Esguerra v. Gonzales-Ardala

9/4/21, 8:08 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 573
goods in simulation of the goods of another dealer, so that

purchasers desiring to buy the goods of the latter would be
induced to buy the goods of the former. (Caterpillar, Inc. vs.
Samson, 505 SCRA 704 [2006])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 168906. December 4, 2008.*
PERLA S. ESGUERRA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE FATIMA

GONZALES-ASDALA, J. WALTER THOMPSON
COMPANY (PHILS.), INC., and AGL MARKET
RESEARCH INCORPORATED, respondents.
Certiorari; At the threshold of every special civil action under

Rule 65, the person seeking the writs must be able to show, on pain
of dismissal of his petition, that his resort to such extraordinary
remedy is justified by the “absence of an appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”—It
does well for Esguerra to remember that at the threshold of every
special civil action under Rule 65, the person seeking the writs
must be able to show, on pain of dismissal of his petition, that his
resort to such extraordinary remedy is justified by the “absence of
an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.” Esguerra utterly fails in this regard for
there is nothing in her Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075, not even
an allegation therein, that she had no appeal or any other
efficacious remedy against the 28 August 2003 Order of RTC-
Branch 87 denying her application for preliminary injunction. The
Court of Appeals, therefore, was compelled to dismiss Esguerra’s
Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075.
Actions; Moot and Academic Questions; Courts of justice
constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions in which no actual interests are involved. Courts will not
determine a moot question.—Esguerra would also later on
withdraw her applica-
_______________
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017bb0b92ddcdde1541a000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/19
* THIRD DIVISION.
51
tion for preliminary injunction/TRO. At this point, the question of

whether RTC-Branch 87 properly denied the said application,
became moot and academic. There is no more justiciable
controversy insofar as the denial of the petition for preliminary
injunction/TRO is concerned, so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial
relief in this regard to which Esguerra would be entitled and
which would be negated by the dismissal of her Petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 79075 by the appellate court. Courts of justice
constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions in which no actual interests are involved. Courts will
not determine a moot question.
Courts; Judges; Judges cannot be subjected to liability—civil,
criminal or administrative—for any of their official acts, no matter
how erroneous, so long as they act in good faith; It is only when
judges act fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance, may
they be held criminally or administratively responsible.—It is
indubitable that Judge Asdala’s Order dated 28 August 2003
denying Esguerra’s application for a preliminary injunction/TRO
was rendered in the exercise of her official function as the
Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 87 which had jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. Q-03-50206 and all its incidents, including the said
application. Judges cannot be subjected to liability—civil,
criminal or administrative—for any of their official acts, no
matter how erroneous, so long as they act in good faith. It is only
when they act fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance,
may they be held criminally or administratively responsible.
Same; Same; Bad faith must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence—it is not presumed and the party who alleges
the same has the onus of proving it.—The records do not show that
Judge Asdala was moved by bad faith, ill will or malicious intent
when she did not grant the TRO and preliminary injunction
Esguerra prayed for. Bad faith must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. It is not presumed and the party who alleges
the same has the onus of proving it. Esguerra has not, in fact,
adduced any proof to show that impropriety attended the actions
of Judge Asdala.
Same; Same; Parties; In petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, the public respondent, should not actively participate
in the proceedings as a general rule, unless directed otherwise by
the court.—In petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
52
the public respondent, such as Judge Asdala herein, should not

actively participate in the proceedings as a general rule, unless
directed otherwise by the court. The inclusion of the public
respondent in such petitions is more of a formality, since it is still
the private respondent/s who must contest the said petitions. It is
likewise explicitly stated in the afore-quoted provision that the
public respondent in petitions under Rule 65 shall not be liable for
the costs which may be awarded to the petitioner/s. It can be
rationally deduced therefrom that in such petitions, the public
respondent is not meant to incur or shoulder personal liability for
his official actions, even if the writs of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus are so issued against him.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Anita R. Tabo for petitioner.
Virgelio T. Nibungco for private respondent J.W.
Thompson Company (Phils.), Inc.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are the Decision1 dated 31 March 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075 which
denied the Petition for Prohibition and
Certiorari/Mandamus with application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction of
petitioner Perla S. Esguerra (Esguerra); and the
Resolution2 dated 12 July 2005 of the appellate court in the
same case denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao with Associate

Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring. Rollo,
pp. 89-98.
2 Rollo, p. 106.
53
Esguerra is a licensed nutritionist-dietitian presently

employed as the Chief Dietitian of the Philippine Heart
Center (PHC), located at East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon
City. Respondents J. Walter Thompson Company3 (JWT)
and AGL Market Research, Inc. (AGL) are corporations
duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. On 15
May 2000, AB Food and Beverages4 Philippines (AB Food)
entered into a contract with JWT whereby the latter would
handle the advertising, marketing, promotional and

general publicity requirements of the former.
Esguerra filed an Amended Complaint5 for Damages
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order against JWT and AGL, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 and raffled to
Branch 87 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC),
presided by respondent Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala
(Judge Asdala).
In her Amended Complaint, Esguerra alleged that on 14
May 2003, AGL, thru its Director/General Manager
Nicanor G. Aguirre (Aguirre), wrote a letter to the PHC,
inviting nutritionists from the said hospital to participate
in a study it was conducting. Aguirre gave the assurance
that “all information that would be generated from this
study would be kept completely confidential,” and the AGL
representative bearing the letter made it understood that,
among other things, a talent fee of P20,000.00 would be
paid to the nutritionist who would be chosen to appear in a
commercial that would subsequently be shot.
Esguerra narrated that she showed up at the Cravings
Restaurant in San Juan at the appointed time on 16 May
_______________
3 Present name is WPP Marketing Communications; Rollo, p. 243.

4 Manufacturer of Ovaltine food product; Rollo, p. 243.
5 AB Foods was not impleaded in the Amended Complaint but was
referred to as one of defendants in Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 although the
Records are silent as to when AB Foods was impleaded in the case. (CA
Rollo, p. 17.)
54
2003 to participate in the AGL “study.” The first stage

thereof consisted in being “interviewed” by a lady about
two unnamed products with disclosed ingredients and
nutrients; the second product had evidently higher
nutrients. Esguerra was requested to compare the two
products and asked whether she would endorse use of the
higher-nutrient product. In the second stage of the
supposed study, Esguerra was taken inside a room where
she was asked additional questions by another lady, while
a man, apparently representing JWT, focused a video-
camera on her. She was then asked to uncover and find out
for herself the product she preferred to endorse. Her candid
reaction to the “discovery” was that it was Ovaltine. The
incident was taped on the video-camera. As Esguerra
emerged from the room, a third lady approached her asking

her to sign a piece of paper and telling her that it had to do
with the taping that just took place. Since she was in a
hurry to keep another appointment in Quezon City,
Esguerra signed the document, which appeared to be a
contract of agreement, but expressly writing at the side
thereof that in case she would be chosen to appear in the
commercial, which she thought would still be shot at some
future time, clearance from the Director of the PHC must
first be obtained before such commercial may be shown to
the public. Esguerra also verbally informed the third lady
of this condition.
On 16 June 2003, at about noontime, an Ovaltine
commercial was aired on television with Esguerra
appearing therein. The said commercial showed a portion
of Esguerra’s interview videotaped on 16 May 2003.
According to Esguerra, there was absolutely no advice from
either JWT or AGL prior to the airing of the commercial
that she had been chosen to so appear therein. Neither did
JWT and AGL secure the required clearance from the PHC
Director nor did they pay Esguerra any talent fee for the
commercial.
That same afternoon of 16 June 2003, after being informed
of the unexpected airing of the Ovaltine commercial, and
fearful of any adverse consequences, disciplinary sanction,
or misunderstanding which may result therefrom,
Esguerra
55
allegedly took the following actions: (a) she immediately

called up JWT Account Director Joef Peña to protest
against the showing of the commercial; (b) she wrote a
letter dated 17 June 2003 to JWT, copy furnished AGL, to
formally protest the airing of the commercial and to
demand the immediate pull-out of the same; and (c) she
furnished the PHC Director and her Association with
copies of her 17 June 2003 letter to inform and explain to
them that what happened anent the Ovaltine commercial
was not of her volition.
Esguerra averred that JWT responded by transmitting
to her, on 24 June 2003, a communication officially
informing her for the first time of her selection as one of
those who would appear in the Ovaltine commercial, for
which she would receive remuneration in the amount of
P5,000.00. Not satisfied therewith, Esguerra, through her
counsel, wrote JWT on 4 July 2003 a second missive
seeking, among other demands, the immediate cessation of
the airing of the Ovaltine commercial and payment of the

agreed upon talent fee of P20,000.00. Despite her letter-
protest, received by JWT and AGL, the Ovaltine
commercial showing Esguerra continued to be broadcasted
on a daily basis up to the time she instituted Civil Case No.
Q-03-50205.
Esguerra thus prayed of the RTC-Branch 87 the
following:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein petitioner

Esguerra] most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that:
1) Pending hearing on the application for preliminary
injunction, a Temporary Restraining Order be immediately
issued enjoining [herein respondents JWT and AGL] from
airing the subject Ovaltine commercial featuring the
appearance therein of [Esguerra]; and after such hearing,
for a preliminary prohibitory injunction to issue against
such airing;
2) Following trial on the merits, judgment be rendered
in favor of [Esguerra] and against [JWT and AGL], making
said injunction already permanent, and further ordering
[JWT and AGL] as follows:
56
a) To pay the amount of P20,000.00 as

[Esguerra’s] talent fee plus interest at the legal rate
thereon until fully paid;
b) To pay the sum of P200,000.00 as and by way
of moral damages;
c) To pay the sum of P300,000.00 as and by way
of exemplary damages;
d) To pay an amount equivalent to 25% of the
amount due, as and by way of attorney’s fees;
e) To pay the costs of suit.”6
Esguerra claimed to have made several inquiries on the

status of her application for preliminary injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with the RTC Branch
Clerk of Court. She was assured that her application would
be set for hearing. After almost three weeks of waiting
without her application for injunctive relief being set for
hearing, Esguerra filed on 26 August 2003 an Urgent
Motion for Inhibition of RTC Judge Asdala, asserting
therein that “by failing to act swiftly on her application for
TRO as mandated under the law, [RTC Judge Asdala] has
already displayed partiality and bias against her and in
favor of the [herein respondents JWT and AGL], whether
or not for ‘valuable’ consideration.”
RTC-Branch 87, however, subsequently issued an Order

dated 28 August 2003 in which it ruled on Esguerra’s
application for preliminary injunction and/or TRO, thus:
“From the given facts (par. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) in the

complaint, this Court finds that not only did [herein petitioner
Esguerra] clearly fail to point the specific acts committed by each
of the [herein respondents JWT and AGL] in alleged violation of
her right or which has caused her or will cause her injustice,
[Esguerra] likewise failed to show in her application the material
and substantial right she claims to have been invaded by [JWT
and AGL] to warrant the issuance of preliminary injunction.
_______________
6 CA Rollo, p. 20.
57
Since facts have not been sufficiently shown by [Esguerra] in

her application to bring her case within the conditions required by
Sec. 3, Rule 58,7 this Court has to refuse injunction, more
considering the fact that the action for damages which [Esguerra]
has already instituted against [JWT and AGL] would adequately
compensate the injuries caused her.
From an overall judicious examination of [Esguerra’s]
allegation in support of her application for injunction, this Court
finds that issuance of an injunctive relief based on the facts
obtaining is not warranted.
WHEREFORE, [Esguerra’s] application for injunction is
DENIED for lack of merit.”8
This led Esguerra to file another Urgent Motion9 which

sought, among other reliefs, reconsideration of the Order
dated 28 August 2003 of RTC-Branch 87 and resolution of
her Motion for Inhibition. She averred in her Urgent
Motion that the denial of her application for injunctive
relief was highly irregular, having been issued without a
summary hearing, in
_______________
7 Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.—A

preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or

acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to
the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
8 CA Rollo, p. 29.
9 Id., at p. 32.
58
violation of the provisions of Section 4(d), Rule 58 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, without waiting for the resolution of her
Urgent Motion by RTC-Branch 87, Esguerra filed a
Petition10 before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 79075, in which she sought the issuance of: (a) an
Order to expedite the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-03-
50205; (b) a Writ of Prohibition permanently enjoining
Judge Asdala of RTC-Branch 87 from conducting further
proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 and an Order to
re-raffle the said case to another judge; and (c) a Writ of
Certiorari to annul and set aside the denial of Esguerra’s
application for injunction/TRO. In the alternative,
Esguerra prayed for the issuance of: (a) a Writ of
Mandamus ordering Judge Asdala to conduct summary
hearing on Esguerra’s application for injunction/TRO; (b)
an Order directing Judge Asdala to pay damages sustained
by Esguerra; and (c) an Order enjoining Judge Asdala from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-03-
50205.
On 3 September 2003, Judge Asdala issued an Order
explaining why no hearing was conducted on the prayer for
TRO filed by Esguerra. The Order of Judge Asdala reads:
“Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that, a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may
be granted only when: (a) the application in the action or
proceedings is verified, and (b) the application shows facts
entitling the applicant to the relief demanded. The Rules further
states that the application for a temporary restraining order shall
only be acted upon in a summary proceeding which shall be
conducted within 24 hours after the sheriff’s return of service
and/or the records are received by the branch selected by raffle.
From this particular provision, it is clear that the conduct of a
summary hearing within 24 hours after the sheriff’s return of
service is subject to the condition that the summons, as well as,
the complaint and the verified application for temporary

restraining order have been properly served
_______________
10 Id., at p. 2.
59
upon the adverse parties, which requirement however, has not

been satisfied in the instant case.
A perusal of the record shows that there is no verified
application for temporary restraining order on record, neither is it
shown that the applicant has provided the adverse parties with
any verified affidavit in support of her application. What is shown
is service of the summons and the amended complaint to only one
defendant, J. Walter Thompson Company (Phils.), but not to
defendant AGL Market. Indeed, there are more reasons than one,
as to why this Court did not conduct a summary hearing within
the 24 hours period after the sheriff’s return of service of
summons to defendant J. Walter Thompson and those reasons
are, as just stated.
Plaintiff’s complaint at the inception was already defective but
despite sufficient time allowed for her to correct that, plaintiff did
not, complacent, that the Court will overlook them in her favor.
With such defects and the filing of the amended complaint, on
August 7, 2003, eight (8) days after the Sheriff’s return showing
that service of summons and the complaint without a verified
affidavit or verified application for temporary restraining order,
the Court is not obliged to conduct a summary hearing, because
the essential “time element” is deemed to have been waived by the
plaintiff herself when she filed the amended complaint only on
August 7, 2003; the non-service of the complaint and
affidavit/application for temporary restraining order to the
defendants.”11
In the meantime, during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP

No. 79075 before the Court of Appeals, Judge Asdala issued
an Order12 dated 18 September 2003, inhibiting herself
from Civil Case No. Q-03-50205. Civil Case No. Q-03-50205
was then re-raffled on 2 October 200313 to the Quezon City
RTC-Branch 215, presided over by Judge Maria Luisa
Quijano-Padilla (Judge Padilla).
At the hearing held on 10 October 2003, Esguerra informed
the trial court (Branch 215) that the Ovaltine
advertisement had ceased to be aired on television and that
she was there-
_______________
11 Rollo, pp. 43-44.

12 CA Rollo, p. 46.
13 Rollo, p. 224.
60
fore desisting from asking for the temporary restraining

order and/or injunction without prejudice to again avail
herself of the said reliefs should the showing thereof
resume.14
Acting on Esguerra’s motion, RTC-Branch 215 issued an
Order dated 27 October 2003, in which it decreed:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court declares as

follows:
a) The application for TRO is rendered moot and academic by
the manifestation of [herein petitioner Esguerra] that she is
withdrawing the same with a reservation to revive should it be
deemed necessary;
b) The Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of the
application for preliminary injunction is likewise rendered moot
and academic pursuant to the above-cited reason;
c) The Motion to Admit Answer filed by [herein respondent] J.
Walter Thompson is granted;
d) The Urgent Motion (to declare [herein respondent] J.
Walter Thompson in default) is rendered moot and academic with
the admission of the Answer of said [respondent].15
Again, claiming that the airing of the commercial

resumed, Esguerra filed another Urgent Motion16 once
more urging the RTC-Branch 215 to issue a preliminary
injunction/TRO as she originally prayed for in her
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-03-50205.
On 14 November 2003, RTC-Branch 215 issued an Order
granting the TRO Esguerra prayed for, to wit:
“Accordingly, let a temporary restraining order issue against the

[herein respondents] J. Walter Thompson Company (Phils.) Inc.,
AGL Market Research Incorporated, and AB Food and Beverage
Philippines, directing them to cease and desist from airing on
different television networks the commercial of Ovaltine where
[herein
_______________
14 Id., at p. 215.
15 CA Rollo, p. 60.
16 Id., at p. 61.
61
petitioner Esguerra] appears as an endorser of said product for a

period of twenty (20) days from receipt of this Order.
The hearing of the application for preliminary injunction set on
November 19, 2003 is maintained.”17
After conducting a hearing on the application for

preliminary injunction prayed for by Esguerra, RTC-
Branch 215 issued on 8 June 2004 another Order likewise
granting Esguerra’s application for preliminary injunction:
“WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued

restraining and enjoining [respondents] from airing the subject
commercial pending the resolution of the main case upon posting
of a bond in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
Pesos pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Let this case be set for pre-trial conference on July 14, 2004 at
8:30 a.m.”18
Henceforth, RTC-Branch 215 carried on with the

proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-03-50205.
Since Esguerra did not withdraw her Petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 79075, the Court of Appeals also proceeded
with the same.
In its Decision dated 31 March 2005, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Esguerra’s Petition. It reasoned that
Judge Asdala resolved Esguerra’s application for
injunction/TRO in Civil Case No. Q-03-50205 in the
exercise of her judicial function. Esguerra assailed in her
Petition an official act of Judge Asdala, for which the latter
cannot be made answerable for damages.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out in its Decision that
the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available
only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law; and in this case, the writ of
certio-
_______________
17 Rollo, p. 54.
18 CA Rollo, p. 117.
62
rari is a remedy not yet available to Esguerra at the time

she filed her Petition for the same. It noted that Esguerra
filed her Petition even before the resolution by the RTC-
Branch 87 of her motion for reconsideration of its Order
dated 28 August 2003. And even though Esguerra already
withdrew her application for injunction/TRO, the denial of

which by RTC-Branch 87 she was assailing in her Petition,
she still wanted to pursue the Petition in apprehension
that her reinstated application for injunctive relief would
again be denied by RTC-Branch 215. This practice of
taking shortcuts of the established rules of procedure
would not be countenanced by the appellate court.19
Esguerra’s Motion for Reconsideration20 of the Decision
dated 31 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals was denied by
the same court in its Resolution dated 12 July 2005.21
Esguerra is presently before us via the Petition at bar,
raising the following issues:
1) Whether or not the case had become totally moot and
academic.
2) Whether or not the public respondent may be held liable
for damages.
3) What is the amount of damages that should be awarded.22
Esguerra wants us not only to reverse and set aside the

assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
but also to hold Judge Asdala answerable for damages in
the amount of P2.2 million, plus costs of suit and attorney’s
fees.
In sum, Esguerra asserts that she suffered damages by
reason of the continued showing of the offending
commercial from the time the TRO should have been issued
by Judge Asdala of RTC-Branch 87, to the time it was
actually issued
_______________
19 Rollo, p. 97.
20 Id., at p. 99.
21 Id., at p. 106.
22 Id., at p. 2.
63
by Judge Padilla of RTC-Branch 215. By Esguerra’s

determination, Judge Asdala could and should have issued
the TRO as early as 1 August 2003, since summons were
already served on respondents on 29 July 2003 and Civil
Case No. Q-03-50205 was raffled to the RTC-Branch 87 on
31 July 2003. Under Section 4(d) of Rule 58, Judge Asdala
was obliged to already conduct a summary hearing on
Esguerra’s application by the very next day, 1 August 2003,
but Judge Asdala dilly-dallied in acting on the application
too long. From 1 August 2003 to 17 November 2003, the
date when JWT and AGL received copies of the Order

dated 14 November 2003 of RTC-Branch 215 granting a
TRO in Esguerra’s favor and, when the showing of the
Ovaltine commercial was actually stopped, the said
commercial was already shown 110 times more.23 Worse,
Judge Asdala also delayed ruling on Esguerra’s Motion for
Inhibition. Esguerra bases her claim for damages on the
omission or failure of Judge Asdala to do what was clearly
required of her by the law.
The Petition is not meritorious. The Court of Appeals
did not err in dismissing Esguerra’s Petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 79075.
Esguerra’s Petition before the Court of Appeals is one
for certiorari, prohibition, as well as mandamus, all special
remedies under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, relevant
provisions of which read:
“SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari.—When any tribunal,

board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the
_______________
23 Id., at p. 114.
64
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such

incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
SEC. 2. Petition for Prohibition.—When the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or
matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty

resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be
done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the respondent.”
It does well for Esguerra to remember that at the threshold

of every special civil action under Rule 65, the person
seeking the writs must be able to show, on pain of
dismissal of his petition, that his resort to such
extraordinary remedy is justified by the “absence of an
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.” Esguerra utterly fails in this
regard for there is nothing in her Petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 79075, not even an allegation therein, that she had no
appeal or any other efficacious remedy against the 28
August 2003 Order of RTC-Branch 87 denying her
application for preliminary injunction. The Court of
Appeals, there-
65
fore, was compelled to dismiss Esguerra’s Petition in CA-

G.R. SP No. 79075.
As the Court of Appeals noted, at the time Esguerra
filed her Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075, her motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated 28 August 2003 of RTC-
Branch 87 denying her application for injunctive relief was
still pending. This only shows that the remedy of a motion
for reconsideration from the adverse 28 August 2003 Order
of RTC-Branch 87 was still available to, and was in fact,
availed of by Esguerra.
Esguerra would also later on withdraw her application
for preliminary injunction/TRO. At this point, the question
of whether RTC-Branch 87 properly denied the said
application, became moot and academic.24 There is no more
justiciable controversy insofar as the denial of the petition
for preliminary injunction/TRO is concerned, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
There is no actual substantial relief in this regard to which
Esguerra would be entitled and which would be negated by
the dismissal of her Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075 by
the appellate court.25 Courts of justice constituted to pass

upon substantial rights will not consider questions in
which no actual interests are involved. Courts will not
determine a moot question.26
Esguerra still insists that her Petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 79075 cannot be moot and academic because the issue
of Judge Asdala’s liability for the damages Esguerra
sustained survived Esguerra’s withdrawal of her
application for injunctive relief and Judge Asdala’s
inhibition from Civil Case No. Q-03-50206, and still needed
to be resolved.
_______________
24 Kho v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 140, 151; 379 SCRA 410, 420
(2002).
25 Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 337 Phil. 654,
657-658; 271 SCRA 204, 207-208 (1997).
26 Korea Exchange Bank v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 139460, 31 March 2006,
486 SCRA 166, 176.
66
It is indubitable that Judge Asdala’s Order dated 28

August 2003 denying Esguerra’s application for a
preliminary injunction/TRO was rendered in the exercise of
her official function as the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch
87 which had jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-03-50206
and all its incidents, including the said application. Judges
cannot be subjected to liability—civil, criminal or
administrative—for any of their official acts, no matter how
erroneous, so long as they act in good faith. It is only when
they act fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance,
may they be held criminally or administratively
responsible.27
In Ang v. Quilala,28 we further explained that it is
settled doctrine that judges are not liable to respond in a
civil action for damages, and are not otherwise
administratively responsible for what they may do in the
exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their
legal powers and jurisdiction. Certain it is that a judge may
not be held administratively accountable for every
erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment. More importantly, the error must be gross or
patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident
bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment
or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some
motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.
Although Ang v. Quilala is an administrative case, our
pronouncements therein are equally relevant to the instant
case,
_______________
27 Contreras v. Judge Solis, 329 Phil. 376, 388; 260 SCRA 572, 584
(1996), citing Valdez v. Valera, 171 Phil. 217, 221; 81 SCRA 246, 250
(1978).
28 444 Phil. 742, 747-748; 396 SCRA 645, 648-649 (2003).
67
a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and

mandamus, in which petitioner Esguerra additionally
seeks civil compensation from Judge Asdala. Not every
error committed by a judge in the exercise of his official
functions would make him liable for the damages which a
party may sustain by reason thereof, unless it is shown
that such error was so gross or patent, deliberate and
malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith.
The records do not show that Judge Asdala was moved
by bad faith, ill will or malicious intent when she did not
grant the TRO and preliminary injunction Esguerra prayed
for. Bad faith must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.29 It is not presumed and the party who alleges
the same has the onus of proving it.30 Esguerra has not, in
fact, adduced any proof to show that impropriety attended
the actions of Judge Asdala.
While we have earlier ruled that the question of the
propriety of the denial of the application for preliminary
injunction has become moot and academic, still let it be
stated that Judge Asdala’s ruling is not manifestly unjust
nor did it constitute gross ignorance. Her reasons for
denying Esguerra’s application for injunctive relief were
clearly stated in her Order of 28 August 2003. She had
obviously applied therein the basic requirements, as laid
down in jurisprudence, for entitlement to injunctive relief
and found that Esguerra’s application failed to comply with
the requisites.
We also refer Esguerra to Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court, governing her Petition before the Court of
Appeals, which provides:
“SEC. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases.—When the

petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court,
quasi-
_______________
29 Gatmaitan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 149226, 26 June 2006, 492

SCRA 591, 605.
30 Sesbreño v. Igonia, A.M. No. P-04-1791, 27 January 2006,
480 SCRA 243, 256.
68
judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the

petitioner shall join, as private respondent or respondents with
such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons
interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall
be the duty of such private respondents to appear and defend,
both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public
respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the
costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall
be against the private respondents only, and not against the
judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the
petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or
file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein.
If the case is elevated to a higher court by either party, the public
respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties.
However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they
shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein.”
It is clear from the foregoing that in petitions for

certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, the public
respondent, such as Judge Asdala herein, should not
actively participate in the proceedings as a general rule,
unless directed otherwise by the court. The inclusion of the
public respondent in such petitions is more of a formality,
since it is still the private respondent/s who must contest
the said petitions. It is likewise explicitly stated in the
afore-quoted provision that the public respondent in
petitions under Rule 65 shall not be liable for the costs
which may be awarded to the petitioner/s. It can be
rationally deduced therefrom that in such petitions, the
public respondent is not meant to incur or shoulder
personal liability for his official actions, even if the writs of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus are so issued against

him.
Esguerra’s subsequent reinstatement of her application for
injunction/TRO before RTC-Branch 215 did not revive the
grounds for her Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075. She
sought recourse with the Court of Appeals because RTC-
Branch 87 denied her previous application for injunctive
relief. In contrast, RTC-Branch 215, upon reinstatement by
Esguerra of
69
her application, actually granted her a TRO and also a

preliminary injunction. Esguerra, however, cannot use her
reinstated application for injunctive relief which was
favorably acted upon by RTC-Branch 215, as the basis for
her then pending Petition before the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79075. This, certainly, will be repugnant to
the fundamental due process which Judge Asdala must not
be deprived of.
Finally, Esguerra is still litigating her civil case against
JWT and AGL before RTC-Branch 215, Quezon City, in
which she also prays for compensation for the damages she
had suffered from the airing of the Ovaltine commercial. To
insist on recovering damages from Judge Asdala for the
same act, i.e., the showing of the Ovaltine commercial,
suspiciously appears to be an attempt to recover double
compensation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is denied for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 31 March 2005 and its Resolution
dated 12 July 2005 CA-G.R. SP No. 79075 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez,

Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—It is a rule of universal application, almost,

that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial
rights, will not consider questions in which no actual
interests are involved—they decline jurisdiction of moot
cases. (Lim vs. Ang, 453 SCRA 802 [2005])
An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justifiable controversy so that a determination
thereof would be without practical use and value—in such
cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which a

petitioner
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9/4/21, 8:08 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 573

goods in simulation of the goods of another dealer, so that

G.R. No. 168906. December 4, 2008.*

PERLA S. ESGUERRA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE FATIMA

Certiorari; At the threshold of every special civil action under

tion for preliminary injunction/TRO. At this point, the question of

the public respondent, such as Judge Asdala herein, should not

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

1 Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao with Associate

Esguerra is a licensed nutritionist-dietitian presently

handle the advertising, marketing, promotional and

3 Present name is WPP Marketing Communications; Rollo, p. 243.

2003 to participate in the AGL “study.” The first stage

emerged from the room, a third lady approached her asking

allegedly took the following actions: (a) she immediately

the airing of the Ovaltine commercial and payment of the

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein petitioner

a) To pay the amount of P20,000.00 as

Esguerra claimed to have made several inquiries on the

RTC-Branch 87, however, subsequently issued an Order

“From the given facts (par. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) in the

6 CA Rollo, p. 20.

Since facts have not been sufficiently shown by [Esguerra] in

This led Esguerra to file another Urgent Motion9 which

7 Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.—A

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or

violation of the provisions of Section 4(d), Rule 58 of the

“Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides

the complaint and the verified application for temporary

upon the adverse parties, which requirement however, has not

In the meantime, during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP

11 Rollo, pp. 43-44.

fore desisting from asking for the temporary restraining

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court declares as

Again, claiming that the airing of the commercial

“Accordingly, let a temporary restraining order issue against the

petitioner Esguerra] appears as an endorser of said product for a

After conducting a hearing on the application for

“WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued

Henceforth, RTC-Branch 215 carried on with the

rari is a remedy not yet available to Esguerra at the time

withdrew her application for injunction/TRO, the denial of

Esguerra wants us not only to reverse and set aside the

by Judge Padilla of RTC-Branch 215. By Esguerra’s

date when JWT and AGL received copies of the Order

“SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari.—When any tribunal,

proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such

performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty

It does well for Esguerra to remember that at the threshold

fore, was compelled to dismiss Esguerra’s Petition in CA-

the appellate court.25 Courts of justice constituted to pass

It is indubitable that Judge Asdala’s Order dated 28

a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and

We also refer Esguerra to Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules

“SEC. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases.—When the

29 Gatmaitan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 149226, 26 June 2006, 492

judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the

It is clear from the foregoing that in petitions for

certiorari, prohibition or mandamus are so issued against