Dawa Vs de Asa

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FER GRACE CATAYLO NIAGA JD I

FLORIDE DAWA, NORALIZ L. JORGENSEN, FEMENINA


LAZARO-BARRETO vs Judge ARMANDO C. DE ASA, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 51, Caloocan City
(A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144, July 22, 1998)
FACTS:
Armando C. de Asa, the presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting
executive judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, was
charged with "sexual harassment and/or acts of lasciviousness" in a letter-
complaint dated on August 15, 1997, filed by Floride Dawa. In view of the
allegations in the Complaint, the Court, in a Resolution dated December 10,
1997, placed respondent judge under preventive suspension; and referred the
case to retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, a consultant of the Office of the
Court Administrator, for investigation, report and recommendation.
Meanwhile, Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino and the 6 who assisted
the aforementioned complainants, also filed a case on September 5, 1997, an
affidavit-complaint 7 against Judge Armando C. de Asa, for "sexual
harassment under Republic Act No. 7877/ acts of lasciviousness, grave or
serious misconduct, and [for] violation [of] the high standard of moral[s]
demanded by judicial ethics . . .." In our Resolution dated March 18, 1998, 8
we resolved to consolidate her Complaint with the earlier one and to refer it
likewise to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo for inclusion in his investigation,
report and recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty for act of lasciviousness, grave
or serious misconduct?

RULING:
Yes. After evaluating all the pieces of evidence presented by the
parties, Justice Romulo S. Quimbo arrived at a conclusion, the salient
portions of which are reproduced below:
1. There is sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that respondent
committed the acts he is charged with. The testimonies of the three
complainants were not in any manner emasculated by the lengthy and
thorough cross examination personally conducted by the respondent.
Incidentally, the undersigned had to recess the investigation several times to
give complainants time to compose themselves as they invariably broke
down in tears as they were required to relate the repeated violations of their
persons and their honors by respondent.
Complainants' declarations were also fully corroborated by the persuasive
testimony of Judge Santiago who had the opportunity of hearing Dawa's
story soon after it had occurred and the uninhibited retelling by the other
complainants. Judge Santiago, on her own accord, wrote a verified letter to
the Court Administrator (Exhibits I, I-1 to I-7; Record; pp. 17-24), wherein
she narrated all that she knew of the different incident.
xxx xxx xxx
2. Respondent has not proven any vicious motive for complainants to invent
their stories. It is highly improbable that the three complainants would
perjure themselves only to accommodate Atty. Buencamino who may have
had some real or imagined resentment against respondent. Moreover, the
reason given by respondent for the ill will that Atty. Buencamino felt against
him is too superficial to genuinely cause such malevolence, especially
because it was Judge Santiago who insisted on the relocation of Atty.
Buencamino so that her office could be used by the executive judge. 12
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that respondent was strict in requiring the employees of the court to
perform their duties and to observe office hours and his prohibition against
loitering and idleness in the premises of the court is not enough to motivate
[the] three women into exposing themselves to ridicule and chastisement,
not to mention criminal prosecution, by relating false stories that would also
be derogatory to them.
Jorgensen may have entertained some hostility at respondent's calling her
attention to an anonymous letter which mentioned her indiscretions with
another employees of the OCC who was also married. We are not convinced
that this would move her into fabricating a story as shocking as the one she
related under oath.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent may have committed an error of judgment when he misjudged
the young Floride Dawa to be fair game. Feeling perhaps that the nod Dawa
gave him, when she saw him as she was about to enter the comfort room,
was an invitation, he took advantage of the young maiden and forced himself
on her. Perhaps because Dawa was naive and innocent, she panicked and
became near hysterical prompting Carpio to question her. This broke the
dam, so to speak. When it became known that Floride Dawa was going to
file a case against respondent, a slew of indignant women surfaced also
wanting to file charges against respondent for his many indiscretions. How
many more remain who prefer to suffer their humiliation in silence, we can
only speculate.14
3. Respondent's denials cannot overcome the probative value of the positive
assertions of complainants and their witnesses. This is elementary. Neither
were the negative observations of respondent's witnesses sufficient to belie
the complainants' declarations. All his witnesses could attest to was that they
had not seen respondent do anything obscene to the complainants nor to
others. The fact that they did not see such lewd acts is not proof that they did
not occur specially so because they were all done in the privacy of
respondent's chambers. 15
xxx xxx xxx
PREMISES CONSIDERED and in line with the decisions in Junio vs.
Rivera, Jr., supra and Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, supra, we regretfully
recommend that respondent be dismissed from the service for gross
misconduct and immorality, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including
government owned or controlled corporations. 16
The Court reviewed the entire record of the instant administrative case and
found the findings, conclusion and recommendation of the investigating
justice to be adequately substantiated by the evidence presented by the
parties and anchored on applicable law and jurisprudence. Thus, with no
need to rehash the reprehensible indiscretions of the respondent judge, we
adopt the conclusion and recommendation of the investigating justice.

The people's confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the
magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the
bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness
they are expected to possess. 17 More than simply projecting an image of
probity, a judge must not only appear to be a "good judge"; he must also
appear to be a "good person." 18 It is towards this sacrosanct goal of
ensuring the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of
Judicial Conduct mandates the following:

A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE


OF IMPRORIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.

RULE 2.02. — A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public


confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides: "A judge's official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties,
but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man,
are required to observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. The
character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his official
acts but also through his private morals, as reflected in his external behavior.
It is therefore paramount that a judge's personal behavior, both in the
performance of his duties and in his daily life, be free from the appearance
of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. 19 For this reason, "[t]he Code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the judiciary,
must behave with propriety at all times." 20 This mandate has special import
for municipal and metropolitan trial court judges, like herein respondent,
since they are the "front-liners" of the judiciary who serve more people at
the "grass-roots" level of society. 21
In the present case, we find totally unacceptable the temerity of the
respondent judge in subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates all, to
his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Not only do the
actions of respondent judge fall short of the exacting standards for members
of the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency
even of society at large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are
an affront to women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because
they necessarily ". . . result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment for the employee[s]." 22 Let it be remembered that respondent
has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere
employees of the court of which he is an officer.
In view of the stature of respondent judge, as well as his authority and
official responsibility over the complainants, who were his subordinates in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, the Court concludes with
moral certainty that he acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and
propriety and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The bench is not a
place for persons like him. His gross misconduct warrants his removal from
office. 23 In resolving this administrative matter, we deem it apt to iterate
our pronouncement in Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, viz.:

Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has


behaved in a manner unbecoming of a judge as a model of moral
uprightness. He has betrayed the people's high expectations and diminished
the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.
xxx xxx xxx
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that the
complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and
supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position
and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of
being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the
one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position. 24
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Armando C. de Asa is hereby
DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct and immorality, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. SO ORDERED.

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