Republic of the Philippines

WESTERN MINDANAO STATE UNIVERSITY

PEACE AND GLOBAL EDUCATION

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PEACE: KEY TO FILIPINO UNITY

The Duterte administration inherited a peace process that had stalled when Congress
failed to pass enabling legislation that would have created an autonomous region for
Muslims in key parts of Mindanao and the southern islands. The proximate cause of
the political resistance in Manila was a botched police raid on a radical splinter group
in January 2015 in which 44 policemen died, but there were other problems
including questions over the constitutionality of some of the provisions and the fact
that the negotiating process had been dominated by a single southern group, the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

President Duterte is making good on his campaign promise to push the process
forward. He has promised to abide by the deals signed by the Aquino administration;
appointed a close confidante from his Davao days, Jesus Dureza, to run the process;
and reached out to other groups, particularly the leader of the other main Muslim
insurgent group, Nur Misuari of the Moro National Liberation Front, who has a long
history of disagreement with MILF.

But there is less clarity now than there was at the end of last year. The government’s
push for greater inclusivity by inviting MNLF, indigenous peoples and other
constituencies into the process is in principle beneficial – if successful it will ensure
greater buy-in to the finished deal – but there is a possibility the new participants
could insist on re-negotiating from scratch, leading to substantial and dangerous
delays. The negotiations should use the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro,
the deal agreed in 2014 between the government and MILF as the framework for the
failed enabling legislation, as the starting point for the new discussions.

Government negotiators have suggested to Crisis Group that they may be willing to
split an autonomous Bangsamoro in two, with MILF de facto running the portions on
Mindanao and MNLF running the islands of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. This
would be a retrograde step that would both undermine the economic viability of the
new entity and necessitate lengthy discussions of the modalities of collaboration
between the two groups.

There is also uncertainty as to how the process will fit in with Duterte’s ambitious
plan to change the Philippines into a federal state. Government negotiators have
suggested that Bangsamoro autonomy could act as a template for federalism. They
say that the more constitutionally controversial aspects of the southern dispensation
could be parked until the constitution is overhauled to make way for federalism. This
would be an invitation for opponents in Congress to water down any legislation to a
level that would be unacceptable to the Moro population.

None of these problems are insurmountable, but they will take time to solve and it is
unclear how much time there is before the security situation begins to deteriorate
significantly.

There are three threats to a successful conclusion. The first is President Duterte’s
ability to push the legislation through. At present he is almost unchallenged in
Congress, but his agenda has upset a broad range of vested interests and it would be
naïve to think that they will not strike back. Derailing a headline initiative like the
Bangsamoro legislation would be an attractive way of weakening Duterte while
hiding behind professions of patriotism

The second threat is disaffection in the South. MILF members say, and there is no
reason to doubt them, that they and their armed cadres are fully committed to the
peace process, but they have only conditional support from Moro youth. There have
been at least three main peace agreements between Manila and the insurgents,
starting with the 1976 Tripoli accord, none of which have delivered a sustainable
peace. There is a strong narrative in Bangsamoro that they have been serially
betrayed by Manila, and the problems in the current process have fed that
skepticism.

Should they finally lose faith in this round, there is a danger that they will feed the
already growing trends of anarchic criminality, most likely in conjunction with
already well established clan-based criminal gangs, or fall victim to jihadi
radicalisation.

Crisis Group research indicates that much of the success of jihadi groups elsewhere
in the world has been due to their ability to exploit disorder of the sort that might be
triggered by a prolonged hiatus, let alone a collapse, in the peace process.

The seeds of radicalisation are already there. A number of groups, including the Abu
Sayyaf faction led by Isnilon Hapilon based in Sulu, have pledged allegiance to
Islamic State, and there is evidence of an emerging threat from university students
radicalised online.

Under normal circumstances, the threat would probably be real but limited. The
central identity of the insurgents is ethno-nationalist rather than religious; Abu
Sayyaf is regarded by most in the south as a criminal enterprise specialising in
kidnap and ransom for profit; and there are significant cultural barriers to
jihadisalafi interpretations of Islam – when Indonesian militants have fled to the
area, they have hardly been given a heroes welcome.

But the third threat is external. Islamic State’s hold over its territories in the Middle
East is becoming more tenuous; the head of IS, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi has already
mentioned the Philippines as one of the group's key international conflicts; and a
Syria-based Malaysian, Mohammed Rafi Uddin, has called on militants who can’t
make it to Syria to converge on Hapilon and his Abu Sayyaf faction.
Should IS implode, a flood of angry South East Asian militants could head back to the
region bringing with them the skills and cash that could provoke a step change in
violence.

Crisis Group believes that the best bulwark against these threats is a rapid delivery of
enabling legislation that is substantial enough to address the key aspirations of the
Moro people. But even in the best-case scenario, this will take time and there are a
number of measures that will help to both stave off a crisis and boost preparations
for eventual autonomy.

The government should deliver an early peace dividend in the shape of development
funds for infrastructure, agriculture and health. The funds should be delivered
through mechanisms that include MILF, MNLF and other local constituencies. This
would boost their legitimacy and relevance, and improve their ability to control fissile
forces within the Moro Community.

The government and the international community should use the opportunity of the
hiatus to boost local technical capacity. If an autonomous Bangsamoro is to have
control of taxation and investment, for example, it will need bureaucrats versed in
developing investment policy and running excise systems.

And finally the government should run a nationwide public awareness campaign to
mitigate the damage of four decades of anti-Muslim propaganda. This would both
weaken opposition to the passage of the bill and improve the chances of a strong and
constructive relationship between an autonomous south and the rest of the
Philippines.

The Philippines is closer to peace today than at any point in the last four decades. If it
can successfully navigate the next few months and deliver a sufficient degree of
autonomy to the south, the impact on local, national and regional peace and
prosperity will be significant. But if it fails, the situation is unlikely to go back to the
status quo ante: the future will be more unpredictable, and potentially much more
violent.

ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The Philippines is one of the world's largest island countries. Here is a list of the largest
ethnic groups in the country.

TAGALOG

Much is unknown regarding the history of the Tagalogs prior to the Spanish Colonization of
the Philippine Islands in the 16th Century. However, since the Filipinos are mostly people of
Malay origin, it can be inferred that the original Tagalogs were also of Malay descent. Due
their concentration mostly in riverine locations, Tagalogs historically have been involved in
fishing, agriculture and sometimes craft. They are also known to engage in trade with
surrounding nations such as China, Japan, India, and others. In terms of culture, the Taglog
peoples lay much emphasis on respect and good behaviors which is evident in their
softspoken language. Family bonds are also at the center of Tagalog life. However, Tagalog
culture today has been influenced by Western ideologies. For instance, the predominant
religion is now Roman Catholicism.
CEBUANO

Cebuanos are Austronasian-speaking peoples that settled in the Filipino province of Cebu,
between the 10th and 16th Centuries. They can also be found in Leyte, Negros Oriental and
Negros Occidental provinces. Prior to Spanish colonization, Cebuanos were mostly involved
in fishing, but today they are also involved in manufacturing, crafts, as well as other forms of
food production. Cebuanos also held various Indigenous beliefs but most are now Christians
due to Colonization. Regarding culture, Cebuanos are very artistic. They are involved in
dancing, singing, painting and other forms of crafts. They also hold several beliefs regarding
birth, death, and marriage, and place emphases on respect, humility and honesty.

ILOCANO

The Ilocanos historically are also of Malay/Austronesian descent that settled in the Northern
region of Luzon before the arrival of the Spanish. Around the 17th Century there was an
uprising of the Illocanos, as well as among other ethnic groups, against Spanish oppression.
Their major activities include rice farming, salt production, and a significant amount of
fishing. Some cultural rites observed center around marriage, funerals, and rites of passage.
Emphasis among the Illocanos is on independence through hard work, respect and tolerance
for the feelings of others. They are also primarily Roman Catholics, but some also practice
religious syncretism.

VISAYAN (BISAYA)

The Visayan settled in the Visayan Islands around 30,000 years ago. Today, they are
concentrated in the provinces of Negros Oriental, Negros Occidental, and Cebu. They are
mainly involved in the activities of farming and lumbering. Visayans are rarely involved in
foreign trade, but they trade crops such as tobacco and coconut with other islands. Visayans
place more importance on the present life than after-life. This is reflected in their adventurous
and comfort-seeking lifestyle. The main religion among Visayans is also Roman Catholicism.

HILIGAYNON

These are Austronesian language speakers who are a subdivision of the Visaya ethnic group.
They are mainly found in the Western Visaya region. Some of their economic activities
include rice and sugarcane farming, fishing, and textile production. The Hiligaynons believe
that every deed comes with reward or punishment as the case may be. They have a very rich
culture which includes very significant festivals. One of these is Dinagyang, which is a
celebration of the baby Jesus in the form of a statue.

BIKOL

Bikolanos are descendants of Southern Chinese immigrants. They mainly occupy the
Southern peninsula of Luzon. Agriculture is the mainstay of the Bikolano economy,
especially in such crops as banana, coconut, rice and corn. Co-operation among family
members is highly emphasized in various aspects, including providing financial support to
one's family. They are generally conservative in nature, while laying emphasis on education.
Bikolanos have a host of cultural festivals, the most grand being the "Our Lady of
Penafrancia" festival. This festival involves the celebration of the statue of the Virgin Mary,
mother of Jesus.

WARAY

Warays are also a subdivision of the Visayans that migrated to the Philippines during the
Iron Age. They mostly inhabit the Islands of Leyte and Samar, which are largely
underdeveloped. The main economic activities of the Waray people is farming and fishing,
and the major cash crop is coconut. They are also involved in wine production. Warays are
deeply involved in faith-healing rituals, which is the use of folk medicine, prayers or symbols
to effect healing of various ailments.

CHINESE FILIPINOS

Rank Ethnic Group Share of Filipino Population

1 Tagalog 28.1%

2 Cebuano 13.1%

3 Ilocano/Ilokano 9.0%

4 Visayan/Bisaya 7.6%

5 Hiligaynon 7.5%

6 Bikol 6.0%

7 Waray 3.4%

8 Chinese Filipino 2.5%

Others 22.8%

These are Filipinos of Chinese ancestry who have arrived in the Philippines, especially those
coming by way of migration from China. It is estimated that at least 2.5% of Filipinos can
trace their ethnicity to China.

OTHER GROUPS

Other ethnic groups in the Philippines include the Kapampangan, Pangasinan, Kalinga,
Ifugao, and Kankaney. Some of these ethnicities are subcultures or subdivisions of other
groups. Hence, they share similar cultures with the above groups. These groups mostly
occupy various locations on Luzon Island. Some other populations come from overseas,
bringing with them their own cultures. These include Koreans, Japanese, Indonesians, and
several others.

Ethnic Groups In The Philippines

 THE MINDANAO PEACE PROCESS AND ROLES OF CIVIL SOCIETY
The peace process in Mindanao between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front was an important step towards ending four decades of conflict in the
south of the Philippines. But this initiative now faces many challenges.

On March 27th 2014 the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) signed the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro. This ended
an armed conflict that began in 1969, which saw at least 120,000 deaths and
hundreds of thousands displaced.

Civil society groups on Mindanao have played key roles in supporting a

comprehensive and sustainable peace process. However, civilian groups and
communities face challenges in the context of new outbreaks of Islamic Stateinspired
violence, and the recent (re-)imposition of martial law.

The peace process in the southern Philippines carries great geopolitical importance,
as an example of a Muslim armed group engaging in structured dialogue to address
and resolve key political grievances. It is important that the Mindanao peace process
succeeds, as it carries great significance beyond the Philippines.

The Moro struggle

The population of the Philippines is approximately 100 million, with twenty-two million
people living on Mindanao, the largest island in the country. Of these, approximately
10% are Muslims, divided into thirteen ethnolinguistic subgroups, known collectively
as the Moro; another 5% are upland ethnic minorities, generally referred to as
indigenous people. To denote continuity with precolonial ethnic-religious identity,
since the late 1960s Mindanao Muslim nationalists have used the epithet ‘Moro’ to
describe themselves and ‘Bangsamoro’ for their homeland.

Armed groups representing the predominantly Muslim Moros have been struggling
for greater autonomy from the Philippines government since the late 1960s. Although
narratives of the Spanish and American colonial periods often overplay the extent of
conflict between Islamic and Christian communities, Moro groups nevertheless share
a strong sense of historic injustice. For many conflict-affected Moro communities, the
state is perceived as politically and economically intrusive and predatory, embodying
a religious and cultural majority bent on forced assimilation of Muslim minorities.
Moro grievances focus in particular on Manila-sponsored ‘internal colonization’,
including transmigration of large numbers of Christian Filipinos to the southern
Philippines, settled on land originally belonging to Muslim and other indigenous
communities.

A troubled peace process

The 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the government and Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) seemed a breakthrough at the time, but was not properly implemented
– although a subsequent 1996 agreement granted some autonomy to Muslim areas
(in addition to decentralisation under the 1987 Constitution). However, the
Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao was a largely hollow entity, undermined
by poor governance. These setbacks discredited the MNLF, leading to a new round
of insurgency by the 12-15,000 strong MILF, which adopted a more overtly Islamic
identity.

The following two decades in western Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago were
characterized by low-intensity armed conflict, with occasional steep upsurges in
fighting associated with human rights abuses and consequent episodes of forced
migration. During this period, the MILF consolidated control over key elements of the
Moro resistance, reinforcing its Islamic credentials, but always open to structured
political engagement with the government.

A 2008 pact with the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo administration focused on Moro rights
to their ‘ancestral domain’, or traditional lands. This could have been an important
breakthrough addressing key grievances, but the agreement was struck down as
unconstitutional by the Philippine Supreme Court, in part at the instigation of
powerful politician-oligarchs on Mindanao. Following the breakdown of the 2008
peace agreement, the Armed Forces of the Philippines launched a major offensive
against the MILF displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians.

During this protracted period of progress towards peace, followed by relapses into
violence, relations between civil society and Moro armed groups underwent
important changes. Civil society actors have in the past complained about their lack
of input in the peace process. One striking difference between the situation since
2012 is the extent to which the MILF has undertaken concerted and systematic
efforts to engage with civil society actors, including through a series of community
consultations. Nevertheless, questions remain regarding whether it will be possible
for community-based organizations to work at the grassroots level without undue
political interference or co-optation.

How will civil society activities, some of which are framed within liberal-democratic
norms and values, fit the Islamic agenda of some MILF leaders and supporters? Past
experience of ineffective government-implemented development projects, and their
appropriation by clientelist networks, has led grassroots activists to be sensitive
about corruption and the politicization of aid, and the risks of being co-opted by
powerful interests. Moro community activists are often wary of outsider (particularly
secular) aid agencies, and sceptical about the international community being able to
understand and respond effectively to local needs in the peace process – although
some external actors have worked diligently to win local trust.

Despite such challenges, the MILF has maintained its ceasefire – in part thanks to
effective ceasefire monitoring on the ground. Mindanao civil society groups have
played key roles in ceasefire monitoring, including networks such as the Bantay
Ceasefire local volunteers, and through civilian participation with the International
Monitoring Team (IMT). The IMT coordinates closely with the MILF and Armed
Forces of the Philippines, on several occasions successfully preventing local
incidents flaring up into large-scale clashes.

For the MILF, internationalization of the peace process has resulted in significantly
enhanced legitimacy and political credibility, on the national and regional stages.
Domestically, one of the MIF’s major challenges is to demonstrate its ability to
represent not only Islamic Moro communities, but also the indigenous peoples of
Mindanao. The MILF (and, to a degree, the MNLF) have included indigenous leaders
in political discussions, and the sharia law envisaged for the Bangsamoro under the
BBL would not apply to non-Muslims. Nevertheless, some indigenous people fear
marginalization in the future Bangsamoro. There are important roles here also for
civil society actors, to represent the often excluded voices of indigenous people, and
continue building trust and confidence between ethno-linguistic and religious
communities.

Conclusion

A key lesson from the southern Philippines for other peace process is the need to
consult extensively with civil society actors, to ensure sustainable buy-in from local
stakeholders. This is particularly important given the risks of widespread lawlessness
in the post-conflict period, as government and non-state armed groups relax their
authority on the ground.

ACTIVITY: POSTER MAKING

INSTRUCTIONS:

 In a Long Bond paper make a poster.

 Theme: Peace the key to Filipino unity

RUBRICS:

CONTENT-40%

CLEANLINESS-10%

ORGANIZATION-20%

CREATIVITY-30%

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