War Beyond Rules: Hybrid War

and India’s Preparedness

Narender Kumar

Introduction

S tates were known to employ military capabilities that were conventional

in nature. The enormous destructive power of conventional capabilities
and nuclear arsenals has made conventional wars cost-prohibitive and
thus the application of non-state actors and irregular forces against states
is becoming the new normal of waging wars. The beginning was made
in Afghanistan when the Taliban and the Mujahids were employed, with
state patronage, against the Soviet Union. Post-Cold War era, a new
warfare has emerged, wherein non-state actors with state patronage, have
begun to utilise military capabilities that were traditionally attributed only
to states. Instead of relying solely on irregular tactics, they have surprised
their adversaries with conventional arsenals including air-defence systems,
missiles, rockets, and artillery.1
Hybrid war is considered to be the next generation of warfare that will
alter the manner in which future conflicts will be fought. The contours of
hybrid war first emerged when the US and NATO-backed irregular forces,
that led to creation of designer states out of erstwhile Yugoslavia. Irregular
Brigadier Narender Kumar is Senior Fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.
NB: The views expressed in this article are those of the author in his personal capacity and
do not carry any organisational endorsement.
 War Beyond Rules: Hybrid War and India’s Preparedness • 59

forces employed conventional capabilities to create Hybrid warfare

new states in Europe, which led to the decline has demonstrated
of Russian influence in East Europe. This new that non-state
warfare prevented direct conflict between global actors with state
patronage, like
military powers and maintained deniability of any the Iran-backed
direct involvement in a conflict. Hybrid warfare Hezbollah,
has demonstrated that non-state actors with state Pakistan-backed
patronage, like the Iran-backed Hezbollah, Pakistan- Taliban, US-
backed Syrian
backed Taliban, US-backed Syrian Democratic Democratic
Forces, and Russian-backed militias in Ukraine are Forces, and
waging war against states by fighting within the Russian-backed
nation and eroding the authority of the state over militias in Ukraine
are waging war
its territory and resources. Instead of relying solely against states by
on irregular tactics, as insurgent groups have done fighting within the
in the past, they have surprised their adversaries nation and eroding
with conventional capabilities2 and the employment the authority of
the state over
of cyber warfare to degrade, disrupt, dislocate, and its territory and
destroy the ability of a state to fight a war. One of resources.
the main facets of hybrid war that makes it more
potent is that an adversary can simultaneously attack The hybrid threat
ideological and kinetic centre of gravity, thus eroding will be more
pronounced in the
the physical and cognitive space of a state. future as China
Pakistan has mastered the art of employment consolidates its
of regulars and irregulars along with non-state presence in Indian
actors and the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir Ocean Region and
South Asia. The
is a manifestation of this capability. Similarly Indian state should
the philosophy of unrestricted war followed by acknowledge that
China is omni-directional and has the potential in a borderless
of confrontation in the battlefield as well as in battlefield, it is no
longer possible
the cyber, information, and economic spheres. to rely on military
India has been the target of the irregular and forces and
unrestricted warfare capabilities of Pakistan weapons alone to
and China. The hybrid threat will be more achieve national
security.
pronounced in the future as China consolidates

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its presence in Indian Ocean Region and South Asia. The Indian state
should acknowledge that in a borderless battlefield, it is no longer possible
to rely on military forces and weapons alone to achieve national security
in the larger strategic sense.3 Therefore, if a nation cannot understand
war without understanding the broader political and social implications
of the context of war in which it is executed,4 it will not be possible to
find answer to such complex security paradigm. Hybrid wars cannot be
fought by blunt military power; they require the intellectual preparation
of a battle space.5
Hybrid war is on the cusp of conventional and sub-conventional wars
and exploits regular and irregular capabilities to achieve the desired results
—that of fighting a war against a strong nation without the risk of major
retribution. The manifestation of hybrid threat can break the barrier of
‘no peace no war’ to a war-like situation. Figure 1 provided by Dr Frank
G. Hoffman describes the spectrum of conflict and how ungoverned or
grey zones lead to an irregular and hybrid threat.

Figure 1: Spectrum of Conflict in Unconventional Warfare

Complexity of Hybrid War

Hybrid war is characterised by an undefined battle space that can be
waged from within the territorial boundary of a state, from the rear and
the flank.6 The outcome of a hybrid threat is catastrophic and states
can be destabilised, not in years but in months and weeks. Syria, Libya,
Yemen, and Iraq bear testimony to the fact that these states may not
be geographically the same as they were prior to the beginning of the
conflict. States have lost their social, secular, cultural, and constitutional

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 War Beyond Rules: Hybrid War and India’s Preparedness • 61

identities. Institutions that bind the various nationalities together stand

fragmented and their restructuring and rehabilitation become near
impossible.
The complexity and characteristics of hybrid war are apparent in
the definition itself. Dr Frank G. Hoffman defines hybrid war as one
waged by ‘any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs
a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism
and criminal behaviour in the battle space to obtain their political
objectives.’7 András Rácz says that in accordance with Russian military
thinking, ‘hybrid war is based on the integrated use of military and
non-military.
Instruments covering the whole range of the state’s political toolbox,
including diplomatic, economic, political, social, information, and also
military resources. Gerasimov’s concepts of ‘hybrid wars’ or ‘non-linear
wars’ include three mutually reinforcing principles. ‘Permanency of
conflict’, blurs the boundaries between war-time and peace-time; time
and space; and actors/stakeholders. According to Gerasimov, twenty-first-
century conflicts in Africa and the Middle East show that prosperous and
stable regimes can, within a short period of time, transform into arenas
of intense conflicts.8 These events may not reflect an official state of
war, but their social, economic, and political implications for individual
countries and their societies are comparable with the consequences of
real wars.9
The elements of hybrid warfare that makes it potent are the fusion
of regular and irregular forces, simultaneity and non-linearity of
application, multi-modality (military and non-military), and criminality
embedded in the acts of terror or subversion. Large-scale conventional
wars are rather easy to understand,10 but the unrestricted application
of just and unjust means make hybrid war complex and unpredictable.
One of the prime characters of the hybrid war is that it attacks through
the military, social, cultural, and cyber space to paralyse the traditional
and non-traditional capabilities of a state to defend and secure its
vital national interests. Figure 2 describes how hybrid warfare exploits

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62 • Narender Kumar

conventional and irregular capabilities without crossing the threshold

for a full spectrum war.

Figure 2: Hybrid War overlaps Irregular and Conventional War

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD military concept and briefing documents and academic writings.

Tools of Hybrid War

Hybrid war has a wide spectrum of conventional and sub-conventional
tools for war fighting. The impact is catastrophic, if these tools are
employed simultaneously in a synergised manner. Stable states can plunge
into chaos and complete disarray in a matter of short time. In conventional
wars, non-military targets are avoided as a matter of principle. But hybrid
war has the advantage that an adversary is able to engage both military
and non-military targets simultaneously. The erosion of state, polity, and
society is achieved at a rapid pace. Figure 3 suggests the elements and tools
of hybrid war.

Figure: 3 : Elements and Tools of Hybrid War

Source: Military Concepts And Hybrid War, Korybko 2016.

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 War Beyond Rules: Hybrid War and India’s Preparedness • 63

Scales of Victory and Objectives of Hybrid war can

Hybrid War graduate to theatre
The scales of victory in hybrid war depend on and conventional
wars because it
its objectives. Are these a denial of resources,
would not achieve
regime change, or using the strategy of chaos to a decisive victory
deny use of a geo-strategic location and cause an in a conflict with a
implosion for strategic reasons? Can the hybrid state.
war lead to decisive victory or can it lead to
protracted war? Hybrid wars are not conceptualised for a decisive victory;
they are executed to set the stage for the dislocation and displacement of
existing regimes, so that collapse of the system is triggered and once the
state plunges into chaos, a party to the conflict can be entrusted with the
responsibility of controlling the entire geographical expanse or a part of
it. The Syrian war was undertaken by NATO and the US to dislodge the
current Assad regime. They have propped up more than one stakeholder
so that designer states can be carved out in accordance with the objectives
of the architects of the conflict. On other hand, Russia wants Assad to stay,
so that their strategic interests are served and their presence maintained in
the Mediterranean Sea.
Hybrid war can graduate to theatre and conventional wars because it
would not achieve a decisive victory in a conflict with a state. The use
of irregular, non-state actors and social unrest
In case of Jammu
is considered as low-cost high return option. and Kashmir,
Create a situation where it becomes untenable the objective of
for a state to exercise control over its territory, Pakistan is to
maintain a no war,
people, and resources. In case of Jammu and
no peace situation
Kashmir, the objective of Pakistan is to maintain by creating a
a no war, no peace situation by creating a sense of sense
indigenous struggle by the people of Kashmir for of indigenous
struggle by
self-determination. Victory of Pakistan is to keep
the people of
Kashmir in a state of turbulence and prolonged Kashmir for self-
conflict and victory for India is to ensure people determination.
of Kashmir get integrated with the main stream.

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Emergence of the Hybrid Threat to India

Is Pakistan waging a hybrid war in Jammu and Kashmir? Pakistan is fixated
with three factors that have driven it to remain at war with India, the
notion of creating a strategic depth against India in Afghanistan; revenge
for its humiliating military defeat in 1971; and the creation of Bangladesh
by dismembering East Pakistan. Pakistan has focused on attaining military
parity by developing nuclear weapons and hybrid warfare capabilities.
Security analysts commonly use the lexicon of ‘hybrid war’ in reference
to conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. Without fulfilling the pre-requisites of
hybrid war it is only hypothetical whether it is simple case of terrorism or
has it gone beyond and become a classic instance of hybrid war. Whether
Pakistan employed hybrid warfare as per its defined elements, or as mere
rhetoric, needs deliberate introspection. There is no denying that Pakistan
has employed irregulars and non-state actors to destabilise Jammu and
Kashmir, but is there a visible overlap of the application of all the elements
of hybrid war? Is it a strategy of denial or has the conflict in Jammu and
Kashmir yet to reach a stage, where it has become potent enough to be
termed a hybrid war? It also throws up the question, that in case it is a
hybrid war then is the strategy of India appropriate or is it a classic case
of the lack of an understanding of the concept of hybrid warfare, at the
political and military level. A response mechanism in the absence of a deep
understanding of a hybrid threat would make it even more difficult to
respond to the hybrid threat. Thus, what are the preconditions that would
provide empirical evidence of a hybrid war being waged by Pakistan in
Jammu and Kashmir?

Societal and structural preconditioning

General Zia unleashed Operation Topac to carry out societal and
structural conditioning in Jammu and Kashmir. The focus was not on
the employment of brute military force, but to make the people believe
that they are an oppressed class. General Zia in one of his meetings with
the military commanders and ISIS is reported to have said that, ‘Our
Kashmiri brethren in the valley, though with us in their hearts and minds,

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 War Beyond Rules: Hybrid War and India’s Preparedness • 65

are simple-minded folk and do not easily take to the type of warfare to
which, say, a Punjabi or an Afghan takes to naturally, against foreign
domination.’11 The objective was to create societal space for hybrid war
and that Pakistan has achieved.

Space for employment of non-state actors

A perception has been created through psychological conditioning that
non-state actors are fighting for a just cause. Those who resisted the terror
organisations and separatists were portrayed as being against the principle
of self-determination in Jammu and Kashmir. Such a perception has
legitimised use of terror, by otherwise peace-loving Kashmiris. Such an
environment has created a space for the employment of non-state actors.

Acts of criminality
These are parts of the coercion to alter the will of the people so that they
do not resist the so called people’s movement. Acts of criminality are
undertaken against the security forces, mainland India, and even against
the Kashmiri people to create a support base by coercion if the support
does not come willingly. Nation must remember that today’s criminal is
tomorrow’s terrorist.

Erosion and subversion of established institutions of

governance
Hybrid war can only become effective if the institutions of governance
collapse and there is an erosion of its functioning. This allows hybrid threats
to create a space for the effective usage of all elements of hybrid war. This
has been achieved to a great extent and the political and public space stands
encroached. Educational institutions are becoming the hubs of Intifada and
secessionist ideology. Members of the state police are under tremendous
pressure to switch sides and not act against stone pelters and terrorists.

Synergised application of regulars, irregulars, and non-state

actors in same battle space
Irregulars and non-state actors can operate both as terror organiations

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and regular forces. The Hezbollah and Syrian Democratic Forces have
acquired the capabilities to operate as regulars and non-state actors.
The targets of regulars, criminals, and irregulars in hybrid war could be
different. Irregulars could target regulars, terrorists could dominate the
cognitive domain, and criminals could target those whom they consider
as obstructing their larger goal. Pakistan has been using regulars to train
equip, control the irregulars, and terrorists to operate in Jammu and
Kashmir and even other parts of India. The targets are carefully selected
by the Pak Army and ISI, and resources and logistics are made available
to them to execute the task. But the irregulars and regulars have restricted
their activities along the line of control (LOC). Interestingly the division
of boundaries for employment is clearly defined. Non-state actors operate
within the Indian Territory while regulars and irregulars operate along the
LOC.

Simultaneity and multi-modality of application of hybrid

capabilities
Hybrid warfare is effective if all components are employed simultaneously
in same battle space. Engagement of security forces, institutions, coercion
of those who oppose the violent means of the terrorists and society at large
is being undertaken to create an impression that entire population has
revolted against the government and system has collapsed.
Internal subversion is triggered to control and deny space to the state
institutions. Effectiveness of hybrid war is in internal subversion and
this is a major reason for the destabilisation of a nation. Syria, Iraq, and
Afghanistan have literally imploded, purely because of internal subversion
and fragmentation of society. Pakistan has achieved internal subversion
in Kashmir Valley and that is one of the major factors of effectiveness of
hybrid war being waged by Pakistan.

Information war
Hybrid war becomes even more potent and volatile with an information
war. It creates the perception of success, decides the scales of victory, and
acts as potent tool for a misinformation campaign against the established

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governments. In the digital era, media becomes one of the most potent
tools of the information war. Pakistan has been exploiting this to the hilt.

Cultural and structural violence

Cultural and structural violence justifies the wrongs as right. It reduces the
space for reconciliation and depicts the entire hybrid war as a war for a just
cause. A state can handle direct violence but it is very difficult to handle
cultural and structural violence.

Resource control
Denial of access to resources is one strategy used in hybrid war. It weakens
the war waging capability of the target nation. Denial of resources is
achieved by disrupting communications and the destruction of resources.
The other aspect of resource control is the exploitation of resources for
enhancing capabilities. ISIS has denied resources to Syrian and Iraqi
governments and used the same resources to enhance its own capabilities.
Pakistan may like to do the same but has been unable to achieve success.

Non-state and irregulars acquiring conventional capabilities

Hezbollah and Syrian Democratic Forces and ISIS have acquired
conventional and sub-conventional capabilities. It is not possible to
acquire such capabilities without state patronage. Thus, such groups pose
a serious threat of hybrid war when combined with other tools of war.
Terrorists are getting support from irregulars and regulars from across the
LOC but a defined conventional capability is yet not employed by Pak-
sponsored proxies in Jammu and Kashmir.

Grey zones or ungoverned territory

Grey zones and ungoverned territories allow criminals and non-state
actors to gain a foothold in a target nation to enable other elements of
hybrid war to destabilise the state. Though a classical grey zone does not
exist in Jammu and Kashmir but hybrid war in Jammu and Kashmir has
ensured that there is neither complete peace nor complete war.

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North-East India
The north-eastern states of India have seen the longest on-going insurgency
in the country. The scale of violence fluctuates but it continues to simmer
and except for Mizoram all other states have active insurgent groups.
What is equally worrying is the nexus between criminals, drug traffickers,
insurgents, and the state patronage of our adversaries who provide
ideological and material support from across the border. Insurgents enjoy
safe havens or grey zones across international borders. There is some degree
of subversion among the population in some areas. The components of
modern instability (corruption, poor governance, unemployment, uneven
distribution of wealth, poor development, and ethnic fragmentation) do
exist and these create the space for hybrid elements to spread the network.
The North-East has seen three cycles of insurgency related instability.
The first cycle was marked by an ideologically-backed ethnic conflict for
self-determination that started in the late 1950s and continued till the
1980s. The second cycle that started in the 1990s highlighted the fact that
ideology was withering away and had become an industry, and this is still
continuing. The third cycle, if not checked in time, is likely to unfold a
dangerous mix of Jihadi and LWE insurgency. This is perilous because it
can pave the way for the beginning of a hybrid threat in the north-eastern
states.
The potential of initiation of hybrid war in the North-East does exist
but the subversion of population has not taken place to a great extent,
except in some pockets in Assam, Bengal, and Manipur. An encouraging
sign is that the masses are looking for peace and development rather than
conflict and instability. The youth still feel that their future lies with India
and in spite of the instability on the ground, insurgency is unlikely to get
converted into hybrid war. This belief should not make the government
complacent and the situation should be continuously monitored and
effective steps both military and non-military need to be taken to restore
peace and stability.

Is the Indian State prepared to deal with Hybrid War?

Hybrid war is amorphous in nature; the trajectory it takes is difficult to

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 War Beyond Rules: Hybrid War and India’s Preparedness • 69

define. Even those who orchestrate this warfare The biggest flaw
can lose control over the outcome. It has the in the Indian
potential to transform into conventional war response,
and multiple sub-conventional wars. On one especially in
Jammu and
side of the spectrum it uses Intifada as a tool to Kashmir, is that
paralyse state institutions and occupy the public India is seeing this
space; and on the other side, it has the potential conflict through
to unleash brutal violence that can be directed the prism of a
conventional
against potential targets. Another facet of hybrid military response.
war is that there is persistent risk of strategic This is a tired
miscalculation and escalation of conflict. Thus, ideology which is
hybrid war is not purely military matter; it is a likely to confront
the fatigue factor
war against a nation, a society, a culture, and sooner or later.
its people. To deal with this emerging threat
a whole of nation approach is required. Figure 3 defines the tools of
war that cover almost the entire spectrum of military and non-military
threats.
The biggest flaw in the Indian response,
especially in Jammu and Kashmir, is that India Intelligence
agencies are
is seeing this conflict through the prism of a operating
conventional military response. This is a tired independently
ideology which is likely to confront the fatigue of the security
factor sooner or later. A synergised response forces and are not
responsible for
under a single command authority covering both the troops on the
military and non-military measures is imperative. ground. The MHA
Intelligence agencies are operating independently controls Central
of the security forces and are not responsible for Armed Police
Force whereas
the troops on the ground. The MHA controls the Army operates
Central Armed Police Force whereas the Army under the MOD.
operates under the MOD. The state police and The state police
the India Reserve Battalions (IRB) operate and the India
Reserve Battalions
under state authority. Cyber and information (IRB) operate
war is conspicuous by its absence and even if it under
is being initiated, it is independent of the other state authority.

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70 • Narender Kumar

The response agencies. A fragmented approach, in the absence

requires a strategy of a common operational plan, is unlikely to
and synergy achieve the desired results. Operations are being
between military executed under different ministries and there is
and non-military
partners and other no single central authority that is responsible and
law enforcement accountable for the execution of a comprehensive
agencies. and integrated response. Therefore, a military
response only will be inadequate and a bad idea to
pursue. The response requires a strategy and synergy between military and
non-military partners and other law enforcement agencies.

Hybrid War needs Hybrid Response

Prevent collapse of state within. When NATO was reviewing its strategy
to deal with Russian hybrid war they realised that, when a country is
attacked by conventional land, sea or air forces, it is usually clear how best
to respond. But what happens when it is attacked by a mixture of Special
Forces, information campaigns, and backdoor proxies? What’s the best
response?12 Hybrid war thrives on internal fault lines. The characteristics
of a hybrid threat are such that it is difficult to identify its footprints
and signatures during the early stages. Identifying the next target likely to
be engaged by the adversary is a clever strategy provided the capabilities
are developed enough to do so. The problem in
The problem arises India is that because of political convenience the
when there is signatures are either suppressed or overlooked.
political patronage
for criminals and Another major problem is the lack of an intellectual
fringe elements appreciation of threats and challenges posed by
that are vulnerable hybrid war. The intelligence agencies should have
to subversion. experts who can demystify the contours of hybrid
Thus, defensive
and offensive war. The best response is to subdue and eliminate
measures as the threat before it manifests. The problem arises
part of national when there is political patronage for criminals and
strategy need to be fringe elements that are vulnerable to subversion.
instituted.
Thus, defensive and offensive measures as part of
national strategy need to be instituted in a synergised manner. The denial

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 War Beyond Rules: Hybrid War and India’s Preparedness • 71

of space and the securing of the exposed flank is the first step a nation
must take to counter hybrid threat. The whole effort should be to prevent
the collapse of the state strengthening of institutions.

Hybrid War in Indian context is here to stay

India must acknowledge that hybrid war is here to stay and it will
require greater understanding and a comprehensive national power to
respond to it. Military as the sole responder of the hybrid threat is a bad
strategy, because lines of conflict/engagements are blurring. Simultaneous
engagement on multiple fronts should be the norm and not an exception.

India needs New Doctrine for Integrated Action

Strategies for war are conceptualised during peace time. Hybrid war is
complex and the military needs to define its strategy, doctrine, concept of
operations, force restructuring, special equipment, and special training.
It would require combatants and non-combatants as part of the force, to
deal with every element of hybrid war.

Intelligence Agencies First Firewall

Hybrid war is initiated first in the minds of the masses and then it manifests
in the physical world. Therefore, an understanding of the stresses and
strains created by religion, society, culture, radicals, and criminals is vital.
Intelligence agencies are required to carry out the mapping of the human
terrain and the social, economic, and cultural fault lines. The ‘mapping
of human terrain’ requires intellectuals, social scientists, cyber experts,
information warriors, and professionals to understand and unravel any
uneven behaviour by individuals and groups of people. Thus, the first
responders should be the intelligence agencies, law enforcing agencies,
and state administration. The terrorists/insurgents live among the people,
terrorist attacks occur before the eyes of the people, and terrorism threatens
the lives of the people. So the people have an unparalleled advantage
compared with uniformed, specialised security forces.13 Therefore,
engagement with the people to fight hybrid war is vital since they are the
centre of gravity.

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Relevance of Conventional Capabilities in Hybrid War

The Indian Armed Forces are equipped, trained, and structured to
fight conventional wars. Often the question, that is raised, is that if
India is unlikely to fight a conventional war then why so much focus
on conventional capabilities. The simple answer is that if India does not
maintain its conventional capabilities it will be engaged in sub-conventional
and hybrid war at multiple levels. Conventional deterrence will, therefore
have to be maintained. However, one should not also assume that all state-
based warfare will be entirely conventional.14

Hybrid War is Multi-Dimensional Unified Conflict and Need

Unified Efforts
Hybrid warfare compels the opponent’s military and civil population
to support the attacker, to the detriment of their own government
and country.15 Thus, hybrid war requires the whole of the government
approach to deal with it. The response should be based on the principle
of unity of efforts, simultaneity, integrated approach, synergised and
synchronised efforts. Execution of plan should be coordinated at the
highest level to achieve cooperation for effect-based response. Tools are
diplomatic, cyber, informational, economic, political, asymmetric, and
military. Operational commanders cannot achieve strategic objectives
solely through military action but must depend on the full government
response to achieve appropriate goals. The defining principle of dealing
with hybrid war is ‘unified effort’—simultaneous application of tools
of war, ‘mixed tactics’ conducted across the enemy’s territory, and more
importantly, within its ‘spheres of influence’.16 Military operations
are, therefore, part of a larger comprehensive, whole of government
approach.17

When to Fight and Where to Fight

It is a smart strategy to determine when and where to fight. There is a need
to identify the tools that are to be applied at a particular stage and against
what specific threat. The cyber threat can be handled by the cyber as well
as the law enforcement authorities. Military response ideally should not

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 War Beyond Rules: Hybrid War and India’s Preparedness • 73

be applied against Intifada and the law enforcing The debate of

agencies should be tasked to deal with it. While ethics and rules
military operations are on-going, dialogue, does not apply to
discussion, analysis, and post-operation actions hybrid war; what
is important is the
are important at every stage. The tools should be impact of own
determined by strategy and not as an emergency response to a
response. borderless war.

Conclusion
India should not become a victim of hybrid war or casualty, because of its
own neglect. There is a need to introspect, analyse and formulate the doctrine
and strategies to have an effective mechanism to deal with it. Hybrid warfare
will be a defining feature of the future security environment18 and thus a
fragmented approach will be detrimental to the national interests. The
debate of ethics and rules does not apply to hybrid war; what is important
is the impact of own response to a borderless war. As Frank Hoffman states,
‘Tomorrow’s conflicts will not be easily categorised into conventional or
irregular, the emerging character of conflict is more complicated than what
it appears. A binary choice of big and conventional versus small or irregular
is too simplistic.’19 India needs to develop an understanding of hybrid
war and the contours of conflict suggest that the future wars will not be
completely conventional, nor should it be assumed that state-based conflict
has passed into the dustbin of history. Many have made that mistake before.
State-based conflict is less likely, but it is not extinct.20 Hybrid warfare has
emerged from the theory to the reality and it is here to stay.

Notes
1. NilanthanNiruthan, ‘How Hybrid Warfare Could Change Asia’, The Diplomat, 25
June 2016.
2. Ibid.
3. Major John A. Van Messel, ‘Unrestricted Warfare: A Chinese Doctrine for Future
Warfare? United States Marine Corps’, available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/
fulltext/u2/a509132.pdf, accessed on 13 March 2017.
4. Colonel Margaret S. Bond, ‘Hybrid War: A New Paradigm For Stability Operations
in Failing States’, USAWC Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 30
March 2007.

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74 • Narender Kumar

5. Dr. Frank Hoffman, The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone,
Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War, Heritage: National Security and Defence, 2016
Index of US Military Strength.
6. Brig Anil Gupta, ‘Is India Prepared to Deal With Hybrid War?’, South Asian Mirror,
4 December 2016.
7. Frank G. Hoffman, ‘Hybrid vs. Compound War, the JanusChoice: Defining Today’s
Multifaceted Conflict’, Armed Forces Journal, October 2009, p. 15.
8. Michael Raska and Richard A. Bitzinger, ‘Russia’s Concept of Hybrid Wars:
Implications for Small States’, RSIS, 14 April 2015.
9. Ibid.
10. Note 5.
11. OP TOPAC: The Kashmir Imbroglio–I, IDR Network, 29 July 2012.
12. ‘Hybrid War—Hybrid Response?’, NATO Review Magazine, available at http://www.
nato.int/docu/review/2014/Russia-Ukraine-Nato-crisis/Russia-Ukraine-crisis-war/
EN/index.htm, accessed on 19 March 2017.
13. Zunyou Zhou, ‘China’s Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Law’, The Diplomat, 23
January 2016.
14. Frank Hoffman, ‘Hybrid Warfare and Challenges’, Small Wars Journal, ndupress.ndu.
edu, Issue 52, 1st quarter 2009.
15. Raska and Bitzinger, Note 8.
16. Ibid.
17. General (Retired) Gary Luck and Colonel (Retired) Mike Findlay, Joint Operations
Insights & Best Practices, Joint Warfighting Centre, United States Joint Forces
Command, July 2008, 2nd Edition.
18. Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, ‘The Defence Inheritance: Challenges and
Choices for the Next Pentagon Team’, Washington Quarterly Autumn 2008, 63.
19. Note10.
20. Ibid.

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