Cenevix G.

Mañago
Juris Doctor Section 1B
Angeles University Foundation SY 2021-2022

CASE1: Nepomuceno v. Duterte, UDK No. 16838 (Resolution) May 11, 2021
FACTS:

1. Before this Court is a petition for writ of mandamus filed by Pedrito Nepomuceno (petitioner)
against respondents President Rodrigo Duterte, Health Secretary Francisco Duque, and Gen.
Carlito Galvez, Jr. (Ret.), as Chief Implementer of the National Task Force against COVID-19
(respondents), seeking to compel respondents to observe the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) rules on the acquisition, procurement and use of drugs, particularly on the issue of trials
and procurement and use of COVID-19 vaccines, namely, the Sinovac vaccines and for them to
properly observe the procurement law. Petitioner likewise prays for the DOH FDA to issue a
Cease-and-Desist Order for the purchase and use of the Sinovac vaccine, and for it and all other
COVID-19 vaccines to undergo the required trials in the Philippines before they are given the go
signal for emergency and/or regular use

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petition for writ of Mandamus is valid?

HELD:

1. No
2. Yes

RATIONALE:

1. Petitioner failed to point out any ministerial duty on the part of the respondents that would
justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the governing provision that provides the
requirements for a party to avail the relief of a writ of mandamus, to wit:

Section 3. Petition for mandamus. -. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required
to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by
the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. The petition shall also
 contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph
of section 3, Rule 46. (3a)

2. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure
the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance of distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

While the concept of immunity from suit originated elsewhere, the ratification of the 1981
constitutional amendments and the 1987 Constitution made our version of presidential
immunity unique. Section 15, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, provided for
immunity at two distinct points in time: the first sentence of the provision related to immunity
during the tenure of the President, and the second provided for immunity thereafter. At this
juncture, we need only concern ourselves with immunity during the President's tenure, as this
case involves the incumbent President. As the framers of our Constitution understood it, which
view has been upheld by relevant jurisprudence, the President is immune from suit during his
tenure.

CASE 2: ALMAZAN v. BACOLOD GR. No. 227529 June 16, 2021

Petitioner is one of the registered owners of a 5,865 square meter parcel of land located in Barangay
Dita/Malitlit, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-060-
2012008993 of the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna (subject property). He and his co-owners
inherited the subject property from their grandfather Agapito Almazan (Agapito).

Sometime in 2010, petitioner visited the subject property, and was surprised to discover the
respondents occupying the same. He demanded them to vacate the land. However, the respondents
refused claiming that the they are agricultural tenants of the subject property, as affirmed in the July 3,
2000 Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) and October 11, 2007 Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Decisions. Petitioner denied the existence of any tenurial
relationship between him and his co-owners and the respondents.

Meanwhile, on February 7, 2013, petitioner filed before the RTC of Binian, Laguna, a Complaint for
Quieting of Title, Accion Reivindicatoria, and Damages against the respondents. 10 Petitioner claimed
that he and his co-owners are not bound by the PARAD and DARAB Decisions considering that the
respondents were never their tenants, and the Decisions were rendered against Arturo, Norberto,
Virginia, Ruben, Manuel and Bayani, all surnamed Erana (collectively, Eranas), with whom the petitioner
has no relationship with. Accordingly, said Decisions constitute a cloud on their title and possessory
rights over the subject property.

On April 14, 2014, the RTC issued an Order14 denying the motion to dismiss. It declared that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is determined based on the allegations in the complaint, and not on the
defenses raised in the answer or motion to dismiss. 15 Thus, it examined the averments and concluded
that the case involved a real action affecting title or possession of real property with an assessed value
exceeding PS0,000.00, thereby falling within its jurisdiction.

Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in its July 7,
2014 Order. Undeterred, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari18 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA. In a Decision19 dated March 7, 2016, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari, and
consequently annulled and set aside the RTC's Orders dated April 14, 2014 and July 7, 2014. The decretal
portion of the CA Decision states: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is
GRANTED. The Orders dated April 14, 2014 and July 7, 2014, in Civil Case No. B-8968 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Complaint of private respondent is DISMISSED on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the Complaint for quieting oftitle, accion
reivindicatoria and damages?

HELD:

1. YES

RATIONALE:

1. An action for Quieting of title is a remedy governed by Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code
which provide:

"Art. 476 Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth or in fact invalid, ineffective, avoidable or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.

Art. 471. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interesi in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said
property. . . . . .”

Significantly, the purpose of an action to quiet title is to secure a ruling that a claim of title to, or
an interest in property, adverse to that of the plaintiffs invalid, so that the plaintiff and all others
claiming rights under him/her may be perpetually liberated from any danger of a hostile claim.
To achieve this end, the court must determine the respective rights of the parties to put things
in their proper place and to prevent the defendant who has no rights over the immovable,
respect and correspondingly, refrain from disturbing the title of the plaintiff. For the action to
prosper, the plaintiff must establish a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the subject
property. Furthermore, he/she must prove that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
alleged to be casting a cloud on his/her title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
The law and jurisprudence have delineated the powers of the DARAB and the regular courts, by
limiting the farmer's jurisdiction to the resolution of agrarian disputes. Specifically, an agrarian
dispute is any controversy that relates to tenurial arrangements, be it a leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, involving lands devoted to agriculture. It also includes cases relating
to farm workers' associations or representations of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. Likewise, it
also involves disputes relating to the terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farm workers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee.

Verily, an essential requisite for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case is the existence of
a tenancy relationship between the parties.70 In tum, a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed.71 Rather, there must be proof that (i) the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; (ii) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (iii) the
parties consented to the relationship; (iv) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (v) the tenant or agricultural lessee personally cultivates the land; and
(vi) the parties share the harvest.

Juxtaposing the requisites with the allegations in the Complaint, it is patent that the DARAB has
no jurisdiction over the case.

First, there is no landlord-tenant relationship between the petitioner and the respondents.
Petitioner clearly and categorically stated in his Complaint that he and his co-owners acquired
the subject property from their grandfather Agapito.

Second, there being no relationship between the petitioner, his co-owners, and predecessors-in-
interest with the respondents, then obviously, the element of consent is likewise wanting.

Third, there is no sharing of harvests between the parties. Respondents themselves admitted
that they remit the share of the harvests to Brana, and later, to Erlinda Jaurige-Alcabasa
(Alcabasa) and Rosita Jaurigue-Aquino (Aquino),