China-Pakistan Relations: In Phases

The Sino-Pakistan relations before the dismemberment of the country in 1971

into two states — Pakistan and Bangladesh — can be divided into four phases. In
the first phase From 1951 to 1954 in which the relations were at modest level
and were limited to trade and occasional official visits. Second phase starts with
Bandung Conference of 1955 in which the exchange of talks and goodwill
increased to a higher level. Chinese side showed much interest. Third phase
started from 1962 to early 1973 in which the trend of relations was downwards.
The fourth phase started in 1973.

 First Phase (1951-1954)

During early years, Sino-Pak diplomatic relations remained cold. This was due to
the fact that Pakistan chose to align with the US in international relations while
China, with its Communist ideology decided to join the USSR.

Initially, Pakistan perceived China as a threat due to its Communism.

During this phase of Sino-Pak relations, the boundary between the two countries
was undefined and Chinese claimed certain areas of Hunza and Gilgit as their own
and it was shown through their maps. When seen in regional context, throughout
these years, China’s relations with both India and Pakistan moved on an even
keel.

 Second Phase (1955-1962)

The second phase in this relationship started in 1955 after Bandung Conference,
also known as Asian-Africa Conference, which took place on April 18–24, 1955 in
Bandung, Indonesia. At the Conference came the first high-level contact between
Pakistani and Chinese leadership which clarified mutual doubts, particularly those
arising out of Pakistan’s entry into SEATO and CENTO. It was there that Pakistan’s
then Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra, made clear to his Chinese
counterpart, Zhou Enlai, that Pakistan’s membership in both blocs was not
directed against China but against India. He also assured the Chinese prime
minister that if the United States took aggressive action against China, Pakistan
would not become a party and it would remain neutral as it did in the Korean
War. Premier Zhou Enlai mentioned in his speech to the political committee of the
Afro-Asian Conference that Pakistan was not against China and had no fears that
China would commit aggression against it. As a result, mutual understanding was
reached, following which a number of visits were made between the two sides.
The most significant of them were those of Pakistani Prime Minister Huseyn
Shaheed Suhrawardy in October 1956 and of Premier Zhou Enlai’s reciprocal visit
to Pakistan in December the same year, both being the first at the highest level. It
is important to note here that Chinese were very cautious in moving forward with
Pakistan as is evident from the fact that during his 1956 visit to India and Pakistan,
President Zhou Enlai tried his hands at balancing when he spoke with equal
fervour of ‘Hindi-Cheeni Bhai Bhai’ and ‘Paki-Cheeni Bhai Bhai’.

In the following years, policies adopted by Pakistan were not conducive for
improving relations with China. For instance, in July 1957, H. S. Suhrawardy visited
the United States. The joint communiqué issued after the meeting between the
two sides stated that the US president and the Pakistani premier had agreed that
“international communism continued to pose a major threat to the security of
free world”. The downward trend in Sino-Pakistan relations continued through
the initial phase of military takeover in Pakistan in October 1958. The situation
became so precarious that when in July 1959, a group of Hajis from Taiwan
stopped over at Karachi, met Pakistani religious leaders, made statements and
speeches, and had a meeting with Pakistan’s foreign minister, Manzur Qadir, the
Chinese called it a serious provocation and in a press note on July 21, 1959,
charged the Pakistan government of stepping up its following of the US plot to
create two Chinas.

Moreover, in September 1959, border skirmishes between Pakistan and China

broke out on the Hunza border. Chinese MiG planes, in violation of Pakistani
airspace, flew over this area a number of times. In retaliation, Pakistan sealed its
borders with Xinjiang in November 1959, and moved the Gilgit Scouts up to the
China border.

 Third Phase (1962-73)

Later, such events took place in early 1960s that China and Pakistan started
seriously thinking about taking a fresh look at their policies vis-à-vis each other.
The emergence of Sino-Indian hostility and the resultant Sino-Indian War of 1962,
Pakistan’s disappointment with its Western allies, New Delhi’s refusal to accept
Pakistan’s proposal for joint defence of the Subcontinent, and USA’s support for
India against China were the major events in this regard.

In March 1962, Beijing intimated its willingness to hold talks with Pakistan on the
issue of demarcation of the Sino-Pakistan border. In the beginning, negotiations
moved at a very slow pace, but the Sino-Indian conflict of October 1962 added
impetus to the border negotiations. Subsequently, a border agreement was
signed on March 2, 1963. The final agreement was signed by foreign ministers
Chen Yi for the Chinese side, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for the Pakistani side.

The agreement was moderately economically advantageous to Pakistan, which

received grazing lands in the deal, but of far more significance politically, as it
both diminished potential for conflict between China and Pakistan.

The then foreign minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, played an instrumental
role in bringing Pakistan and China closer and in turning their relationship that
would later become an ‘maxim’ in the international relations. Speaking to the
National Assembly in 1962, he said:

“I should like to make it clear beyond all doubt that we have friendly relations
with the People’s Republic of China and that nothing will be permitted in any way
to endanger those relations. Our relations with China are an independent factor
in our foreign policy and not contingent on any other. In the best interests of
Pakistan, we shall maintain the spirit of goodwill, friendship and cordiality with
the great People’s Republic of China. I declare that our friendship with China is
not tainted by any form of bargain or barter. It is steadfast amity between two
neighbouring Asian States.”
The delimitation of the border between Pakistan and China actually became the
catalyst for much-needed improvement of ties between them, and resulted in
high levels of economic and military collaboration.

The most significant event of this crucial phase was the Indo-Pak war of 1965.
During this war, China not only provided Pakistan with all-out political support but
also issued stern warnings to India. When the US abandoned Pakistan in this hour
of trial by halting arms aid, China stepped in to help the country in bolstering its
armed forces. In the wake of the 1971 crisis between Pakistan and India, China
again provided economic, political and moral support to Pakistan to overcome the
traumatic situation that had emerged as a result of the separation of East
Pakistan. In 1972, China used her first-ever veto in the United Nations Security
Council to hold back the recognition of Bangladesh as a gesture of support to
Pakistan.

During these years, Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) became the first non-
Communist airline to land on Chinese territory. Pakistan also played an important
role in restoration of China’s membership in the UN.

The then US President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took
advantage of Pakistan’s close relationship with People Republic of China to
initiate secret contacts that resulted in Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to China in
July 1971 after visiting Pakistan. These contacts resulted in Nixon’s visit to China
in 1972, and the subsequent normalizing of relations between the United States
and the People’s Republic of China.

 Fourth Phase (1973-present)

China Pakistani relationsIndia conducted nuclear tests in 1974 and this gave a new
dimension to the strategic balance in the region and a fresh impetus to expanding
Pak-China defence cooperation. Moreover, with the advent of reformists in China
under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 heralded a new era. The reformists
placed economic development of China as their foremost priority. In that
direction, they introduced sweeping reforms both internally and externally. The
reforms had a substantial impact on Sino-Pakistan relations which, since then,
have been witnessing both quantitative as well qualitative changes in political,
economic and strategic areas.

Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 also opened a new chapter
of consultation and collaboration between China and Pakistan. The two countries
were in total agreement that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan posed a
great threat to the security of the entire region and prepared to coordinate their
policies to face the challenge. Support to Pakistan’s security was the major
feature of China’s Afghan policy because they wanted to honour their oft-
repeated commitments. Regarding recent developments in Afghanistan, China
and Pakistan have a close understanding of each other’s point of view.

By the 1980s, Pakistan had become the most trusted ally of China. Throughout
the 1980s, Pakistan-China relations continued to develop into a comprehensive
relationship. Although there was a visible shift in the Chinese stance on Kashmir,
Pakistani policymakers believed that China’s improved relations with India would
act as a restraining factor on Indian belligerency towards Pakistan.

Pakistan also supported China on all issues important to Chinese national

interests such as sovereignty over Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Tibet and issues
relating to human rights and democracy. China always appreciated and counted
on Pakistan’s strong support as a trusted friend over all these issues at
international forums.

In 1992, Deng Xiaoping stepped down as Chairman of the Central Military

Commission in 1989, and retired from the political scene in 1992. The post-Deng
leadership also continued to follow his guidelines. China adhered to the policy of
strengthening and stabilising its relations with all countries of the region.

Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan remained under US sanctions and China was the
primary source of Pakistan’s military hardware procurements. During this period,
Pakistan-China defence-related cooperation also substantially increased. Then in
May 1998, Indian nuclear tests destabilized the strategic balance in South Asia. As
a prelude to these tests, the Indian defence minister and prime minister
described China as a long-term security threat. While commenting on the Indian
assertion, the official Chinese media reported that “India’s explosions have
sabotaged the fragile trust built up with Beijing over the past decade.” Following
the Indian nuclear tests, Sino- Indian relations suffered a severe setback.
Deterioration in Sino-Indian relations reinforced Pakistan’s importance in China’s
South Asia policy.

China expressed its understanding of Pakistan’s compulsion to go nuclear. It gave

Pakistan the confidence to re-establish the strategic balance in South Asia by
conducting its own nuclear tests.

On Kargil Crisis, however, China maintained absolute neutrality by emphasizing a

bilateral resolution of the issue through dialogue. Shortly after the Kargil episode,
by the end of 2001, Indo-Pakistani tension again escalated, bringing the two
nuclear rivals to the brink of war. On this occasion, China stressed upon both
Pakistan and India to resolve their dispute through peaceful means. Beijing
adopted multi-channel diplomacy to defuse the tension and stressed the need for
the international community to take a more balanced and unbiased approach to
the problem.

Pak-China Joint Statement, issued in Islamabad on December 19, 2010 on the

conclusion of Premier Wen Jiabao’s historic visit to Pakistan, highlighted the
following points:

1. It is important to deepen the China-Pakistan all-weather strategic partnership;

2. China-Pakistan relations have gone beyond bilateral dimensions and acquired

broader regional and international ramifications;

3. Friendship and cooperation between Pakistan and China serve the fundamental
interests of the two countries, and contribute to peace, stability and development
in the region and beyond; and

4. The two sides will enhance their strategic coordination, advance pragmatic
cooperation and work together to meet the challenges in pursuit of common
development.
Later, the 2005 Pakistan-China Treaty for Friendship and Cooperation and Good
Neighbourly Relations also proved to be a key instrument as it enables both
countries to strengthen their strategic, economic and cultural relations.

The Current Scenario

At present, China is investing heavily in Pakistan. In contrast to the US, China is

viewed by Pakistan as a reliable, “all-weather”, non-interfering, supportive
strategic partner. While the US is looked on with suspicion, Beijing is treated as a
time-tested, trusted friend. The undercurrent of common interests and objectives
implies that Pakistan and China face the same friends and foes. One common
adversary, India, still remains the germane reason for Sino-Pak alliance. In fact,
China and Pakistan continue to create partnerships based on countering the
possible rise in influence of other powers in the region, including India, Russia and
the United States. The role of Gwadar port is expedient in this regard. Attacks on
Chinese workers inside Pakistan, and violent extremism in Xinjiang province that
has been linked to safe havens inside Pakistan, remain thorny issues in an
otherwise rosy alliance. However, there appears to be a tacit understanding that
“outside involvement,” including but not limited to the US and India, aimed at
containing Pakistan-China collaboration is a likely source of disturbance.

During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan in April 2015, the two countries
agreed to elevate their relations to an ‘all-weather strategic cooperation
partnership’, enriching the Pakistan-China community of shared destiny and
ensuring the perpetual continuity in friendship from generation to generation.

China while appreciating Pakistan’s consistent and staunch support on issues

concerning China’s core interests, reaffirmed its support and solidarity for the
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan.

Future Trajectory

Pakistan will have to factor in China’s global perspective while formulating its
future policy and expectations. There is also a lot that our leaders need to learn
from the sophistication of China’s foreign policy. Despite US strategic
convergence and growing support to India’s role at the regional and global level,
China remains unruffled and poised. China-Pakistan relations that are based on
mutuality of interests seem destined to grow. Pakistan should, however, remain
sensitive to the complexities that surround this relationship and factor these in.