EGYWELLS-WG-040 - HPHT Well Design Manual

Document Name EGYWELLS-WG-040
HPHT Well Design Manual

Guidance
Updated to new LR
Energy Guideline
1 27.11.17 SG SMG
template &
numbering
0 22/09/16 For Issue NL/GS/NS/ZZ SG DR
B 20/09/16 Draft NL/GS/NS/ZZ DR
A 30/04/15 Draft NL/GS/NS/ZZ DR
Rev Date Description Created Reviewed Approved
Uncontrolled if downloaded or printed Page 1 of 71

Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 Foreword .................................................................................................................................................. 4
1.2 Policy Statement – HPHT Well Control .................................................................................................... 4
1.3 Revision .................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.4 Documents & References ........................................................................................................................ 5
2. HPHT Definition ........................................................................................................................................ 5
3. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR HPHT WELL CONTROL ......................................................................... 5

3.1 Minimum Well Control Standards - Planning and Responsibility ............................................................. 7
3.2 Minimum Well Control Standards - Prevention and Detection ................................................................. 7
3.3 Minimum Well Control Standards – Shut In ............................................................................................. 9
3.4 Minimum Well Control Standards – Killing ............................................................................................... 9
3.5 Minimum Well Control Standards – BOP Equipment ............................................................................... 9
3.6 Minimum Well Control Standards - BOP Drills ......................................................................................... 9
3.7 Minimum Well Control Standards – Shallow gas ..................................................................................... 9
4. HPHT WELL CONTROL QHSSE...........................................................................................................11

4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................11
4.2 HPHT Major Safety Issues .....................................................................................................................11
4.3 ALARP ....................................................................................................................................................13
4.4 HAZID .....................................................................................................................................................13
4.5 HAZOP ...................................................................................................................................................13
4.6 SIMOPS ..................................................................................................................................................14
4.7 Emergency Response Plan ....................................................................................................................14
4.8 Risk Evaluation .......................................................................................................................................14
5. HPHT WELL PROJECT MANAGEMENT ..............................................................................................16

5.1 Well Planning Team / Managing the Engineering Process ....................................................................16
5.2 Management of Change .........................................................................................................................17
5.3 Dispensations .........................................................................................................................................17
5.4 Well Examination ....................................................................................................................................17
5.5 Contingency Planning ............................................................................................................................17
5.6 Training ...................................................................................................................................................18
6. HPHT WELL DESIGN OBJECTIVES.....................................................................................................19

6.1 Overview .................................................................................................................................................19
6.2 Well Objectives .......................................................................................................................................19
6.3 Statement of Requirements ....................................................................................................................21

7. HPHT WELL DESIGN ............................................................................................................................22

7.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................22
7.2 Detailed Tangible Specification & Design ..............................................................................................23
7.3 Pore Pressure Fracture Gradient Prediction ..........................................................................................24
7.4 Well Bore Stability ..................................................................................................................................24
7.5 Depletion ................................................................................................................................................24
7.6 Temperature Prediction ..........................................................................................................................25
7.7 Shallow Hazard Assessment ..................................................................................................................26
7.8 HPHT Casing Design .............................................................................................................................26
7.9 HPHT Production Liner Design ..............................................................................................................37
7.10 Metallurgy Selection and Corrosion .......................................................................................................38
7.11 Drilling Fluids ..........................................................................................................................................43
7.12 Cementing Operations ...........................................................................................................................52
7.13 Wellhead Design ....................................................................................................................................59
7.14 Drill String and BHA................................................................................................................................60
7.15 Hydraulics and Bit Selection ...................................................................................................................62
7.16 MWD/LWD..............................................................................................................................................62
7.17 MPD ........................................................................................................................................................63
7.18 Coring Programme .................................................................................................................................63
7.19 Wireline Logging .....................................................................................................................................63
7.20 Fishing Equipment ..................................................................................................................................64
7.21 Well Control Programme / Management ................................................................................................64
7.22 Barrier Assessment ................................................................................................................................64
7.23 Well Suspension / Abandonment ...........................................................................................................64
8. HPHT WELL TESTING / COMPLETIONS .............................................................................................65

8.1 HPHT Testing Options ...........................................................................................................................65
8.2 Annulus Management ............................................................................................................................66
8.3 Contingencies and Interventions ............................................................................................................66
8.4 Points of Consideration for HPHT Well Testing .....................................................................................66
9. HPHT RIG SELECTION .........................................................................................................................67

9.1 Minimum Rig Requirements ...................................................................................................................67
9.2 Additional Requirements for Floating Rigs .............................................................................................69
9.3 HPHT Considerations .............................................................................................................................70
9.4 Safety History .........................................................................................................................................71

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Foreword
Successful HPHT Well Design requires not only strict adherence to normal well design standards, guidelines
and procedures: i.e.
• EGYWELLS-ST-001 Offshore Well Design and Operations Standards

• EGYWELLS-ST-002 Well Barrier Standard
• EGYWELLS-ST-005 H2S Contingency Standard
• EGYWELLS-WG-010 Casing Design Guidelines
• EGYWELLS-WP-015 Well Control Manual
but also, due to the tighter operational tolerances, additional attention to the items presented in this manual.
To avoid duplication of material, this Manual, supplements all 5 standards listed above. Together these
manuals document the Minimum Standards and Guidelines for Well Design and Well Control that will
be applied in all well operations managed by LR on HPHT wells. These manuals also provide Procedures
and Guidance which will assist in the application of these minimum standards to guide LR personnel to design,
plan and execute well programmes in a safe, cost effective manner and to provide standardisation of policy
irrespective of the drilling location.
It is recognized that changes will be necessary from time to time, wherein departure from the contents of this
manual may be required. If changes to procedures are required, these should be conducted in accordance
with EGYWELLS-WP-005
1.2 Policy Statement – HPHT Well Control
Section 3 of this document and Section 2 of EGYWELLS-WP-015 detail the LR Minimum Standards for Well
Control on HPHT Wells. (Note: EGYWELLS-WP-015 Well Control applies to all wells and takes primacy; this
document details the additional standards and safeguards for HPHT wells.) These represent the policy of the
Company and hence strict compliance is mandatory. They have been set in order to reduce the risk of a well
control incident to as low as reasonably practicable. These standards shall not be reduced to comply with any
governmental agency or client requirements. They may, however, be adjusted as described below to comply
with more stringent regulatory or client requirements.
All personnel engaged in LR HPHT operations must be familiar with the contents of this document and are
responsible for compliance thereto. LR Project Managers and Drilling Superintendents will be held
accountable to the LR Wells Management for compliance and in some jurisdictions, are accountable in law.
If, on an individual well basis, departure from any standard is considered appropriate, then dispensation can
be requested from the LR Head of Wells using the Deviation Procedure, EGYWELLS-WP-005.
1.3 Revision
This manual is a “live” document and therefore is subject to change.
This manual has been compiled based on current practices and it is therefore recognised that updates will
be required as technology and practices develop.
Suggested changes to this manual should be forwarded in writing to the Head of Wells QHSE & the regional
wells manager.

1.4 Documents & References
QHSE Statutory Instruments and Guidance.

EGYWELLS-ST-001 Offshore Well Design and Operations Standards
EGYWELLS-ST-002 Well Barrier Standard
EGYWELLS-WP-003 Emergency Response
EGYWELLS-ST-004 SIMOPS
EGYWELLS-ST-005 H2S Contingency Standard
EGYWELLS-WG-010 Casing Design Guidelines
EGYWELLS-WP-015 Well Control Manual
EGYWELLS-WG-035 Managed Pressure Drilling Manual
Energy Institute Model code of safe practise part 17, volume 1 Well Planning
Energy Institute Model code of safe practise part 17, volume 2 Well Control
Energy Institute Model code of safe practise part 17, volume 3 Completions & Intervention
2. HPHT Definition
In line with UKOG Guidelines for HPHT wells section 1.2 & Energy Institute Model code of safe practise volume
17 part 1 section 1.1, High pressure high temperature drilling will be considered to apply when one or both of
the following conditions occur:
• The maximum expected wellhead pressure exceeds 10,000 psi (690 Bar)
(or the maximum pore pressure of any porous formation exceeds a hydrostatic gradient of 0.8 psi/ft
(EMW 1.85 SG / 15.4ppg))
• The maximum bottom hole temperature exceeds 300 deg F (149 deg C).
3. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR HPHT WELL CONTROL
Successful HPHT Well Control requires strict adherence to normal well control procedures (EGYWELLS-WP-
015) and due to the tighter operational tolerances, also requires additional attention to the items presented in
this manual. To avoid duplication of material, this Manual, supplements EGYWELLS-WP-015 Well Control
Manual, and together these manuals document the Minimum Standards for Well Control that will be
applied in all well operations managed by LR on HPHT wells. These manuals also provide Procedures
and Guidance which will assist in the application of these minimum standards.
Often the upper sections of the well fall within NPNT conditions and are fully covered in EGYWELLS-
WP-015. However, in the lower HPHT sections additional measures are required. EGYWELLS-WP-015
makes some reference to HPHT operations, and these are supplemented here in this, Standard. In the
table below, reference is made in the right-hand column of the table to HPHT sections in EGYWELLS-WP-
015.
At the start of all Projects agreement shall be reached in writing in the Project Management Handbook with
the client, LR as the Well Operator/ Project Manager and the Drilling Contractor which clearly sets out the
responsibilities of the companies, their respective supervisors and the acceptance of the HPHT well control
procedures. These shall be documented in the SMS Bridging Document.


3.1 Minimum Well Control Standards - Planning and Responsibility
EGYWELLS-
Std.
Minimum Well Control Standard WP-015
No.
Ref. Sect.
2.1.3 All primary well control operations should be carried out in 5.0
accordance with this LR Well Control Manual. For each project
a SMS Bridging Document or Joint Operations Manual will be
generated. This SMS Bridging document will be compiled with
reference to this Manual and the Rig Contractor’s HPHT Well
Control Manual (where this exists). The HPHT well control
practices to be adopted will be agreed in advance where
differences are identified.
2.1.9 Additional procedures/operational steps may be required to test 6.4
the casing, depending on the maximum anticipated wellhead
pressure. These high-test pressures could preclude the use of
the drilling mud to test the casing.
2.1.22 A minimum volume of weighting material capable of adding 5.9
1.5ppg to the active system should be available when drilling. In
any case this should be above 150 MT on HPHT wells. Drilling
must stop if stocks drop below these levels. Sufficient reserve
stocks of viscosifier must be on site to enable such an increase
in mud weight to be effected.
Other minimum stock levels for HPHT operations are:

• 80 MT Cement
• 500 bbl Reserve Mud onboard
• 200 gal Glycol.
3.2 Minimum Well Control Standards - Prevention and Detection
Secondary well control is implemented when primary well control has failed to prevent the influx of formation
fluid into the wellbore. Well control equipment includes the BOP stack, BOP control system, connector, casing,
Kelly cocks, Kelly hose, drill string safety valves (i.e. inside BOP’s), mud and cement pumps, the kill and choke
lines and manifold and all associated pipework and valves. EGYWELLS-WP-015 documents the minimum well
control standards and states that “Every HPHT well shall have well control procedures specific to that section
of the well. These shall be produced and approved jointly by the client and LR”. These will include specific
operational detail for the section and include any additional methods being used such as MPD/ advance flow
detection systems and incorporate or bridge to the 3rd party procedures.
These minimum well control standards have been expanded to cover HPHT operations where necessary.
The drilling engineer is also required to read and understand the Energy Institute Model code of practise part
17 volumes 1 – 3 guidance on well control. These HPHT additions to EGYWELLS-WP-015 have been
tabulated below.

EGYWELLS-
Std.
Minimum Well Control Standard WP-015
No.
Ref. Sect.
2.2.1 Kick Detection / monitoring: The following best practices are 5.4
added:
1. Tolerances
a. Mud weights
b. Pipe rotation
c. Pumping mud
d. Moving pipe
2. Active Volumes
3. Mud Parameters
4. Gas Levels
• Ballooning Effect
• Breathing Effect
5. Pump off events
6. Differential Sticking
2.2.7 As a minimum, a non-ported float shall be run in the drill 5.4
string until a casing string is set which has sufficient shoe
integrity to allow shutting the well in with the BOP. The
following equipment shall be used in all HPHT sections.
1. Non-ported float
i. Double non-ported Floats are not
regarded
as Standard for HPHT wells
2. Dart Subs
3. Kill Pump / HP Kill Manifold & hoses
4. Kick Single/stand when drilling through the
pressure ramp/transitional zones.
5. Mud Cooler
6. Mud Gas Separator / Hot Mud Line
7. Glycol injection for Gas hydrate prevention
2.2.13 During flow checks on semi-submersibles all activities such 5.4

as crane work which could affect the movement of the rig
should be suspended during flow checks.
2.2.13 All trips, both in and out of the hole, shall be monitored using 5.4
the trip tank and recorded on the trip sheet. When out of the
hole, continuous circulation shall be maintained across the
well by use of the trip tank. Instrumentation shall be provided
to allow the Driller to monitor the trip tank level at all times.
Tripping shall stop while emptying or refilling the trip tank.
Fingerprinting the well response during the following
activities should be conducted:
1. Breaking Circulation
2. Simulated connections
3. Tripping
4. Circulation Bottoms up through the choke

3.3 Minimum Well Control Standards – Shut In
The rig and potentially section specific shut in procedures will be generated from EGYWELLS-WP-015 by the
LR drilling team in conjunction with the client, the drilling contractor and any relevant 3 rd party service company.
These will be included in the project specific joint operations manual and any deviations from EGYWELLS-
WP-015 addressed.
During the formulation of these shut-in procedures the LR drilling team should consult the UKOG Guidelines
for High-Pressure High-Temperature wells and the Energy Institute Model code of safe practise volumes 1, 3
& in particular volume 2.
3.4 Minimum Well Control Standards – Killing
There are no generic HPHT well kill standards. The rig and potentially section specific well kill procedures will
be generated from EGYWELLS-WP-015 by the LR drilling team in conjunction with the client, the drilling
contractor and any relevant 3rd party service company. These will be included in the project specific joint
operations manual and any deviations from EGYWELLS-WP-015 addressed.
During the formulation of these well kill procedures the LR drilling team should consult the UKOG Guidelines
for High-Pressure High-Temperature wells and the Energy Institute Model code of safe practise volume 1, 3 &
in particular volume 2.
3.5 Minimum Well Control Standards – BOP Equipment

The minimum well control standards for BOP equipment are as per EGYWELLS-WP-015. The temperature
rating of all BOP elastomers should be checked to ensure they are suitable use in high temperature operations.
The HPHT additions to EGYWELLS-WP-015 are tabulated below;
Std. Minimum Well Control Standard Ref.

No. Sect.
2.5.6 Ram Configuration for Surface Stacks 6.4
The minimum configuration for HPHT BOP stacks is as follows:
• 1 x annular preventer – preferably rated to 10,000psi.
• 4 x ram type preventers – rated to 15,000psi or 20,000psi
2.5.7 Ram Configuration for Sub-Sea Stacks 6.4

Minimum configuration for HPHT wells, is as follows:
• Two (2) annular preventers. One (1) of which should be retrievable on the
lower marine riser package). – rated to 10,000psi preferably.
• Four (4) ram type preventers – rated to 15,000psi or 20,000psi.
• All stacks will have at least three (3) inlets/outlets.
.
3.6 Minimum Well Control Standards - BOP Drills
The drill requirements stated in EGYWELLS-WP-015 section 2.6 shall be met as an absolute minimum
however the guidance from the Energy Institute Model code of safe practise part 17, volume 2 section 9.2.4
should be followed in conjunction with the drilling contractors drill procedures.
3.7 Minimum Well Control Standards – Shallow gas
Shallow gas is defined as accumulations of gas which occur at a depth above the setting depth of the first
pressure containment casing string (i.e. the surface casing).

The LR standards for shallow gas as stated in EGYWELLS-WP-015 Section 2.7, will be implemented as a
minimum.
Although shallow gas is not a specific HPHT risk. It can have an effect if the project is part of an HPHT
development, as the increased number of wells in the platform or subsea template may concentrate the heat
when the wells are in production. Future wells drilled on the development may encounter shallow conditions
altered by this thermal input. As such in HPHT development / infill wells, heating of the seabed and any
attendant change in the stress state of the sediments (fracture flow) should be taken into account during the
design phase. There is at least one case where a cluster of high temperature production wells super-heated
the shallow formations for a considerable distance around the platform. This created difficulties when drilling
subsequent wells on the development.

4. HPHT WELL CONTROL QHSSE

4.1 Introduction
High pressures have a large impact on engineering requirements, but high temperatures are the hardest to
deal with and arguably have the greater impact. The following are all influenced by temperature and must be
addressed in the well design process and any controls recorded in the drilling programme and the Joint
operations manual:
1. Tubular movement and stress

2. Buckling
3. Cement design
4. Fluid density and viscosity
5. Equipment limits – BOP and packer seal elements
6. Annular pressure build up
7. Packer loads
8. Wellhead loads and movement
9. Deration of tubular strength
10. Corrosive environments
11. Hydrate formation and wax deposition
A key to success in HPHT is to always remember that the drilling requirements on well components alone are
a lot less onerous than the long term production requirements. Designing to safely drill an HPHT well is one
thing, designing for long term production means meeting the most extreme and complex loads that the well
will ever be exposed to. This demands and deserves the upmost attention if the well is to withstand the effects
of production for the life of field.
4.2 HPHT Major Safety Issues

There is no compromise on safety. HSE considerations must have the highest priority and weighting when
planning an HPHT well. Accepted safety practices stated in the EI 17 Model code of safe practise part 17,
volumes 1-3 must always be applied to well design operations. HPHT operations differ only in that additional
rigor is needed to identify and mitigate hazards. Certain hazards can impose significant threats in HPHT
environments that are irrelevant or insignificant in others. HPHT operations will often require equipment to
perform at or close to its design rating. HPHT environments are unforgiving and a step change in quality control
and quality assurance (QAQC) of equipment is essential to avoid failures and safety compromise.

In principle any well construction is designed to be fit for purpose i.e. fit to be produced to full potential with
risks as low as reasonably practicable. It is only during commissioning and subsequent full production that the
well design premise is put to the test.
During HPHT production there are three main safety issues:
1. The high-pressure regime existing in the well. This will not only lead to the use of exotic, less commonly
applied materials and thick-walled pipes but it may also increase the probability of mechanical
equipment failures.
2. The high temperature of the produced fluids resulting in extreme operating temperatures for the total
well construction and the adjacent surface facilities. In addition, there will be strong temperature
changes (and hence thermal forces) and high temperature gradients in the well especially near
surface. Chemical activity of well fluid components may also be enhanced by the high temperature.
3. The large flowrates generated by most HPHT wells, especially when first opened up.
As an example, a review of wells identified a number of incidents related to the integrity of HPHT well
construction which gave rise to the following concerns about the following hazards:
a. Catastrophic failure of well tubulars and hangers: -

In most cases the failed equipment was manufactured from premium stainless steels or alloys and the
root cause of the failure was attributed to metallurgical flaws. There was no obvious correlation
between the specific metallurgical problems encountered and in one case no metallurgical cause was
identified. The failures have invariably led to the loss of one safety barrier.
b. Failure of sealing elements: -

Incomplete setting of metal to metal wellhead seals was caused by the complex installation sequence,
dictated by the selected well foundation arrangement. There is a general uneasiness about the
suitability of the available elastomers used for HPHT seals. Failure of wellhead or production packer
seals will result in the loss of one safety barrier.
c. Inability to contain the gas bearing formations: -

Gas channelling has been experienced in the annulus of many wells despite optimum techniques
applied during casing cementation. The problem may be related to the effect of large thermal cycles
on cement and/or the underestimation of the pore pressure in the chalk zone. A pressurized and
gaseous B or C annulus poses a risk to the outer safety barrier of the well if not continuously monitored

and managed. Operationally this would be more problematic for subsea wells than it is for surface
completed wells.
d. Erratic well growth: -

The thermal growth of wells during commissioning has been underestimated in many cases due to
optimistic assumptions regarding the conductor rigidity (point of fixity). Due to variations in subsurface
conditions this may remain an element of uncertainty. If the wellhead bay is not designed to
accommodate the maximum possible well growth, damage to surface facilities may be incurred.
e. Inability to withstand reservoir compaction: -

The collapse or lateral movement of rock-layers overlying the HPHT reservoirs caused damage to the
production liner. This can lead to loss of one safety barrier from the completion.
f. Inability to inject chemicals for continuous downhole scale inhibition: -

On safety grounds there is a reluctance to introduce ports in HPHT hangers to accommodate chemical
injection lines. The extremely hard scale deposits experienced in water-cut HPHT wells will affect the
operation of the safety valve and the wellhead valves, both are essential safety barriers in a producing
well.
4.3 ALARP
See EGYWELLS-WG-001
Reducing risk to As Low As Reasonably Practicable “ALARP” is a sound engineering principle and should be
considered essential good engineering practice.
4.4 HAZID
See EGYWELLS-ST-001 and EGYWELLS-WG-001
HAZID (hazard identification) is a high level systematic identification of potential hazards associated with an
activity it is often the first step in risk assessment activity
4.5 HAZOP
See EGYWELLS-ST-001 (ST5.3.301)
HAZOP is a well-established method, which takes a full description of a process system and questions every
part of it to discover what deviations from the intention of the design can occur and what the causes and
consequences of these deviations may be. This is done systematically by applying suitable guidewords and is
an effective technique for identifying potential safety and operational challenges associated with the design,
maintenance, or operation of a system.

4.6 SIMOPS
See EGYWELLS-ST-004 SIMOPS Standard.
The key impacts that HPHT operations can have on SIMOPS is the greater reaction times. It can take longer
to secure a HPHT well and put in a safe condition. This extra time and any additional procedures should be
included in the Joint Operations Manual. It is key to get input and alignment from all departments involved
when writing the joint operations manual to ensure it is fully effective and to ensure full buy in by all departments
involved in the SIMOPS.
4.7 Emergency Response Plan

See EGYWELLS-WP-003 Emergency Response.
In addition to normal emergency response requirements, Deepwater HPHT wells can bring some more
extreme requirements. Response plans must be well specific, but below are some area’s which should receive
additional focus, when preparing the emergency response plan and the Joint operations manual.
▪ A requirement for fast, early kick detection and response. Response times must be much faster on
HPHT wells if kicks are to be limited to similar surface gas volumes and pressures as normal wells.
▪ Fast emergency disconnect and securing of the well at any time during any operation. The equipment,
materials and practices used in HPHT drilling can hinder the timeliness of securing and disconnecting
from the well.
▪ Blowouts can be considerably more intense and may require the development of alternative plans.
▪ Blowout interventions are likely to require specialist equipment, e.g. HP blowout control equipment,
HP pumping capacity, large quantities of very heavy weight mud, etc. Locating equipment with
adequate pressure, temperature and pumping capacity may be difficult, but locating such equipment
that can function in extreme water depths is a far greater challenge.
▪ Relief well planning and the specialist requirement for relief well materials often result in the plans
having to be taken to a more advanced stage. For example, availability of specialist casings,
wellheads, BOP’s and rig. Not to mention pumping capability and capacity to succeed with a well kill.
▪ Responding to an underground blowout, although not always a threat to personnel, rig or the
environment, is likely to require exceptional pumping capacity which may not necessarily be
immediately available.
▪ Perform a rigorous hazard identification exercise and ensure that all major risks are addressed.
4.8 Risk Evaluation

See EGYWELLS-ST-001 and EGYWELLS-WG-001
The inherent nature of HPHT wells can introduce additional risks over and above those for NPNT wells, which
section 4.8 will highlight. The major risks posed due of lack of training and/or HPHT experienced personnel
are discussed in section 5.6.

4.8.1 Organisational Failure

Organizations new to HPHT operations may not have sufficient understanding of the issues related to marginal
drilling and completion operations. HPHT well design and operations require a step change in reporting,
documentation and training, requiring new economic models which need to accommodate the increased risk
and the associated costs. Migrating conventional well cultures to HPHT can increase the risk of failure.
Recycling designs or batch design philosophies do not work with HPHT well design so these practises should
be eliminated. Failure to plan, inform and execute information flow within the organisation will increase risk
and can directly impact Safety. The use of the principle of ALARP will mitigate many of the potential problems
and allow a culture of safe and best practice to develop. Each HPHT well is best viewed as an individual
bespoke project so that, in this way, complacency can be avoided. The notable exception to this is a
development wells programme, where the opportunity arises to build significant team competence and
remarkable improvements in execution can be achieved.
4.8.2 Human Failure

Clear reporting lines and detailed documentation should form part of the HPHT project culture. Failure to
understand risks, engineering limitations for equipment and poor training will result in heightened risk of failure,
both economic and HSE. The duty of care principle should form a core practice within the wells team.
During planning, for instance while interrogating offset well data, warnings of impending difficulties can often
get ignored and risk is carried onto the next phase of planning or even into operations. There may be many
reasons for this failure. One good example of this may be to overlook regional data garnered from different
wells that highlights consistent failure or difficulty in achieving total depth (TD) due to adverse subsurface
conditions. This data can indicate for instance, well bore stability problems or excessive pore pressure over
and above the expected regional estimates. Documented cases illustrate that new wells teams have been
unaware or have failed to link these failures and question the accepted regional prognosis. This can result in
the new well design not capturing the real lessons from offset wells. This can result in failure being built into
the new well.
Familiarization with equipment and its limitations is essential. Wherever possible, equipment specifications
and the physical equipment must be checked during the well design process; at the procurement stage, then
again at the shipping to rig stage. Often great care is taken on complicated materials or tools only for the casing
or tubing string to fail during testing due to a minor component such as a cross-over or elastomeric materials
which fail at elevated temperatures or under combined or cyclic loading.

4.8.3 Equipment Failure

The majority of oilfield casing and tubular equipment is not designed for HPHT environments. In standard
operations equipment failure is still high. The addition of higher temperature and pressures take equipment
specifications to the near limit of their operability. It is essential that good communications with supplier is
established from the outset and that the vendor is fully aware of the likely well plan and equipment use.
Electronic components will suffer from the increased temperature and are likely to experience an increase in
failure rates. Therefore, simplicity of design is essential to reduce risk. Equipment work history and fit for
purpose testing should be thoroughly investigated and the results applied to the well design. Additional quality
assurance and quality control measures may be necessary during the manufacture and supply of equipment.
4.8.4 Software Failure

It is considered good practice to test the accuracy of algorithms used in computer software, check the history
of competence and accuracy in extreme environments. Verify the output of models against actual operational
results, input errors, etc. Software tools impose their own logic that is applicable and efficient for the
programme. It is recommended that once the software has been selected then its logic is followed and
understood. Provided the methodology is logical and thorough, the end result should be satisfactory. However,
'sense' checking shall be employed, and senior, experienced HPHT engineers should verify the outputs. Peer
reviewing work outputs shall also be considered, especially for safety critical areas.
5. HPHT WELL PROJECT MANAGEMENT

5.1 Well Planning Team / Managing the Engineering Process
5.1.1 Contract Strategy

The purpose of contract strategy is to identify what contracting work is required for the project. Service sector
requirements for HPHT wells are demanding. Poor service sector performance can easily lead to unnecessary
downtime coupled with operational inefficiency. It is necessary to ensure that a robust contract strategy is in
place and ensures critical service providers, can provide the necessary services. Contracting activities should
be initiated as soon as possible and for critical HPHT services well likely include a pre-qualification process.
Precedent has shown that contract activities can be complicated and frequently become critical path activities.
5.1.2 Data Acquisition Strategy

Data acquisition strategy is required to identify any requirements that may impact the well design. An example
may be DST and/or sidetrack core requirements. Both of these have a direct bearing on casing seat position
and hole size at a particular depth. The strategy may also result in a significant cost impact to the well which
is better to identify at an early stage in the planning cycle rather than at a late stage.

5.2 Management of Change

Due to the complex, higher risk nature of HPHT wells a health, safety and environment impact assessment
will be needed for each change. Change can introduce new risks and the identification, evaluation and risk
reduction process should be rigorously applied. This may involve additional testing, modelling and analysis of
the new component, process or procedure as an integrated part of the system. Refer to EGYWELLS-WP-001
and EGYWELLS-F-001.
5.3 Dispensations
See EGYWELLS-WP-005 and EGYWELLS-F-003.
Dispensations will be required when non-standard procedures or equipment are not covered by existing HSE,
LR, Client or and regulatory directives.
5.4 Well Examination

All wells will have a form of examination or verification depending on the well location either EGYWELLS-WP-
002 Well Examination Scheme or EGYWELLS-WP-012 International Well Examination Scheme will be
applicable.
The well examination process should be guided by the HPHT planning team but the examiner should have
sufficient independence and HPHT technical authority to question and request changes to the well design if
required.
5.5 Contingency Planning
5.5.1 Oil Spill Plan and Blowout Containment Plan

See EGYWELLS-ST-001 (ST5.3.02)
5.5.2 Emergency Disconnect

This should be in accordance with the drilling contractors procedures with any deviations from with LR
EGYWELLS-ST-001 covered in the Joint operations manual.
5.5.3 Expandable Liners

Several hundreds of expandable liners and screens have been installed in conventional wells since the advent
of the expandable tubular technology in 1999 – 2000. This technology can provide contingency in the casing
design to mitigate formation error depth bars etc. and avoid potentially compromising the ability to reach well
TD.

In HPHT wells expandable tubulars would primarily be applied in the prospective zone where very high
temperatures prevail. This places extra conditions on the specifications of the material used for the pipe and if
considered; the elastomers used for sealing off the annulus. The potential risk should be recognised that further
uncertainties could be introduced into completions that are already designed on the edge of metallurgical and
elastomer knowledge.
If expandable pipe is used for drilling or production liners, the sealing against the borehole can be achieved by
placing conventional cement slurry before expansion, or by the use of elastomers energised by the expansion
process. It is not known if elastomers have already been qualified for high temperature application.
5.5.4 Relief Well Planning

Relief Well Planning is covered in EGYWELLS-ST-001 and EGYWELLS-ST-012. Given the higher risk profile
of HPHT wells, relief well contingency plans must be included in the HPHT well planning process and
developed in detail.
The minimum requirements when preparing the programme are:

a. Identify safe anchoring/drilling areas at site survey time
b. Model the relief well kill scenario
c. Conceptual tubular design for well kill
d. Source contingency well control equipment/ tubulars/ wellheads
e. Logistics support including materials, transport, etc.
f. The availability of specific services for directional drilling, high pressure pumping, mud engineering, etc.
The role of drilling and management personnel should be addressed when developing a contingency plan.
Note: Section 5.5.4 is as per the Energy Institute model code of safe practise part 17, volume 2, section 7.1.3.
5.6 Training
5.6.1 General
Training is touched upon in several SIMS with the most detailed guidance on training being located in
EGYWELLS-WP-015 and EGYWELLS-WG-009. Due to the higher risks associated with HPHT wells, a full
training programme should be implemented, and specific HPHT courses attended by all personnel in the
drilling team. The Energy Institute Model code of safe practise part 17, volume 2 section 9, provides detailed,
specific, and thorough guidance on the training required on HPHT operations. This detailed guidance should
be followed, and it is the responsibility of the project manager to ensure the full implementation of section 9,
except for section 9.3 Permit to Work training which should be conducted in accordance with the drilling
contractor’s procedures. Any deviation from the training requirements/ guidance in section 9 should be risk
assessed by the drilling team and approved by the project manager and the QHSE manager. It is

recommended to read The Energy Institute Model code of safe practise part 17, volume 1 section 2.3 HPHT
Well Planning Team – Roles and Responsibilities.
5.6.2 HPHT Well Control Training

Well specific well control and HPHT specific training will be conducted with all staff involved in the planning of
HPHT wells. The training should not be limited to drilling but extended to completions and well testing. The
offshore personnel should also be sufficiently trained in HPHT specific well control, which as a minimum
includes the following roles: Company Men, Tool pushers, Drillers and Assistant Drillers.
6. HPHT WELL DESIGN OBJECTIVES
6.1 Overview
The importance of setting realistic yet precise well objectives within the prevailing HPHT conditions becomes
one of the major challenges. Keeping within the constraints of achievable objectives will provide a clear focus
on safe design and will aid the economic delivery of the well. The principle of 'keep it simple' should point the
team towards safe design and execution. Over-complicated design with the deployment of untried and
untested equipment will lead inevitably to compromised well objectives.
6.2 Well Objectives

HSE should be the priority of the well objective. The following points should be considered since HSE may be
compromised if these technical challenges are not addressed at the beginning of the design process:
a. There are now greater economic requirements to use an exploration well bore for future side track
options to maximize production. This option can increase the loads on casing strings and wellheads,
especially if future fracture stimulation is required. Stress changes during production may affect borehole
stability while drilling any side track. Thermal cycling during production may compromise existing well
integrity and therefore safety as can excessive casing wear.
b. Many HPHT prospects are found in deep water, which challenges conductor and riser designs. These
deep-water HPHT prospects challenge further the HS&E objectives.
c. When designing suitable casing strings for HPHT wells, some well conditions may require the
improvement of specifications above API standards to ensure high burst and collapse ratings. This can
be critical to HS&E.
d. Some HPHT operations require well suspensions that require long term monitoring of the well
conditions. Special gauge technology for remote fly-by monitoring may be required, however gauge
failure is highly probable and where data is in doubt extra safety margins may be needed.

6.2.1 Drillability of Target

The 'drillability' of a target is determined by two main factors namely, equipment performance and the drilling
window (often defined as kick tolerance). Casings and wellheads may not be available to meet the
specifications of a well. The temperature and pressure limits of downhole tools can be quickly reached which
can restrict or prevent directional work in some environments. Extended Reach Drilling (ERD) or horizontal
HPHT wells can be greatly affected by this limitation. The drilling window or kick tolerance requires adequate
separation between the formations pore pressure and fracture gradient. Such a separation may not always
exist. Cost and final borehole size may also make a target uneconomical. However, primary consideration
should be given to how safely the well can be drilled. Economics must be subordinate to HSE.
6.2.2 Sand Production and Early Water Break-through

Planning for sand control measures requires careful consideration. Sandstone which is initially very stable
under high pore pressure can become mechanically unstable with pressure depletion. HPHT wells can deplete
rapidly leaving unsupported high-pressure shales and unstable sands (see section on drilling and production
on HPHT fields). The well objectives should address sand control requirements, whether gravel packing or
simple slotted liner, for the initial completion or accept the risk of an early workover and re-completion to
address sand production. Early interventions and workovers while the pressures and temperature remain high
substantially increase the risk to safety. The risk of water breakthrough will influence the choice of completion
depending on the requirement for water shut-off or prevention. Issues relating to fluid chemistry will also need
to be addressed since aggressive fluids, exacerbated by high temperatures, can cause early failure of
equipment through e.g. corrosion or scale deposition. Again, future workovers and interventions increase
exposure to HSE uncertainty and increase safety risk.
6.2.3 Production and Safety

Compromised well production will ensue if the production rates and volumes are not built into the
completion design at the well plan inception. If initial production assumptions and safety considerations are
properly considered, there is a reduced risk of compromising the well’s economic worth when completed. Not
addressing the completion-production design at the start can result in possible 'slim-hole' completions which
will in turn add risk by making intervention – if necessary – difficult, expensive and leaving rig personnel open
to compromised safety.
6.2.4 Minimise Intervention while at High Pressure

Well objectives should include minimizing well interventions whether wireline (slickline), coil tubing or workover.
Increased frequency of well intervention automatically increases HSE risk.

6.2.5 Business Objectives

Business aspirations should not exceed safe working practice or push the well design, construction and
materials beyond their safe working limits. HPHT wells are by their nature complex and expensive therefore
some compromise on economic goals may be necessary.
6.2.6 Testing
When planning for HPHT well testing it is vital that clear objectives are built into a robust work flow. The Wells
Team should consider the following points:
▪ Using the ALARP principle, to initiate safe and environmentally acceptable production of hydrocarbons
to surface.
▪ Use of good practical isolation to maintain well integrity.
▪ Ensure that chosen materials have acceptable risk failure tolerances to variations in pressure and
temperature.
▪ Apply a minimum intervention approach.
▪ Apply simplicity in the design principles – 'KIS' (keep it simple).
6.3 Statement of Requirements

The purpose of the Statement of Requirements deliverable is to formally document and communicate to the
LR Drilling and Completion Team the requirements of the well. The SOR needs to contain all pertinent
information required to enable the basis of design work to progress. It forms the foundation of all future well
planning activities. Late changes to the statement of requirement, brings significant project risk and can
adversely affect the safety of the well design, as such a design freeze point should be agreed with the client.
Changes to the SOR can result in significant technical changes and therefore an associated cost impact to the
well. A signed off SOR is a crucial document to project success.

7. HPHT WELL DESIGN

7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Data Gathering

A comprehensive data set is required for establishing the expected well conditions, in order to prepare an
optimised operations programme for an HPHT well. It will be necessary to generate additional well data by
processing regional and offset well data into formats that can be used for advanced engineering calculations.
Often there is lack of data to allow a high level of certainty about the well conditions to be encountered. In
these circumstances, some assumptions must be made about the conditions. The assumptions made should
represent the worst possible conditions to provide maximum safety. Typical data that should be gathered when
designing an HPHT well are:
1. Well location
2. Total depth
3. Water depth
4. Objective depths
5. Well trajectory
6. Rig equipment specifications and load/capacity limitations (e.g. derrick lifting capacity, variable deck
load, pumping capacity and pressure, mud storage volume and weight, etc)
7. Exploration or development well
8. Evaluation requirements (logging, coring, or testing – impacts hole size and mud types)
9. Testing or production rates (impact tubing size, production casing requirements)
10. Hydrocarbon and produced water composition (gas or oil)
11. Corrosion anticipated from H2S, CO2, Halites (impacts material selection, cost and lead time)
12. Production life of the well, completion design and intervention procedures (e.g. ESPs, gas lift, N 2
cushions, fracturing, annular cuttings injection and associated temperature predictions)
13. Geological information (formation tops, faults, structure maps)
14. Accurate pore pressure, fracture gradient and geothermal profiles
15. Offset well data (casing program, geological tie-in, operational problems, mud weights)
16. Hazards and constraints (e.g. shallow fluid flows, faults, lost circulation zones, etc)
17. Tubing and downhole completion component sizes
18. Packer fluid requirements
19. Annulus pressure monitoring policy and bleed of policy in case of tubing to annulus leaking during
production testing. This could have direct influence on the burst pressure rating of the production
casing
20. Advanced casing design calculations including triaxial temperature deration, compression loads,
trapped annulus loads, sour service, etc.

21. Detailed mud property data including the relationship of Pressure Volume and Temperature (PVT
data) for the mud and how the mud’s rheology changes with pressure and temperature.
22. Cement slurry designs, including contingency cement slurries and cement displacement hydraulic
modelling.
23. Hydrate curves with effect of inhibitors. This should include the predicted pressure and temperature at
which the expected hydrocarbons in the well will form gas hydrates that can plug the choke or BOP
equipment. Hydrate inhibitor concentrations should also be examined for effective treatment at
expected conditions.
24. The temperature dynamics of the mud system should be modelled using advanced hydraulic
simulators. This will permit accurate control of bottom hole pressure arising from temperature changes
in the mud.
25. Well control planning with a dynamic two-phase flow kick model. The accurate modelling of well kick
scenarios using advanced simulators can provide confirmation of what can be expected and ensure
that established procedures are sufficient for the purpose.
7.2 Detailed Tangible Specification & Design

HPHT planning does require thorough validation to avoid unnecessary issues during execution. Detailed
tangible specification and design should be specified precisely to ensure:
▪ Material compliance with well conditions.

▪ Mechanical properties of proposed product incorporated in design files and verified for design
acceptability.
▪ Review of OD, ID and pass through restrictions. For example, will the product pass through the
wellhead or will drop balls pass through crossovers, drill string connections, running tools, etc.
▪ Where more than one vendor is involved, an interface meeting and memorandum of all critical
dimensions and procedural harmony is achieved.
▪ In the case of autofill equipment, that a well control plan is developed and risk assessed.
▪ Possible requirement for equipment qualification if a new design is used or if designated as a safety
critical element.

7.3 Pore Pressure Fracture Gradient Prediction

Most top hole sections, down to the 12 ¼” section of typical HPHT wells are very similar to NPNT wells. It’s
once the well reaches the pressure/temperature ramp that the reduced drilling window becomes a major design
concern and fracture gradient prediction becomes a matter of great importance for well integrity.
Geomechanical modelling can mitigate some of the uncertainties where wellbore stability problems pose a
serious risk to operations.
7.4 Well Bore Stability

Use of geomechanical modelling has become common in drilling any type of wells. In HPHT specific
environments the geomechanical limit of formations is usually deeper and often in technically stressed
formations. This is further complicated by large temperature changes that have greater impact on
Geomechanical integrity.
The understanding of geomechanical impacts from depleted reservoirs is in its infancy and rapidly becoming
a significant issue as more HPHT fields are developed. Whether the geomechanical modelling is for mitigation
of sand production, reservoir collapse or shale displacement or, for infill drilling, assisting with remedial
sidetracks etc., it is an important part of the design. As the geomechanical impacts from depleted reservoirs
are proving to be quite severe.
7.5 Depletion
All reservoirs will suffer from depletion at some time in their productive life, however with HPHT reservoirs it is
the rate and magnitude of the depletion and the fact that HPHT reservoirs start at much higher energy levels
that make exploitation so challenging. The produced formations reduce in pore pressure while the cap rock
and interbedded shales remain at abnormal pressures.
Other formations at high virgin pressures may exist below the producing formation too; therefore, drilling into
this ‘pressure sandwich’ requires careful planning. These environments often prove difficult and activity is at
or near the technical limit with attendant increased risk to well integrity. For instance, early sand production
can cause severe erosion and may compromise downhole safety valves and wellhead trees during production.
In addition, liners can become distorted or sheared as stress changes take place in response to production
related settlement of the reservoir. These stress changes can also cause re-activation of faulting. It is not
certain as yet how far from the reservoir these changes may be felt; however, it is worth nothing that planned
new wells in the vicinity of a producing HPHT field may be subject to extraneous stresses (and pore pressures)
which have not been allowed for in the design: a possible source of concern for safety management.

7.6 Temperature Prediction

Any HPHT well design needs to predict an accurate maximum temperature and temperature profile for the
well. Temperature forecasts often assume a linear gradient; this is an incorrect generalisation. A more accurate
profile can often easily be prepared and goes some way to reducing at least one of the inaccuracies in well
planning.
i. Rock strength will increase with increasing temperatures.

ii. Cooling by well fluids can cause fracturing.
iii. Temperatures will decline very slowly while reservoir pressures may rapidly reduce.
iv. Temperature has a greater effect on equipment than pressure.
v. Thermal cycling during production can cause materials to fatigue and fail.
vi. Elastomers can become brittle and fail as temperatures increase.
vii. High temperature wells suffer from hydrate formation problems due to Joule-Thompson cooling
effects.
viii. Changes in BHT have been used to detect over-pressure and warn of impending kicks.
ix. Reverse Joule-Thompson effects during production can produce bottom-hole temperatures (BHT)
higher than the initial reservoir temperature.
Temperature data can be sourced from:
i. Basin analysis
ii. Known regional geothermal gradients
iii. Offset well information
7.6.1 Maximum Predicted Temperatures

The formation temperature profile of the well should be determined with as much accuracy as possible. From
this and usually with the aid of advanced temperature modelling software the maximum surface and wellhead
temperatures can be determined.
This will define the temperature rating required of the well control equipment. The same process should be
used to predict the maximum surface production temperature. Commonly available high temperature BOP
equipment is limited to 250 deg F continuous rating with 350 deg F for a one-hour maximum excursion. High
temperature surface production equipment often has a 300 deg F limit.
7.6.2 Minimum Predicted Temperatures

The minimum temperatures upstream and downstream of the choke should be determined. This may result
from cool seabed temperatures or adiabatic expansion of gas. This will determine what hydrate prevention
measures are required to prevent hydrate plugging. For most HPHT wells and especially deepwater HPHT

wells, a well kick with even a nominal gas component will fall well within the hydrate forming envelope when
being circulated through the choke. Choke lines, kill lines, surface choke manifolds and even the BOP’s have
all been reported plugged with hydrates on several occasions. The injection of an inhibitor, glycol or
methalglycol is considered a routine part of well control. For HPHT wells the injection point is often immediately
upstream of the choke, for deepwater HPHT wells inhibitor injection will often be needed at the BOP stack in
addition to the choke.
7.7 Shallow Hazard Assessment

The purpose of shallow hazard assessment is to allow the design team to evaluate and cater for any pertinent
factors that may impact on well design and execution strategy. In HPHT wells it is particularly important as the
surface casing tends to be seated as deep as possible. Thus a deep penetrating high resolution seismic data
set is required to identify and register the drilling hazards. During this time, bathymetric and soil boring data
should be gathered which might be used for conductor engineering and rig selection. The study should consist
of interpreted high resolution seismic data down to a depth that is beyond the surface casing setting depth.
7.8 HPHT Casing Design

7.8.1 Basis of Design (BOD)
The purpose of the basis of design (BOD) is to develop and document a robust well design that is able to meet
the well objectives as well as mitigate potential risks as determined. This document is comprehensive and
captures all well integrity elements, load case assumptions and corresponding design factors.
Simplicity and common sense will assist with the reduction of exposure to HSE risk. To satisfactorily complete
the BOD, the following components must be considered:
▪ Offset well analysis
▪ Pore pressure and fracture gradient
▪ Shallow hazards
▪ Static and Dynamic temperature profile modelling
▪ Fluid composition
▪ Barrier philosophy and assessment
▪ Casing seat selection
▪ Material specifications and selection
▪ Casing wear
▪ Kick tolerance
▪ Drilling and production design loads
▪ Casing compression integrity during temperature cycling
▪ Annulus fluid expansion assessment

▪ Wellhead growth analysis and dynamic load sharing with top of cement sensitivities
▪ Wellhead load engineering
Each HPHT well can have its own set of peculiarities, even within a field development. Design recycling should
not be assumed, but rather verified for validity against the original and probably more comprehensive basis of
design.
7.8.2 Methodology
Refer to EGYWELLS-WG-010 Casing Design Guidelines.
There are specific requirements for HPHT designs. Temperature modelling is a special requirement to evaluate
the effects of the following:
• Thermal deration on steel tubulars
• Steel expansion and contraction (tension and compression) due to temperature changes, which can
result in wellhead growth.
• Thermal pressure changes of trapped annular fluids.
Temperature profiles can be generated from the Landmark WELLCAT TM programme, which specifically
addresses the temperature effects on casing design.
7.8.3 Required Information

It is required to fully establish the material specifications for downhole tubulars. The full suite of required data
may not be available, especially at the concept stage. Therefore, in the following listings two types of data can
be highlighted.
a. The minimum requirements to enable initial materials selection. This enables initial materials selection
for conceptual studies, order of magnitude estimates, etc.
b. Information required for final materials selection. This is required before preparing a final specification
for the downhole tubulars.

Information Minimum
Required
Design life of well √
Type of well (gas, water, oil) √
Change in field conditions during well life
General
Required material strength √
Planned tubular size
Planned connection type
Bottom hole √
Flowing @ WH √
Temperature
Shut-in @ WH √
Lowest ambient temperature
Bottom hole √
Pressure Flowing @ WH √
Shut-in @ WH √
Expected flow rate (max)
Expected flow rate (min)
Flow regime
Water cut
Production H2S (ppm) √
Information CO2 (mole %) √
GOR
Bubble point pressure (for oil wells)
Likelihood of sand production?
Sand rate (lbs/kbbl or lbs/mmscf)
Water salinity √
Na
Ca
K
Mg
Fe
Ba
Water Chemistry
Sr
Cl
S2
SO2
HCO3 √
Organic acids √
pH (in situ)
Packer fluid
Packer fluid density
Introduced Fluids
Acids
Other chemicals
Table 1: Required Information

7.8.4 Setting Depths

Surface casing setting depth must be selected and set principally for structural strength to support the other
casing loads, tubing loads, wellhead, BOP, riser, etc. In addition, there may be shallow gas or shallow water
flows to contend with that will influence the setting depth.
Production casing seat will be governed by formation pressure transition zones. The following factors will
influence casing seat selection:
a. Well control
b. Shallow gas zones
c. Lost circulation zones
d. Formation stability to exposure time
e. Formation stability to mud weight, static and ECD
f. Possible differential sticking
g. Directional profile
h. Sidetrack requirements
i. Aquifers to case off
j. Hole cleaning
k. Salt sections
l. Pressure transitions
m. Competent formations
n. Uncertainty in depth and pressure estimation
o. ECD at shoe
p. Completion strategy and contingencies in place
7.8.5 Basic Load Cases for HPHT Casing Design

7.8.5.1 Buckling and Compression
When casing heats up it expands, and it contracts when cooled. When casing is first cemented the initial
temperature, profile determines its initial condition. Since it is fixed at the bottom by cement and the top by the
casing hanger lock down, any change in temperature profile will result in a change to the stress state of the
casing. Tensile load calculations should include any resulting change in tension caused by temperature
variations while in service and as it is being drilled. As the well is drilled deeper, the increase in bottom hole
temperature will change the circulating temperature profile, stopping the pumps will allow the casing to cool
down close to surface and heat up deeper in the well. These temperature cycles will have associated
compression and expansion cycles in the casing string. The greatest temperature change is likely to occur
during production or well testing. The hot production fluids will heat up the casing strings, periods when
production is stopped will cool the casings down near surface. Bullheading, injection or hydraulic fracturing
operations will produce large changes in the temperature as the cold injection fluid is pumped into the well.

These temperature variations will affect the cemented portion of casings and liners. The integrity of cemented
casing is unlikely to be affected, but cement bonding and zonal isolation may be. This is very much dependant
on the magnitude of the temperature change for different operations. The greatest effect on casing integrity
will be in the un-cemented portion of casings. These are free to expand and contract and will significantly
impact on casing tension and often put the casing into compression in HPHT wells.
A compression load can induce buckling in un-cemented casing. The critical buckling force can be calculated
for a casing string and is dependent on casing specifications, hole diameter, hole angle, etc. If the forces
exceed the critical buckling force the casing will buckle. It is extremely unlikely that this will result directly in a
casing failure principally because the physical lateral displacement of the casing is restrained by the hole size
or internal diameter of the previous casing. For most standard oilfield sizes, calculations will demonstrate that
helical buckling to failure is not possible. In exceptional circumstances when a standard casing size is omitted
or large diameter under-reaming has been performed, failure in helical buckling is possible. However, the
following concerns may arise and have to be addressed:
▪ In un-cemented intervals in open hole opposite long washouts or in oversized ratholes, sufficient
deflection may be possible to cause casing failure.
▪ Buckling of casing or tubing can prevent large diameter tools from entering the wellbore.
▪ Drilling through buckled casing can accelerate casing wear.
▪ Drilling ahead through buckled casing can result in connection failure close to the natural point of the
buckled casing.
▪ Tubing buckling can result in significant lateral movements that can interfere with completion or
production operations.
▪ Excessive buckling can result in localised strain concentrations that will fail when tensile load is re-
applied.
7.8.5.2 Design Factors

See EGYWELLS-WG-010 Casing Design Guidelines.
LR standard casing design will utilise the following minimum design factors:
Collapse 1.0
Burst 1.1
Tension 1.4
Triaxial 1.25
Table 2: Casing Design Factors

7.8.5.3 Burst and Temperature De-Rating Factors

Erosion and corrosion will degrade casing strength and its ability to resist pressures. In HPHT wells, safe
practice dictates that an allowance for temperature should be made too. Burst rating of tubulars reduces with
increasing temperature. De-rating factors vary from 5% to 10% at 149oC (300oF) for carbon steel. These factors
will vary with material composition thus a consultation with the manufacture by the senior drilling engineer is
recommended and should be captured as part of the design process.
7.8.5.4 Collapse and the Effects of Trapped Annulus Pressure

Trapped annulus pressure (TAP) is a safety related risk. TAP could result in collapsed production casing and
tubing. Such failures are catastrophic leading to not only loss of production but also potential hydrocarbon
escape and a very high risk to personnel.
TAP is caused by the high temperature of the produced fluid heating the production annulus and so to the
peripheral annuli (production casing to intermediate casing, and intermediate to surface casing). The
temperature increase in these peripheral annuli cause expansion on the fluid in that annulus which can lead
to a build-up of extreme pressures which can then result in collapse. This is the most often a long-term
production issue but can occur during extended well tests.
TAP is more of a problem for subsea wells since surface wellheads can be accessed more easily for any
pressure increase to be bled off.
7.8.5.5 Tension while Running Casing in Hole

There are variations, depending on source, of what safety factor to apply for Tension when running casing.
Again, API standards should be consulted, and extra allowance made for temperature. Both the intermediate
and production casing on typical HPHT well designs are extremely heavy and often approach or exceed 500
tonne (~1,000,000 lbs). When lifting these casings off the slips and when stopping downward travel, significant
shock loadings can result, which can exceed the casing or casing connector specification. Repeating this
several times during casing runs could mean that fatigue will become significant and therefore, an allowance
should be made for this loading in the design. In addition, running speed should be restricted and control
exercised over the rate at which pipe accelerations are applied.
7.8.5.6 Yield Strength

Low alloy steels show reduced yield strength at elevated temperatures. The customary reduction applied in
casing design is 0.03% per deg F above 68 deg F. This corresponds to a 9.72% reduction in yield strength at
200 deg C (392 deg F).

Corrosion resistant alloys (CRA), duplex stainless steel and high chrome casings show a considerably greater
reduction in yield strength with temperature, e.g. 10% at 120deg C. This significant reduction in yield strength
with temperature must be accounted for when designing for HPHT wells.
7.8.5.7 Elongation and Contraction

Once a casing has been landed and cemented, it’s initial conditions are set. These initial conditions include
temperature profile and tension. Any subsequent change in the temperature profile, which may occur during
circulation, drilling deeper, injection or production will produce an associate elongation or contraction of the
casing. This will change the tension in the casing string. The tension may increase beyond its specification
during cooling or exceed the compression specification or even buckle during heating. The greatest affect is
seen in the un-cemented portion of the casing.
Additional tension changes from a casing’s initial condition will occur from other non-temperature related
affects, e.g. increasing the mud weight will cause casings to balloon and increase the loads on the casing; as
will pressure testing. These loads should be included in the assessment.
7.8.5.8 Cement Bond Deterioration

The compressive strength and permeability of neat Portland cement deteriorates with time at elevated
temperatures. This effect can be mitigated with the use of silica flour in the cement matrix (The addition of 35%
BWOC Silica flour is required above a BHST of 225 deg F.). In addition to this, temperature cycling that occurs
during operations along with hydrostatic or pressure changes will cause changes to the bond stresses at the
casing/ cement interface. These small movements can, over time, reduce the cement bond integrity. The major
cementing service providers have software (CemSTRESS, WellLIFE) that can assess the impact of these
stresses on the set cement and recommend the mechanical property attributes (Youngs Modulus, Poissons
Ratio) required for the set cement.
7.8.5.9 Connector Failures/ Leakage

Casing connectors are weaker in compression that they are in tension. Temperature changes during
operations can put casing into compression, which could exceed the connector’s compression rating. This
aspect should be examined during casing design verification.
Some premium connectors have been found to leak gas after undergoing severe tension/ compression cycling.
7.8.5.10 Wellhead Growth

The greatest temperature changes from initial casing setting conditions occurs during long-term production.
Hot production fluids will heat up all the casing strings and annular fluids.

When all the casing strings, below the wellhead are subjected to prolonged exposure to very high
temperatures, the casings will elongate. The elongation of the casings will cause the wellhead to move
upwards significant distances. This can vary from a few inches to over a foot. This is most commonly observed
in platform and land wells, because of ease of access, but it will occur on subsea wells. This growth will change
the load distribution and stresses on the wellhead but probably has most impact on production infrastructure,
flowlines, etc. wellhead growth is dependent on casing configuration, wellhead configuration and of course
production temperature and can be modelled with computer software, e.g. Landmark WellCat TM.
7.8.5.11 Annular Fluid Expansion

Thermal pressure increase in un-cemented annuli is an area of HPHT concern. Temperature is transmitted
through the casing wall to the fluid in un-cemented annuli. The annulus fluid expands increasing the pressure
in that annulus. This effect is not just restricted to the production casing but can extend out to the intermediate
casing and any fluid filled annulus in the well including liners.
Depending on the fluid in these annuli, the pressure rise can be sufficient to collapse the inner casing and/or
burst the outer casing.
Determining the significance of this problem for a given well requires a great deal of complex maths and is
best achieved with modelling software (e.g. Landmark WellCat TM). Once the expected annulus pressure rise
has been estimated the likelihood of casing failure can be determined. Mitigating measures and strategies can
then be evaluated as part of the casing design process.
The most common solution applied is not to cement the casing back into the previous casing string. Leaving
exposed formation in annulus should provide a leak path for the thermal pressure to dissipate. Unfortunately,
it has been found that the annulus often becomes plugged when the drilling mud deteriorates with time and
barite settles out plugging the annulus. Several approaches that have been used are:
a. Rupture disks in the previous casing string. These can also get plugged with barite, and have been
known to prematurely fail.
b. Collapsible foam sheaths that take up some of annular space. They collapse under the pressure build
up providing an increased volume for expansion.
c. Displacing the mud out of the well ahead of the cement with weighted clear brine. This is to avoid the
possibility of barite bridging as well as attempting to provide a known density fluid in the annulus.
Removing all the old mud is sometimes very difficult. Any mixing of the brine and mud will encourage
barite fall out. Brines have higher thermal conductivity than drilling mud and will become hotter. Brines
are also relatively incompressible compared with an oil-based mud; this produces much higher thermal
pressures in the annulus. But a solids free system should help ensure easier leak-off to the
formations.

d. Displace the mud with nitrogen foamed mud of the same weight. The concept here is that as the mud
deteriorates with time it will release the nitrogen, which then acts as a compressible cushion to absorb
the thermal pressure rise.
e. Displace the production annulus (tubing/production casing annulus) with nitrogen. Nitrogen is a good
thermal insulator. The purpose is to thermally insulate the production casing from the production fluid
and so prevent the annulus fluids from heating up.
f. Use vacuum insulated production tubing. This tubing behaves like a vacuum flask with an inner and
outer tube and a vacuum drawn between them during manufacture. This will thermally insulate the
production fluids and limit heat transfer to the casings.
7.8.5.12 Kick Tolerance

Thermal expansion in HPHT well environment can be significant with large temperature variations during
drilling operations. The pressure increase in a shut-in well caused by this expansion can be significant for the
well’s kick tolerance and should be part of the risk assessment prior to a drilling operation. Tight, narrow
operating margins that are often seen between pore pressure and formation strength become particularly
crucial for HPHT wells, and adopting standard overbalance polices and kick tolerance values could make the
well undrillable, or dispensation to drill at little margin may be required. A reasonable kick tolerance for a drilling
HPHT wells can now be extensively modelled using SPT Drillbench Dynamic Well Control software which
employs a multiphase model. A transient, multiphase model simulates these processes and provides
operationally vital information, including:
▪ Kick size safely circulated out of the well

▪ Arrival time at surface
▪ Maximum gas rate at surface
▪ Whether surface equipment is large enough to handle well flow rates
▪ The depth at which free gas forms in the well
The standard kick tolerance requirements are stated in EGYWELLS-ST-001; Standard Well Design and
Operations.
7.8.5.13 Casing Wear

Casing wear could have a significant impact on the well and it is discussed in EGYWELLS-WG-10; Casing
Design Guidelines. Common practices to minimize the potential wear during the well planning phase are:
▪ Limit the dog leg severity in the wellbore or remove the deviation completely
▪ Drill pipe tool-joint must be designed to minimise casing wear, with smooth hard banding such as
Arnco 200XT or Armacor M. Pipes should have been inspected prior to spudding.

▪ Use Torque Reducers or Casing Protectors in the drill string. A significant number protectors run over
the length of the casing can induce greater ECD which could lead to well control situations when
drilling high pressure reservoir sections.
▪ Drilling with oil based fluids can minimise the casing wear due to its lower friction factor.
▪ Greater wall thickness casing
▪ A utilisation of wear monitoring software
▪ A thorough casing inspection should be performed prior to sending to the rig.
Casing wear modelling is normally applied to identify the level of risk that casing wear might impose. The
results are often used to confirm trajectory planning, wear protector requirements and the allowance that
should be included in the casing design. Wear is significantly seen during:
▪ Side-tracking
▪ Underreaming
▪ Abrasive particles in the mud (hematite)
▪ Excessive tripping
▪ Excessive wireline runs
7.8.5.14 Casing Handling

High grade and heavy weight casing is often used in HPHT wells. This could lead to handling issues. It should
be understood that the higher the grade of material the more brittle the casing becomes. Higher grade casings
can easily be damaged beyond use through rough handling (marking by the slips and exposure to corrosive
environments such as salt-water spray) and additional precautions should be put in place for handling such
casing.
7.8.5.15 Deepwater Casing Design considerations

There are two principle concerns in deep water HPHT casing design.
i. Risk of shallow water flows and placing the surface casing correctly. The potential weaknesses of
shallow formations may lead to broaching from shallow water flows.
ii. The structural loads that may be imposed on the wellhead, conductor and surface casings. These
impacts are mainly due to rig or riser movement, drive or drift offs, mud weight in riser, mid water
currents, BOP and wellhead angle, etc.
Several techniques can be developed to mitigate these issues as follows:
▪ Computer modelling of soil strengths and the effects of loadings (geomechanic study)
▪ Careful selection of surface casings material specifications and associated connectors

▪ Use of mud mats and structural pipe

▪ Deeper setting of conductor (800 – 1000ft below mud line) and surface pipe (1500 – 3000ft below mud
line). Both are often constrained by shallow water flow risk.
▪ Advanced cementing techniques of surface casings (e.g. specialist light weight cements, foam
cementing, etc).
▪ Greater control and monitoring of wellhead, BOP and riser angles (e.g. increasing the number of riser
angle sensors with improved accuracy and reliability, increasing the accuracy and redundancy of rig
position sensors, temperature and pressure sensors on the BOP and surface controlled subsea
chokes).
▪ High level of riser buoyancy to reduce excessive top tension requirements.
▪ Restrictions and modelling of maximum mud weight permitted in the riser using thermodynamic
hydraulics models related back to riser loading calculations.
The deeper set casings must meet very high specifications particularly in burst. HP casing strings are extremely
heavy and can exceed 1,000,000 lbs buoyed weight and must be borne by the wellhead and structural casings.
The increased load will also be applied to the shallow formations. Given the structural concerns that already
exist in deepwater wells, great care is needed to ensure the structural integrity with the excess loads of HP
casing strings.
Further loading of the wellhead and structural casings will occur from pressure loadings during casing testing.
In addition, significant temperature variations during well operations, e.g. circulating, well testing, bullheading,
etc., produce high levels of thermal expansion and contraction in the casings. Under some circumstances,
these can induce very high loads, which are often cyclic in nature.
High mud weights will produce higher loads on the riser, increasing buoyancy and top tension requirements,
possibly in excess of existing rig capacity. This same load will increase lateral stress imposed on the BOP
connectors, wellhead and surface casings. The heavy mud in the riser may adversely affect riser reactions
from weather conditions, water currents and tides.
Surface mud volumes required to be stored on board the rig could have an adverse impact on useable variable
deck load. This may have specific impact if the riser has been displaced for disconnection, or in the event of
well testing with underbalanced annulus fluids, heavy weight kill mud will be required to be kept on board.

7.9 HPHT Production Liner Design

Production liners are key a component of HPHT well design. Liner top isolation is generally critically important.
7.9.1 Liner Isolation

Mechanical isolation of the liner is necessary on HPHT wells as an additional isolation to a cemented lap and
as the primary and only annulus seal in the borehole. Cementation of the liner is often considered on normal
wells to provide a permanent pressure seal and permanently fixes the liner preventing movement but there is
no guarantee of the permanency in HPHT wells due to the changing of hanging loads and stresses placed on
the liner during the life of the well. To increase the chances of success, liner cement jobs should consider the
following:
▪ Temperature control of the cement slurry

▪ Slurry designed to inhibit gas migration
▪ Post placement operations require special attention to ensure well flow does not occur as the cement
loses hydrostatic as it sets
▪ Reciprocation and rotation if possible during slurry placement
The challenge of obtaining a good and reliable liner top seal over the life of the well typically favours a
production packer style completion. Liner top completions relying on a sealing liner top will generally have a
lower reliability. Practically, the production packer should be set in the casing above the liner top, and not
inside the liner.
7.9.2 Service Requirements

All liner components, including the liner lap packer must be specified to meet the service requirements through
the life of the well. Load cases with potential for high differential collapse pressures; e.g. plugged perforations,
should be investigated in the liner design.
CRA materials are not always necessary for HPHT liners, however the use of some joints of such material has
successfully prolonged completion integrity by inhibiting corrosion in the vicinity of the packer. Also,
intervention jobs (logging, zonal isolation, retro-fit sand control) should be assessed when selecting the liner
metallurgy.
7.9.3 Underbalanced Packer Fluid Completions

Recommended practice for wells incorporating underbalanced packer fluids include:

▪ Liner hanger selection – use of mechanical liner hangers, proven in HPHT environments. Eliminate
elastomeric seals below the liner top packer.
▪ Liner hanger design – use longest possible liner running tool cementing stingers
▪ Shoe track – review shoe track design to ensure sufficient reliability
▪ Liner top packer – a liner top packer is recommended and should be used in addition to the primary
cement. Collapse pressure due to cooling should be assessed.
▪ Setting depth – The liner top packer should be set away from connections in the casing. The outer
casing should be scraped and clean where the packer is set.
▪ Liner cementing – a proper cementing and cement displacement design is required. Liner rotation
should be performed, if at all possible (from an ECD perspective).
▪ Displacement – pressure and circulation rate need to be controlled to avoid reverse-ballooning and
thermal shock.
▪ Be aware of potential underbalance when the cement is setting. Review alternate cements (foam
cement).
▪ Inflow testing – inflow test for sufficient time (kick calculations with the actual fluid will indicate the time
required). Inflow test to the same (or higher) differential that the liner top will see in operation (when it
is required to hold pressure). Be prepared for an influx when inflow testing.
▪ Swabbing – operational methods should be put in place to avoid swabbing when pulling off the liner
hanger.
▪ Preparedness – kick simulations should have been done for the underbalanced (brine) fluid. Well
control procedures in place. Crew trained and prepared.
7.10 Metallurgy Selection and Corrosion

Refer to EGYWELLS-WG-010; Casing Design Guidelines.
High well pressures demand high strength requirements for the materials used in the well. Corrosive
compounds such as H2S and CO2 coupled with the elevated temperatures will further impact on tubular design
and the health, safety and environmental risks. NACE MR-0175 should be used as a guideline if H 2S is
anticipated. The wellhead, completion equipment, tubing, liners, etc. that will be exposed to produced fluids
will be the most affected.
7.10.1 Sour or Sweet Conditions

The selection of tubular and downhole equipment is dependent upon the composition of the well fluids, well
pressure and life-of-well expectations. Sour service is defined in NACE MR-0175 as service where the fluid
contains liquid water and hydrogen sulphide at a level exceeding certain criteria. The hydrogen sulphide criteria
differ for oil and gas wells. It is important to keep in mind that the properties of well fluids may change during
the lifetime of the well; for instance, during initial flowback, scale squeeze treatments, stimulation treatments,

well killing, etc. Also, events such as reservoir souring as a result of water injection can produce more arduous
service conditions and they must be considered during the material selection activity.
Theoretically, wells producing only dry gas would not be considered as ‘sour’ using this definition. In such
cases the presence of water, even if only for short periods, cannot be totally discounted (e.g. water wetting
may occur during process upsets, at start up, or during shut in). This is especially the case for HPHT wells
where the large temperature differences between hot and cold conditions will cause water in the gas phase to
condense during shut in. Also, self-equalising safety valves are not common (nor recommended) for HPHT
wells. This typically means that the safety valve will need to equalise by pumping a fluid into the well. Therefore,
in most cases the presence of water should be assumed to be likely and the designation of the well as sour or
otherwise should be based purely on the partial pressure of hydrogen sulphide.
H2S partial pressure can be calculated as follows:
PH2S = Concentration H2S in ppm x Ptotal

1,000,000
For oil wells under circumstances where there is gas present (multiphase wells), the partial pressure of
hydrogen sulphide can be estimated by multiplying the total pressure by the mole fraction of hydrogen sulphide.
The situation for oil wells in which there is no gas phase present under downhole conditions is somewhat
different. The partial pressure of hydrogen sulphide that needs to be calculated is that in a gas phase in
equilibrium with gas that dissolved in the well liquids (oil/water). An alternative description of this is the partial
pressure of hydrogen sulphide in the gas phase formed at its bubble point. Therefore, a convenient method
often used to calculate the partial pressure is to multiply the bubble point pressure by the mole fraction of
hydrogen sulphide in the gas phase.
The definition of sour conditions is different for gas and oil wells. For the purpose of this definition any well with
a gas/oil ratio of greater than 5000 standard cubic feet per barrel of oil is taken as a gas well.
Total System Pressure Partial Pressure of Hydrogen Sour Environment

(psia) Sulphide (YES/NO)
(psia)
< 65 < 0.05 No
< 65 > 0.05 No
> 65 < 0.05 No
> 65 > 0.05 Yes
Table 3: Definition of Sour Service of a Gas Well

Total System Partial Pressure of

Mole. % of H2S in The Sour Environment
Pressure Hydrogen Sulphide
Gas Phase (YES/NO)
(psia) (psia)
< 265 < 0.05 < 15 No
< 265 > 0.05 but < 10 < 15 No
> 265 < 0.05 < 15 No
> 265 > 0.05 - Yes
Any Pressure > 10 - Yes
Any Pressure - > 15 Yes
Table 4: Definition of Sour Service for Oil/Water/Gas Well
From these tables and formulas, it is apparent that a HPHT well producing 4 – 5ppm H2S in the gas phase is
defined as sour.
The level of CO2 does not influence whether the well is defined as sour or not. However, it is used in the
material selection roadmaps. As such, it is useful to calculate the CO 2 partial pressure as per following:
PCO2 = (mole % CO2 x Ptotal) / 100

100
The worst downhole conditions (upper limit) will be at the bubble point pressure, which defines the maximum
amount of dissolved CO2, and hence the maximum PCO2 in terms of CO2 corrosion rate. If the bubble point
pressure is not known, the default should be the bottom hole flowing or reservoir conditions. The lower limit
will be determined by the wellhead flowing conditions.
7.10.2 Materials Selection

One of the assumptions often made in dealing with HPHT wells is that water will be present. The well
completion needs to be addressed from a metallurgical viewpoint for corrosion resistance, sulphide stress
cracking (SSC), and chloride stress cracking. The basic premise is that HPHT well environments are often
extremely corrosive.
Downhole injection of corrosion inhibitors may, for some wells, counter the HPHT simplicity philosophy. A
penetration point in the tubing and tubing hanger is a possible leak path. With today’s CRA materials
technology and competitive pricing, the use of low-alloy or carbon steel is less common for today’s HPHT well
completions.
Carbon steel may still be made suitable for some HPHT wells with an appropriate use of inhibition method. It
could be practical in an application that has low criticality (e.g. slotted liner), or in areas of the well that have
less exposure to corrosive fluids.

In general, CRA materials are a wiser choice than carbon steel as they provide the highest probability of
problem free installation and life of field service. A proper selection of packer fluid (with appropriate chemicals
to inhibit corrosion), and annulus management system is recommended to extend the well life. HPHT
completion should not contain packer fluid of halite (chloride or bromide), and oxygen.
The standard selection criteria for HPHT material can be categorised as:
i. Material Selection for Sweet Conditions: -
Only when well conditions can be assured to contain no hydrogen sulphide can it be considered as
being sweet. The materials selection for sweet corrosion requires a corrosion rate to be estimated and
this can be done with CO2 corrosion plot (manufacturers or industry guidelines).
ii. Material Selection for Sour Conditions (Corrosive Resistant Alloys): -

For sour conditions where the well fluid corrosivity is such that carbon/low-alloy steels are not suitable.
iii. Material Selection for Sour Conditions (Carbon Steel): -

For sour conditions where the well fluid corrosivity is such that carbon/low-alloy steels are not suitable.
7.10.3 Temperature Deration

High borehole temperatures degrade the strength of materials and may thus shorten the well life and result in
a very complex workover or well intervention. Depending on the specification of the equipment and materials
used, the magnitude of this affect can be mitigated. The common deration in HPHT completion can be
tabulated as below (to request the data from the manufacturers).
Anisotropic Temperature Thermal

Material Type Comment
Yield Yield Expansion
Carbon 4140, etc 0 0.035% per deg F 6.4 x 10-6 per
Steel deg F
13Cr Martensitic 0 0.035% per deg F 6.0 x 10-6 per
SS deg F
Cr13S Martensitic 0 0.035% per deg F 6.0 x 10-6 per
SS deg F
Martensitic + Radial stress 6.0 x 10-6 per Note with
22Cr
Austenitic = 0.95 x axial 0.1% per deg F deg F reduced
Duplex
stress compressive
Martensitic + Radial stress 6.0 x 10-6 per strengths
25Cr
Austenitic = 0.95 x axial 0.1% per deg F deg F
Duplex
stress
8.5 x 10-6 per
Alloy 825
deg F
Martensitic 0 0.035% per deg F 6.0 x 10-6 per
Alloy 450
SS deg F
Table 5: Deration Value for Common HPHT Materials

The issue of thermal de-rating is also important for completion equipment such as packers, safety valves, etc.
7.10.4 Corrosion Resistance of CRA

The corrosion rate of carbon steel typically is excessive without the use of any inhibition. Chloride content,
temperature, pH and the presence of H2S are the key factors which determine their acceptability where
susceptibility to pitting corrosion and/or cracking is the primary concern.
NACE recognises that the likelihood of SSC reduces with increasing temperature. Typical selections of 13%Cr
steels have a number of advantages including:
▪ Higher strength/toughness (available in strengths up to 110ksi)

▪ Much better corrosion resistance in HPHT conditions
▪ Slightly better resistance to sulphide stress cracking under sour conditions (i.e. for the same strength
level)
These have good general (and pitting) corrosion resistance over a wide range of conditions; up to a
temperature of 200oC. Tests undertaken in the UK indicated good general (and pitting) corrosion resistance in
a high chloride (120,000ppm) solution at a pH of 3.5 and a temperature of 200 oC.
7.10.5 Pitting Corrosion

The pitting process is strongly affected by temperature, with the propensity towards pitting increasing with
increasing temperature. Pitting corrosion of CRAs will not be a significant risk. In this case, a specific test
should be undertaken in which field conditions shall be applied.
7.10.6 Crevice Corrosion

Crevice corrosion is the localised damage that can result in a narrow gap or crevice between two adjacent
components. Examples of crevices that can occur in downhole tubulars are at interfaces between two joints,
under deposits, in contact with completion equipment, etc. It is extremely difficult to establish the maximum
service temperatures to avoid crevice corrosion. Therefore, in HPHT downhole tubular design, steps need to
be taken to ensure that crevices are, as far as possible, eliminated. In this way the risk of crevice corrosion
can be minimised so that the material can be used up to the service temperature limit indicated from a
consideration of pitting corrosion.
It is recommended that the following steps are to be taken to minimise the risk of crevice corrosion:

▪ Use only premium connections with CRAs. These connections have an energised metal-metal seal on
the ID that minimises the size of any crevice so formed.
▪ Prevent significant scale build up. Significant scale build-up, as well as possibly affecting the well
productivity by affecting the throughput of the tubulars, can lead to crevices at the scale/metal surface
interface leading in turn to crevice corrosion. Therefore, if necessary, steps should be taken to prevent
significant scale build up, e.g. by de-scaling treatments, use of scale inhibitors, etc.
▪ Ensure that due consideration is given to the potentially adverse effects of crevices in the design of
any completion equipment and that steps are taken to minimise the number of crevices.
7.10.7 Galvanic Corrosion

The galvanic corrosion occurs when two different metals are electrically coupled in a corrosive environment.
In such a couple, one of the metals will act as an anode (i.e. it will corrode at an enhanced rate) and the other
will act as a cathode (i.e. there will be a certain degree of protection).
In general, downhole tubular systems should be designed to eliminate galvanic cells where possible.
7.11 Drilling Fluids

The drilling fluids programme guideline is covered in EGYWELLS-ST-001; Standard Well Design and
Operations and does not significantly differ against HPHT wells. However, the preparation work and
assurances are required to formulate mud recipes more extensively.
HPHT close margin drilling conditions require very precise control of mud weight as expressed by equivalent
static density (ESD) and equivalent circulating density (ECD). All mud systems expand when heated and
contract when cooled. This directly affects mud density and therefore the ESD experienced by the well.
Different mud systems are also compressible to a greater or lesser extent. This too will affect the equivalent
density in the well. The viscosity of a mud will vary with temperature, which can have a significant impact on
ECD.
7.11.1 Oil/Synthetic Based Mud (OBM/SBM)

Oil based mud systems demonstrate good thermal stability and resist the effects of most drilling contaminants.
It can be designed and formulated to remain stable at high temperature and will not require extensive additional
treatments or frequent dilution. In general, the only change that is usually required for any normal system is to
tighten the emulsion by adjusting the emulsifier package. NOTE- Extreme HT wells (> 400°F) may require
higher temperature stable emulsifiers and fluid loss control products.
Despite oil/synthetic based systems being very common and practical in drilling HPHT wells, they become
thinner and expand significantly with increasing temperature, so the viscosity and downhole density may differ

from the measurement on surface. The compression effects at high downhole pressures tend to counteract
this expansion in high density fluids, but the effects do not completely cancel each other since there is no direct
relationship between them. In practice, the net result of these affects can sometimes be observed on a deep
well, where fill-up volume when tripping out is greater than the calculated string (steel) volume. On ECD-critical
wells, actual HPHT rheologies of field mud should be tested on a FANN 75 (or equivalent) rheometer. This is
usually done in the base laboratory with the data being reported back to the rig to adapt the pressure profile
modelling.
HPHT mud formulations should be made with special high temperature compatible organophilic clays,
particularly where the mud will be exposed to temperatures in excess of 350 oF. For environments in which
acidic gases such as H2S or CO2 is anticipated, the excess lime content should be maintained at 5 to 10 ppb.
Common identified limitations of oil/synthetic based systems in HPHT environments are:
i. Lost circulation – costly and often difficult to control. Laboratory studies (SPE 22581) have demonstrated
that although the pressures that are required to initiate a fracture are similar for either type of system,
fracture reopening pressures are lower for oil/synthetic based systems. This means that fractures are
more likely to reopen with oil/synthetic systems, which results in continued losses.
ii. LOT consideration – if a fracture is unintentionally created then the fracture is more likely to heal with
WBM than OBM/SBM.
iii. Gas kick detection – the solubility of the gas in the system makes kick detection difficult. Gas solubility
in oil/synthetic fluids is a very serious consideration on an exploration well, where the formation
pressures will not be accurately known. The concern may be lower for appraisal wells if the formation
pressures are confidently known and trip margins are adequate.
iv. H2S gas is highly soluble in the oil phase of an OBM/SBM. It is extremely difficult to remove by
mechanical means such as a rig degasser and will often remain in the circulating system far longer than
in a WBM. The use of a chemical scavenger that will absorb / adsorb the H2S is highly recommended.
v. Barite stripping – gas influxes decrease viscosity of the liquid phase causing barite to settle out
vi. Logging – some e-logs can only be run in water based fluids
vii. Density – the measured density will vary with temperature. It should be routinely check to ensure the
appropriate overbalance is maintained down hole.
viii. Environmental legislation – the use of OBM/SBM may not comply with local regulations
ix. The thermal retention capacity of OBM/SBM is greater than WBM. This can severely effect down hole
electronics and will usually require Mud Coolers to help control and reduce the circulating mud system
temperature in HT wells.
x. Any formation water / brine flow will compromise the stability and rheology of any OBM/SBM. This
negative effect is magnified in HP systems where the oil and solids content are very high to control the

system rheology. NOTE- a unit of water influx may require more than five unit of base oil + Barite to
treat the influx. This is especially true with divalent / mixed brine flows.
7.11.2 Water Based Mud (WBM)

Conventional water-based systems are sensitive to temperature and are not very compressible. Generally,
water-based systems are preferable environmentally and have lower unit cost. However, at temperatures >
than 350°F the use of speciality synthetic polymers will often significantly increase the unit cost over LT WBM
systems. They are however, less resistant to contamination and do not provide the same level of lubricity as
oil-based fluids.
The availability of superior solids controls equipment and the use of adequate dilution, to counter high
evaporation rates, are critical to the successful application of water based systems in HPHT wells. Active clays
can promote gelation and other rheological problems at high temperatures. The bentonite concentration must
be kept low and the concentration of reactive solids should be monitored using the methylene blue test.
Generally, in a 0.935 psi/ft (18 ppg) fluid, the bentonite concentration should be reduced to Ca. 5 ppb.
The circulating fluid temperature in HPHT wells is usually significantly lower than the formation temperature
and mud additives are therefore not normally exposed to the highest temperatures, except during trips. When
temperatures increase during trips, viscosifiers such as PAC and xanthan polymers may degrade but they do
not produce contaminating by-products. When viscosifing polymers are used intentionally above their
temperature limit, they are called “sacrificial” viscosifiers. Although the viscosifing benefit of the polymers will
be lost, it will be offset by an increase in viscosity from the thermal flocculation of reactive solids. This maintains
the suspension and viscous properties, and the product consumption is limited to the small quantity of drilling
fluid exposed to higher formation temperatures. Many new high temperature, synthetic polymers, are now
available that have supplemented or replaced dispersed bentonite based HPHT WBM.
Other requirements specific to water based fluids include:
i. Addition of thermal rheological stabilizers, such as anionic thinners.

ii. Use of thermally stable fluid-loss additives.
iii. Maintaining a stable pH.
iv. When additives that degrade into CO2 (e.g. lignosulphonate and lignite) are used, a small amount of
excess lime should be added to prevent contamination.
7.11.3 Effects of Pressure & Temperature on Density

Liquids are not totally incompressible and those compressibility’s are themselves influenced by temperature
and pressure. Changes in compressibility cause changes in density which lead to differences between the

common isothermal calculations of downhole pressures and the actual downhole values. Under certain
circumstances this may lead to a real value of downhole pressure which may be either higher or lower than
the basic calculated value. This has obvious complications on pressure control whilst drilling and tripping, apart
from any influences on other rheological properties.
The effects of changes in pressure and temperature can be reasoned, as follows:
a. Increasing pressure:
b. As pressure increases with depth in a well, then the compressibility reduces the volume, whilst mass
stays the same. Thus density is increased with pressure.
c. Increasing temperature:
d. As depth increases in a well, the temperature also (generally) increases. Liquids expand with
temperature and consequently the volume increases and thus the density decreases.
The plot below shows the effects of temperature and pressure on the density of 17ppg oil based muds at
constant temperature conditions of 78oF, 200°F and 350oF.
Figure 1: Effects of Temperature & Pressure on Mud Density
Temperature profiles in flowing wells differ from static or geothermal profiles; the mud generally being cooler
whilst circulation is in progress. Also, the mud is warmer when moving up the annulus than when pumping
down the drillstring.

At high temperatures, the bottom hole pressures can be less than anticipated by the constant temperature
hydrostatic pressure formula. The implications of such pressure reductions on pressure control and on the
potential for swabbing must be noted.
Detailed mud property data, including the relationship of pressure, Volume and Temperature (PVT) data for
the mud, should be available. The initial data is generated on HPHT rheometers such as the FANN 75 (or
equivalent) using lab muds and then correlated against actual field samples. Base oils have different PVT
profiles so pre-selection is recommended, especially in ECD-critical wells.
7.11.4 Barite Sagging

Sag is defined as the settling of barite or other heavy weighting materials towards the low side of the wellbore
causing significant variations in mud density. Sag occurs when the rheology of mud cannot support the quantity
of barite that has been added for weight control. Barite sag results in a number of problems including:
▪ Lost circulation
▪ Well control problems
▪ ECD fluctuations
▪ Torque and drag
▪ Logging problems
▪ Poor cement job
The following conditions give rise to barite sag in Invert Emulsions which are usually used to drill HPHT wells:
i. Hole Angle – sagging of barite becomes a problem in hole angle above 30 o with slumping off at angles
45-60o. Above 75o, beds are stable.
ii. Static Time – sagging occurs if the mud in hole is left static for long periods of time (generally more than
30 hours).
iii. Flow Rate – sagging is promoted at low flow rates with annular velocities of less than 100 ft/min.
iv. Drillpipe Rotation – sagging is reduced with pipe rotation.
v. Eccentricity - eccentric pipe also encourages sagging. Eccentricity causes a reduction in annular
velocities which in turn increase the tendency towards sagging.
At very high mud weights, when the limits of barite systems are approached, barite sag can no longer occur.
With so many solids in the mud system it becomes self-supporting and the barite cannot sag past the other
solids. The most severe barite sag normally occurs in 1.92 SG (16.0ppg) and 2.04 SG (17.0ppg) mud systems
and in hole inclinations of around 45 – 60degs.

7.11.5 Extended Temperature Stability

Drilling fluid that is to be used as a packer fluid or kill fluid shall be measured precisely with respect to long
term suspension stability. At static bottom hole temperature, the solids in these systems are very likely to settle
gradually and cause major problems when trying to re-enter or pull tubing.
7.11.6 Drilling Fluid Testing Requirements

7.11.6.1 Laboratory Testing
In all HPHT well pre-planning, full laboratory testing of the drilling fluids must be carried out by the service
provider. The results must be verified and the specifications agreed by the Drilling Team. The minimum test
schedule and requirements are:
i. The fluid has to meet required specifications before and after hot rolling at BHT +20 oF.
ii. Perform HPHT rheology testing (Fann 70/75 or equivalent) at expected BHT +20oF. This equipment is
not usually suitable for rig site use.
iii. Static aging at expected BHT +20oF for 16 and 32 hours or longer if more appropriate to expected rig
operations. Check rheology, fluid loss and shear strength using a shearometer tube.
iv. Contaminate drilling fluid with solids to determine maximum tolerable solid contents as well as the quality
of the Barite supply.
v. If the HPHT well is also a deep water well, the cold temperature rheologies of both the OBM/SBM and
base fluid must be optimised.
vi. Verification and compatibility testing of the base fluid to be used and down hole elastomers must be
carried out.
7.11.6.2 Field Testing

If bottom hole temperature (BHT) exceeds 300oF, special consideration must be given to continually checking
the high temperature stability of the mud. Guidelines for fluid monitoring, in addition to the daily mud checks
should be followed.
In addition to the standard mud testing equipment a heating/roller oven with heat aging cells, a shearometer
tube and a Garrett Gas Train should be sent to the rig, and the personnel involved must be trained in using
the equipment.
The following tests should be conducted:
i. Static aging tests should be performed daily on the mud sample from the active system at current BHT
+ 20oF in order to determine if a problem is developing. The testing should be performed on the rig using
the roller oven and stainless steel or inconel cells, pressurised to 100psi with N 2 and aged for 16 hours.

The mud engineer should be made responsible for the collection of samples and for documenting and
communicating the results to the office-based support teams.
ii. Whenever the mud has been left static in the hole, bottoms up samples should be tested for rheology
and fluid loss properties in order to detect any developing problems.
iii. Prior to testing operations where mud will be left in the annulus for an extended period of time, long term
static aging tests should be performed. The length of time for the static aging test will be determined by
the anticipated duration of the well test period. These aging tests can be carried out both on the rig
and/or in the drilling fluid company’s laboratory.
iv. The mud engineer should collect 1 gallon samples of active mud and send them to the drilling fluid
contractor’s laboratory for further high temperature stability and HPHT rheology testing (Fann 70/75 or
equivalent).
v. Pilot tests should be made before performing any special treatment to the mud system. In this context,
special treatments are any treatments other than maintenance of the required product concentrations.
The pilot testing should also include static age testing of the treated mud.
vi. A Garrett Gas Train analysis should be performed twice daily (or more frequently if required) when
drilling to provide early detection of any CO2 or H2S, whether from drilled formations or from
decomposition of mud products.
vii. Routine rheology testing should be run at the standard test temperature of 120 oF. In addition, tests
should be run at the average BHT (if practical) and flow line temperatures for use in ECD, swab/surge
and cementing calculations.
viii. Pressurised mud balances should be used for density measurement. Since these can read inaccurately
at densities above 0.831psi/ft (16ppg), the mud balances should be calibrated with 0.954 psi/ft (18.36
ppg) Caesium Formate brine, at least once per week. The brine density must be cross-checked with a
hydrometer each time. NOTE- For HSE issues, Zinc Bromide should NEVER be used to calibrate
balances.
7.11.7 Stress Caging

From experience with drilling HPHT wells, where ECD is often close to the fracture gradient, it has become
evident that controlling lost circulation during well construction involves more than simply selecting the proper
type of LCM.
Investigation through finite element modelling has shown that lost circulation can be prevented or cured by
developing high concentric stresses near the wellbore region of the formation by inducing short fractures and
plugging and sealing them with particles. The process generally involves increasing the fracture closure stress
by widening the fracture to compress the adjacent rock. It is the closing stress that determines that the fracture
pressure and losses cannot occur if the fracture reopening pressure is greater than the ECD.

In practice, this is accomplished by placing a plugging material in an induced fracture, which can prevent
further pressure and fluid transmission to the fracture tip and at the same time, widen the propped fracture.
Field testing has identified that the sizes of graphite carbon particles are particularly effective materials for this
purpose, particularly when used in conjunction with ground marble. The material particles must be correctly
sized however and to do this it is necessary to estimate fracture width.
Fracture width depends on fracture length and current near wellbore models do not calculate the critical
fracture length beyond which the fracture will propagate. This is a significant deficiency in the new technology.
Fracture characterisation software is becoming available which can correlate both the formation and the
required sealant properties. Formation properties such as in-situ stress, Young’s modulus and Poisson’s ratio
are required, but can be derived from offset well logs and normalised with available direct measurements.
The application of a deformable, viscous and cohesive (DVC) chemical sealant in a long fracture assists by
increasing the compressive stress around the wellbore by widening and propping the fracture so the wellbore
can contain higher pressure than defined by the natural pressure gradient. Chemical sealant lost circulation
treatments that form a DVC material inside a lost circulation fracture may also have the ability to improve
wellbore pressure containment as long as they increase compressive strength at the fracture face. This
phenomenon is the same as that accomplished by particulate borehole stress treatments in a short fracture,
but it does not require a permeable formation to allow fluid leak-off as the most effective particulate borehole
stress treatments.
7.11.8 Deepwater HPHT

Large temperature variation in HT deepwater wells between the seabed to TD has adverse impact in ESD and
ECD that may be sufficiently large as to encroach on the fracture gradient in close margin drilling or conversely
in creating an underbalance resulting in a well flow.

Figure 2: Temperature Effect on Mud in Deepwater Drilling
Computer modelling is helpful to assist in examine these phenomena. It is significant measurement whenever
the working margin between mud weight and fracture gradient is small and large temperature and pressure
differences are expected.
7.11.9 Mud Cooling

If mud temperature remains high when it is circulated back into the drill string, both mud motor stator life and
MWD/LWD reliability may be significantly reduced. In this case it may be necessary to cool the mud to
acceptable limits
Mud coolers typically use commercially available heat exchangers that are water cooled or air cooled or a
combination of air and water cooled for land operations. Physical size of the units required is largely dependent
on the type and temperature of the cooling fluid, but usually ranges from a 20 ft. Skid mounted water cooled
unit for offshore operations, to a 40 ft trailer mounted air cooled unit for land operations. A team of two service
technicians is usually required to maintain and operate the units.

Typical mud coolers available in the market can handle flow rates of 1000gpm and reduce temperatures by an
average of 15 – 30o F.
7.12 Cementing Operations

7.12.1 Cement Programme
Although the basic objectives of primary cementing are the same irrespective of the environment, in a HPHT
environment the increased sensitivity of the behaviour and properties of both the cement slurry and set cement,
combined with the increased uncertainty with the accurate prediction of downhole temperatures, standard
cement job planning and cementing practices are not adequate for HPHT wells.
The cementing contractor is the key company with respect to cement planning and execution. Most often the
BHCT is above the boiling point of water hence specialist lab equipment is required to measure representative
downhole slurry properties. The inherent error bar associated with the determination of the correct BHCT
requires sensitivity tests to be run on a range of temperatures hence multiplies the number of slurry tests
required. Availability and experience in using advanced computer simulation software is an essential
requirement and the software should be capable of modelling dynamic temperatures with respect to hydraulic
calculations during slurry placement.
A specialist-cementing consultant may be required in the team to work closely with the cementing contractor
and to select and supervise third party laboratories or services if required. Quality assurance measures should
be put in place to confirm cement and chemical quality standards. Similar measures should be put in place for
the cementing equipment, pumps, mixers, bulk delivery, cement heads, cement plugs, etc.
7.12.2 Thickening Time

The Thickening Time is the time from the start of mixing until the cement takes on its initial set. Hydration rate
is a very important controlling parameter and it is a function of slurry composition, temperature history and
mixing energy. Hydration rate controls the slurry’s behaviour including its viscosity and yield point during
pumping and its gel strength, transition time and compressive strength development during setting.
Mixing energy has been found to be a key factor in controlling the hydration rate and often the cause of
discrepancies between lab results and field results. Tests have shown that field operations often fail to achieve
the same mixing energy as achieved under laboratory conditions, or indeed, what is required in the API
specifications.
Slurry composition is most often verified by monitoring density variations. In cement-sensitive environments
getting the very first part of the cementing process wrong is surprisingly common and results in a failure to
meet the basic objectives. Tests have shown that batch mixing cement slurries is by far the best method of

providing sufficient mixing energy and consistent slurry properties. Even then it’s important that the batch
mixing element is accounted for in the slurry preparation in the lab.
On critical jobs a portable consistometer may be required at the rig site to check the thickening time and
transition time of the slurry, using samples taken directly from the slurry tub on the cement unit. Surface
sample behaviour (if left at atmospheric conditions) will be misleading as the slurry additives have be chosen
based on the downhole conditions.
7.12.2.1 Transition Time

The cement slurry design in an HPHT well should have a transition time, defined as the time for the static gel
strength to go from 48 Pa (100 lbf/100ft2) to 239 Pa (500 lbf/100ft2), of 30 to 45secs which normally accepted
as the onset of cement set. Some slurries can exhibit transition times up to 3.5hrs and should not be accepted
for HPHT cementing.
A cement slurry will take on a static gel strength when it is in place and pumping has stopped. As the gel
strength develops and before the cement takes on its initial set, the gel starts to support the hydrostatic
pressure of the fluid above it. The drilling fluid above the cement also takes on static gel strength when
circulation stops. Poor mud condition can lead to progressive gels which adds to the loss of transmission of
the hydrostatic pressure. Consequently during this transition time there will be a reduction in the effective
hydrostatic pressure transmitted to the formation which could allow formation fluid to enter the well and at the
same time the cement has not set sufficiently to block this influx.
This may still be managed by optimising both the length and weight of the lead slurry and spacer, and ensuring
that the lead slurry has low gelling tendencies and a longer thickening time than the Tail.
7.12.2.2 Temperature History

Planning cement jobs based on an estimated BHST is not adequate in the difficult environments of an HPHT
well. The changes in temperature that the slurry is exposed to during mixing, displacement, and setting and
even the temperature exposure of the cement during long term production must be accurately known if the
objectives are to be met. Circulating through drill-pipe or through casing produces a different BHCT. Circulating
rate and water depth all influence the BHCT. It is equally important to accurately model mud circulation ahead
of the cement job.
Temperature histories can be modelled with advanced computer simulations to allow proper control of the
slurry design and cementing practices. When lab testing slurry designs, the temperature history must be
replicated. Sensitivity studies are necessary to accommodate uncertainties in the input data and accuracies of
the software models.

7.12.2.3 Degradation due to High Temperature Exposure

BHCT profiles will vary with pump rate, drilling fluid, circulating time, etc. BHCT is considerably lower when
circulating through casing as opposed to drill pipe. Heat transfer rates through casing are very different to
those through drill pipe and are influenced by the changes in annular capacity and flow regime. The BHCT is
primarily used for the dynamic thickening time tests, rheology and fluid loss tests. The BHST is typically
important for the longer term properties related to the set cement properties.
At temperatures above 225°F (107°C) the compressive strength of cement degrades with time and there is an
increase in the permeability of the set cement matrix. Silica flour is added at 35% BWOC to mitigate strength
retrogression with Portland cement.
Silica flour can be used even in surface casing cement slurries to prevent degradation. Although temperatures
above 225 °F are not seen while drilling the surface casing section, once the well is completed and during long
term production, the high temperatures of the produced fluids heat up the surrounding area and exposed
cemented casings to temperatures above the degradation threshold of the cement, even at the shallower
depths. The temperature profiles in the different casing strings during production operations can be modelled
with advanced software programmes such as WellCAT.
7.12.3 Top of Cement (TOC) / Trapped annuli

Selecting and achieving the right top of cement is an important design parameter. Each casing string will have
its own requirement. Conductor and Surface casings will normally require cement back to the mud-line to
ensure adequate structural strength for the wellhead, BOP stack and production tree. Intermediate strings may
have permeable formations that require adequate isolation. Well life cycle considerations should also be
factored into the decisions. The most critical top of cement is most likely to be the production casing. This will
be designed to isolate the shallowest hydrocarbon bearing formation and also leave an adequate portion of
the annulus below the previous casing shoe uncemented to avoid issues with a “trapped annulus” (which could
lead to catastrophic casing failure).
Liners are commonly cemented to the liner top with additional excess above (300 – 500 ft) to ensure hydraulic
isolation of the liner lap.
In order to balance the need for a minimum amount of cement above the hydrocarbon zone for zonal isolation
and avoiding a cement top inside the previous casing, which could lead to issues with trapped annuli, it is
important to have a tight control on volumes required and pumped. Hence caliper logs are recommended.
7.12.4 Lab Testing

Conventional rheometers are limited to an upper temperature of 185 °F. A HPHT rheometer has been
developed based on the Fann 35 to measure slurry rheologies up to 205°C and 15,000psi. It is essential to

measure the rheology and stability (sedimentation) of all fluids pumped i.e. cement slurries, the spacers and
drilling fluids as well.
It is imperative that all lab testing is performed using cement and chemicals from the same batch that is to be
used for the job. The same applies for the mix water used - the contaminants and variations in salinity, etc.,
can have significant adverse effects on cement behaviour. The water source for the rig should be used for all
lab testing and the quality of that water should be checked before each job. The slurry must be tested for its
sensitivity to temperature. Tests should be run for a variety of temperatures both higher and lower than what
is expected or predicted.
7.12.5 Hydraulics
Due to the close margins that are most likely to exist between pore pressure and fracture gradient in deepwater
and/or HPHT wells the hydraulics of cement jobs play an important role. Hydraulics modelling will determine
the pumping schedule thus the thickening time required for the slurry.
7.12.6 Gas Tight

The ingress of formation fluids into the cement slurry during the transition period can cause serious well control
issues. Formation gas that enters the slurry column will migrate and expand, thus allowing further ingress. As
well as introducing a well control issue, this scenario may lead to gas channelling with a resulting failure of the
cement to casing bond.
Gas migration control additives are used to minimise gelation effects and provide a very short transition time
for the cement slurry. Ideally a “right angle” set slurry is preferred. The more performant gas migration additives
contain very tiny particles that lower the permeability of the cement matrix and further mitigate gas migration.
Carefully managing spacer and mud properties ahead of the cement slurry and ensuring the setting time of
the lead slurry, if pumped, is longer than the setting time for the gas tight Tail slurry will ensure full hydrostatic
pressure transmission to the top of the gas tight slurry until it sets. In the case of a liner, circulation above the
top of the liner can stop static gels from forming in the mud and ensure the hydrostatic pressure is transmitted.
7.12.7 Slurry Density

The standard density for a Class G Portland cement slurry or Class G + 35% Silica flour slurry is typically 15.8
ppg to 16.0 ppg dependent upon the cement manufacturer. In a HP environment it is not uncommon that a
higher density cement slurry will be required. This can be achieved using the weighting additives hematite or
magnesium tetraoxide. (Note: barite is not used in cement slurries). The use of weighting agents does make
the slurry more susceptible to sedimentation. However this can be mitigated with cement blend optimization
and careful slurry and additive selection and testing in the lab. This may well involve additional lab time. It’s
recommended to start from the basic cement design rather than attempt to “patch” a previous design – too

often the final slurry becomes over complicated with a high number of additives, some of which have conflicting
attributes.
On the other end of the spectrum, if a lightweight slurry is required, the preferred approach is to use an
“engineered” lightweight slurry, typically with the use of lightweight ceramic or glass spheres. This approach
enables a higher Portland cement content, lower slurry porosity and set cement permeability and the slurry
can more readily be converted to a gas tight slurry if required. The correct choice of lightweight particle will be
determined by the bottom hole pressure. (products exist for 2000 psi, 5,000 psi and 10,000 psi) Exceeding the
recommended downhole pressure will result in crushing of the lightweight particle and consequently an
increase in the effective slurry density. The advantage of these “engineered” lightweight slurries is that the
downhole properties are more predictable and can be measured in the lab.
7.12.8 Post Placement Considerations

Once the cement has set it must withstand the loads that it will be exposed to during the lifetime of the well.
Pressure loads, both burst and collapse and extreme temperature cycles must be accounted for during the
design. Fit for purpose slurries, with appropriately optimised set mechanical properties may be required. The
main cementing service providers have software that can be used to assess regular slurries based on the
expected well loads and determine if a more resilient flexible/elastomeric slurry is required.
One of the most extreme loads imposed on casings is during pressure testing of the casing, particularly for
HPHT wells. Often this is due to the requirement to demonstrate that the casing could handle the worst-case
kick scenario. This pressure test, due to its magnitude can have a detrimental effect on the cement to casing
bond if done after the cement has set.
This can be circumvented by:
- Test the casing on plug bump, but obviously requires higher rated cement plugs.
- Pressure test the casing in stages with the use of a retrievable packer.
- Displace the casing to seawater prior to performing the well test. (Note: Some operators consider the risk
of a casing leak or shoe failure too high to adopt this practice.)
7.12.9 Mud Removal

Good mud removal is one of the key elements for a successful HPHT cement job. The cement spacer must
be thoroughly tested to include at least the following:
▪ Compatibility with the drilling mud

▪ Compatibility with the cement
▪ Higher viscosity and density than the drilling mud but lower viscosity and density than the cement slurry
▪ Generous carrying capacity to suspend wall cake debris and loose cuttings

▪ Sufficient volume to avoid contamination by either the mud or the slurry

▪ Suitable flow regime to remove the mud within acceptable pump rate
The spacer could functionally control and limit the hydrostatic load on the well during displacement while
providing sufficient hydrostatic pressure transmission during the transition period.
In HPHT cement jobs, a contamination test of the slurry with the mud should be conducted prior to field
execution. This could determine the worst case compressive strength value. (Table 6)
Compressive Strength
Mud Contamination
psi at 77oC (170oF)
(% by Volume)
8 Hours 16 Hours
0% 4547 psi 5862 psi
5% 3512 psi 5300 psi
10% 2519 psi 4538 psi
20% 2378 psi 2331 psi
50% 245 psi 471 psi
Table 6: Mud Contamination at 16.5 ppg (1.98 SG) Neat Cement Slurry
Centralisation of the casing string is key to good mud removal. A minimum stand-off of 80% is recommended
and can be modelled using advanced software. Rotating the pipe/liner during displacement will enhance mud
removal. However, casing reciprocation in an HPHT environment could induce swabbing or surging in the well
and is not advisable.
7.12.10 Cement Evaluation

It is possible to obtain good cement bond logs if there is good mud removal and no gas migration into
the slurry.
The common CBL/VDL logs will result in very poor bonding when a micro annulus is present. The
Ultrasonic bond log (USIT) has mud weight limitations on their effective use and are seldom suitable for
HPHT work. However lower frequency Radial Tools will provide more reliable results in the HPHT
environment – SCMT (Schlumberger), RAL (Baker Hughes), RBT (GE Oil and Gas) and the SBT (Baker
Hughes). The pads on the SBT tool are designed to be in contact with the casing wall, hence the results
are independent of the fluid in the well at the time of logging.
The success of logs is very much influenced by:

▪ Correct Tool and Log set-up calibration and QA/QC.

▪ Tool centralisation
▪ Compensation for thicker wall casing is essential
▪ Logging tool quality assurance testing at higher temperatures and pressures
▪ Cement Bond Log results will demonstrate poor bonding if run too early before sufficient
compressive strength has developed. The ultrasonic cement analyser (UCA) as used in the
cement lab for slurry testing, or preferably when used in the field on the actual slurry pumped
will provide guidance on the earliest time to run a log after the cement job.
7.12.11 Contingency Cementing

HPHT well construction faces several challenges such as severe mud losses and well flows that may
require contingency cementing including the following:
▪ Remedial Cement Squeeze: -
The preferred method of placement should be selected and modelled and the slurry design,
pump schedule, etc. should be prepared to meet the objectives of the remedial job.
▪ Open Hole Cement Plugs: -

Setting successful open hole cement plugs in heavy weight mud under high temperature and
pressure is recognised by the industry as difficult. The chances of success very much
depending on considering the following:
i. Use of a cement stinger

ii. Circulating the well at the setting depth until the design temperature has been
achieved
iii. Use drill pipe wiper dart(s) ahead and behind the cement to provide mechanical
separation and minimise slurry contamination. Latch down systems do exist for
these wiper darts but a simple landing joint below perforations in the cement
stinger is often seen.
iv. Lay the cement plug on the run. Pull the pipe back while pumping at the rate
that will fill the open hole below the stinger with cement. This technique avoids
disturbing or contaminating the cement plug when pulling the cement stinger
back through the plug.
v. Pump at least twice the volume of cement required. Small cement plugs are seldom
effective.
vi. Give ample time for the cement to set before testing or tagging.
▪ Emergency Cement Plugs: -

These typically involve cementing through the drill string to seal off difficult zones. And this is
normally a last course of action in an emergency, which is only employed when all else failed.
The following consideration should be adhered when planning for a contingency plug job:
i. Emergency plug slurry design, temperature profiling and pumping schedule

should be prepared in advance.
ii. Sufficient contingency stocks should be maintained at the rig, including spacer
chemicals.
iii. Run large nozzles in the bit to facilitate pumping cement and to minimise
plugging
iv. Consider running a circulating sub in the BHA if LWD or mud motors are to be
used
v. Consider the risks and attempt to avoid performing operations that limit
alternative strategies.
vi. If the drill pipe is to be recovered, consider laying the plug while POOH.
Consider using the annular preventer to limit U tubing while laying the plug.
vii. Cement plugs set through the bit are seldom fully competent. Back-up the first
plug with a second cement plug as soon as possible.
7.13 Wellhead Design

Wellheads are complex pieces of safety critical equipment and form the last barrier to surface. It has to be
designed for life of well considerations, exposure to corrosive and toxic reservoir fluids and severe temperature
fluctuations.
There are number of considerations that must be taken into account in selecting the various components of
an HPHT wellhead: -
i. Material compliance with well conditions

ii. OD, ID and pass through restrictions and compatibility with other well construction equipment
iii. Fit the production facilities flowline and side outlet valve elevations. Wellhead movement and thermal
growth must be considered when designing the facilities.
iv. Emergency hanger system that achieves metal to meal seal requirement and can be installed without
lifting the BOP.
v. If the wellhead is designed to be newly introduced, independent design verification is then required.
vi. Peer review of wellhead design
vii. System validation through qualification testing, factory acceptance testing (FAT), system integration
testing or stack up testing, etc.

viii. Storage and preservations quality plans in place and Company warehousing facilities/supply base
audited for compliance.
ix. Flexible enough to accommodate the running of contingency casing strings
x. The load ratings of the heaviest casing string must be taken into account along with any thermal load
changes that may occur during the life of the well. Hydraulic fracturing or bullheading can reduce the
thermal profile of the well sufficiently to cause contraction of the steel casings imposing very high tensile
loads on the wellhead.
xi. Delayed installation of casing hanger annular seals can compromise well control. This may occur if full
bore casing running tools are used, or initial attempts to set the seal fails.
7.14 Drill String and BHA

All downhole equipment, drillstring and BHA components must be rated for the maximum anticipated
temperature and pressure in the appropriate hole section. Those items with elastomer components must be
compatible with the mud system at the applicable pressure and temperature.
Standard HPHT practice when designing BHAs can be summarised as below:
i. Use of light BHA (i.e. maximise HWDP at the expense of drill collar), or only spiral groove drill collars to
reduce the ECD/ swab/ surge associated problems.
ii. Minimise the number of x-overs. The x-overs are weak points prone to fatigue failure and should at least
match or exceed the minimum material specification of the joined components. Long x-overs are
preferred over short x-overs.
iii. If a mud motor is planned, it should be ported in order to reduce any difficulty in ready SIDPP.
iv. Circulating sub must be installed above the BHA for the emergency pumping of high concentration LCM
or densified cement slurries. It should include large diameter ports to permit circulation between the drill
pipe and annulus.
v. The drill string should be fitted with both a float valve and a drop in dart sub. The dart sub must be
situated above circulating sub.
vi. The wireline retrievable dart should be immediately available on the rig floor and rated for the maximum
anticipated downhole pressure and temperature.
vii. Drill pipe hard banding should be smooth and flush in good repair to minimise casing wear.
viii. A drilling stand should be used when drilling in abnormally pressured hydrocarbon bearing formations
with the potential for high severity kicks.

Special attention should be given to the following issues:

Items Issues Risks
Torque/drag & hydraulics Collapse and fatigue

Strength reduction due to
Increase risk of failure
temperature effects
Drill string components
H2S, CO2 or a combination of
Excessive corrosion, fatigue
these with elevated
and failure
temperatures
Circulating subs Cementing through the bit Well control
Possible handling due to Slippage and failure to fully
High strength steel drill pipe
hardness; in addition to BOP close BOP resulting in well
(e.g. Z-140 & V-150, etc)
design criteria for shear rams control failure
Possible handling due to Slippage and failure to fully
Titanium drill pipe / titanium
hardness; in addition to BOP close BOP resulting in well
tubulars
design criteria for shear rams control failure
Table 7: Drill String Issues & Risks in HPHT Environment
Aluminium and composite drill pipe are not recommended for HPHT work. Titanium, whilst strong can stretch
considerably, this being especially significant with deep drilling, deep-water operations. Steel drill pipe is still
considered to be the more viable, least risk and most economical of materials. In addition, steel drill pipe has
a good service history with HPHT operations.
7.14.1 Kick Assembly

Kick assembly shall be available in the derrick or utilised in the drill string when drilling in abnormally pressured
hydrocarbon bearing formations with the potential for high severity kicks. It is used to facilitate high pressure
pumping that may be needed during well killing operation. The kick assembly allows the top drive to be isolated
and pumping to continue through the side entry sub (SES) using a high pressure kill pump.
The main requirements for kick assembly are:
i. Shall be made up, pressure tested and set back in a position convenient for installation in the drill string
at any time.
ii. Should have all internal shoulders bevelled to allow free passage of the drop in dart.
iii. Pressure rating of assembly must exceed the maximum anticipated surface pressure, and tensile rated
to match the drill pipe and included in the BOP pressure testing schedule.
iv. Ensure the length and configuration adjusted to suit the space out requirements. This would allow the
drill pipe to be spaced out and hung off on a BOP ram, thus the top drive being made up and used for

low pressure kills and easy access to the side entry sub to connect the high pressure line for high
pressure kills.
7.14.2 Safety Subs

The following requirements for safety subs in HPHT drilling can be used as guidelines:
i. Both full opening safety valve (FOSV) and an inside BOP suit the connections or x-overs to fit every
component of the drill string.
ii. The pressure rating must exceed the maximum anticipated surface pressure.
iii. Shall be drifted for the drop in dart.
7.14.3 Circulating Head

A circulating head must be available on the drill floor with suitable connections or crossovers to fit every
component of the drill string. It should be rated to above the maximum anticipated surface pressure and should
be compatible with the high pressure pumping line that is available on the rig floor.
7.15 Hydraulics and Bit Selection

Formations with HPHT environments have higher compressive strength and shear strength in comparison with
normal drilling conditions. Drilling HPHT wells can be optimised using PDC/TSP bits and with the use of
turbines vibration can be reduced. High TFAs should be considered to allow the pumping of LCM or emergency
plugs. Extensive hydraulic modelling should be carried out using the appropriate software with ECD predicted
and compared to the data obtained from the downhole tools.
The bit manufactures should be consulted during HPHT planning to ensure the bits are able to meet the
elevated temperatures and pressures as well as aggressive formation fluids which may impact on material
selection.
Tripping in an HPHT environment is viewed as presenting a high degree of risk. The long tripping hours (normal
slow controlled speed) contributing to higher cost thus bits are generally selected for their longevity over their
pure rate of penetration (ROP) performance.
7.16 MWD/LWD
Using MWD and LWD tools as part of the bottom hole assembly is recommended in preference to wireline
logging. Consideration should be given to include a formation pressure while drilling tool in the LWD suite is
considered standard for HPHT wells.
The following considerations shall be used as guidelines when finalising the MWD/LWD tools for HPHT well:
▪ Ensure the tool dimension, pressure and temperature rating meeting the well kill operations
requirements.

▪ Identify the tool limitations over lost circulation materials (LCM).

▪ Pressure while drilling sensors should be considered to accurately measure mud bottom hole hydrostatic
pressure and the effect of ECD, pipe rotation, etc (useful during ‘fingerprinting’ of the well).
▪ Actual measurements shall be compared with computer-generated hydraulic model results allowing
calibration and confidence in the modelling software.
7.17 MPD
MPD takes a different approach to well control relying on detection and automated controls to keep the well at
or slightly above balance. The objective of MPD planning is to understand the relationship between pore
pressure and fracture gradients thereby allowing the safe predictable management of the annular hydraulic
pressure profile while drilling. This can lead to the avoidance of incidental losses to the formation, influxes
(kick) and borehole collapse. Refer to EGYWELLS-WG-035, Managed Pressure Drilling Manual.
7.18 Coring Programme

Limiting the coring of the HPHT reservoir while drilling the first well on a structure should be considered, owing
to the increased risk of:
▪ Differential sticking
▪ Risk of influx/losses in the unknown pressure regime
▪ The potential for high gas events at surface
There is a high risk of taking losses while running in hole and taking a kick while the core barrel is located in
the section. The core barrel can become stuck especially if accompanied by lost circulation. It is recommended
that care is taken in planning for coring and that this activity should be kept to a minimum. Consideration should
be given to the length and diameter of the barrel.
7.19 Wireline Logging

Wireline logging tools are normally rated for continuous operation to 176 oC (350oF) and 1380 bar (138 MPa,
20K psi) downhole conditions. With many HPHT reservoirs exceeding these limits, the need for specialised,
environment specific wireline tools have been a requirement for some time.
The following considerations can be used as guidelines for HPHT wireline logging:
▪ Open hole wireline logging will increase the risk of a well control incident. Formation sampling will be
necessary to restrict the volume flushed into the wellbore.
▪ Wireline work carried out through the drill string or tubing e.g. string shot, free point, etc. should be
conducted with wireline pressure control equipment installed.

▪ Wireline pressure control equipment should have a pressure rating that exceeds the maximum
anticipated surface pressure for the well.
▪ Monitor well on the trip tank with trip tank fill-up pump operating. Tool and wire displacement shall be
accurately monitored and can be fingerprinted between one run and the next.
▪ Large OD logging tools should be pulled from the well at reduced speed to avoid swabbing.
▪ Detailed contingency plans should be prepared to deal with possibility of a well control incident during
wireline operations. additional equipment will be required including wireline well control lubricators,
wireline cutters etc.
7.20 Fishing Equipment

The performance of explosives at high temperature should be documented (cutters, punchers, severing tools,
etc.) and compatibility of the fishing equipment with the metallurgy of the components to be worked should be
checked in HPHT conditions. Elastomer components are particularly susceptible, while fishing jars and bumper
subs, free point indicators, back-off equipment, etc. will seldom work for very long if at all in these conditions.
7.21 Well Control Programme / Management

See EGYWELLS-WP-015-001 Well Control Manual.
7.22 Barrier Assessment

See EGYWELLS-ST-002 Well Barrier Standard.
7.23 Well Suspension / Abandonment

The plugging and abandonment procedure must provide an effective isolation of the well fluids all along the
well to reduce environmental risks of contamination and prevent costly remedial jobs. For safe well
abandonment that allows for cement and plug behaviour which will prevent environmental problems, it is
recommended that the effect of high temperature, with possible remnant high pressures, be simulated using a
geomechanical simulator. Such simulations provide an understanding of the pressure and thermal changes
and the maximum effective stress changes in the reservoir cap rock where critical plugs are put in place for
isolating the production intervals. These thermally induced changes in stress can lead to a change in wellbore
shape and possible failure of the cement sheath.
Any elastomeric materials or initially pre-stressed plugs can be adapted to the downhole conditions changes
but many of these will deteriorate with time (especially with well fluids). It may be necessary to factor these
risks as part of the plugging and abandonment plan.
Design engineers should check the regulatory requirements in their area of operation as these regulations will
vary. Final abandonment pugs have to cater for potential reservoir re-pressurisation over time. It is therefore

important to confirm with the reservoir engineers what pressures are likely to be present e.g. hydrodynamic
drive and reservoir compaction (depletion).
8. HPHT WELL TESTING / COMPLETIONS

The purpose of this section is to highlight some areas where consideration needs to be given in the well design
for a planned or potential Well Test / Completion flow back.
8.1 HPHT Testing Options

The two principle options for flow testing HPHT wells are:
i. Install a permanent completion including the fully rated tubing hanger and tree. This will always be the
safest option and provide full integrity, full functionality and allow maximum production rates and
temperatures to be explored. This is becoming the option of choice in the industry because of the
improved safety, reduced risk and the ability to perform full rate tests for extended periods. Furthermore,
it provides an ideal proving ground for completion equipment, installation procedures, contingency
plans, etc. for the field’s future development. Well testing with a permanent completion is probably the
biggest driver for the installation of permanent downhole pressure and temperature gauges for collecting
downhole well test data. This option would only be used on an appraisal well where the plan is to
suspend the well for later production. In the scenario of an exploration well. Option 2 (DST) would be
the preferable choice.
ii. Perform a DST. In HPHT terms this will involve running a temporary test string which will include a
permanent packer or retrievable packer, tubing and possibly drill collars with premium connections,
downhole shut-in capability, downhole circulating valve(s) and safety valve. Bottom hole samplers and
surface read out gauges are also likely to be used. The principle difference and weakness between a
completion and a DST is that reliance is placed on the temperature limitations of the BOP stack in the
DST scenario. In some cases, a DST configuration can only provide a restricted well test due to the ID
of the downhole test tools, by the temperature rating of the BOP and occasionally by the capabilities of
the surface well test package. Flow rates and flow periods can be severely restricted by these limitations.
Large ID downhole tools are available on the market, but due to their increased OD cannot be run in 7”
or smaller liners.
A hybrid or mix between options 1 and 2 has also been used where downhole equipment that does not require
to survive the life of the well can be used: memory gauges and downhole shut-in can be employed. A tubing
hanger and tree will be installed and tested. After the test the completion string is recovered. This perhaps
offers the best of both options in several respects.

8.2 Annulus Management
Temperature expansion of the fluids in the various annuli will occur during flow periods. The tubing to
production casing annulus (‘A’ annulus) will be most affected, but this annulus is routinely controlled during
well testing. Pressure limits / alarms both high and low, should be set by taking account any downhole tool
functions.
The production casing to intermediate casing annulus (‘B’ annulus), and the remaining outer annuli should at
least be pressure monitored, where possible, and facilities available to bleed or pump into them if needed.
These outer annuli are monitored whilst on Jack Ups / production installations but generally ignored whilst well
testing on semi-subs.
On Subsea wells these outer annuli are often completely sealed and no monitoring capability exists. Some
wellhead manufacturers have methods for accessing these annuli but they are seldom installed and are often
considered to be additional potential leak paths. Any thermal pressure build-up in these annuli becomes un-
monitored. Dependence is therefore placed on providing a pressure leak path at the casing shoe. Great care
is needed to evaluate this issue and to ensure the leak path remains open or the thermal conductivity is limited
or other methods are employed to prevent a catastrophic failure of the casings.
8.3 Contingencies and Interventions

A full set of contingency plans will be required for each well test. These should be developed in line with the
planned operation and the test requirements. It is recommended that a process be followed to identify the
contingencies needed for any given test, that they are formally documented, discussed and rehearsed (if
necessary), with all relevant parties and that adequate provision is made for contingency equipment, materials
and supplies.
Interventions, whether operational or contingent, must be planned ahead of time and with the same rigour and
attention to detail as the rest of the programme. Well testing always takes place under a short time frame so
planning ahead for all contingencies and Interventions is imperative. Planning and especially procurement is
often required to be brought forward to a much more advanced state to ensure there is adequate provision
within the well testing time frames.
Mk hy
8.4 Points of Consideration for HPHT Well Testing

Reference should be made to the SIMS guideline for well testing but points for consideration for HPHT well
testing include: -

▪ Casing Test Pressures – Test pressures must exceed the maximum operational pressure of the
downhole test tools.
▪ Liner Top Packer – Must be good for the differential pressure experienced when the well is displaced to
underbalance fluid, typically seawater.
▪ Pip Tag in Casing/Liner – To be positioned circa 400ft above the prognosed top of the reservoir for TCP
depth correlation
▪ Displacement of the well to seawater prior to running the DST String – Clean pits and lines required.
9. HPHT RIG SELECTION

In general HPHT wells require the most modern and capable units available. The criteria of selection must
include all aspects including equipment, rig management, competent crews, maintenance and documentation,
training, safety history, etc. In addition to the section’s below, section 6 of the Energy Institute Model Code of
Safe Practise Part 17 Volume 1 High pressure and high temperature well planning, should be consulted.
9.1 Minimum Rig Requirements

Thorough considerations must be taken when selecting the rig for HPHT operation which not limited to the well
design, completion design, well and location conditions. Restrictions in rig capacity and/or operability may
impact the risk profile, the deployment of the well design and possibly compromise safety critical areas. The
minimum rig requirements are:
▪ The rig must comply with all relevant legislative requirements and have a current safety case for HPHT
operations.
▪ Capable of working in the water depth of interest.
▪ Drill depth capability for the wells planned. (6,300 metres (20,000 ft) is sufficient for most wells).
▪ Ability to stand back in the derrick any large diameter drill pipe that may be needed. (2,500 metres of 6
5/8" drill pipe or 3,700 metres of 5 ½" drill pipe is sufficient for most wells).
▪ A substructure safe working load (SWL) capable of handling the heaviest casing string + casing handling
equipment + drill pipe standing in the derrick. (1.3 million pounds is sufficient for most wells)
▪ Pipe deck area and load capacity that can accommodate the heaviest casing string planned. (For
example: a 3,300 metre string of 14" x 93 lb/ft casing or a string comprising of 2,900 metres of 10 ¾ x
86.5 lb/ft casing and 2,000 metres of 9 7/8 x 62.8 lb/ft casing)
▪ Preference for a rotary table with a 45” opening.
▪ If coil tubing operations are planned or contingent, the rig cranes must be able to lift the coil tubing reel
from the boat and position the reel for access to the rig floor.
▪ BOP stack suitable for the well conditions with pressure and temperature ratings sufficient for the "worst
case". (For example: 1,035 bar (~15 Ksi) x 18 ¾" BOP stack, 15K choke manifold and associated well

control equipment (including elastomers) suitable for HPHT operations with temperature ratings of up to
120°C (250°F) continuous, 175°C (350°F) for 1 hour and H2S service.
▪ Derrick and hoisting equipment safe working load (SWL) sufficient to handle the heaviest casing string
+ pumping loads + drag. 500-750 ton is sufficient for most wells
▪ Top Drive continuous torque sufficient to reach TD taking account of tortuosity and drill string design.
(47,500 Nm (~35,000 ft/lbs) is sufficient for most wells).
▪ Mud pump and circulating system working pressure rating sufficient to meet above requirement of (350
bar (~5,000 psi) is sufficient for most wells. 517 bar (7,500 psi) systems are available and may be
preferred.)
▪ Rotary table safe working load (SWL) sufficient for the heaviest casing string + shock loading of (500-
750 tons (~1.2 million pounds) is sufficient for most wells).
▪ A high pressure (HP) kill pump capable of maximum anticipated surface pressure (MASP) + bull heading
margin circa 35 bar (500 psi) at sufficient pump rates to effect a kill. (1,035 bar (15Ksi) cement unit is
sufficient for most wells). Preference for remote controls from driller’s consol.
▪ Sufficient storage for kill weight completion fluid (brine) to meet operational requirements. (1,500 bbls
of brine is sufficient for most wells).
▪ Rapid mud weight up system and ability to transfer barite to weight up mud system. (A 1.25 MT /minute
is sufficient for most wells).
▪ Adequate storage capacity for bulk barite and bentonite. (285 m3 (~10,000 cubic feet) is sufficient for
most wells).
▪ Ability to mix and transfer sufficient mud weights to meet the well requirements. (2 SG (16.7 ppg) should
be sufficient for most wells although heavier mud weights may be needed on some wells).
▪ Adequate degasser capacity for well conditions. (2,250 litres per minute (~600 gallons per minute) is
sufficient for most wells).
▪ Adequate industry recognised high performance shale shakers and flow line capacity for maximum
anticipated pump rates. (4,900 litres per minute (~1300 gallons per minute) is sufficient for most wells).
▪ HPHT mud return and pit volume monitoring system.
▪ Ability to skip and ship drilled cuttings or alternative bulk cuttings transfer system (if required).
▪ Stripping tank or alternative arrangement for stripping operations.
▪ The facility to inject hydrate suppressant (e.g. glycol) into the choke manifold upstream of the chokes.
Preference for additional injection point at BOP.
▪ Ability to mix and pump barite pills with cement unit.
▪ Mud / Gas separator of sufficient capacity for well conditions. 3.5 x 105 m3 per day to 5.0 x 105 m3 per
day (~of 12 MMscf per day to (5.1 x 105 m3 per day (18MMscf per day)) with a minimum dip tube length
of 5m (~16.7 ft) should be sufficient for most wells).
▪ Sufficient redundancy on well control chokes. (2 x hydraulic and 2 x manual chokes should be sufficient
for most wells).

▪ Facility to route choke manifold returns to blow-down line which should have sufficient pressure and gas
rating for the well conditions. (350 bar (~5,000 psi) and capable of gas flow rate of 1.42 x 106 m3 per
day (50 MMscf per day) should be sufficient for most wells).
▪ Choke manifold and mud gas separator (MGS) monitoring and overboard dump system. (Pressure and
temperature).
▪ Water curtain deluge capacity and burner booms to meet regulatory requirements for well test. (Six days
at 1.7 x 106 m3 per day (60 MMscf per day) should be sufficient for most operations).
▪ If well testing operations are to be performed, suitable well test pipe-work should be available (6" gas
line with 4" directional valve manifold, 4" oil line with 4" directional valve manifold and 8 - 10" separator
relief line should be sufficient for most well tests).
▪ If a 6" hole is planned or is a contingency, the facility to circulate with high pump pressures may be
needed. (45 MPa (450 bar ~6 500) psi pump pressure should be sufficient for most cases).
▪ Sufficient accommodation for the increased number of personnel.
Additional instrumentation should be installed on the rig to monitor critical well parameters during well control
operations. These parameters should be displayed where it is visible from the remote choke operating console.
▪ Temperature sensor on the BOP (optional)
▪ Temperature sensor upstream of any flexible hose (optional)
▪ Temperature sensor upstream of the chokes
▪ Temperature sensor downstream of the choke capable of reading very low temperatures
▪ Pressure sensor on the BOP (optional)
▪ High accuracy digital gauges should be used for monitoring SIDPP and SICP. These gauges should be
calibrated regularly.
▪ A pressure sensor should be installed in the MGS vessel to manage the operation of the separator. The
reading must be visible to the choke operator. Consider using this pressure sensor as an alarm trigger
for automated bypass sequencing, where the pressure alarm automatically opens the bypass overboard
line and isolate the MGS.
▪ Consider installing a mud seal monitor in the MGS mud seal. A simple pressure sensor can be used to
monitor for any contamination of the seal fluid or any reduction in the effective hydrostatic pressure of
the seal.
9.2 Additional Requirements for Floating Rigs

The additional minimum requirements for floating drilling operations are:
▪ Ability to handle and deploy sub-surface x-mas tree (SSXT) system with BOP carrier, SSXT +
emergency disconnect package (EDP) + lower riser package (LRP). (67 ton handling capability should
be sufficient for most operations).

▪ Skidding system to transfer SSXT stack up from the deck to the BOP carrier.
▪ Cranes to handle a subsea x-mas tree (SSXT) and shipping skid. (70 ton lift and reach capability should
be sufficient for most operations).
▪ Variable deck load (VDL) sufficient to handle operational loading requirements. (For example: 1.3 million
pound casing string, full drill string & BHA, 2,500 bbls 1.98 SG mud, 1,000 bbls of base fluid and ancillary
drilling equipment should be sufficient for most wells.)
▪ 15 Ton Stevpris anchors or anchors with similar holding capacity.
▪ Drill string motion compensator rated for maximum anticipated operational loads. (300 tonne (~600,000)
lbs and 500 tonne (~1,000,000 lbs) fully open should be sufficient for most operations). Preference is
for active heave compensator system. It is strongly recommended that a third party rig audit is conducted
to ensure equipment and work practice comply with the required rig specification and legislation
requirements.
9.3 HPHT Considerations

To highlight and describe the differences and potential safety critical equipment issues for HPHT operations:
▪ 1,035bar (15 Ksi) well control equipment, or better depending on the well to be drilled.
▪ High-pressure kill pump and associated high pressure kill lines. Often the cement unit can be modified
for high pressure pumping, saving on rig space. However, the pump rate at high pressures may be
insufficient for bullhead or dynamic kills.
▪ Any additional equipment required for handling riser gas on floating drilling operations.
▪ Due to the increased risk of taking a kick in a high pressure zone, accommodation for large volumes of
heavy weight drilling fluid – including kill mud should be made. If the storing of kill mud presents
operational difficulties these can be offset with the use of high-speed barite mixers. A particular safety
concern is the additional weight and volume of the riser mud following its displacement prior to
disconnect.
▪ Larger stocks of barite and cement may be required to provide adequate contingency.
▪ High-pressure casing strings often have thicker walls with a corresponding increase in weight; there are
three things that must not be overlooked in safety planning. They can weigh 500 tonne (~1,000, 000 lbs)
or more buoyed weight. Firstly, accommodating them on the pipe deck (without damage) may be
challenging. Secondly the extreme hook loads imposed during running must be accounted for. Thirdly,
some of these strings are so heavy that even high tensile drill pipe is unable to be used for landing them
in the wellhead. In these cases, full-bore casing landing strings are necessary. This could greatly
increase both the deck loading and space requirements which in turn will require further safety
considerations.
▪ Temperature and pressure monitoring on choke manifold will be required and high accuracy pressure
gauges should be used on the choke panel.
▪ Mud gas separator (MGS) must handle much larger gas volumes including bypass overboard lines.

▪ Stripping tanks should also be considered.

▪ There should be an extensive, accurate and reliable H2S detection system.
▪ Hot returning fluids may need special handling.
▪ Depending on the annulus fluid selected for well testing, it may be necessary to accommodate one and
a half-hole volume of kill weight fluid for well killing. This volume of fluid must be kept on board for
emergency kill purposes.
▪ For floating drilling operations much higher riser top tensions may have to be held because of the heavy
weight mud in the riser. This is likely to come out of the allowable variable deck load.
▪ In general, any HPHT operation will require units that are fit for purpose with provision for extra load
handling, greater weight capacities, capable well control equipment, improved and max drilling depths.
In addition enhanced equipment handling capability is required; this is especially true of crane lifting
limits due to increased casing and subsea x-mas tree weights.
9.4 Safety History

The following additional information should be included during the rig tendering process:
▪ Campaign history – does the rig have an efficient and safe operations history?
▪ What is the history of non-productive time (NPT) – technical or safety related?
▪ Well control incidents – examination should be rigorous, e.g. were any incidents related to equipment
deficiency, failure, bad practice or non-observance of procedures?
▪ Documented injuries – are these better or worse than benchmarked HPHT rigs.
▪ Age – what is the likelihood of fatigue exposure during increased loading (shock loads) and is there
likely to be any impact on safe operation during drilling, completions and intervention.
▪ Modifications – last refit and schedule of repairs – were inspections undertaken and were they
satisfactory. Do these criteria conform to local and government regulation in the area of proposed
operations?
▪ Rig documentation e.g. HPHT well control manual, HPHT crew training schedule, HPHT drilling
practices, does the current rig safety case cover HPHT operations?
▪ Particular care and inspection rigor will be needed if employing a 15K rig that has not performed in
HPHT environment in recent history.

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Document Name EGYWELLS-WG-040

HPHT Well Design Manual

HPHT Well Design Manual

0 22/09/16 For Issue NL/GS/NS/ZZ SG DR

B 20/09/16 Draft NL/GS/NS/ZZ DR

A 30/04/15 Draft NL/GS/NS/ZZ DR

Rev Date Description Created Reviewed Approved

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2. HPHT Definition ........................................................................................................................................ 5

3. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR HPHT WELL CONTROL ......................................................................... 5

4. HPHT WELL CONTROL QHSSE...........................................................................................................11

5. HPHT WELL PROJECT MANAGEMENT ..............................................................................................16

6. HPHT WELL DESIGN OBJECTIVES.....................................................................................................19

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7. HPHT WELL DESIGN ............................................................................................................................22

8. HPHT WELL TESTING / COMPLETIONS .............................................................................................65

9. HPHT RIG SELECTION .........................................................................................................................67

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• EGYWELLS-ST-001 Offshore Well Design and Operations Standards

1.2 Policy Statement – HPHT Well Control

This manual is a “live” document and therefore is subject to change.

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1.4 Documents & References

QHSE Statutory Instruments and Guidance.

3. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR HPHT WELL CONTROL

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3.1 Minimum Well Control Standards - Planning and Responsibility

Other minimum stock levels for HPHT operations are:

3.2 Minimum Well Control Standards - Prevention and Detection

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2.2.13 During flow checks on semi-submersibles all activities such 5.4

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3.3 Minimum Well Control Standards – Shut In

3.4 Minimum Well Control Standards – Killing

3.5 Minimum Well Control Standards – BOP Equipment

Std. Minimum Well Control Standard Ref.

2.5.7 Ram Configuration for Sub-Sea Stacks 6.4

3.6 Minimum Well Control Standards - BOP Drills

3.7 Minimum Well Control Standards – Shallow gas

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4. HPHT WELL CONTROL QHSSE

1. Tubular movement and stress

4.2 HPHT Major Safety Issues

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During HPHT production there are three main safety issues:

a. Catastrophic failure of well tubulars and hangers: -

b. Failure of sealing elements: -

c. Inability to contain the gas bearing formations: -

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d. Erratic well growth: -

e. Inability to withstand reservoir compaction: -

f. Inability to inject chemicals for continuous downhole scale inhibition: -

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4.7 Emergency Response Plan

4.8 Risk Evaluation

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4.8.1 Organisational Failure

4.8.2 Human Failure