of
the Regulatory Agency is on citizen representation.xxi
Since 1998, despite the Model Bill allocating the regulation of
broadcasting to the Model Authority, this aspect seems to have been
54
forgotten. By 1999 eight of the fourteen members of SADC had created

independent telecommunications regulators, with the majority consisting
of regulatory commissions of several members. These and others where
the regulator remained in the Ministry had signed up to membership of the
Telecommunications Regulator’s Association of Southern Africa
(TRASA) designed to facilitate best practice harmonization throughout
the region. But, in general, broadcasting regulation had got lost in concern
for the richer telecommunications sector.
The main exception was South Africa, where a broadcasting
regulatory agency, the Independent Broadcasting Authority, was
established subject to accountability to the legislature but without links of
accountability to the Ministry. Because of mistakes in its original
structure, the regulatory agency subsumed the policy making of
government. It became the de facto policy maker, rather than the
regulatory agency working within policy goals set by the government. As
a result, using the technological convergence of broadcasting and
telecommunications to give its proposals legitimacy, the Ministry set out
to bring the regulation of broadcasting together with the regulation of
telecommunications under one agency, ICASA.xxii However, the changes
proposed provoked anxiety that the Ministry’s intention was to increase
state control of broadcasting by making the South African Broadcasting
Corporation report on its programming policies to the Minister. That
reporting will now be to ICASA retains the public broadcaster’s autonomy
from direct political control.
However, there are other African models available. In Botswana, in
1998, a Broadcasting Act brought into being the National Broadcasting
Board to issue licences and regulate the sector. The telecommunications
regulator provides the secretariat for the Broadcasting Board. In turn this
Board could provide a model for other countries in the region. It consists
of eleven members with five year terms of office, seven of them appointed
by the Minister from ten people whose nominations had been approved by
a Nominating Committee comprising a member nominated by the Council
of the Law Society of Botswana, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of
Botswana and a representative of the Office of the President. The
legislation demands ‘transparency and openness’ in the nomination
process. Members and their spouses are disqualified from holding an
interest in a licence. In some respects the legislation follows British
practice in that codes of practice to be issued by the regulator will contain
detailed guidelines on content regulation.xxiii
55
Hence there is a regulatory model which is already accepted within

Southern Africa containing a regulatory agency created for
telecommunications, independent of the telecommunications operator and
semi-autonomous but linked into the Ministry, with a separately elected or
nominated board for broadcast content regulation serviced by personnel
within the telecommunications agency. It is possible therefore, where
resources are limited, instead of separate regulatory agencies for
telecommunications and broadcasting, that one agency to regulate the two
sectors can be combined. Although headed by one Director, it is possible
that internal differentiation and responsibility to two different boards may
prevent broadcasting regulation losing out to the telecommunications
responsibilities of the regulator.
The advantage to this model is that even in the poorer African
economies, the telecommunications sector tends to be larger and richer
than the broadcasting sector and the amount that licence fees can produce
to support the independent regulator will be more substantial. The dangers
are that, as in the South African example of 2002, bringing broadcasting
regulation under the telecommunications regulator can lead to the
potential for increased political control of broadcasting. It is therefore
important, as in the Botswana example, to have a separate Board for
Broadcasting Regulation.
Structural Regulation for Access Diversity,

Plurality and Quality
We have argued above that diversity of programming will not happen
without regulation. Today it is accepted that in liberal representative
democracies, it is necessary for the human rights of freedom of speech and
freedom of information to be respected and that the broadcast media have
a major part to play in the access of citizens to democratic processes and
institutions. The traditional aim of European regulation has been to create
diversity, plurality and quality in the choice available to the
consumer/citizen and to guarantee access to that citizen. These goals are
worth transferring to the African environment.
Only if a citizen can access several sources of information can he/she
make up their own minds on an issue. Creating that pluralistic structure
ideally means several layers of broadcasting, from national to regional to
56
community. In turn, the differentiating factor is likely to be the

geographical area that stations serve, the technology and radio spectrum
they use, who may own what, the extent of foreign ownership and the
method of financing. For community broadcasting some form of
specification of community ownership may also be required.
Since the economics of information favour concentration and
monopoly, structural regulation in favour of diversity usually refers to
those aspects of legislation, which keep media outlets from owning each
other. It is possible to regulate for specific geographical areas or for the
country as a whole. It is possible to regulate against the concentrated
ownership of one transmission medium or against the ownership of one
medium by dominant owners of another. The intention is always to retain
a number of sources of information for the local populace. For instance,
in the USA in the 1990s, companies were limited to owning 3AM and
3FM stations and TV coverage of not more than 25% of TV homes in a
given market and not more than 20AM and 20FM radio stations
nationally. But those restrictions have gradually been liberalised to allow
ownership of 3 radio stations (either FM or AM) in a given market where
there are less than 15 radio stations. Today demand from the US Courts
that the FCC produce a rationale for its policy on media ownership is
likely to lead to further relaxation of the rules.
However, in the case of African regulation, it seems reasonable that
when private commercial stations are first allowed, the number that any
one company may own should be strictly limited. That number may then
be gradually increased depending on how many licences have been issued.
As in the USA, regulations concerning ownership may address both the
national market and the local market, preventing concentration in both. If
the primary goal of policy is to ensure diversity of sources of information
then the concentration for which the economics of information provides
the incentive is contrary to that policy. In some countries, such as South
Africa, it is the regulatory agency that will take the decision on how much
concentration should be allowed, in others it will be the government.
In addition, in the USA, there are rules that prevent cross-media
ownership, particularly between the press and broadcasting. These too
have been loosened over the past ten years. In the UK, since the 1990s the
cross-ownership rules have prevented newspapers with 25% of the
national market from owning a television station. In addition, rules have
prevented the commercial TV stations from consolidation into one
operator. But these rules are also coming under pressure. The difficulty is
57
that they run against the economic incentive and corporate desire for
concentration, particularly in a poor overall economic situation and a
downturn in advertising income. Such rules are likely to be difficult to get
legislated in the poor economic situation of many African countries, but,
in general, where the regulatory agencies are likely to be weak, structural
regulation is easier to enforce than behavioural regulation. So it is easier
to enforce separation of ownership than it is to ensure that a consolidated
entity fulfils its programming obligations.
In developing countries, the economics of information also run up
against the desire to keep ownership local or subject to specific ethnic
requirements. In South Africa recently the regulatory authority, ICASA,
ruled against the consolidation of New Africa Investments Limited (Nail)
with Kagiso Media for such reasons. In African countries, where local
capital is scarce, without regulation there would be no local ownership.
Particularly in a time of expansion of both satellite and foreign
broadcasters, foreign investment rules are necessary. Even the
industrialised countries have such rules. For instance, in the USA, a non-
US citizen may not own more than 20% of a company using the radio
spectrum. Local ownership rules as practiced in South Africa to ensure
black empowerment are therefore not unusual and are essential to achieve
the goal of diversity. Similar rules in other African countries may protect
against the takeover of local media by South African capital.
In the global economic downturn of the early years of the twenty
first century, the trend in both the USA and the European Union is for
foreign ownership and media concentration requirements to be relaxed. In
the industrialised West, the grounds for relaxation are that cable and
satellite TV coupled with the ongoing digitalisation which allows the
carriage of an increased number of TV and radio channels are creating a
plurality of outlets. But in the African context such arguments that media
plurality exists cannot be valid. However, the situation in Africa is
complicated by the fact that it is often newspapers and media groups that
are the ‘first movers’ and set up new radio stations in the most promising
urban areas. These media interests together with those of privatised
telecommunications operators may be the only indigenous source of
capital. However, once they hold control of all media outlets in a
geographical area they can push up advertising rates to the detriment of
other businesses. Although it is possible to borrow mechanisms from
telecommunications regulation and demand accounting separation and
separate reporting between different businesses within the same media
58
group, such mechanisms cannot control the impact of concentration of

media on the economy in general. Hence for African governments
regulation of cross-media ownership is more important than for
industrialised governments.
In similar fashion, community radio has been shown to be an
important adjunct to economic development. Community based media can
become a means of community participation, not only in the media, but
also in the decision-making process of development. But, in similar
fashion to commercial radio stations, community media need to be
licensed, to have their means of financing established in that license and
to be regulated within that license in terms of language, advertising,
programming and local content. There is a danger that once the financial
support of donor agencies or government subsidies runs out, if there has
been no consistent application of regulatory structural principles, then
commercial incentives may produce a similar effect on community radio
as on any other commercial radio. It may become a vehicle for Western
music and advertising, indistinguishable from commercial radio.
African governments therefore need to think ahead. The structural
regulation of the market contained in the enabling legislation needs to set
out the licensing pattern for the whole country, including only that number
of commercial radio and TV stations that the advertising market can
support. It needs to set out which markets are considered separate. For
instance, should telecommunications operators or newspaper owners be
allowed to own broadcasting licences? The enabling legislation needs to
ensure that the regulatory authority issues the licences without which no
service can be provided and that changes in licences have to be approved.
Too many stations in a small advertising market, or a market dominated
by the advertising needs of the state broadcaster will lead to consolidation.
And that consolidation will favour those companies with deep pockets and
the best licences in the major cities. Similarly, without a defined licensing
regime, companies in urban areas can expand transmission power thereby
covering a wider area. They can then squeeze out smaller competitors
and set up national networks by stealth (as happened in the USA where
the regulator has had numerous problems in regulating the major
broadcast networks).
To sum up, the initial structure of the market envisaged in
government policy is very important in African countries. Too many
operators in a small advertising market and the market will fail. If the
structure is not stated and transparent, and enforced through licences, then
59
companies will push to provide service to the largest number at the least
cost, and any regulator will be under immense pressure. The aim of the
market structure is to retain a plurality of media outlets that a citizen can
access to gain information. No one source, private or public, should
dominate. Cross-ownership restrictions should apply to
telecommunications operators, newspapers, radio and TV stations and
rules on concentration should be aimed at preventing any one company
achieving a position where it holds the bottlenecks which prevent others
entering the market. Local ownership rules can help bolster local
entrepreneurs or disadvantaged groups. Diversity of ownership leading to
diversity of content and opinion is the goal.
Behavioural Regulation
The primary mechanism of control for the regulator is the licence. It
contains the conditions and obligations under which the licensee must
operate. Licences can be awarded by auction to the highest bidder or by a
‘beauty contest.’ A beauty contest is the term used to describe the process
where operators enter bids for licences and the regulator either chooses or
advises the Minister between them. It is also possible to have a mixed
system in which an auction has certain criteria attached. These criteria
can, for instance, demand that those bidding are capitalised to a certain
extent and are financially sound, or have local ownership, or demonstrate
local support. Although the ‘beauty contest’ has been the traditional
method of awarding licences in the industrialised countries and ensures
that the government retains control, the lack of transparency in the process
lends itself to challenges in the courts by the losing bidder and is being
replaced by auctions. In Canada and South Africa, public hearings are held
to determine the suitability of applicants, but this is an expensive process
for creating transparency.
The advantages of an auction are that the available spectrum is
licensed to the highest bidder and the mechanism of allocation is
transparent to the applicants. But before bidding starts the regulatory
framework in which the auction takes place has to be publicly available.
The bidders have to know what the structure of the market will be in
which they will be operating.
Where a regulatory agency is inexperienced an auction is less
demanding on resources and less liable to legal challenge. In Europe, there
60
is discussion on whether companies winning auctioned licences should in

the future be able to trade them in a secondary market A secondary market
allows the licence to be sold on if the first applicant is unsuccessful. It
reduces the risk to the bidder. But the disadvantages are that an applicant
may bid for a licence with the specific intention of selling it on at a profit
and taking the windfall gains. Therefore, there needs to be restriction
within the legislation as to how many licences one company may hold.
How long should a licence run for? And should it be renewable? The
longer the licence runs the more valuable it becomes as a property to the
licensee. The licensee will also require time to make a return on its
investment. In the industrialised countries, in order to reduce the risk to
the licensee, the licence period seems to have been extended from the
traditional five-year period and automatic relicensing has become more
common. In general, regulators seem to favour the view that to change
licensees may involve upsetting viewers or listeners, but this conservatism
then creates a barrier to market entry for potential competitors. Such
practises also act as a barrier to the effective regulation of programme
quality and diversity.
What’s in the Licence?

Normally the government will want to specify the type of financing
allowed within the licences it issues:
• Subsidy/licence fee
• Advertising/sponsorship
• Subscription
• Pay per view
Traditionally, licencing has been limited to broadcasters transmitting from

within the country concerned. But in Europe there has been discussion (in
2002) about the licensing of satellite broadcasters which are transmitting
into a country. These broadcasters would be forced to gain a licence to use
the spectrum in the country into which they broadcast. A similar provision
could be adopted in Africa to raise money from the licence fees of
broadcasters who otherwise contribute little financially, to the economies
61
of the countries into which they broadcast. Ideally such action would be
best taken on a regional level.
Codes of Practice and Guidance

Advertising
Advertising may be controlled by the regulatory agency through codes of
practice or guidelines. Rules may vary from those applicable to all; to
those applicable only to the commercial public service broadcasters to
those applicable to other channels, such as cable and satellite TV.
Particularly, in Europe there is a ban on programmes carrying ‘subliminal’
advertising; that is advertising which the viewer knows nothing about. In
Britain, companies are prevented from introducing lotteries and bingo
games, while mail order and home shopping are strictly controlled.
Advertisers are prevented from using the term ‘free’, on the grounds that
it is rarely true. They are also controlled in their use of animals or
appealing to fear to sell products. The intention is to protect the consumer
from unscrupulous advertisers.
These guidelines also state how many minutes of advertising may be
shown in total per hour, how often advertising breaks may come and how
many minutes advertisements may last. In Europe the average is 7 minutes
per hour with 9 minutes per hour for cable and satellite plus a further 3
minutes for teleshopping. In addition no advertising breaks are allowed in
certain programmes – for instance religious services. Again the intention
is to protect the consumer. Codes of practice may also delineate the role
of sponsorship in actual programmes – for instance, whether the sponsor’s
name may be shown within the programmes as well as at the beginning
and end.
In some countries, legislation controls advertising. It may be
government policy to limit or ban the advertising of certain products, such
as tobacco or alcohol. In addition, separate legislation and regulation of
advertisers across the media is likely to be necessary to ensure a standard
or code of conduct in advertisements – that they are true, do not promote
violence, crime or racism.
There are certain controls on advertising where practice between the
USA and Europe differs. In European countries regulators ensure that
62
minors are protected by bans on advertising certain products within

children’s programmes. And whereas in the USA political advertising
during elections is used without restraint, it is also the norm in Europe to
regulate political advertising during elections.
Content Regulation
Content regulation can be covered within the licencing process either by
the issue of regulations or guidelines or by demanding a business plan
from companies taking part in a ‘beauty contest.’ So, for instance, the
enabling legislation for the Botswana Broadcasting Board allows it to
demand such other information as it sees fit when it takes a decision on a
licence. The Board can therefore demand a business plan from the
licensee, which covers what programming mix the broadcaster undertakes
to provide. In particular, a broadcaster can be obliged in its licence to
provide such programmes as national, regional and local news, current
affairs, minority language broadcasts and religious broadcasts or to
provide universal coverage.
Either the legislation itself or the regulator can also specify the
quotas of imported material the broadcaster is allowed to use. In
specifying the quota as a proportion of broadcasting hours, attention has
to be paid to detail, such as whether the total hours cover advertising, at
what time may the imported material be played (for instance how much of
prime time should be taken up with imports), is the quota based on
regional production or does it refer to non-domestic programmes.
However, the difficulty in placing limits on imports is that it creates
political problems with industrialised donor countries. Also, unless and
until sufficient local production is possible, a quota on imports might lead
to unfilled airtime.
Alternatively, and less contentiously, quotas can refer not to imports
but to locally produced programmes or to independently produced
programmes. So, for instance, in order to support the domestic programme
making industry in South Africa, a quota of 20% for local programming
and music was intended to help support local creative industries. Since
‘local’ content may be interpreted by broadcasters to mean no more than
news or sport, again the legislation needs to be detailed in its definitions
of what is ‘local’ content. Does ‘local’ refer to the origin of those who
create, or the finance used or the place where the creation took place?
63
Does it include co-productions or material from the region. Is the quota

proportion that of all programming or programming in peak times or
programming without news. Because local content is expensive,
broadcasters are likely to obey the letter of the law, so it is important to
specify exactly what is required. In the context of ongoing GATTS
negotiations under the World Trade Organisation local content rules may
be threatened, so that it is important for African governments to have them
in place before they come under pressure from the industrialised West.xxiv
Moreover, unless there are people available with the requisite skills
and finance, such quotas alone may not be enough to ensure that a local
content creation industry survives. Broadcasters may argue that local
content is of too poor quality to broadcast. In South Africa, such quotas
have been followed by the setting up of the Media Diversity and
Development Agency, to “increase access to the media for all citizens”,
develop community radio stations and newsletters, and ensure a racial
balance in newsrooms. a government entity to support local content
creation.xxv
Even without specific regulation favouring local content, regulation,
which enforces broadcasting in minority languages, may have a similar
effect. In order to protect minorities, the licence may contain provisions
on the language or languages to be used. The regulation may specify the
numbers of hours, time of day and specific content required. So, for
instance in Wales, the transmission of Welsh language programmes has
led to a local independent production industry. In all cases, as the potential
for local supply of content improves so the quota can be increased.
The enabling legislation of the Botswana Broadcasting Board also
has a clause preventing the broadcast or rebroadcast of non-copyright
material. This provision is designed to ensure compliance with the World
Trade Organisation’s rules on copyright protection. The intention is to
prevent broadcasting stations pirating material from elsewhere, or playing
music without paying royalties.
Taste and Decency

In general, most industrialised countries have some provision to prevent
the broadcasting of sexual and violent material that offends the mores of
the society in which it is broadcast. The difficulty for the regulator in
64
enforcing the duty of ‘taste and decency’ on the broadcaster is that what is
acceptable for the majority in any particular society changes over time and
that an element of discretionary taste is inevitable within such decisions.
In a society with many minority groups, the regulator may be pressured
from all sides. Nevertheless, there is general consensus that children
should be prevented from watching such material, and the protection of
minors through the application of a ‘watershed’ time, before which sexual
and violent material may not be broadcast is one way of children. The
legislation may give the regulator the power of levying fines if
broadcasters breach ‘taste and decency’ undertakings.
The regulator is responsible for monitoring the programme mix
promised by licensees and enforcing their compliance. Those licensees
may include all commercial broadcasters and community broadcasters
together with or without the public broadcaster. In Britain, the commercial
broadcasters had at first to submit programming for agreement with the
regulator, but such prior assent creates a huge regulatory burden. Instead,
it is more practicable for the broadcaster to make undertakings on
programming standards, on how much news, sport, local content, current
affairs, drama and in what languages it will broadcast and for the regulator
to proceed on the basis of the monitoring of those commitments. If the
legislation empowers the regulator to accept complaints on programming
from the general public, the expense of content regulation can be reduced.
Openness to consumer complaints is an alternative source of information
to the regulator on how effective in satisfying the needs of the community
is the current regulatory regime. For the public broadcaster, such
accountability to the public can also be written into the legislation. Hence
the Broadcasting Amendment Bill of 2002 in South Africa has ensured
that the programming policies of the South African Broadcasting
Corporation are first brought to the public before being subject to the
regulation of ICASA.
One of the problems with detailed programme promises is that the
operator may need to adjust programming in order to become more
competitive. It is therefore necessary for the regulator to have the power
to be able to vary programme promises at a later date. However, in small
advertising markets, where competition is unlikely to develop quickly, the
regulator needs to be vigilant in ensuring diversity of content within a
broadcaster’s output, rather than diversity across stations.
65
Conclusions
This chapter has discussed a number of models for the regulation of the
broadcast media. It rejects the argument that diversity flourishes without
regulation. Instead it argues that the aim of independent regulation of
broadcast media is to protect plurality, diversity, quality and access by a
combination of structural and behavioural regulatory mechanisms. In a
democratic society, the aim of the regulator is to strengthen that
democracy by giving even the poorest individual within the poorest
minority the potential to access information from which he or she can
make choices. Neither to privatise a state broadcaster nor to introduce
commercial broadcasters into a market will gain these goals by
themselves. An independent regulator can help to retain editorial
impartiality and independence by standing and mediating between
government and broadcaster.
There are a number of different institutional models for that
independent regulation. It is possible to take the previous South African
model, to have a Board of Governors that acts as the regulator of the
public broadcaster together with separate regulatory agencies for
commercial broadcasting and for telecommunications. But such a solution
is based on British tradition, is expensive and has weaknesses.
In the case of the public broadcaster, this model relies on the Board
of Governors not becoming too closely identified with the broadcaster’s
interests. It relies on the self-regulation of a public broadcaster that will be
under pressure to follow the tenets of commercialisation in the African
economic situation. Other than the possibility that the Governors have
been drawn from a wide representative section of society, it provides no
means for the government to ensure that the public broadcaster meets the
needs of the population it serves. Nor does it prevent interference in
editorial decisions by the government. Although the Governors may stand
between the government and the broadcaster, unless editorial
independence is guaranteed in legislation, the Governors may not be
strong enough to withstand pressure from those who appointed them.
In the case of commercial broadcasters, by divorcing the regulation
of these from the regulation of the public broadcaster, the model makes it
more difficult to impose similar obligations in terms of programme mix
and local content. It appears to prioritise commercial interests over those
of the receiving public and to give commercial broadcasters a status
different from the public service broadcaster. And if the regulator is
66
dependent on licence fees from the sector, it also fails to give the
broadcast regulator an assured source of income.
A second institutional model is to bring telecommunications and
broadcasting under the same regulatory agency. While this solution may
be less expensive and is likely to produce the income from licences that
can support the regulatory agency, it risks demoting the poorer
broadcasting sector below the interests of the richer telecommunications
sector. In the USA, that demotion of broadcast interests has tended to
occur in the Federal Communications Commission where there is one
media division of the organisation. The British are attempting to solve the
problem by creating a Content Board to be subject to the overall new
Ofcom Board.
However, there is an African answer. The agency can be forced to
give attention to broadcasting matters by being held accountable to two
Boards – one for telecommunications and one for broadcasting, both
drawn from the community. In Botswana the telecommunications
regulator is also responsible to and services the Broadcasting Board.
Again this model can include regulation of satellite broadcasters, of
commercial TV and commercial radio and community radio together with
that of the public broadcaster. Or it may exclude the public broadcaster.
The advantage of this Botswana model is that it comes out of Africa,
it can be subsumed under the model telecommunications bill of the SADC
region and makes use of the existing independent telecommunications
agencies that are under establishment in many African countries to meet
WTO obligations. It represents an answer to some of the problems that
have been evident in Western regulatory agencies. It does not adopt the
FCC model of a commission at the head of the agency, which can lead to
bargaining between commissioners and uses scarce personnel. Nor does it
place regulatory power in the hands of a Director accountable mainly to
the media, as in the British Oftel and Independent Television Commission
cases. Instead, it emphasises the role of transparency in appointments and
brings in part-time members of Boards from a wide variety of
occupations. To these, a full-time Executive Director is responsible, and
the agency itself can be further accountable to Parliament and Minister.
For African governments faced with a changing broadcasting
environment, with pressure from commercial interests to open markets,
with a declining economic situation and widespread drought and poverty,
the money available from broadcast licences may be tempting in the short
term. However, without regulation it is possible that foreign interests can
67
simply take over whole national broadcasting systems. Current GATS

negotiations within the World Trade Organisation open up the possibility
that developing countries may be pressured to allow liberalisation of
service industries such as; broadcasting. Before liberalisation of the
market, governments need to structure the sector according to what the
advertising market will support. They need to put in place regulations that
will retain diversity of ownership and will support a local content creation
industry. They need to put in place transparent independent regulation for
the broadcasting sector, as they have been obliged to do under the WTO
1997 Basic Telecommunications Agreement. And for all broadcasters,
they need to legislate for independence of editorial decision and creation
from political interference.
Independent regulation of the broadcast media can contribute to
ongoing democratisation in both industrialised and non-industrialised
societies.
End Notes
i Mandla Langa (2001)’Serving a Diverse Community’ The Radio Festival

2001 http://www.radioacademy.org/festival/2001/mandla_speech.html
iiMark S.Fowler and Daniel L. Brenner (1982) ‘ A marketplace approach
to broadcast regulation’ Texas Law Review 207:60 quoted in Wilhemina
Reuben Cooke(1986) ‘Broadcast and Cable Deregulation in the United
States’ in CNRS La Deréglementation des telecommunications et de
l’audiovisuel Paris ,CNRS Colloquium.
iii
See Michael Powell, Chairman of FCC before the Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary of the Committee on
Appropriations, US Senate, 7 March 2002. http://www.fcc.gov
iv Mandla Langa (2001) ‘Serving a Diverse Community’ The Radio
Festival 2001,http://www.radioacademy.org/festival/2001/mandla
speech.html
v For instance in October 2002 the Malawi Communications Regulatory
Authority reacted to complaints of anti-Christian remarks by Radio Islam
with an investigation which could lead to a public hearing. See
broadcast@misa.org.na
viMandla Langa ‘Serving a Diverse Community’ http://www.radioacademy.
org/festival/2001/mandla_speech.html
68
vii
Tessa Jowell in Hansard, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates,
Vol.395, Part 13,3 Dec 2002 : Column 783.
viii John Barker (2001) ‘Is no policy a policy goal’ http:www.
africafilmtv.com/pages/archive/magazines/afm27e/coverstory.htm
ix See for instance the report of a conference on Public Service
Broadcasting in West Africa held under the auspices of ARTICLE 19 and
the Media Foundation for West Africa. http://www.africafilmtv.com/
pages/features/NF174recommendations.htm
x See Par Said Essoulami (2002) ‘Les defies de la radio télévision en
Afrique du Nord.’ Conference organised by le Conseil Mondial de Radio
télévision. Morocco 28-31 May.
xi‘President blasts national broadcaster on programming content’ 2
October 2002 ,See broadcast@misa.org.
xii
Broadcasting Amendment Bill, 6 (2) no. 23745 government gazette, 15
August 2002, Broadcasting Amendment Bill, 2002. http://www.pmg.
org.za/bills/020815broadcasting.htm
xiii
Claire Cozens, ‘BBC daces fines over falling standards’ The Guardian
29 October 2002
xiv See Par Said Essoulami (2002) ‘Les defies de la radio télévision en
Afrique du Nord.’ Conference organised by le Conseil Mondial de Radio
télévision. Morocco 28-31 May.
xv John Barker (2001)’Is no policy a policy goal’ http:www.africafilmtv.m
com/pages/archive/magazines/afm27e/coverstory.htm
xvi First the Independent Broadcasting Association (IBA) then the
Independent Television Commission (ITC)
xviiSee the Media Institute for Southern Africa: http://www.misnet.org/
broadcast/vision2.html.
xviii
SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology
(1996) Article 10.4
xix SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport (2001) General
Principles (d)
xx SADC Model Telecommunication Bill (1998) Part II, 7(1)
xxi SADC Model Telecommunication Bill (1998) Part II, 7 (5) (a & b)
xxii See Mandla Langa, ‘Which way to the Web?’, Speech to UBS
69
Warburg TMT Conference 5-6 October 2000 http://iba.org.za/

warburg.htm
xxiii
In Britain the Independent Television Commission has regulated
commercial TV and has produced guidelines on
xxiv See: World Development Movement (2002) ‘Public service
broadcasting measures threatened by free trade agreement’:
http://www.wdm.org.uk/presrel/current/ukgatscommunications.htm
xxvSee CPJ homepage: http://www.cpj.org/attacks01/africa01/southafrica.
htm
70
African Regulation of Satellite Broadcasting in the Era of Convergent ICTs
Chapter 3
AFRICAN REGULATION OF SATELLITE
BROADCASTING IN THE ERA OF
CONVERGENT ICTS
Russel Honeyman
Abstract
he rapid development of new communications technologies and
T digitalization and the rapid growth of satellite television in an
unregulated fashion in Africa, has created a number of new policy and
regulatory challenges. Whilst the focus of regulation in traditional
broadcasting was frequency allocation and content, in the new
technological context both content and technological issues are the focus.
Satellite communication cannot be easily regulated at the level of nation
state because the signals or communications networks they use are not
transmitted or located physically within the bounds of the nation state.
However, satellite broadcasting can and should be regulated at the
point of access by audiences. It is the local providers of access to
broadcast content who would be regulated. This requires modification
of existing broadcasting regulation to take into account
telecommunications regulation.
This regulation can be justified on several grounds:
• to promote fair and sustainable competition that will foster new

and diverse forms of content, packages and delivery.
• to enhance cultural integrity which is informed by cultural
diversity, since satellite broadcasters often provide popular
foreign programming to public broadcasters who have low
capacity to produce local content (regulation would include
levies on advertising or pay television subscriptions, which could
be a contribution towards financing local production);
71
• to introduce technical standards that ensure standardization and

compatibility within system (such regulation may also improve
access for audiences who might be constrained because of cost or
inability to transfer from technology, which might become
redundant);
• to address issues of the exclusive purchase of sporting rights by
satellite and pay channels of national or popular sporting events;
• to address issues concerning advertising, especially international
advertising which might conflict with regulation of advertising
for terrestrial broadcasters.
Any form of regulation should remain consistent with principles of

freedom of expression and the free flow of information. These principles
advocate independent regulators who have the knowledge and expertise
on broadcasting, telecommunications, ICTs and the economics
of broadcasting.
Introduction to African Broadcasting and ICT

Policy
The Information Age and Broadcasting Policy in Africa
Conventional terrestrial broadcasting in Africa is extensively regulated,
sometimes in terms of legislation dating back to colonial times. But
satellite television was not provided for in some legislation, and it is
becoming an increasingly prevalent means of communication that some
governments wish to regulate.
This chapter seeks to identify trends in African broadcast policy, as
the technology and meaning of broadcasting it self is changing. Digital
technology developed since the 1980s allows television services, and
other forms of information, to be communicated using any or all of a
variety of communications technologies (traditional terrestrial radio
frequencies, cable and satellite). Digitisation of information means that all
forms of information (video, audio and text) are converging to form a data
stream, which can be handled equally by any communication technology.
The user decodes this digital stream using his or her reception device,
such as a PC or computerised reception device. Satellite television is not
72
the only alternate delivery method for television services there is also
cable. Interactive services available on television now include Internet and
even voice telephony. This convergence of the worlds of
telecommunications and broadcasting means that regulators need to
embrace new concepts and terminology. In this chapter, the reader will
find terminology from two worlds: broadcasters use the words ‘content’
and ‘transmission’, while in the world of convergent ICT policy makers
use the words ‘information’ and ‘communications’. The two sets of words
have similar intents, except that content does not include interactive
services of data and voice information, and transmission does not include
a communications return path.
International satellite signals are beyond the power of national
governments to regulate, but they do not need to regulate these signals:
they can be regulated at the point of access to national populations. This
requires defining the information (broadcast) system of the nation. In this
way existing or modified legislation and government policy as it affects
information content, can regulate broadcasters and other content
providers. Regulation of the broadcasting and telecommunications sectors
may be further harmonised and possibly unified.
Human Rights declared in areas of freedom of speech, diversity and
access to communication are reflected in national constitutions. These
rights need to be implemented through legislation in telecommunications
and broadcasting that reflects the convergence of these technologies.
This chapter looks at broadcasting and communications in Africa
today, and the ways in which government policy and regulation is
grappling with the changes in this convergent industry, in three different
territories: South Africa, where the latest policy thinking is being enacted;
Zimbabwe where the government is using regulatory legislation to obtain
political control of broadcasting; and Kenya, where broadcasting
legislation is only being updated recently since the colonial era.
What is Broadcasting in Africa in 21st Century Africa?

For most of the latter part of the twentieth century, broadcasting referred
to terrestrial broadcasts in radio frequencies. The term embraced both the
content of what was being broadcast, and the means of transmission, since
the broadcaster carried on both these activities. Limited frequency
availability gave the necessity to regulation in order that the many services
73
using radio frequencies would not conflict with each other. The
frequencies are regarded as a public asset and regulated at an international
level by conventions of the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU).
Cable TV has not become widely established in Africa, with the
exception of Cameroon and the capital city of Mozambique, Maputo.
Extension of cable networks to large audiences is capital intensive, but
may also be limited by regulation of telephony, which places
responsibility for landline infrastructure, into the hands of a state
owned monopoly.
Satellites are also capital intensive, but offer a more cost effective
way of reaching affluent markets throughout Africa and some are not
controlled by governments. MultiChoice DStv, an African digital
multichannel TV service, reaches around 700,000 subscribers in Africa
through four satellites, PAS 4, PAS 7, PAS 10 and Eutelsat. DStv caters
for niche markets, and may have pre-empted cable TV in some of the
more affluent urban centers.
The practicalities of electronic communication, notably the user
interfaces (telephone, television set, PC) and transmission formats
(analogue) divided the users of these services into distinct sectors and
regulatory areas. In terms of this paper, broadcasting has come to mean:
radio frequency, satellite or cable TV transmission of programme content
(information) to a uni-directional electronic communications system open
to the public, through subscription or otherwise. The introduction of
interactive television services is threatening to make the word ‘uni-
directional² redundant.’ Telecommunications has come to mean: other
kinds of electronic communication such as voice and data (telephony
and internet).
Within broadcasting, communication technology formats also
defined market sectors. Terrestrial, radio frequency transmission was
where the first telecommunications mass audiences were. Satellite and
cable were relatively small, affluent markets that were overlooked in some
regulatory legislation.
Convergence
Digital technology is causing the broadcast and telecommunications
sectors to converge into one information communication technology
74
(ICT) market. Internet Protocol (IP) universal formats for electronic

information mean that all information can be converted into a universal
format and transmitted using any of the available communications
technologies. Now, popular television and radio programming can be
received in Africa by terrestrial broadcasts, satellite, cable, or (broad
band) internet. Electronic information is converging on a single format
protocol, and, in literal sense, converges on an electronic communications
pipeline for transmission to users around the globe: the ‘information
super-highway’.
Interactivity, Multimedia and the Digital Divide

In November 2001, the ITU Africa 2001 (Johannesburg) conference
promoted the idea that establishment of effective ICTs in Africa would
significantly advance development in the continent. The phrase ‘bridging
the digital divide’ reflects the expectations of what ICTs can do. The
concept is one where communications, whether by radio frequency,
satellite or cable or wire, delivers interactive content to people throughout
the continent. This interactivity is seen as providing fundamental solutions
to development issues, whether they are agricultural education in
Ethiopia, primary schooling in Gauteng, or raising international finance
in Nigeria.
Interactivity means a communications system with a ‘return path’.
The receiver can interact with the sender. The first interactive
telecommunications services were telex, telephone, and fax. The Internet
used digital technology to compress communications, and made them a lot
cheaper. For cable or telephone landline delivery, interactivity is simple:
two way communications come down a wire, connect a keyboard and you
can talk electronically two ways: order shopping, argue politics,
discuss things with a tutor and arrange finance on the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange.
This interactive content can be delivered by any transmission
method. Cable can offer huge capacity for information transmission for
correspondingly huge capital outlay, for example, the fibre optic
backbone, which is planned for Africa, by South Africa’s Telkom. Satellite
has restrictions on return path can be overcome using other return paths.
Interactivity in terrestrial broadcasting is seen as restricted by frequency
availability, but the ‘cellular’ approach (as in mobile phones) has been
75
demonstrated in dense German cities as capable of providing multi-user

interactivity over terrestrial frequencies.
Interactive text communications are now commonplace in the
Internet, delivered over telephone lines. But video signals such as
television require a lot more data carrying capacity (or band width). A new
communications term, multimedia, has emerged to refer to such data
heavy Internet services involving interactive text, audio and video data.
The term is still subject to complete definition, with some preferring to
call multimedia by the term interactive broadcasting.
Africa’s first interactive television service was launched by
MultiChoice in early 2002. Satellite transmission capacity is limited, and
expensive. How is the return path provided? Most subscribers cannot set
up their own earth links to communicate with satellites (though some
corporate clients do). The solution is found through land telephone lines.
MultiChoice Interactive TV (iTV) requires that the subscriber has a digital
telephone link. The subscriber gets his, or her, down link from the
satellite, data heavy with video images such as TV programmes. The
return path is by telephone link. Phillips (Netherlands) and others are
already manufacturing TV sets with modems built in, for equivalent
European services such as French TAK TV. The keyboard is your
remote control.
Likelihood of Transformation of ICT Sector in Africa

Access to broadband Internet connection is the main limit to reception of
interactive multimedia services. Broadband refers to a large bandwidth of
data carrying capacity. The cost of infrastructure is significant. So,
terrestrial broadcast is still the main mode of delivery for television, or
video communications. But, new policies may oblige states to provide
universal ICT access to its people, so new regulations may affect the
future of broadcasters. Internet connectivity is low but growing rapidly in
Africa. It is beyond the ambit of this paper to discuss the growth and
potential growth of broadband ICT access in Africa, and in any event,
future government and global policy toward ICT in Africa will be the
determining factor. How much, and how fast, the ICT infrastructure will
be extended in Africa will be greatly affected by national and global
political decisions. If broadband Internet access becomes commonplace in
Africa, regulators will face the problem that broadcast content will be
increasingly difficult to distinguish from internet content.
76
Major Players and Early Regulation in African Satellite

Broadcasting
Satellite has become an important communication technology for
television in Africa, compared with cable delivery. This is partly due to the
fact that capital intensive cable laying operations work best in affluent
urban areas, whereas satellite can reach niche markets scattered over wide
areas. But it is also to do with fact that international satellite broadcasts
cannot be regulated by national governments, and African governments
have been slow to license independent television operators. So new
television services have emerged with satellite delivery aimed at pan
African audiences. These may be grouped in three main categories: pay
TV television platforms, free-to-air TV networks and TV channels.
Pay TV Television Platforms

MultiChoice
MultiChoice DStv is the name of the first pay TV platform in sub-Saharan
Africa. MultiChoice grew from M-Net, a single channel pay TV service
that was set up in South Africa in 1986. When first established, M-Net
used terrestrial frequencies to broadcast an encrypted signal with sports
and movie programming. Subscribers bought a decoder and paid monthly
subscriptions. M-Net obtained a license from the South African
government for its terrestrial channel, as a pay TV service with two hours
per day free-to-air broadcasting which turned out to be an important
marketing tool, since non subscribers could see the exclusive
programming contained in M-Net during this open time. By 1993, M-Net
had leased a satellite transponder, which gave C-band (satellite
transmission frequency) footprint over sub-Saharan Africa. This was
leased from INTELSAT, the global communications satellite network. At
that time, the world’s governments, through their Posts and
Telecommunications Authorities, controlled INTELSAT. M-Net set up
MultiChoice to be a satellite platform for delivery of television services
throughout Africa. MultiChoice soon became a part of Netherlands
headquartered Nethold, with television services in Europe as well as
Africa. One secret of the group’s success was the viewer decoder,
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developed by subsidiary IRDETO, which remains one of the worlds most

advanced integrated reception devices (IRD). The other was exclusive
programming, including the latest global drama and movies, as well as
sports, especially rugby in South Africa.
MultiChoice signal distribution subsidiary, Orbicom, was desperate
for additional transponder space to offer more channels to Africa. it also
wanted to use digital technology to compress more channels into the
transponder space it did have. INTELSAT set up a satellite capacity
agency based in Senegal and named Rascom, to handle the demands of
commercial communication operators such as TV. Rascom was effectively
under the control of the African governments, who were not whole-
heartedly committed to the development of independent continental
television services, though they did grant an additional channel to
MultiChoice at the cost of US$1m in 1994.
The arrival of the PAS-4 satellite in 1995 changed all that. PAS-4
was launched by PanAmSat, the Mexico/USA owned satellite company
which had just successfully challenged the effective monopoly of
INTELSAT in South America, using USA anti-trust legislation.
MultiChoice launched one of the world’s first digital multichannel TV
services in 1995 (Arabic platform Orbit was the first by a few months).
The MultiChoice DStv service included 22 channels of TV and 40 audio
channels. For a monthly subscription of US$45, and was available in Ku
band for the first time. Ku band needs smaller, cheaper satellite dishes
than C-band for reception, so reception kit cost was reduced from US$2-
7,000 to US$400. By 2002 there were over 500,000 subscribers in Sub-
Saharan Africa to DStv’s 55 television channels, now with interactive
services including email and shopping.
During the 1990s, MultiChoice DStv was effectively unregulated in
many territories where subscriptions were sold. MultiChoice agencies in
some territories did set up licensed terrestrial re-broadcasters, in other
territories they installed satellite dishes and managed subscriptions for
Direct to home (DTH) satellite services. This is one reason that African
regulators are prompted to try to define satellite broadcasting.
In 2002, MultiChoice Africa was part of the international MIH
group, traded on Johannesburg New York and Amsterdam stock
exchanges, with over 2.1 million subscribers in Africa, Middle East and
Thailand. MIH tuned over US$644m in year ending March 31 2002.
Though it recorded massive losses totalling US$442m from USA ventures
into interactive television last year, these businesses (Mindport and Open
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TV) were disposed of, and the Africa subscription operations remained
profitable, with MultiChoice Africa contributing earnings before interest,
tax and depreciation (EBITDA) of US$75 million.
MultiChoice Africa (Pty) Limited (MCA)’s aggregate subscriber
base ended 2002 with 1.28 million households. The digital base for Africa
grew by 140,000 subscribers to 793,000 for the year, and now accounts for
62% of the total number of subscribers, establishing a platform for the
roll-out of interactive television (iTV) services which were available to
most digital subscribers by July 2002.
Le Sat
Le Sat is an initiative taken over by the government Canal France
International (CFI) in June 2002, through its commercial subsidiary, Port
Invest. Le Sat pay TV platform is a bouquet of pay TV channels originated
in France, in French language. The service became a digital platform in
September 2001. By March 2002, 12 channels were on offer with 85,000
subscribers in Africa.
The mode of delivery of Le Sat illustrates the difficulty of defining
new television services. Le Sat can be received by direct to home (DTH)
satellite transmission, or through local MMDS terrestrial or cable
broadcasters. In future this might include broadband cable. We can see
that a distinction between the delivery methods might be possible, but that
the principal point of regulation is the point of connection, or access to
information, to the public. This access to information is made possible
through one of a variety of communications technologies.
Vivid
VIVID is the name of a pay TV platform set up by the South African, state
owned, common signal carrier, Sentech. At present VIVID carries only
free-to-air South African services, but new legislation seeks to position
Sentech as a supplier of public access to multimedia services. The new
license for these services is the focus of much regulatory attention, and
spotlights the capability of regulators to set the conditions under which
commercial television services and other information access providers
can operate.
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Free-to-Air Networks
Three free-to-air African television networks are delivered by satellite to
local TV stations, which then broadcast the channels in whole or in part.
These networks are the French government owned CFI professional,
which styles itself a programme bank, Africa Broadcast Network (ABN),
which grew from programme distributor ABC, and TVAfrica, which
received financial backing from the International Finance Corporation in
December 2001. The latter two networks seek income from continental
advertisers, while their local partners seek advertising from local clients.
African Broadcast Network (ABN)

ABN, a content-provider, is a pan-African television network that aims to
own and maximize the value delivered to prime-time television across the
Continent. ABN provides free-to-air television services through its
terrestrial private and public affiliates.
The commercial justification for the establishment of such a network
is that many African countries cannot afford to purchase quality (read
American) programmes, or to sustain any programming consistency. As a
result, concludes ABN’s marketing information, advertisers no longer use
television as their primary means of communication in many African
countries. The net effect of this is that African broadcasters are faced with
the problem of financial and programming instability.
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Currently ABN broadcasts one-hour pre-packaged programmes to

the following countries:i
COUNTRY AFFILIATE TIME
Ghana Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) 18:00 – 18:30

22:00 – 22:30
Kenya Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) 18:30 – 19:00
19:45 – 20:15
Zambia Zambia National Broadcasting 18:00 – 19:00
Corporation (ZNBC)
Nigeria Africa Independent Television (AIT) 21:00 – 22:00
20:00 – 21:00
(Fri)
Tanzania Independent Television Limited (ITV) 20:30 – 21:00
22:30 – 23:00
ABN concluded a deal in 2002 with broadcasters in Malawi, Rwanda and

Namibia.
1 ABN content typically consists of American comedies such as
“Kids say the darndest things” and “King of Queens.” ABN also has plans
to start broadcasting and co-funding local productions although no
transmission date has been set yet.
TV Africa
TV Africa currently provides a free-to-air satellite broadcasting service to
an estimated 128 422 people living in East, West, South and French-
speaking Africa. It broadcasts a full-time schedule or sports/special events
schedule to those countries either through its public/private affiliates.
Although carriers of foreign content into Africa distribute their material
via private stations, this discussion focuses specifically on satellite
broadcasters that transmit their signals using the national terrestrial
broadcaster’s free-to-air services.
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COUNTRY AFFILIATE FULL/SPORT

SCHEDULE
TV Africa – East
Ethiopia ETV2 Full
ETV Sport
Eritrea ERITV Sport
Zanzibar TVZ Sport
Seychelles SBC Sport
TV Africa – West
Nigeria NTA Sport
Ghana GTV Sport
Cameroon CRTV Sport
Sierra Leone SLBS Sport
Liberia LBC Sport
Gambia GRTS Sport
TV Africa – South
Angola TPA Sport
Namibia NBC Sport
Botswana BTV Sport
Zimbabwe ZBC Sport
Zambia ZNBC Sport
Malawi MBC Full
Mozambique TVM Sport
Swaziland TVS Sport
Lesotho LTV Full
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COUNTRY AFFILIATE FULL/SPORT

SCHEDULE
TV Africa – French
Cote d’Ivoire RTI1 Full
RTI2 Sport
Senegal RTS Sport
Benin ORTB Full
Togo TVT, TVG-2 Full
Burkina Faso RTB Sport
Mali ORTM Sport
Central African Republic RTCA Sport
Congo RTCA Sport
Democratic Republic of RTNC Sport
the Congo
Guinea ORTG Sport
Mauritius MBC3 Sport
TV Africa’s economic rationale is similar to that of ABN’s: broadcasters

in Africa lack the financial capacity to purchase programming and able,
through TV Africa’s pre-packaged formula, to guarantee advertisers an
audience and provide programming to broadcasters.
It is of particular concern to note that TV Africa’s programming line-
up does not contain any local content nor does is its programming content
differentiated in any of the countries that receive its signal.
Television Channels
The above pay TV and free-to-air services might be considered
information access providers regulated at the point at which they provide
access to the public. But the information is provided by third parties: the
television channels. Mostly these are global media operations including
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the likes of CNN, BBC, Arabic and Indian services. Some originate in
Africa, such as privately owned M-Net, SuperSport, KTV, Summit TV,
some are intended for African audiences, such as French Canal +
Horizons, and an increasing number of African national channels are
obtaining distribution by satellite. Even those channels originated in
Africa cannot be legislated for and regulated except in their home
territory. It is the local providers of public access to information who can
be regulated.
Why regulate? Considerations of Regulators of

Broadcast Information and Communication
Channel Availability
Frequency and other channel availability is the first and undeniable reason
that electronic communications need to be regulated. This includes cable
and satellite networks, since space is limited and operators need to know
what frequencies they can broadcast under, and what streets they can lay
cable under. Positive regulation can also be used to extend access to
communication technology to the public. Frequency regulation
mechanisms are detailed below.
Constitutional Rights and Media Freedom and Universal

Access
The monopolistic tendencies of state and capital mean that a diverse and
accessible communications media (infrastructure) needs to be legislated
for. See discussion on South Africa below. The concept of universal access
to communications and information has been advanced as a human right.
Global and South African groups are convinced that universal access to
information and communications technologies can bring social and
economic change to Africa. Policy development, legislation and
regulation are seen as essential to bringing about changes in the
infrastructure of communications, and the production of
information (content).ii
Legislation can provide differing emphasis to the concepts of human
rights. The South Africa Broadcasting Act 1999 is full of references to
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human rights: ‘The South African broadcasting system... provides... for

the maintenance of a South African identity, universal access, equality,
unity and diversity and resolves to align the broadcasting system with the
democratic values of the Constitution and to enhance and protect the
fundamental rights of citizens’.iii By contrast, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting
Services Act of 2001 makes no mention of human rights, constitutional
rights or freedoms, except in that the regulator is expected to ‘to ensure
the role of broadcasting services and systems in developing and reflecting
a sense of Zimbabwean identity, character and cultural diversity’.iv
Political Independence
Ownership of communications technologies brings immense political
power. The government needs to be regulated in its licensing of
information and communications technologies. For this reason, the
regulator and its officers need to be appointed and funded in such a way
that they are free from political interference. Nominations by the public,
or by civic institutions, are both ways of achieving this. Again the South
African and Zimbabwean legislation provide differing examples of
modern legislation, the latter designed to promote freedoms of speech and
access to information, the latter seeking to impose political control
on broadcasters.
Commercial Considerations: Development of a Viable

Media Industry
The development of Africa’s broadcast industries cannot be performed by
regulation alone. Audiences for television are needed, as are commercial
revenues from these audiences. From such a commercially viable industry
will flow local content and the expression of national identities, in formats
acceptable to audiences. A viable commercial broadcasting sector can also
be a significant employer and contributor to national wealth. For this
reason, commercial broadcasting is considered a necessary part of a
national broadcasting system. The job of the regulator is to create an
environment in which commercial operators are encouraged, and required
to contribute toward local content.
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It may be best for commercial operators to make this contribution to

local content in the form of a levy on revenues (advertising, pay TV
subscriptions, cinema admissions), the resulting fund to be administered
by an independent production financing body. An alternative is a
requirement for minimum percentage of airtime
Commercial television broadcasters are only interested in
commercial success. This means becoming the first choice for their
audiences, in order to make a commercial success of their popularity. The
regulator must try to ensure that suitable local content is available to
commercial broadcasters.
The licensing of communications services is an important revenue
earner for the state. European telecommunications companies such
Vodaphone (UK) paid billions for rights to broadcast G3 mobile
telephony. Equally, the revenues earned from such services are huge
(though they have not yet materialised for Vodaphone’s G3 investment).
MultiChoice earned US$870m in 2001 from its DStv service. Regulations
can significantly impact these commercial revenues.
Content Regulation
New African satellite television networks are delivering popular
(Hollywood) programming to national audiences through national
television services, which should be public broadcasters. But the advent of
satellite broadcasting is not responsible for the dilution of local identity.
African television was broadcasting cheap western programming from
tape, before it was available from satellite. The answer is not to ban
foreign product, but to develop local content. Local content development,
and the development of public broadcasters, can contribute to the national
identity, while still allowing audiences freedom of choice, and respecting
the universal freedom of access to information. The SABC has already
proved itself competent in developing effective local programming that
local audiences will choose to watch. Television programmes such as the
soap Generations and others dominate the audience ratings in South
Africa. Local content regulations may have helped to stimulate production
of programmes like Generations, and more importantly, the training and
industry background necessary for the production, but only audience
choice can make a success of these programmes.
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Content Regulation: Advertising, Copyright and Other

Issues Relating to Content
Other issues relating to the content of satellite delivered broadcast
programming, range from whether international advertising is suitable for
local markets, to issues of copyright, to issues of whether national sporting
rights can be purchased exclusively for pay television. This chapter
suggests that these are not special issues for regulation of satellite
broadcasting. In some cases national legislation or industry regulation
already deals with these matters. Confusion arises when we say that the
signal comes from abroad: how can local laws be effective to control
advertising, etc, that originates from abroad? This chapter proposes that
the organisation which provides access to the content, to the local
audience, (e.g. local pay TV sales organisation) is responsible for ensuring
that the content complies with local regulations, which already exists to
deal with issues such as advertising, copyright, obscenity, defamation etc.
Technical Standards
The South African Broadcasting Act 1999 defines the broadcasting system
provided by a common signal carrier as well as other commercial signal
carriers, who provide transmission services for a range of content
broadcasters, categorised as public, commercial and community. A
newcomer to broadcasting may use the existing broadcast system to reach
consumers, without the expense of setting of setting up a national
network. Broadcasters must pay licence fees to utilise the system.
Regulation of technical standards will ensure that parts of the broadcasting
system are compatible with each other, and with future developments.
Adoption of such standards may improve universal access, since it may
help to streamline industrial development of the broadcasting system, and
may prevent consumers from purchasing equipment, which later becomes
redundant. In practice, the global industry will adopt, evolve and change
broadcast technology as it sees fit.
Broadcasting standards PAL and NSTC became regional industry
standards in the era of analogue television. Now, in the digital era, there
are three digital standards competing for global acceptance: DVB-T
(Europe), ASTC (North America), BST-OFDM (Japan). The South
87
African Department of Communications is examining the adoption of

technical standards for the national broadcasting system through a Digital
Broadcasting Advisory Board (DAB).
Consumer receiving devices are needed for public access to the
communications broadcasting system. Integrated Receiver Devices
(IRDs) are the decoders, which are needed to decode encrypted satellite
signals, so only those viewers with paid subscriptions may view the
signals. In the digital era, these will be needed for even free-to-air
broadcasts and cable TV. Some of this technology is patented, restricting
its adoption for national use by regulatory authorities. African
subscription television group MultiChoice has advanced, patented IRDs,
which help to make it difficult for competition to attack its subscriber
base. But, the common carrier (in South Africa this is Sentech) may adopt
its own IRD technology, along with a satellite platform, in order to
provide access to South African audiences, for competing satellite and
cable services. Sentech has already established such a platform in South
Africa. Known as Vivid, this service has yet to carry commercial services,
in part because the regulatory basis for the operation is not yet established.
There is an issue of whether it is right for a state-owned organisation, with
financial resources belonging to the state, to compete with a private sector,
which developed digital television subscription technology and markets in
Africa, and its own risk and profit. See further discussion of this
issue below.
Global Policy Regarding International Communications:

Open Skies vs Prior Consent
The emergence of satellite broadcasting services means that in many
cases, several territories will be included in the footprint of a satellite
signal. The governments of those territories cannot control the content of
those signals. Most nation-states do, however, wish to ensure that the
broadcasts reaching their population conform to policy objectives such as
promoting a national identity, promoting the public interest and promoting
competition and stability. This is sometimes expressed as concern that
foreign content is a threat to local cultures.v This debate is discussed by
Fischer (1990) who argues that for developing nations, their prerogative is
the protection of their national boundaries and sovereignty. Developed
nations have rejected this argument based on the idea that any attempt to
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limit the reception of satellite broadcasting services would constitute a

breach of the universal principle of freedom of information. Some
developing countries have requested an international legislative approach
that would resolve disputes of such a nature. They have proposed a
principle of prior consent whereby advance permission would have to be
obtained from a receiving country in order for foreign transmissions to
take place. Developed nations such as the United States (U.S.) have
opposed this motion, resulting in a stalemate in United Nations (U.N.)
negotiations in 1982. The resulting situation is known as ‘open skies’,
where there is no regulation of the content of international
communication signals.
The principle of prior consent is fraught with dangers. If for
example, prior consent to broadcast to southern Africa were required for
an international television news service, it is unlikely that such a news
service could get on the air, or that it would survive for long. The
government of Zimbabwe has, for example, banned CNN from re-
broadcast in Zimbabwe.vi Yet a neighbouring country might wish to have
access to CNN. It seems that the universal principle of freedom of access
to information must take precedence over prior consent. In any event,
most practical concerns of national governments can be met by regulating
local suppliers of communications technologies and their access to
citizens of that country.
Mechanisms of Regulation
Types of Regulation: Content and Transmission
Broadcasting legislation as it was conventionally phrased, licensed the
broadcaster to both use particular frequencies for communication, and,
implicitly, to supply content to the public. New South African legislation
is differentiating between the provision of content to the public (through
a broadcasting system), and the offering of access to communications
technology to the public, by a signal carrier or telecommunications
network. The various legislation acts to regulate in the two main sectors
of ICT:
• Content, (information), and

• The transmission of that content (communication).
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A variety of other legislation can have the effect of regulating content, or

broadcast information, for example those relating to press freedom,
freedom of information, obscenity, defamation, ownership of copyright or
intellectual rights.
Regulation of Content (Information)

Individual countries can regulate locally based content providers, and can
also promote access to, and creation of, information. They cannot regulate
foreign based content providers such as satellite television. But they can
regulate those local organizations, which supply access to content as if
they are the content providers. These providers of access to content
include subscription television agencies, and internet service
providers (ISPs).
Broadcasting has historically received the attention of regulators of
content and information. But what of internet content? South African
legislationvii defines broadcast as a unidirectional communication of
information on a broadcast system. Where an individual calls for
particular information, and gets a specific response, this is not broadcast,
since it is not available to the public. Some argue that internet content is
not broadcast, so does not need regulation under broadcast content
legislation. However, internet content is effectively broadcast to a national
communications system when it is connected to that system.
Public access to specific internet content can be regulated by the
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). It is possible to block web addresses
accessed through national ISPs, or to offer only a limited selection of web
addresses. Controlling internet content in this way is difficult, in view of
the vast numbers of web addresses, which are all content providers to the
internet. Some groups say regulation of internet content is not necessary
and an impingement on freedom. Content licences to host a web site or
own a web address are not being talked about in any legislation.
Policy makers want regulation to stimulate development of local
content, and to control what local audiences are watching. If broad band
internet access becomes common in Africa, the convergence of television
and internet will make existing regulation of broadcast content
increasingly irrelevant. Regulators will have to decide whether they will
try to regulate internet content. Positive regulation of internet content
(local content, national identity) is easy, but restrictive regulation is
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difficult, and would most likely involve huge limitations to internet

accessibility. Regulators would then be in the position of having to
concentrate on encouraging the development of local content, and local
content channels, to compete with global content for local audiences. In
this environment, content regulation will embrace both internet and
broadcast information.
Regulation of Transmission (Communications)

To get from its originator, to its recipient, content (information) requires
transmission using electromagnetic frequencies or land lines, and
connection (via some sort of reception device) to users or audiences.
Together this process is called communication, and can be regulated at
transmission and reception. Providers of communications technology
(signal carrier and cable network operators), do not supply any content, or
information, to the system.
Electromagnetic frequencies are regarded as a public asset and
regulated at an international level by conventions of the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), and at a national level by the members
of the ITU, the Posts and Telecommunications representatives of the
world’s governments. The International Telecommunications Union is the
principal international forum within which international consensus is
reached about spectrum use, and ITU Conventions have, in some
countries, been given the equivalent status of international treaties. The
frequencies to be used as broadcast frequencies are determined by
the ITU.
Regulation of ownership of means of reception and transmission of
signals is the most direct, and the traditional method of broadcast
regulation. Licences are required for ownership of equipment for
receiving and broadcasting radio transmissions. These are justified in
terms of needing to regulate radio frequencies. But they also earn money
for the state owned broadcaster through listener’s licences. Regulators
who wished to make the public hold licences for ownership of reception
technology for multimedia services might be faced with a difficult
task: could they ask for licences for those owning modems, or
satellite decoders?
Global satellite TV signals are regulated by the ITU under open skies
policy, and seem to be out of the reach of regulators in any individual
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country, except to the extent that the ground station may be located in that
country, or to the extent that that country can regulate ownership of
reception devices. In Afghanistan, in recent history, ownership of satellite
reception equipment was banned. In South Africa, satellite dishes and
reception kits can be owned by anyone without a licence, though
conventional TV sets need one.
Cable does not use radio frequencies, and falls under
telecommunications legislation. Cable infrastructure can be regulated with
licences to carry out the work of laying and maintaining the cable
infrastructure, and charging the public for access to it.
Governments may try to make providers of access to
communications responsible for content. This would be inaccurate: they
should focus on the providers of access to content- pay television
subscription companies, television companies and ISPs.
Towards a Unified Regulatory Policy

In noticing the difference between: regulation of content (information);
and providers of transmission (communication) technology to the public,
the concept of a national information communications system suggests
some redefinition of existing sectors for regulatory purposes. Public
providers of access, to communications technology, and to the
information available through it, are always based locally in the regulating
state, and can be the effective point of ICT regulation.
The local providers of public access to information content include
broadcasters (e.g. SABC), subscription TV services (e.g. MultiChoice)
and ISP’s, who use the communications (broadcast) system to deliver
content provided by content owners. Regulation of information including
promotion of national identity and public interest happens here.
Local providers of public access to (tele-) communications
technology, include signal carriers and networks (e.g. Sentech, Orbicom,
Telkom) that provide the public with access to the communications
backbone maintained by carriers of carriers (global and local). Regulation
of communications including frequency management and universal access
happens here.
At present, special regulation of electronic information extends to
‘broadcast content’, but not to internet information, except in as much as
other statutes dealing with information affect internet content. Freedom of
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speech considerations, and the ‘non broadcast’ status of internet, indicate

that internet need not be further regulated, but this countered by the idea
that internet content needs some regulation to promote its development.
Can National Governments Regulate Convergent

Communications?
Broadcast regulation used to be limited for practical purposes by the range
of terrestrial television stations. Satellite transmission footprints include
more than one territory, and can be made from remote geographic
locations. Convergence of telephony, internet and broadcasting has
blurred the boundaries of what constitutes any of these sectors. Internet
can carry telephony and broadcast content. So not only are governments
trying to grapple with legislative ways of defining and controlling these
activities, but also, those in telephony, satellite, internet and broadcasting
have financial interests at stake in the outcome of such legislation.
Some say that government has no business in trying to regulate the
content of the new communications technologies. But regulation is a two
edged sword, it can both inhibit and promote the subject of regulation, and
much content regulation in the new legislation is designed to provide to
positive developments in the content of the ICT revolution (see South
Africa Broadcast Act 1999).
Practical Regulation: The Business Model

In this era of change in communications technologies, it is interesting to
explore the existing regulatory control. For example, it appears that a
licence is not required to own a satellite dish and decoder in South Africa.
What is to prevent an overseas satellite television channel from
broadcasting its signal to South Africa, and selling decoders and
subscriptions in Johannesburg? Can the definitions of broadcasting be
extended to such a service, for the purposes of business? In fact such
television services already exist, such as the national broadcasts of DWTV
(Germany) CFI (France), though these are free-to-air non-commercial
national channels. They do not even need a decoder for reception. What if
commercial services were started? Does the sale of decoders constitute a
broadcasting activity? New South African legislation defines these
services to an extent, but other territories have not made such definitions
in legislation.
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The answer to many questions of how regulation can affect

television services is that of the business model. Maybe the legislation in
a particular territory does not provide for a particular modern
communication technology. This means that either, a business will not
start up to offer a television service that might be deemed illegal, since it
is a poor investment risk, or a business will start up without regulation.
Practical Regulation: Political Control

In our discussion of models of regulation we talk about specific policies
and legislation. This legislation needs to be implemented by a body that is
free of commercial and political interference, such as an independent
regulatory authority. The method of appointment of regulators is an
important facet of legislation. In examples of legislation, appointment of
the regulatory executive may be done by a government minister, which
may be subject to political influence, or by a panel drawn from civic
institutions, or from nominations submitted by a cross parliamentary
committee, or from public nominations following advertisement.
Where the state owns a broadcaster or other communications
infrastructure, it is able to control programming to a high degree, even
when that broadcaster is protected by legislation, through appointment of
the executive. This influence may extend to other broadcasters, especially
in socio-political environments where government decree carries more
authority than legislation and rule of law.
Regulation in Africa
Legislation that governs regulation of broadcasting in Africa was often
modeled on legislation from the colonising nations of the last century. In
Francophone territories, co-operation agreements have resulted in
introduction of regulatory mechanisms that allow for independent
broadcasting, and most territories are considering or have reviewed
broadcast legislation in the last decade. Definition of satellite TV and
convergent information is a central issue to new legislation.
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African Charter on Broadcasting 2001

The African Charter on Broadcasting was launched as an official activity
of the Africa Commission Human and People’s Rights meeting held in
Pretoria in May 2002. The Charter expands, to broadcasting and electronic
media, the ideals of the 1991 Windhoek Declaration, which inspired the
independent press in the region and worldwide a decade ago.viii
The Charter says that ‘freedom of expression includes the right to
communicate and access to means of communication’, and includes the
following declarations:
• The frequency spectrum is a public resource, which must be

managed in the public interest.
• The legal framework for broadcasting should include... respect
for freedom of expression, diversity, and the free flow of
information and ideas, as well as a three-tier system for
broadcasting: public service, commercial and community.
• All State and government controlled broadcasters should be
transformed into public service broadcasters, that are accountable
to all strata of the people as represented by an independent board,
and that serve the overall public interest, avoiding one-sided
reporting and programming in regard to religion, political belief,
culture, race and gender.
• Community broadcasting is broadcasting which is for, by and
about the community, whose ownership and management is
representative of the community, which pursues a social
development agenda, and which is non-profit.
The right to communicate includes access to telephones, email, Internet

and other telecommunications systems, including through the promotion
of community controlled information communication technology centers.
Broadcast Regulation Models in Africa: Three Cases

Legislation that affects broadcasters and other information providers are
extensive documents, and this is complicated by the necessity to examine
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the actual implementation of regulation in each country, which makes an

adequate survey of Africa’s legislation impossible in the space allowed for
this paper. Below is a survey of legislation in three of Anglophone Africa’s
biggest economies: Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa. South African
legislation is examined as representing the most forward thinking
legislation for information and communications, Zimbabwe as
representing a repressive interpretation of the latest trends in regulation,
while Kenya is discussed as a nation that still has to define its regulation
of broadcast, satellite and other information services.
Broadcast Regulation in South Africa

Constitutional Rights: Freedoms and Rights to Access
Bill of Rights
According to the Bill of Rights, as contained in South Africa’s

Constitution, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), everyone has the right to freedom
of expression, which includes:
• Freedom of the press and other media

• Freedom to receive or impart information or ideas
• Freedom of artistic creativity
• Academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.
Various laws, policies and organisations act to protect and promote press
freedom in South Africa. Press Freedom Day is celebrated annually on
October 19.
Legislation
Redefining Communications and Information
The Department of Communications is the centre of policy making and

policy review for the posts, telecommunications and broadcasting sectors
in the country. This includes policy making that affects State owned
96
enterprises such as Telkom SA Ltd, the South African Post Office (Pty)
Ltd, Sentech and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), as
well as the regulators, the Independent Communications Authority of
South Africa (ICASA) and the Universal Services Agency (USA). All
these, including the Department, fall under the Cabinet portfolio of the
Ministry of Communications. The Department aims to enable ordinary
people to have access to Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs).
The Department of Communications is redefining South African
broadcast legislation, which may set a lead for other African territories.
The objectives seek to facilitate the theme of bridging the digital divide.
The catch phrase represents the hope that convergence of internet,
telecommunications and television might hold a solution to the problems
of Africa’s chronic lack of development.
The Department is examining the move to digital broadcasting,
through its Digital Broadcasting Advisory Board (DBAB), which it hopes
will free up bandwidth for commercial services such as interactive TV,
and educational services based on video on demand. The plans are
ambitious, but the dream of developing a digital backbone for convergent
communication services may represent competition for some commercial
services and opportunity for others. The Department has determined that
it restructures publicly owned broadcast signal provider, Sentech, to
reposition the organisation as multimedia digital company, to exploit
opportunities in the multimedia environment, to facilitate entry of Sentech
into the telecommunications sector, to develop a digital terrestrial
backbone and to launch a pay TV service.
This last objective, a pay TV service, might compete with
commercial DTH (Direct To Home) satellite pay TV operator,
MultiChoice. Publicly owned transmission network, Sentech, established
the satellite platform VIVID to be an alternative low cost DTH satellite
platform, partly in order to increase geographical coverage of the country
for South African public broadcasters. VIVID has been a free-to-air
satellite service since 1999, but on 2 August 2001, VIVID encrypted its
distribution of South Africa¹s terrestrial free-to-air channels. These
include the SABC channels, BopTV and e.tv. The VIVID footprint
extends throughout southern Africa, and this meant that neighbouring
countries could receive the service when it was free-to-air, which meant
that the territorial limits of some programme licensing agreements might
have been exceeded. The encryption of the
97
South African Broadcasting Act 1999
The Act defines the ‘South African Broadcasting System’ as owned by

South Africans, and places expectations on that system in terms of
contributing to the enlightenment and moral fibre of South Africans.
The Act:
• provides a Charter for the South African Broadcasting

Corporation Ltd;
• establishes the Frequency Spectrum Directorate in the
Department;
• establishes the South African Broadcasting Production Advisory
Body; and
• seeks to regulate broadcasting services that are provided by
means other than radio frequencies, i.e., satellite and cable.
Definitions of Broadcasting and Satellite TV
The Act recognised satellite broadcast services (TV channels) as subject

to broadcast regulation, for the first time. In its definitions, “satellite
broadcasting service” means a service which is broadcast by transmitters
situated on a satellite; “broadcaster” means any person who composes or
packages or distributes television or radio programme services for
reception by the public or sections of the public or subscribers to such a
service irrespective of technology used”; and “broadcasting” means any
form of unidirectional telecommunications intended for the public,
sections of the public or subscribers to any broadcasting service having
appropriate receiving facilities, whether carried by means of radio or any
other means of telecommunication or any combination”.ix Cable and
satellite pay TV are regarded as broadcasting activities according to this
Act, and interactive services, including data and voice transmission, are
excluded by the definitions of broadcasting as unidirectional. Other
unidirectional services such as video on demand, and dissemination
of text-only services are specifically excluded from the definition
of broadcasting.
Chapter III of the Act, Classification of Broadcasting Services, re-
emphasises that the act will cover satellite services requiring that ‘any
98
person who intends to provide a broadcasting service, including

distribution services whether satellite or terrestrial, or any other form of
distribution which offer programming to the public is required to obtain a
licence’]. A consequence of this is that MultiChoice may be required to
obtain new licences for the channels on the multi-channel satellite pay TV
service called DStv. The carrier of these services is required to have a
“multi-channel or signal distribution licence” See reference to Chapter VII
of the Act, below. But the Act stated that any services in existence at the
time of the Act would automatically be licensed on application, unless the
regulatory authority decided otherwise.
Chapter III recognises that foreign services may reach South Africa,
but that South Africa has no power to legislate these services: ‘This
section must not be construed to mean that a broadcaster licensed or
authorised to provide service to a foreign country by the appropriate
authority and whose signal is incidentally received in South Africa, is
required to hold a licence in South Africa.’ The Act does, however, say
that if these broadcast services are to be formally promoted or sold to the
public in South Africa, those making such offerings must obtain a licence.
Indeed, each individual TV ‘channel provided in a multi channel
environment must be authorised by the Authority upon application by the
person offering a broadcasting service to the public’.x
The Act defines the following Classes of broadcast licences:
1. Public broadcasting service;

2. Commercial broadcasting service; and
3. Community broadcasting service.
And provides that broadcasting licences are issued in 11 types

including: free-to-air television service; satellite free-to-air television
service; satellite-subscription television service; and multi-channel
satellite distribution.xi
Chapter VII of the Broadcasting Act deals with Signal Distribution
and Multi Channel Distributions. This refers to licences needed by the
carriers of the various broadcasting services (TV channels), which, as
stated above, already need broadcast licences. Such signal distributors
include Sentech and Orbicom.
Telecommunications legislation, especially in a convergent
environment, also licenses carriers of communications. The convergence
of ICT means that the distinction between signal carriers as
99
telecommunications, or broadcasting carriers is becoming less

meaningful. This recognised by the Broadcasting Act, to the extent: that it
does recognise signal carriers as a separate entity to broadcasters; and by
the management of broadcast frequencies under a Frequency Spectrum
Directorate in the Department of Communications. The Directorate will
unify frequency management, which had been allocated to various
government agencies, such as broadcasting, defence, and
telecommunications.xii
The problems of jurisdiction over licences and services were
resolved to some extent by the Independent Communications Authority
Act of 2000, which merged the regulatory authorities for broadcasting and
telecommunications into one body, the Independent Communications
Authority of South Africa (ICASA). According to the ICASA web site,
until the restructuring of the new regulator has been completed, ICASA
will operate with two divisions. The former IBA will constitute the
broadcasting division, while the former SATRA departments will
constitute the telecommunications division. The ICASA Council will
oversee both divisions.
Redefining Broadcasters as Providers of Content (Information)
The Broadcasting Act appears to be transitional toward a regulatory

separation of broadcasting content (information), from the transmission of
that content (communication). As constituted, the Act regulates both
broadcasting and signal distribution, but also defines the separation.
Later legislation (Telecommunications Amendments Act 2001)
seeks to regulate carriers of telecommunications. In a convergent world, it
is apparent that broadcast signal distributors/carriers, and telephony’s
“carriers of telecommunications”, are differentiated not by the content
they carry, but solely by the technical form of communication utilised: the
former uses electromagnetic frequencies, and the latter, land lines (and
mobile telephony). It seems logical to regulate these Carriers and Signal
Distributors together as “Communications carriers”, in classes of
licences defined by their utilisation of either land line or
electromagnetic frequencies.
A redefinition of broadcast regulations as content (electronic
information) regulations might see provision of access to broadcast and
internet as different classes of public “Information”, based on the
100
distinction of interactivity. Information defined in two classes: broadcast,

including pay TV; and interactive services (such as internet). The
interactive class of information (internet) is not available as a public
service, since it must be ‘called for’ by the user (an arguable point), so it
is not subject to the same restrictive regulation as broadcast content, but
rather subject to positive development regulation.
The highlights below demonstrate that the South African
Broadcasting Act is concerned to regulate content (information) of
broadcasters. The Act intends broadcast regulation to:
• contribute to democracy, nation building, the provision of

education and strengthening the moral fibre of society
• provide for a three-tier system of public, commercial and
community broadcasting services
• establish a strong and committed public broadcaster to service
the needs of all South Africans
• promote the production and distribution of local content, through
the establishment of the South African Broadcasting Production
Advisory Body.xiii
However, the Act falls short of a harmonised re-definition of broadcasting,

including satellite TV, as being part of the “local provision of access to
information”. It is restricted from doing this since the current situation
separates broadcast from telecommunications information. Harmonisation
under the ICT scheme would see Information regulation governing local
broadcasters and pay TV agencies, while regulation of Communications
would govern signal carriers and providers of access to them (cable and
frequency transmission, and consumer connections to same).
Much of the Act is given over to re-defining the South African
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). It guarantees the independence of the
SABC as public broadcaster, with the Government holding 100% of the
shares in the SABC as a limited liability company.
Digital Broadcasting & Production Advisory Bodies
Early in 2001, the Minister responsible for the Department of

Communications jointly launched the Digital Advisory Body and the
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Broadcast Production Advisory Body. The latter will promote the

production of local content, the production of materials that will meet the
needs of the community sector, and the foreign sale of local products. The
Digital Broadcast Advisory Body will advise the Minister on digital
broadcasting and economic and other implications of converting from
analogue to digital transmission.xiv
South African Telecommunications Amendments Act of 1999
New Licences for Information and Communications Services
The Telecommunications Amendments Act of 1999 seeks to promote new

convergent services, and competition in the communications sector. It has
mandated ICASA to implement these goals. ICASA is grappling with the
extent to which convergence will merge the traditional boundaries within
communications. The Act attempts to create a communications sector
called “multimedia”, in a compromise effort to protect the traditional
markets of existing carriers of telephony and broadcasting, while
simultaneously promoting the development of digital media platforms. As
a result, the existing operators are complaining that the definition of
multimedia does not work.
The Act mandates a Second National Operator (SNO) for telephony,
which will compete with Telkom, the state-owned telecommunications
provider. The creation of the SNO was the cause of some debate, but the
principal of competition is relatively straightforward. The proposed new
licence for multimedia services is, however, a more contentious issue. The
Act proposes that Sentech, South Africa’s government owned “common
signal carrier”, is licensed to provide additional services of multimedia,
multimedia networking and an international telephony gateway referred to
as the “carrier of the carriers”. Sentech is already licensed through the
broadcasting Regulations to be a common signal carrier for broadcasting.
Under the proposed multimedia licence from the Act Sentech may not
provide telephony services to the end user, but might provide them for
others licensed to do this, e.g. the SNO.xv
The proposed new multimedia licence for Sentech, would allow
Sentech to provide convergent media services to the public, and has
generated debate in South Africa from interested parties in
telecommunications and broadcasting. The Independent Communications
102
Authority of South Africa, ICASA, gazetted proposed licence conditions

in December 2001, and invited comment. In June 2001, ICASA held
hearings on the proposed conditions for the 15year licence to be issued to
Sentech by May 7 2001. Several interested parties made submissions,
which are detailed in the newspaper story ‘Reviewing a One-of-a-Kind
Licence’: Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg); March 1, 2002.
The main issues that emerged are:
• Problems of definition of a multimedia service (which might, in

the convergent multimedia environment, include TV, internet,
voice and e commerce), and;
• How such a service will impact on the traditional business
activities of telephony and broadcasting, and;
• Is regulation of internet necessary: why regulate what was
previously unregulated?
Defining Multimedia:
Signal carrier Orbicom says that the gazetted notice for the new
multimedia licence, as issued by ICASA, alters and broadens the
definitions of multimedia contained in the Telecommunications
Amendments Act. A lengthy definition says that Sentech will supply
(some) broadcast and multimedia services, but will not carry (traditional)
telephony services. These distinctions may be difficult in a convergent
environment, and avoid the difficulty of distinguishing ‘multimedia’
from ‘internet’.xvi
The new licence may allow Sentech to provide interactive and pay
television services. Orbicom says that it is beyond ICASA’s powers to
provide for a wider definition of multimedia service than the one
contained in the Act. Orbicom says that multimedia services are properly
construed as broadcasting services, and that it would be unconstitutional
if the multimedia licence awarded to Sentech authorises it to deliver a
telecommunications service.
The New Licence Might Conflict with Traditional Business:
Submissions from Orbicom and Telkom contain reference to the

possibility that the regulations may impinge on their businesses, and
103
highlight the difficulties of defining “multimedia” as distinct from

broadcasting or internet. Orbicom is the signal carrier for the MultiChoice
pay TV network, so would be threatened by any moves by Sentech to
create a digital media platform that might carry video, or pay television
services. Telkom is also concerned that the new Sentech services might
cut into their (present) monopoly of telephony. Telkom argues that the
proposed Sentech licence provides for “multimedia services”, and claims
that simple internet traffic is not a multimedia service: e-commerce, text,
data and graphics do not constitute integrated content and should be
removed from the multimedia licence proposal to be awarded to Sentech.
Telkom also argues that Sentech’s carrier of the carriers licence, should be
limited from carrying international telephony traffic.xvii
The New Licence Might Not Be Viable
The licencee (Sentech) says that the new licence envisages services that
are not yet viable. Sentech argues that the proposed R250-million licence
fee is exorbitant and stands as a “barrier of entry”. Telecommunications
service providers such as Vodacom and MTN and Cell C for example, are
required to pay a fixed licence fee of R100-million together with an
annual amount of 5% of their audited annual operational income. It is only
the demand for voice services, says Sentech, which might generate
revenue for a multimedia service or network provider, as opposed to the
more specialised multimedia telecommunication services and value added
network services.xviii
Is Regulation of Internet Services Unnecessary?
The Cape Telecommunications User’s Forum objected in its submission to

ICASA that the issuing of a multimedia licence to Sentech “will create a
precedent for the regulation of services that have previously been
unregulated, including Internet content provision, online banking and
commerce services”. The forum argues that the impact of Sentech’s
proposed multimedia licence will also affect the providers of content and
media services negatively. xix
104
Legislation in Kenya
The Panos publication, Up in the Air: the state of broadcasting in Eastern
Africa provides an excellent survey of legislation and policy in East
Africa, and is also a good model for the issues involved. Panos is an
international non-profit institute working with partners worldwide to
stimulate informed public and policy debate and build media capacities on
developing country issues. Due to limited space this chapter will provide
only brief summaries of observations discussed more fully in Up in
the Air. xx
Legislative Reform
In 1996, the Kenyan government adopted a policy framework paper,

“Economic Reforms 1996-1998”, with support from IMF and the World
Bank. One component of the reforms relates to the liberalisation and
restructuring of the telecommunications sector. Two bills prepared by the
government, namely the Kenya Communications Act and the Postal
Corporation Act, have become operational as of July 1999. A nine-man
transitional management committee was appointed to liquidate the Kenya
Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (KPTC). This allowed the
separation of postal and telecommunications services and the
restructuring of KPTC into three entities: Telecoms Kenya Ltd., Kenya
Postal Corporation, and Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK),
the latter acting as the licensing and regulatory authority.
Kenya Communications Act, 1998
The Kenya Communications Act, 1998 established the regulatory

authority for telecommunications, the Communications Commission of
Kenya, the duties of which are to provide licences to telecommunications
operators, issue frequencies to these operators (including broadcasters),
type approve telecommunications equipment (including broadcast
transmission equipment) and manage the frequency spectrum. [26]
105
Constitutional Reform?
Panos says that the Constitution needs reform and can borrow from the
South African Bill of rights regarding free flow of ideas and notes four
existing limitations in the law, including restrictions of the enjoyment of
fundamental rights and freedoms. The authority to broadcast, publish
newspapers, prohibit publications and invoke the Preservation of Public
Security Act is in the hands of the Minister for Information and
Broadcasting and the President.
With respect to broadcasting, Panos says that: a key concern is that
there are no clearly defined, publicly debated and publicly known criteria
and procedures for issuing broadcast licences or allocating frequencies.
The Kenyan Union of journalists in 1998 devised a Mass Media Bill, as a
model for future legislation. Kenya Community Media Network
(KCOMNET), has also devised sample legislation with a three tiered
approach to regulating broadcasting.xxi
Regulation in Zimbabwe
The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Services Act 2001
Satellite Defined as Part of Zimbabwe Broadcast System
The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Services Act 2001 says that international

satellite services become part of the Zimbabwe broadcasting system when
they are processed in Zimbabwe: “the operation in Zimbabwe of a
broadcasting system, includes the operation in Zimbabwe of broadcasting
apparatus that is connected to a broadcasting system operated outside
Zimbabwe” and “the provision, reception or transmission of a
broadcasting service includes the provision or reception within, or
transmission to, from or within, Zimbabwe of such service transmitted by
satellite or any other means”.xxii
Other references to satellite broadcasting are in the definitions of
“broadcasting service”, which “shall include the delivery of television
programmes by any means including satellite and cable, to those with the
means to receive them”. The act also introduces licences for those who
wish to provide a “a subscription satellite broadcasting service”; “a
broadcasting service which transmits programmes by satellite, whether by
means of encoded or unencoded signals... and which is made available to
106
persons on payment of a subscription fee”. The Act allows three months

from enactment, for existing suppliers of those services to apply for
a licence.
Having defined satellite broadcasting as part of the Zimbabwe
broadcasting system, the Act contains little legislation specific to satellite
broadcasting, except in that it specifies “Every subscription satellite
broadcasting licensee shall transmit an unencoded signal from a public
broadcaster”. Presumably, the onus is on the local operator giving access
to the foreign service to arrange for transmission of the local public
broadcaster, and also to ensure that the content delivered complies with
other local content requirements discussed below.
Political Control
The Act created a Broadcast Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) to receive

broadcast licence applications, though none have yet been granted. Critics
of the Act [14] say that it gave Zimbabwe’s Minister of State for
Information and Publicity, Professor Jonathan Moyo, too much control
over regulatory authorities and broadcasters. The board is appointed
directly by the Minister: Part II, 4, (2). “the Board shall [be]... appointed
by the Minister after consultation with the President and in accordance
with any directions that the President may give him”.xxiii
Despite the fact that Minister will appoint the executive of the
regulatory authority, key phrases in the Act remove power from the
regulator. The regulatory function is limited to an advisory one: “to
receive, evaluate and consider applications for the issue of any
broadcasting licence or signal carrier licence for the purpose of advising
the Minister on whether or not he should grant the licence”. To re-
emphasise this point: “Subject to this Act, the Minister shall be the
licensing authority for the purpose of licensing any person to provide a
broadcasting service or operate as a signal carrier in Zimbabwe.”xxiv
The Act wishes to regulate the political content of broadcasts. “A
licensee shall make one hour... per week of its broadcasting time available
for the purpose of enabling the Government of the day... to explain its
policies to the nation”. There are stringent requirements for broadcasters
of political matter, which is extended to include current affairs: “ if a
broadcaster broadcasts matter relating to a political subject or current
affairs, being matter that is in the form of news, an address, a statement, a
107
commentary or a discussion, the broadcaster must cause a record of the

matter to be made in a form approved in writing by the Authority”. Other
local programme content is specified in schedules to the Act, as being
75% for television broadcasters (within two years) and 30% of weekly
airtime for subscription television broadcast services.xxv
In common with similar legislation in South Africa, the Zimbabwe
Broadcasting Act requires the broadcasting system to foster the national
identity. But Zimbabwe goes one step further; the Authority is also
charged with “the preservation of the national security and integrity of
Zimbabwe”. Foreign participation is not allowed, since broadcasters must
be 100% owned by Zimbabwe resident citizens. No licensee can employ
a non-citizen of Zimbabwe without authorisation from the Minister.xxvi
Amendment of the Broadcasting Services Act 2001
In August 2001, a few months after bringing the Broadcasting Services

Act into law, the government evoked the Presidential Powers (Temporary
Measures) Act to amend the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC)
Act and the Broadcasting Services Act 2001 to form a new company to
provide transmission services to broadcasters. The amendment also made
ZBC a duly licensed broadcasting entity under the Broadcasting Services
Act. The justification of the statutory instrument was that the transitional
period granted by the Broadcasting Services Act 2001 expired the
previous month and there was thus need to extend the period in order to
process the issuance of licences to broadcasters.xxvii
Other than controlling the broadcasting spectrum, the new company
would provide satellite broadcasting services and subscription television
services. The company is also mandated to expand multi media services
by providing Internet, web development and e commerce services across
the country. Another of its roles would be to provide a state of the art
production plant for audio tape, compact discs and digital videodiscs
and to set up sound recording studios and facilities for video and
film production.xxviii
108
Conclusions
Present Regulatory Situation
Legislation governing broadcasting is being reviewed throughout Africa,
in the light of satellite television and other information communication
technologies (ICTs), which may not be covered by existing broadcast
regulation. Satellite services are coming under new regulatory scrutiny,
and other transmission methods might become viable for television
services. This means the novelty of trying to regulate global content
delivered by satellite and cable.
The ideals behind the legislation are underpinned by human rights,
public ownership of the frequency spectrum, and the preservation of
national identity. It is also hoped that provision of universal access to
information can significantly contribute to the development of Africa.
The actual legislation, and implementation of regulations, can be
restrictive of independent broadcasting and free expression, especially of
political views and news. Legislators should be particularly careful to
preserve these aspects of the new broadcasting, or access to information
systems they define. Legislation can be enacted and interpreted in ways
that are more, or less, friendly to constitutional rights. South Africa is a
leading nation in the development of new legislation to embrace the
digital information age in full recognition of human rights issues. Kenya
and other African countries still need to update their legislation to reflect
human rights and information communication policy. Zimbabwe’s latest
legislation, while recognising some concepts of a modern broadcasting
system, pays little heed to constitutional rights and uses new legislation to
establish government control over broadcasting.
Regulating Satellite Television at the Point of Public

Access
This paper discusses the principles by which regulators may seek to define
broadcast systems in their countries. Broadcasting, satellite TV and
internet content, might be conceptualised as electronic media content, or
a part of information. Regulation of global information (content)
providers is increasingly difficult for national governments, but the degree
to which local populations have access to such content, can be regulated
109
through the providers of public access to information. Freedom of access

to information dictates that few restrictions on access to content must be
in place. But there are many positive aspects to information regulation:
fostering a national identity; recognition of diversity and stimulation of
the local content production industry.
Regulation of global content/information, such as satellite television,
can only be effective at the point of local access to information, to the
public. This is separate from regulation of communications technology
(such as landline/cable, terrestrial broadcast, satellite), which carries the
information. Nor are global television channels the providers of local
access to content/information. Local providers of access to information
are local re-broadcasters and subscription agencies. Free-to-air DTH
satellite channels which have no representation in a particular territory
might be deemed unregulatable by that territories government, in line with
Open Skies policy, but when that information channel starts a commercial
operation that supplies access to the channel (information), then it can be
regulated. Such commercial operations would include subscription sales,
advertising sales and even advertising to promote access to that channel.
In definitions of a broadcast system, one might say that: (local) providers
of access to information to the public must have a license. Provision of
access to information consists of any commercial activity that promotes
public access to an information service, as distinct from access to
communications (i.e. with no information content).
Thus, global information cannot be regulated locally, but regulators
can provide for the production and dissemination of local content to local
and global audiences through:
i) Information regulation: requiring providers of public access to

information (local broadcasters, pay TV subscription agencies,
ISPs) to contribute toward local content aspirations through
licence fees and levies on income (advertising, subscription).
Establishment of public broadcasters and other content
production mechanisms such as film,video and electronic content
creation boards or funds.
ii) Communications regulation: requiring (local) providers of public
access to communications technologies (signal carriers and
cable networks), to promote universal public access to
the communications system (including broadcast &
110
telecommunications networks); and to properly develop and

maintain the system and contribute with licence fees and levies to
regulators funds such as universal access and local content funds;
Broadly speaking, existing broadcast regulations might to be modified to

apply to all content (electronic information), with broadcast and internet
as different classes of information, based on the distinction of interactivity.
Existing national telecommunications regulations might be modified to
apply to all communications access providers, including the broadcast
signal carriers currently regulated as part of broadcast regulations.
These functions are closely related, and in South Africa, the
regulatory authority for broadcasting and telecommunications has been
merged. Legislation and regulation of these sectors might become further
harmonised and unified, retaining the main distinctions of information
and communication.
Regulation of International Satellite Signals

In traditional broadcasting, providers of communication could be asked to
regulate the content (information) which is carried to the public, but this
is increasingly difficult in the interactive age where the public can ask for
content (information) from any global provider. The local providers of
public access to information can, however, be regulated. This requires
defining the communications system of the nation. In this way existing or
modified legislation and government policy as it affects content, can be
regulated at the point of access to communications.
This chapter proposes that international signal transmission should
remain subject to ³open skies² policy, and free of content regulation.
Under this global policy, content, or information, providers can only be
regulated in their home bases. Possibilities do exist for global content
regulation. The internet does contain a framework for regulation, by the
allocation of domain names that already exists, but the number of websites
globally defies meaningful regulation.
In the meantime, states which wish to fully regulate or promote
digital content, or information, dissemination, will define their
broadcasting system, and focus on regulation of the local providers of
access to content.
111
End Notes
i Programming information available on the ABN website:

<http://www.africanbroadcast.com/programming/schedule.asp>
ii ECA/NICI: http://www.bellanet.org/partners/aisi/nici/Default.htm
iii South Africa Broadcasting Act, No 4 of 1999: http://www.polity.org.za/
govdocs/legislation/1999/act99-004.html
iv Zimbabwe Broadcasting Services Act, Act No. 3/2001
v De Klerk, P., The Formulation of a Regional Regulatory Policy. Paper
presented at the Regional Satellite Regulatory Policy Workshop. 31
August 1997. Johannesburg.
vi MISA: Cable News Network banned from national broadcaster.
09/01/2002. http://www.misanet.org/alerts/20020109.zimbabwe.2.html
vii
South Africa Broadcasting Act, No 4 of 1999: http://www.polity.org.za/
viii African Charter on Human Rights: http://www.misanet.org/
ixSouth Africa Broadcasting Act, No 4 of 1999: http://www.polity.org.za/
x Ibid.
xi Ibid.
xii Ibid.
xiii Ibid.
xivTelephone Interview with Allison Gillwald, Digital Broadcasting
Advisory Board
xv
Reviewing a One-of-a-Kind Licence: Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg);
March 1, 2002: http://allafrica.com/stories/ 200202280687.html
xvi Ibid.
xvii Ibid.
xviii Ibid.
xix Ibid.
xxPANOS: Up in the Air: the state of broadcasting in Eastern Africa.
Kenya broadcast regulations: http://www.econewsafrica.org/panos/
K_regulation.html
112
xxi Ibid.
xxii Zimbabwe Broadcasting Services Act, Act No. 3/2001
xxiii Ibid.
xxiv Ibid.
xxv Ibid.
xxvi Ibid.
xxviiMISA: Government calls new media company to life 28/08/2001.
http://www.misanet.org/alerts/20010828.zimbabwe.0.html
xxviii Ibid
113
Chapter 4
MEDIA PLURALISM AND DIVERSITY: A
CRITICAL REVIEW OF COMPETING
MODELS
Francis Nyamnjoh
Abstract
edia ownership and its relationship to the role of the media in
M general and broadcasting in particular is an essential question in the
building democratic societies. Private and public ownership needs to be
reviewed in a historical context, including the current context which is
characterised by the dominance of global privately owned commercially
driven media.
The importance of both public and private ownership must be
recognised, whilst at the same time we need to critically note their short
comings in catering for the information and communication needs of
societies. This is central to media pluralism and diversity.
Media policy and regulation, which promotes all forms of ownership
and promotes new forms of ownership is key to the realisation of
pluralism and diversity.
The collective and community ethos of African societies is an
element that should be taken into account in creating pluralistic and
diverse media systems. We must be wary of the marginalisation of such
ethos and its possibility to produce democratic forms of politics by the
promotion of a dominant neo-liberal form of democratic politics.
114
Media Pluralism and Diversity: A Critical Review of Competing Models
Introduction
Media pluralism and diversity remains an unanswered question almost
everywhere, despite the current semblance of universality of the neo-
liberal model championed by the USA and global capitalism. At the heart
of the pluralism and diversity debate is another question: what regime of
media ownership and control best guarantees the greatest utility to the
greatest number? How the issue of ownership and control has been
addressed in different contexts through history has largely depended on
prevalent assumptions about the ‘individual’ and ‘society’ — autonomy
and social control. Different cultural and economic experiences have
informed different philosophies of personhood and agency, which in turn
have resulted in different ideas of property rights, and social control.
Hence, whether the media are owned by collectivities or individuals or
both, depends very much on what philosophies of personhood, agency,
property rights and social control are dominant in any given context. In
general, two schools of thought have dominated debate and practice in
this area.
On the one hand are propagators of the belief in the possibility of an
autonomous individual with interests superior to any alliances or
relationships he or she may forge with others as fellow members of a
group, community, society, nation or state. This idea which has
traditionally informed most media systems in the USA, is best epitomised
by such notions as: ‘private property’, ‘free market’, ‘deregulation’, ‘free
flow of information’, ‘consumer sovereignty’, and ‘liberal democracy’. It
is disciples of this school of thought who are currently celebrating the
virtues of media globalisation and the benefits of neoliberalism to the
information and communication needs of global consumer citizens.
On the other hand are advocates of collective interests, who privilege
media systems with the mission of promoting and protecting the concerns,
values and aspirations of groups, cultural communities and whole
societies, and who do not believe that it is enough merely to assume that
the media are of service to the community by being of service to
individual consumers. They insist on public service or community media,
with the mission of representing the interests of different cultural
groupings and social categories. Until recently and largely influenced by
Marxism and Socialism, European countries tended to share this pre-
occupation, hence direct involvement of states and governments with
media ownership and control.
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In Africa however, where the colonial experience is the most recent

in the world, media ownership and control patterns have tended to ignore
both individual and community interests, inspired by the colonial
obsession with central control and readiness to devalue the humanity of
colonial subjects. The consequence has been media systems that have
served governments and states, without necessarily serving the nation or
individual consumers. Despite this appropriation of the media by the
ruling elite, African societies do share in philosophies of ownership and
control that could easily reconcile the dichotomy between individual and
public interests, which one notices in the history of media appropriation in
the West.
This chapter makes a critical appraisal of the various media
ownership and control philosophies, highlighting their strengths and
weaknesses. It suggests that the best way forward may well be with media
systems that bridge, marry or reconcile individual interests with collective
or community interests. It is as much an illusion to talk of an autonomous
individual (complete and entire in him/herself), just as it is an illusion to
imagine a community that is totally deaf to the interests of the individuals
who constitute it.
Communities are made up of interconnected individuals with diverse
interests, who are constantly negotiating and renegotiating relationships,
recognition and representation. To invest exclusively in the individual, is
to miss out on this reality of sociality and conviviality forged through
relationships with others. Equally, to consider the collectivity simply as a
dictatorship is to ignore the fact that without individual agency seeking
conviviality through interdependence or interconnectedness, there would
be no group and community interests (cf. Nyamnjoh 2002). The chapter
thus calls for a media future where pluralism and diversity are guaranteed
by media systems providing both for individual interests and the interests
of various collectivities however defined or constituted.
Competing Claims to Pluralism and Diversity

Issues articulated in most national communication policies usually border
on the roles the public and private sectors should play towards
communication and media institutions and activities within the national
territory. Explicitly or implicitly, what is stressed in these policies and
their implementation is to a large extent determined by what assumptions
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about personhood and agency are shared by the policy makers in a given
society. While some governments and states advocate private initiatives in
the setting up and operation of communication facilities, others argue in
favour of state or government ownership and control. Taking a more
conciliatory stance are those uncomfortable with both exclusive state or
government monopolies on the one hand, and purely commercial or
private systems on the other.
The whole debate is centred on how best the interests of the public
could be served by communication, and also on whether the public
interest is seen as a composite of individual interests, as collective group
interests, or as a marriage of individual and group interests. The two basic
philosophies stand out clearly: some advocate and practise the ‘public
service’ view and others the ‘business’ view.
The Public Service Model

The public service view is one in which media are seen as ‘an enriching
and limited resource’ that should be employed most judiciously to serve
the needs and aspirations of ‘the entire spectrum of society’ (Adkins
1985:54). It expects media to function as a public utility ‘in the service of
the public sphere’, guaranteeing that ‘all members of society have access
to the information and knowledge they need in order to perform their civic
duties’, or simply to satisfy their interests and preferences as individual
readers, listeners and viewers (Syvertsen 1999:6). Such media should be
informative and educational, capable of stimulating thought, developing
latent tastes for good art of all kinds, and encouraging a proper sense of
values, as well as enhancing wisdom (Beadle 1963:93). It should provide
content that examines public issues ‘with an incisively critical eye’ and
services that ‘provide fora for debate’ (Findahl 1999:18). The position of
the public service advocates is that collective interests cannot be served if
the media are left entirely in the hands of the private sector; they see the
need for partial or total state regulation (Curran 1988:292).
The Business Model

The business view, on the other hand, maintains that only when operated
as privately owned business can the media satisfy the whole of society.
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The free competition among the forces in the marketplace inevitably

brings the public more services and pleasure. Only if government
interference and manipulation can be avoided will broadcasting be free
from undesirable influences and free to serve the public more effectively.
Perhaps one should add immediately that these distinctions are more
ideal than real, for there is hardly any country in the world where absolute
freedom is guaranteed, or where there is no attempt by the state to regulate
communication and the media (Hamelink 1983:111-12; Downing 1986;
Wells 1987:34; Findahl 1999:14). Media practitioners and ‘journalists
everywhere have to work within certain confinements, whether of law,
custom or economics’ (Head 1963:595). For as Beadle (1963:51) rightly
notes, ‘abstract appeals for liberty’, though always exciting, are ‘seldom
satisfying, because they beg too many questions. Whose liberty? Liberty
of what? Liberty for what? How much liberty ?’
The ideal of free press, inherent in Western discourse, has given the
mistaken view that Western media systems are indeed totally free of state
interference and regulation. Thus, Western media have generally been
presented to the rest of the world as free and unrestricted systems that
operate in an environment where there is ‘free flow of information’, and
for which reason, Western countries have often posed as pace-setters for
the rest of the world. Theirs is a position hotly contested in countries and
regions where the free flow of information is generally said to be
hampered through state regulation of media content (Wells 1987:24-42).
Debates on Ownership and Control Models

We can understand how the various ownership and control policies are
translated into reality, by referring to discussions and research findings by
some communication scholars. I use broadcasting as an example because,
although in most societies it is taken for granted that there should be a
private press free from rigid government control, there usually tends to be
some controversy on and around broadcasting, with government
interference and regulation more apparent.
On Public Ownership and Control

Raymond Williams, one of those who have most reflected on the topic,
identifies two types of ownership and control patterns of broadcast
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institutions in Europe and North America. The one is capitalist and

commercial (but whose proponents, for rhetorical purposes, prefer to
describe as ‘free’ and ‘independent’, as opposed to ‘monopoly’ and ‘state
control’), and the other is public service or non-commercial. His
distinction is between institutions which are privately owned, operated
and funded with advertising revenue, and which have as ‘their primary
aim the realisation and distribution of private profit on invested capital’,
and other institutions whose concerns are not to make profit but which
devote revenue ‘almost wholly to production and development of the
broadcasting service’ (Williams 1979:266).
In the USA, unlike their commercial counterparts, which are funded
with advertising revenue, public service television not only has its
production funds subject to central control, but it is ‘member-supported,
and survive with great difficulty only by constant local fund-raising’
(Williams 1979:266). Mulcahy and Widoff (1986:31) find the use of the
term ‘public’ rather misleading in the American context where, unlike in
France and Britain, such broadcasting is independent of the state
financially, administratively, and in the elaboration of its policies. They
note that ‘one of the outstanding questions facing public broadcasting is
how to administer a national program without a national policy – indeed,
where national policymaking has been virtually prohibited’ (1986:32).
They argue that ‘any discussion of public broadcasting must emphasize
the highly circumscribed and decentralized character of the system,
especially if compared to the commercial networks’ (1986:31).
Furthermore, juxtaposed with commercial television, public broadcasting
in the US, despite its ‘significant presence, has a decidedly minority share
of viewership’.
Attractive though the idea of public service broadcasting may be,
affirms Williams, it can only function effectively if there is no ‘ambiguity
about the public interest’ and if ‘its relation to the state’ is clearly defined.
Yet it is not always easy to say with required precision what in effect
constitutes ‘public interest’, and what is the relationship between the
public institutions charged with promoting such interest and the state.
Though Williams is in favour of public service broadcasting, he does not
think that state monopolies, as were found in some Western societies and
developing countries at the time he wrote, are the best way of ensuring
this. The reason for his scepticism is that whenever that is the case, ‘the
state can be correctly identified with a partisan version of the public
interest.’ In France, where competitive versions of public interest are
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active, ‘the equation between state and public interest is especially

vulnerable, and this leads not only to internal conflicts but ... to
complicated international pressures’ (1979:267).
In France, the constant interference with broadcasting by
government along party-political lines proves Williams’ point that state
monopolisation of broadcasting could lead to all sorts of complications in
a multiparty state. Although France has carried out ‘a rapid and confused
process of deregulation which has led to an explosion in the number of
radio and television networks’ in the country (Betts 1988:3), the tradition
in the past has been for every government that comes to power to seek
total control of broadcasting by placing its own people at the head of the
broadcast institutions. Accordingly, there have been ten regulatory
structures since World War II, each replacing the other to reflect changes
in the political arena. Betts describes the nature of the struggles by various
governments to control broadcasting in France, and uses Mitterand and
Chirac as examples.
According to Betts (1988:3), the tradition after every general
election in France has been for ‘heads to roll’ in the broadcasting sector –
‘with the new government appointing its supporters and friends to the key
jobs’. Thus, following the 1981 elections, the victorious Socialists not
only ‘placed their cronies at the head of the public networks’, but also
reformed the broadcasting authority in order to secure the necessary
influence over the regulation of broadcasting. The Socialists were
‘anxious to ensure that the right would find it hard to regain control of the
broadcasting sector when it came back to power’. To do this, they decided
to emulate Britain whose public service broadcasting is ‘flanked by a
private sector’.
The Socialists then proceeded ‘to create two new private commercial
networks and one private pay television channel to compete against the
existing three public television networks’. However, immediately the right
came back to power after the 1986 elections,
Mr Jacques Chirac, the Gaullist Prime Minister, set

about dismantling the broadcasting structure set up by
the Socialists. The heads of the public networks were
replaced and the concessions granted to the new
private channel operators were cancelled. The
broadcasting authority was replaced by a new
Commission Nationale de la Communication et des
LibertÈs (CNCL), a supposedly independent body
dominated by Gaullist representatives (Betts 1988:3).
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Prime Minister Chirac did not stop at that, but proceeded to the
privatisation of TF-1, France’s ‘oldest and most influential network’, thus
scoring a further political victory over the Socialists, who favour
nationalisation and more central control.
The French state gives subventions or assistance to newspapers and
news organisations in a way unparalleled elsewhere in the West. More
than 50% of the resources of Agence France Presse (AFP) for example,
come by way of subscriptions from the administration. Recently, laws
have been passed limiting the concentration of ownership, which was
already becoming a menace to press pluralism. In 1984, the Pierre Mauroy
government passed a law making it impossible for any group of
newspapers to get bigger by buying off others. And a commission was
created to oversee the transparent application of this law. Although the
commission was abolished two years later by the right-wing government,
the law against concentrated ownership was, however, maintained.
The regulation of broadcasting is done through an ‘independent
authority’, the Conseil SupÈrieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA), which took over
from the defunct Haute AutoritÈ de la communication audiovisuelle
(HACA) and the commission national de la communication et de libertÈ
(CNCL) in 1989. The CSA grants broadcasting licenses and ensures that
TV channels in particular respect the requirement for pluralism in
information and assists in the production of French programmes. Until
1982, French broadcasting was a state monopoly. In 1982, HACA was
created to coordinate state broadcasting institutions and ensure a certain
independence vis-‡-vis political authorities. In 1986, HACA was replaced
by the CNCL whose mission was to encourage free competition and
pluralism in media content. Although CSA replaced CNCL in 1989, its
functions are similar to those of its predecessors: the need to guarantee
pluralism and fairness in news; organise the broadcast of election
campaigns; issue frequencies to different operators; monitor radio and
television channels; oversee programme content; protect human dignity
and children (CSA: La Lettre, No.112, Janvier 1999:3). However, a lot of
French interventionism in the media is bound to be affected as new
European Community de-regulation and liberalisation laws are designed
and impressed upon EU member states.
This struggle between conservative and socialist governments to
control the media in France speaks for itself; it brings out the demerits of
excessive central control and clearly points out how governments might
use their positions as custodians of the public interest to secure and
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consolidate power for themselves, their parties and supporters. Williams

can thus be said to argue for policies that foster pluralism, though not
commercialism, in broadcasting. To him it is possible for the broadcast
media to be plural without being commercial and public service without
becoming the mere mouthpiece of the government or being reduced to a
mere state monopoly. He is apprehensive of any other form of political
organisation but that which Schlesinger (1978) terms ‘democratic
pluralism’, wherein power is shared by ‘competitive political parties’ in a
way that is balanced, and that allows no particular interest to weigh too
heavily upon the state. The BBC, which supposedly subscribes to the very
same democratic pluralism (Seaton 1988:263-72), is Williams’ example of
an independent public service broadcasting institution. It is ‘supposed to
be ... a marketplace for ideas and competing viewpoints, endorsing none,
admitting all, a national institution above the fray’ (Schlesinger
1978:166).
For one to have an idea of what Williams is advocating, a brief
presentation of the BBC is in order. The BBC was created to reflect the
plurality of British society in politics and culture. It is public property,
governed by an authority, whose individual members are publicly
appointed by the state for a defined and limited term of office. Its authority
is answerable to Parliament, to which it is supposed to make annual
reports through the Postmaster General. It operates under terms of
reference designed by Government and approved by Parliament, and it is
subject to certain overt Government powers of control over the content of
its programmes. It has powers to produce its own programmes.
Concerning funding, ‘the BBC lives on an agreed proportion of the
licence revenue and is forbidden to broadcast advertisements’. However,
the fact that ‘the BBC derives its revenue through the agency of a
government department – the Post Office’, ‘gives the Government a
financial hold over the BBC which can be used to hold back
development’. Although the government has power under the BBC’s
licence to instruct it ‘to broadcast or to refrain from broadcasting
something specific or some particular class of material’, the BBC has an
important safeguard against the government using such powers to the
detriment of the institution in that the BBC is ‘authorized to announce
publicly that ... [it is] broadcasting or refraining from broadcasting
something on government instructions. So the government cannot use its
powers secretly, and any instruction given by government is open to
comment and criticism by parliament and press’ (Beadle 1963:64-67).
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Though Williams endorses the BBC as a public institution that is free

and independent from direct and blatant state interference and
manipulation, he cautions against any uncritical acceptance of the
institution’s independence. Although direct pressures by the state are rare,
the fact that the government appoints the public authorities that oversee
the institution is enough for a certain measure of long-term influence on
the part of the government. Any attempts to introduce the direct election
of the institution’s authorities and to bring about ‘democratic
representation or control by actual producers and broadcasters’ within the
corporation have continued to be ‘very vigorously opposed’, suggesting
that the appointed authorities are all part of ‘a complicated patronage
system on which the real state, as distinct from the formal state,
effectively relies’ (Williams 1979:267).
Curran (1988:300) provides evidences of how the Thatcher
administration appointed BBC officials on a partisan basis, and how the
government exerted pressure on its board of governors for the suppression
of certain programmes of which it disapproved. But Williams thinks that
no matter the amount of pressure which might be brought to bear on the
BBC, no interference by the government or state can be as rigid as the
formal control through a ministry of information, as applies elsewhere in
France. The fact that there is political pluralism (epitomized by
‘competitive political parties’) makes any rigid or formal control a virtual
impossibility (Williams 1979:267).
Further developments in British broadcasting have revived debates
about how public interest can best be served. In May 1988, for example,
the government created a Broadcasting Standards Council (BSC) to
monitor ‘taste and decency’ on radio and TV under the chairmanship of
Sir Rees-Mogg. The BSC was charged, inter alia, with previewing
imported programmes in order to guard against excessive ‘sex and
violence’ on British TV. The move attracted criticism, not least from the
BBC and IBA, who considered the BSC’s right to preview as an
interference with their traditional ‘systems of self-regulation’. Opposition
politicians, on the other hand, criticised the government for using sex and
violence as a pretext to ensure its political convenience and to ‘inhibit
those who dare to criticise’ it. In the right to preview is the presupposition
that a single group of people appointed by the ruling government can
determine morality for a country of over fifty six-million people. The
Broadcasting Standards Council became part of the Broadcasting Act
of 1990.
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The Public Service Model in Africa

It is important to mention Africa in relation to the public service model,
though the subscription of most African states and governments to this
model has tended to be more rhetoric than practice. It is however
necessary to situate postcolonial tendencies in historical perspective. In
opting for rigid state ownership and control of the media, postcolonial
governments were just as keen as their colonial predecessors in justifying
why the media, needed to be controlled tightly. Though power was a
common appetiser for both states, the postcolonial leaders marshalled
additional rhetoric to justify rigid control of the media. From the early
days of independence until recently, it was common for states to claim that
centralism was necessarily the best way of attending nation-building and
development. Central control of the media was justified as less wasteful
of limited resources, and as guaranteeing the political stability badly
needed for rapid development and for catching up with the West.
Generally, governments claimed that once their states had become more
mature and stable, they would loosen their grip and become more tolerant
of media pluralism and diversity. This position was similar to that of the
colonial states, which saw the importance of free and private initiative in
the media only towards or at the end of their colonial stay. These
similarities generally point to how much the postcolonial leaders
had learnt from their colonial predecessors, the rhetoric of
liberalism notwithstanding.
Again, just as the colonial state was most rigid about broadcasting
and relatively more tolerant of the print media, so too have been the
governments of postcolonial Africa. Broadcasting was singled out as
needing to be watched at close range. This was also because radio (and
later television) was/were largely considered the most available and
accessible of all the media, and as capable of instant effects and with
enormous potential for nation-building and development. In most
countries, from independence to the late 1980s when the clamour for
liberalisation intensified, journalists in the state media were little more
than public relations men and women for the government and ruling party.
Their role as mouthpieces or ‘errand boys’ committed them much less to
the truth and the public service than to building a positive image, selling
the ideas and promoting the interests of the state and ruling elite. Instead
of serving as active and critical vehicles of information and
communication, such media were confined to feeding the public with
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doctored events and information tailored to serve the sensitivities and

expectations of those at the helm of state. Thanks perhaps to years of
socialisation or to strategic self-interest, some of these journalists grew to
take for granted the truth of what they were fed, which they in turn
presented with conviction and persuasion to the public as if it were the
fruit of professional and disinterested journalism. In this way, they could
be compared to night-soil men or scavengers for the powerful, dutifully
cleaning up mess and litter generated by arrogance, ignorance and
complacency, while in turn reducing everyone else to scavengers in
situations of social decadence and economic downturns. Sacrificed in the
name of unattainable nation-building and development, were media
pluralism and diversity, under the colonial and postcolonial corruption of
the public service model in Africa.
On Private Ownership and Control

Proponents of commercial or competitive broadcasting in the West do
more than just share Williams’ pluralism and stance against state
monopoly over broadcast institutions. It is their contention that the state
must not interfere in any way with the free market forces that shape the
state of affairs. They are firmly convinced that when ownership is private,
free and open to competition, the audiences who ‘are sufficiently
sophisticated’ are the sole judges of what is good or bad in the television
and radio programmes that should be freely available (Wells 1987:31).
Thus, in order to guarantee a free marketplace of entertainment, ideas and
serious information, public service seen as monopolistic tendencies must
be guarded against.
To Seiden (1974:15-16), this involves the elimination of public
ownership of any kind, which he seems to see as the only real threat to a
free and open marketplace. His position is that government-supported
media must not be tolerated, for such ‘support necessarily goes hand-in-
hand with government control’. He argues that it is precisely the absence
of government financial support and/or interference in the selection of the
persons involved in media operation that has given the American
communication system a unique position as champion of press freedom.
He cites France and Britain as states where the government interferes
either directly or indirectly with the media.
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It is important for the American communication system to reflect the

general economic structure of the American society, Seiden argues. But
this can only happen if government ownership and interference is
minimized, given that such involvement on the part of the government
inevitably leads to attempts by the latter to conceal and falsify
information. Hence the need to maintain a permanent state of tension
between the government and the media, making sure that the sharp lines
separating their interests are reinforced. Though he is rather worried that
this ideal might be compromised by a new breed of media practitioners
who, to paraphrase him, see themselves most elitistly as educators rather
than informers, thus making the distinction between ‘news’ and
‘editorials’ less clear.
Seiden makes certain assumptions that others would find to be rather
uncritical and therefore difficult to swallow. There is nothing wrong with
his seeing the media as watchdogs against political or economic control
and manipulation. But one wonders why he should think that such control
or manipulation is only possible by the government. Perhaps this is the
result of his view of monopoly as possible only when there is state
intervention or public control. Finally, if the American communication
system is really the free and open marketplace Seiden claims it is, there is
apparently no reason why he should be worried about the new breed of
journalists who blur the distinction between news and editorials. For one
should normally think that audience sovereignty would overrule in the
long run. For, who else than the audience can decide what it wants?
As Seiden himself argues, the fear that owners and employees of the
mass media possess the power over the audience is quite unjustifiable in
a free market situation. He maintains that audience sovereignty is being
assured by means of constant audience polls. Through polls the audience
determine television and radio programmes, and through the circulation
figures newspapers and magazines learn the audience’s desires. Granted
that these audience studies are constantly carried out and that they are
constantly consulted by the journalists and broadcasters, how sure is
Seiden that, as consumers, the audiences have not come to want only what
the media owners and employees have made them to want? Furthermore,
Seiden does not say how one should distinguish between the audience
who rejects a media product because he or she does not want it, and the
other who does so because he cannot afford it. For, as far as the argument
in favour of commercial broadcasting goes, it seems to imply that in the
American society the consumer’s problem is not that of means, but that of
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deciding on what to spend the means. However, the fact that the media are
available does not necessarily imply that they are affordable, as our
discussion of the Internet indicates. Yet nonaffordability as a first rate
consumer does not imply total exclusion, especially in cultures that stress
interdependence and conviviality between individual and group interests.
Another point made in favour of privately owned media is the
importance of using advertising revenue to finance these institutions.
According to William G. Harley, communications adviser to the US
delegation to the Unesco General Conferences in the 1970s (Wells
1987:26), such a form of funding is advantageous in that it helps the
media to withstand pressures from the government and ‘private interest
groups’, at the same time as it permits the establishment of a plethora of
newspapers, magazines and broadcasting stations, which, thanks to their
multiplicity, freedom and independence, ‘guarantees that no single voice
or group of voices can ever achieve predominance.’ Motivated by profit
though they may be, the private media safeguard the rights of people and
pose as constructive critics of government.
In a study of the very same American society that has permitted
Seiden and others to argue the way they do, Bagdikian (1985) comes out
with strikingly different but more critical conclusions. The focus of his
argument is that the media, in addition to providing entertainment and
selling merchandise, must be in a position to create ‘a rich marketplace of
ideas and serious information’. Bagdikian considers diversity and richness
in the media, as the most essential ingredients for the survival of
democracy. But unlike Seiden, he does not think that the absence of
government ownership, support or intervention is enough to guarantee this
diversity and richness in the marketplace of freedom and open
competition. He is very aware that diversity and richness or freedom and
democracy are much easier to talk about than to actually implement. As
he remarks, ‘public acceptance of a full range of public ideas does not
emerge solely from exhortations for tolerance. It comes from experiencing
diversity. A public used to a narrow range of ideas will come to regard this
narrowness as the only acceptable condition’ (1985:99).
Bagdikian argues that the media in the USA are becoming ever more
homogeneous in content and structure even though the population is
growing larger, more diverse and confronted with fast changing
circumstances (1985:98). This, according to him, is a direct consequence
of the growth of control by a relatively small number of corporate hands.
If private ownership were all there is to ensure richness and diversity in
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the media as it has been argued, one may well ask why in a supposedly
diverse society as America, the media are so homogeneous in content that
‘most newspapers and broadcast programs [are] uniform in basic content,
tone and social-political values’ (Bagdikian 1985:100)? This is a fact
which leads Aggarwala to conclude that ‘the danger to press freedom
inherent in the domination or control of the media by big business may be
less obvious than that arising from government subsidy or control of the
media but it is not any the less insidious’ (1985:50).
It has been argued that, with few exceptions, most owners who buy
and set up private broadcasting institutions are motivated more by the
drive to make profit than by a genuine desire to promote richness and
diversity in the public mind. The mere fact that commercial broadcasting
relies on advertising revenue imposes certain limitations to the type of
programmes produced or broadcast. As early as the 1960s, academics
were already seriously concerned with the problem of the media’s
widespread dependence on advertising revenue. This, to Halloran
(1963:40), reduces broadcasting and the other media to mere profit-
making organisations for those whose major purpose is to sell. In such
circumstances, he argues, the main aim of a paper or a programme in the
radio or television is, ‘to get a large audience as quickly as possible so that
advertisers may be attracted and held’. These commercial pressures,
together with pressures of a political, organisational or professional
nature, constitute ‘the complex of constraints’ to the media’s role as
‘autonomous ‘watch-dogs’’, and with which the media and practitioners
must constantly negotiate (Gallagher 1982; Head 1963).
Such plurality without diversity is growing worldwide, since the
demise of the Soviet Bloc and bipolarity in the late 1980s. Current debates
on media ownership and control are informed by and largely focused on
the effects of globalisation of neoliberalism on media scenarios
throughout the world. Inspired by narrow, individual-centred philosophies
of personhood, agency and property rights, neoliberalism is aggressive in
its sacrifice of community rights and group interests, as it pursues profit
through the illusion of promoting the interests of the autonomous
individual as consumer and citizen. Almost everywhere, old patterns
informed by more inclusive philosophies of ownership and control, are
giving way to new configurations with a focus on the individual,
consumerism and exclusion. National, state-owned, public service media
systems are yielding to commercial pressure and its emphasis on ‘profit
over people’ (Chomsky 1999). Propelled by ‘the incessant pursuit of
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profit’ global media entrepreneurs are asking for little short of unregulated
commercial exploitation and concentrated ownership of media
(McChesney 2001:1-4). The trend is clearly towards global oligopolies,
and the guiding logic of the media firms is, as Robert McChesney puts it:
‘get very big very quickly, or get swallowed up by someone else.’ Firms,
he argues, ‘must become larger and diversified to reduce risk and enhance
profit-making opportunities, and they must straddle the globe so as to
never be outflanked by competitors’ (McChesney 2001:3-9).
An obvious casualty of this shift in philosophies of ownership and
control is the traditional emphasis on public service media that guarantee
cultural pluralism and diversity, by providing for groups and social
categories that otherwise are ignored or marginalised by the market. This
tradition of public service media, while not denying the articulation of
individual interests, believed that the greatest good came from a
negotiated balance between various individual interests as part of a
community. Media conceived in this tradition stressed negotiation,
interconnectedness and harmony between individual interests and
community expectations. Within the ownership logic that inspired the
public service media, the freedom to pursue individual or community
goals existed within a socially predetermined framework that emphasised
conviviality with collective interests while simultaneously allowing for
individual creativity and self-fulfillment. It was therefore a philosophy of
ownership and control that sought to marry individual and group or
community property rights, rather than seeking to impose the illusion of
the autonomous individual.
In Europe for example, the shift in philosophies has meant that since
the 1990s, the market-driven ideas of public service broadcasting serving
the interests and preferences of individual media consumers have taken
precedence over media in tune with the expectations of particular cultural
communities such as ethnic minorities, religious and linguistic groupings
(Syvertsen 1999; S¯ndergaard 1999). With a focus on consumption as the
ultimate unifier, a supreme indicator of cultural sophistication and symbol
of civilisation, individuals are seen and treated as autonomous agents
glued together by a selfless market slaving away for their cultural
freedom, development and enrichment as global citizens. This
development blurs the traditional distinction between public service and
commercial media, and passes for public service even the greedy and
aggressive pursuit of profit without people. It also blurs the distinction
between national media and world services targeting foreign territories, by
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emphasising the ‘unregulated flow’ and ‘transnationalisation’ of the

streamlined, standardised and routinised cultural products of the media
industries of the West (cf. Golding and Harris 1997). Not only is the
traditional idea of public service radio and television fast becoming
outmoded, calls for some ground rules to protect cultural diversity have
simply been greeted with the rhetoric of free flows at worst or with token
concessions to ‘cultural minorities’ at best. What is more, the corporate
media are in a particularly powerful position, given their dual role as
players and umpires in the game of profit (McChesney 2001:3-9). They
‘enjoy an enormous leeway to negotiate and protect interests from the
vantage of prior monopoly positions’, and ‘do not have to bend over
backwards to strike deals. It is generally the case that they decide and the
world follows suit ‘(Thomas and Lee 1998:2). And if they decide to invest
mostly in tastes informed by a very narrow understanding of culture, then
cultural richness and diversity suffers, as the likelihood of cultural
imperialism, trivialisation and misrepresentation increases. Given the
freehand and caprice of the cultural industries and their investors, the
piper may well be under-tasked with tunes of little significance as
creativity, diversity and variety are downplayed in the interest of
homogeneity and profitability.
This implies that, their rhetoric of benevolence and munificence
notwithstanding, the global media corporations are more about closures
than free flows among the world’s cultures. The corporate media promote
a largely one-way flow in cultural products that favours a privileged
minority as it compounds the impoverishment of the majority through
closures and containment (cf. Golding and Harris 1997). As ‘empires of
image and of the imagination’ the corporate media control global markets
and global consciousness (Murdock 1994:3), mostly by denying access to
creativity perceived to stand in the way of profit, power and privilege. The
results are streamlined, standardised, routinised or McDonaldised cultural
products devoid of complexity, richness and diversity that command a
disproportionate share of the global market. The tendency is to mistake
plurality for diversity, oblivious of the possibility that an appearance of
plenty could well conceal a poverty of perspectives (Murdock, 1994:5).
This literally leaves ordinary consumers, marginal communities, and
whole cultures at the mercy of the McDonaldised news, information and
entertainment burgers served them in the interest of profit by the global
corporate media. Because the global media system ‘advances corporate
and commercial interests and values and denigrates or ignores that which
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cannot be incorporated into its mission’, content becomes uniform,

regardless of the nationalities or cultural identities of shareholders. This is
hardly surprising since wanted are passive, depoliticised, unthinking
consumer zombies more prone ‘to take orders than to make waves’ by
questioning the ‘light escapist entertainment’ menu presented them by the
chosen pipers (McChesney 1998:7). In this regard, it could be argued, as
McChesney (1998:6; 2001:13) has done, that the basic differences are not
between nation-states as such, but between the rich and the poor (whom I
term ‘consumer citizens’ and ‘consumer subjects’ respectively), across
national borders. However, the fact remains that the investors, advertisers
and affluent consumers whose interests the global media represent, are
more concentrated in and comprise a significant proportion of the
populations of the developed world, than is the case in Africa where only
an elite minority are involved and hardly any local cultural tunes get
chosen for the global pipers to perform.
Adkins (1985:55) sees three major undesirable effects of
commercialism in broadcasting. First, the pressure to build up large
audiences in order to satisfy the advertisers causes programmes that
appeal to the smaller interest groups to be eliminated or given less
attention. ‘The complete spectrum of public interests and needs can no
longer be served,’ and the programme types that survive are those that
appeal to ‘the largest shares of audience and the specific age and socio-
economic groups wanted by the advertisers’. Second, emphasis is placed
not on educative and informative programmes but on those with ‘the
strongest appeal to most basic human interests’, such as violence and sex,
in order to retain the attention of the audience. Third, any programme
content likely to bring about a significant drop in audience figures must be
avoided. Thus, because emotion is ‘more gripping than fact,’ the news
programmes tend to focus on the sensational and to shove aside ‘the
heavier items involving complicated explanations, little action or
comparative numbers’. The stories which are preferred become those with
exciting visual content, and ‘oversimplification of complex issues seems
necessary to avoid the risk of boring and losing the audience’.
However, Adkins fails to say whether these characteristics are
exclusive to the commercial media or simply tend to be more pronounced
here than elsewhere in the non-commercial state-owned systems. But, like
Aggarwala, he is equally aware of the shortcomings of a state-dominated
broadcast system, where non-commercialism, it must be noted, is not
synonymous with public service mission or content. This is evidenced in
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his argument that the answer for a free broadcast system is neither
exclusive state monopoly nor total commercialism, but a balance between
the two (Adkins 1985:55). This point is echoed by de Sola Pool (1977:32),
who argues that a country which opts to develop broadcasting either as ‘an
entertainment medium to serve advertisers’ or as ‘a propaganda medium
for the government’, is bound to fail to meet the other needs of its plural
society. Though de Sola recognises that a mixed system is probably the
best, he however advocates that in looking for alternative ways of funding,
control, and organisation of broadcast systems, each country must do well
to determine how broadcasting ought to relate and interact with other
social institutions, and what role it must play in propagating the richness,
diversity, and aspirations of the society.
Aware that press freedom is threatened by the control or domination
of the media by the government, as well as by the media’s ownership by
or dependence on big business, and that in both cases public interests are
relegated to a back seat, Aggarwala advocates ‘free media’ independent of
big business and/or government control or domination’ (1985:50-51). But
how these ‘free media’ can be brought about remains the unanswered
question, though he does not hide his admiration for BBC’s ‘excellent,
top-quality television and radio fare’. Concluding his observation of the
Italian situation where there is a mixture of state and private broadcasting,
Rando (1986:39) is less optimistic. Attractive though the idea of free and
unrestricted media might be at a theoretical level, says Rando, in reality
governments are most unlikely to surrender regulation, and the economics
of broadcasting (especially in television) are such that a ‘genuine
pluralism of content’ is out of the question, even where there is a plethora
of stations. In this way, a democratic and free media system appears to be
possible neither in exclusive private control, nor in total state monopoly,
nor in a mixture of both state and private enterprise. But for many
practical purposes, much could be realised in Africa under a careful
balance between public and private concerns, especially given the
possibility of domesticated democracy and media informed by ethics
grounded in popular notions of personhood and agency.
Global Oligopolies and Global Censorship

The rhetoric of free-flow of information propagated by the USA in
particular, has been applied globally; the idea being to spread and
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legitimate the economic, political and cultural system which has made
such a policy possible. This has given rise to controversial accusations of
cultural imperialism on the part of some, and their refutation by others (cf.
Hamelink 1983; Golding and Harris 1997). Way back in the 1970s,
Schiller (1977) affirmed that the US had used its doctrine of ‘Free Flow
of Information’ as a ‘highly effective ideological club’ to promote its
political and economic values by whipping ‘alternate forms of social
organization’ into a ridiculous defensiveness. Thanks to such an
ideological club, Wells argues, the US was able, for a long time in
UNESCO, to impose its preferences upon weaker countries and interests
‘by isolating, minimising and/or neutralising the opposition’ (Wells
1987:20-21). For two decades and more, thanks to the doctrine, the US
imposed itself at the centre of the world political and economic stage, and
flooded the international community with its cultural material (Schiller
1977, 1983), ending up with a globally positive export balance in every
sphere of culture including the knowledge industry, where its ‘unrelenting
one-way traffic’ or ‘inward-directed focus’ was ‘so pronounced that
almost no room ... [was] left for imports’ (Gareau1987:598-600; see also
Nossal 1998:12). The information poor of the Third World thus saw
themselves as victims of a free-flow doctrine that ‘promoted not so much
a balanced exchange as a ‘one-way flow’ of messages moving vertically
from ‘dominating’ to ‘dominated’, with they ‘being reduced to the role of
passive consumers’ (Wells, 1987:37). The USA and Europe alone
‘produce almost 70 per cent of the world’s books’ in their ‘increasingly
privatized and commercialized’ knowledge industries (Hamelink,
1995:20-21). There was no evidence of cultural pluralism or diversity in
the production, distribution and consumption of culture.
On the other hand, such accusations of cultural imperialism have
been contested vigorously by other researchers. Cantor and Cantor (1986)
for example, argue against what ‘critics from the left imply’ about the
domination of the world TV by US culture, in the form of American-made
programmes. They invoke the argument that the audiences are
sophisticated and powerful enough to determine or choose what appeals
to them, and thus do not need anyone to plead their case for them. This
argument is traditional to the US and Britain, who see Third World
audiences as being ‘sufficiently sophisticated to judge the worth of
information they receive and to discount alien value-loading’, and the
global free-flow of information must therefore not be impaired by such
reasoning (Wells, 1987:31). In 1980s the US and Britain suspended their
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membership of UNESCO in protest against what they saw as

policitisation, when the Third World member states asked for a
decolonised, democratic, participatory, and multi-way New World
Information and Communication Order.
Dissatisfied with the ‘domination of global informastion flows by
Western news agencies, radio and television concerns’, Third World
countries called for cultural and political protection against hostile or
unfriendly propaganda (Wells, 1987:34-41) from the ‘unrelenting one-
way traffic’ (Gareau, 1987:598-600) of the information superpowers of
the West. They argued that the prevailing structurally imbalanced
information relationships be redressed, and that it be recognised that any
unrestricted global flow of information could only benefit the West (the
US most especially), which ‘spearhead technological advance in the
communication sector and produce the bulk of the hardware traded
internationally’ (Wells, 1987:37). They saw the state of affairs ‘as a threat
to survival of traditional forms of communication and culture, and as
discouraging local creativity’, and ‘precluding new entry at the
international and/or national levels’. They favoured policies that
guarantee national sovereignty and self-determination, and make it
possible for states to actively intervene at the local, national, regional and
global levels ‘to rectify market distortions and ensure greater balance in
the allocation of relevant resources’ (Wells, 1987:39-41).
Needless to say that the concerns of the developing countries were
dismissed by American and British media leaders and governments, who
branded them as ‘an attempt by Third World governments, despots and
dictators all, to regulate and restrict the media and to use the media for
their own propaganda purposes’, and reiterating ‘total, uninhibited, free
and unbiased information flows’ (Aggarwala, 1985:45). Since then,
concentrated ownership and control has only grown globally, and media
content has become less and less representative of the diverse cultures of
the world. The G8 countries have continued to act to ensure even less
diversity, and to limit the social shaping of new information and
communication technologies to the barest minimum and by the big
players of the North only. At the G7 conference in Brussels in
February 1995 for example, ministers adopted ‘Core Principles’ on the
‘Information Society’.
These Core Principles as presented by the German Government
position paper titled ‘Germany and the Global Information Society’ (see
Federal Republic of Germany, 1996:834-837), comprise: 1.) ‘Promotion
of Dynamic Competition’ in order to ensure greater choice, higher quality
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and better access; 2.) ‘Promotion of Private Investment,’ given the

enormous financial commitment required to make the environment
competitive; 3.) ‘Establishment of an Adaptable Legal Framework’
liberalising telecommunications and providing market participants with
clear ground rules for investment; 4.) ‘Guaranteed Open Network Access’
to make possible a world-wide exchange of information and services that
is open and free of discrimination; 5.) ‘Ensuring Universal Service’ is the
responsibility of all participating nations who have the duty of protecting
net operators from inappropriate financial burdens; 6.) ‘Promotion of
Equal Opportunities’ to all members of the public to access the new
information and communication services must be encouraged, and
anything aimed at separating and isolating some groups in society
discouraged; 7.) ‘Promotion of Program Diversity as well as Cultural and
Linguistic Diversity’ should be the aim of the information society; 8.)
‘Mutual Encouragement and Support in the Development of the
Information Society’ through the exchange of especially successful
experiences between countries in the establishment and application of
modern information and communication infrastructure; 9.) ‘Guaranteed
Broad Access through Education and Training’ places new requirements
on all levels of the educational system; 10.) ‘Guaranteed Adequate
Protection of Content’ through legal measures such as internationally
accepted intellectual property rights and personal data protection.
By Way of Conclusion
The above debates on models of media ownership and control, taken
together, indicate that democracy is both an individual and a group right,
and that the media can only provide for genuine pluralism and diversity
by recognising and creating space for this reality. The debates suggest that
individuals and groups must be allowed the creative interdependence to
explore various possibilities for maximising their rights and
responsibilities within the confines of the economic, cultural and political
opportunities at their disposal. Inclusion, not exclusion, seems the best
way forward in our quest for media pluralism and diversity, given the
uncertainties to which we as individuals, groups and states are subjected
under global media and global consumer capitalism. To achieve this, there
is need a richer idea of democracy to replace the current fixation with
liberal democracy.
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Popular and ideological representations of liberal democracy treat its

promise of rights and empowerment for the individual as a fait accompli.
The tendency is to minimise the power of society, social structures, and
communal and cultural solidarities by ‘trumpeting instead the
uncompromising autonomy of the individual, rights-bearing, physically
discrete, monied, market-driven, materially inviolate human subject’
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1999: 3; Young 1995:162-166). It is
commonplace to assume the nation-state both as the best form of political
organisation and also as an encroachment on the autonomy of the
individual. Multiparty electoral politics is seen as the sole guarantor of
democracy and also as the deterrent to state control and repression. This
reasoning is predicated upon the assumption of no intermediary
communities or loyalties between the state and the individual as an
autonomous agent who is free to elect and to be elected. Furthermore,
assumed legal rights and political choices for the individual are
automatically associated with economic, cultural and social opportunities,
often packaged and presented in the media as though availability were
synonymous with affordability. It seldom occurs that proponents of this
doctrine distinguish between their rhetoric of rights and the reality of
indignities that makes self-determination an illusion for most.
Exploitation and subjection, globalisation of poverty and zombification
(cf. Mbembe 2001; Comaroff and Comaroff 2000; Moore and Sanders
2001) invite scrutiny of claims of rights and freedoms uninformed by the
difficulties, impossibilities or transience of being an autonomous
individual under neo-liberalism. A critical look beneath the rhetoric of
rights appears to point to the fact that being an individual in the liberal
democratic sense of the word is both a process and a luxury that few can
afford in reality. There are more confinements and closures than the
rhetoric of rights, openness and free flows suggests. Such mitigation when
unrecognised, as is often the case, could be quite misleading, as noted in
our discussion of the models above.
In the quest for a richer and more negotiated notion of democracy,
African cultures have got an important contribution to make. Throughout
the continent, a common political culture in most indigenous communities
‘demands the involvement of everyone in promoting the common good’,
and people participate ‘not because they are individuals whose interests
need to be asserted, but because they are part of an interconnected whole.’
Participation is based ‘not on the assumption of individuality but on the
social nature of human beings’, and is ‘as much a matter of taking part as
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of ... sharing the burdens and the rewards of community membership’. It

is also more than just ‘the occasional opportunity to choose, affirm or
dissent’, in that it requires active involvement in the process of decision-
making and community life in general (Ake 2000:184).
Drawing from this communal understanding of democracy, the way
forward should be media models that recognise and provide for the
creative ways in which different peoples the world over merge their
traditions with exogenous influences to create realities that are not
reducible to either but enriched by both. The media and the liberal
democratic rhetoric of rights that has tended to dominate media content,
must listen to, and take on board, creative responses by other cultural
communities, informed by their traditions, historical experiences, and
socio-economic circumstances in our global village. As media and
communication scholars, we would be contributing to this process if our
work reflects the reality of democracy as an unending project, an aspiration
subject to renegotiation with changing circumstances and growing claims
by individuals and groups for recognition and representation.
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Chapter 5
VIABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF

PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING
E.A. Mbaine
Abstract
ublic service broadcasting plays a critical role in a situation where
P structural imbalances and scarcities of media access can undermine
democratisation and development. In a majority of cases public service
broadcasters are still government-controlled broadcasters and are under
funded by African governments although they are expected to do a lot on
behalf of the government’s political and developmental agenda. The
reliance by public broadcasters on advertising can also have the effect of
squeezing out commercial and other broadcasters.
For this reason, government controlled broadcasters need to be
transformed into public service broadcasters, with clearly defined public
service mandates, that enjoy editorial and programming independence, are
governed by independent bodies and accountable to all sections of society.
Public service broadcasting requires adequate, secure and
predictable forms of public funding (a mixture of the license fee and
public grants) which is not subject to ‘arbitrary interference’. If
advertising and commercial sponsorship are allowed as an element of
public funding, the question is how to prevent advertisers and commercial
sponsors from determining the programming of public broadcasters.
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Viability and Sustainability of Public Service Broadcasting
Brief History of ‘Public’ Service Broadcasting in

Africa
Most African countries inherited national broadcasting institutions at
independence created for propaganda purposes during the colonial era but
elected to retain their monopoly over the airwaves. It was not only the
monopoly that was continued, but also the tradition of using broadcasting
as an instrument to propagate government ideas and policies. In practice
therefore national broadcasters, although officially designated as public
service broadcasters became state broadcasters i.e. broadcasting was in all
respects owned, controlled and financed by the state. The political culture
of the colonial state, which conflated rather than distinguished a
government in power and state institutions, was carried into the post
colonial period. State control was therefore government control. The post-
colonial state broadcasters did not enjoy the operational and editorial
autonomy that their European equivalents enjoyed.
The role of national broadcasters in both colonial and post-colonial
Africa was mainly to support the ideology of the government and party in
power and generally play a propaganda role for the government. To ensure
that broadcasting played this role, editorial independence was not
respected. The justification used for control by post-colonial governments
was that media and in particular broadcasting with its wide reach was an
important tool for forging national unity, promoting development and
fostering a national identity and protecting national culture. While the
imperative to create a sense of nationhood, forge a national culture and
identity and address questions of socio-economic development in nations
emerging out of the ravages of colonialism cannot be denied, it did not
follow that centralised control was the only option.
Control by a central authority i.e. the ruling party and government
inevitably obscured the necessity of alternative ideas and programmes. It
also led to the suppression of any notions of pluralism and diversity of
ideas and opinions and in conceptualising national identity and culture. In
short the role of broadcasting as a provider of impartial and balanced
information, reflecting contending views and opinions, acting as agency
of safeguarding human rights, exposing abuse of power and corruption
and promoting robust debate and discussion was not considered a priority.
The logic of editorial control was that representation of alternative views
especially those outside the ruling party was a direct political challenge
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and a threat to the party’s hold on power. The democratic role of the media
was not seen as part of a participatory path to socio economic
development. Rather it was viewed as a dangerous challenge not to
be brooked.
Not long after independence, state control of broadcasting became
the norm and was further strengthened when political pluralism and in
some countries civilian government was abolished in favour of one party
states and military governments between the 1960s and 1990s. The
combination of authoritarian government and strict control of
broadcasting negated lack of socio-economic development and in some
countries failed to actually enhance national unity.
Institutionally, as part of the controls the state broadcasters were
usually placed under a government ministry or department, and ministry
responsible for information, and/or broadcasting. The Ministry and the
Minister acted not only as policy makers but also regulators of
broadcasting. Employees of the state broadcaster were to all intents and
purposes civil servants under the daily direction of the Minister and the
President or Prime Minister. This arrangement meant that state
broadcasters had no operational autonomy. Editorial staff forfeited the
independence they required as professionals who were expected to make
decisions based on professional values, especially in relation to selection
of news and programming. The Minister in consultation with the President
or Prime Minister appointed the board of the broadcaster, which usually
consisted of party loyalists or people with known sympathies and leanings
towards the ruling party’s political project. Either the Minister or the
board in consultation with the President appointed the senior managers.
The entire system further meant that editorial and programming
independence of the broadcaster did not exist to any appreciable degree.
News bulletins were testimony to this lack of independence as they
usually featured the President and other top ruling party officials as the
key newsmakers whose pronouncements were broadcast without regard to
any criteria of newsworthiness. Official statements were broadcast as the
unquestionable truth. Critical views from outside the party or government
were treated as heresy. As the late veteran Zimbabwean journalist William
Musarurwa once remarked, it was the case of ‘minister’ and ‘sunshine
journalism’. At any rate most African governments saw and used the state
media as instruments of maintaining power and hegemony. The net
consequence of state control of broadcasting was also to equate public
media with government and party media and propaganda.
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However, the late eighties and early nineties brought with them
several developments that propelled changes in the broadcasting
landscape on the continent. These changes are related to global political
developments that happened at the same time or soon after the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the socialist regimes of Eastern and Central Europe.
These changes have had ramifications for Africa as a continent.
These global political developments, among other changes,
generated changes from one state party systems and military regimes to
multiparty political systems, with active opposition political parties
readying themselves to contest for power. In many countries across the
continent there have been changes of government through elections. It is
also true that there are many cases where multi party elections have not
resulted in any changes due to ballot rigging and other irregularities
resulting in elections being declared unfair and not free.
The changes also brought into sharp focus demands for freedom of
expression and of the press by political reformers, journalists, academics,
human rights organisations, students and other organisations in civil
society. Those campaigning for a new political dispensation inevitably
linked political reforms or democracy with the need for alternative
channels and sources of information and communication. Freedom of
information and free flow of information became part of the demands.
In the broadcasting arena there were demands for liberalisation of
the airwaves, which was a call for the right to own private radio and
television stations and an end to monopoly of broadcasting. In relation to
the state broadcasters reformers wanted them to be freed from of editorial
control and manipulation by party and government apparatchiks. Two
tendencies emerged: one which believed that privatisation of state media
was the solution and the other wanted state media to be transformed into
public service media, enjoying operational and editorial and programming
independence. Democratisation as the process of political reform
became popularised and powered the agenda for media pluralism on the
African continent.
Changes in the post Cold war economic sphere also provided
impetus for demands for media pluralism. Just as political liberalisation
ushered in political pluralism economic reformers preferred liberalisation
over state control and command economics, which were considered to
have failed to deliver economic prosperity and development. To these
reformers economic liberalisation meant processes of deregulation,
commercialisation and privatisation of state enterprises. These policy
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preferences were extended to the broadcasting arena. The belief was that
the private media were necessary because they would be free and
independent from state control. In come countries like Ghana, Mali and
Uganda, private FM Stations became an important medium of democratic
expression and played critical roles in elections.
As a result, the African broadcasting landscape between 1990 and
the beginning of the 21st Century has been characterised by not only the
old state broadcasters in various states and stages of being transformed in
one way or another, but also private broadcasters and in some countries
community broadcasters and a multi channel environment as well as
satellite and pay channels. While state broadcasters remain dominant in
terms of reach as the new private radio and television stations tend to
restricted to urban areas they certainly no longer enjoy a legislated
monopoly, save in a few countries. In the new context state broadcasters
lost audiences to the new entrants who often appeal more to younger
urban viewers with western popular music as their core programming.
In the new political, economic and technological context, calls for
the liberation of national broadcasters from state or government control
have increased. Debates centre around the creation of public service
broadcasters which are publicly owned, enjoy levels or forms of public
funding which enable them to provide the widest range of programming
and guarantees their editorial from political and economic interests. The
debates also recognise the need for new regulatory frameworks,
which include independent regulation of broadcasting separate from
government ministries.
Media advocacy organisations and individuals in civil society who
favour this approach to broadcasting are sceptical about private
broadcasting as an answer to the discredited state broadcasters and
perceive public service broadcasting as a critical element of a pluralistic
and diverse broadcasting environment. They point to the bias towards
popular western music or sensationalised news reporting as a weakness of
the private commercially driven systems, which sacrifice quality and
editorial integrity in pursuit of profit. They caution therefore against
throwing out the baby with the bath water. Public service broadcasting is
not synonymous with state broadcasting, although both the colonial and
post independence history seem to suggest they are. Democratic
transitions and the developmental agenda media reform activists are better
served by a three tier system of broadcasting which has both a public
service broadcasting at the core, commercial or private broadcasting and
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community broadcasting. They point out that given the lack of

development in Africa and the high costs of setting up private radio and
television stations, public service broadcasting is still a prerequisite for
democratisation and development. They point out that private
broadcasters are likely and have shown in the brief period of their
existence since the 1990s that they serve or seek to serve affluent
audiences who can attract advertisers, and that in programming will not
necessarily be diverse and cater for the broadest range of information,
entertainment and cultural needs of all the audiences. As primarily
businesses they pursue strategies that make them profitable.
Despite the changes that began in the late 1980s and 1990s, it should
be mentioned here that most African governments still exhibit a “critical
shortage” in democratic practice: rigged elections, use of brutal force
against political opponents, human rights violations by the army and other
people in authority, corruption and non-transparency, among other
malpractices. In effect, most African governments cannot sit comfortably
in a situation where the media is free to report and comment on the
conduct of the leaders, in public affairs. Thus, where the media has been
liberalised (usually through a slow and painstaking process), governments
have retained control over the public for hegemonic purposes.
It is important to discuss the merits of public service broadcasting
and reflect on the importance of transforming broadcasters be transformed
into genuine public service broadcasters capable of serving the democratic
and developmental needs of Africans.
The Role of Public Service Broadcasting

Historically broadcasting came onto the scene long after the press had
won freedom from direct government control in democratic societies.
Radio and television required the use of a public resource, the frequency
spectrum; and hence attracted licensing and regulation, both of which
necessitated restricted entry (Ferguson, 1990).
The term “public service broadcasting” has been used as a synonym
for the original European broadcasting corporations, which were set up as
licence fee funded monopolies in the inter-war period. These institutions
have been characterised by their attempts to bring into being a culture and
a shared public life to the whole population within the nation state
(Mpofu, 1999).
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The idea of public service broadcasting has, according to Siune

(1998), always embodied the following elements:
• A commitment to balanced scheduling

• Broadcasting institutions as public bodies with financial
independence from government and commercial sources.
• The service should be provided to all in return for a basic
payment usually in the form of a licence fee.
• Political content that is obliged to be balanced and impartial.
To these elements can be added that public service broadcasting should

deliver programmes to audiences whereas commercial or private
broadcasting operates on a logic of delivering audiences to advertisers.
The South African Broadcasting Act No. 4 of 1999 provides a useful
reference to the ideal roles of public service broadcasting, it states, that
such service must:
• make services available to South Africans in all the official

languages;
• Reflect both the unity and diverse cultural and multilingual
nature of South Africa and all of its cultures, realities and regions
to audiences;
• provide significant news and public affairs programming which
meets the highest standards of journalism, as well as fair and
unbiased coverage, impartiality, balanced and independence from
government, commercial and other interests;
• include significant amounts of educational programming, both
curriculum based and informal educative topics from a wide
range of social, political and economic issues, including, but not
limited to, human rights, health, early childhood development,
agriculture, culture, justice and commerce and contributing to a
shared South Africa consciousness and identity;
• enrich the cultural heritage of South Africa by providing support
for traditional and contemporary artistic expression;
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• strive to offer a broad range of services targeting, particularly,

children, women, the youth and the disabled;
• Include programmes made by the Corporation as well as those
commissioned from the independent sector; and
• Include national sports programming as well as developmental
and minority sports.
A publication by the World Radio and Television Council (2000) defines

public service broadcasting thus:
Neither commercial nor State-controlled, public

broadcasting’s only raison d’ etre is public service. It
is the public’s broadcasting organization; it speaks to
everyone as a citizen. Public broadcasters encourage
access to and participation in public life. They
develop knowledge, broaden horizons and enable
people to better understand themselves by better
understanding the world and others.
Encapsulated within the definitions quoted above is the popular notion

that public service broadcasting is characterised by programming that is
broad and diverse and addresses all citizens rather than some citizens
through both general programmes that are of high quality and specific
programmes catering for special interest, tastes, minorities and
marginalised groups. There is also a notion that of public service acts
broadcasting as an agency for providing a diversity of information,
education and entertainment necessary for democratic life for all its
audiences without discrimination on socio economic grounds and without
undue deference to powerful or dominant groups or interests. Public
service broadcasting is also expected to nurture, reflect and represent the
plurality and diversity of cultures as they exist and evolve in a society and
other societies that make up the world. Public service broadcasting can be
said therefore to have both a democratic and developmental role. Africa is
a continent in need of and in various stages of democratisation and
development. It needs public service broadcasting organisations as both
agents and indices of democratisation and development.
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Organisation of Public Service Broadcasting

To enable public service broadcasting to play these roles, particular
institutional and organisational arrangements are necessary. As discussed
above, the institutional and organisational arrangements of the colonial,
post-independence and the pre 1990s period did not allow the flourishing
of genuine public service broadcasting. Instead, the location of national
broadcasters within government ministries delivered state broadcasting as
a service to power and authoritarian rule and not to citizens and
democratic life. There were also arrangements consistent with a monopoly
situation where the state broadcasters did not have to compete for
audiences and with private owned commercially driven broadcasters. The
new institutional and organisational arrangements will need to ensure the
viability and sustainability of public service broadcasting as a distinct type
of broadcasting central to democratic public life in the context of
competition in a multi channel environment. Therefore policy and
regulatory reforms have been characterised since the 1990s by calls for
liberalisation of the airwaves.
Policy and Regulatory Reforms

Most African countries have not deliberately and clearly articulated media
and broadcasting policies. But, as Barker (2001) has noted, no policy
might be a policy goal in itself. It seems, that the idea of liberalising the
airwaves has been taken to be a policy in itself. Its most concrete
manifestation has been to license private broadcasters. In some cases the
licensing has been done by ministries in ways that are not transparent or
in line with any explicitly stated policy goal. Most countries have not
developed media and broadcasting policies which take into account the
broader communication landscape, which takes into account the needs,
funding and financing, market size and technologies. The tendency has
been for policy to be imbedded in broadcasting legislation. Explicitly
stated media policy would address questions of pluralism and diversity in
ownership and content and how to achieve the same.
Another manifestation of new policy directions has come out of
economic liberalisation policies more than media or broadcasting policy
reference here is made to. the decision to reduce state subsidies to national
broadcasters and leave them to raise revenue from commercial sources,
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which is part of broader economic policies to reduce subsidies to state

enterprises. The policy of reducing subsidies to state enterprises and
commercialising them has been applied in a blanket fashion to state
broadcasters without regard to their role if they were transformed into
genuine public broadcaster, which would require public funding. In other
words, because of a lack of broadcasting policy a national broadcaster
have been treated as a state owned tyre manufacturing factory, an
enterprise best left to the private sector.
Across the continent but not necessarily in every country there are
attempts to create new regulatory frameworks for broadcasting. The most
concrete manifestation is to create a regulator for media, broadcasting or
communications, which is located outside the Ministry of Information or
Broadcasting or Communications as way of giving it independence or
autonomy. The regulator depending on the country has a role to play in
licensing of new stations as well as monitoring and frequency allocation.
In relation to the national broadcaster the reforms included in varying
degrees new inclusive and participatory systems of appointing the board
of the national broadcaster, which reduces the powers of the Minister and
the President while giving the board and broadcasters more operational
and editorial independence.
In many cases across Africa where such regulatory frameworks and
regulators were set up the motivation was to free broadcasting from state
control as part of securing not only media freedom but political pluralism.
In others, parties competing for political power did not want their
competitors controlling the media during elections.
It must be pointed out that where they occurred, these reforms were
by no means sweeping and a complete break with the past. Just as the
process of creating pluralist political systems has not been smooth and in
some cases has suffered reversals and setbacks or distortions, the reforms
have also been halt gradual and are still continuing. A few examples below
will suffice. It is also true that independent regulation and public service
broadcasting is new to everyone including reformers who have grown
accustomed to government or state broadcasting as the norm.
Quite a number of countries especially in West and North Africa as
part of processes of dismantling one party states and military regimes
through national conferences, agreed on commissions or councils to
regulate broadcasting. Increased clamours for freedom of association and
expression resulted in the reform of most media laws with the effect of
allowing private broadcasters to operate, except, notably, in Guinea
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Conakry where only state-owned radio and television exist. Subsequent to

the political changes of 1990s, laws that allowed the liberalisation of the
airwaves were enacted in Mali (1992), Ghana (1992), Senegal (1995),
Nigeria (1995), Ivory Coast (1996), Burkina Faso (1996), Benin (1997)
and Togo (1997) (Baglo, 2001).
In Southern Africa, a process of multi party talks for a new
democratic dispensation in South Africa led to the creation of the
Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) in 1993 to regulate
broadcasting prior to the first multi party democratic elections in the
public interest. To a large extent this move was informed by the desire to
ensure that the national broadcaster hitherto a state broadcaster,
underpinning apartheid, would perform an impartial role in the historic
elections. Although civil society and media reform activists wanted much
more radical reforms and broadcasting policies, the two dominant political
parties the liberation movement the African National Congress (ANC) and
the then ruling National Party were not in support (Barnett,1999). They
were more focused on reforms necessary to ensure a media that would not
be biased during the elections (Barnett, 1999). In July 2001 the IBA was
merged with the telecommunications regulator the South African
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA) to form the
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), which
is charged with regulating both broadcasting and telecommunications in
the ‘public interest’.
It has not been the case however that all the new regulatory
framework and regulators entrench the principle of independence from
both government and commercial interests and all broadcasters. In
Zambia, for example, although a process of liberalisation of the airwaves
was started in 1994, the unreformed state broadcaster the Zambia National
Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), acts as a national broadcasting
regulator! In practice therefore the state not only still controls the national
broadcaster, but also regulates broadcasting. It is surprising that
liberalisation of the airwaves in Zambia and in other African countries has
taken a disturbing turn where licenses are awarded to powerful interests
that are either connected to the government or to companies owned or
controlled by government ministers.
In Zimbabwe, the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) has
only advisory functions as the Minister of Information and Publicity in the
President´s office is the licensing authority. It is not surprising that
Zimbabwe is one of those few countries where the unreformed state
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broadcaster does not play an impartial role in elections and no private or

community broadcasters have been licensed to operate. Most of the other
Southern African countries including Malawi, Mozambique and
Botswana have taken steps towards creating autonomous regulators and
some reforms of the state broadcasters.
In West Africa in the Gambia the for example the minister of
Communications is empowered to license the establishment of any
electronic media. In addition, he has powers of censorship. The minister
in his absolute discretion administers the law and regulations, and no
criteria have been described that are required to be fulfilled by the
applicants (Baglo, 2001).
In Southern Africa, South Africa leads in terms of the creation of
independent regulatory frameworks. There has been a definite change to
the processes of appointment to the board of the regulator, board of the
public broadcaster and management and staff of the public broadcaster.
The direct role of the minister in charge of communications and the
President have been reduced or are shared by the regulator and include
public nominations and hearings in the case of the boards and boards
appointing management and management appointing staff. However, the
dominance of a political party can still undermine or limit the extent of the
independence of the processes.
In most African countries these processes are still dominated by the
minister and the President and thereby undermining the operational and
editorial independence of the broadcaster. This is mainly because some
governments have continued to retain control of national radio and
television, in spite of liberalisation process. The reason most African
governments continue to hang onto national broadcasters (most of them in
a sorry state of disrepair) is because they want their own voice to dominate
the national airwaves. Most importantly, it gives these governments an
opportunity to counter criticism from the private print media and the those
urban FM stations which carry news and political commentary or host
talks shows in which political issues are raised.
The lack of operational and editorial independence has grave
implications for the viability of the public broadcaster in the new
broadcasting context. In view of this, campaigns for broadcasting reform
are still important across the continent. The African Charter for
Broadcasting adopted in Windhoek in 2001i and the Principles for
Freedom of Expressionii piloted through the African Commission and
People’s Rights adopted in Banjul, Gambia in 2002 are important
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documents on which should guide these campaigns.

In East Africa Uganda liberalised the airwaves in 1992 and the first
private radio began to broadcast in December 1993. However, the
Electronic Media Statute, which was meant to regulate the industry, was
to come three years later, in 1996. In Tanzania, the Broadcasting Services
Act, which provides for the regulation of broadcasting through the
Tanzania Broadcasting Commission (TBC), was enacted in June 1993 and
marked the end of government monopoly in broadcasting (Temba, 2000).
The Kenya government granted its first license and frequency to a private
television station, the Kenya Television Network (KTN) in 1989, and
becoming the first country in East Africa to liberalize broadcasting.
However, the whole process has had a slow start and political factors have
been cited as responsible for the non-transparent system that prevails in
this sector in Kenya today (Odhiambo, 2001). KTN is a station owned by
interests linked to the former ruling party KANU, which enjoyed power
for 39 years before losing power to the opposition at the end of 2002.
Kenya has not created an independent regulator and the national
broadcaster the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation has not been reformed,
and even in the 2002 elections, it did not play an impartial role. The
national broadcaster even went to the extent of refusing to flight paid
advertisements from the opposition National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)
after initially accepting them and was criticised by the electoral
commission and election observers.
The policy reforms and new regulatory frameworks have not as
indicated earlier, addressed the question of funding and financing for
public service broadcasters in the context of pluralism and competition. It
appears that most African governments confuse giving financial
autonomy to public broadcasters with reduction of public grants or
subsidies and leaving them to seek revenue from commercial sources. It
appears also that they do not recognise that this is a form of
commercialisation (but a prelude to privatisation), and can defeat the
mandate and uniqueness of public service broadcasting. It is also true that
some governments, for example the South African and Zimbabwe
governments have deliberately chosen to commercialise part or the whole
of public broadcasting services rather increase public grants or subsidies.
In South Africa the strategy is to through corporatisation allow the South
African Broadcasting Corporation to have both commercial and public
service divisions. The hope is that commercial services will cross-
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subsidise the public services. As a policy response, commercialisation can

also have a negative effect on the entire broadcasting system because the
half reformed or unreformed state broadcaster can attract most of the
advertising because of its reach. The effect of on other broadcasters
especially start-ups would be negative. It is not an exaggeration to say that
one of the major challenges facing public service broadcasting is to craft
viable and sustainable funding and financing mechanisms.
Funding of Public Service Broadcasting in Africa

Historically, a key defining feature of public service broadcasting,
particularly in Europe is the predominance of public funding over
commercial advertising and sponsorship. Such funding can take the form
of government grants, license fee or levies for electricity bills. Public
funding is considered to be critical to the ability of the public broadcasting
service to offer a diversity of programming across all genres, which is not
driven by advertisers.
Without adequate funding to cover the human and material
resources, public service broadcasting is neither viable nor sustainable.
In Africa, the national broadcasters under both colonial and post-
independence regimes have been funded through public grants or
subsidies, license fees, commercial advertising and sponsorship.
In West Africa the predominant form of funding was direct
government grants, which after independence far exceeded license fees
because of deliberate increases in government spending. A good example
is how public broadcasting was funded in Ghana. In the immediate post
independence period of the 1960s, President Kwame Nkrumah provided
large sums of government funds to Ghana Broadcasting service so that it
could be used as political and developmental tool and to transmit
broadcasts by African liberation movements across the continent.
Government funding came with control and lack of alternative views
in news. Although a license fee was introduced with the advent of
television, it was minimal and never meant to be a significant source of
revenue for the national broadcaster. However, the military government
that took over after the overthrow of Nkrumah introduced advertising as a
source of revenue as well as commercially driven programming
dominated by western programmes in particular popular music. However,
the dominant source of revenue was still government funding even until
1995 (when the first private stations came on air). Even then according to
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Apenteng (2002), only 26% of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation’s

(GBC) revenue came from advertising. The GBC had never developed its
capacity to collect the license fee or increase its capacity to get
commercial revenue. Although the GBC’s major source of revenue was
still government funding this has dwindled as the economy declined and
new economic policies, favouring withdrawal or gradual reduction of state
subsidies were introduced in the 1990s. Government funding amounted to
very little in relation to the needs of the broadcaster, leading to the decline
of services.
In the new context of competition with new private stations, the
GBC has increased its proportion of advertising revenue to state grants
with the balance coming from television license fee, which have been
declining. The government is determined to further reduce its grants as
part of its public expenditure reduction strategy. In the foreseeable future
GBC will have to generate most of its revenue from commercial sources.
In Southern Africa especially in South Africa and Zimbabwe
broadcasting has been up until the mid 1990s a mixture of government
grants/subventions, license fee and commercial advertising and
sponsorship. Advertising and commercial sponsorships have in recent
years been the largest sources of revenue for public broadcasters as
government funding dwindled. In 2002 the SABC reported that only 3
percent of its funding came from government funds. South Africa’s
history of post independence public funding of public service
broadcasting is very short, although recent policy debates and
announcements by the ruling party point towards creating a public
funding model for public service broadcasting channels. License fees,
which should be paid by all set owners, have been difficult to collect,
while the little funds collected could not cover ant major costs. Collection
and compliance has been a major problem. Barker argues that public radio
and television in Southern Africa have found their survival in
commercialisation after losing their monopoly position “Faced with rising
costs and decreasing government subsidy or the stopping of subsidies
altogether, the intensification of commercialisation has become an
imperative for public broadcasters throughout the region.” (Barker 2001)
Funding for national or public broadcasters in Africa has always
been a thorny issue, with governments utilising the services of the
broadcaster while investing very little in return. Most of the broadcasters
lack such basic equipment as recorders, cameras, editing suites, transport,
telephone lines, fax machines and internet services. This is partly the
reason why a number of them have lost staff to the new private stations,
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in countries where private players have been allowed to operate broadcast

stations.. In Southern and East Africa and in some countries in West and
North Africa, advertising revenue contributes more than 50% and is
therefore the predominant form of funding.
The effect of under funding has lead to lack of investment in new
technologies, by public broadcasters, this failure to extend the service to
all parts of the country, and inability to develop diverse programming and
provide quality services to audiences and advertisers. As result in the era
of competition with commercial broadcasters the public broadcasters find
themselves in need of large injections of financial resources to refurbish
their facilities, invest in new technologies to improve programme quality,
and retain staff by paying better remuneration packages if they are not to
lose staff to new private broadcasters. Failure to reinvent themselves
could result in public broadcasters declining and losing audiences.
In many other countries like Ghana advertising as increasing as a
source of revenue and it has directly influenced the nature of
programming. In some cases people have been able to pay to be part of a
news bulletin or to secure coverage of an event. The problem with
reliance or dependence on advertising is that most of the African
economies are small and advertising revenue is still meagre. Many
economies have yet to recover from the command policies of the past even
with economic reforms.
In Chad for example, the advertising is too small to support even the
national broadcaster. With the advent of privately owned commercially
driven stations, competition for the small advertising cake makes it even
more difficult for all broadcasters. For the public broadcaster competition
for advertising has implications for programming. offering and opens it
for pressure towards programming which undermines its programming
principles and therefore its character. Funding and financing of public
service broadcasting has a direct impact on programming and the choices
available to citizens.
Programming in Public Service Broadcasting in

Africa
According to the World Radio and Television Council public service
broadcasting is typified by a distinct form of programming which diverse
in three respects ‘in terms of genres of programs offered, the audiences
targeted and the subjects discussed’ (2002: 10).
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The history of state broadcasters as they emerged from the colonial

and post independence era up to the 1990s is almost the exact opposite of
such diversity. The tendency, which continues in some national
broadcasters is the faithful reflection of ruling party and government
views, lack of diversity of views in news, lack of controversy, lack of
debates and live interviews, lack of coverage of the opposition during
elections, and very little programming for rural and ordinary people.
Such an approach to news and current affairs programming
undermines the public broadcaster’s capacity to provide impartial
information necessary for informed and democratic citizenship. It cannot
therefore empower citizens to participate in the collective decisions that
affect their lives and only strengthens those who hold undemocratic
power. Diversity, controversy, debate and live interviews make the public
service broadcaster an open public sphere in which all citizens regardless
of socio-economic status, can enter to hear and be heard. However, it must
be pointed out that the state broadcasters often use local languages much
more and to that extent are responsive to their audiences. The problem
often is that news content in African languages is not impartial and
balanced and so language is being used for propaganda purposes.
In relation to entertainment, sport and culture, there was and still is
a tendency towards lots of coverage for both local and international sport.
Also noticeable is a predominance of foreign produced cultural and
entertainment programming on television. Radio tends towards high
levels of foreign popular music. The emergence of private radio stations
has lead to even higher levels of foreign music. Without airplay, local and
African music tends to be marginalized. What is lacking is, on both radio
and television are locally made programmes on television, which reflect
and represent local cultures and values and the creativity of African
producers. High levels of foreign content also mean high usage of non-
local languages. The foreign programmes of state broadcasters are also
often evidence of the link with the former colonial powers. Francophone
and Lusophone countries in import their programmes from France and
Portugal and Brazil while Anglophone countries from the United
Kingdom, North America, Australia and New Zealand.
Such a programming profile as described above cannot be described
as public service programming. Key changes need to be made in
programming values and practices to transform national/state broadcasters
into genuine public service broadcasters. Diversity of programming
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meaning a range of programmes from news to light entertainment should

be a defining feature of the schedule.
To ensure that cultural and entertainment programming reflects,
represents and nurtures national and local cultures, is important that public
service programming include a significant amount of locally made
productions. At the same time, it should be noted thatcarrying locally
made productions does not mean the total exclusion of foreign made
productions even when the subjects, situations or issues they reflect or
represent would enrich the lives of local audiences. It is important
therefore that the national broadcasting policies and regulation include
prescriptions of local content in license conditions for all broadcasters.
Issues such as what constitutes local content and what percentages in
which genres will be required need to be carefully attended to. Local
content regulations should take into account the issue of quality, cost and
sources of local productions. A useful approach, which would help public
broadcasters to carry a diversity of programmes is a regulation requiring
them to get a percentage of their local productions from independent
producers and not necessarily produce it themselves. As ARTICLE 19 has
cautioned, regulation and enforcement of local content conditions should
not be used to undermine the programming independence of broadcasters.
It is important therefore that regulation of such conditions be left to
independent regulators whose mandate should include the promotion,
support and protection of public service broadcasters.
Last but not least the question of language in public service
broadcasting its very important in terms of accessibility and cultural
identity. The tendency in broadcasting in Africa is to privilege foreign
languages or the most spoken languages and to marginalize some African
and minority languages. Authoritarian regimes have used state
broadcasters in their projects of ethnic and cultural hegemony by
privileging some languages over others. Public service broadcasters
should avoid the same pitfalls. This tendency is most prominent in
television in part because of its urban penetration and because of costs of
sets its prevalence among the elite. Programmes in African languages are
important since in many countries in Africa the largest majority are most
competent in their languages. It is also the role of public service
broadcasting to nurture Africa languages as way of affirming and
promoting national and local identities.
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Viability of Public Service Broadcasting in Africa

The key question that policy and regulation frameworks need to address
is the overall viability and sustainability of public service broadcasting in
Africa as a distinct form which is accessible to all, addresses all and is
characterised by diverse and actually relevant programming.
To be viable and sustainable, public service broadcasting requires
two related aspects: new institutional and organisational arrangements
within a broader broadcasting policy and regulatory framework, as well as
adequate material resources or funding.
The new institutional and organisational arrangements must be part
of a policy and regulatory framework, which recognises the necessity of
public service broadcasting as the core of a pluralistic and diverse
broadcasting system. Public service broadcasting in such a context must
have operational and editorial independence. The new context of changes
towards political pluralism and accountable forms of governance favours
independent and transparent regulation. As the discussion above has
noted, many countries have started moving in the direction of creating
broadcasting regulatory frameworks, which recognise the importance of
independent regulation.
The new institutional arrangements must entrench the principles of
transparent, participatory and merit based appointments to boards, senior
management positions and editorial positions in public broadcasters.
Regulators and multi party committees of national assemblies or
parliaments must drive such processes and not the minister or President.
In essence such institutional arrangements are what constitutes
operational and editorial autonomy. Bodies constituted in such a manner
are better able to make the sound operational and editorial decisions that
will ensure the viability and sustainability of public service broadcasting.
In turn public service broadcasters regulated in transparent and open ways
are better able to enjoy the confidence and support of the public.
Equally it is important that regulators be not only independent from
political and economic interests but be adequately funded to regulate in
ways which protect all broadcasters and the centrality of a public
broadcasting service. Critical to such institutional arrangements is that the
underpinning philosophy in policy and regulation is freedom of
expression and freedom of the media as well as free flow of information
and a pluralistic and diverse broadcasting sector.
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The public broadcaster themselves need to part of new institutional

arrangements in which a premium is placed on accountability. But they
need to be accountable to multi party committees of parliament where no
single person in particular may hold sway. They should submit their
annual reports to parliament through a specified committee of parliament.
In relation to content, they need to be accountable to independent
regulators, self-regulating professional bodies of journalists on ethical and
professional issues and the public through for example road shows and
public meetings where they engage the public on their performance. At
any rate it should be clear to citizens where they can register complaints
or indeed praise and get a response.
The new institutional arrangements should amount to a change of
ownership of state broadcasters from governments and ruling parties of
the day to the public as citizens. If the public feels ownership of the public
broadcasters there is a higher likelihood of their viability and
sustainability. There is also a higher likelihood of support for public
funding by citizens.
While the new institutional arrangements and policy will create an
enabling and supporting environment for public service broadcasting,
adequate, secure and predictable resources especially financial resources
are absolutely critical to viability and sustainability. As indicated above,
programmes whether produced in-house, bought from local producers or
imported cost money. Operational costs have to be covered and facilities
need to be maintained and/or upgraded and now competition exists for
advertising. Any sources of funding must not undermine the operational
and editorial independence of the public broadcaster.
The new institutional arrangements are linked to public funding
because only an operationally and editorially independent public service
broadcaster will have the legitimacy and credibility with citizens to earn
their support: support in the double sense of their choice for its
programmes and for any public funding which includes their direct
contribution through license fees or levies. It stands to reason that only
public service broadcasting which enjoys operational and editorial
autonomy can attract funding and financing which ensures its viability
and sustainability.
The adoption of new economic policies, which favour reduction or
the elimination of subsidies to state linked enterprises mean that state
grants will no longer be necessarily available. A rethink of such policies
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as they relate to public service broadcasting in Africa is necessary. It is

ironic that just some degree of operational and editorial independence is
being given to public broadcasters to finally play their public service role
while public funding is being withdrawn. This means that when they were
state- funded through public money they did not serve the public. Now
that they are beginning to serve the public, they cannot get public funding.
If it is accepted that public service broadcasting is central to
democratisation and development, it follows that it must be publicly
funded. It also follows that arguments about other pressing priorities like
education and health are not logical because allowed its proper role,
public service broadcasting is an equally pressing priority.
The hope that advertising can be the main source of revenue for the
entire broadcasting system including the public broadcaster is not
realistic. It is true that public broadcasters because of their mass audiences
have an attraction for advertisers. It does not follow that the advertising
revenues are sufficient for the public broadcaster to fulfil its mandate. As
the debates in South Africa in 2002 during the Broadcasting Amendment
Bill process revealed, even if the SABC gets the lion’s share of advertising
on account of its reach, the number of channels some of which are
commercial channels, the revenues would not be sufficient to fulfil its
African languages mandate. Its television programming exhibits the same
domination of foreign programmes as in other African countries. Its
African language radio stations with the largest audiences (millions) get
less advertising than urban FM stations broadcasting in English and
dominated by popular music. Further, the new privately owned
commercially driven broadcasters mean competition for advertising and
sponsorship for the public service broadcaster. They are often an even
more attractive proposition for advertisers looking for affluent audience
and not the mass audiences. Television and the urban-based FM radio
stations have that attraction. In this context, the survival and viability of
the state broadcaster is put into an even sharper focus.
A funding mechanism, which while not excluding advertising but is
not wholly dependent on it, needs to be devised. It is clear from
developments in the 1990s that advertising is now a reality in funding
public broadcasting services. This situation is not likely to be reversed.
What is problematic is that it is developing into the main source of
funding yet it is not only unpredictable but tends to skew programming
and in the case of public service broadcasting is not adequate. To ensure
that public service broadcasting maintains its identity and role, some
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forms of public funding which are not subject to political manipulation

and interference should be the predominant source of financial resources.
Such forms of public funding, will have to take into account increases in
costs and be sufficient to cover the operational and programming needs of
a public broadcaster in a multi-channel competitive environment, which is
still evolving.
The conditions prevailing in each region and country in Africa will
have to be taken into account in choosing how to structure public funding.
Suffice to say that options include a combination of a direct grant, voted
by parliament, which is multi year in nature as among others the World
Radio and Television Council (2000) recommends rather than yearly to
enhance financial autonomy and enable long term planning, license fees
for set owners or a levy on electricity bills if the infrastructure for billing
and collection is sufficiently advanced. In many countries in Africa this
might not be possible because electricity connections are not widespread
or billing and collection are not sophisticated. The public grant should be
voted by parliament separately from the budget of the ministry in charge
of broadcasting to prevent interference. Accounting for the grant should
also be directly supervised by parliament through a designated multi
party committee.
Public service broadcasters, which have professional management
and enjoy operational autonomy, should also improve license fee
collection mechanisms and advertising revenue so that all revenue streams
are maximised. The key to acceptance and compliance with license fees or
paying levies is going to be whether indeed the public service broadcasters
create through programming strong links and a sense of ownership by the
broad public as audiences.
While it is realistic to recognise that advertising and commercial
sponsorship will be part of the funding mechanism, advertising needs to
be regulated in various ways including capping the ratio of advertising to
public funding and amount of advertising within programmes and its
exclusion from news and current affairs. Finally, public service
broadcasters must be protected from having to devote their energies to
seeking advertising and instead focus on putting together programming
that is distinct and caters for all needs and tastes.
It must be taken into account that satellite broadcasters, new
terrestrial channels, pay or subscription services will continue to compete
for market share among the affluent audiences. New entrants also compete
for human resources including editorial and production staff who might be
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attracted by better remuneration packages. As the World Radio and

Television Council (2000) points out, public service broadcasting cannot
compete for advertising by abandoning all the other audiences and
focusing on the affluent audiences in an attempt to either retain or gain
market share. Such a strategy will skew its programming and alter its
distinctness. It will also result in its benefit from public funding being
questioned on the grounds that it does not offer anything different from
the commercial broadcasters and so has an unfair advantage in that it
receives public funding. Public service broadcasting should not ignore
programmes for affluent audiences either because such programmes
should form parts of its diverse range of programming.
Adequate funding, which is secure and is constantly reviewed,
should be used towards fulfilling the public service broadcaster’s role as
the place of diversity of information, education and entertainment. It is
necessary that the funding mechanism for the public broadcaster be
enshrined in legislation such as a Broadcasting Act.
The transformation of state broadcasters into genuine public
broadcasters therefore needs to involve the re-engineering of funding,
changes in institutional arrangements which result in editorial and
programming independence which can bestow credibility with audiences
and by extension with advertisers and sponsors and enable the public
broadcaster to ‘compete’ effectively with the new broadcasters. Finally, as
the Charter on African Broadcasting and the Declaration on Principles of
Freedom Of Expression in Africa says “African governments must pursue
economic polices which enable broadcasting to flourish”.
Possible Advocacy Actions

What goes for public service broadcasting in most of Africa is really state
or government broadcasting, with a tinge of public service broadcasting.
There is thus need to transform the state broadcaster into a public
service broadcaster.
The opening up of the airwaves has been a good step in the right
direction, as it has broken the monopoly of the state on information within
the broadcast media. However, opening the airwaves does not necessarily
led to a pluralistic and diverse broadcasting landscape. Secondly, opening
up the airwaves has also brought forth a flurry of competition in which
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national broadcasters have had to wake up and provide better services, if

only to survive.
New institutional arrangements in the context of broadcasting
policies, which promote pluralism and diversity and entrench independent
regulation and operational and editorial independence of public service
broadcasters, are necessary. The formulation of new broadcasting policies
needs to involve government, journalists and civil society in participatory
processes. The context of democratic reforms is a good climate for an
inclusive approach. Democratisation and development, will not be
sustainable, as some countries have shown, if state broadcasters are not
transformed into public service broadcasting which can play a critical role
in promoting and defending new democratic values.
The African Broadcasting Charter formulated at the Windhoek + 10
conference in 2001 by a representative group of African media
practitioners and The Declaration on Principles of Freedom of Expression
adopted by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in
2002 are sufficiently broad enough to be a blueprint for transformation of
state broadcasters into public service broadcasters. The issues they
highlight and the guidelines they offer are solid basis upon which to
formulate advocacy programmes for different countries in Africa.
End Notes
iThe African Charter on Broadcasting was adopted the Windhoek + 10

Conference in August 2001. The conference was a follow up to the 1991
conference which adopted the Windhoek Declaration on Promoting an
Independent on Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic Press.
ii The Declaration on Principles of Freedom of Expression was adopted by
the African Commission for Human and People’s Rights in Banjul, The
Gambia in October 2002.
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Chapter 6
ISSUES IN LOCAL CONTENT OF

BROADCAST MEDIA
Nixon Kariithi
Abstract
n the current context of liberalization of the airwaves there is a real
I danger of a plurality of channels broadcasting the same content. The
tendency has been to go for popular music, sport and low budget films and
drama imports and to avoid production of local programmes in local
languages. Nevertheless, there are ideological, moral and economic
imperatives for promoting local content.
The ideological and moral imperatives are related to the role of
broadcasting and its relationship to audiences. Local content is important
for achieving diverse programming and needs to be promoted. Local
content regulations are an ideal way of promoting diversity in
programming. Local content regulations can encourage the democratic
roles of broadcasting as long as they are not administered in ways that
undermine editorial, creative and programming independence. Local
content quotas are identified as a key mechanism for promoting diverse
programming. The licensing process conducted by independent regulators
is a key mechanism for regulating for local content and should be
stipulated in all licenses including commercial broadcasting licenses.
Local content regulation is a way of stimulating and developing a
local production industry as well as economic activity in general. It is
critical that ways of financing and creating professional skills for local
content production be developed if local content quotas are not to become
forever unfulfilled license conditions.
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Issues in Local Content of Broadcast Media
Introduction
The recent expansion of broadcast media in Africa has also highlighted
numerous gaps in policy. Among these is content regulation. Content
regulation is highly sensitive and contentious, especially because it
involves drawing a line between individual freedoms, constitutional
guarantees, international agreements, and a society’s endeavour to create
a collective identity. Broadcast policies emerging in many Africa
countries lack substantive engagement with the philosophy and principle
of local content, and therefore offer little guidance to media institutions,
media workers, and the general society. The aim of this chapter is to
examine the state of local content regulation in Africa, highlight major
issues relating to local broadcast content in Africa, and to identify
advocacy issues for stakeholders. There are ideological, economic and
moral reasons for promoting local content in broadcast programming. The
ideological reasons include promoting national and collective identity,
protecting cultural sovereignty, promoting national cohesion, engendering
a culture of tolerance through pluralism in opinion and choice, and
fostering democracy and democratic values. The economic reasons
include promoting local talent, creating economic activities for the local
population in broadcasting, and skills and technology transfer from
developed to developing countries. Moral reasons include protecting the
public against negative content that incites public disorder, offends public
decency and good taste, or is culturally/ethnically inflammatory.
Defining Broadcast Media Content

Media content is a broad term with multiple meanings. Generally, media
content encompasses the production and consumption aspects of audio
and audio-visual media output. The production aspects relate primarily to
the economic nature of media industries and the transnational nature of
media products. Production of media content is an economic activity with
a wide range of private and public benefits. Consequently, content
production is deemed crucial not just for what it routinely provides to
broadcasters, but also for the broad economic benefits that accrue to the
content producers. In the present age of highly globalised cultures, media
content produced for one society often has high resale value in other
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societies so long as they have some cultural values in common with the
original, or are willing to tolerate foreign values. In this case, one
producer is then able to duplicate and resell one product.
The consumption aspects are often underlined by moral and
ideological norms. Moral norms relate to what is acceptable as “good” or
“bad” taste, and are generally based on the society’s acceptance of
common interpretations of good and evil. Ideological norms are less
explicit, especially because they are often interpreted in such abstract
terms as “protection and enhancement of national identity and
cultural sovereignty”.
These multiple definitions are however rooted in the deeper
interpretation of the role of broadcasting in society. In many instances the
frequency spectrum (air waves) are conceived as a limited natural
resource whose use must not only enhance public good but also uphold
public interest. Enhancing public good relates to improving the general
welfare of society. Upholding public interest involves universal access to
allotted frequencies, access to choice and diversity of choice. The
attainment of access, diversity, equality and independence in broadcasting
ensures a pluralism of information and opinion, and fosters
democratic values.
Local media content is generally defined as programming that is
produced under the creative control of nationals of the country. South
Africa’s Independent Communications Authority of South Africa
(ICASA) defines local content as the imposition of licence conditions on
broadcasters to oblige them to carry programme material that originates
from and/or reflects all aspects of public life in their respective countries.i
Such “origination” or “production” is generally interpreted to mean use of
local human resources as well as local production and post-production of
the programming. Use local of human resources implies the employment
of local producers, directors, writers, actors and supporting cast, etc. Local
production and post-production refers to the actual on-line editing, video
and audio enhancement, and duplication. Consequently, the “local” in
broadcast media content is primarily understood by its qualitative
relevance, material benefit, and long-term contribution to preservation
of cultures.
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Rationale for Regulating Local Content

The definitions are critical to understanding why governments regulate
broadcast media content. The regulation of broadcast content, and indeed
most broadcast regulation, endeavours to:
• Protect the identity, unity and sovereignty of the nation

• Promote pluralism in opinion and choice
• Promote a common sense of citizenship, promote tolerance,
diversity and reconciliation
• ProSafeguard national security and security
• Fostering democracy and democratic values
• Improve local talent
• Improve economic opportunities for the national population
• Protect the public against negative media content (indecent or
pornographic material, violation of privacy, dangerous practices,
etc)
These objectives may be placed in three broad categories, namely,

ideological, economic and moral. Ideological objectives for content
regulation are premised on the notion that media content may have
deleterious effects on existing norms and values among audiences. This
presupposes that different societies have distinct norms and values, and
that there is a desire among such societies to preserve these unique
cultural qualities. Societies then regulate the extent to which media can
use foreign content and, in the process, minimise their exposure to the
pervasive qualities of foreign media content. In so doing, the countries
protect their own national identity and culture. Without any regulation on
content, it is feared that the imported content would flood the local
broadcast media and overwhelm local cultural norms and values. One
major assumption here is that indigenous media content poses no threat to
national identity but instead contains elements that celebrate national
unity and sovereignty. For example, Canada’s Broadcasting Act (1991)
provides that the country’s broadcasting system should contribute to the
maintenance and enhancement of national identity and cultural
sovereignty. In addition, the broadcasters should:
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• Serve to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political,

social and economic fabric of Canada.
• Encourage the development of Canadian expression by providing
a wide range of programming that reflects Canadian attitudes,
ideas, values and artistic creativity, by displaying Canadian talent
in entertainment programming and by offering information and
analysis concerning Canada and other countries from a Canadian
point of view.
Similarly, Tanzania’s Broadcasting Services Act (1993) requires

broadcasters to encourage the development of Tanzanian and African
expression and culture; serve the interests and needs of Tanzanians; and to
contribute through programming to shared national consciousness,
identity and continuity. The Act further requires broadcasters to provide
programming that caters for culture, arts, sport and education pertaining
to Tanzania and Africa.
The economic objectives are premised on the well accepted position
that developed countries have superior technologies but saturated markets,
while developing countries have less sophisticated technologies and large
untapped markets. In economics theory, the benefits of local content
requirements are felt mainly through backward linkages. Backward
linkages exist when the growth of an industry leads to the growth of the
industries that supply it; for example, growth of the broadcast industry
may encourage the growth of production houses, which will lead to
demand for independent producers and development of related skills in
the country. In this circumstance, the broadcasting industry has a direct
backward linkage to the production houses, and an indirect backward
linkage to training institutions that develop the human skills and resources
necessary to meet the rising demand from the production houses.
Local content regulations require broadcasters to use a certain
proportion of their airtime to local productions, thereby promoting
employment and technology transfer. Broadcasters keen to raise
programming quality often motivate local production houses through such
incentives as new contracts, funding, and training assistance.
The backward linkages generated by local content regulation will
depend on the strategies taken by individual broadcasters or the industry
in general. If backward linkages are achieved by sourcing content from
local production houses, this may lead to transfer of knowledge and
growth in the local production capabilities. On the other hand, backward
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linkages realised from sourcing content through in-house arrangements or

from business subsidiaries and affiliates will culminate in the upgrading
of employee skills. Notably, most countries enact general statutory
regulations and delegate interpretation and implementation to the
regulation authorities. For example, Tanzania’s Broadcasting Services Act
(1993) requires broadcasters to:
• Encourage the development of Tanzanian and African expression

and culture.
• Serve the interests and needs of Tanzanians.
• Produce programmes of high standards.
• Make maximum use of Tanzanian creative and other resources in
the creation and presentation of programming.
• Contribute through programming to shared national
consciousness, identity and continuity.
• Provide programming that caters for culture, arts, sport and
education pertaining to Tanzania and Africa.
Similarly, Canada’s Broadcasting Act (1991) requires that broadcasters,

through their programming and employment opportunities arising out of
its operations, serve the needs and interests, and reflect the circumstances
and aspirations, of Canadian men, women and children. The Act further
states that the programming should reflect equal rights, the linguistic
duality and multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian society, and
the special place for minorities in society.
The moral objectives are premised on the need to preserve public
decency and decorum. The objectives presuppose the existence of well-
known measures of such often-subjective values as good taste, violence,
crime and anti-social behaviour, defamation, privacy, etc. For example,
Britain’s Broadcasting Act (1990 and 1996) set up the Independent
Television Commission (ITC), which in turn has developed a detail
programme code on such moral/ethical issues as accuracy, impartiality,
sexual portrayal, language, violence, taste and decency, and racial and
religious offences.
The development of local content regulation is highly correlated to
the general level of development of the broadcast sector in many
countries. As such, Western European and North American countries have
relatively longer history of local content regulation than African countries.
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In almost all countries, however, local content regulation in many

countries is rooted in the political philosophy of media and society. Media
institutions have a critical role in democracies, namely, fostering public
debate, representing broad opinion in deliberations, and being watchdogs
and advocates for ordinary citizens. In doing so, media participate in
promoting equality, national identity, diversity of opinion, and an
informed citizenry. The media also assist in nation-building by
engendering a common sense of citizenship, and by promoting tolerance,
diversity and reconciliation. Such roles place media alongside such
national institutions as the Church and other civil society institutions in
advancing social stability and progress. Proponents of this philosophical
position argue that media content should be regulated in order for the
benefits of media in a democracy to be realised.
A complementary perspective to political philosophy is premised
upon human entitlements provided for under a number of international
declarations. Such declarations include the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights (the Banjul Charter), the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (IACHR).
The declarations underline basic human rights to freedom of expression
and self-determination. Notably, media content that does not promote
such tenets of democracy as diversity, access, and equality violates these
declarations. In the context of local content, the declarations have been
utilised to protect socio-cultural, political, and economic aspects of a
society that were unique to a sovereign nation and needed to be
distinguished from other aspects.
Most African countries are signatories to UDHR, the Banjul Charter,
and at least one other declaration. For example, the Kenyan Constitution
(revised 1998) state that “everyone has the right of freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinion without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media regardless of frontiers.” Similarly, Section 16 of South Africa’s
Bill of Rights states “everyone has the right to freedom of expression,
which includes freedom of the press and other media; freedom to receive
or impart information or ideas; freedom of artistic creativity; and
academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.” Articles 9, 17 and
18 of The Banjul Charter (1982) state:
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Article 9:
1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information.
2. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate
his opinions within the law.
Article 17:
1. Every individual shall have the right to education.
2. Every individual may freely, take part in the cultural life of his
community.
3. The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values
recognized by the community shall be the duty of the State.
Article 18:
1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall
be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical
health and moral.
2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the
custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by the
community.
3. The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination
against women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the
woman and the child as stipulated in international declarations
and conventions.
4. The aged and the disabled shall also have the right to special
measures of protection in keeping with their physical or moral
needs.
A Framework for Local Content Regulation

Many African countries have no independent institutions to oversee
broadcasting activities, although a growing number is beginning to create
some. In those countries with functional regulatory authorities there are
two models one is to bundle together broadcasting and
telecommunications activities and another is to have separate regulators
for the two sectors. In Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria, communications
169
regulatory bodies oversee operations in broadcasting and

telecommunications simultaneously. Others, like Tanzania and
Zimbabwe, have created separate regulators for the two activities. In
countries with no regulatory agencies, government ministries directly
manage broadcasting and telecommunication activities.
The present global trend of combining broadcasting and
telecommunications regulation is an attempt to keep pace with the
inevitable convergence of what was previously seen as disparate
communication industries. In Africa, however, such practice overlooks the
frailties of the communications sectors, economic development levels and
the erratic nature of private investment initiatives in the sector.ii It is
noteworthy that where different agencies regulate television and radio, a
general statute is often applied across the industry as a preamble to more
specific statutory regulation. In the United Kingdom, for example, the
Broadcasting Act (1996) establishes the Radio Authority and the
Independent Television Commission as the primary regulators of radio
and television, respectively.
Some African countries have confusing structures for legislating
broadcasting. For example, the Namibian broadcasting industry is subject
to the Radio Act (1952), the Broadcasting Act (1991), and the Namibian
Communications Commission (1992 & 1995). In Tanzania, several laws
govern media operation, namely, the Newspaper Act (1976), Tanzania
News Agency Act (1976 & 1992), the Radio Tanzania Act (1965), the
Broadcasting Services Act (1993), and the Tanzania Telecommunications
Act. In Kenya, the Book and Newspapers Act, the Films and Stage Plays
Act, the Defamation Act, and the Copyright’s Act work in tandem with the
Kenya Broadcasting Act and the Kenya Communications Act.
Streamlining such legislation to eliminate bottlenecks and inefficiencies is
critical for the growth and development of broadcasting.
While some form of regulation of local content is always deemed
necessaryiii, some observers support voluntary regulation as the most
practical and efficient. Such self-regulation utilises independently
appointed councils with mandate to set content guidelines, and run a
complaints and sanctions system. Voluntary regulation is preferred
because it gives broadcasters flexibility to develop strategies consistent
with the growing multiplicity of broadcast media. For example, until
2000, Australia employed a voluntary system that required pay television
to spend at least 10% of their programme budgets on local content.
Proponents also argue that voluntary regulation is critical because of the
declining distinctions between electronic and non-electronic media.
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A competing argument calls for statutory regulation of media content

primarily due to the growing commercialisation and global nature of
media industries. Proponents emphasise media’s increasing response to
profit motives, the increased global nature of many media products, and
the transnational (supranational in cases) nature of media organisations
like CNN, BBC, Multichoice, and the SABC. Referring to studies
showing that broadcast media are highly pervasive and influential, this
school of thought considers it essential to maintain strong regulation on
media content. At the very least, the school argues, a consistent statutory
regulation should support any form of voluntary regulation.
Like voluntary regulation, statutory regulation comprises content
guidelines, and a highly enforceable complaints and sanctions system. In
the Gambia, for example, the National Media Commission Act (2002) sets
standards for local content as well as considers and determines complaints
against media personnel or institutions regarding content. Local content
rules are difficult to design and implement primarily because they are
expected to cover broad spectrum of qualitative and quantitative aspects
of programming. Quantitative aspects are generally those that stipulate
specific proportions of air time over a performance period to be devoted
to local content. Performance periods are blocks of time during which the
broadcaster is considered as having significant audiences for rating or
regulation purposes. For example, in Australia, a single performance
period is 6am to midnight. Many countries use hourly, weekly and/or
annual basis as measures of performance periods. Different quantitative
requirements on local content may be stipulated for public and private
broadcasters, depending on how the extent to which each depends on
advertising and general public expectations on them as sources of news,
information and entertainment. On the other hand, qualitative aspects are
those based on cultural, linguistic, gender, demographic, and other related
values. For example, South Africa, Canada and Australia all have
qualitative regulations on drama, films, children’s programming, news,
talk shows, music videos, etc. Today, most regulations attempt to regulate
these two broad categories, albeit with varying degrees of success.
One common regulation strategy is the establishment of multi-level
tier structure, with the basic tiers supporting general standards across all
broadcast content and the higher tiers supporting the more specific
standards. The general standards primarily include employment of local
human capital, namely, use of local personnel for management,
production, and programme financing. For example, for programming to
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qualify as local content the ICASA Act (2000) of South Africa

requires that:
• Programme directors and writers be South African citizens or

permanent residents
• 50% of leading actors, 75% of supporting cast, 50% of crew be
South African citizens or permanent residents
• Post-production be wholly done in South Africa
• 50% of financing should come from within South Africa
One clear disadvantage in these requirements is that they assume an

abundant supply of appropriately skilled manpower, and availability of
production technology and financing. It is noteworthy that in February
2002, ICASA moved to seek the requirements on post-production and
financing, arguing that they discouraged investments and international
collaborations among the country’s broadcast production industry. ICASA
proposes to lower the minimum South African financial contribution to
20%, and only require the utilisation of South Africans as key personnel
in post-production.
Another disadvantage is the difficulty of monitoring and enforcing
these requirements. A pool of skilled assessors is required, as well as a
highly efficient mechanism of conducting regular independent checks and
follow-ups. As such, most regulatory agencies do not enforce these
requirements and rely on data and information supplied by broadcasters.
Beyond the basic tier system, more specific regulations are designed for
current affairs, talk shows, dramas, and children’s programming. The
criteria for developing these additional tiers are premised upon the need
for broadcast programming to inform and educate audiences.
A second strategy is to allocate local content quotas that broadcasters
must meet as part of their license conditions. Quotas are designed to
improve both the quantity and balance of local content in the general
broadcast offerings. Some quota allocation strategies include reruns of
local productions. In almost all cases, quota strategies offer broadcasters
a period within which to satisfy local quota conditions. South Africa and
Zimbabwe have some of the most elaborate local content regulations
stipulated in broadcasting Acts, and in the case of South Africa, in the
license conditions of all broadcasters including the public broadcaster,
privately owned radio and television stations and community radio stations.
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Different broadcast licenses and license conditions are subject to

different quotas. For example, public service broadcasters have different
quota allocations from community television stations, commercial free-to-
air television, and subscription television. Similarly, public service radio
and commercial radio are often required to maintain different minimum
quotas. As earlier stated, different minimum are used to reflect the extent
to which a particular broadcaster is expected to rely on advertising as the
primary source of revenue, as well as the particular broadcaster’s role in
public information, education and entertainment.
Studies of local content quotas around the world review mixed
patterns. First, local content requirements for public service broadcasters
are often considerably higher than commercial broadcasters. In South
Africa, for example, public television should have at least 55% local
content, while commercial free-to-air televisions are required to have
30%. Subscription television operators are required to have 8% local
content. Public and community radio stations should have at least 40%
local content, while private commercial stations should have at least 25%.
In 2002, these quotas were being revised upwards. In Canada, public
service broadcasters must meet a 60% minimum requirement for local
content, while pay and speciality TV operators are mostly expected to
offer at 20% of output as local content.
Second, local content quotas for commercial free-to-air television
and commercial radio are generally at the same levels in many countries.
For example, this is the case for South Africa (30% and 25%), Canada
(30% and 35%), Bulgaria (both at 50%) and Malaysia (both at 80%).
Third, there does not appear to be any peculiar pattern across
countries on the level of local content quotas imposed. For example,
Portugal, Poland and South Africa require 30% of local content for
commercial free-to-air television operators. South Korea, Latvia and
Malaysia demand at least 80% of local content, while Zimbabwe demands
75%. The exception is a number of European Union countries that demand
that a major portion of the “local” content be generally sourced from the
Union. In practice, this implies that broadcasters have a bigger field from
which to draw local content. This minimises short-term problem of
securing content to meet minimum quotas. The regulations are likely to
boost EU productions considerably, and in the process create a vibrant
regional broadcast content production capability. This is a useful model
for African countries, especially because many lack the infrastructure to
produce significant amounts of local broadcast content.
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Challenges to Local Content Regulation

Many issues confound attempts to regulate local content. These
challenges may be generally categorised as administrative, economic and
ideological. Administrative challenges involve the ability of regulators to
design and implement effective monitoring systems for local content. As
has been demonstrated in South Africa and Malaysia, a dearth of human
and infrastructural resources may force regulators to rely on updates
supplied by broadcasting operators. Incidents of misreporting have been
identified in the some countries. This greatly attenuates the regulators’
ability to enforce strict guidelines or to apply sanctions. There is little that
can be done to have effective regulation outside of creating large,
bureaucratic inspection system. However, media analysts have in the past
proposed the use of professional media associations – representing some
of the major beneficiaries of local content regulations – in
enforcing regulation.
Use of performance periods is common in the design of monitoring
methodology. For example, in Australia, Canada and South Africa, local
content regulations require radio stations to spread their minimum local
content quotas evenly during the daily performance period (0500hours –
2300 hours). In South Africa, commercial radio stations keep daily logs
detailing all music broadcast during the performance period, and submit
them to the regulator four times annually. Public service stations and
community broadcasters have simpler content reporting schedules.iv
While these systems are criticised for being open to abuse, they could be
improved by co-opting new stakeholders (for example, media workers)
into the monitoring, reporting and enforcing. A number of electronic
monitoring systems are in use in Europe and North America, but are
expensive and their efficacy in capturing the entire repertoire of local
music questionable.
The cost of producing local content is a factor that policymakers
constantly overlook. In South Africa, local television production
productions cost more than R3 000 (US$300) per minute. Production
costs are even higher in other African countries where production
activities are relatively less developed. In countries like Zimbabwe, where
the local content quotas have been set at 75%, the annual cost of churning
out local content is estimated by industry pundits at nearly US$60 million
(based on a performance period of Noon to Midnight). Aside from the
inhibitive costs, the initiative would employ literary tens of thousands of
174
technical and other personnel. Notably, the cost of local productions

becomes highly contentious when broadcasters turn to cheap imported
content. For instance, South African regulators estimate that overseas-
sourced programmes costs US$30 per minute or one sixth of the cost of a
local production.
There are numerous ways to circumvent the challenge of human and
financial resources. First, policymakers often introduce local content
quotas gradually, allowing broadcasters and other content producers time
to gather prerequisite resources to support local production endeavours.
For example, South Africa’s policy gave the existing public television
broadcaster five years within which to attain 50% local content. New
public and commercial free-to-air broadcasters get 18 months and 24
months, respectively, to have at least 20% local content. Hungary gave
television stations three years to grow local content from at least 15% to
20%, while Macedonia demands that all broadcasters increase local
content from 20% to 40% over the same period. Another way is to
recognise reruns of local programmes. For example, the Independent
Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), notes that first
repeats of local programmes count only half of a first-time screening, and
further repeats count for nothing.v
The contemporaneous globalisation of trade and communications
poses two major challenges. First, use of local content rules is under
assault from international trade pacts such as the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the World Trade Organisation, and a variety of
regional pacts e.g. the European Union and the North American Free
Trade Association (NAFTA). Generally, these agreements require
ratifying countries to scrap tariffs on a wide range of specified locally-
produced products, and to desist from engaging in trade protectionist
policies such as export compensation, production subsidies or express
market quota allocations. While many of these agreements were drafted
with industrial production and manufacturing as their main focus,
audiovisual services have recently been enjoined in the list of contentious
products. For example, bilateral trade obligations forced Australia in 1999
to extend quota benefits enjoyed by Australian producers to New
Zealand’s film and television industry. Similarly, Indian producers are
lobbying WTO to intervene in their quest to penetrate US television and
movie markets. Under such circumstances, how can policy makers ensure
that local content policy does not contradict trade agreements allowing
importation of goods including media and entertainment goods? What if
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the other country treated it as a free trade issue and actually threatened
economic reprisals if the local content policy was upheld? In Africa, it is
unclear whether any bilateral or regional agreements include the provision
of full market access in the area of audio-visual services.
One way African countries could deal with this challenge is to set
content quotas that recognised regional content as ‘local’ content. Setting
up regional guidelines is especially possible for countries with a common
language, for example, English, French, Arabic, Swahili or Hausa. Such
regional content quotas could encourage exchange of programming,
creating diversity, choice and cultural exchange. It is noteworthy that
regional policies on local content are already in place in many European
countries, including the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia
(50% European broadcast productions for all commercial radio and TV).
France requires up to 60% of television productions to be of European
origin, while Spain demands that 50% of films broadcast be Spanish
or European.
The second challenge produced by globalisation is that local
broadcast industries are made to comply with content rules that do not
apply to its main competitors, namely, transglobal satellite stations, print
media and the Internet. The ongoing convergence of global
communication systems implies that non-broadcast media is now able to
provide audio-visual services that compete with radio and television but
are not subject to the same legislation. For example, Internet radio and
television operators as well as transglobal satellite stations are redefining
broadcasting and offering significant competition to radio and television,
but are so far not subject to any content or even licence regulations. Print
media, which have also found new ways of marketing themselves in this
age of multimedia platforms, have intensified their challenge to traditional
broadcast media. Some analysts have called for the removal of regulations
that render broadcasters uncompetitive against the wave of new
challengers.
Advocacy Issues in Local Content

The unresolved debate on local content opens up multiple avenues for
media advocacy. First, a number of existing or proposed regulations
curtail personal freedoms of expression and opinion, and unduly interfere
with editorial independence. For example, The Gambia’s National Media
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Commission Act (2002) gives regulators wide-ranging powers to receive

and determine complaints over media content as well as administer
sanctions. Legislation that specifically demands media content to reflect
national cultures and opinions inherently compromises people’s cultural
rights. In Kenya, the Books and Newspapers Act (2002) establishes a
media council to adjudicate on complaints and administer sanctions to
media professionals and organisations. In Zimbabwe, the Access to
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2002) lays down stringent
conditions and sanctions for media organisations and journalists, a
number of which infringe upon freedom of expression and freedom of
the press.
Advocacy groups serving the African media should seek
clarification on all regulations pertaining to local content and broadcasting
activities. Such rules need to be clear, well documented, and easily
interpreted. In addition, the groups should demand transparency so that
broadcast regulation business is conducted in the public domain. Use of
public domain here should include public hearings, open courts and open
judgments. In all dealings, the regulator must remain accountable to all
stakeholders and to the public interest principles enunciated earlier.
To achieve high levels of transparency and accountability, local
content regulators must be independent from both government and media
industry influence. One way of ensuring this would be have all
stakeholders represented in the regulators’ composition. Moreover, the
content regulator actions must always be consistent with national laws and
international statutes of human rights and civil societies. Advocacy groups
should lobby the African Union to adopt African Charter on Broadcasting
(2002) and for African countries to ratify the Charter to facilitate its
operation and enforcement. African countries should also ratify other
continental and international charters and protocols that recognise Africa’s
right to produce media that is relevant to its audiences and reflects the
continent’s rich cultural diversity.
Advocacy may happen in three steps. First, national, regional and
international groups operating in Africa should commission studies to
establish the extent to which African countries recognise local content as
an issue requiring substantive regulation. The next step should comprise
aggressive campaigns among media policy makers and the African
publics on the need to need to introduce and promote local content
regulations. Such campaigns must include engagements with the local
broadcast operators with a view to raising public awareness on the
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ideological, economic and moral rationale for regulating local content.

Such engagements could be in the form of public debates, information
campaigns, lectures, and symposia. Considering the dearth of local
content information especially that pertaining to broadcast media,
advocacy groups should also endeavour to add to the knowledge base
through additional research as well as through interaction and exchange of
relevant information between Africa and the rest of the world.
Short-term problems in human and technological capacity may be
addressed by encouraging regional and continental indigenous
programming exchange. However, such initiatives will best succeed if
supported by local and regional professional media associations. Such
organisations are already active in all regions of Africa and include the
Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), Media Foundation for West
Africa (MFWA), Eastern African Media Institute (EAMI), Uganda Media
Women’s Association (UMWA), Southern Africa Communications for
Development (SACOD), Kenya Community Media Network
(KCOMNET), Association Pour la Femmes et la Communication
Alternative (Altercom), African Women Development Communication
Network (FEMNET), World Association of Community Radio
Broadcasters (WACRB), International Women’s Media Foundation
(IWMF), African Women’s Media Center (AWMC), etc.
Conclusion
It is important for African countries to design and implement some policy
on local content for their respective broadcast industries. In a number of
countries, broadcasting regulators already aim to have local content
dominate all media genres within a stated time frame. Examples abound
of countries whose local productions have achieved global popularity
primarily because of the support on the home front. In the same vein, it is
appreciated that institutionalising local content requires a large resource
outlay that many African countries presently lack. The most feasible
solutions involve setting quotas that rise gradually to the desired levels,
guided by a combination of legislated and voluntary policies. Such quotas
must reasonably fit such specific local nuances as sophistication of the
broadcast industry, availability of funds for content producers, and the
regulator’s ability to effectively monitor such programming.
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In all instances, the introduction of local content rules should not

culminate in loss of media freedom or other individual and institutional
freedoms guaranteed by national laws and international conventions.
Local content rules must promote pluralism of opinion and diversity, as
well as promote impartiality in political, social, cultural and religious
discourses. The rules should be implemented through appropriate legal
means. Such means must include establishment of an open and transparent
system of broadcast licensing, monitoring and regulation. In addition, the
system should be overseen by an independent regulatory institution,
whose inception must be the product of broad-based consultation and
engagement between all stakeholders in the broadcast media sector.
Finally, local content rules should take into account the human and
technological capacities of the country or region. This will ensure that
such rules are realistic, achievable, and sensitive to such special categories
as community broadcasters. In tandem, the implementation of such rules
should be progressive in order to give all stakeholders time to comply with
the new requirements. Such flexibility is essential for the promotion of the
sector’s stability and viability.
References
Canada’s Broadcasting Act (1991)
Tanzania’s Broadcasting Services Act (1993)
Britain’s Broadcasting Act (1990 and 1996)
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), African Charter on
Human and People’s Rights (the Banjul Charter), the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the Inter-American
Convention on Human Rights (IACHR).
South Africa’s Bill of Rights
The Banjul Charter
Namibia’s Radio Act (1952),the Broadcasting Act (1991), and the
Namibian Communications Commission (1992 & 1995).
Tanzania’s In Tanzania, several laws govern media operation, namely, the
Newspaper Act (1976), Tanzania News Agency Act (1976 & 1992), the
Radio Tanzania Act (1965), the Broadcasting Services Act (1993), and the
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Tanzania Telecommunications Act.

Kenya’s In Kenya, the Book and Newspapers Act, the Films and Stage
Plays Act, the Defamation Act, and the Copyright’s Act work in tandem
with the Kenya Broadcasting Act and the Kenya Communications Act.
The Gambia’s National Media Commission Act (2002)
South Africa’s ICASA Act (2000)
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)
Zimbabwe’s Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2002)
African Union to adopt African Charter on Broadcasting (2002)
End notes
iIt is however noteworthy that local content is not necessary defined by

political boundaries. In numerous European countries, local content is
conceptualised to include products from countries with common language
and culture.
ii Indeed, there are unique features of African radio, television, and
telecommunications that call for separate legislation and regulatory
agencies.
iii
No level of media penetration or sophistication precludes the need for
content regulation. Indeed, the United States and the UK are classic
examples of countries battling to tighten content legislation in light of
technological advances in satellite broadcasting and Internet
communications.
ivICASA concedes that a high volume of paperwork is generated by this
system, and monitoring is generally problematic. Moreover, it is difficult
to implement spot checks and the regulator relies on the honesty of
broadcasters’ logs.
v In 2001, repeats assisted the South African Broadcasting Corporation
(SABC) in complying with the regulators’ minimum requirement of 50%
local content for public service broadcasters.
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Access to the Airwaves
Annex 1
ACCESS TO THE AIRWAVES

Principles on Freedom of Expression and
Broadcast Regulation
Acknowledgements
hese Principles were drafted by Toby Mendel, Head of ARTICLE 19’s
T Law Programme. They are the product of a long process of study,
analysis and consultation overseen by ARTICLE 19 and drawing on
extensive experience and work with partner organisations in many
countries around the world.
These Principles elaborate a set of standards on how to promote and
protect independent broadcasting and yet ensure that broadcasting serves
the interests of the public. They address the complex issue of how to
regulate in the public interest and yet prevent that regulation from
becoming a means of government control. They also address the need for
regulators to prevent commercial interests from becoming excessively
dominant and to ensure that broadcasting serves the interests of the public
as a whole.
These Principles are part of ARTICLE 19’s International Standards
Series, an ongoing effort to elaborate in greater detail the implications of
freedom of expression in different thematic areas. They are intended
to be used by campaigners, broadcasters, lawyers, judges, elected
representatives and public officials in their efforts to promote a vibrant,
independent broadcasting sector that serves all regions and groups
in society.
Background
These Principles set out standards for broadcast freedom. They apply to
specific regimes for the regulation of broadcasting but also apply more
generally to State and even private action in this area and the overall legal
framework for freedom of expression. They recognise both the need for
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independent broadcasting, free of government or commercial interference,

and the need in some areas for positive action to ensure a vibrant, diverse
broadcasting sector.
These Principles are based on international and regional law and
standards, evolving state practice (as reflected, inter alia, in national laws
and judgments of national courts) and the general principles of law
recognised by the community of nations. They are the product of a long
process of study, analysis and consultation overseen by ARTICLE 19,
drawing on extensive experience and work with partner organisations in
many countries around the world.
Section 1 General Principles

Principle 1: The Right to Freedom of Expression and Information
1.1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes the
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, orally, in print, in the form of art,
through the broadcast media or through any other media of his or
her choice.
1.2 The right to freedom of expression includes both the right of
broadcasters to be free of State, political or commercial interference
and the right of the public to maximum diversity of information and
ideas in broadcasting.
1.3 Broadcast content should never be subject to prior censorship either
by the government or by regulatory bodies. Any sanctions for breach
of regulatory rules relating to content should be applied only after
the material in question has been broadcast.
Principle 2: Editorial Independence
2.1 The principle of editorial independence, whereby programming

decisions are made by broadcasters on the basis of professional
criteria and the public’s right to know, should be guaranteed by law
and respected in practice. It should be up to broadcasters, not the
government, regulatory bodies or commercial entities, to make
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decisions about what to broadcast, subject to Sections 6 (Content

Issues) and 9 (Election Coverage).
2.2 This Principle protects both general editorial policy (it is not
legitimate, for example, to prescribe how broadcasters should report
on war or to require them to promote a certain economic model) and
specific editorial decisions.
2.3 Broadcasters should never, subject to Principle 31 (Direct Access
Political Broadcasts), be required to carry specific broadcasts on
behalf of, or to allocate broadcasting time to, the government.
Principle 3: Promoting Diversity
3.1 Diversity implies pluralism of broadcasting organisations, of

ownership of those organisations, and of voices, viewpoints and
languages within broadcast programming as a whole. In particular,
diversity implies the existence of a wide range of independent
broadcasters and programming that represents and reflects society as
a whole.
3.2 The State has an obligation to take positive measures to promote the
growth and development of broadcasting, and to ensure that it takes
place in a manner which ensures maximum diversity. It also has an
obligation to refrain from imposing restrictions on broadcasters
which unnecessarily limit the overall growth and development of
the sector.
3.3 Effective measures should be put in place to prevent undue
concentration, and to promote diversity, of ownership both within
the broadcast sector and between broadcasting and other media
sectors. Such measures should take into account the need for the
broadcasting sector as a whole to develop and for broadcasting
services to be economically viable.
Principle 4: Emergency Measures
The legal framework for broadcasting should not allow State actors
to assume control of broadcasters – either over their equipment or
their broadcasts – in an emergency. Should a genuine state of
emergency arise which absolutely necessitates such measures,
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special legislation can be passed at that time, to the extent strictly

required by the exigencies of the situation, in accordance with
international law.
Principle 5: Liability for the Statements of Others
Broadcasters should be protected against liability for the statements

of others in the following circumstances:
• during a live broadcast where it would be unreasonable to
expect the broadcaster to prevent transmission of the statement;
• where it is in the public interest for the statements to be
broadcast, for example to demonstrate the existence of certain
views in society, and the broadcaster does not adopt the
statements;
• in the context of direct access political broadcasts (see
Principle 31).
Section 2 The Broadcasting Environment

Principle 6: Universal Access
6.1 The State should promote universal and affordable access to the
means of communication and reception of broadcasting services,
including telephones, the Internet and electricity, regardless of
whether such services are provided by the public or private sectors.
One idea in this regard is communication centres in libraries and
other places to which the public has access.
6.2 The State should take measures to ensure maximum geographical
reach of broadcasting, including through the development of
transmission systems. Access to publicly owned transmission
systems should, subject to capacity limits, be provided to all
broadcasters at reasonable rates and on a non-discriminatory basis.
Principle 7: Infrastructure
7.1 The State should promote the necessary infrastructure for broadcast
development, such as sufficient and constant electricity supply and
access to adequate telecommunications services.
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7.2 A special effort should be made to ensure that broadcasters can take
advantage of modern information technologies, such as the Internet,
and satellite and digital broadcasting.
Principle 8: Economic Environment
The State should promote a general economic environment in which

broadcasting can flourish. Whether or not specific measures are
required will depend on the context but any measures adopted should
be fair, transparent and non-discriminatory. Measures may include:
• putting in place preferential tax, import duty and tariff regimes
for broadcasters and for the purchase of receiving equipment
(such as radios and televisions);
• reducing direct levies on broadcasters, for example through a low
licence fee regime and preferential terms of access to the national
transmission system; and
• providing adequate training opportunities.
Section 3 Frequencies
Principle 9: Frequency Planning
9.1 Decision-making processes at all levels, international and national,

about the allocation of the frequency spectrum between all frequency
users should be open and participatory, should involve bodies
responsible for broadcast regulation, and should ensure that a fair
proportion of the spectrum is allocated to broadcasting uses.
9.2 A process should be put in place to develop a frequency plan for
those frequencies allocated to broadcasting (broadcasting
frequencies), in order to promote their optimal use as a means of
ensuring diversity. The process should be open and participatory, and
should be overseen by a body that is protected against political and
commercial interference. The frequency plan, once adopted, should
be published and widely disseminated.
9.3 The frequency plan should ensure that the broadcasting frequencies
are shared equitably and in the public interest among the three tiers
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of broadcasting (public, commercial and community), the two types

of broadcasters (radio and television) and broadcasters of different
geographic reach (national, regional and local).
9.4 A frequency plan may provide that certain frequencies should
be reserved for future use for specific categories of broadcasters
in order to ensure diversity and equitable access to frequencies
over time.
Section 4 Regulatory and Complaints Bodies

Principle 10: Independence
All public bodies which exercise powers in the areas of broadcast

and/or telecommunications regulation, including bodies which
receive complaints from the public, should be protected against
interference, particularly of a political or commercial nature. The
legal status of these bodies should be clearly defined in law. Their
institutional autonomy and independence should be guaranteed and
protected by law, including in the following ways:
• specifically and explicitly in the legislation which establishes the
body and, if possible, also in the constitution;
• by a clear legislative statement of overall broadcast policy, as
well as of the powers and responsibilities of the regulatory body;
• through the rules relating to membership;
• by formal accountability to the public through a multi-party
body; and
• in funding arrangements.
Principle 11: Explicit Guarantee of Independence
The independence of regulatory bodies, as well as a prohibition on

interference with their activities and members, should be specifically
and explicitly provided for in the legislation which establishes them
and, if possible, also in the constitution. While there is no particular
form of words that must be used for this purpose, the following is
one way of guaranteeing independence:
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The [name of body] shall enjoy operational and

administrative autonomy from any other person or
entity, including the government and any of its
agencies. This autonomy shall be respected at all
times and no person or entity shall seek to influence
the members or staff of the [name of body] in the
discharge of their duties, or to interfere with the
activities of the [name of body], except as specifically
provided for by law.
Principle 12: Broadcast Policy
Legislation establishing regulatory bodies should set out clearly the

policy objectives underpinning broadcast regulation, which should
include promoting respect for freedom of expression, diversity,
accuracy and impartiality, and the free flow of information and ideas.
Regulatory bodies should be required to take into consideration and
to promote these policies in all their work, and to act in the public
interest at all times.
Principle 13: Membership
13.1 Members of the governing bodies (boards) of public entities which

exercise powers in the areas of broadcast and/or telecommunications
regulation should be appointed in a manner which minimises the risk
of political or commercial interference. The process for appointing
members should be set out clearly in law. Members should serve in
their individual capacity and exercise their functions at all times in
the public interest.
13.2 The process for appointing members should be open and democratic,
should not be dominated by any particular political party or commercial
interest, and should allow for public participation and consultation.
Only individuals who have relevant expertise and/or experience should
be eligible for appointment. Membership overall should be required to
be reasonably representative of society as a whole.
13.3 The following exclusions or ‘rules of incompatibility’ should apply.
No one should be appointed who:
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• is employed in the civil service or other branches of government;

• holds an official office in, or is an employee of a political party,
or holds an elected or appointed position in government;
• holds a position in, receives payment from or has, directly or
indirectly, significant financial interests in telecommunications
or broadcasting; or
• has been convicted, after due process in accordance with
internationally accepted legal principles, of a violent crime,
and/or a crime of dishonesty unless five years has passed since
the sentence was discharged.
13.4 Members should be appointed for a fixed term and be protected
against dismissal prior to the end of this term. Only the appointing
body should have the power to dismiss members and this power
should be subject to judicial review. A member should not be subject
to dismissal unless he or she:
• no longer meets the rules of incompatibility, as set out above;
• commits a serious violation of his or her responsibilities, as set
out in law, including through a failure to discharge those
responsibilities; or
• is clearly unable to perform his or her duties effectively.
13.5 The terms and conditions of membership, as well as the
responsibilities of members, should be set out clearly in law. No
other terms, conditions or responsibilities should apply. In particular,
no minister or other government representative should have the
power to impose terms, conditions or responsibilities on members.
Neither individual members nor the body itself should receive
instructions from any body other than the one that appointed the
members.
13.6 The rules relating to payment and reimbursement of members should
be set out clearly in law in a manner that does not allow for
discretion in relation to individual members. Members should be
prohibited from receiving any funds in connection with their
functions as members other than those provided for by law.
13.7 The power to adopt internal rules, for example relating to meetings
and quorum, should either be set out in law or vest in the regulatory
body itself.
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Principle 14: Remit
14.1 The powers and responsibilities of regulatory bodies, for example in

relation to licensing or complaints, should be set out clearly in the
legislation which establishes them, and these powers and
responsibilities should not be subject to change other than through
amendment of the relevant legislation. These powers and
responsibilities should be framed in such a way that regulatory
bodies have some scope to ensure that the broadcasting sector
functions in a fair, pluralistic and smooth manner and to set
standards and rules in their areas of competence, given the
complexity of these tasks and the likelihood of unforeseen issues.
14.2 The law should provide explicitly for clear, transparent and fair
processes in relation to all powers exercised by regulatory bodies
which affect individual broadcasters, either existing or prospective.
All decisions should be subject to the principles of administrative
justice and be accompanied by written reasons.
Principle 15: Accountability
15.1 Regulatory bodies should be formally accountable to the public

through a multi-party body, such as the legislature or a committee
thereof, rather than a minister or other partisan individual or body.
Regulatory bodies should be required by law to produce a detailed
annual report on their activities and budgets, including audited
accounts. This annual report should be published and widely
disseminated.
15.2 All supervision of regulatory bodies should be exercised in relation
to actions already taken (a posteriori) and should never have the
purpose of trying to influence an individual decision.
Principle 16: Judicial Review
All decisions of regulatory bodies which affect individuals should be

subject to judicial review.
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Principle 17: Funding
17.1 Regulatory bodies should be adequately funded, taking into account

their mandates, by a means that protects them from arbitrary
interference with their budgets. The framework for funding and for
decisions about funding should be set out clearly in law and follow
a clearly defined plan rather than being dependent on ad hoc
decision-making. Decisions about funding should be transparent and
should be made only after consultation with the body affected.
17.2 Funding processes should never be used to influence decision-
making by regulatory bodies.
Section 5 Licensing
Principle 18: Licence Requirement
Broadcasters should be required to obtain a licence to operate,

subject to the principles set out in this Section. For purposes of this
requirement, broadcasters may be defined to include terrestrial,
satellite and/or cable broadcasting, but not the Internet.
Principle 19: Responsibility for Licensing
19.1 All licensing processes and decisions should be overseen by an

independent regulatory body that meets the conditions of
independence set out in Section 4.
19.2 The responsible regulatory body should be required to issue licences
in accordance with the frequency plan and in a manner which
promotes diversity in broadcasting. Licences should be issued to all
three tiers of broadcasting and to both types of broadcasters.
Principle 20: Eligibility
20.1 There should be no blanket prohibitions on awarding broadcasting

licences to applicants based on either their form or nature, except in
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relation to political parties, where a ban may be legitimate. In

particular, applicants should not be required to have a particular legal
form, such as incorporation. Nor should certain types of applicants,
such as religious bodies, be subject to a blanket ban on receiving
licences. Instead, the regulatory body should have the power to make
licensing decisions on a case-by-case basis.
20.2 Restrictions may be imposed on the extent of foreign ownership and
control over broadcasters but these restrictions should take into
account the need for the broadcasting sector as a whole to develop
and for broadcasting services to be economically viable.
Principle 21: Licensing Processes
21.1 The process for obtaining a broadcasting licence should be set out
clearly and precisely in law. The process should be fair and
transparent, include clear time limits within which decisions must be
made and allow for effective public input and an opportunity for the
applicant to be heard. It may involve either a call for tenders or ad
hoc receipt by the licensing body of applications, depending on the
situation, but where there is competition for limited frequencies, a
tender process should be utilised.
21.2 Licence applications should be assessed according to clear criteria
set out in advance in legal form (laws or regulations). The criteria
should, as far as possible, be objective in nature, and should include
promoting a wide range of viewpoints which fairly reflects the
diversity of the population and preventing undue concentration of
ownership, as well as an assessment of the financial and technical
capacity of the applicant. No one should be required to pay in
advance for a licence they have not yet received, although a
reasonable administrative fee for processing applications may be
charged.
21.3 Any refusal to issue a licence should be accompanied by written
reasons and should be subject to judicial review.
21.4 Where licensees also need a broadcasting frequency, they should not
have to go through a separate decision-making process to obtain this
frequency; successful applicants should be guaranteed a frequency
appropriate to their broadcasting licence.
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21.5 Successful applicants should have the option of undertaking

transmission themselves or of contracting transmission services.
Principle 22: Licence Conditions
22.1 Licences may contain certain terms and conditions. Terms and
conditions may be general, set out in legal form (laws or
regulations), or specific to an individual broadcaster. Normally, the
information set out in the broadcasting application will form part of
the licence terms and conditions. No terms and conditions should be
imposed which are:
• not relevant to broadcasting; and
• do not serve the objectives of broadcast policy as set out in law.
Furthermore, any specific terms and conditions should be reasonable
and realistic given the licensee.
22.2 Licensees should have the right to apply to amend their licence
conditions. Any amendments imposed by the licensing body should
be subject to the principles of administrative justice and meet the
conditions of Principle 22.1.
22.3 Clear time limits on the duration of different types of broadcast
licences should be set out in legal form. These time limits should be
sufficient to give applicants a realistic opportunity to recoup their
investment in both financial and human terms. The time limits for
licences may differ depending on the tier and type of broadcaster.
22.4 Licensees may be charged a licence fee but this should not be
excessive taking into account the development of the sector, the
competition for licences and general considerations of commercial
viability. Fees for different types of licences should be set out in
advance, according to a schedule.
22.5 Licensees should benefit from a presumption of licence renewal,
although this may be overcome for public interest reasons or where
the licensee has substantially failed to comply with the licence terms
and conditions. Licence renewal may also provide an opportunity for
both the licensee and the regulator to review licence conditions. Any
refusal to renew a licence should be accompanied by written reasons.
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Section 6 Content Issues

Principle 23: Administrative Content Rules
23.1 Broadcasting laws should not impose content restrictions of a civil

or criminal nature on broadcasters, over and above, or duplicating,
those that apply to all forms of expression.
23.2 An administrative regime for the regulation of broadcast content, in
accordance with the principles set out in this Section, may be
legitimate. Where an effective self-regulatory system for addressing
broadcasting content concerns is in place, an administrative system
should not be imposed.
23.3 Any content rules should be developed in close consultation with
broadcasters and other interested parties, and should be finalised
only after public consultation. Agreed rules should be set out clearly
and in detail in published form. The rules should take into account
the different circumstances of the three tiers of broadcasting and the
two types of broadcasters.
23.4 Responsibility for oversight of any content rules should be by a
regulatory body that meets the conditions of independence set out in
Section 4. It is preferable for a single body to apply content rules to
all broadcasters.
Principle 24: Positive Content Obligations
24.1 Public broadcasters have a primary obligation to promote the

public’s right to know through a diversity of voices and perspectives
in broadcasting and a wide range of broadcast material, in
accordance with Principle 37 (Public Service Remit).
24.2 Subject to this Section, positive content obligations may be placed
on commercial and community broadcasters but only where their
purpose and effect is to promote broadcast diversity by enhancing
the range of material available to the public. Such obligations are not
legitimate where they have the effect of undermining broadcast
development, for example because they are unrealistic or
excessively onerous. Furthermore, such obligations should be
sufficiently general in nature that they are politically neutral, clearly
193
define the type of material covered (so that there is no ambiguity),

and not be excessively vague or general. Such obligations may be
imposed, for example, in relation to local content and/or language(s),
minority and children’s programming, and news.
Principle 25: Advertising
25.1 The amount of advertising may be subject to overall limits but these
should not be so stringent as to undermine the development and
growth of the broadcasting sector as a whole. Agreements in some
regions, such as the European Convention on Transfrontier
Television, establish regional limits on advertising (in that case
of 20%).
25.2 Public service broadcasters should be subject to fair competition
rules in relation to any advertising they carry. In particular, they
should not be allowed to take advantage of public funding to offer
advertising at below market rates.
25.3 A separate administrative regime for regulating the content of
advertising, in accordance with the principles set out in this Section,
may be developed.
Section 7 Sanctions
Principle 26: Process for Applying Sanctions
Sanctions should never be imposed on individual broadcasters

except in case of a breach of a clear legal requirement or licence
condition and after a fair and open process which ensures that the
broadcaster has an adequate opportunity to make representations.
Sanctions should be imposed only by a body which meets the
conditions of independence set out in Section 4. Sanction decisions
should be published and made widely available.
Principle 27: Proportionality
27.1 A range of sanctions should be available to regulatory bodies.

Sanctions should always be strictly proportionate to the harm
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caused. In assessing the type of sanction to impose, regulatory

bodies should keep in mind that the purpose of regulation is not
primarily to ‘police’ broadcasters but rather to protect the public
interest by ensuring that the sector operates smoothly and by
promoting diverse, quality broadcasting.
27.2 In most cases sanctions, particularly for breach of a rule relating to
content, should be applied in a graduated fashion. Normally, the
sanction for an initial breach will be a warning stating the nature of
the breach and not to repeat it. Conditions should be placed on the
application of more serious sanctions – such as fines and suspension
or revocation of a licence – for breach of a rule relating to content.
In such cases fines should be imposed only after other measures have
failed to redress the problem, and suspension and/or revocation of a
licence should not be imposed unless the broadcaster has repeatedly
been found to have committed gross abuses and other sanctions have
proved inadequate to redress the problem.
27.3 Broadcasters should have a right to appeal to the courts for judicial
review of the imposition of any serious sanctions.
Section 8 Access to State Resources

Principle 28: Non-discrimination
28.1 Access to State resources, including the placement of State

advertisements, should always be provided in a fair and non-
discriminatory manner, subject to Principle 36 (Funding Public
Broadcasters).
28.2 The provision of information by officials to the media should not
discriminate between public, commercial and community
broadcasters.
28.3 Any public funding for commercial and/or community broadcasters
should serve the goal of promoting diversity. Allocation of funds
should be on the basis of clear criteria set out in advance, and should
be undertaken by a regulatory body that meets the conditions of
independence set out in Section 4.
195
Section 9 Election Coverage

Principle 29: Adequate Public Information
29.1 States have an obligation to ensure that the public receive adequate
information during an election, including through broadcasting,
about how to vote, the platforms of political parties and candidates,
campaign issues and other matters of relevance to the election. Such
information should be made available through news and current
affairs programmes, special election programmes, direct access
political broadcasts and, where allowed, commercial political
advertisements.
29.2 Public broadcasters have a primary obligation in this regard but
obligations may also be placed on commercial and/or community
broadcasters, in accordance with this Section, provided that these
obligations are not excessively onerous.
29.3 Broadcasters should be required to ensure that all election coverage
is fair, equitable and non-discriminatory (see Principle 31.1).
29.4 Any obligations regarding election broadcasting should be overseen
by a regulatory body that meets the conditions of independence set
out in Section 4.
Principle 30: Voter Education
States are required to ensure that voters understand the technicalities

of voting, including how, when and where to register and to vote,
their right to choose candidates freely and by secret ballot, and the
importance of voting. Where this is not already provided for in other
ways, public broadcasters should carry voter education programmes.
Commercial and/or community broadcasters may also be required to
carry voter education programmes.
Principle 31: Direct Access Political Broadcasts
31.1 Public broadcasters should be required to grant political parties

and/or candidates direct access airtime, on a fair, equitable and non-
discriminatory basis, for political broadcasts. Commercial and/or
196
community broadcasters may also be required to grant parties and/or

candidates direct access airtime for political broadcasts. The term
‘fair, equitable and non-discriminatory’ applies to the amount of
airtime granted, the scheduling of the broadcasts and any charges
levied. Public broadcasters should, and commercial/community
broadcasters may, be required to provide technical assistance to
parties and candidates for purposes of production of direct access
political broadcasts.
31.2 Broadcasters should not be allowed to refuse to carry obligatory
direct access political broadcasts unless they clearly and seriously
breach a legal obligation. At the same time, broadcasters should be
protected against legal liability for direct access political broadcasts,
in accordance with Principle 5.
Principle 32: Commercial Political Advertisements
Where parties and candidates are permitted to purchase broadcast

time to air political advertisements, broadcasters should be required
to make such time available on an equal, non-discriminatory basis to
all parties and candidates.
Principle 33: Rapid Redress
The body responsible for overseeing election broadcast obligations

should ensure that prompt redress is available to parties and
candidates for election-related violations, including in response to
complaints. The oversight body should, in this context, have the
power to impose a range of remedies including requiring the
offending broadcaster to carry a correction, retraction or reply. The
decisions of this body should be subject to judicial review.
Section 10 Public Service Broadcasters

Principle 34: Transformation of State/Government Broadcasters
Where State or government broadcasters exist, they should be

transformed into public service broadcasters, in accordance with
this Section.
197
Principle 35: Independence
35.1 Public broadcasters should be overseen by an independent body,

such as a Board of Governors. The institutional autonomy and
independence of this body should be ensured in the same way as for
regulatory bodies, in accordance with Section 4. In particular,
independence should be guaranteed and protected by law in the
following ways:
• specifically and explicitly in the legislation which establishes the
body and, if possible, also in the constitution;
• by a clear legislative statement of goals, powers and
responsibilities;
• through the rules relating to appointment of members;
• through formal accountability to the public through a multi-party
body;
• by respect for editorial independence; and
• in funding arrangements.
35.2 The governing body should be responsible for appointing the senior
management of public broadcasters and management should be
accountable only to this body which, in turn, should be accountable
to an elected multi-party body. The appointments process for senior
management should be open and fair, individuals should be required
to have appropriate qualifications and/or experience, and the rules of
incompatibility for regulatory bodies, as set out in Principle 13.3,
should also apply to senior management. Individual members of
management should have a right to written reasons for any serious
disciplinary action against them, including dismissal, and to judicial
review of such actions.
35.3 The role of the governing body should be set out clearly in law. The
role of the governing body should include ensuring that the public
broadcaster fulfils its public mandate in an efficient manner and
protecting the broadcaster against interference. The independent
governing body should not interfere in day-to-day decision-making,
particularly in relation to broadcast content, should respect the
principle of editorial independence and should never impose prior
censorship. Management should be responsible for running the
198
broadcaster on a day-to-day basis, including in relation to

programming matters.
Principle 36: Funding Public Broadcasters
Public broadcasters should be adequately funded, taking into

account their remit, by a means that protects them from arbitrary
interference with their budgets, in accordance with Principle 17.
Principle 37: Public Service Remit
The remit of public broadcasters is closely linked to their public

funding and should be defined clearly in law. Public broadcasters
should be required to promote diversity in broadcasting in the overall
public interest by providing a wide range of informational,
educational, cultural and entertainment programming. Their remit
should include, among other things, providing a service that:
• provides quality, independent programming that contributes to a
plurality of opinions and an informed public;
• includes comprehensive news and current affairs programming,
which is impartial, accurate and balanced;
• provides a wide range of broadcast material that strikes a balance
between programming of wide appeal and specialised
programmes that serve the needs of different audiences;
• is universally accessible and serves all the people and regions of
the country, including minority groups;
• provides educational programmes and programmes directed
towards children; and
• promotes local programme production, including through
minimum quotas for original productions and material produced
by independent producers.
199
Annex 2
AFRICAN CHARTER ON BROADCASTING

Acknowledging the enduring relevance and importance of the
Windhoek Declaration to the protection and promotion of freedom of
expression and of the media;
Noting that freedom of expression includes the right to communicate
and access to means of communication;
Mindful of the fact that the Windhoek Declaration focuses on the
print media and recalling Paragraph 17 of the Windhoek Declaration,
which recommended that a similar seminar be convened to address the
need for independence and pluralism in radio and television broadcasting;
Recognising that the political, economic and technological
environment in which the Windhoek Declaration was adopted has
changed significantly and that there is a need to complement and expand
upon the original Declaration;
Aware of the existence of serious barriers to free, independent and
pluralistic broadcasting and to the right to communicate through
broadcasting in Africa;
Cognisant of the fact that for the vast majority of the peoples of
Africa, the broadcast media remains the main source of public
communication and information;
Recalling the fact that the frequency spectrum is a public resource,
which must be managed in the public interest;
We the Participants of Windhoek + 10 Declare that:
Part I: General Regulatory Issues

1. The legal framework for broadcasting should include a clear
statement of the principles underpinning broadcast regulation,
including promoting respect for freedom of expression, diversity,
and the free flow of information and ideas, as well as a three-tier
system for broadcasting: public service, commercial and community.
200
African Charter on Broadcasting
2. All formal powers in the areas of broadcast and telecommunications

regulation should be exercised by public authorities which are
protected against interference, particularly of a political or economic
nature, by, among other things, an appointments process for
members which is open, transparent, involves the participation of
civil society, and is not controlled by any particular political party.
3. Decision-making processes about the overall allocation of the
frequency spectrum should be open and participatory, and
ensure that a fair proportion of the spectrum is allocated to
broadcasting uses.
4. The frequencies allocated to broadcasting should be shared equitably
among the three tiers of broadcasting.
5. Licensing processes for the allocation of specific frequencies to
individual broadcasters should be fair and transparent, and based on
clear criteria which include promoting media diversity in ownership
and content.
6. Broadcasters should be required to promote and develop local
content, which should be defined to include African content,
including through the introduction of minimum quotas.
7. States should promote an economic environment that facilitates
the development of independent production and diversity
in broadcasting.
8. The development of appropriate technology for the reception of
broadcasting signals should be promoted.
Part II: Public Service Broadcasting

1. All State and government controlled broadcasters should be
transformed into public service broadcasters, that are accountable to
all strata of the people as represented by an independent board, and
that serve the overall public interest, avoiding one-sided reporting
and programming in regard to religion, political belief, culture, race
and gender.
2. Public service broadcasters should, like broadcasting and
telecommunications regulators, be governed by bodies which are
protected against interference.
201
3. The public service mandate of public service broadcasters should

clearly defined.
4. The editorial independence of public service broadcasters should be
guaranteed.
5. Public service broadcasters should be adequately funded in a manner
that protects them from arbitrary interference with their budgets.
6. Without detracting from editorial control over news and current
affairs content and in order to promote the development of
independent productions and to enhance diversity in programming,
public service broadcasters should be required to broadcast
minimum quotas of material by independent producers.
7. The transmission infrastructure used by public service broadcasters
should be made accessible to all broadcasters under reasonable and
non-discriminatory terms.
Part III: Community Broadcasting

1. Community broadcasting is broadcasting which is for, by and about
the community, whose ownership and management is representative
of the community, which pursues a social development agenda, and
which is non-profit.
2. There should be a clear recognition, including by the international
community, of the difference between decentralised public
broadcasting and community broadcasting.
3. The right of community broadcasters to have access to the Internet,
for the benefit of their respective communities, should be promoted.
Part IV: Telecommunications and Convergence

1. The right to communicate includes access to telephones, email,
Internet and other telecommunications systems, including through
the promotion of community-controlled information communication
technology centres.
202
African Charter on Broadcasting
2. Telecommunications law and policy should promote the goal of

universal service and access, including through access clauses in
privatisation and liberalisation processes, and proactive measures by
the State.
3. The international community and African governments should
mobilise resources for funding research to keep abreast of the rapidly
changing media and technology landscape in Africa.
4. African governments should promote the development of online
media and African content, including through the formulation of
non-restrictive policies on new information and communications
technologies.
5. Training of media practitioners in electronic communication,
research and publishing skills needs to be supported and expanded,
in order to promote access to, and dissemination of, global
information.
Part V: Implementation
1. UNESCO should distribute the African Charter on Broadcasting
2001 as broadly as possible, including to stakeholders and the
general public, both in Africa and worldwide.
2. Media organisations and civil society in Africa are encouraged to use
the Charter as a lobbying tool and as their starting point in the
development of national and regional broadcasting policies. To this
end media organisations and civil society are encouraged to initiate
public awareness campaigns, to form coalitions on broadcasting
reform, to formulate broadcasting policies, to develop specific
models for regulatory bodies and public service broadcasting, and to
lobby relevant official actors.
3. All debates about broadcasting should take into account the needs of
the commercial broadcasting sector.
4. UNESCO should undertake an audit of the Charter every five years,
given the pace of development in the broadcasting field.
5. UNESCO should raise with member governments the importance of
broadcast productions being given special status and recognised as
cultural goods under the World Trade Organisation rules.
203
6. UNESCO should take measures to promote the inclusion of the

theme of media, communications and development in an appropriate
manner during the UN Summit on the Information Society in 2003.
204
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Annex 3
AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND

PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
Expression in Africa
Preamble
Reaffirming the fundamental importance of freedom of expression as
an individual human right, as a cornerstone of democracy and as a means
of ensuring respect for all human rights and freedoms;
Reaffirming Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights;
Desiring to promote the free flow of information and ideas and
greater respect for freedom of expression;
Convinced that respect for freedom of expression, as well as the right
of access to information held by public bodies and companies, will lead to
greater public transparency and accountability, as well as to good
governance and the strengthening of democracy;
Convinced that laws and customs that repress freedom of expression
are a disservice to society;
Recalling that freedom of expression is a fundamental human right
guaranteed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, as well as other international documents and
national constitutions;
Considering the key role of the media and other means of
communication in ensuring full respect for freedom of expression, in
promoting the free flow of information and ideas, in assisting people to
make informed decisions and in facilitating and strengthening democracy;
Aware of the particular importance of the broadcast media in Africa,
given its capacity to reach a wide audience due to the comparatively low
cost of receiving transmissions and its ability to overcome barriers of
illiteracy;
205
Noting that oral traditions, which are rooted in African cultures, lend
themselves particularly well to radio broadcasting;
Noting the important contribution that can be made to the realisation
of the right to freedom of expression by new information and
communication technologies;
Mindful of the evolving human rights and human development
environment in Africa, especially in light of the adoption of the Protocol
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the
principles of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000, as well as
the significance of the human rights and good governance provisions in
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD); and
Recognising the need to ensure the right to freedom of expression
in Africa, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
declares that:
1. The Guarantee of Freedom of Expression
1. Freedom of expression and information, including the right to seek,

receive and impart information and ideas, either orally, in writing or
in print, in the form of art, or through any other form of
communication, including across frontiers, is a fundamental and
inalienable human right and an indispensable component of
democracy.
2. Everyone shall have an equal opportunity to exercise the right to
freedom of expression and to access information without
discrimination.
2. Interference with Freedom of Expression
1. No one shall be subject to arbitrary interference with his or her

freedom of expression.
206
2. Any restrictions on freedom of expression shall be provided by

law, serve a legitimate interest and be necessary and in a
democratic society.
3. Diversity
Freedom of expression imposes an obligation on the authorities to
take positive measures to promote diversity, which include among
other things-:
• availability and promotion of a range of information and ideas to
the public;
• pluralistic access to the media and other means of
communication, including by vulnerable or marginalised groups,
such as women, children and refugees, as well as linguistic and
cultural groups;
• the promotion and protection of African voices, including
through media in local languages; and
• the promotion of the use of local languages in public affairs,
including in the courts.
4. Freedom of Information
1. Public bodies hold information not for themselves but as custodians
of the public good and everyone has a right to access this
information, subject only to clearly defined rules established by law.
2. The right to information shall be guaranteed by law in accordance
with the following principles:
• everyone has the right to access information held by public
bodies;
• everyone has the right to access information held by private
bodies which is necessary for the exercise or protection of any
right;
207
• any refusal to disclose information shall be subject to appeal to

an independent body and/or the courts;
• public bodies shall be required, even in the absence of a request,
actively to publish important information of significant public
interest;
• no one shall be subject to any sanction for releasing in good faith
information on wrongdoing, or that which would disclose a
serious threat to health, safety or the environment save where the
imposition of sanctions serves a legitimate interest and is
necessary in a democratic society; and
• secrecy laws shall be amended as necessary to comply with
freedom of information principles.
3. Everyone has the right to access and update or otherwise correct
their personal information, whether it is held by public or by private
bodies.
5. Private Broadcasting
1. States shall encourage a diverse, independent private broadcasting
sector. A State monopoly over broadcasting is not compatible with
the right to freedom of expression.
2. The broadcast regulatory system shall encourage private and
community broadcasting in accordance with the following
principles:
• there shall be equitable allocation of frequencies between private
broadcasting uses, both commercial and community;
• an independent regulatory body shall be responsible for issuing
broadcasting licences and for ensuring observance of licence
conditions;
• licensing processes shall be fair and transparent, and shall seek to
promote diversity in broadcasting; and
• community broadcasting shall be promoted given its potential to
broaden access by poor and rural communities to the airwaves.
208
6. Public Broadcasting
State and government controlled broadcasters should be transformed
into public service broadcasters, accountable to the public through
the legislature rather than the government, in accordance with the
following principles:
• public broadcasters should be governed by a board which is
protected against interference, particularly of a political or
economic nature;
• the editorial independence of public service broadcasters should
be guaranteed;
• public broadcasters should be adequately funded in a manner that
protects them from arbitrary interference with their budgets;
• public broadcasters should strive to ensure that their transmission
system covers the whole territory of the country; and
• the public service ambit of public broadcasters should be clearly
defined and include an obligation to ensure that the public
receive adequate, politically balanced information, particularly
during election periods.
7. Regulatory Bodies for Broadcast and

Telecommunications
1. Any public authority that exercises powers in the areas of broadcast
or telecommunications regulation should be independent and
adequately protected against interference, particularly of a political
or economic nature.
2. The appointments process for members of a regulatory body should
be open and transparent, involve the participation of civil society,
and shall not be controlled by any particular political party.
3. Any public authority that exercises powers in the areas of broadcast
or telecommunications should be formally accountable to the public
through a multi-party body.
209
8. Print Media
1. Any registration system for the print media shall not impose
substantive restrictions on the right to freedom of expression.
2. Any print media published by a public authority should be protected
adequately against undue political interference.
3. Efforts should be made to increase the scope of circulation of the
print media, particularly to rural communities.
4. Media owners and media professionals shall be encouraged to reach
agreements to guarantee editorial independence and to prevent
commercial considerations from unduly influencing media content.
9. Complaints
1. A public complaints system for print or broadcasting should be
available in accordance with the following principles:
• complaints shall be determined in accordance with established
rules and codes of conduct agreed between all stakeholders; and
• the complaints system shall be widely accessible.
2. Any regulatory body established to hear complaints about media
content, including media councils, shall be protected against
political, economic or any other undue interference. Its powers shall
be administrative in nature and it shall not seek to usurp the role of
the courts.
3. Effective self-regulation is the best system for promoting high
standards in the media.
10. Promoting Professionalism

1. Media practitioners shall be free to organise themselves into unions
and associations.
2. The right to express oneself through the media by practising
journalism shall not be subject to undue legal restrictions.
210
11. Attacks on Media Practitioners

1. Attacks such as the murder, kidnapping, intimidation of and threats
to media practitioners and others exercising their right to freedom of
expression, as well as the material destruction of communications
facilities, undermines independent journalism, freedom of
expression and the free flow of information to the public.
2. States are under an obligation to take effective measures to prevent
such attacks and, when they do occur, to investigate them, to punish
perpetrators and to ensure that victims have access to effective
remedies.
3. In times of conflict, States shall respect the status of media
practitioners as non-combatants.
12. Protecting Reputations

1. States should ensure that their laws relating to defamation conform
to the following standards:
• no one shall be found liable for true statements, opinions or
statements regarding public figures which it was reasonable to
make in the circumstances;
• public figures shall be required to tolerate a greater degree of
criticism; and
• sanctions shall never be so severe as to inhibit the right to
freedom of expression, including by others.
2. Privacy laws shall not inhibit the dissemination of information of
public interest.
211
13. Criminal Measures

1. States shall review all criminal restrictions on content to ensure that
they serve a legitimate interest in a democratic society.
2. Freedom of expression should not be restricted on public order or
national security grounds unless there is a real risk of harm to a
legitimate interest and there is a close causal link between the risk of
harm and the expression.
14. Economic Measures

1. States shall promote a general economic environment in which the
media can flourish.
2. States shall not use their power over the placement of public
advertising as a means to interfere with media content.
3. States should adopt effective measures to avoid undue concentration
of media ownership, although such measures shall not be so
stringent that they inhibit the development of the media sector as a
whole.
15. Protection of Sources and other journalistic

material
Media practitioners shall not be required to reveal confidential
sources of information or to disclose other material held for
journalistic purposes except in accordance with the following
principles:
• the identity of the source is necessary for the investigation or
prosecution of a serious crime, or the defence of a person accused
of a criminal offence;
• the information or similar information leading to the same result
cannot be obtained elsewhere;
212
• the public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to freedom of

expression; and
• disclosure has been ordered by a court, after a full hearing.
16. Implementation
States Parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
should make every effort to give practical effect to these principles.
Adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’

Rights. October 2002.
213
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Declarations and Charters

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (the Banjul Charter)
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (IACHR).
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)
219
Statutes
Botswana
Broadcasting Act (1998)
United Kingdon
Broadcasting Act (1990, 1996)
Canada
Namibia
Radio Act (1952)
Tanzania
Newspaper Act (1976)
Tanzania News Agency Act (1976 & 1992)
Radio Tanzania Act (1965)
Broadcasting Services Act (1993)
Telecommunications Act.
Kenya
Book and Newspapers Act
Films and Stage Plays Act
Defamation Act
Copyrights Act
Kenya Broadcasting Act
Kenya Communications Act.
The Gambia
The National Media Commission Act (2002)
South Africa
South African Broadcasting Act 1999
ICASA Act (2000)
Zimbabwe
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2002)
Broadcasting Services Act (2001)
220
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com/pages/archive/magazines/afm27e/coverstory.htm
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http://usaembassy.southafrica.net/About%20South%20Africa/Yearbook2
001/communications/default.html
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Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary of the Committee on
Appropriations, US Senate, 7 March 2002. http://www.fcc.gov
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legislation/2000/
NICI web site:
http://www.uneca.org/aisi/nici/
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http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white_papers/broadcastingwp02.html#5.1
Press Statement by MISA-Zimbabwe on arrest of Zimbabwean
journalists 02/05/2002:
South Africa Broadcasting Act, No 4 of 1999:
http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1999/act99-004.html
The Independent Communications Authority Act, Act 13 of 2000:
http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/2000/act13.pdf
The Telecommunications Amendments Act, No 64 of 2001:
http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/2001/act64.pdf
Afrol news report:
http://www.afrol.com/News2001/zim013_broadcast_act.htm
Media Institute of South Africa (MISA) report: Broadcasting licensing
procedure raises eyebrows May 10, 2002
221
MISA: Broadcasting Services Bill 2001 passed into law April 4, 2001.
MISA: Cable News Network banned from national broadcaster.
09/01/2002. http://www.misanet.org/alerts/20020109.zimbabwe.2.html
MISA: Zimbabwe Broadcasting Bill gazetted. 13/11/2002.
MISA: Government calls new media company to life 28/08/2001.
MISA: Confusion over Broadcasting Licence July 18, 2001.
NICI indicators: An overview of the African ICT Sector - 1998/99:
http://www.uneca.org/aisi/nici/nici%20indicators.htm
ECA/NICI:
http://www.bellanet.org/partners/aisi/nici/Default.htm
NICI in Africa:
http: //www.uneca.org/aisi/nici/NICI%20in%20Africa.htm
Telecommunications Act, no. 103 of 1996:
http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1996/act96-103.html#c4
ICASA web site:
http://www.icasa.org.za/
NICI:
http://www.uneca.org/aisi/nici/
Other
SADC, (1996) Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology
SADC (1998) Telecommunication Policies & Model Telecommunication
Bill
Telephone interview with Allison Gillwald, DBAB
222
ARTICLE 19
ARTICLE 19
THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION
ARTICLE 19 takes its name and purpose from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
ARTICLE 19 works impartially and systematically to oppose censorship worldwide.

We work on behalf of victims of censorship – individuals who are physically attacked,
killed, unjustly imprisoned, restricted in their movements or dismissed from their jobs;
print and broadcast media which are censored, banned or threatened; organizations,
including political groups or trades unions, which are harassed, suppressed or
silenced.
ARTICLE 19’s programme of research, publication, campaign and legal intervention

addresses censorship in its many forms. We monitor individual countries’ compliance
with international standards protecting the right to freedom of expression and work at
the governmental and inter-governmental level to promote greater respect for this
fundamental right.
ARTICLE 19 has established a growing international network of concerned

individuals and organizations who promote awareness of censorship issues and take
action on individual cases. We have a global law programme and regional
programmes in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East.
ARTICLE 19 is a non-governmental organization, entirely dependent on donations

(UK Charity No. 327421). For more information and subscription details please
contact:
ARTICLE 19
Lancaster House, 33 Islington High Street
London N1 9LH
Tel: +44 20 7278 9292 Fax: +44 20 7713 1356
E-mail: info@article19.org Web site: http://www.article19.org
Trustees: Richard Ayre, Acting Chair, (UK); Kevin Boyle (Ireland); Peter Phillips (UK); Mary-Ann
Stephenson (UK)
International Board: Galina Arapova (Russia) Param Cumaraswamy (Malaysia); Paul Hoffman
(US); Cushrow Irani (India); Jody Kollapen (South Africa); Gara LaMarche (US); Daisy Li (Hong
Kong); Goenawan Mohamad (Indonesia); Arne Ruth (Sweden); Malcolm Smart (UK),
Honorary Member: Aung San Suu Kyi (Burma)
Executive Director: Andrew Puddephatt
224
BROADCASTING
POLICY AND
PRACTICE IN AFRICA
‘Broadcasting is by far the most important source of information, as well
as of entertainment, for most people in countries around the world. High
levels of illiteracy along with the difficulty of distributing newspapers
mean that broadcasting is the only media which is accessible for many
people. For the poor, newspapers may be prohibitively expensive, and
some people simply find it easier and more enjoyable to watch or listen
to the news than to read it. Furthermore, broadcasting plays a very
important role as a cheap, accessible form of entertainment.
As a result of its centrality as a source of information and news, and its

growing profitability, governments and dominant commercial interests
have historically sought to control broadcasting. All too frequently, the
public broadcaster operates largely as a mouthpiece of government
rather than serving the public interest. In many countries, broadcasting
was until recently a State monopoly, a situation which still pertains in
some States. In other countries, private broadcasting is becoming
increasingly important and a variety of mechanisms have been used to
try to control it. Governments have exerted control through the licensing
process while commercial interests have sought to monopolise the
broadcasting sector and to focus on low-quality but profitable program-
ming.’
Access to the Airwaves, Principles on Freedom of Expression and
Broadcast Regulation, ARTICLE 19.
ARTICLE 19
ISBN 1-902598-50-4

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BROADCASTING

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be photocopied, recorded or

Chapter 1: EQUITABLE FREQUENCY ALLOCATION 7

Chapter 2: REGULATORY MODELS FOR

Chapter 3: AFRICAN REGULATION OF

Chapter 4: MEDIA PLURALISM AND DIVERSITY:

Chapter 5: VIABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF

Chapter 6: ISSUES IN LOCAL CONTENT OF

Annex 1: ACCESS TO THE AIRWAVES

Annex 2: AFRICAN CHARTER ON BROADCASTING 200

Annex 3: AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN

RTICLE 19 gratefully acknowledges the support of the Swedish

Jill Hills (PhD) is Professor of Telecommunications and Broadcasting

Russel Honeyman is the editor of Africa Film & TV journal and

Adolf Mbaine is Lecturer at the Department of Mass Communication,

Francis B. Nyamnjoh (PhD) is Associate Professor, Department of

Nixon Kariithi is Pearson Chair Economics Journalism, Department of

Tawana Kupe (PhD) is Senior Lecturer in Media Studies, School of

Background and Context

Liberalization of the Airwaves

Soviet Union collapsed and western liberal democracy gained ascendance.

playing popular music or showing popular television programmes

New Directions in Policy and Regulation

ministers cannot as the ultimate policy makers double up as regulators just

• the importance of a transparent, open and a participatory

Radio Frequency Spectrum for Broadcasting

Given the special role of public broadcasting, it is normal to treat the

International Frequency Allocation

sphere of public international law. Public international law – the law

allotment plan is made and state administrations must adopt

should be ensured, including e.g. growing recognition of the economic

ITU-R should also in co-operation with those sections of ITU directly

ITU and Equitable Frequency Allocation

Use of the Radio-Frequency Spectrum and of the

Frequency allocation must permit equitable access. By using the word

would be more equitable to reserve parts of the spectrum and orbit or if it

National Frequency Allocation

determine the exact make-up of frequency users, even if it is indeed ITU

One new element to think about in the frequency allocation sphere is

Frequency allocation is furthermore not the only element of

content. As this approach is coupled with the existence of public

The African Situation

• Medium Wave Sound Broadcasting: Geneva Plan of 1975 for

offices in different African states and regional activities aimed at reducing

On the legal and regulatory side, it is notable that many African

Another issues that occurs in some countries in Africa (and

How to Achieve a Really Equitable Frequency

nominate members to the governing bodies of regulators and/or there

access for humankind as a whole to a resource, which is the common

Introduction: Changing International

Deregulation of broadcasting, particularly in terms of concentration, is

communities and cultural identities of the population. Only with

the apartheid regime, while offering facile arguments that any

The Bill deals with the means by which our society

The regulatory framework itself needs division into two aspects,

Structural Regulation: Financing

broadcasters. But, if there is no advertising market to support them, then

• Pay TV: payments made for individual sports events or films.

Yet it is not the method of financing that determines the extent of

Structural Regulation: Radio Spectrum and the