Best Spatial Issues of Franchise Contracts
Best Spatial Issues of Franchise Contracts
Best Spatial Issues of Franchise Contracts
franchising to produce and distribute their product that has not been adequately explained. 15 The Örst
is 12 In 1973 only 2% of franchise outlets in the United States declared bankruptcy (see Vaughn, C.L.
Franchising Lexington Books, Lexington Mass. (1974). 13Mathewson, F. and Winter R. Supra note 7.
14Klein, B. and Murphy, K. " Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms," The Journal of
Law and Economics, Oct. (1988) 265-297 15Simon, Carol J., "Franchising vs. Ownership: a contracting
explanation", University of Chicago working paper (1991). This paper presents the results of an extensive
survey of franchise contracts across the midwest United States. 12 the breakdown between corporate
owned and franchised outlets found within a given organization. It is frequently observed that an
organization that engages in franchising will frequently buy back certain franchised outlets and operate
them as corporate stores while at the same time issue franchises in new areas. Furthermore, there
appears to be little correlation between the size of the quasi-rent that individual outlets are earning and
the decision to buy them back. The second unexplained observation is the fact that franchise fees
remain relatively Öxed, both across outlets and over time, while across outlets there is a wide variability
in rents being earned. This fact appears to be inconsistent with the proposition that franchise fees allow
the parent company to capture some of the economic rents being earned by the agent. 16 Incentive
compatibility constraints determine the extent that a parent company can capture the economic rents
being earned by the individual outlets. If one assumed that individual franchisees have similar
opportunity costs then one would expect that the quasi-rent required to ensure compliance would be
the same across franchises. Therefore, if economic rents vary across outlets, the residual (minus the
quasi-rent) would be captured by a variable franchise fee. One would expect the parent company to set
each outletís franchise fee based on local market conditions. One characteristic common to franchise
industries is that aspects production and distribution are carried out by many small, geographically
displaced outlets. Therefore, when the parent company wishes to monitor its outlets, the monitor
engage in considerable travel. In a large chain this will require the monitor to cover great distances in
the execution of his duties. Therefore one would expect the remoteness of an outlet to have a bearing
on the choice of contractual arrangement between the parent company and the local operator. If the
location of outlets and the distance between outlets is a function of market 16See Tirole, J.The Theory of
Industrial Organization, chapter 4 (1988).