Vergara V Suelto

10/22/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 156
VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 753

Vergara, Sr. vs. Suelto
*
No. L-74766. December 21, 1987.
DOMINGO VERGARA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE T.

SUELTO, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Davao
City, Branch IV, MANOLITO GUINOO, ROMEO MONTEBON
and PORFERIO CABASE, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice when an answer fail to tender

an issue.—Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that where an
answer "fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegation
of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading." The answer would fail to tender an issue, of
course, if it does not comply with the requirements for a specific denial set
out in Section 10 (or Section 8) of Rule 8; and it would admit the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleadings not only where it expressly
confesses the truthfulness thereof but also if it omits to deal with them at all.
Same; Same; Same; Judgment on the Pleadings; If an answer does
comply with the requirements of Section 10 of Rule 8 and Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 6, judgment on the pleadings will not prosper.—Now, if an answer
does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the complaint in the
manner indicated by said Section 10 of Rule 8, and/or asserts affirmative
defenses (allegations of new matter which, while admitting the material
allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless
prevent or bar
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
754
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001669c3f71fbc38dee27003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/15
recovery by the plaintiff) in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule ,a a

judgment on the pleadings would naturally not be proper.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if the answer does tender
issues, summary judgment may till be rendered if the issues endered are not
genuine, are sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, patently
unsubstantial; Case at bar.—But even if the answer does tender issues—and
therefore a judgment on the pleadings is not proper—a summary judgment
may still be rendered on the plaintiff's motion if he can show to the Court's
satisfaction that "except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact," that is to say, the issues thus tendered are not
genuine, are in other words sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith,
patently unsubstantial. The determination may be made by the Court on the
basis of the pleadings, and the depositions, admissions and affidavits that the
movant may submit, as well as those which the defendant may present in his
turn. In this case, the defendants' answer appears on its face to tender issues.
It purports to deal with each of the material allegations of the complaint, and
either specifically denies, or professes lack of knowledge or information to
form a belief as to them. It also sets up affirmative defenses. But the issues
thus tendered are sham, not genuine, as the slightest reflection and analysis
will readily demonstrate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Writ of Certiorari and not
writ of Mandamus as the proper remedy available to petitioner.—The
remedy properly available to the petitioner in the premises, however, is not
the writ of mandamus. Well known is the rule that mandamus issues only to
compel performance of a mandatory, ministerial duty. The determination
that under the facts and circumstances obtaining in a case a summary
judgment is proper and the motion therefor should be granted and summary
judgment consequently rendered, rests in the sound discretion of a trial court
and can not be regarded as a duty or ministerial function compellable by the
extraordinary writ of mandamus. In this case, the respondent Judge had
discretion to make that determination. What happened was that His Honor
made that determination with grave abuse of discretion Despite the plain
and patent propriety of a summary judgment, he declined to render such a
verdict. The writ of certiorari will he to correct that grave abuse of
discretion.
Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; Where the issuance of an extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional
Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific
755
VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 755
action for the writ's procurement must be presented.—We turn now to the
second question posed in the opening paragraph of this opinion, as to the
propriety of a direct resort to this Court for the remedy of mandamus or
other extraordinary writ against a municipal court, instead of an attempt to
initially obtain that relief f from the Regional Trial Court of the district or
the Court of Appeals, both of which tribunals share this Court's jurisdiction
to issue the writ. As a matter of policy such a direct recourse to this Court
should not be allowed. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must
so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its
original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be
exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important
reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised
relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some
reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court
of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the
specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is and
should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and
lawyers must strictly observe.
PETITION for mandamus to review the order of the Municipal Trial

Court of Davao City, Br. IV. Suelto, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
NARVASA, J.:
Two issues are involved in the instant special civil action of

mandamus. The first is whether or not the appropriateness of a
summary judgment may ever be so self-evident in a case as to make
it well nigh a duty on the part of the Trial Judge to grant the
plaintiff's motion therefor. The second relates to the propriety of the
filing directly with this Court an application for a writ of mandamus
against a municipal trial court, considering that jurisdiction to issue
this extraordinary writ is also possessed by the Court of Appeals as
well as the Regional Trial Court of the district.
To resolve the first issue it will be necessary to deal with the
756

facts in some detail.

Petitioner Vergara commenced in the Municipal Trial Court of
Davao City an action for illegal detainer against the private
1 2
1 2
respondents. His complaint alleged in essence that—
1) he is the owner of a commercial building consisting of three (3)

sections, each of which is separately occupied by the defendants
(private respondents herein) as lessees;
2) the defendants' lease contracts, two of which were written, were all
on "a month to month basis," and originally prescribed a monthly
rental of P350.00, later increased to P450.00;
3) because the defendants all defaulted in the payment of their rentals
for many months, Vergara's lawyer sent each of them a letter "(1)
demanding payment of their unpaid rentals, (2) terminating their
lease contracts effective at the end of December 1985 on two
grounds: non-payment of rentals and plaintiff's need of the property
for some other purpose, and (3) demanding that defendants vacate
the leased premises not later than the end of said month of
December 1985;"
4) the defendants sent Vergara a joint reply pertinently reading as
follows:
"This is to confirm our verbal commitment with you to leave the said premises as
soon as you need it. However due to mainly economic reason, we request for an
extension of three months (3) to enable us to find new space wherein we can
continue our sole livelihood,"; livelihood,";
in addition, defendant Montebon also paid a part of his arrearage;
5) later however, the defendants wrote Vergara another letter; this

time, while acknowledging the latter's ownership of the building
and their status as lessees thereof they announced their refusal to
vacate the premises on the ground that the lot on which the building
stands, though titled in Vergara's name, was part of a tract of land
identified as Lot 508 which had been ordered reverted to the public
domain by the Regional Trial Court (Branch XIV) in a decision
rendered in Civil Case No. 16192 for "Cancellation of Titles and
Reversion" entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Kwong Tai
Lung y Cia., et al.";
_______________
1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 343-D-M.

2 Rollo, pp. 21-34.
757
VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 757

6) Vergara wrote back to them, pointing out the error of the

position thus taken by them, and reiterating his demand to
vacate; his reply having gone unheeded, he initiated the
requisite proceedings before the Office of the Barangay
Captain; and when the controversy was not settled by
conciliation, he instituted the ejectment suit at bar.
3
In their answer to the complaint, defendants Guinoo, Montebon and
Cabase—
1) denied the averments of the complaint relative to their and

the plaintiff's personal circumstances;
2) denied Vergara's ownership of the building and the fact that
it consisted of three sections separately leased by him;
3) claimed that their lease contract with Vergara were null and
void;
4) denied having initially paid rentals but thereafter defaulting
and incurring arrearages in the amounts specified in the
complaint, claiming that they had been "occupying the
premises in the concept of an owner;"
5) denied knowledge and hence professed inability to form a
belief regarding either their joint letter to Vergara (copy of
which was attached to the complaint) or of the reply thereto
by Vergara's lawyer;
6) denied liability to Vergara for damages because as
"member(s) of good standing of (a group calling itself)
Salandanan et al Landless Association, Inc., x x (they were)
occupying the land as owners;"and
7) claimed that in virtue of the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. 16192 declaring null and void the
title issued over "lot 508"—of which Vergara's was
formerly a part—they were claiming Vergara's land "as their
share as member of Salandanan et al Landless Association,
" which was "a recognized intervenor" in the case.
Vergara presented a reply to the defendants' answer, chiefly making

the point that neither he nor any of the defendants was a party to
Civil Case No. 16192 and hence could not be bound by whatever
judgment or orders might be rendered therein; that his title to the
land was not void nor had it ever been sub-
_______________
3 Id, pp. 34-37.
758

ject of any action for annulment; and that in any event Civil Case
No. 16192 had no relevance to the "case for ejectment against
defendants4 for non-payment of rents on x x (his) commercial
building.''
Under date of March 7, 1986 Vergara filed a Motion for Summary
5
Judgment. The motion was verified and had 8 supporting
6
documents annexed to it. It asserted and sought to substantiate the
following propositions, to wit:
1. The 3 defendants were lessees of Vergara's commercial

building, their status as such being established by—
a) the 2 written contracts of lease of Guinoo and Cabase,

copies of which were attached to the verified complaint as
Annexes A and B;
b) the demand letters sent by Vergara's lawyer to each of the 3
defendants, copies of which were attached to the motion for
summary judgment as Annexes A, B, and C thereof;
c) the payment by Montebon on December 20, 1985 of back
rentals for November and December 1984, evidenced by
Official Receipt No. 2300, a copy of which was appended
to the motion as Annex D;
d) the joint letter dated December 6, 1985 confirming their
"verbal commitment to leave the x x premises" as soon as
needed and asking for an "extension of three (3 months to
enable x x (them) to find new space," a copy of was
attached to the verified complaint as Annex C thereof.
2. Neither he (Vergara) nor the defendants were parties in

Civil Case No. 16192 and consequently could not be bound
by any judgment or order therein promulgated, a
proposition confirmed by the Order of the Court in that
action dated February 24, 1986, a copy of which he
attached to his motion as Annex E.
3. Civil Case No. 16192, involving "parcels of land," was
irrelevant to the ejectment case at bar involving ejectment
from Vergara's "commercial building;" and defendants had
acknowledged in their joint letter dated January 7, 1976 that
the building belongs to
_______________
4 Id., pp. 38-39; joined to the reply was his answer to counterclaim.
5 Id., pp. 40-49.
6 Id., pp. 50-61.
759
VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 759

Vergara, a copy of the letter being attached to the motion as Annex

F.
4. In view of their acknowledgment of Vergara's ownership of

the building, the defendants' claim of ownership of the land
on which it stands is "false and absurd." "Moreover,
defendants as lessees are estopped from asserting any
adverse claim or title against plaintiff (Art. 1436 of the
Civil Code)."
5. The defendants' answer is patently defective. It flatly denies
their own personal circumstances, and professes lack of
knowledge sufficient to form a belief about the exchange of
letters between them and Vergara's lawyer—matters about
which they could not but have direct, personal awareness 7
and about which they could not therefore claim ignorance.
Against this motion defendants filed an "Opposition

8
to Motion for
Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss. " They argued that—
1. A genuine issue exists which "cannot be resolved by mere

resort to summary judgment," that issue having arisen from
defendants' controversion of Vergara's claim "of possession
and ownership over the commercial building and the land
on which the same is constructed."
2. Their answer "tendered a genuine issue and does not only
consist of a mere general denial" since in the main "it
specifically denied the material averment of facts in the
complaint setting forth the substance of the matters in
support of their denial;" and as regards their declared
ignorance of some of the facts alleged in the complaint, an
averment of lack of knowledge was under the Rules
equivalent to a specific denial.
3. The Court had no jurisdiction over the case because "the
real issue involved x x is title and/or ownership of the
property and not physical possession," and "this case should
not be by accion interdictal but accion de reivendicacion
(sic).
Vergara submitted a reply dated April 9, 1986, adverting to the

distinction between a summary judgment under Rule 34 and a
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 19, and
_______________
7 Citing Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd. v. Reyes, et al., 55 O.G. 3109-3111.
8 Rollo, pp. 62-68.
760

reiterating and amplifying the propositions and arguments set out in

9
his motion for summary judgment.
The incidents were resolved by the respondent Judge in two
separate orders promulgated on the same day, April 15,10
1986. The
first order denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The Judge
ruled that—
"x x Ownership by the plaintiff of this building has not been seriously
denied by defendants who instead insist that their claim to ownership of the
land be a ground for a dismissal of this case for the court's lack of
jurisdiction. But the court believes that this case properly is an Unlawful
Detainer action as it assesses the respective claims of the parties and it (the
court), in accordance with the provisions of Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 is not without authority to resolve the issue of ownership if only to
11
determine the issue of possession."
The second order12 denied Vergara's motion for summary judgment.

The denial was grounded on the following observations of the
respondent Judge:
"x x Of course, the (plaintiff's) discussion seeks to convince the court that
there is no more need of a trial because conclusively it is claimed that no
genuine issue on a material fact was raised. But it appears from the answer
that the material allegations of facts in the complaint constituting plaintiffs
cause of action are specifically denied and in addition thereto, defendants
have put up affirmative defenses in avoidance of plaintiff's claims. x x.
"The rule gives the court limited authority to enter summary judgment.
Upon a motion for summary judgment, the court's sole function is to
determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. It does not vest the
court with authority to try the issues on depositions, pleadings, letters or
affidavits. x x (I)f there is a controversy upon any question of fact, there
13
should be a trial of the case upon its merits.
His Honor's observations expose no little confusion about the

fundamental nature of a summary judgment. The confu-
________________
9 Id., pp. 69-74.
10 See footnote 8, supra.
11 Rollo, p. 75.
12 Id., p. 76.
13 Emphasis supplied.
761
VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 761

sion is further bared by his statement that the "only issue in this
motion (for summary judgment) is whether, in this Unlawful
Detainer action the material averments of facts constituting
plaintiffs cause of action have been specifically denied in
accordance with Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court" He seems
to think it is the same as a judgment on the pleadings which, of
course, it is not.
The confusion is shared by the defendants (private respondents),
this being revealed by their argument that in view of their denial of
plaintiff's assertion of ownership over the premises in question, and
their controversion of "the material facts of the adverse party," their
answer did not only consist of a mere "general denial" but "definitely
tendered a genuine issue" "which cannot be resolved by resort to
14
mere summary judgment." Indeed, they point out that in their
answer they have dealt with each paragraph of the complaint; and
"considering therefore the totality of the allegations of x x (said)
answer vis-a-vis the allegations
15
of the complaint, x x the answer
tendered a valid issue.''
The essential question however is not whether the answer does
controvert the material allegations of the complaint but whether that
controversion is bona fides. The fundamental issue is not whether
the answer does tender valid issues—as by setting forth specific
denials and/or affirmative defenses—but whether the issues thus
tendered are genuine, or fictitious, sham, characterized by bad faith.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that where an
answer "fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegation of the adverse party's pleading, the court
16
may, on motion
of that party, direct judgment on such pleading." The answer would
fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not comply with the
requirements for a specific denial set out in Section 10 (or Section 8)
of Rule 8; and it would admit the material allegations of the adverse
party's
_______________
14 Set out in their Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, etc.: rollo, pp. 62,
63.
15 See Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration; rollo, pp. 8889.
16 Emphasis supplied.
762

pleadings not only where it expressly confesses 17

the truthfulness
thereof but also if it omits to deal with them at all.
Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material
averments of the complaint in the manner indicated by said Section
10 of Rule 8, and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new
matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the
complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar
recovery by the plaintiff) in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 6, a judgment on the pleadings would naturally not be proper.
But even if the answer does tender issues—and therefore a
judgment on the pleadings is not proper—a summary judgment may
still be rendered on the plaintiff's motion if he can show to the
Court's satisfaction that "except as to the amount
18
of damages, there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact," that is to say, the issues
thus tendered are not genuine, are in other words sham, fictitious, 19
contrived, set up in bad faith, patently unsubstantial. The
determination may be made by the Court on the basis of the
pleadings, and the depositions, admissions and affidavits that the
movant may submit, 20
as well as those which the defendant may
present in histurn.
In this case, the defendants' answer appears on its face to tender
issues. It purports to deal with each of the material allegations of the
complaint, and either specifically denies, or professes lack of
knowledge or information to form a belief as to them. It also sets up
affirmative defenses. But the issues thus tendered are sham, not
genuine, as the slightest reflection
________________
17 Section 1, Rule 9.
18 Sec. 1, Rule 34. N.B. A defendant may also move for summary judgment in his
favor on the theory that the plaintiff s complaint raises no genuine issue (Sec. 2, Rule
34).
19 See Cadirao v. Estenzo, 132 SCRA 93, citing Viajar v. Estenzo, 89 SCRA 684;
Gorospe v. Santos, 69 SCRA 191, 203; de Leon v. Faustino, G.R. No. L-15804, Nov.
29, 1960; PNB v. Philippine Leather Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No. L-10884, Mar. 31,
1959; Bautista, et al. v. Gonzalez, 78 Phil. 390; Jugador v. de Vera, G.R. No. L-6308,
March 30, 1954.
20 Sec. 3, Rule 34; Cadirao v. Estenzo, 132 SCRA 93, 100, supra.
763
VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 763

and analysis will readily demonstrate.

1. To begin with, the defendants' denial of their own personal
circumstances, as these are stated in the complaint, is obviously
sham. The accuracy of those stated circumstances is quite evident.
They are in truth all residents of Davao City, doing business at
Cabaguio Avenue, where the plaintiff's building is located, and in
which they have rented space and where they have been maintaining
their commercial establishments under one trade name or another.
As fictitious is their denial of plaintiff's own personal circumstances.
They could not but know that those circumstances had been
correctly set down in the complaint, having been dealing with the
plaintiff for years, and he being the owner of the building occupied
by them.
2. Their disavowal of the plaintiff's ownership of the building
occupied by them, and also that the building is composed of three
(3) sections, also cannot be genuine. They had each been occupying
those three (3) sections for years and been paying rentals therefor to
the plaintiff. Their answer contains their admission that
21
the plaintiff
has title over the land on which the building stands. There are two
(2) written contracts showing the lease by two of them of the
building from the plaintiff, and a receipt evidencing payment by
another of rentals to the plaintiff, documents which they have made
no serious or effective effort to controvert but which, on the
contrary, they have impliedly admitted. There is, too, their own letter
to the plaintiff dated December 6, 1985, acknowledging receipt of
the communication of the latter's lawyer (demanding their vacation
of the premises and payment of rentals in arrears), and confirming
their "verbal commitment to you to leave the said premises as soon
22
as you need it." There is, finally, another letter of their dated
January 7, 1986 referring to Vergara's demand for the payment of
their "rental
23
in arrears" and for them "to vacate the building rented
by us."
3. Also patently sham is their professed ignorance of the
_______________
21 Rollo, p. 35-36.
22 Id., pp. 23, 30, 42.
23 Id, pp. 24, 57-58.
764

joint letter sent by them to the plaintiff under date of December 6,

1985, just referred to. It should be noted that they have not denied
writing or sending the letter. What they say is that "they have no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief" as to it. This is
ridiculous. Either they wrote the letter or they did not. Either way,
they cannot but have knowledge of it. To say that they are ignorant
of it is palpable dishonesty. In any event we have already
pronounced such a profession of ignorance about a fact which is
patently and necessarily within the pleader's 24
knowledge, or means of
knowing, as ineffectual, as no denial at all.
4. So, too, their denial of ever having paid rents to the plaintiff is
fictitious. The facts on record, to which the plaintiff has drawn
attention, inclusive of the official receipt issued to defendant
Montebon, prove they're beyond cavil.
5. Finally, their affirmative defense, in which they assert title in
themselves over the land on which the plaintiff's building stands, is
also sham, even an absurdity. They base their claim on a judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in an entirely separate action in
which title over a large tract of land—of which the plaintiff's once
formed a part—had been annulled, and the land ordered reverted to
the public domain. But neither the plaintiff nor the defendants are
parties to this action. The judgment has moreover been appealed.
And the defendants' connection with the case rests on nothing more
substantial than their alleged membership in an association at whose
relation the reversion suit had supposedly been instituted by the
Republic, and which association would presumably have preferential
rights to occupy or acquire the land once finally reverted to the
public domain. It is apparent that defendants' claim of title to the
particular lot of the plaintiff is so tenuous and conjectural as to be
practically inexistent. In any event, the claim is utterly irrelevant to
the ejectment suit at bar, which involves merely the question of
whether or not their possession of the plaintiff's premises had
_______________
24 See cases collated: Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1970 ed., Vol. 1, p. 335; J.P.
Juan & Sons, Inc. v. Lianga Industries, Inc., 28 SCRA 807; Phil. Advertising
Counsellors, Inc. v. Revilla, 52 SCRA 26; Gutierrez v. CA, 74 SCRA 127.
765
VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 765

become illegal in virtue of their extended failure to pay rentals and

their refusal to vacate the premises and pay those arrears despite due
demand. They are moreover estopped to dispute the plaintiff's title.
'The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement

25
of the relation of landlord and tenant bet
ween them."
Under the circumstances herein set forth at some length, the
fitness and propriety of a summary judgment cannot be disputed.
The failure of the respondent Judge to render such a judgment was
due solely to his unfortunate unfamiliarity with the concept of a
summary judgment. It is a failure which we have it in our power to
remedy. No genuine issue having been tendered by the defendants,
judgment should be directed as a matter of right in the plaintiff's
favor. To yet require a trial notwithstanding the pertinent allegations
of the pleadings and the other facts indubitably appearing on record
would be a waste of time, and an injustice to the plaintiff whose
obtention of the relief to which he is plainly and patently entitled
would be further delayed. As it is, the delay has already been
considerable.
The remedy properly available to the petitioner in the premises,
however, is not the writ of mandamus. Well known is the rule that
mandamus issues only to compel perf ormance of a mandatory,
26
ministerial duty. The determination that under the facts and
circumstances obtaining in a case a summary judgment is proper,
and the motion therefor should be granted and summary judgment
consequently rendered, rests in the sound discretion of a trial court
and can not be regarded as a duty of ministerial function
compellable by the extraordinary writ of mandamus. In this case, the
respondent Judge had discretion to make that determination. What
happened was that His Honor made that determination with grave
abuse of discretion. Despite the plain and patent propriety of a sum-
_______________
25 Sec. 3 (b), Rule 131, Rules of Court.

26 Sec. 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; Marcelo vs. Tantuico, Jr., 142 SCRA 439,
440, 445 citing PAL Employees' Association vs. PAL, 111 SCRA 758; Reparations
Commission vs. Morfe, 120 SCRA 460, 461; Darnoc Realty Dev. Corp. v. Ayala
Corporation, 117 SCRA 538, 539.
766

mary judgment, he declined to render such a verdict. The 27

writ of
certiorari will lie to correct that grave abuse of discretion.
We turn now to the second question posed in the opening
paragraph of this opinion, as to the propriety of a direct resort to this
Court for the remedy of mandamus or other extraordinary writ
against a municipal court, instead of an attempt to initially obtain
that relief from the Regional Trial Court of the district or the Court
of Appeals, both of which tribunals share this Court's jurisdiction to

issue the writ. As a matter of policy such a direct recourse to this
Court should not be allowed. The Supreme Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of
dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only
where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons
exist therefor, Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised
relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or
before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose
acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of
Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within
the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it
is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's
procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be
the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must
strictly observe.
In the case at bar, however, to apply the policy by referring the
action to the Regional Trial Court of the district would serve no
useful purpose. It would on the contrary work injustice to the
petitioner to whom the relief rightly due has already been withheld
for many years. The case having been
_______________
27 Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 527, 539 citing Herrera vs. Barreto, 25
Phil. 245; Albert vs. CFI of Manila, 23 SCRA 948; De Castro vs. Delta Motor Sales
Corp., L-34971, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 344; Aguilar Tan, 31 SCRA 205; Ilacad vs.
Court of Appeals and Prudential Bank & Trust Co., L-24435, Aug. 20, 1977, 78
SCRA 301.
767
VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 767

filed before this Court as early as 1986, and having already been
subject of an extensive exchange of pleadings, it should and will
now be decided without further delay.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Judge dated April
15, 1986 denying the petitioner's (plaintiff s) motion for summary
judgment, and that dated April 30, 1986 declining to reconsider the
same, are hereby annulled and set aside. Said respondent Judge is
hereby commanded forthwith to render a summary judgment in
favor of the petitioner (plaintiff) against the private respondents
(defendants), namely: Manolito Guinoo, Romeo Montebon and
Porferio Cabase, in accordance with the prayer of the former's

motion for summary judgment dated March 7, 1986. The
appropriateness and correctness of a summary judgment in the
premises having already been adjudged by this Court, His Honor is
further commanded to direct execution of the judgment immediately
upon its rendition. This decision is immediately executory and no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration
shall be entertained. Costs against private respondents.
**
Teehankee (C.J.), Cruz, Paras, and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Order annulled and set aside.
Notes.—Judicial admission in a pleading while binding on a

party is not an inflexible rule. The testimony of a defendant who
repudiate the matter raised in his answer may be given credence.
(Gardner vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 585.)
Supplemental pleading are meant to supply deficiency in aid of
original pleading, not to entirely substitute the latter. (Pasay City
Government vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, 132 SCRA 156.)
——oOo——
_______________
** Designated a Special Member of the First Division.
768
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10/22/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 156

VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 753

DOMINGO VERGARA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE T.

Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice when an answer fail to tender

754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vergara, Sr. vs. Suelto

recovery by the plaintiff) in accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule ,a a

VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 755

Vergara, Sr. vs. Suelto

PETITION for mandamus to review the order of the Municipal Trial

Two issues are involved in the instant special civil action of

756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

facts in some detail.

1) he is the owner of a commercial building consisting of three (3)

in addition, defendant Montebon also paid a part of his arrearage;

5) later however, the defendants wrote Vergara another letter; this

1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 343-D-M.

VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 757

6) Vergara wrote back to them, pointing out the error of the

1) denied the averments of the complaint relative to their and

Vergara presented a reply to the defendants' answer, chieﬂy making

3 Id, pp. 34-37.

758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vergara, Sr. vs. Suelto

1. The 3 defendants were lessees of Vergara's commercial

a) the 2 written contracts of lease of Guinoo and Cabase,

2. Neither he (Vergara) nor the defendants were parties in

VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 759

Vergara, a copy of the letter being attached to the motion as Annex

4. In view of their acknowledgment of Vergara's ownership of

Against this motion defendants ﬁled an "Opposition

1. A genuine issue exists which "cannot be resolved by mere

Vergara submitted a reply dated April 9, 1986, adverting to the

760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

reiterating and amplifying the propositions and arguments set out in

The second order12 denied Vergara's motion for summary judgment.

His Honor's observations expose no little confusion about the

9 Id., pp. 69-74.

VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 761

762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

pleadings not only where it expressly confesses 17

VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 763

and analysis will readily demonstrate.

764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

joint letter sent by them to the plaintiff under date of December 6,

VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 765

become illegal in virtue of their extended failure to pay rentals and

time of the commencement

25 Sec. 3 (b), Rule 131, Rules of Court.

766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

mary judgment, he declined to render such a verdict. The 27

of Appeals, both of which tribunals share this Court's jurisdiction to

VOL. 156, DECEMBER 21, 1987 767

Porferio Cabase, in accordance with the prayer of the former's

Order annulled and set aside.

Notes.—Judicial admission in a pleading while binding on a

** Designated a Special Member of the First Division.

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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