Preamble

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common
good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality,
and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein,
and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial,
fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of
their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
Fourteenth Congress
Second Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eight day of July, two thousand eight.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 9522             March 10, 2009

AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea
of the Philippines", as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby amended to read as
follows:

Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described specifically as
follows:

Basepoint Station Location World Geodetic System of 1984 Distance

Number Name (WGS 84)           Coordinates to next
basepoint
Latitude (N) Longitude (E) (M)

1 PAB-01 Amianan Is. 21º6’57.73" 121º57’27.71" 70.08

2 PAB-02 Balintang Is. 19º57’38.19" 122º9’46.32" 99.17

3 PAB-04 Bigan Pt. 18º18’35.30" 122º20’19.07" 71.83

4 PAB-05A Ditolong Pt. 17º7’16.30" 122º31’28.34" 1.05

5 PAB-05B Ditolong Pt. 17º6’14.79" 122º31’43.84" 0.39

6 PAB-05 Ditolong Pt. 17º5’51.31" 122º31’42.66" 3.29

7 PAB-06 Spires Is. 17º2’36.91" 122º31’3.28" 9.74

8 PAB-06B Digollorin Pt. 16º59’18.03" 122º27’56.61" 3.51

9 PAB-06C Digollorin Rk. 16º49’56.11" 122º26’50.78" 2.40

10 PAB-07 Divimisa Pt. 16º47’38.86" 122º26’4.40" 30.94

11 PAB-08 Dinoban Pt. 16º18’44.33" 122º14’06.69" 116.26

12 PAB-10A Tinaga Is. 14º29’54.43" 122º57’51.15" 80.29

13 PAB-11 Horodaba Rk. 14º6.29.91" 124º16’59.21" 0.54

14 PAB-12 Matulin Rk. 14º6.10.40" 124º17’26.28" 96.04

15 PAB-13 Atalaya Pt. 12º41’6.37" 125º3’53.71" 6.79

16 PAB-13A Bacan Is. 12º36’18.41" 125º8’50.19" 5.52

17 PAB-14 Finch Rk. 12º32.33.62" 125º12’59.70" 0.80

18 PAB-14A Cube Rk. 12º31.57.45" 125º13’32.37" 4.90

19 PAB-14D NW Manjud Pt. 12º28’36.42" 125º17’12.32" 1.30

20 PAB-15 SE Manjud Pt. 12º27’37.51" 125º18’5.23" 7.09

21 PAB-16A S Sorz Cay 12º21’41.64" 125º23’7.41" 5.68

22 PAB-16B Panablihon 12º17’27.17" 125º27’0.12" 5.21

23 PAB-16C Alugon 12º13’21.95" 125º30’19.47" 1.94

24 PAB-16D N Bunga Pt. 12º11’48.16" 125º31’30.88" 0.54

25 PAB-17 E Bunga Pt. 12º11’20.67" 125º31’48.29" 5.71

26 PAB-18A SE Tobabao Is. 12º6’7.00" 125º34’11.94" 83.94

27 PAB-19C Suluan Is. 10º45’16.70" 125º58’8.78" 56.28

28 PAB-19D N Tuason Pt. 9º49’59.58" 126º10’6.39" 57.44

29 PAB-20A Arangasa Is. 8º53’16.62" 126º20’48.81" 40.69

30 PAB-21B Sanco Pt. 8º13’11.53" 126º28’53.25" 30.80

31 PAB-22 Bagoso Is 7º42’45.02" 126º34’29.08" 12.95

32 PAB-22C Languyan 7º29’49.47" 126º35’59.24" 0.54

33 PAB-23 Languyan 7º29’16.93" 126º35’59.50" 0.76

34 PAB-23B Languyan 7º28’30.97" 126º35’57.30" 1.2

35 PAB-23C N Baculin Pt. 7º27’29.42" 126º35’51.31" 10.12

36 PAB-24 Pusan Pt. 7º17’19.80" 126º36’18.26" 1.14

37 PAB-24A S Pusan Pt. 7º16’14.43" 126º35’57.20" 63.28

38 PAB-25B Cape San Agustin 6º17’14.73" 126º12’14.40" 1.28

39 PAB-25 Cape San Agustin 6º16’8.35" 126º11’35.06" 67.65

40 PAB-26 SE Sarangani Is. 5º23’34.20" 125º28’42.11" 0.43

41 PAB-27 Pangil Bato Pt. 5º23’21.80" 125º28’19.59" 3.44

42 PAB-28 Tapundo Pt. 6º21’55.66" 126º25’11.21" 3.31

43 PAB-29 W Calia Pt. 5º21’58.48" 125º21’52.03" 0.87

44 PAB-30 Manamil Is. 5º22’2.91" 125º20’59.73" 1.79

45 PAB-31 Marampog Pt. 5º23’20.18" 125º19’44.29" 78.42

46 PAB-32 Pola Pt. 6º9’8.44" 124º15’42.81" 122.88

47 PAB-33A Kantuan Is 6º26’47.22" 122º13.34.50" 29.44

48 PAB-34A Tongguil Is. 6º2’33.77" 121º56’36.20" 2.38

49 PAB-35 Tongquil Is 6º1’8.51" 121º54’41.45" 1.72

50 PAB-35A Tongquil Is. 6º0’17.88" 121º63’11.17" 85.94

51 PAB-38A Kirapusan Is 5º12.8.70" 120º41’38.14" 55.24

52 PAB-39 Manuk Manka Is. 4º47’39.24" 119º51’58.08" 43.44

53 PAB-40 Frances Reef 4º24’53.84" 119º14’50.71 0.61

54 PAB-40A Frances Reef 4º25’3.83" 119º14’15.15" 15.48

55 PAB-41A Bajapa Reef 4º36"9.01" 119º3’22.75" 6.88

56 PAB-42A Paguan Is. 4º42’52.07" 119º1’44.04" 8.40

57 PAB-43 Alice Reef 4º45’55.25" 119º3’15.19" 2.28

58 PAB-44 Alice Reef 4º47’5.36" 119º5’12.94" 18.60

59 PAB-45 Omapoy Rk. 4º55’10.45" 119º22’1.30 23.37

60 PAB-46 Bukut Lapis Pt. 5º2’23.73" 119º44’18.14" 44.20

61 PAB-47 Pearl Bank 5º46’35.15" 119º39’51.77" 75.17

62 PAB-48 Bagnan Is. 6º5’58.41" 118º26’57.30" 8.54

63 PAB-48A Taganak Is 6º4’14.08" 118º18’33.33" 13.46

64 PAB-49 Great Bakkungaan 6º11’4.65" 118º6’54.15" 3.97

Is.

65 PAB-50 Libiman Is. 6º13’39.90" 118º3’52.09" 5.53

66 PAB-51 Sibaung Is. 6º17’43.99" 118º0’5.44" 41.60

67 PAB-52 Muligi Is. 6º52’14.53" 118º23’40.49" 75.06

68 PAB-53 South Mangsee Is. 7º30’26.05" 117º18’33.75" 26.00

69 PAB-54 Balabac Is. 7º48’30.69" 116º59’39.18" 6.08

70 PAB-54A Balabac Great Reef 7º51’27.17" 116º54’17.19" 1.18

71 PAB-54B Balabac Great Reef 7º52’19.86" 116º53’28.73" 2.27

72 PAB-55 Balabac Great Reef 7º54’36.35" 116º53’16.64" 5.42

73 PAB-60 Ada Reef 8º2’0.26" 116º54’10.04" 10.85

74 PAB.61 Secam Is. 8º11’18.36" 116º59’51.87" 30.88

75 PAB-62 Latua Pt. 8º87’56.37" 117º15’51.23" 7.91

76 PAB-63 SW Tatub Pt. 8º44’17.40" 117º20’39.37" 11.89

77 PAB-63A W Sicud Pt. 8º53’32.20" 117º28’15.78" 13.20

78 PAB-64 Tarumpitao Pt. 9º2.57.47" 117º37’38.88" 81.12

79 PAB.64B Dry Is. 9º59’22.54" 118º36’53.61" 82.76

80 PAB-65C Sinangcolan Pt. 11º13’19.82" 119º15’17.74" 74.65

81 PAB-67 Pinnacle Rk. 12º19’35.22" 119º50’56.00 93.88

82 PAB-68 Cabra Is 13º53’24.45" 120º1’5.86" 115.69

83 PAB-71 Hermana Mayor Is. 15º48’43.61" 119º46’56.09" 9.30

84 PAB-72 Tambobo Pt. 15º57’61.67" 119º44’55.32" 12.06

85 PAB-72B Rena Pt. 16º9’57.90" 119º45.15.76" 0.25

86 PAB-73 Rena Pt. 16º10’12.42" 119º45’11.95" 6.43

87 PAB-74 Rocky Ledge 16º16’34.46" 119º46’19.50" 0.65

88 PAB-74A Piedra Pt. 16º37’12.70" 119º46’28.62" 1.30

89 PAB-75 Piedra Pt. 16º18’29.49" 119º46’44.94" 1.04

90 PAB-75C Piedra Pt. 16º19’28.20" 119º47’7.69" 0.63

91 PAB-75D Piedra Pt. 16º20’4.38" 119º47’20.48" 80.60

92 PAB-76 Dile Pt. 17º34’24.94" 120º20’33.36" 6.86

93 PAB-77 Pinget Is. 17º41’17.56" 120º21’2.20" 14.15

94 PAB-78 Baboc Is. 17º55’4.13" 120º24’40.56" 35.40

95 PAB-79 Cape Bojeador 18º29’32.42" 120º33’42.41" 1.77

96 PAB-79B Bobon 18º30’52.88" 120º34’55.35" 58.23

97 PAB-80 Calagangan Pt. 19º10’14.78" 121º12’52.64" 98.07

98 PAB-82 Itbayat Is. 20º43’15.74" 121º46’57.80" 25.63

99 PAB-83 Amianan Is 21º7’17.47" 121º56’43.85" 0.08

100 PAB-84 Amianan Is. 21º7’18.41" 121º56’48.79" 0.25

101 PAB-85 Amianan Is. 21º7’12.04" 121º57’3.65" 0.44

Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with
Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over
all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws
including, without limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
as amended.

Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the aforesaid
baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith produce and
publish charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing the delineation of basepoints and
baselines as set forth in this Act.

Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supplemental
budyet or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law.

Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other portions or
provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.

Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and all other
laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or
modified accordingly.

Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any
two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R No. 187167               August 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C.
ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA
BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL
BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA
BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY
DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER,
CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA
LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA,
WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON,
JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO,
MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER
VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO
ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING &
RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE
UNITED NATIONS, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby
territories.

The Antecedents

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States
parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this
void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus,
domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968
(Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The
change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February
1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended
continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the
location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate
their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens,
taxpayers or x x x legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal
grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of
relevant constitutional provisions.13

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in
the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress
their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included –
its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of
islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.

Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s
compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack
of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA
9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS
III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does
not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim
over Sabah.

Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what
Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within
the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.

We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:

1. Preliminarily –

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA
9522.

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2)
the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the
merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.

On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens

Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the
petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by
the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens
with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises
issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA
9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to
bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition

Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes

In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of
the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of
respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.18

Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional
power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as
proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of
government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no
bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the
Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-
compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one
such law.

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory"21 because it discards
the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties,
successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the
Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of
Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’
technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around
the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22

Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical
miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the
culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the
conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’
graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve
as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48
of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance
with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33),
and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77).

Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the
rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn
in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS
III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in
the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."24

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose)
territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on
the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime
zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead
governed by the rules on general international law.26

RA 9522’s Use of the Framework

of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas

Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the
baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial
claim" over that area.27 Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from the
Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial
waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the
baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law,
coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’
obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.1avvphi1

The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed
the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the
location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on
the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes
the wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim
over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.

Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is
similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of
basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and
exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29

Extent of maritime
area using RA Extent of maritime
3046, as amended, area using RA
taking into account 9522, taking into
 
the Treaty of Paris’ account UNCLOS
delimitation (in III (in square
square nautical nautical miles)
miles)

Internal or
archipelagic
waters 166,858 171,435

Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106

Exclusive
Economic Zone   382,669

TOTAL 440,994 586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even
extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course,
where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a
delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30
Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA
9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the
Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:

SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with
Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine
archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of
two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such
baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical
miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical
miles.31

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for
several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of
the Philippine archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint
will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."

The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize
the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough
Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be
accused of violating the provision of international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating
baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing
malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.

This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the
orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas,
that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na
sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama
itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of
the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits.1avvphi1 The need to
shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became
imperative as discussed by respondents:

[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its
maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III].
As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to
wit:

1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06
nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which
states that "The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of
the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of
125 nautical miles."

2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the
baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.

3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey
methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were
later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by
Article 47.35

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’
decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any
"naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of
the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.37

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under

RA 5446 Retained

Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah
in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door
for drawing the baselines of Sabah:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this
Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
(Emphasis supplied)

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not

Incompatible with the Constitution’s
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally
"converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and
sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights
indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the
Constitution.38

Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution39 or as "archipelagic
waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III
affirms this:

Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and
subsoil. –

1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic

baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast.

2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil,
and the resources contained therein.

xxxx

4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the
status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its
sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
(Emphasis supplied)

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of
freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the
competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways
for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41

In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and
conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international
law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke
its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent
passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States
which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage
through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under
UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters
landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters
subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago
and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as
separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the
waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty,
subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.47

Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and

State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as
mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights x x x."49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing
legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v.
Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an
exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The
other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph
251 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.

In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone.
Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of
UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course
reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui
generis maritime space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS
III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200
nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that
attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass
RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’ reading
plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court.
Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant
baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable
baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a
two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the
resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s
case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely
avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

Magallona (Petitioner) v. Ermita (Respondents)

2021-03-04administrator

G.R No. 187167

August 16, 2011
CARPIO, J.:

Facts:
Congress passed RA 3046 in 1961 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic
State, This is pursuant to the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in
1958 UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II.

RA 5446 was passed to correct the typo errors under RA 3046 and included reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah in North Borneo. In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522,
to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the UNCLOS III, which the Philippines ratified.

The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints
and classify the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and
security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories, thus
may not only result in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen
Issue:  
Whether or not Republic Act 9522 is unconstitutional as it reduces the Philippine Maritime Territory 

Held:
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating sea-use
rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone
[24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.

UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify
norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and
archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their
coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve
as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48
of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance
with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33),
and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

 
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by
their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her
parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R.
FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.
CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA,
BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE
MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA,
minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA,
JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by
their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and
DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID,
FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors,
represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN
MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO
and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT,
minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA,
DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and
MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which
the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-
generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of
action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock
and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges
that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are
"so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that
judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a
land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in
which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures
which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of
fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial,
commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation
have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of
the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of
the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be
found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential
loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d)
the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance
and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f)
the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a
critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced
by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers,
(i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of
forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for
the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the
reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely
2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour —
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after
the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued
trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are
already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will
work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors —
who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he
holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and
devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly
blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the
State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive
and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being.
(P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of
natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of
plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint
shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the
said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and
that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only
represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation
per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting
Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that
even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked
by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal
right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles
the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to
them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether
logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not
to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the
State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually
for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the
holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other
forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without
the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case
No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this
matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring
all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and
in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present
as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the
issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule
against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of
alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court
notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data.
In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the
sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental
law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness
a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these
conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because
of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health
are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to
come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner
Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise
pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty
of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental
balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as
the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of
the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O.
No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and
grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public
domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order
to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas
and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and
equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's
natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of
the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications
relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as
future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks
of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject
to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural
resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases
for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code)
were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos,
and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-
being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said
policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear
as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and
the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect
the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim
was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the
full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state
a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the
said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the
rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to
dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is
effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may
thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof
for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid
for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the
meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according
to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is
that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not
be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts
clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental
law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to
the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of
the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is
it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court
held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it
can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do
not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No.
L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve
a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses.
Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a
violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could
have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral,
safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is
limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private
and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither
property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect
to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other
instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the
questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Oposa (Factoran) vs Factoran (Respondent)

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations
yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

           1.       Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

           2.       Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a
clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he
holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

           1.       Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

           2.       The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court
ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony
of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well
as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come